1. Chicago PABF The Journal of Finance – August 2008
Selection and Termination of Investment Amit Goyal and Sunil Wahal
Management Firms by Plan Sponsors
This is a little bit of a “dry” note. Those that will (rightfully) get bored after
a few lines should nonetheless jump to its conclusion, because I humbly think that
this paper1 highlights a few important points about our discussions around the
“Watch List” and rebalancing.
---
“At the end of 2003, there were 47,391 plan sponsors in the United States, which
were responsible for delegating investments of $6.3 trillion to institutional
investment managers. At that time, there were 7,153 equity, bond, and hybrid mutual
funds with total assets of $5.4 trillion. The enormity of the assets under the
jurisdiction of plan sponsors and their potential impact on asset prices are
compelling reasons to examine their behavior.
I. Motivations for Hiring and Termination
Plan sponsors hire investment managers either because 1) new inflows need to be
invested or 2) to replace terminated investment managers.
On the other hand, one obvious reason for terminating investment managers is
underperformance. However, plan sponsors also terminate investment managers for
reasons related to the plan sponsor (such as reallocations from one investment
style to another, or the merger of two plans) or events at the investment
management firm (such as personnel turnover, the merger of two investment
management firms, or regulatory actions).
II. Pre-Hiring vs. Post-Hiring Returns
In their paper, the authors examine benchmark-adjusted cumulative excess returns,
information ratios, and calendar-time alphas from factor models up to 3 years
before and after hiring.
All measurement methods show that for domestic equity and fixed income mandate,
pre-hiring returns are positive, large and statistically significant, but that
post-hiring returns are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
For international equity mandates, however, both pre-and post-hiring excess returns
are positive and large.
III. Pre-Firing vs. Post-Firing Returns
Excess returns prior to firing are negative for performance-based terminations but
not for others. Post-firing excess returns for the entire sample are statistically
indistinguishable from zero in the first two years after termination, but positive
in the third year. Three-year post-firing returns are also positive for
performance-based terminations.
IV. Post-Hiring vs. Post-Firing Returns
The return difference between hired and fired managers prior to the “switch” is
positive. However, after the “switch,” returns differential is negative, but with
large standard errors.
1
As usual, the original is available to you upon request
Samuel Kunz - PABF Page 1 of 2 8/2/2010

2. Chicago PABF The Journal of Finance – August 2008
Selection and Termination of Investment Amit Goyal and Sunil Wahal
Management Firms by Plan Sponsors
V. Additional Concerns
Larger plans are less likely to retain consultants to assist them in the selection
process and have higher post-hiring excess returns than their smaller counterparts.
Further, headline risk-sensitive sponsors are likely to chase investment styles
with high returns in the past three years, to retain consultants to assist them in
their hiring decisions, and to terminate managers for poor performance. But they
have lower post-hiring returns than those that are headline risk-resistant or risk-
neutral.
Finally, underfunded plans are more likely to fire underperforming investment
managers than overfunded plans.”
VI. Comments and Conclusion
According to Goyal and Whahl’s study:
1) pre-hiring returns are large and positive, but post-hiring returns “neutral”
2) excess returns prior to firing are negative for performance-based terminations,
while post-firing returns are, on the other hand, positive
In other words, managers tend, on average, to outperform before hired, fail to
outperform while included a portfolio, and outperform again after they have been
terminated for bad performance. This is rather discouraging given the time and
efforts all parties involved in a managers’ selection/termination process. But two
points might help (to at least partially) explain this paradox:
1) Like (almost) everything else in life, I believe that investment managers’
performance has a tendency to “revert to the mean.” That is, exceptionally good
performance is followed by a drift below the mean and vice versa. Further, it is
easier to sell “something that works,” and marketing people have a propensity to
market their performance more aggressively after (or during) a strong period.
Because of the decision lag, their strategy tends to be incorporated in a
portfolio at the top of the cycle.
2) The best long-term performers in any probabilistic field (such as investing) all
emphasize (investment) process over (returns) outcome2. It’s not that results
don’t’ matter. They do. But judging solely on results is a serious deterrent to
taking risks that may be necessary to making the right decision. Simply put, the
way decisions are evaluated affects the way decisions are made3.
In conclusion, performance should continue to act as a (red) flag to help us
identify potential changes in a manger investment process. But systematically
terminating underperforming managers might not be the optimal strategy. In other
words, an effective managers’ selection/termination process should not focus solely
on attribute (performance) but also consider the circumstance (“bad break” vs. bad
process) that shaped performance4.
Good Outcome Bad Outcome
Good Process Deserved Success Bad Break
Bad Process Dumb Luck Poetic Justice
2
“More than You Know” – Michael J. Mauboussin
3
Former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin
4
“Wining Decisions” - Russo and Shoemaker
Samuel Kunz - PABF Page 2 of 2 8/2/2010