* Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reserved Chapter 7 Discretion Cyber Attacks Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed. Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reserved The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science * Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer * Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer * Proprietary information will be exposed if discovered by hackersNational infrastructure protection initiatives most prevent leaksBest approach: Avoid vulnerabilities in the first placeMore practically: Include a customized program focused mainly on the most critical information Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 7 – Discretion Introduction Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science * Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer * Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer * A trusted computing base (TCB) is the totality of hardware, software, processes, and individuals considered essential to system securityA national infrastructure security protection program will includeMandatory controlsDiscretionary policyA smaller, less complext TCB is easier to protect Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 7 – Discretion Trusted Computing Base The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science * Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer * Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer * Fig. 7.1 – Size comparison issues in a trusted computing base Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 7 – Discretion * Managing discretion is critical; questions about the following should be asked when information is being considered for disclosureAssistanceFixesLimitsLegalityDamageNeed Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 7 – Discretion Trusted Computing Base The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science * Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer * Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer * Security through obscurity is often maligned and misunderstood by security expertsLong-term hiding of vulnerabilitiesLong-term suppression of informationSecurity through obscurity is not recommended for long-term protection, but it is an excellent complementary controlE.g., there’s no need to publish a system’s architectureE.g., revealing a flaw before it’s fixed can lead to rushed work and an unnecessary complication of the situation Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved Chapter 7 – Discretion Security Through Obscurity The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science * Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Comp.

1. *
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reserved
Chapter 7
Discretion
Cyber Attacks
Protecting National Infrastructure, 1st ed.
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reserved
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Proprietary information will be exposed if discovered by
hackersNational infrastructure protection initiatives most
prevent leaksBest approach: Avoid vulnerabilities in the first
placeMore practically: Include a customized program focused
mainly on the most critical information
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Introduction
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science

2. The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
A trusted computing base (TCB) is the totality of hardware,
software, processes, and individuals considered essential to
system securityA national infrastructure security protection
program will includeMandatory controlsDiscretionary policyA
smaller, less complext TCB is easier to protect
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Trusted Computing Base
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Fig. 7.1 – Size comparison issues in a trusted computing base
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion

3. *
Managing discretion is critical; questions about the following
should be asked when information is being considered for
disclosureAssistanceFixesLimitsLegalityDamageNeed
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Trusted Computing Base
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Security through obscurity is often maligned and misunderstood
by security expertsLong-term hiding of vulnerabilitiesLong-
term suppression of informationSecurity through obscurity is
not recommended for long-term protection, but it is an excellent
complementary controlE.g., there’s no need to publish a
system’s architectureE.g., revealing a flaw before it’s fixed can
lead to rushed work and an unnecessary complication of the
situation
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Security Through Obscurity
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer

4. *
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Fig. 7.2 – Knowledge lifecycle for security through obscurity
*
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Fig. 7.3 – Vulnerability disclosure lifecycle
*
Information sharing may be inadvertent, secretive, or
willfulGovernment most aggressive promoting information
sharingGovernment requests information from industry for the
following reasonsGovernment assistance to industryGovernment
situational awarenessPoliticsGovernment and industry have
conflicting motivations
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Information Sharing
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*

5. Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Fig. 7.4 – Inverse value of information sharing for government
and industry
*
Adversaries regularly scout ahead and plan before an
attackReconnaissance planning levelsLevel #1: Broad, wide-
reaching collection from a variety of sourcesLevel #2: Targeted
collection, often involving automationLevel #3: Directly
accessing the target
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Information Reconnaissance
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion

6. Fig. 7.5 – Three stages of reconnaissance for cyber security
*
At each stage of reconnaissance, security engineers can
introduce information obscurityThe specific types of
information that should be obscured
areAttributesProtectionsVulnerabilities
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Information Reconnaissance
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Layering methods of obscurity and discretion adds depth to
defensive security programEven with layered obscurity, asset
information can find a way outPublic speakingApproved
external siteSearch for leakage
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Obscurity Layers
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer

7. *
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Fig. 7.6 – Obscurity layers to protect asset information
*
Governments have been successful at protecting information by
compartmentalizing information and individualsInformation is
classifiedGroups of individuals are granted
clearanceCompartmentalization defines boundaries, which helps
guides decisionsPrivate companies can benefit from this model
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Organizational Compartments
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion

8. Fig. 7.7 – Using clearances and classifications to control
information disclosure
*
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
Fig. 7.8 – Example commercial mapping of clearances and
classifications
*
To implement a national discretion program will requireTCB
definitionReduced emphasis on information sharingCoexistence
with hacking communityObscurity layered modelCommercial
information protection models
Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All rights Reserved
Chapter 7 – Discretion
National Discretion Program
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
The University of Adelaide, School of Computer Science
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer
*
Chapter 2 — Instructions: Language of the Computer