MEDIAEVAL STUDIES part of it. Nevertheless it is p.docx

MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
part of it. Nevertheless it is part of that emanation which
ultimately stems from
the One. For it 1s a quality whereby human beings· are
connected and
harmonized with each other, and it is of the nature of the One to
bestow on
the beings along with their substances such states as are
conducive to order,
harmony and organization.20
The treatise On the Essence of Love found in the Encyclopedia.
of the
Brethren of Purity is probably the most explicit · and important
treatment of
love to be found in Arabic philosophy prior • to Ibn Sina, a
treatise which would
well merit a new translation and a detailed analysis. The basis
of the doctrine
of this treatise, which deals exclusively with love as a quality of
the human
soul, is the Platonic division of the soul into (i) nutritive-
appetitive, (ii)
emotional-animal and (iii) rational parts.!?, Each of these three
parts has a
specific type and specific objects of love, namely, (i) food and
sexual grati-

fication, (ii) victory, rev~:mge and supremacy, and (iii)
knowledge and the
acquisition of perfection, respectively. In all its manifestations
love is definitely
a quality of the soul, never of the body; £or love is most
properly defined as
the desire for unification with the object of love,:!!! and
unification is an entirely
spiritual achievement, bodies allowing merely of mixture and
proximity.09
Even in the manifestations of the lowest type of love the body
serves merely
as an instrument in an activity which is of the soul.8()
Thus all love has its place and type of unification. Embracing,
kissing31 ~nd
sexual intercourse,:i:i for instance, are types of unification in
accordance wi'th
the capacity of the animal soul, the desire for the preservation
of the species
being part of the nature of most animals.~ And all love-which is
never ceasing
in the souls--34 is a perfection given by God's grace for the
purpose of leading
the souls toward good aims.as .
However, all love is of a perishing nature except spiritual love
and especially
the love of God;:ir, and God is the "first object of love".~1 The
real and final aim
of all love is to "awaken the soul from slumber and folly" and to
lead it away
from the sensual-bodily to the spiritual world, away from mere
bodily ornament.
and beauty to the beauty of the spiritual world.35 Therefore,

those who are truly
wise try in their actions, insights and character to become
assimilated to the
universal soul just as the universal soul attempts to become
assimilated to the
Creator Himself."°
III.
An indication of the connection between the Risalah fi'l- 'ishq
and Ibn Sina's
general philosophical doctrill€ is to be found in the annotations
to the translation
given below; a more thorough exhibition of this connection
would lead
beyond the scope of this introduction. It remains here merely to
point out
one fact: that Ibn Sina's psychology is the basis on which his
doctrine of love
is built.'" To exhibit this by some examples: the third chapter of
the Risalah
26 Op. cit. p. 17.
21 Br. P. text, p. 495, Br. P. Weltseele, p. 73.
28 Br. P. text, pp. 494 ff., Br. P. Weltseele ,
p. 72.
""Br. P . text, p. 496, Br. P. W eltseele, pp.
73 ff ..
30 Br. P. text, p. 497, Br. P. Weitseele, p. 75.
81 Br. P. text, p. 496, Br. P. Weltseele, p. 74.
s:i Br. P. text, p. 500, Br. P. Weltseele, p. 78.
:is Ibid.
3~ Br. P. text, p. 493, Br. P. Weltseele, p. 70.

[ 210]
:-.;; Br. P. text, p. 501, Br. P. W eltseele, p. 79.
~ Br. P. text, p. 503, Br. P. Weltseele, p. 80.
.,, Br. P. text, pp. 506, 507, Br. P. Welt-
seele, pp. 83, 84.
:JS Br. P. text, pp. 504 ff., Br. P. W eltseele,
pp. 81 ff.
39 Br. P. text, p. 506, Br. P. W eltseele, p. 83.
•°Cf. most conveniently Ibn Sin.a's short
treatise on psychology published by S.
Landauer, Die Psychologie des Ibn Sina
ZDMG XXIX (Leipzig, 1875), pp. 335-418;
EMIL L. FACKENHEIM
fi'l- 'ishq, with its basic division of the nutritive soul inio three
parts, is virtually
a summary of doctrines expounded more fully elsewhere~' with
the addition
of such conclusions as appertain to the subject of love; the
division of the
animal soul into perceptive and appetitive parts and the division
of sense-
perception into external and internal, which are basic to the
conclusions arrived
at in the fourth chapter, are likewise summary of doctrines fully
expounded
elsewhere.'"
But Ibn Sina's psychology is in a yet deeper sense the basis of

his doctrine
of love. In Ibn Sina's psychology as a whole, Platonic have
given way to Aris-
totelian conceptions. · The concept of a harmonious hierarchical
order of the
parts of the soul has taken the place of a concept leading readily
to a doctrine ·
advocating the suppression of the lower parts of the soul in the
attempt to reach
the perfection of the highest. It is on this basis that some of Ihn
Sina' s most
important doctrines on love are formulated, especially those of
the fifth chapter
where a great attempt is made to allot to the love of external
beauty a role
which -ill remain positive, valuable and honorable even when
compared with
the most exalted and unearthly love.
TRANSLATION
IN the name of the all-merciful God: 0 Abdullah 'l-Ma'sumi,3
the
lawyer, you have asked me to compose for you a clear and brief
treatise
on love. In reply let me say that with the following treatise I
have done
my utmost to win your approval and to satisfy your desire. I
have let
it consist of the following seven chapters:
(i) On the power of love as pervading all beings;
(ii) O.q the existence of love in those substances' which are
simple and
inanimate;;

(ih) On the existence of love in those beings which have the
faculty of
assimilating food, insofar as they possess that faculty; 0
(iv) On the existence of love in the animal substances, in
respect of
their possession of the animal faculty;
(v) On the love of those who are noble-minded and young1 foi:
external
beauty;
(vi) On the love of the divine souls;
(vii) General conclusion.
more ' explicitly his Opus egregium De
Anima which is part of the a.sh-Shifa'. Of
this work we have used a typewritten copy
of the Latin edition of Venice 1508, the
Arabic original being unavailable.
u Cf. Laudauer, op. cit., pp. 349 ff., 384
ff.; Opus egregium De Anima, 4v col. 2B.
•~ Cf. Landauer, op. cit., pp. 353 ff., 391 ff.;
Opus egregitmi De Anima, 4v col. 2B ff.;
cf. H. A. Wolfson, 'The Internal Senses in
Latin Arabic and Hebrew Philosophic
Texts HaT'Oard Theological Review (Cam-
bridge, 1935), pp. 95 ff. .
~ Cf. on him C. Brockel.mann, Geschichte
der arabischen Literatur, Erster Su.ppLe-
mentband (Leiden, 1937), p. 828; cf. also
Mehren's resume, p. 1 note 2.

• Jawhar; this term is here used in a sense
which includes accidents. For this' usage
which is quite general in Arabic philosophy ·
cf. also al-Farabi, Der Musterstaat, ed.
F. Dieterici (Leyden, 1895), p. 44 and lbn
Rushd, Compendio de Metafisica, ed. C. Q.
Rodriguez (Madrid, 1919), part I, chapter 24.
"Cf. A. M. Goichon, Introduction d Avi-
cenne (Paris, 1933), p. 82. By adding the
character "inanimate" to that of simplicily
Ibn Sina excludes souls, intelligences and
God so that only prime matter, form and
accident remain.
0 B.M. reads instead: "On the existence of
love in the vegetative beings." .
7 I.e. in the prime of life (cf. Lane, Arabic-
English Lexicon, (London, 1863 ff.) ' book I,
part 6), p. 2337, article fata.; this root has
the secondary meaning of "generous".
[ 211]
·'

Plato
Republic (360 BCE)
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
This text is in the Public Domain
Book Two
Socrates - GLAUCON
With these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the
discussion;
but the end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For
Glaucon, who is
always the most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at
Thrasymachus'
retirement; he wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me:
Socrates, do
you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have
persuaded us, that
to be just is always better than to be unjust?
I should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.
Then you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now: --
How would
you arrange goods --are there not some which we welcome for
their own
sakes, and independently of their consequences, as, for
example, harmless
pleasures and enjoyments, which delight us at the time,
although nothing
follows from them?
I agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.
Is there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge,
sight, health,
which are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their

results?
Certainly, I said.
And would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic,
and the care
of the sick, and the physician's art; also the various ways of
money-making
--these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no
one would
2
choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some
reward or
result which flows from them?
There is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?
Because I want to know in which of the three classes you would
place
justice?
In the highest class, I replied, --among those goods which he
who would
be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of
their results.
Then the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to
be
reckoned in the troublesome class, among goods which are to be
pursued
for the sake of rewards and of reputation, but in themselves are
disagreeable and rather to be avoided.
I know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this

was the
thesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he
censured
justice and praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be
convinced by him.
I wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then
I shall see
whether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a
snake, to
have been charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have
been; but
to my mind the nature of justice and injustice have not yet been
made clear.
Setting aside their rewards and results, I want to know what
they are in
themselves, and how they inwardly work in the soul. If you,
please, then, I
will revive the argument of Thrasymachus. And first I will
speak of the
nature and origin of justice according to the common view of
them.
Secondly, I will show that all men who practise justice do so
against their
will, of necessity, but not as a good. And thirdly, I will argue
that there is
reason in this view, for the life of the unjust is after all better
far than the
life of the just --if what they say is true, Socrates, since I
myself am not of
3
their opinion. But still I acknowledge that I am perplexed when

I hear the
voices of Thrasymachus and myriads of others dinning in my
ears; and, on
the other hand, I have never yet heard the superiority of justice
to injustice
maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear
justice praised
in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the
person from
whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I
will praise
the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of
speaking will
indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising
justice and
censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my
proposal?
Indeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of
sense
would oftener wish to converse.
I am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin
by speaking,
as I proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.
Glaucon
They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer
injustice, evil; but
that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have
both done
and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not
being able to
avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had
better agree

among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and
mutual
covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them
lawful and
just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice; --it
is a mean or
compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice
and not be
punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice
without the
power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point
between the two,
is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured
by reason of
the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy
to be called
a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able
to resist; he
4
would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates,
of the
nature and origin of justice.
Now that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and
because they
have not the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine
something
of this kind: having given both to the just and the unjust power
to do what
they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them;
then we shall
discover in the very act the just and unjust man to be

proceeding along the
same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be
their good,
and are only diverted into the path of justice by the force of
law. The
liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given
to them in
the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by
Gyges the
ancestor of Croesus the Lydian. According to the tradition,
Gyges was a
shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great
storm, and
an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where
he was
feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended into the
opening,
where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse,
having
doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of
stature, as
appeared to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a
gold ring;
this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now
the
shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might
send their
monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly
he came
having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them
he chanced
to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he
became
invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of
him as if he
were no longer present. He was astonished at this, and again

touching the
ring he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made
several trials of
the ring, and always with the same result-when he turned the
collet inwards
he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared. Whereupon
he
contrived to be chosen one of the messengers who were sent to
the court;
where as soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her
help
5
conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom.
Suppose
now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on
one of them
and the unjust the other;,no man can be imagined to be of such
an iron
nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep
his hands
off what was not his own when he could safely take what he
liked out of
the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his
pleasure, or kill or
release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a
God
among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions
of the
unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this
we may
truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly
or because

he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of
necessity, for
wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is
unjust. For
all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more
profitable to the
individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been
supposing, will
say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining
this power
of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching
what was
another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most
wretched
idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces,
and keep up
appearances with one another from a fear that they too might
suffer
injustice. Enough of this.
Now, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just
and unjust, we
must isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the
isolation to be
effected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and
the just man
entirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them,
and both are
to be perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives.
First, let the
unjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the
skilful pilot or
physician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps
within their
limits, and who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover
himself. So let the

unjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden
if he means
to be great in his injustice (he who is found out is nobody): for
the highest
6
reach of injustice is: to be deemed just when you are not.
Therefore I say
that in the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most
perfect injustice;
there is to be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing
the most
unjust acts, to have acquired the greatest reputation for justice.
If he have
taken a false step he must be able to recover himself; he must be
one who
can speak with effect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who
can force
his way where force is required his courage and strength, and
command of
money and friends. And at his side let us place the just man in
his
nobleness and simplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and
not to seem
good. There must be no seeming, for if he seem to be just he
will be
honoured and rewarded, and then we shall not know whether he
is just for
the sake of justice or for the sake of honours and rewards;
therefore, let
him be clothed in justice only, and have no other covering; and
he must be
imagined in a state of life the opposite of the former. Let him be

the best
of men, and let him be thought the worst; then he will have been
put to the
proof; and we shall see whether he will be affected by the fear
of infamy
and its consequences. And let him continue thus to the hour of
death;
being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have reached
the
uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice,
let
judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.
Socrates - GLAUCON
Heavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish
them up
for the decision, first one and then the other, as if they were two
statues.
I do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like
there is no
difficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of
them. This I
will proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a
little too
coarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which
follow are not
mine. --Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of
injustice: They
7
will tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be

scourged,
racked, bound --will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after
suffering
every kind of evil, he will be impaled: Then he will understand
that he
ought to seem only, and not to be, just; the words of Aeschylus
may be
more truly spoken of the unjust than of the just. For the unjust
is pursuing
a reality; he does not live with a view to appearances --he wants
to be really
unjust and not to seem only:--
His mind has a soil deep and fertile,
Out of which spring his prudent counsels. In the first place, he
is thought
just, and therefore bears rule in the city; he can marry whom he
will, and
give in marriage to whom he will; also he can trade and deal
where he likes,
and always to his own advantage, because he has no misgivings
about
injustice and at every contest, whether in public or private, he
gets the
better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and is rich,
and out of
his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies;
moreover, he
can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly
and
magnificently, and can honour the gods or any man whom he
wants to
honour in a far better style than the just, and therefore he is
likely to be
dearer than they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and
men are said

to unite in making the life of the unjust better than the life of
the just.
Adeimantus -SOCRATES
I was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when
Adeimantus, his
brother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that
there is
nothing more to be urged?
Why, what else is there? I answered.
The strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he
replied.
8
Well, then, according to the proverb, 'Let brother help brother' -
-if he fails
in any part do you assist him; although I must confess that
Glaucon has
already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and take from
me the
power of helping justice.
Adeimantus
Nonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is
another
side to Glaucon's argument about the praise and censure of
justice and
injustice, which is equally required in order to bring out what I
believe to
be his meaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons

and their
wards that they are to be just; but why? not for the sake of
justice, but for
the sake of character and reputation; in the hope of obtaining
for him who
is reputed just some of those offices, marriages, and the like
which
Glaucon has enumerated among the advantages accruing to the
unjust
from the reputation of justice. More, however, is made of
appearances by
this class of persons than by the others; for they throw in the
good opinion
of the gods, and will tell you of a shower of benefits which the
heavens, as
they say, rain upon the pious; and this accords with the
testimony of the
noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of whom says, that the gods
make the
oaks of the just--
To hear acorns at their summit, and bees I the middle;
And the sheep the bowed down bowed the with the their fleeces.
and many
other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer
has a very
similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is--
As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god,
Maintains justice to whom the black earth brings forth
Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed with fruit,
9

And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him fish.
Still grander are
the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to the
just; they
take them down into the world below, where they have the
saints lying on
couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands;
their idea
seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest
meed of
virtue. Some extend their rewards yet further; the posterity, as
they say, of
the faithful and just shall survive to the third and fourth
generation. This is
the style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked
there is another
strain; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them
carry water in a
sieve; also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy,
and inflict
upon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the
portion of the
just who are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their
invention supply.
Such is their manner of praising the one and censuring the
other.
Once more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of
speaking
about justice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets,
but is found
in prose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always
declaring that
justice and virtue are honourable, but grievous and toilsome;
and that the
pleasures of vice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are

only censured
by law and opinion. They say also that honesty is for the most
part less
profitable than dishonesty; and they are quite ready to call
wicked men
happy, and to honour them both in public and private when they
are rich
or in any other way influential, while they despise and overlook
those who
may be weak and poor, even though acknowledging them to be
better than
the others. But most extraordinary of all is their mode of
speaking about
virtue and the gods: they say that the gods apportion calamity
and misery to
many good men, and good and happiness to the wicked. And
mendicant
prophets go to rich men's doors and persuade them that they
have a power
committed to them by the gods of making an atonement for a
man's own
or his ancestor's sins by sacrifices or charms, with rejoicings
and feasts; and
they promise to harm an enemy, whether just or unjust, at a
small cost;
10
with magic arts and incantations binding heaven, as they say, to
execute
their will. And the poets are the authorities to whom they
appeal, now
smoothing the path of vice with the words of Hesiod; --

Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is
smooth and her
dwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,
and a
tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the
gods may
be influenced by men; for he also says:
The gods, too, may he turned from their purpose; and men pray
to them
and avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and
by libations
and the odour of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed.
And they
produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who
were
children of the Moon and the Muses --that is what they say --
according to
which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only
individuals, but
whole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be
made by
sacrifices and amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are
equally at the
service of the living and the dead; the latter sort they call
mysteries, and
they redeem us from the pains of hell, but if we neglect them no
one
knows what awaits us.
He proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about
virtue and
vice, and the way in which gods and men regard them, how are
their minds
likely to be affected, my dear Socrates, --those of them, I mean,
who are

quickwitted, and, like bees on the wing, light on every flower,
and from all
that they hear are prone to draw conclusions as to what manner
of persons
they should be and in what way they should walk if they would
make the
best of life? Probably the youth will say to himself in the words
of Pindar--
Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier
tower which
may he a fortress to me all my days? For what men say is that,
if I am really
11
just and am not also thought just profit there is none, but the
pain and loss
on the other hand are unmistakable. But if, though unjust, I
acquire the
reputation of justice, a heavenly life is promised to me. Since
then, as
philosophers prove, appearance tyrannizes over truth and is lord
of
happiness, to appearance I must devote myself. I will describe
around me a
picture and shadow of virtue to be the vestibule and exterior of
my house;
behind I will trail the subtle and crafty fox, as Archilochus,
greatest of
sages, recommends. But I hear some one exclaiming that the
concealment
of wickedness is often difficult; to which I answer, Nothing
great is easy.

Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we would be
happy, to be the
path along which we should proceed. With a view to
concealment we will
establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And there are
professors
of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and
assemblies; and so,
partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make unlawful
gains and
not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods cannot
be
deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are
no gods? or,
suppose them to have no care of human things --why in either
case should
we mind about concealment? And even if there are gods, and
they do care
about us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the
genealogies of
the poets; and these are the very persons who say that they may
be
influenced and turned by 'sacrifices and soothing entreaties and
by
offerings.' Let us be consistent then, and believe both or
neither. If the
poets speak truly, why then we had better be unjust, and offer of
the fruits
of injustice; for if we are just, although we may escape the
vengeance of
heaven, we shall lose the gains of injustice; but, if we are
unjust, we shall
keep the gains, and by our sinning and praying, and praying and
sinning,
the gods will be propitiated, and we shall not be punished. 'But
there is a

world below in which either we or our posterity will suffer for
our unjust
deeds.' Yes, my friend, will be the reflection, but there are
mysteries and
atoning deities, and these have great power. That is what mighty
cities
12
declare; and the children of the gods, who were their poets and
prophets,
bear a like testimony.
On what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice
rather than the
worst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a
deceitful regard to
appearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men,
in life and
after death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities
tell us.
Knowing all this, Socrates, how can a man who has any
superiority of mind
or person or rank or wealth, be willing to honour justice; or
indeed to
refrain from laughing when he hears justice praised? And even
if there
should be some one who is able to disprove the truth of my
words, and
who is satisfied that justice is best, still he is not angry with the
unjust, but
is very ready to forgive them, because he also knows that men
are not just
of their own free will; unless, peradventure, there be some one

whom the
divinity within him may have inspired with a hatred of injustice,
or who has
attained knowledge of the truth --but no other man. He only
blames
injustice who, owing to cowardice or age or some weakness, has
not the
power of being unjust. And this is proved by the fact that when
he obtains
the power, he immediately becomes unjust as far as he can be.
The cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the
beginning of the
argument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we
were to find
that of all the professing panegyrists of justice --beginning with
the ancient
heroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and
ending with
the men of our own time --no one has ever blamed injustice or
praised
justice except with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits
which flow
from them. No one has ever adequately described either in verse
or prose
the true essential nature of either of them abiding in the soul,
and invisible
to any human or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a
man's soul
which he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and
injustice the
greatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought
to persuade

1
The Song of Songs (circ. 900 BCE)
The Song of Solomon
New Revised Standard Version1
Colloquy of Bride and Friends
Let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth!
For your love is better than wine,
your anointing oils are fragrant,
your name is perfume poured out;
therefore the maidens love you.
Draw me after you, let us make haste.
The king has brought me into his chambers.
We will exult and rejoice in you;
we will extol your love more than wine;
rightly do they love you.
I am black and beautiful,
O daughters of Jerusalem,
like the tents of Kedar,
like the curtains of Solomon.

Do not gaze at me because I am dark,
because the sun has gazed on me.
My mother’s sons were angry with me;
they made me keeper of the vineyards,
but my own vineyard I have not kept!
Tell me, you whom my soul loves,
where you pasture your flock,
where you make it lie down at noon;
for why should I be like one who is veiled
beside the flocks of your companions?
1 The New Revised Standard Version (Anglicized Edition),
copyright 1989, 1995 by the Division of Christian Education of
the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United
States of America. All rights reserved.
2
If you do not know,
O fairest among women,
follow the tracks of the flock,
and pasture your kids
beside the shepherds’ tents.
Colloquy of Bridegroom, Friends, and Bride

I compare you, my love,
to a mare among Pharaoh’s chariots.
Your cheeks are comely with ornaments,
your neck with strings of jewels.
We will make you ornaments of gold,
studded with silver.
While the king was on his couch,
my nard gave forth its fragrance.
My beloved is to me a bag of myrrh
that lies between my breasts.
My beloved is to me a cluster of henna blossoms
in the vineyards of En-gedi.
Ah, you are beautiful, my love;
ah, you are beautiful;
your eyes are doves.
Ah, you are beautiful, my beloved,
truly lovely.
Our couch is green;
the beams of our house are cedar,
our rafters are pine.

I am a rose of Sharon,
a lily of the valleys.
As a lily among brambles,
so is my love among maidens.
3
As an apple tree among the trees of the wood,
so is my beloved among young men.
With great delight I sat in his shadow,
and his fruit was sweet to my taste.
He brought me to the banqueting house,
and his intention towards me was love.
Sustain me with raisins,
refresh me with apples;
for I am faint with love.
O that his left hand were under my head,
and that his right hand embraced me!
I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem,
by the gazelles or the wild does:
do not stir up or awaken love
until it is ready!
Springtime Rhapsody

The voice of my beloved!
Look, he comes,
leaping upon the mountains,
bounding over the hills.
My beloved is like a gazelle
or a young stag.
Look, there he stands
behind our wall,
gazing in at the windows,
looking through the lattice.
My beloved speaks and says to me:
‘Arise, my love, my fair one,
and come away;
for now the winter is past,
the rain is over and gone.
The flowers appear on the earth;
the time of singing has come,
and the voice of the turtle-dove
is heard in our land.
4
The fig tree puts forth its figs,
and the vines are in blossom;

they give forth fragrance.
Arise, my love, my fair one,
and come away.
O my dove, in the clefts of the rock,
in the covert of the cliff,
let me see your face,
let me hear your voice;
for your voice is sweet,
and your face is lovely.
Catch us the foxes,
the little foxes,
that ruin the vineyards—
for our vineyards are in blossom.’
My beloved is mine and I am his;
he pastures his flock among the lilies.
Until the day breathes
and the shadows flee,
turn, my beloved, be like a gazelle
or a young stag on the cleft mountains.
A Dream of Love
Upon my bed at night

I sought him whom my soul loves;
I sought him, but found him not;
I called him, but he gave no answer.
‘I will rise now and go about the city,
in the streets and in the squares;
I will seek him whom my soul loves.’
I sought him, but found him not.
The sentinels found me,
as they went about in the city.
‘Have you seen him whom my soul loves?’
Scarcely had I passed them,
5
when I found him whom my soul loves.
I held him, and would not let him go
until I brought him into my mother’s house,
and into the chamber of her that conceived me.
by the gazelles or the wild does:
until it is ready!
The Groom and His Party Approach

What is that coming up from the wilderness,
like a column of smoke,
perfumed with myrrh and frankincense,
with all the fragrant powders of the merchant?
Look, it is the litter of Solomon!
Around it are sixty mighty men
of the mighty men of Israel,
all equipped with swords
and expert in war,
each with his sword at his thigh
because of alarms by night.
King Solomon made himself a palanquin
from the wood of Lebanon.
He made its posts of silver,
its back of gold, its seat of purple;
its interior was inlaid with love.
Daughters of Jerusalem,
come out.
Look, O daughters of Zion,
at King Solomon,
at the crown with which his mother crowned him
on the day of his wedding,
on the day of the gladness of his heart.

6
The Bride’s Beauty Extolled
How beautiful you are, my love,
how very beautiful!
Your eyes are doves
behind your veil.
Your hair is like a flock of goats,
moving down the slopes of Gilead.
Your teeth are like a flock of shorn ewes
that have come up from the washing,
all of which bear twins,
and not one among them is bereaved.
Your lips are like a crimson thread,
and your mouth is lovely.
Your cheeks are like halves of a pomegranate
behind your veil.
Your neck is like the tower of David,
built in courses;
on it hang a thousand bucklers,
all of them shields of warriors.

Your two breasts are like two fawns,
twins of a gazelle,
that feed among the lilies.
Until the day breathes
and the shadows flee,
I will hasten to the mountain of myrrh
and the hill of frankincense.
You are altogether beautiful, my love;
there is no flaw in you.
Come with me from Lebanon, my bride;
come with me from Lebanon.
Depart from the peak of Amana,
from the peak of Senir and Hermon,
from the dens of lions,
from the mountains of leopards.
7
You have ravished my heart, my sister, my bride,
you have ravished my heart with a glance of your eyes,
with one jewel of your necklace.
How sweet is your love, my sister, my bride!
how much better is your love than wine,
and the fragrance of your oils than any spice!

Your lips distil nectar, my bride;
honey and milk are under your tongue;
the scent of your garments is like the scent of Lebanon.
A garden locked is my sister, my bride,
a garden locked, a fountain sealed.
Your channel is an orchard of pomegranates
with all choicest fruits,
henna with nard,
nard and saffron, calamus and cinnamon,
with all trees of frankincense,
myrrh and aloes,
with all chief spices—
a garden fountain, a well of living water,
and flowing streams from Lebanon.
Awake, O north wind,
and come, O south wind!
Blow upon my garden
that its fragrance may be wafted abroad.
Let my beloved come to his garden,
and eat its choicest fruits.
I come to my garden, my sister, my bride;
I gather my myrrh with my spice,

I eat my honeycomb with my honey,
I drink my wine with my milk.
Eat, friends, drink,
and be drunk with love.
8
Another Dream
I slept, but my heart was awake.
Listen! my beloved is knocking.
‘Open to me, my sister, my love,
my dove, my perfect one;
for my head is wet with dew,
my locks with the drops of the night.’
I had put off my garment;
how could I put it on again?
I had bathed my feet;
how could I soil them?
My beloved thrust his hand into the opening,
and my inmost being yearned for him.
I arose to open to my beloved,

and my hands dripped with myrrh,
my fingers with liquid myrrh,
upon the handles of the bolt.
I opened to my beloved,
but my beloved had turned and was gone.
My soul failed me when he spoke.
I sought him, but did not find him;
I called him, but he gave no answer.
Making their rounds in the city
the sentinels found me;
they beat me, they wounded me,
they took away my mantle,
those sentinels of the walls.
if you find my beloved,
tell him this:
I am faint with love.
Colloquy of Friends and Bride
What is your beloved more than another beloved,
O fairest among women?
9

What is your beloved more than another beloved,
that you thus adjure us?
My beloved is all radiant and ruddy,
distinguished among ten thousand.
His head is the finest gold;
his locks are wavy,
black as a raven.
His eyes are like doves
beside springs of water,
bathed in milk,
fitly set.
His cheeks are like beds of spices,
yielding fragrance.
His lips are lilies,
distilling liquid myrrh.
His arms are rounded gold,
set with jewels.
His body is ivory work,
encrusted with sapphires.
His legs are alabaster columns,
set upon bases of gold.
His appearance is like Lebanon,
choice as the cedars.
His speech is most sweet,

and he is altogether desirable.
This is my beloved and this is my friend,
O daughters of Jerusalem.
Where has your beloved gone,
O fairest among women?
Which way has your beloved turned,
that we may seek him with you?
My beloved has gone down to his garden,
to the beds of spices,
to pasture his flock in the gardens,
10
and to gather lilies.
I am my beloved’s and my beloved is mine;
he pastures his flock among the lilies.
The Bride’s Matchless Beauty
You are beautiful as Tirzah, my love,
comely as Jerusalem,
terrible as an army with banners.

Turn away your eyes from me,
for they overwhelm me!
Your hair is like a flock of goats,
moving down the slopes of Gilead.
Your teeth are like a flock of ewes,
that have come up from the washing;
all of them bear twins,
and not one among them is bereaved.
Your cheeks are like halves of a pomegranate
behind your veil.
There are sixty queens and eighty concubines,
and maidens without number.
My dove, my perfect one, is the only one,
the darling of her mother,
flawless to her that bore her.
The maidens saw her and called her happy;
the queens and concubines also, and they praised her.
‘Who is this that looks forth like the dawn,
fair as the moon, bright as the sun,
terrible as an army with banners?’
I went down to the nut orchard,
to look at the blossoms of the valley,
to see whether the vines had budded,

whether the pomegranates were in bloom.
Before I was aware, my fancy set me
in a chariot beside my prince.
11
Return, return, O Shulammite!
Return, return, that we may look upon you.
Why should you look upon the Shulammite,
as upon a dance before two armies?
Expressions of Praise
How graceful are your feet in sandals,
O queenly maiden!
Your rounded thighs are like jewels,
the work of a master hand.
Your navel is a rounded bowl
that never lacks mixed wine.
Your belly is a heap of wheat,
encircled with lilies.
Your two breasts are like two fawns,
twins of a gazelle.

Your neck is like an ivory tower.
Your eyes are pools in Heshbon,
by the gate of Bath-rabbim.
Your nose is like a tower of Lebanon,
overlooking Damascus.
Your head crowns you like Carmel,
and your flowing locks are like purple;
a king is held captive in the tresses.
How fair and pleasant you are,
O loved one, delectable maiden!
You are stately as a palm tree,
and your breasts are like its clusters.
I say I will climb the palm tree
and lay hold of its branches.
O may your breasts be like clusters of the vine,
and the scent of your breath like apples,
and your kisses like the best wine
that goes down smoothly,
12
gliding over lips and teeth.

I am my beloved’s,
and his desire is for me.
Come, my beloved,
let us go forth into the fields,
and lodge in the villages;
let us go out early to the vineyards,
and see whether the vines have budded,
whether the grape blossoms have opened
and the pomegranates are in bloom.
There I will give you my love.
The mandrakes give forth fragrance,
and over our doors are all choice fruits,
new as well as old,
which I have laid up for you, O my beloved.
O that you were like a brother to me,
who nursed at my mother’s breast!
If I met you outside, I would kiss you,
and no one would despise me.
I would lead you and bring you
into the house of my mother,
and into the chamber of the one who bore me.
I would give you spiced wine to drink,
the juice of my pomegranates.
O that his left hand were under my head,

and that his right hand embraced me!
until it is ready!
Homecoming
Who is that coming up from the wilderness,
leaning upon her beloved?
Under the apple tree I awakened you.
13
There your mother was in labour with you;
there she who bore you was in labour.
Set me as a seal upon your heart,
as a seal upon your arm;
for love is strong as death,
passion fierce as the grave.
Its flashes are flashes of fire,
a raging flame.
Many waters cannot quench love,
neither can floods drown it.

If one offered for love
all the wealth of one’s house,
it would be utterly scorned.
We have a little sister,
and she has no breasts.
What shall we do for our sister,
on the day when she is spoken for?
If she is a wall,
we will build upon her a battlement of silver;
but if she is a door,
we will enclose her with boards of cedar.
I was a wall,
and my breasts were like towers;
then I was in his eyes
as one who brings peace.
Solomon had a vineyard at Baal-hamon;
he entrusted the vineyard to keepers;
each one was to bring for its fruit a thousand pieces of silver.
My vineyard, my very own, is for myself;
you, O Solomon, may have the thousand,
and the keepers of the fruit two hundred!
O you who dwell in the gardens,
my companions are listening for your voice;

let me hear it.
14
Make haste, my beloved,
and be like a gazelle
or a young stag
upon the mountains of spices!
1
Reflection paper 1
Hao Chen
UCOR2500-02
25/7/2019
Virtue and Plato-Meno
In the Meno, Socrates brings out the possibility of an
individual’s way of thinking to
uncover knowledge. He explains the theory of recollection by
outlining what he thinks virtue is.

He then moves further to demonstrate the process by
questioning the slave boy. This theory
originated from the simple question “What is virtue?”1 When he
questions Meno about the
definition of Virtue, Meno replies by giving the different
categories instead of a general
definition. He lists the virtues, saying, there is virtue of a
woman, of a man and of a slave. This
paper focuses on exploring Socrates’ theory of recollection and
definition of virtue. While
knowledge requires actions, virtue cannot be taught and one
cannot be guided to become
virtuous.
If only Meno had asked what sort of thing virtue is, through this
inquiry they would
eventually have ended with what virtue could possibly be. Meno
presents his paradox, saying “if
we do not know what we seek, how would we know what it is
when we find it and if we know,
why do we still inquire.”2 The only challenge in this situation is
that for one to come up with the
right definition of virtue, they must use logical insights and
reflection rather than research. If this

1 Palumbo, Lidia. "Soul, Triangle and Virtue. On the Figure
of Implicit Comparison in Plato’s
Meno." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 1 (8) (2017): 201-212.
2 Ibid
Comment [1]: Notate this as the title of the
text.
Deleted: ,
Comment [2]: Your thesis should more
cohesively define your argument, and outline
your supporting points.
Deleted: and
Deleted: ,
Deleted: then
Deleted: .
2
question was empirical, then the objection by Meno would be
meaningless because it needs to be

answered by counting heads.
Socrates confronts this paradox by telling Meno that the
argument was an “excuse for
indolence therefore we must not give ear to this specious
argument, for it will make us idle, and
is pleasing only to the slothful.”3 We can understand this
because not knowing can lead to
knowing but in Meno's case, one can never know what he does
not know. Socrates then brings a
slave boy to use a mathematical play to demonstrate, amongst
other things, that the way to
knowing is through inquiry. Even though he basically spoon
feeds the slave boy (from the sound
of it) much of the answers, he still proved a valid point because,
at the end, the slave boy saw his
errors and admitted he did not know.
Meno whom we know is the student of Gorgias and a political
figure (a man of speeches
that is) would want to save his reputation not admitting his
ignorance, Socrates proves this by
saying: “Had I the command of you as well as of myself, Meno,
I would not have enquired
whether virtue is given by instruction or not, until we had first

ascertained 'what it is.' But as you
think only of controlling me who am your slave, and never of
controlling yourself, such being
your notion of freedom, I must yield to you, for you are
irresistible.”4
Socrates considers the right opinion to be the one that lead
people to make the right
decisions and do the right thing. This is not the same as
knowledge since opinions can easily
escape form one mind. This is therefore different from
knowledge since right opinion that
3 Marshall, Mason. "Socrates’ defensible devices in Plato’s
Meno." Theory and Research in
Education (2019): 1477878519862544
4 Iwata, Naoya. "Plato's Hypothetical Inquiry in the Meno."
British Journal for the History of
Philosophy 24, no. 2 (2016): 194-214
Comment [3]: Stay in present tense.
Comment [4]: Place punctuation inside the
quotation marks.

Deleted: .
Deleted: ,
Deleted: ,
Comment [5]: Cite even if you are
paraphrasing.
3
influences virtues is short lived while knowledge is permanent.
While this concept stresses the
theory of knowledge, it is closely related to the theory of
collection in many ways. In his
conclusion, Socrates argues that correct opinion is prized lower
than knowledge.
People can acquire knowledge through various experiences but
one cannot become
virtuous in the same way. As explained above, we can
understand this because, not knowing can
lead to knowing but in Meno's case, one can never know what
he does not know. Socrates then
brings a slave boy to use a mathematical, play to demonstrate,
amongst other things, that the way
to knowing is through inquiry. To further prove his point,

Socrates goes into the theory of
recollection, he insists that the soul somehow knows everything
in the past life and that when we
inquire as humans, we are only helping the soul recollect.
Here, Socrates implies that Meno had no control of himself and
that; if he had he would
have asked what virtue was instead of whether it could be
taught or learned. And Socrates subtly
discredited Meno here implying that, the slave boy admitting to
his error and not knowing knew
him more than Meno the slave master did. Again, Socrates
implies that Meno is ruled by public
opinion because he failed to admit he knows nothing, he also
posits that Meno was simply being
foolish by acting as if he was all knowing to gain praise from
the public. To further prove his
point, Socrates goes into the theory of recollection, he insists
that the soul somehow knows
everything in the past life and that when we inquire as humans,
we are only helping the soul
recollect.
Socrates uses the myth of Persephone in the following poem.
“For in the ninth year

Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has
received the penalty of ancient crime
back again from beneath into the light of the sun above, and
these are they who become noble
4
kings and mighty men and great in wisdom and are called
saintly heroes in after ages… And
therefore we ought not to listen to this sophistical argument
about the impossibility of inquiry:
for it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard, but
the other saying will make us
active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will gladly enquire
with you into the nature of virtue.”5
Socrates uses this poem, by Pindar, that the soul knows
everything by living so many
times and obtaining all it could possibly know about virtue and
other things pertaining to
knowledge. He implies that listening to sophists speak on
knowledgeable things because sophists
do not speak the truth but simply persuade you to believe they
are wise without tackling the
important topic. Also, this hint implies that the soul knowing all

things makes all things
internalized. This is where it becomes confusing because,
everything being internalized makes it
subjective and one can say that virtue is subjective but saying,
we simply agree with Meno.
In addition, Socrates uses this myth to apply to Meno’s
appreciation for the gods, in a
way he patronizes him knowing that Meno would instantly
believe anything that has to do with
divinity. Socrates therefore argues that the concept of virtue
cannot be taught in the same way a
father can teach new concepts to his boy. The example given in
this story shows that
Themistocles successfully taught his son how to throw javelin
and ride horses. His ability to
teach is therefore unquestionable. Nevertheless, he was not able
to teach his boy how to be
virtuous. This claim is very clear.
Additionally, Socrates investigates the concept that people
obtain knowledge both through
perception as well as hard work and reason. He also makes it
plain that knowledge requires
action. One can be guided and come to knowing a certain
matter, he can be knowledgeable. But

5 Iwata, Naoya. "Plato's Hypothetical Inquiry in the Meno."
Philosophy 24, no. 2 (2016): 194-214
5
virtue doesn’t really work like this. It cannot be taught and
therefore it is not knowledge. From
this, we can conclude that there is no one true definition of
virtue and that it is relative. But, we
can agree to the fact that it is internal, and it comes from
within. How deep and complex is it that
even Socrates, the wisest of all men and most articulate couldn’t
define it.
In conclusion, virtue cannot be taught and one cannot be guided
to become virtuous. Also
there is no one definite definition of virtue. For one to come up
with the right definition of virtue,
they must use logical insights and reflection rather than
research. This has been demonstrated by

the recollection theory where Socrates argues that the soul
somehow knows everything in the
past life and that when we inquire as humans, we are only
helping the soul recollect.
You have many elements here of a good argument, and it is
clear that you have reflected
thoroughly on the text and its themes. What you’re missing is a
narrowly focused and clear thesis
statement. You need to bring together your separate points to
create a unified purpose. You need
to outline supporting points so that the progression of your
paper is logical. Overall you need
consistent editing for grammar and punctuation, as well as to
cite information you paraphrase
from the text.
78
6

Bibliography
Palumbo, Lidia. "Soul, Triangle and Virtue. On the Figure of
Implicit Comparison in Plato’s
Meno." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 1 (8) (2017): 201-212.
Marshall, Mason. "Socrates’ defensible devices in Plato’s
Meno." Theory and Research in
Education (2019): 1477878519862544.
Iwata, Naoya. "Plato's Hypothetical Inquiry in the Meno."
Philosophy 24, no. 2 (2016): 194-214.

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