cyber law sectins cases

1. Central Government Act
Section 43 in The Information Technology Act, 2000
43 45 [Penalty and compensation] for damage to computer, computer system, etc. -If
any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a
computer, computer system or computer network,-
(a) accesses or secures access to such computer, computer system or computer
network 46 [or computer resource];
(b) downloads, copies or extracts any data, computer data base or information from
such computer, computer system or computer network including information or
data held or stored in any removable storage medium;
(c) introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer
virus into any computer, computer system or computer network;
(d) damages or causes to be damaged any computer, computer system or computer
network, data, computer data base or any other programmes residing in such
computer, computer system or computer network;
(e) disrupts or causes disruption of any computer, computer system or computer
network;
(f) denies or causes the denial of access to any person authorised to access any
computer, computer system or computer network by any means;
(g) provides any assistance to any person to facilitate access to a computer, computer
system or computer network in contravention of the provisions of this Act, rules or
regulations made thereunder;
(h) charges the services availed of by a person to the account of another person by
tampering with or manipulating any computer, computer system, or computer
network,
47 [(i) destroys, deletes or alters any information residing in a computer resource or
diminishes its value or utility or affects it injuriously by any means;]
If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge
of a computer, computer system or computer network-
(i) accesses such computer, computer system or computer network or computer
resource; (ii) downloads, copies or computer system or computer network or
computer resource; (ii) downloads, copies or extracts any data, computer data-base
or information; (iii) introduces or causes to be introduced any computer
contaminant or computer virus; (iv) damages or causes to be damaged any
computer, computer system or computer network data, computer database or any
other programmes; (v) disrupts or causes disruption; (vi) denies or causes the denial
of access to any person authorised to access; (vii) provides any assistance to any
person to facilitate access in contravention of the provisions of this Act; (viii) charges
the services availed of by a person to the account of another person by tampering
with or manipulating any computer, computer system or computer network;
destroys, deletes or alters any information residing in a computer resource or
diminishes its value or utility or affects it injuriously by any means; (x) steal,
conceals, destroys or alters or causes any person to steal, conceal, destroy or alter

2. any computer source code with intention to cause damage; he shall be liable to pay
damages by way of compensation to the person so affected
Under Section 43A of the (Indian) Information Technology Act, 2000, a body corporate who is
possessing, dealing or handling any sensitive personal data or information, and is negligent in
implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices resulting in wrongful loss or wrongful
gain to any person, then such body corporate may be held liable to pay damages to the person so
affected. It is important to note that there is no upper limit specified for the compensation that can be
claimed by the affected party in such circumstances.
Under
Section 65(B) of Indian Evidence Act. :Admissibility Of
Electronic Records.
Section 65(B) of Indian Evidence Act.
—————————————————————————————————-
Section 65(B). Admissibility Of Electronic Records-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is
printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer
(hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions
mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be
admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents
of the original or any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in the Sub-section (1) in respect to the computer output shall be following,
namely:
(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by computer during the period over which
computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried
on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of computer.
(b) during the said period the information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from
which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the
said activities.

3. (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in
respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation for that part of the period,
was not such to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents.
(d) The information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into
computer in ordinary course of said activities.
(3) Where over any period, the function of storing and processing information for the purposes of any activities
regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) was regularly performed by
the computers, whether-
(a) by a combination of computer operating over that period, or
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period of time; or
(d) in any other manner involving successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more
computers and one or more combinations of computers,
all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purpose of this section as
constituting a single computer Page 3097 and any reference in the section to a computer shall be construed
accordingly.
————————————————————————————————————————————
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Delhi High Court
Info Edge (India) Ltd. And Ors. vs Mr. Sanjeev Goyal on 16 November, 2007
Author: A Kumar
Bench: A Kumar
JUDGMENT
Anil Kumar, J.
Page 3092

4. IA No. 6066 of 2007
1. This is an application by the defendant seeking condensation of delay in filing the written statement alleging
that there are exceptional circumstances in the facts and circumstances for condensation of delay.
2. The defendant specifically contended that he had not been served properly by the plaintiff till the date of
filing of the written statement. It is contended that the plaintiff had been sending emails to him without serving
him with the entire paper book of the suit.
3. The defendant/applicant asserted that he is the Registrar with NIXI and he came in contact with Mr. Rishi
Chawla, Advocate, who informed him that he has been working in the High Court of Delhi with Mr. C.V.
Francis, Advocate, and he with his senior will be able to look after the matter properly. A vakalatnama of Mr.
C.V. Francis was sent by Mr. Rishi Chawla, Advocate, for signing and then sending it back to Mr. C.V.
Francis which was done by Page 3093 the defendant. The applicant further asserted that Mr. Rishi Chawla,
Advocate, was paid Rs. 25,000/- by the defendant for contesting the suit on his behalf and for making the
payment to Mr. C.V. Francis, Advocate, which amount was withdrawn by the defendant/applicant from an
ICICI Bank’s ATM at Connaught Place, Delhi. Mr. Rishi Chawla, Advocate had assured the applicant that Mr.
C.V. Francis, Advocate, shall look after the matter and will intimate him as to whatsoever is to be done. The
defendant/applicant had also sent some relevant documents to the said advocate through courier. Since the
documents had been received by Mr. C.V. Francis, Advocate, and since nothing was demanded from him, the
defendant remained under the bonafide impression that everything is being taken care of in the suit, as
defendant was not aware of the legalities involved. The applicant categorically contended that at no point of
time he was called upon to appear in the court or to take any further steps though he had been in continuous
touch with Mr. Rishi Chawla, Advocate. It is contended by the defendant that he had been visiting Delhi
regularly on account of his professional activities and had been meeting Mr. Rishi Chawla, Advocate, in this
regard who always represented that the counsel is appearing on his behalf as a power of attorney had already
been signed by the defendant and sent to him.
4. The applicant has contended that he received the letter dated 24th February, 2007 from Francis and George,
Advocates and Consultants, of Mr. C.V. Francis, Advocate, asking him to make suitable arrangement for
defending the applications before the court since he was not in the picture and not able to defend the defendant.
This letter completely surprised the defendant because he was under the bona fide impression that since he has
paid the fees and sent the document, the case is being contested on his behalf. The said counsel had also
written a letter dated 16th February, 2007 to the counsel for the plaintiff stipulating that he is not a counsel for
Mr. Sanjiv Goel, defendant/applicant although a colleague of Mr. C.V. Francis had appeared in the court on
account of telephonic information. In his letter to the counsel for the plaintiff, it was also stated that he has not
received any vakalatnama nor he has been instructed by the applicant to represent before the court and he is
helpless to deal with the situation and, therefore, the plaintiff was asked to deal directly with the defendant

5. since the counsel, Mr. C.V. Francis alleged that he was not in the picture. The said counsel, however, never
intimated the defendant that he had not received the vakalatnama signed and sent by the defendant and that he
has not been instructed and paid fees by Rishi Chawla advocate.
5. The applicant contended that on receipt of such a letter from Mr. C.V. Francis, Advocate, he tried to contact
Mr. Rishi Chawla a number of times but could not contact him for considerable time as his mobile number was
either out of reach or switched off and, therefore, the defendant came personally to Delhi and contacted Mr.
Rishi Chawla, Advocate, who after persistence enquiry by the applicant brought a file consisting of few
documents placed haphazardly and delivered it to him against a receipt about the receipt of case file by the
applicant. The said counsel, Mr. Rishi Chawla, Advocate, also refused to return the money which was paid by
the defendant to him and any other information about the progress of case and as to what was Page 3094 done
on his behalf in the case. The applicant also contended that in the meantime a police man approached his place
at Mumbai with bailable warrants issued by this Court. Therefore, another counsel was engaged by the
applicant who inspected the file when it transpired that no steps were taken by the counsel who appeared on
behalf of the applicant nor filed the power of attorney or any memorandum of appearance nor the written
statement on behalf of the applicant. Therefore, the new counsel immediately prepared the written statement
and filed the same along with the present application for condensation of delay dated 15th May, 2007. The
defendant/applicant has also filed the application for vacation of the stay under Order XXXIX Rule 4 read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure after stopping his web site as an interim injunction order was
passed against him which was not communicated to him earlier.
6. The applicant has also filed a number of documents showing that the website of the plaintiff ‘Naukri.com’ in
the list of job sites has also included the website of the applicant ‘Noukri.com’. A copy of this document was
taken from the Internet by the defendant on 15th June, 2006 showing that the plaintiff’s website had relied on
the URL address of the defendant till that date. The applicant also relied on the appraisal of domain names
reflecting that a combined domain name appraisal value secured by plaintiff was 442 and the estimated domain
name value of the plaintiff was $ 170,612.00 in contradiction to the domain name appraisal value of 2056 of
the defendant with estimated domain name value of $ 680,536. The applicant, therefore, contended that the suit
has been filed merely with a view to usurp the goodwill and the reputation of the defendant and there was no
reason for the defendant not to contest the suit or delay the suit as later on it transpired that an ex parte order
had been obtained by the plaintiff by misstating the facts. The defendant stated that he has closed his website
on account of interim order passed by the Court and is suffering substantially. The applicant/defendant also
contended that the written statement could not be filed as he was not aware that it had to be filed within 30
days nor the counsel had informed him about the same and he has been misled by the counsel to whom
consideration demanded by him was paid. Despite the fact that the counsel engaged by the defendant, Mr.
Rishi Chawla, Advocate, was paid the fees and the vakalatnama was sent to Mr. Francis Advocate though he
alleged that he has not been paid any consideration and that he had not received the vakalatnama and only on
account of telephonic information to him, one of his colleagues had appeared in the case. The applicant

6. contended that he bona fide believed that the counsel will look after his interest and will advise him as to what
is to be done. He had entrusted some of the relevant papers and had also paid the fees and had also sent the
vakalatnama. The applicant contended that in these circumstances, the loss which will be caused to the
applicant shall be immense which cannot be compensated in terms of money, in case his right to file the
written statement is closed compared to the loss to the plaintiff, as he already has an ex parte order because of
which the defendant business has come to a knot and the delay, if any, in filing the written statement can be
compensated by awarding cost to the plaintiff.
Page 3095
7. The application is contested by the plaintiff alleging inter alia that the written statement has been filed one
year after the institution of the present suit and consequently it is beyond the period of 30 days and 90 days as
contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff/non-applicant also contended that the summons
were served by courier and an affidavit of the clerk of the plaintiff counsel was filed on 10th October, 2006
along with courier receipt and report from the site of the courier intimating that the article had been delivered
to the defendant on 8th September, 2006.
8. It is further contended that the Joint Registrar on 11th October, 2006 had recorded that the service had been
effected upon the defendant and placed the matter before the court on 18th December, 2006 on which date Mr.
C.V. Francis, Advocate, appeared for the defendant and sought time to file the written statement and he was
given time to file the written statement within the time prescribed by the law.
9. The plaintiff also contended that the pending applications IA Nos. 1784 and 1785/2007 were filed under
Order 39 Rule 2A for continued breach of injunction order for transfer of the domain name and the Court
issued notice for 1st March, 2007 directing the presence of defendant in person. On 1st March, 2007 since the
defendant did not appear, as the counsel, Mr. C.V. Francis, stated that he has not received any instructions and
sought his discharge, therefore, the bailable warrants were issued against the defendant for 16th May, 2007. On
16th May, 2007, defendant appeared through a counsel and the bailable warrants were discharged. According
to the plaintiff, the defendant has willfully dis-obeyed the order of injunction passed on 8th May, 2006 and he
stopped operating his website on 11th May, 2007 though he was served on 8th September, 2006 and
consequently the conduct of the defendant dis-entitles him for any condensation of delay as there are no
bonafide reasons. The plaintiff also contended that the allegations by the defendant against his erstwhile
counsel are false, as it is evident from the order dated 1st March, 2007 where the learned Counsel made a
statement that he had not received any instructions and therefore, he had sought a discharge. The plaintiff has
also contended that defendant himself was sending emails to the plaintiff admitting that he had come to know
about the suit, which clearly discloses that the defendant was clearly posted about the present matter and
proceedings and, therefore, the defendant cannot blame his lawyer and there are no grounds for condensation
of delay in filing the written statement.

7. 10. The written statement has since been filed by the defendant on 15th May, 2007. For the defendant to file a
written statement within time contemplated under Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not
only the knowledge of the pendency of the suit which is material but also the fact that the entire copy of the
paper book has also been supplied to the defendant and received by him. The plaintiff contesting the
application for condensation of delay in filing the written statement must disclose that the copy of the plaint
and the documents had been served on the defendant and despite that the written statement has not been filed.
In the present case, the plaintiff has relied on a copy of the e-mail dated 14th June, 2006, the print for which
was taken on 1st October, 2007. It is Page 3096 alleged that a copy of the interim order passed against the
defendant was sent along with the e-mail as an attachment. However, the same has not been filed in
compliance with Section 65(B) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 65(B) of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 is as under:
Section 65(B). Admissibility Of Electronic Records-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is
printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer
(hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions
mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be
admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents
of the original or any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in the Sub-section (1) in respect to the computer output shall be following,
namely:
(a) the computer output containing the information was produced by computer during the period over which
computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried
on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of computer.
(b) during the said period the information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from
which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the
said activities.
(c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in
respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation for that part of the period,
was not such to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents.

8. (d) The information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into
computer in ordinary course of said activities.
(3) Where over any period, the function of storing and processing information for the purposes of any activities
regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) was regularly performed by
the computers, whether-
(a) by a combination of computer operating over that period, or
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period of time; or
(d) in any other manner involving successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more
computers and one or more combinations of computers,
all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purpose of this section as
constituting a single computer Page 3097 and any reference in the section to a computer shall be construed
accordingly.
(4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate
doing any of the following things, that is to say, -
a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was
produced;
b) giving such particulars of such device involved in the production of electronic record as maybe appropriate
for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer.
c)Dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in Sub-section (2) relates,
and purporting to be signed by the person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation
of the relevant device or management of relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any
matters stated in the certificate; and for the purpose of this section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated
to best of knowledge or best of belief of the person stating it.
(5) For the purpose of this section,-

9. (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and
whether it is so supplied directly ( with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate
equipment.
(b) whether in course of activities carried on by any official information is supplied with a view to its being
stored or processed for the purpose of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in course of those
activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to the computer in
course of those activities.
(c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it
directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.
Explanation – For the purpose of this section any references to information being derived from another
information shall be a reference to it’s being derived there from by calculation, comparison or any other
process.
11. Though it is alleged that a copy of the interim order dated 8th May, 2006 was scanned and was attached
with the e-mail, however, from the copy of the e-mail it is not apparent as to what was sent along with alleged
e-mail. No report or affidavit has been filed fulfillling the condition contemplated under Section 65(B) of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to show that e-mail was sent to the defendant and was received by him along with
any attachment. On the basis of alleged e-mail, it could not be expected that the defendant could file the
written statement refuting the pleas and contentions raised by the plaintiff and refuting or admitting the
documents relied on by the plaintiff.
12. The plaintiff has also contended that the summons of the suit were served on the defendant by courier and a
copy of courier receipt along with Page 3098 the affidavit of Mr. Kamal Mehra, clerk of the counsel for the
plaintiff has been filed. From the index of the plaint, it appears that there are 63 pages in the plaint which
include list of documents, list of reliance, applications and vakalatnama and the documents which have been
filed by the plaintiff along with the suit also run into about 188 pages out of which documents which are on
pages from 183 to 188 are the folders of thick paper and quite heavy. From the courier receipt, it appears that
the weight of the paper book which was sent was only 1.500 kg. There is no acknowledgment receipt that the
articles sent by courier were served and received by the defendant except the alleged copy of status report of
courier article taken by the plaintiff from the Internet which is again not in compliance with Section 65(B) of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 nor it is in compliance with Order V Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In
the circumstances, there is nothing to show that defendant was served with the copy of the plaint, applications
and copies of the documents relied on by the plaintiff which was filed along with the plaint. In the
circumstances, this cannot be accepted to be a valid service on the defendant so as to make him liable to file
the written statement within thirty days from the alleged date of service.

10. 13. Mr. C.V. Francis, learned Counsel, appeared on behalf of defendant on 18th December, 2006 and sought
time to file the written statement. However, neither the vakalatnama of Mr. C.V. Francis is on record nor any
memo of appearance has been filed by the said counsel appearing on behalf of defendant. The counsel had
alleged in his letter to the counsel for the plaintiff and in the letter to the defendant that he had appeared in the
case on account of telephonic instructions and he had no other knowledge about the matter. From the order
dated 18th December, 2006 it does not appear that a complete set of paper book was given to the said counsel
in the Court. The case of the defendant is that he had engaged Mr. Rishi Chawla, Advocate, who was also
associated with NIXI where the defendant is a Registrar. It has also been contended specifically that Mr. Rishi
Chawla, Advocate, was paid Rs. 25,000/- which fact cannot be doubted in the present facts and circumstances.
The defendant has categorically contended that he has not been served properly till the time of filing the
written statement. According to the defendant, he had sent all relevant documents to Mr. C.V. Francis, through
courier, however, Mr. C.V. Francis, Advocate, had stated in a letter written to the counsel for the plaintiff that
the vakalatnama has not been received by him. Without the vakalatnama or memo of appearance filed by the
counsel who appeared only on account of telephonic instruction given to him by another counsel, he could not
seek time to file the written statement on behalf of the defendant nor it will be appropriate to compute the time
from the date when Mr. Francis sought time to file written statement in the present facts and circumstances of
the case. Mr. Francis did not know whether the defendant has been served with the complete paper book or
not. The case is very peculiar because Mr. C.V. Francis was not engaged by the defendant but he was entrusted
brief by Mr. Rishi Chawla, Advocate, telephonically and it seems Mr. Rishi Chawla also did not pay any fees
to Mr. Francis though he had received the fees from the defendant. Mr. C.V. Francis Page 3099
communication stipulates that he appeared in the court on account of the telephonic message received by him
perhaps from Mr. Rishi Chawla, Advocate, without any further authorization. He has categorically contended
that he is not the counsel for the defendant. The said counsel had also intimated the defendant by letter dated
24th February, 2007 that he is not his counsel as he had appeared on account of telephonic instructions from
Mr. Rishi Chawla and defendant should make suitable arrangement for defending the suit as he is not in the
picture. On receiving this communication from Mr. C.V. Francis, Advocate, who appeared without proper
authorization on behalf of defendant and sought time to file the written statement without knowing whether the
defendant has been served with a copy of full paper book. The plaintiff thereafter, engaged Mr. A.K. Singh,
Advocate who filed the written statement dated 15th May, 2007. If the time is computed after 24th February,
2007 when the intimation was sent by Mr. C.V. Francis, Advocate, to the applicant/defendant that he is not
representing him and is not his counsel, then written statement has been filed within 90 days and there is
sufficient cause for condensation of delay in filing the written statement.
14. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff has also emphasized on an application for rectification filed by the
defendant before the Intellectual Property Office in June 2006 stipulating about the case filed by the plaintiff
against the defendant. I think, in the present facts and circumstances, mere knowledge of the filing of the case
will not be sufficient nor will impute the liability on the defendant to file the written statement within 30 days
of such knowledge, unless the copies of the plaint, applications and documents were served on the defendant.

11. Merely on the basis of the knowledge of the pendency of the case, it is not expected from the defendant to
comprehend the allegations made against him and the documents which have been filed and to file a written
statement within 30 days of such knowledge. Even on this ground, the plaintiff cannot succeed and contend
that the right of the defendant to file the written statement be closed as he did not file the written statement
within 30 days of such knowledge.
15. In any case, considering various other pleas, on the merit of the case, where the defendant has shown that
his domain name appraisal value was much more than the plaintiff and the other factors, it appears that the
defendant would not have gained anything from delaying the suit as an interim order had already been passed
against him. Whether the defendant has violated the interim order or not, is to be decided separately, as an
application for alleged violation of the interim order is pending and in the present application, in the present
facts and circumstances, on the ground of alleged violation of the order, the right of the defendant to file the
written statement should not be closed in the interest of justice.
16. The defendant has contended that he had not been served though he had knowledge of the pendency of the
suit and only after the counsel Mr. C.V. Francis’s letter that he will not represent him and he should employ a
new counsel, Mr. A.K. Singh was appointed who probably inspected the file, got the documents and prepared
the written statement within 90 days. In the circumstances, as the defendant was not properly served by courier
Page 3100 or by any other mode, therefore, it cannot be held that the period for counting the time will
commence from 18th December, 2006 when Mr. C.V. Francis, Advocate who did not file his vakalatnama and
who also did not file his memo of appearance on behalf of defendant, had sought time to file the written
statement. Even if, it is presumed for some reason that the time should commence from 18th December, 2006,
still, in the facts and circumstances, the defendant has been able to make out a case of exceptional
circumstances for condensation of delay in filing the written statement. The plaintiff has already obtained an ex
parte order pursuant to which the website of the defendant has been closed.
17. It is no more res integra that in spite of the time limit contemplated by Rule 1 under Order VIII of the Code
of Civil Procedure having expired, the Court is not powerless to permit a written statement being filed, if the
Court may require such written statement. The Court also need not necessarily pronounce judgment against the
defendant who fails to file the written statement as required by Rule 1 or Rule 9 and may still make such other
order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. If the written statement is not filed within ninety days no penal
consequences as such has been provided and relying on these features the Supreme Court in Kailash v.
Nanhku had held:
28. All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of
processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to
advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of
participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the
statute, the provisions of CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which

12. would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The observations made
by Krishna Iyer, J. in Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar 10 are pertinent: (SCC p. 777, paras 5-6)
The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a judge’s conscience and points an angry interrogation at
the law reformer.
The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice.
The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels
consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise
would be wholly inequitable. Justice is the goal of jurisprudence – processual, as much as substantive.
18. The Apex Court in Nankhu (supra) had thus held that the provision has to be construed as directory and not
mandatory and in exceptional circumstances, the Court may extend the time for filing the written statement
Page 3101 though the period of 30 days and 90 days as contemplated in the provision has expired. The
extension can be only by way of an exception and for reasons assigned by the defendant and also recorded in
writing by the Court to its satisfaction and if required in the interest of justice and if grave injustice would be
occasioned if the time is not extended. This was also held that the Court may extend time by imposing costs
for dual purpose: (i) to deter the defendant from seeking any extension of time just for asking and (ii) to
compensate the plaintiff for the delay and inconvenience caused to him. A two Judges Bench of the Apex
Court in Rani Kusum v. Kanchan Devi had relied on the ratio of three Judges bench in
Nanhko (supra) and had held that Order 8 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure is a part of procedural law and
hence directory, keeping in view the need for expeditious trial of civil causes which persuaded Parliament to
enact the provision in its present form. It was held that ordinarily the time schedule contained in the provision
is to be followed as a rule and departure there from would be by way of exception. A prayer for extension of
time made by the defendant is not to be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for the asking, more so
when the period of 90 days has expired. Extension of time may be allowed by way of an exception, for reasons
to be assigned by the defendant and also be placed on record in writing, howsoever briefly, by the court on its
being satisfied. Extension of time may be allowed, if it is needed to be given for circumstances which are
exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and grave injustice would be
occasioned if the time is not extended. Costs may be imposed and affidavit or documents in support of the
grounds pleaded by the defendant for extension of time may be demanded, depending on the facts and
circumstances of a given case. This ratio was again reiterated by another bench of two Hon’ble Judges of
Supreme Court in Sk. Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar relying on Nanhku (supra) and Rani Kusum
(supra) holding that the Extension of time can be allowed, if it is needed to be given for circumstances which
are exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and grave injustice would be
occasioned, if the time is not extended and for this costs may be imposed and affidavit or documents in support
of the grounds pleaded by the defendant for extension of time may be demanded, depending on the facts and
circumstances of a given case. It was held as under:

13. 19. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the court could not have granted time beyond 90 days.
This plea is untenable in view of what has been stated in Kailash case and Rani Kusum case. Additionally a
party cannot be made to suffer if the court has committed a mistake, if for the sake of argument it is held that
the court had mistakenly granted time.
Page 3102
19. This also cannot be disputed that in certain circumstances, a party cannot be allowed to suffer for
misdemeanor or inaction of his counsel. Reliance can be placed on Rafiq v. Munshilal , where at page 790 the
Apex Court had held as under:
3. …After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his
interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required
but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the
proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in
the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in
the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr. A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the
High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular
Bench. Maybe, we do not know, he is better informed in this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even
if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may discourage
such a tendency, would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute. What is the fault of the party who
having done everything in his power expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we
reject this appeal, as Mr. A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer
who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is
proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The
answer obviously is in the negative. Maybe that the learned Advocate absented himself deliberately or
intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on that
aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his
chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both
dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal be restored to its original
number in the High Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will
continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the
costs of the respondent here. As we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was
possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs. 200 should be recovered from the advocate
who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr. A.K.
Sanghi.
20. Default by a lawyer in not informing the dismissal of the writ petition to a Corporation which corporation
after coming to know about the default, engaged another lawyer and removed the defaulting lawyer from the

14. panel Page 3103 and filed an appeal seeking condensation of delay on account of default of the lawyer, was
held to have sufficient cause for condensation of delay by the Supreme Court in Devendra Swamy v.
Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation AIR 2002 SC 2545. In another matter , Municipal Corporation,
Gwalior v. Ramcharan (D) by L.Rs., the Supreme Court had held that the counsel and the Revenue Officer,
who filed their affidavits, did not have any personal interest in the matter and the learned advocate appearing
for the Municipal Corporation was not going to gain anything either by remaining absent at the time of hearing
of the first appeal or by assigning a false cause for his non-appearance at the time of hearing. It was held that
since the valuable rights of the parties in an immovable property were involved and therefore, on the totality of
the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court ought to have taken a liberal, and not a rigid and too
technical a view of the issue before it, and should have condoned the delay in filing the appeal and
concentrated on examining whether the appeal raised any substantial question of law worth being heard by the
High Court and therefore, had held that a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before
the High Court was made out on account of default of the lawyer. Regarding condensation of delay it was held
that the expression `sufficient cause’ is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in meaningful
manner to subserve the ends of justice and had enunciated the principles in , Collector Land
Acquisition, Anantnag and anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. for having a liberal approach as follows:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and
cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a
cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not
every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic
manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial
justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
Page 3104

15. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
21. The learned Counsel for the plaintiff has relied on 130 (2000) DLT 629, HTIL Corporation, B.V and Ors.
v. Ajay Kohli and Ors. to contend that the defendant is not entitled for condensation of delay in filing the
written statement. Apparently the facts of the case relied on by the plaintiff are quite distinguishable and in
those facts and circumstances, it was held that the defendant was not entitled for condensation of delay in filing
the written statement as the defendant had failed to make out any good ground justifying delay in filing written
statement despite time given by the court.
22. In case the delay in filing a written statement is not condoned in the facts and circumstances it will
occasion injustice especially as the plaintiff already has an ex parte interim order pursuant to which the
defendant has already stopped his web site. Extension of time is to be allowed in the present facts and
circumstances which are exceptional and are occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant. The
Apex Court in Rafiq (supra) had held that a party cannot be allowed to suffer for misdemeanor or inaction of
his counsel. The defendant has categorically contended that he had not been served with the summons of the
suit and the applications and on the basis of his knowledge he had engaged the counsel Shri Rishi Chawla who
further entrusted the brief to Shri C.V.Francis who however, took a plea that he was informed telephonically
only and had no instructions in the brief and he asked the defendant to engage some other counsel.
23. Considering various other factors, it will be just and appropriate to impose cost on the defendant for the
delay in filing the written statement to be paid to the plaintiff and condone the delay in filing the written
statement.
24. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the application is allowed subject to cost of Rs. 10,000/- payable by the
defendant to the plaintiff to be paid within four weeks and delay in filing the written statement by the
defendant is condoned and the written statement is taken on record.
CS(OS) No. 783/2006
Written statement is taken on record. Replication, if any, be filed within four weeks.
Parties are directed to file their original documents or certified copies thereof within 8 weeks.
List before the Joint Registrar for admission/denial and marking of documents on 25.1.2008.
List before the Court on 7.3.2008 for framing of issues.

16. IA Nos. 6065 and 6067 of 2007
List for hearing on 7.3.2008.
Interim orders to continue.
65-69
IT Act Section 66 to 69

17. Sec 66. Computer Related Offences
If any person, dishonestly, or fraudulently, does any act referred to in section
43, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years or with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees or with both.
Explanation: For the purpose of this section,-
a) the word “dishonestly” shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 24 of
the
Indian Penal Code;
b) the word “fraudulently” shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 25 of
the Indian Penal Code.
66 A Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc
Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication
device,-
a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing
annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation,
enmity, hatred, or ill will, persistently makes by making use of such computer
resource or a communication device,
c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing
annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or
recipient about the origin of such messages shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, terms “Electronic mail” and
“Electronic Mail Message” means a message or information created or transmitted
or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or
communication device including attachments in text, image, audio, video and any
other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message.
66 B. Punishment for dishonestly receiving stolen computer resource or communication
device

18. Whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen computer resource or
communication device knowing or having reason to believe the same to be
stolen computer resource or communication device, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years
or with fine which may extend to rupees one lakh or with both.
66C Punishment for identity theft
Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly make use of the electronic signature,
password or any other unique identification feature of any other person, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to rupees one
lakh.
66D Punishment for cheating by personation by using computer resource
Whoever, by means of any communication device or computer resource cheats
by personation, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which
may extend to one lakh rupees.
66E Punishment for violation of privacy
Whoever, intentionally or knowingly captures, publishes or transmits the image of
a private area of any person without his or her consent, under circumstances
violating the privacy of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment which
may extend to three years or with fine not exceeding two lakh rupees, or with
both Explanation.- For the purposes of this section–
(a) “transmit” means to electronically send a visual image with the intent that it
be viewed by a person or persons;
(b) “capture”, with respect to an image, means to videotape, photograph, film or
record by any means;
(c) “private area” means the naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area,
buttocks or female breast;
(d) “publishes” means reproduction in the printed or electronic form and making
it available for public;
(e) “under circumstances violating privacy” means circumstances in which a
person can have a reasonable expectation that–

19. (i) he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image
of his private area was being captured; or
(ii) any part of his or her private area would not be visible to the public,
regardless of whether that person is in a public or private place.
66F. Punishment for cyber terrorism
(1) Whoever,-
(A) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or
to strike terror in the people or any section of the people by –
(i) denying or cause the denial of access to any person authorized to access
computer resource; or
(ii) attempting to penetrate or access a computer resource without authorisation
or exceeding authorized access; or
(iii) introducing or causing to introduce any Computer Contaminant. and by
means of such conduct causes or is likely to cause death or injuries to persons
or damage to or destruction of property or disrupts or knowing that it is likely
to cause damage or disruption of supplies or services essential to the life of
the community or adversely affect the critical information infrastructure specified
under section 70, or
(B) knowingly or intentionally penetrates or accesses a computer resource without
authorisation or exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct
obtains access to information, data or computer database that is restricted for
reasons of the security of the State or foreign relations; or any restricted
information, data or computer database, with reasons to believe that such
information, data or computer database so obtained may be used to cause or
likely to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India,
the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order,
decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement
to an offence, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, group of individuals or
otherwise, commits the offence of cyber terrorism.
(2) Whoever commits or conspires to commit cyber terrorism shall be punishable
with imprisonment which may extend to imprisonment for life’.
67. Punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form

20. Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published in the electronic form,
any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect
is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having
regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained
or embodied in it, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to three years and with fine
which may extend to five lakh rupees and in the event of a second or
subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to five years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh
rupees.
67 A Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually explicit
act, etc. in electronic form
Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the
electronic form any material which contains sexually explicit act or conduct shall
be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to ten lakh
rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and also with
fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees.
Exception: This section and section 67 does not extend to any book, pamphlet,
paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure in electronic form-
(i) the publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public
good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting,
representation or figure is in the interest of science,literature,art,or learning or
other objects of general concern; or
(ii) which is kept or used bona fide for religious purposes.
67 B Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material depicting children in sexually
explicit act, etc. in electronic form
Whoever,-
(a) publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted material in
any electronic form which depicts children engaged in sexually explicit act or
conduct or

21. (b) creates text or digital images, collects, seeks, browses, downloads, advertises,
promotes, exchanges or distributes material in any electronic form depicting
children in obscene or indecent or sexually explicit manner or
(c) cultivates, entices or induces children to online relationship with one or more
hildren for and on sexually explicit act or in a manner that may offend a
reasonable adult on the computer resource or
(d) facilitates abusing children online or
(e) records in any electronic form own abuse or that of others pertaining to
sexually explicit act with children, shall be punished on first conviction with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years
and with a fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and in the event of
second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years and also with fine which may extend to
ten lakh rupees: Provided that the provisions of section 67, section 67A and this
section does not extend to any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting,
representation or figure in electronic form-
(i) The publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public
good on the ground that such book, pamphlet, paper writing, drawing, painting,
representation or figure is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or
other objects of general concern; or
(ii) which is kept or used for bonafide heritage or religious purposes
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, “children” means a person who
has not completed the age of 18 years.
67 C. Preservation and Retention of information by intermediaries
(1) Intermediary shall preserve and retain such information as may be specified
for such duration and in such manner and format as the Central Government
may prescribe.
(2) Any intermediary who intentionally or knowingly contravenes the provisions of
sub section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
68. Power of Controller to give directions

22. (1) The Controller may, by order, direct a Certifying Authority or any employee
of such Authority to take such measures or cease carrying on such activities as
specified in the order if those are necessary to ensure compliance with the
provisions of this Act, rules or any regulations made there under.
(2) Any person who intentionally or knowingly fails to comply with any order
under sub-section (1) shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine not
exceeding one lakh rupees or to both.
Sec 69. Powers to issue directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any
information through any computer resource
(1) Where the central Government or a State Government or any of its officer
specially authorized by the Central Government or the State Government, as the
case may be, in this behalf may, if is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient
to do in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of India, defense of India,
security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for
preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to
above or for investigation of any offence, it may, subject to the provisions of
sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any
agency of the appropriate Government to intercept, monitor or decrypt or cause
to be intercepted or monitored or decrypted any information transmitted received
or stored through any computer resource.
(2) The Procedure and safeguards subject to which such interception or
monitoring or decryption may be carried out, shall be such as may be
prescribed
(3) The subscriber or intermediary or any person in charge of the computer
resource shall, when called upon by any agency which has been directed under
sub section (1), extend all facilities and technical assistance to –
(a) provide access to or secure access to the computer resource containing such
information; generating, transmitting, receiving or storing such information; or
(b) intercept or monitor or decrypt the information, as the case may be; or
(c) provide information stored in computer resource.
(4) The subscriber or intermediary or any person who fails to assist the agency
referred to in sub-section (3) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term
which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

23. Sec 69 A Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information
through any computer resource
(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorized by it
in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the
interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the
State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing
incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may
subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) for reasons to be recorded in
writing, by order direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block
access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by public any
information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer
resource.
(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by
the public may be carried out shall be such as may be prescribed.
(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section
(1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend
to seven years and also be liable to fine.
Sec 69B Power to authorize to monitor and collect traffic data or information through any
computer resource for Cyber Security
(1) The Central Government may, to enhance Cyber Security and for
identification, analysis and prevention of any intrusion or spread of computer
contaminant in the country, by notification in the official Gazette, authorize any
agency of the Government to monitor and collect traffic data or information
generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource.
(2) The Intermediary or any person in-charge of the Computer resource shall
when called upon by the agency which has been authorized under sub-section
(1), provide technical assistance and extend all facilities to such agency to
enable online access or to secure and provide online access to the computer
resource generating , transmitting, receiving or storing such traffic data or
information.
(3) The procedure and safeguards for monitoring and collecting traffic data or
information, shall be such as may be prescribed.
(4) Any intermediary who intentionally or knowingly contravenes the provisions of
sub-section (2) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

24. Explanation: For the purposes of this section,
(i) “Computer Contaminant” shall have the meaning assigned to it in section 43
(ii) “traffic data” means any data identifying or purporting to identify any person,
computer system or computer network or location to or from which the
communication is or may be transmitted and includes communications origin,
destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type of underlying service or any
other information.
Central Government Act
Section 70 in The Information Technology Act, 2000
70 Protected system. - 85 [
(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare
any computer resource which directly or indirectly affects the facility of Critical
Information Infrastructure, to be a protected system. Explanation. -For the purposes
of this section, "Critical Information Infrastructure" means the computer resource,
the incapacitation or destruction of which, shall have debilitating impact on national
security, economy, public health or safety.]
(2) The appropriate Government may, by order in writing, authorise the persons
who are authorised to access protected systems notified under sub-section (1).
(3) Any person who secures access or attempts to secure access to a protected system
in contravention of the provisions of this section shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and
shall also be liable to fine
503. Criminal intimidation.—Whoever threatens another with any injury to his
person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom
that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that
person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act
which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of
such threat, commits criminal intim idation. Explanation.—A threat to injure the
reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is
within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from
prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of criminal
intimidation.

25. 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.—Whoever cheats and
thereby dishonestly induces the person de ceived to deliver any property to any
person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or
anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a
valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 499 in The Indian Penal Code
499. Defamation.—Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by
signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning
any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such
imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases
hereinafter expected, to defame that person. Explanation 1.—It may amount to
defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm
the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of
his family or other near relatives. Explanation 2.—It may amount to defamation to
make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons
as such. Explanation 3.—An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed
ironically, may amount to defamation. Explanation 4.—No imputation is said to
harm a person’s reputa tion, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the
estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or
lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers
the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in
a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgrace ful. Illustrations
(a) A says—“Z is an honest man; he never stole B’s watch”; in tending to cause it to
be believed that Z did steal B’s watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of
the exceptions.
(b) A is asked who stole B’s watch. A points to Z, intending to cause it to be believed
that Z stole B’s watch. This is defama tion unless it fall within one of the exceptions.
(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B’s watch, intending it to be believed
that Z stole B’s watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.
First Exception.—Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or
published.—It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any
person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published.
Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact. Second Exception.—
Public conduct of public servants.—It is not defamation to express in a good faith

26. any opinion whatever re specting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of
his public functions, or respecting his character, so far as his character appears in
that conduct, and no further. Third Exception.—Conduct of any person touching any
public question.—It is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever
respecting the conduct of any person touching any public question, and respecting
his character, so far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further.
Illustration It is not defamation in A to express in good faith any opinion whatever
respecting Z’s conduct in petitioning Government on a public question, in signing a
requisition for a meeting on a public question, in presiding or attending a such
meeting, in forming or joining any society which invites the public support, in voting
or canvassing for a particular candidate for any situa tion in the efficient discharges
of the duties of which the public is interested. Fourth Exception.—Publication of
reports of proceedings of Courts.—It is not defamation to publish substantially true
report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result of any such
proceedings. Explanation.—A Justice of the Peace or other officer holding an inquiry
in open Court preliminary to a trial in a Court of Jus tice, is a Court within the
meaning of the above section. Fifth Exception.—Merits of case decided in Court or
conduct of witnesses and others concerned.—It is not defamation to express in good
faith any opinion whatever respecting the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which
has been decided by a Court of Justice, or respecting the conduct of any person as a
party, witness or agent, in any such case, or respecting the character of such person,
as far as his character appears in that conduct, and no further. Illustrations
(a) A says—“I think Z’s evidence on that trial is so contradic tory that he must be
stupid or dishonest”. A is within this exception if he says this is in good faith, in as
much as the opin ion which he expresses respects Z’s character as it appears in Z’s
conduct as a witness, and no further.
(b) But if A says—“I do not believe what Z asserted at that trial because I know him
to be a man without veracity”; A is not within this exception, in as much as the
opinion which he express of Z’s character, is an opinion not founded on Z’s conduct
as a witness. Sixth Exception.—Merits of public performance.—It is not defa mation
to express in good faith any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which
its author has submitted to the judgment of the public, or respecting the character of
the author so far as his character appears in such performance, and no further.
Explanation.—A performance may be substituted to the judgment of the public
expressly or by acts on the part of the author which imply such submission to the
judgment of the public. Illustrations
(a) A person who publishes a book, submits that book to the judgment of the public.

27. (b) A person who makes a speech in public, submits that speech to the judgment of
the public.
(c) An actor or singer who appears on a public stage, submits his acting or signing in
the judgment of the public.
(d) A says of a book published by Z—“Z’s book is foolish; Z must be a weak man. Z’s
book is indecent; Z must be a man of impure mind”. A is within the exception, if he
says this in good faith, in as much as the opinion which he expresses of Z respects Z’s
character only so far as it appears in Z’s book, and no further.
(e) But if A says—“I am not surprised that Z’s book is foolish and indecent, for he is a
weak man and a libertine”. A is not within this exception, in as much as the opinion
which he expresses of Z’s character is an opinion not founded on Z’s book. Seventh
Exception.—Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful authority over
another.—It is not defamation in a person having over another any authority, either
conferred by law or arising out of a lawful contract made with that other, to pass in
good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in matters to which such lawful
authority relates. Illustration A Judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a
witness, or of an officer of the Court; a head of a department censuring in good faith
those who are under his orders; a parent censuring in good faith a child in the
presence of other children; a school-master, whose authority is derived from a
parent, censuring in good faith a pupil in the presence of other pupils; a master
censuring a servant in good faith for remissness in service; a banker censur ing in
good faith the cashier of his bank for the conduct of such cashier as such cashier—are
within this exception. Eighth Exception.—Accusation preferred in good faith to
autho rised person.—It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation
against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with
respect to the subject-matter of accusation. Illustration If A in good faith accuse Z
before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z’s
master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, and child, to Z’s father—A is
within this exception. Ninth Exception.—Imputation made in good faith by person
for protection of his or other’s interests.—It is not defamation to make an imputation
on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for
the protection of the inter ests of the person making it, or of any other person, or for
the public good. Illustrations
(a) A, a shopkeeper, says to B, who manages his business—“Sell nothing to Z unless
he pays you ready money, for I have no opin ion of his honesty”. A is within the
exception, if he has made this imputation on Z in good faith for the protection of his
own interests.

28. (b) A, a Magistrate, in making a report of his own superior offi cer, casts an
imputation on the character of Z. Here, if the imputation is made in good faith, and
for the public good, A is within the exception. Tenth Exception.—Caution intended
for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good.—It is not defamation to
convey a caution, in good faith, to one person against another, provided that such
caution be intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some
person in whom that person is inter ested, or for the public good. COMMENTS
Imputation without publication In section 499 the words “makes or publishes any
imputation” should be interpreted as words supple menting to each other. A maker
of imputation without publication is not liable to be punished under that section;
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 7 Supreme Today 12
Section 463 in The Indian Penal Code
463. Forgery.— 340 [Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic record or
part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage or injury], to
the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to
part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to
commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery.

29. Crl.R.C.No.1190 Of 2012 vs The Deputy Superintendent Of ... on 4 April,
2014
Showing the contexts in which section 43 information technology act
Special Assistant of Confidential Section in DVAC office, Chennai and departmental action
against then S.K.Upadhyay IPS and Vijayarajan, Legal Adviser, S.Prabakaran, Sub
Inspector of Police and Hariharasudhan, Police Constable. The commission also
recommended criminal action against four journalists. However, the Government of Tamil
Nadu decided to ignore the recommendations against the journalists and to accept the
remaining recommendations. Accordingly, complaint was lodged by then Home Secretary
S.Malathi IAS to Crime Branch CID, who on the basis of the complaint, registered the case
in Crime No.2/2008 under Section 5 of the Official Secrets Actand Sections 43 and 66 of
the Information Technology Act and sections 378, 463, 470 and 505 IPC.
referred to in Section 43, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years or with fine, which may extend to five lakh rupees or with both.
Explanation: For the purposes of this section - (a)the word dishonestlyshall have the
meaning assigned to it in section24 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); (b)the word
fraudulentlyshall have the meaning assigned to it in section 25 of the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860).It is sought to be argued on the side of the petitioner that under the Amended Act,
the word hacking has been removed and unauthorised access into the computer system
amounts to an offence under the New Act only if the act was done dishonestly and
fraudulently. Whereas, dishonest and fraudulent intention are absent in the present case,
as such, unless and otherwise the charge is altered, the proceedings initiated under the
Old Act cannot be allowed to go on. 7.Insofar as the second charge under section 70 of the
Old Act is concerned, Section 70 deals with protected system, which is under the
old Act and Amended act, as follows: (1)The appropriate Government

30. 8.Regarding third charge under section 72, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the
petitioner that as per the evidence of PW42/K.Natarajan, former Director of Vigilance and
Anti Corruption, no sanction was obtained to prosecute the petitioner under Section 72 of
the Act. In the absence of due sanction, the court has no jurisdiction to prosecute the
accused for the above stated offence.
Amended Act, as the amendment effects implied repeal of the State Amendment Act and
operates retrospectively:(i)(1983) 1 SCC 177 (T.Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe and another) (ii)
(1999) 9 SCC 312 (State through CBI, Delhi v. Gian Singh) (iii)(2000) 2 SCC 536 (Kolhapur
Canesugar Works Ltd and another v. Union of India and others) (iv)(2006) 6 SCC 289
(Vijay v. State of Maharashtra and others ) (v)CDJ 2008 SC 1750 (the Superintendent,
Narcotic Control Bureau v. Parash Singh) and (vi)Indian Kanoon-http://
indiankanoon.org/doc/762707/ (the Government of Tamil Nadu rep. by its Chief
Secretary v. Union of India and others) (Division Bench of our High Court). 10.The relief
sought for herein is seriously opposed by the prosecution by relying on the decision of the
larger Bench of the Supreme Court, consisting of three judges reported in (2002) 9 SCC
639 (Jagan M.Seshadri v. State of TN) and the judgment of this court in 1992 (2) MWN
(Crl.) Madras (State rep. by Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBCID, Madras v.
S.Thirunavukarasu). 11.The trial court dismissed the petition mainly on the ground that
the Information Technology Act is prospective in nature
Case 2:43 &66
A.Shankar vs State Of Tamil Nadu on 4 March, 2011
Showing the contexts in which section 43 information technology act appears in the
document
part of the Government Order No.SS.II/211-40/2008 Public (SC) Department dated 09.09.2008,
accepting the recommendation (b) (i) & (ii) of the Commission of Inquiry with a consequential
prayer for issuance of a writ in the nature of prohibition, forbearing the respondent / State from
commencing / continuing any departmental or criminal action against the petitioner in pursuance
to the said recommendations. The recommendation (b) (i) & (ii) reads as under: "(b) Thiru
A.Shankar, Special Assistant, DVAC:- (i) Criminal case may be registered and proceeded
with under Section5 of the Office Secret Act, Section 43 and 66 of

31. the Information Technology Act, Sections378, 463, 470 and 505 of India Penal Code
investigated and proceeded against Thiru A.Shankar. (ii) To initiate departmental proceedings
for misconduct and endangering the security and confidentiality of official communication by
accessing the computer unauthorisedly and leaking it to the media persons in question". 2. The
State of Tamil Nadu appointed a Commission of Inquiry, headed by the Hon'ble Thiru Justice
P.Shanmugam to; i)inquire into the origin of the alleged transcript, which appeared in the
'Deccan Chronicle dated 14.04.2008 regarding the overhearing and recording of the telephonic
conversation between
telephonic conversation, if any. iii)recommend to the Government specific civil / criminal action
to be taken against the person or agency or both who are all responsible for the alleged transcript
and also action to be taken against the person or agency or both responsible for the tapping of the
telephonic conversation, if any, between the said two senior Officers of the Government. 3. The
Commission of Inquiry submitted a report recommending to initiate the departmental as well as
criminal action against the petitioner. The State Government accepted the recommendation and
initiated departmental inquiry and also registered FIR No. 2 of 2008 dated 17.07.2008, which
reads as under: "The Government have appointed a Commission of Inquiry chaired by the Single
member, namely Hon'ble Justice Thiru P.Shamugam, Retired High Court Judge, for the purpose
of making an inquiry into the alleged transcript which appeared in the "Deccan Chronicle" dated
14.04.2008 regarding the overhearing and recording of the telephonic conversation between the
Chief Secretary to the Government and a Senior Officer. 2. Accordingly, the Commission of
Inquiry conducted an Inquiry and submitted its report to Government. The Commission found
that the Telephone conversation made on 20.09.2007 between the Chief Secretary
Anti-Corruption, did take place and the same was recorded by the former Director, Vigilance and
Anti-Corruption, in his laptop computer connected to the Telephone No.24612561. The
transcript is by and large is as appeared in Deccan Chronicle. The Commission also found that
the main person responsible for the access and the leak of the conversation is Thiru A.Shankar,
Special Assistant, Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Chennai. The Commission has
recommended that Criminal Case may be registered against Thiru A.Shankar, Special Assistant,
Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Chennai, under Section 5 of the Official
Secrets Act, Section 43and 66 of the Information Technology Act, Sections 378, 463, 470 and
505 of Indian Penal Code and investigated and proceeded against him.

32. The State Of Maharashtra vs Rajkumar Kunda Swami on 4 December, 2001
Showing the contexts in which section 43 information technology act appears in the document
The complaint was lodged by Shri Yuvraj Patil. The Assistant General Manager, Abhyudaya Co-
Op. Bank Ltd., Vashi 'Branch, Sector 17, Navi Mumbai on 28.7.2001. The F.I.R. was registered
against the respondent/accused uide C.R. No. 1-210/2001 under Sections 409, 420, 463, 464,
471, 477(A) of the Indian Penal Code and under Sections 43, 65, 66 and 73
of InformationTechnology Act, 2000. It has been stated by the complainant in the complaint
that respondent/accused Rajkumar K. Swami was working as a clerk in Abhyudaya Co-Op. Bank
Ltd., Vashi Branch, Sector 17, Navi Mumbai and looking after the maintenance and repair of the
computers in the said Bank since 1997 and all the accounts and transactions were computerised
in the Bank since 1995. The complainant has further stated that respondent/accused committed
fraud to the extent of Rs. 81 lacs by opening fictitious accounts in his own name and manipulated
the credit entries in the said
8. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, F.C. on 18.9.2001.
rejecting the application of police custody remand and granting bail and also the order passed by
the learned Sessions Court on 25.9.2001, allowing the revision but granting police custody
remand only for a day, and not cancelling the bail granted by the Magistrate, the applicant-State
of Maharashtra has approached this Court under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code and in
alternatively under Section 439(2) of Criminal Procedure Code.
10. In relation to the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, he has submitted that the
learned Sessions Judge misconstrued the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure that the period of P.C.R. can be granted only for first 15 days when
the sectionprovides that 15 days P.C.R. can be granted as a whole. He has stated that both the
Courts below failed to appreciate that investigation was at a very crucial stage and in view of the
gravity of the offence, the learned Magistrate ought not to have released the accused on bail as it
substantially hampered the course of investigation. The learned Sessions Judge ought to have

33. cancelled the bail and granted P.C.R. for seven days. The learned A.P.P. further submitted that
accused
11. The learned A.P.P. has submitted that as one of the Sections involved in this case
i.e. Section409 of the I.P.C. provides for punishment of life imprisonment, the learned
Magistrate did not have the power to grant bail. He has placed reliance upon the judgment of this
Court in State of Maharashtra v. Kashar Yasin Qaereshi and Anr. 1996(2) Mh. L.J. 485 : 1996
(5) Bom. C.R. 43. In the said judgment, this Court has held that if there are reasonable grounds
for believing that a person is a guilty of an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment
then, only the High Court or the Court of Sessions will have jurisdiction to grant bail to the
person unless the person is below 16 years of age or is a woman or is a sick or infirm
Kerala High Court
Hani Thankachan vs State Of Kerala on 16 March, 2011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Crl.Rev.Pet.No. 738 of 2011()
1. HANI THANKACHAN, W/O. THANKACHAN,
... Petitioner
2. MANIKANDAN, S/O. KUTTANPILLA, MANGALATHU
3. ANIKUMAR, S/O. K.V.KUMAR, C.C.16/434,

34. Vs
1. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE
... Respondent
2. THE SUB INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
For Petitioner :SRI.T.RAMPRASAD UNNI
For Respondent : No Appearance
The Hon'ble MR. Justice V.K.MOHANAN
Dated :16/03/2011
O R D E R
V.K.MOHANAN, J.
----------------------------------------
Crl.R.P No. 738 of 2011
----------------------------------------
Dated the 16th Day of March, 2011
ORDER
The revision petitioners are the accused in C.C.No.61/2006 on the file of the Judicial First Cass
Magistrate Court-III, Thiruvananthapruam. In this Cr.R.P., the challenge is against the order
dated 14.2.2011 in CMP No.3020/10 in C.C.No.61/2006 of the trial court by which the
petitioners' prayer for discharge under section 239 of Cr.P.C is declined.

35. 2. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri K. Ramakumar appearing for the revision
petitioners as well as the learned Public prosecutor .
3. The Senior Counsel strenuously submitted that while issuing the order impugned, the learned
Magistrate exceeded his jurisdiction and went to the extent to hold that the accused are liable to
be
CRRP 738/11 convicted and punished, which is totally unwarranted.
4. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that all the contentions of the
petitioners had already been considered by this court while disposing of the Cr.M.C.
No.2116/2007 filed by the very same petitioners and this Court has found that, out of the
offences alleged against the petitioners under sections 3, 4, 6 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention)
Act 1956 and Section 67 of information Technology Act 2000 and Section 292 (2) read with
section 34 IPC, Section 3 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and section 67 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 will not lie against the accused and it is specifically found that all other
offences would lie. It is thereafter the petitioners preferred the present petition under
CRRP 738/11 section 239 Cr. P.C seeking their discharge from the above case. Thus according
to the learned Public Prosecutor, the order of the learned Magistrate is perfectly legal and valid
and no interference is called for.
5. The learned Magistrate as per the impugned order held that, " upon considering the final report
and the documents sent with it and after hearing the prosecution and the accused I am of the
opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused have committed the offences under
sections 3, 4, 6 of Immoral Traffic(Prevention) Act and Section 292(2) read with section 34 IPC
and could be adequately punished. Hence the above petition is dismissed". On a scrutiny of the
impugned order, I am of the view that the above order of the learned Magistrate is not legally
sustainable on two grounds. First of all,
CRRP 738/11 while considering the petition filed under section 239 Cr.P.C, the jurisdiction of
the trial Magistrate is very limited and his only task is to find out whether there is sufficient
grounds or prima facie case to proceed against the accused. Under Section 239 Cr.P.C, no
objective assessment is contemplated as to whether there is any possibility for conviction or

36. otherwise, if the trial is taken place. In the present case, the learned Magistrate, as per his finding
in this impugned order, exceeded his jurisdiction and went to the extent to hold that the accused
are liable to be convicted and punished. The above approach of the learned Magistrate is against
the settled position of law, particularly, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Sajjan
Kumar v. CBI (2010 (9) SCC 368). Therefore, the above order is liable to be set aside on that
ground alone.
CRRP 738/11
6. Secondly, it is a settled position of law particularly in view of the decision of this Court
in Vijayan v. State of Kerala (2007(3) KLT 495) that, at the time of framing charge, the trial
Magistrate or the Sessions Court need not pass an elaborate order but when an application for
discharge is filed by the accused and while passing orders thereon, the trial court is bound to pass
a speaking order. But in the present case, going by the order, it can be seen that after stating the
prosecution case, as well as the ground putforth by the accused, there is no reference to any of
the materials produced by the prosecution along with the charge so as to come into a conclusion
as to whether any prima facie case is made out or there are grounds to proceed against the
accused. On the other hand, merely banking
CRRP 738/11 upon the order of this court in Crl.M.C. No.2116/2007 the learned Magistrate has
come into a finding and held as stated above. From the above order it appears to me that the
learned Magistrate miserably failed to apply his judicial mind independently. It is also relevant to
note that, non-application of mind is crystal clear from the impugned order itself since even
though, while disposing of the Crl.M.C, this Court has held that Section 3 of the Immoral Traffic
(Prevention) Act is not attracted, the learned Magistrate ignoring the above finding, went to the
extent to say that Section 3 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act attracted as well. Therefore,
according to me, the order impugned is not sustainable and liable to be set aside.
In the result, this Crl.R.P is allowed setting aside the order dated 14.2.2011 in CMP No.3020/10
CRRP 738/11 in C.C.No.61/2006 and remitted the matter back to the trial court for fresh
consideration and for issuing appropriate orders after hearing the prosecution as well as the
accused.

37. V.K.MOHANAN, JUDGE kvm/-
CRRP 738/11
Nagpur Congress leader’s son MMS scandal
The Nagpur police arrested two engineering students -- including the son of an influential
Congress leader -- for harassing a 16-year-old girl, whom the accused threatened of making a
MMS clip of their alleged sexual encounter public.
According to the Nagpur (rural) police, the girl was in a relationship with Mithilesh (19), son of
Yashodha Dhanraj Gajbhiye, a senior zilla parishad member and an influential Congress leader
of Saoner region in Nagpur district.
The girl, a school dropout, was initially close to Mithilesh, the key accused. Mithilesh got her
into a sexual relationship with him with a promise to marry her in March 2011. Mithilesh then
deserted her. But he clandestinely got recorded a clip of them having sex on his mobile phone.
Later, Mithilesh started threatening her on the pretext of making the obscene MMS public if she
failed to keep relationship with him and oblige one of his friends. The helpless girl succumbed to
the pressure. But Mithilesh was relentless and continued to blackmail her.
At one point when the girl did not give in to his blackmailing, both the accused circulated the
obscene MMS showing the girl in a compromising position with them.
Later the girl narrated her sordid tale to her parents who registered a police complaint.

38. Subsequently, the victim’s medical examination was performed and the police arrested Mithilesh
and his friend, Sushil Gajbhiye (20), a resident of Saoner. The accused have been sent to police
custody, informed Manoj Sharma, superintendent of police, Nagpur (rural).
The police have registered offences against Mithilesh and Sushil under publishing or transmitting
obscene material in electronic form and raping the minor girl.
Section 66-A, Information
Technology Act, 2000:
Cases
http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/section-66-a-information-technology-act-2000-cases
In this blog post Snehashish Ghosh summarizes the facts of a few cases
where Section 66-A, Information Technology Act, 2000, has been mentioned
or discussed.
There has been numerous instances application of the Section 66-A, Information
Technology Act, 2000 (“ITA”) in the lower courts. Currently, there are six High Court

39. decisions, in which the section has been mentioned or discussed. In this blog post, I will
be summarizing facts of a few cases insofar as they can be gathered from the orders of
the Court and are pertinent to the application of 66-A, ITA.
Sajeesh Krishnan v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court, Decided on June 5, 2012)
Petition before High Court for release of passport seized by investigating agency during
arrest
In the case of Sajeesh Krishnan v. State of Kerala (Decided on June 5, 2012), a
petition was filed before the Kerala High Court for release of passport seized at the time
of arrest from the custody of the investigating agency. The Court accordingly passed an
order for release of the passport of the petitioner.
The Court, while deciding the case, briefly mentioned the facts of the case which were
relevant to the petition. It stated that the “gist of the accusation is that the accused
pursuant to a criminal conspiracy hatched by them made attempts to extort money by
black mailing a Minister of the State and for that purpose they have forged some CD as
if it contained statements purported to have been made by the Minister.” The Court also
noted the provisions under which the accused was charged. They are Sections 66-A(b)
and 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000 along with a host of sections under
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (120B – Criminal Conspiracy, 419 – Cheating by
personation, 511- Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with
imprisonment for life or other imprisonment, 420 – Cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property, 468 – Forgery for purpose of cheating, 469 – Forgery for purpose
of harming and 201 – Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false
information to screen offender read with 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860)
Nikhil Chacko Sam v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court, Decided on July 9, 2012)
Order of the Kerala High Court on issuing of the summons to the petitioner
In another case, the Kerala High Court while passing an order with respect to summons
issued to the accused, also mentioned the charge sheet laid by the police against the
accused in its order. The accused was charged under section 66-A, ITA. The brief facts
which can be extracted from the order of the Court read: “that the complainant and the
accused (petitioner) were together at Chennai. It is stated that on 04.09.2009, the
petitioner has transmitted photos of the de facto complainant and another person
depicting them in bad light through internet and thus the petitioner has committed the
offence as mentioned above.”

40. J.R. Gangwani and Another v. State of Haryana and Others (Punjab and Haryana
High Court, Decided on October 15, 2012)
Petition for quashing of criminal proceedings under section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973
In the Punjab and Haryana High Court, an application for quashing of criminal
proceeding draws attention to a complaint which was filed under Section 66-A(c). This
complaint was filed under Section 66-A(c) on the ground of sending e-mails under
assumed e-mail addresses to customers of the Company which contained material
which maligned the name of the Company which was to be sold as per the orders of the
Company Law Board. The Complainant in the case received the e-mails which were
redirected from the customers. According to the accused and the petitioner in the
current hearing, the e-mail was not directed to the complainant or the company as is
required under Section 66-A (c).
The High Court held that, “the petitioners are sending these messages to the
purchasers of cranes from the company and those purchasers cannot be considered to
be the possible buyers of the company. Sending of such e-mails, therefore, is not
promoting the sale of the company which is the purpose of the advertisement given in
the Economic Times. Such advertisements are, therefore, for the purpose of causing
annoyance or inconvenience to the company or to deceive or mislead the addressee
about the origin of such messages. These facts, therefore, clearly bring the acts of the
petitioners within the purview of section 66A(c) of the Act.”
Mohammad Amjad v. Sharad Sagar Singh and Ors. (Criminal Revision no. 72/2011
filed before the Court of Sh. Vinay Kumar Khana Additional Sessions Judge – 04
South East: Saket Courts Delhi)
Revision petition against the order of the metropolitan magistrate
In a revision petition came up before the Additional Sessions Judge on the grounds that
the metropolitan magistrate has dismissed a criminal complaint under Section 156(3) of
the Criminal Procedure Code without discussing the ingredients of section 295-A, IPC
and 66-A, IT Act.
In this case, the judge observed that, “...section 66A of Information Technology Act (IT
Act) does not refer at all to any 'group' or 'class' of people. The only requirement of
Section 66A IT Act is that the message which is communicated is grossly offensive in
nature or has menacing character.” He also observed that the previous order “not at all

41. considered the allegations from this angle and the applicability of Section 66A
Information Technology Act, 2000 to the factual matrix of the instant case.”
http://www.chmag.in/article/feb2013/case-study-section-66c
Case Study - Section 66C
Vinod Kaushik and Ors. V. Madhvika Joshi and Ors., Before Sh. Rajesh Aggarwal,
AdjudicatingOfficer,Information Technology Act, 2000, Government of Maharastra, At
Mantralaya,Mumbai- 400032, Complaint No.2 of 2010192
The adjudicating officer held that the act of the wife to access information from the email account ofthe
husband without his permission is unauthorized access under Section 43 of the IT Act, 2000. It alsonoted
that there cannot be any compensation as the wife has not published the information. She hasonly
submitted it to the police and court. The adjudicating officer also held the wife liable underSection 66-
C193of the IT Act for dishonestly making use of password of any other person.
The main issue in this case is whether accessing husband’s and father in law’s email account without
their permission amounts to ‘unauthorized access’.
In this case, the first respondent had accessed the email account of her husband and father in law, in
order to acquire evidence in a Dowry harassment case. The Adjudicating Officer held that, accessing e-mail
account without authorization amounts to contravention of section 43 of the Information Technology
Act, 2000. There was no compensation awarded to the complainant as the respondent has only
submitted the information so obtained to the police and the court. The Adjudicating Officer, however
ordered the first respondentto pay a fine of Rs. 100, as she was held to be in contravention of Section 66-
C (identity theft anddishonest use of password of any other person) of the Information Technology Act,
2000.
Defense of a bonafide intention, in case of violation of privacy by accessing e-mail account without the
consent of the user was upheld. The relationship of husband and wife was also taken into
considerationThe adjudicating officer also relied on the reasoning that the information procured by the
‘unauthorized access’ was only disclosed before the Court and the police, therefore the respondent is not
liable to pay any compensation to the complainant.