1. Hurricane Hugo
The Storm, Coastal Development and FEMA’s Response
Greg Licamele
EMSE 232
March 30, 2004
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2. Soundbites
“We’ve had 35 years with no storm of real consequence on the East Coast. This
unprecedented gap in hurricane activity has coincided with an unprecedented rush to
develop” – Orrin Pilkey, coastal geologist (Galloway, 1989)
“Hugo roared through the state last Sept. 21 and 22, doing more property damage in a
day than was done in four years of the Civil War.” – USA Today (Mayfield, 1990)
“Not too many people could even tell you what a FEMA was a few days ago, let alone
understand our mission. That’s the way we like to have it.” – Grant Peterson, former
FEMA associate director (McAllister, 1989)
“(FEMA) is the biggest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses.” – Sen. Fritz Hollings (D-SC)
(Hall, 1990)
Table of Contents
I.) Introduction
II.) The Hurricane and Its Effects
a.) Hugo Approaches
b.) Coastal Development
c.) Preparations
d.) Hugo Reaches Shore
e.) Deaths, Damages and Dollars
f.) Power Outages
g.) Response and Recovery
h.) FEMA’s Role
i.) Federal Assistance
j.) Poor and Rural Areas
k.) FEMA Beyond South Carolina
l.) Disasters and Politics
III.) Lessons Learned
IV.) Conclusion
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3. Introduction
Hurricane Hugo arrived on the shores of the United States with a weather punch
unmatched in years, but the storm also left imprints of social, government, economic and
environmental issues to consider.
Two aspects of Hurricane Hugo are particularly focused upon in this study: the
level of coastal development in South Carolina and, in general, in the United States; and
the response of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the disaster.
One case shows what went terribly wrong and how changes have been made while the
other example highlights policies that have barely changed in decades.
As Hugo hit Charleston, S.C., on Sept. 22, 1989, coastal residents and officials
worried about the intensity of the storm. After it ravaged the Virgin Islands and Puerto
Rico, Hugo had gained steam and headed toward the United States – an inviting target for
damage because of coastal development. Congress and state governments attempted to
regulate development, but to little success.
After the hurricane struck, FEMA and local officials were slow to respond. It took
10 days for the first Disaster Application Center (DAC) to be established. Residents
waited weeks for aid, while local governments could not penetrate the bureaucracy of
FEMA’s policies and forms. Power outages plagued response efforts. In all, 35 people
died in the Carolinas and the price tag for Hugo totaled almost $6 billion. But the slow
response by FEMA to Hugo and other events in 1989 led to agency changes that have
made the federal government a more useful partner in disasters. Meanwhile, 90 percent of
buildings destroyed by Hugo have been rebuilt and flocks of people have moved to the
coast despite annual hurricanes that lead to more damage. A delicate balancing act exists
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4. between economic development and coastal growth, as coastlines often generate a
substantial portion of a state’s tourism dollars. While all levels of government learned
their lessons about the response to hurricanes, they have not enacted mitigation principles
in coastal environments.
The Hurricane and Its Effects
Hugo Approaches. This monumental storm was first tracked off the coast of Africa on
Sept. 9, 1989. It made its way through the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, causing
billions of dollars in damage and scores of deaths on those island nations. As it left the
Caribbean, it cast its eye on the United States, first aiming toward Florida on Sept. 18-19.
However, the track moved northward and the first hurricane watch was issued from St.
Augustine, Fla., to Cape Hatteras, N.C. (Baker, 1994). Charleston, S.C., was next.
Coastal Development. As the storm churned toward the Carolinas, one major concern
among government officials, engineers, environmentalists and others was the potential
impact a storm could have on the rapidly developed coast. South Carolina’s economy is
based in large part on tourism and the draw of the beach, so economic development was
often put first before mitigation strategies. According to one study, coastal counties from
Maine to Texas were home to approximately 40 million people in 1997. In historical
context based on 1997 numbers, about 3.2 million people alone lived in Florida’s Dade
and Broward counties compared to 3.2 million people who lived in all 109 coastal
counties from Texas to Virginia in 1930 (Pielke, 1997).
As more people move to coastal communities, their exposure to hurricane hazards
increases. The population grew, but the number of properties increased even more.
According to 1993 statistics, coastal communities in the Atlantic and Gulf Coast regions
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5. accounted for more than $3.1 trillion worth of insured property, a 69 percent increase
over 1980’s total of $1.9 trillion (Pielke, 1997).
South Carolina’s risk for hurricanes has traditionally been less than its neighbors;
it ranked fifth behind Florida, Texas, Louisiana and North Carolina in the number of
direct hurricane hits from 1900-1982 (Platt, 1991). This ranking led to some level of
complacency for mitigation and preparedness because local tax bases increased. Nearly
all of the 60-mile, northeast stretch of coast in South Carolina known as the “Grand
Strand” and half of all South Carolina’s coastal islands were developed in 1991,
generating two-thirds of the state’s $3.75 billion annual tourism receipts (Platt, 1991).
It was a well-established fact that coastal erosion was occurring in South Carolina
and around the country. “The South Carolina coast is vulnerable to erosion and damage
from hurricanes. Erosion of more than one foot per year affects an estimated 26 miles of
the total developed shoreline; another 30 miles is subject to erosion of less than one foot
annually.” In 1987, Congress acted on these trends by passing the Upton-Jones
Amendment, which authorized the National Flood Insurance Program to reimburse
property owners for demolishing or relocating structures endangered by erosion.
However, its impact was limited, as only 228 claims were approved nationwide in four
years (Platt, 1991).
The South Carolina state government slowly awakened to potential problems a
year before Hugo when it passed the Beachfront Management Act (BMA), which
“prohibited new construction or the replacement of destroyed buildings in a ‘dead zone’
20 feet back from the first row of dunes, and it restricted development in an adjoining
‘setback zone.’ It also limited repairs that could be made to damaged seawalls”
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6. (Applebome, Sept. 24, 1989). But the BMA also followed the common pattern of other
localities by instituting a beach replenishment program, which, in many cases,
encourages population growth and development.
Before the hurricane, the BMA led to 60 lawsuits (Platt, 1991) in response to the
competing goals of protecting shorelines and promoting economic development. This
debate was manifested more clearly during Hurricane Hugo. Some argued that coastal
development was just as important in the long-term as was responding to impacts of
short-term hurricanes. As one scientist wrote, “The general public does not understand
very well the process of gradual, long-term beach erosion, tending rather to focus on
dramatic events such as hurricanes” (Leatherman, 1994).
In addition to tensions of coastal development, building codes in South Carolina
were sometimes non-existent or not enforced (Manning, 1994). Lessons from previous
coastal hurricanes did not influence local governments.
For example, in 1954, Hurricane Hazel caused widespread damage to the
southeast coast of North Carolina. After that storm, building codes were strengthened
there. As a result, Hurricane Diana made less of an impact in 1984 (Leatherman, 1994).
But South Carolina was left relatively untouched during those and other storms
and it did not change its building or coastal codes, which led to heavy damage from
Hurricane Hugo (Leatherman, 1994). At the time of Hugo, there were virtually no
statewide building code controls on the books in South Carolina (Rubin, 1990).
These twin pillars of coastal development and building codes played an
undetected, major role in how damaging Hurricane Hugo turned out to be. This caused
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7. one researcher to follow the path of money and politics when writing about popular Folly
Beach, S.C., which is instructive to understanding coastal communities:
“(Folly Beach) reflects a capitalist pursuit of financial gain facilitated by public
tax policies, infrastructure subsidies, potential beach renourishment, federal flood
insurance policies that ignore erosion hazards…Folly Beach epitomizes the nature of
erosion as a political hazard” (Platt, 1991).
Preparations. After the first hurricane watch was issued for much of the Atlantic
coastline on Sept. 20, state officials initiated no significant response actions. By that
night, however, officials in South Carolina began recommending evacuations – the
primary preparedness method for Hugo – because the 11 p.m. news would be the final
opportunity to reach residents until the next morning. At 6 a.m., a hurricane warning was
issued from Fernandina Beach, Fla., to Cape Lookout, N.C., as the storm lurked 24 hours
away from landfall. South Carolina’s governor ordered the evacuation of barrier islands
and beaches with the help of the National Guard (Baker, 1994).
Throughout the day on Sept. 20 and into Sept. 21, the storm intensified,
increasing in wind speed from 115 mph at noon to 138 mph at 6 p.m. (labeling Hugo a
Category IV hurricane). By 6 p.m., the evacuation of almost 265,000 people was nearly
completed (Platt, 1991).
Public response to the evacuation was generally well heeded, according to a study
conducted three months later. Eighty-nine percent of residents in the areas ordered to
evacuate did, compared to 70 percent who evacuated based on recommendations. These
evacuees did not venture to public shelters; rather, most (55-66 percent) went to homes of
friends or relatives. According to the study, this probably resulted from officials
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8. discouraging the use of public facilities for fear of insufficient space (Baker, 1994).
Based on data, this study concluded “evacuation rates, evacuation timing and vehicle use
were all predicted accurately throughout South Carolina” (Baker, 1994).
Gas and other services were turned off in preparation for the hurricane.
Commercial flights to the area were halted (Cook, 1994).
Officials said the loss of life would have been far greater if evacuations were not
ordered. Evacuations were not always standard operating procedure, however. In 1969,
Hurricane Camille killed 256 people, including some brave souls who gathered for a
hurricane party (Applebome, Oct. 1, 1989). Lessons learned led to greater coordination
for evacuations, especially because as every year passes, more people live on the coast
than ever before. Coastal development and evacuations go hand-in-hand, though
evacuations are not exactly a long-term mitigation strategy.
Compared to the response and immediate recovery periods, the preparedness
portion, especially evacuations, turned out to be one of the few positive steps during
Hurricane Hugo, as “very little recovery planning had been done at any level of
government” (Rubin, 1990).
Hugo Reaches Shore. On Sept. 22, Hugo’s eye crossed just north of Charleston, S.C.
One-hundred and thirty-five mph winds extended 100 miles northeast and 50 miles south.
The eye of Hugo continued its path just east of Columbia, S.C., 100 miles inland; at 3
a.m., winds continued there at 109 mph. Hugo reached Charlotte, N.C., by sunrise, but as
a tropical storm with 87 mph winds (Rubin, 1990). Unlike most hurricanes, Hugo belted
the inland with stronger winds than usual due to its faster forward movement (Manning,
1994). The forward speed at 6 p.m. on Sept. 21 was roughly 20 mph (Baker, 1994). The
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9. faster forward speed might have limited the damage to the coastal regions because the
storm moved quicker than expected, but significantly greater damage still occurred than
what was anticipated (Manning, 1994).
Deaths, Damages and Dollars. As the storm raged through the Carolinas, it soon
became clear that Hurricane Hugo would become the most destructive, costly natural
disaster in U.S. history up to that point in time. Hugo cost $5.9 billion in the United
States; it destroyed 8,000 homes and damaged 92,000 buildings. Thirty-five people died
in the Carolinas (with another 17 fatalities in the Caribbean) (Mayfield, Sept. 20, 1990).
President George H.W. Bush declared half of South Carolina a disaster area as 70,000
families were displaced (Brown, Sept. 6, 1990). Electrical power was knocked out for
weeks to some places and the loss of power severely hindered the response and recovery
processes.
Though the deaths were relatively low compared to the total population living
along the coast, the majority of the actual causes of death happened after Hugo passed,
according to a Centers for Disease Control report. Thirteen residents of South Carolina
died during the storm, while 22 died after the hurricane due to heart attacks, house fires
caused by burning candles and other reasons (Booth, Dec. 19, 1989).
Many beach resorts that host the tourism industry were ravaged in South Carolina,
something U.S. News & World Report said, “validated warnings from geologists,
planners and environmentalists against barely controlled coastal development.” Said
Orrin Pilkey, a coastal geologist, “We’ve had 35 years with no storm of real consequence
on the East Coast. This unprecedented gap in hurricane activity has coincided with an
unprecedented rush to develop” (Galloway, Oct. 2, 1989).
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10. In addition to tourism, the timber industry feeds the South Carolina economy.
Hurricane Hugo devastated the Francis Marion National Forest and other privately owned
timberland at a cost of $1 billion. More than four million acres of trees (36 percent of the
state’s forest area) experienced unrecoverable damage, which equaled enough lumber to
build 660,000 homes. As the third largest manufacturing industry in the state, timberland
owners contributed $4.3 billion annually to the economy in 1988 (Pyatt, Nov. 19, 1989).
Power Outages. The severe nature of power outages led to difficult response and
recovery phases of Hurricane Hugo. The power failures disrupted transportation systems,
communications and water and wastewater facilities. The primary causes of these lifeline
failures were wind and windblown debris, though storm-surge damage impacted the
barrier islands more than wind.
“In many cases, electric utilities had to rebuild systems as opposed to just
repairing them. Approximately 1.5 million customers were without power after the
storm…In many cases, it was 2-3 weeks before service was restored. The magnitude of
destruction to the electric power infrastructure caused severe hardships on residents and
hampered the recovery efforts” (Cook, 1994).
Utilities had appropriate preparedness plans to deal with a certain level of damage
by Hurricane Hugo, but the storm’s intensity was more than expected. Total damages to
the power companies were estimated at $400 million (Cook, 1994).
The key delivery mechanisms that failed were transmission lines, especially those
made of wood. Those with metal support structures fared just fine, but those made of
timber collapsed due to faulty foundations. Instead of restoring power immediately, the
critical days after Hugo were spent reconstructing infrastructure (Cook, 1994).
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11. Response and Recovery. The first major storm to strike the area in 35 years showed
how little had been prepared for the aftermath of a hurricane. Local, state and federal
officials experienced many problems in the response phase, partly due to power failures
that plagued communications, but also partly due to poor planning and interagency
coordination. In South Carolina, understaffed emergency planning offices at the state,
county and local levels slowed response efforts, as did the placement of the state’s chief
emergency manager, who was the adjutant general, an independently elected official. The
adjutant general established an operations center as did the governor’s office, creating
two levels of confusing coordination. “Initial reports (in the mass media) regarding the
aftermath of Hugo in South Carolina indicated serious problems in virtually all horizontal
and vertical intergovernmental relationships” (Rubin, 1990). This lack of response
planning was most evident through FEMA’s efforts.
FEMA’s Role. Because of the state’s limited natural disaster experiences, officials did
not have many opportunities to interact with FEMA. Many state officials overestimated
what FEMA could do for their localities while many local governments were almost
oblivious as to how FEMA could help. As a result, response and recovery efforts were
hampered while an instant education was happening on the ground between federal and
local officials. One local official commented, “It was several days before we understood
what all that (process) was” (Lancaster, Oct. 4, 1989).
FEMA came under great scrutiny during the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo.
Governors, senators, mayors and citizens all heaped complaints on the agency, leading
Sen. Fritz Hollings to call it the “biggest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses” (Hall, 1990).
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12. As FEMA came under attack, so did President Bush. Eight days after Hugo hit, he
visited South Carolina, a trip the media framed as defensive with headlines such as “Bush
Defends Carolina Relief Efforts” (Weinraub, Sept. 30, 1989).
Bush tried to initially marshal the resources of the government when he signed a
$1.1 billion relief measure approved by Congress and when he directed $5 million of
Department of Commerce funds to Charleston, S.C. (Weinraub, Sept. 30, 1989).
However, the problems of a short-staffed FEMA continued, also hampered by the lack of
electricity to establish Disaster Application Centers (Rubin, 1990).
FEMA attempted to defend itself by pointing out that “site assessments” were
waived so a disaster could be declared immediately after the storm (Lancaster, Oct. 4,
1989). FEMA leaders also pointed out to the media that the agency carried out its role
according to the 1974 Disaster Relief Act, which puts FEMA behind state and local
governments for assistance. Those governments, according to FEMA, can act on their
own without a presidentially declared disaster, which is the only way FEMA can become
involved after an event (McAllister, Oct. 6, 1989).
But FEMA did not help its case, either, when its top official said, “Not too many
people could even tell you what FEMA was a few days ago, let alone understand our
mission. That’s the way we like it” (McAllister, Oct. 6, 1989). This “agency-in-a-closet”
mentality by FEMA’s leadership perhaps underscored the salience the agency gave to
communicating with people.
The media did not help FEMA, either. In a quantitative study of Hugo coverage,
56 percent of those interviewed on TV were victims or witnesses, while just 20 percent
were elected officials or spokespersons (Walters, 1993). The coverage of victims telling
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13. their stories of long lines, no relief and FEMA hurdles probably perpetuated, and in some
cases supported, the notion that FEMA was not helpful.
Federal Assistance. Individuals are not automatically approved for assistance after a
hurricane strikes. Citizens must work through local and state governments, who then
provide a governor with estimates. Those numbers are then provided to FEMA, who must
appeal to the president for federal disaster assistance. After those declarations are issued,
FEMA establishes the Disaster Assistance Centers so people can apply for a variety of
grants outside of insurance claims (Baker, 1994).
However, in South Carolina, the DACs did not open until one week after the
storm, which fueled more outrage toward FEMA. Once opened, the lack of DACs was
criticized, too. Charleston mayor Joseph Riley called FEMA’s decision to open just two
DACs in his relatively large city “absolutely ridiculous” (Weinraub, Sept. 30, 1989).
Once the hurdles of delay and eligibility are crossed, funding begins to flow. But
as already stated, residents, elected officials and emergency managers were unaware of
this somewhat lengthy process, which led to the delays (Baker, 1994). On Oct. 22, 1989,
of 23,451 applications for emergency aid of up to $10,000, only 1,939 were approved. Of
more than 16,000 people who applied for temporary housing, 1,782 received assistance
(Applebome, Oct. 22, 1989).
Once the process moved along, 37,000 families in South Carolina received
Individual and Family Grant (IFG) funds totaling almost $70 million (on average per
family, $1,900) (Baker, 1994). Temporary housing assistance was provided to 30,000
people in South Carolina through FEMA resources. The Small Business Administration
doled out 8,000 loans equaling $150 million, with 80 percent for individuals.
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14. Beyond assistance to individuals, FEMA provided resources to state and local
governments that topped $300 million. More than 80 percent of these funds went to
South Carolina; North Carolina received funds, too. These funds were essentially divided
in thirds devoted to debris removal, restoration of utilities and for roads, bridges, waste
facilities and government buildings (Baker, 1994). Typically, states are required to pay
25 percent of losses, but President Bush waived the requirement for South Carolina,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands (McAllister, Nov. 23, 1989).
Poor and Rural Areas. In some rural areas, relief efforts took even longer to
establish. In Berkeley County, the DAC did not open until 10 days after the storm and
residents were told it would be weeks before they would receive funds, making life
particularly challenging for those already struggling. Communication was so poor to
South Carolina residents that many were not aware they could apply for aid, reported The
Washington Post (Lancaster, Oct. 4, 1989). This lengthy response was also highlighted
with headlines in major newspapers that read, “Hurricane Relief Is Said to Skip Poor”
and “Pain Lingers for Poorer Victims of Hurricane Hugo.”
The outreach to people in rural, poor areas was slowed because of the
infrastructure problems and by the lack of knowledge from state and local leaders. This
lack of knowledge of working with FEMA ultimately led to many citizens being unaware
of the agency’s role.
One resident in a rural area, asked whether he would apply for FEMA aid, said, “I
haven’t heard of them” (Lancaster, Oct. 4, 1989). This only slowed relief efforts and
caused more misery for many people, including elected officials.
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15. This delayed response to rural areas continued for months, according to news
reports in January 1990. “We are 110 days after Hugo. But for many of our families, it’s
still like the day after Hugo,” said the president of a local urban league. Some poor
residents did not apply for aid because they were illiterate, but they continued to live in
homes with large holes in their roofs. (Associated Press, Jan. 13, 1990). This inattention
to poorer communities helps feed concerns of FEMA and local government
inefficiencies, but it also raised awareness of response to poorer communities.
FEMA Beyond South Carolina. While FEMA’s work on the ground was moving
slowly and criticized heavily, FEMA officials also were in Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands assisting those nations. So before even coming into South Carolina, FEMA
experienced short staffs upon already short staffs. Meanwhile, on Oct. 17, 1989, 25 days
after Hugo hit South Carolina, the Loma Prieta earthquake struck California with a 7.1
magnitude, forcing FEMA to reassess its personnel in the Caribbean and the Carolinas.
These overlapping, major disasters overwhelmed FEMA with 390,000
applications for aid in less than one month. Additionally, one year after the California
earthquake, 39 federal emergencies were declared, more than twice the annual number
(Cushman, Oct. 21, 1990). These disasters put a major strain on an already challenged
system. “The dual disasters were a ‘one in a hundred year event...We were really
stretched” (Squitieri, Oct. 26, 1989).
Disasters and Politics. All disasters are political and in this case, state and local
officials were competing for attention. Wrote one researcher studying an example of
response efforts, “...South Carolina’s governor was a Republican and Charleston’s mayor
was a Democrat. Moreover, the mayor was rumored to be a candidate for governor, and
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16. several other impacted counties also had Democratic administrations” (Rubin, 1990).
Because of this, FEMA and other organizations experienced difficulties in finding one
common page from which to work in response and recovery.
At the federal level, FEMA’s culture and President Bush’s inattention to the
agency rose to the forefront. After President Bush was inaugurated in 1989, he did not
appoint a FEMA director. Instead, according to Senate Democrats, seven of the eight
most senior positions at FEMA remained vacant or filled by acting officials from the
Reagan years, so temporary leaders guided the response to dual disasters.
Rep. Tom Ridge (R-PA) said, “I have told the White House to get a move on. If
FEMA is virtually rudderless, you can’t expect the course to be very direct” (Squitieri,
Oct. 26, 1989). In March of 1990, six months after Hugo and the California earthquake,
Bush nominated Wallace Stickney as director.
Political opponents and emergency managers also questioned the credentials of
FEMA officials after Hugo, Loma Prieta and Hurricane Andrew in 1992. “Critics call
FEMA a ‘dumping ground’ for lackluster presidential appointees, a charge the Bush
administration denies. Yet, of the 21 political appointees who hold most of the top jobs,
half had no background in emergency management” (Christensen, Sept. 12, 1992).
Lessons Learned
Clearly, Hugo was an instructive storm for many reasons. The participants during
the hurricane, including those mentioned in this study and those not cited such as the
American Red Cross, evaluated their roles during Hugo. One of the clearest lessons
learned was the importance of evacuation. If local governments did not evacuate the
barrier islands and other parts of South Carolina, the human tragedy could have been far
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17. more extensive. South Carolina followed its evacuation for Hugo with orders to leave
during hurricanes Fran, Bertha and Bonnie (Yellin, Aug. 29, 1999).
FEMA learned the lessons of responding more rapidly and in more flexible ways.
Hugo truly set the course for FEMA’s image, which, in a few short weeks, was battered
and bruised. When the Loma Prieta earthquake struck California, “the speed of response
in California probably was due in part to the criticism it took for its sluggish response to
Hurricane Hugo,” reported The New York Times (Cushman, Oct. 21, 1990). Rep. Nancy
Pelosi (D-CA) said FEMA acted quickly and completed tasks well in California,
especially given the fact that earthquakes provide no warning unlike hurricanes.
President Bush learned the value of a better-organized agency as he nominated a
permanent director in March 1990. A permanent director provided the direction Rep.
Tom Ridge was looking for, as well as a boost in morale. However, when Hurricane
Andrew struck Florida in 1992, FEMA was once again slow to respond and heavily
criticized. President Bill Clinton learned the value of FEMA leadership when in 1993 he
nominated James Lee Witt, an emergency manager in Arkansas, to head the organization
to a renaissance of credibility in the 1990s.
FEMA’s mounds of paperwork also changed after Hugo (and the California
earthquake), when the agency changed over to a computerized system for taking
applications for assistance. This plan, a key lesson learned, was intended to minimize the
delays that the FEMA associate director said were “agonizingly tedious” (Cushman, Oct.
21, 1990). One resident recounted that it took two years and a stack of forms “a foot tall”
to get aid from FEMA (Mercer, Sept. 27, 1997). The lessons learned continued years later
when the Midwest Floods of 1993 hit. Toll-free telephone numbers were established for
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18. people to receive aid, with more than 75 percent of applicants requesting assistance
through the phone, dramatically reducing long lines and the time it takes to establish
centers. Also during the floods, FEMA distributed report cards for the community to fill
out citing the agency’s response (Claiborne, Aug. 13, 1993). Among other steps post-
Hugo, this led to greater coordination and understanding between governments.
FEMA’s culture was changing away from the pre-Hugo attitude of “we don’t
want anyone knowing about us” to a more proactive, robust agency able to respond to
disasters in more timely and compassionate ways. State and local governments have the
lead in disasters, but the federal government plays a key role that FEMA, during Hugo,
failed to perceive because of its rules and regulations. FEMA did not recognize the speed
with which people want to get back on their feet and rebuild. FEMA underestimated
public outcry and defended itself, thinking only within predefined paradigms and not
outside the lines, in terms of a quicker response, to meet the needs of a major natural
disaster. Waiting 10 days to open a disaster center, followed by reams of paperwork, did
not inspire confidence in the agency. As one official in South Carolina said, “You don’t
put procedure first, you put the needs of people first” (Lancaster, Oct. 3, 1989). The
biggest lesson learned during Hugo was FEMA’s response, though FEMA did not learn
all of its lessons because of the slow response to Hurricane Andrew, which caused
President Bush to name his transportation secretary to oversee the response and recovery.
A report issued to Congress after Hugo, Andrew and the Loma Prieta earthquake said,
“FEMA is like a patient on triage. The president and Congress must decide to treat it or
let it die” (Hill, June 2, 1993). A congressman from California introduced legislation to
abolish FEMA and put its responsibilities under the military (Lochhead, Sept. 16, 1993).
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19. However, slowly, but surely using a customer-service model, FEMA has dispelled
the demons of its response to Hugo.
The Miami Herald cited seven lessons learned from Hurricane Hugo and among
those listed, one was troubling and still true today: “People never learn from past
disasters” (Miami Herald, Sept. 13, 1992).
Despite Hugo’s damage, most areas have been rebuilt. Despite the miseries
suffered by people, most communities have rebounded with structures in that harm’s way
of future hurricanes. Despite all of the aid from the federal government and all private
dollars spent on response and recovery, people continue to flock to the Carolinas to work,
live and play. When a future hurricane strikes the area again, more damage will
potentially occur and more dollars will be necessary for a cleanup.
Three months after Hugo, FEMA argued for a stricter Beach Management Act in
a report, which claimed it “is crucial that the concept of a gradual, strategic retreat from
the ocean remain a part of coastal management.” The report also cited the lack of uniform
building codes in South Carolina (Engineering News Record, Dec. 7, 1989).
Fixing the position of beaches also came under attack, but is a lesson still
ignored. Spending millions of dollars to build sea walls and replenish beaches “may be
futile in resisting nature’s unceasing impulse to push barrier islands toward the mainland”
(Schmitt, Feb. 6, 1990).
But shortly after Hugo, a $1.3 million beach renourishment project was completed
along 40 miles of coastline, including Myrtle Beach (Mayfield, March 28, 1990). Three
years later, Folly Beach spent $16 million on a beach-replenishing project (Applebome,
Sept. 18, 1992). One major reason associated with these projects is tourism. South
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20. Carolina officials reported that more than 90 percent of beach homes damaged by Hugo
will be rebuilt on the original location. One geology professor at Duke University said,
“By most standards, that type of behavior would be classified as insanity.” The head of
the state’s coastal council compared post-Hugo building to post-Hazel, with people
flocking right back to the beaches (McAllister, April 9, 1990). But money from insurance
helped people pay to rebuild after Hugo, sometimes with better structures.
There are many answers in trying to determine why people do not learn from
disasters. Some people cited facts that hurricanes don’t strike very often and when they
do, there’s often a gap until the next one. One resident who rebuilt on shifting sand said,
“It’s just like people who live on the Mississippi River. There’s no way you can fight the
inevitable, so why worry about it?” (Parker, Sept. 16, 1990).
But levels of destruction are “directly related to the level of coastal development,”
where disasters are practically invited to shore (Leatherman, 1994). However, with
tourism as the No. 1 industry along the shores of Carolina and around the country, it is
hard to imagine that coastal development would slow down because of the delicate
balancing act between money, politics and nature. Perhaps this is not a lesson learned for
those trying to infuse mitigation practices, but rather “lessons lamented.”
Conclusion
Mitigation did not play and does not continue to play a major role in South
Carolina and other coastal areas. After each hurricane, states are required to develop a
hazard mitigation plan, but because of the messy response efforts in the area, such a plan
was not delivered for one year. This made response and recovery efforts independent of
any mitigation tactics for the next hurricane.
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21. This lack of attention to nature because of the pursuit for economic development
will continue to haunt Charleston and other popular coastal communities. Hurricanes are
not going away and neither are human beings. In fact, as outlined in the paper,
populations are exploding along beaches, which helps those local economies. South
Carolina eventually rebounded from Hugo, primarily due to people’s quest to visit beach
communities.
Hurricane Hugo taught FEMA a lesson in being more responsive to disasters,
and, in general, its efforts have improved remarkably. Coordination with local
governments has also appeared to improve for natural disasters.
However, Hurricane Hugo did not teach the lesson of mitigation to residents, state
officials or the federal government. Money and politics hold the keys to lessoning the
impact of hurricanes on coastal communities, but so does willpower. Slowly, some
communities are taking matters into their own hands and planning in smarter ways, but
now money for terrorism preparedness and response competes for attention. But until
there is a concerted effort at the federal or state level for natural disaster mitigation, the
level of damage and the cost of hurricanes will continue to increase. Even smaller
hurricanes than Hugo, like Isabel in 2004, cause enormous amounts of damage because
more structures are in the eye of a hurricane, tornado and other disasters. The subsidizing
of land and structures on the coast should be re-examined because the potential economic
benefits could be reduced to nothing when the next storm spins through a coastal town.
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22. List of References
Applebome, Peter. “After Hugo, a Storm Over Beach Development.” The New York
Times, September 24, 1989.
Applebome, Peter. “Hugo Shows How to Save Lives While Much Is Lost.” The New
York Times, October 1, 1989.
Applebome, Peter. “For Victims of the Hurricane, Pain and Uncertainty Linger.” The
New York Times, October 22, 1989.
Applebome, Peter. “Hugo’s 3-Year Wake: Lessons of a Hurricane.” The New York
Times, September 18, 1992.
Baker, Earl. “Hurricane Hugo, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Charleston, South
Carolina, September 17-22, 1989 (Chapter 8).” The National Academy of Sciences, 1994.
Baker, Earl. “Hurricane Hugo, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Charleston, South
Carolina, September 17-22, 1989 (Chapter 10: Warning and Response).” The National
Academy of Sciences, 1994.
Booth, William. “Hazards Were High in Hugo’s Wake.” The Washington Post,
December 19, 1989.
Christensen, Mike. “It’s Politics Over Skill at Disaster Relief Agency.” Atlanta Journal
and Constitution, September 12, 1992.
Claiborne, William. “More Welcome Than Disaster; For Once – in Midwest – FEMA Is
Relatively Well Received.” The Washington Post, August 13, 1993.
Cook, Ronald. “Hurricane Hugo, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Charleston, South
Carolina, September 17-22, 1989 (Chapter 14: Lifelines).” The National Academy of
Sciences, 1994.
Cushman, John. “A Change in Procedures for Emergency Agency.” The New York
Times, October 21, 1990.
Devroy, Ann. “Sununu Picks Ex-Aide as FEMA Chief.” The Washington Post, March
23, 1990.
“FEMA Endorses Beach Act.” Engineering News-Record, December 7, 1989.
Galloway, Joseph. “The Brutal Lesson of Hurricane Hugo.” U.S. News & World Report,
October 2, 1989.
Hall, Mimi. “Agency Studies Hugo’s Lessons.” USA Today, September 20, 1990.
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23. Hill, John. “Agency May Be Ready Next Time.” Times Picayune, June 2, 1993.
“Hurricane Relief Is Said to Skip Many Poor.” Associated Press, January 13, 1990.
Lancaster, John. “Lag in U.S. Aid Angers Hugo Victims; Relief Centers Open, but
Applicants Face Long Waits.” The Washington Post, October 4, 1989.
Leatherman, Stephen. “Hurricane Hugo, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Charleston,
South Carolina, September 17-22, 1989 (Chapter 11: Coastal Processes).” The National
Academy of Sciences, 1994.
Lochhead, Carolyn. “Pete Stark Withdraws House Bill to End FEMA.” The San
Francisco Chronicle, September 16, 1993.
Manning, Billy. “Hurricane Hugo, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Charleston, South
Carolina, September 17-22, 1989 (Chapter 13: Wind Damage to Buildings and
Structures).” The National Academy of Sciences, 1994.
Mayfield, Mark. “Sacked S.C. Bounces Back.” USA Today, March 28, 1990.
Mayfield, Mark. “Recovery From Storm Is Steady, Painful.” USA Today, September 20,
1990.
McAllister, Bill. “FEMA Officials Admit Response to Hugo Was Slow.” The
Washington Post, October 6, 1989.
McAllister, Bill. “Bush Waives Hurricane Cleanup Costs.” The Washington Post,
November 23, 1989.
McAllister, Bill. “A Hurricane’s Fury Fast Forgotten.” The Washington Post, April 9,
1990.
Mercer, Marsha. “After Disaster.” The Tampa Tribune, September 24, 1997.
Parker, Laura. “Rebirth, Ongoing Adversity a Year After Hugo.” The Washington Post,
September 16, 1990.
Pielke, Roger A. “Reframing the U.S. Hurricane Problem.” Society & Natural Resources,
September/October 1997.
Platt, Rutherford, Timothy Beatley and Crane Miller. “The Folly at Folly Beach and
Other Failings of the U.S. Coastal Erosion Policy.” Environment, November 1991.
Pyatt, Rudolph. “Two Months Later, Hugo Still Packs a Punch.” The Washington Post,
November 19, 1989.
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24. Rubin, Claire and Roy Popkin. “Disaster Recovery After Hurricane Hugo in South
Carolina.” Natural Hazard Research Working Paper #69, University of Colorado, January
1990.
Schmitt, Eric. “Big What If: How Hugo Might Hit L.I.” The New York Times, February
9, 1990.
“Seven Bold Lessons From Hugo.” The Miami Herald, September 13, 1992.
Squitieri, Tom. “FEMA Still Is Digging Out From Criticism.” USA Today, October 26,
1989.
Walters, Lynne Masel and Susanna Hornig. “Faces In the News: Network Television
Coverage of Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta Earthquake.” Journal of Broadcasting
& Electronic Media, Spring 1993.
Weinraub, Bernard. “Bush Defends Carolina Relief Efforts.” The New York Times,
September 30, 1989.
Yellin, Emily. “Hurricane Gathers Force on Path Toward Carolinas.” The New York
Times, August 29, 1999.
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