The article criticizes the Burmese government's handling of ethnic conflicts in the country. It argues that the government has not sincerely implemented the NCA peace agreement from 2008 and continues to discriminate against ethnic armed groups. The author calls on the government to genuinely address ethnic demands through an inclusive political process as outlined in the NCA.

1. http://burma.irrawaddy.com/opinion/viewpoint/2016/11/02
/125763.html
အမြင်သာနီး ခရီးဝ ီးသညာ့် မြန်ြာာ့ ငငြိြ်ီးချြ်ီးဝရီး
က ွာျော်စွာမိုး
2 November 2016၂၁ ရွာစ ပငျော်လံညီလွာခံ ပထမအက မျော် မမနျော်မွာာ့နငျော်ငံကရိုး ကခေါငျော်ိုးက ွာငျော်မ ွာိုး /
က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော်၏ ပထမဦိုးစွာိုးကပိုး နငျော်ငံကရိုးအစီအစဉ် မြစျော်က ွာငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ိုးကရိုးလပျော်ငနျော်ိုးစဉ်မွာ
တငျော်ိုးရငျော်ိုး ွာိုး လ ျော်န ျော် ငျော်မ ွာိုး အကပေါ် တပျော်မကတွာျော်၏ ျော်တ ျော် ထိုးစစျော်မ ွာိုးကက ွာငာ့ျော်
မကရမရွာမြစျော်ကနငပီ မြစျော် ညျော်။ တခ နျော်တညျော်ိုး တငျော် က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော် ညျော် တျော်မတျော်အခ နျော်
အတငျော်ိုး မပညျော်တငျော်ိုး ငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ိုးကရိုး ရယူရံတငျော်မ မမနျော်မွာာ့တပျော်မကတွာျော် ကရိုး ွဲခွဲာ့ ညာ့ျော် ီမ ကရစီ
မ နျော်က ွာ ၂၀၀၈ ခနစျော် ြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံ အကမခခံဥပက လညျော်ိုး မပငျော်လ ညျော်။
ကအွာ ျော်တဘွာ တယ အပတျော်အတငျော်ိုး က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော် ကခေါငျော်ိုးက ွာငျော်က ွာ လ ျော်ရအစိုးရ
၎ငျော်ိုး၏ အမ ိုး ွာိုး မပနျော်လညျော် ငာ့ျော်မမတျော်ကရိုး မူဝေါ နငာ့ျော် မပညျော်ကထွာငျော်စအ ငာ့ျော် ငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ကရိုး မူဝေါ မ ွာိုး
ကက ညွာခွဲာ့ ညျော်။ ထ မူဝေါ မ ွာိုး မူလက တငျော် စီစဉ်ထွာိုး ညာ့ျော် တျော်မတျော်ခ ျော်မ ွာိုးနငာ့ျော် အညီ
ငပီိုးစီိုးကအွာငျော် လပျော်မညာ့ျော် ကဘွာ အရပျော်အကယွာငျော် ကတွဲ့ရ ညျော်။ ထမူဝေါ မ ွာိုး
က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော် ကအွာ ျော်တဘွာ ၁၅ ရ ျော်ကန ာ့တနငျော်ငံလံိုး အပစျော်အခတျော် ရပျော်စွဲကရိုး
ကဘွာတူညီခ ျော် နစျော်ပတျော်လညျော်ကန ာ့မန ာ့ျော်ခနျော်ိုးတငျော် ထညာ့ျော် ငျော်ိုးကမပွာက ွာိုးခွဲာ့ငပီိုး
အစိုးရ တငျော်ိုးစွာမ ွာိုး လညျော်ိုး ကြွာျော်မပခွဲာ့က ညျော်။
အခ ျော် ၇ ခ ျော်ပေါက ွာ အမ ိုး ွာိုး မပနျော်လညျော် ငာ့ျော်မမတျော်ကရိုး မူဝေါ နငာ့ျော် မပညျော်ကထွာငျော်စအ ငာ့ျော် ငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ကရိုး
မူဝေါ ၏ ပထမ အခ ျော် ၂ ခ ျော်မွာ ဗလျော်ခ ပျော်က ွာငျော်ိုး ဦိုး နျော်ိုးစနျော်ကခေါငျော်ိုးက ွာငျော်က ွာ ယခငျော်အစိုးရ
ကရိုး ွဲခွဲာ့ ညာ့ျော် နငျော်ငံကရိုးက ိုးကနိုးပွဲ မူကဘွာငျော် မပနျော်လညျော် ံိုး ပျော်မပငျော် ငျော်ရနျော် မြစျော် ညျော်။ တတယနငာ့ျော်
စတတထ အခ ျော်မွာ ၂၁ ရွာစပငျော်လံညီလွာခံ ျော်လ ျော် ငျော်ိုးပရနျော်နငာ့ျော် ထညီလွာခံအကပေါ် အကမခခံ၍
မပညျော်ကထွာငျော်စငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ကရိုး ကဘွာတူစွာခ ပျော် ခ ပျော် ရနျော် မြစျော် ညျော်။
က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော်နငာ့ျော် ူ၏ အစိုးရ ညျော် ီမ ရ ျော်တစျော်ြ ျော် ရယျော် မပညျော်ကထွာငျော်စ ထူကထွာငျော်ရနျော်
အခ နျော် ွာလ မညျော်မျှ တျော်မတျော်ထွာိုး ညျော် မညျော် ညာ့ျော်အခေါ မျှ တရွာိုးဝငျော် ကမပွာက ွာိုးခွဲာ့မခငျော်ိုး

2. မရက က ွာျော်လညျော်ိုး စတျော်ထွဲတငျော်မူ တ က ွာ အခ နျော် တျော်မတျော်ခ ျော် ရပံရ ညျော်။ ပဉ္စမအခ ျော်တငျော်
လ ျော်ရြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံ မပညျော်ကထွာငျော်စ ကဘွာတူညီခ ျော်နငာ့ျော် အညီ မပငျော် ငျော်ကရိုး အတအလငျော်ိုး
ကြွာျော်မပထွာိုးငပီိုး ဌမ အခ ျော်မွာမူ မပငျော် ငျော်ထွာိုးက ွာ ြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံနငာ့ျော် အညီ ပေါတီစံ ီမ ကရစီ
ကရိုးက ွာ ျော်ပွဲ ငျော်ိုးပကရိုး ကြွာျော်မပထွာိုး ညျော်။
ဤအခ ျော် ၂ ခ ျော် ညျော် အခ နျော် တျော်မတျော်ခ ျော် မပ ကန ညျော်။ အစိုးရ၏ မူဝေါ တငျော် ကြွာျော်မပထွာိုး ညာ့ျော်
အကထကထကရိုးက ွာ ျော်ပွဲမွာ ကနွာ ျော်လွာမညာ့ျော် ၂၀၂၀ ကရိုးက ွာ ျော်ပွဲ ရညျော်ညနျော်ိုးပံ ရ ညျော်။ ထ ာ့ကက ွာငာ့ျော်
၂၀၂၀ ကရိုးက ွာ ျော်ပွဲ မတငျော်မီ နငျော်ငံကတွာျော်အတငျော်ပငျော်ခံ ပဂ္ လျော် ညျော် မပညျော်ကထွာငျော်စအ ငာ့ျော်
ကဘွာတူညီခ ျော်နငာ့ျော် ြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံ အကမခခံဥပက မပငျော် ငျော်ကရိုး အပေါအဝငျော် မူဝေါ ၏ အမခွာိုးအခ ျော်မ ွာိုး
အက ွာငျော်အထညျော် ကြွာျော်ရမညျော် မြစျော် ညျော်။
အ ပေါ အခ ျော်အရ အစိုးရ၏ မူဝေါ မ ွာိုး ညျော် မပညျော်တငျော်ိုး ငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ိုးကရိုး ရရံ ွာမ နငျော်ငံဥပက မ ွာိုး
မပငျော် ငျော်ကရိုး ပေါ ရညျော်မနျော်ိုးကက ွာငျော်ိုး အထငျော်အရွာိုး မပ ကန ညျော်။ ြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံ အကမခခံဥပက ငျော်ရွာ
အခငာ့ျော်ထူိုးမ ွာိုး ခံစွာိုးကနက ွာ မမနျော်မွာာ့တပျော်မကတွာျော် ညျော် လ ျော်ရအကမခအကနတငျော် ြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံ
အကမခခံဥပက မပငျော် ငျော်ကရိုးနငာ့ျော် ပတျော် ျော်ငပီိုး အတ ျော်အခံ လပျော်နငျော်က ွာကက ွာငာ့ျော် လ ျော်ကတွဲ့တငျော်
ထြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံအကမခခံဥပက မပငျော် ငျော်ရနျော် အွာိုးထတျော်မှု ပမက ီိုးမွာိုးက ွာ စနျော်ကခေါ်မှု တျော်မတျော်နငျော် ညျော်။
ာ့က ွာျော် က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော် ကခေါငျော်ိုးက ွာငျော်က ွာ အမ ိုး ွာိုး ီမ ကရစီ အြွဲွဲ့ခ ပျော်၏
မူလရညျော်မနျော်ိုးခ ျော်မ ွာိုး အန ျော်တခမွာ “မမနျော်မွာမပညျော် ူအွာိုးလံိုး ကအိုးခ မျော်ိုးလံမခံ စွာ အတူတ
ကနထငျော်နငျော်ကရိုး အတ ျော် ြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံအကမခခံဥပက မပငျော် ငျော်ကရိုး မြစျော် ညျော်။ ထအခ ျော်
အမ ိုး ွာိုး ီမ ကရစီအြွဲွဲ့ခ ပျော်၏ ၂၀၁၅ ခနစျော် ကရိုးက ွာ ျော်ပွဲ ကက ညွာစွာတမျော်ိုးတငျော်
တရွာိုးဝငျော်ကြွာျော်မပထွာိုး ညျော်။
နငျော်ငံကတွာျော် အတငျော်ပငျော်ခံပဂ္ လျော်နငာ့ျော် အမ ိုး ွာိုး ီမ ကရစီအြွဲွဲ့ခ ပျော် အစိုးရတ ာ့ ၎ငျော်ိုးတ ာ့၏ တ
တညျော်ရနျော် အတ ျော် ြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံ မမြစျော်မကန မပငျော်နငျော်ရနျော် လ ညျော်။ ာ့က ွာျော် တပျော်မကတွာျော်၏
အဓ တွာဝနျော်မွာ ၎ငျော်ိုး၏ စီိုးပွာိုးကရိုး အ ိုးစီိုးပွာိုးနငာ့ျော် နငျော်ငံကရိုးနယျော်ပယျော်တငျော် အခငာ့ျော်ထူိုးမ ွာိုး ွာ ယျော်
အွာမခံကပိုးက ွာ လ ျော်ရြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံ ွာ ယျော်မညျော် မြစျော် မြငာ့ျော် ဤ စစမွာ မညျော် ညာ့ျော် အစိုးရအတ ျော်
မ မယံက ညျော်နငျော်ကလွာ ျော်ကအွာငျော် ခ ျော်ခွဲက ွာ စစရပျော် မြစျော်ကန ွဲ မြစျော် ညျော်။

3. မူဝေါ ၏ ဋ္ဌမ အအခ ျော်တငျော် ကရိုးက ွာ ျော်ပွဲ မပငျော် ငျော်ထွာိုးက ွာ ြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံနငာ့ျော် အညီ ငျော်ိုးပမညျော်
ကြွာျော်မပထွာိုး မြငာ့ျော် ကရိုးက ွာ ျော်ပွဲ ြွဲွဲ့စညျော်ိုးပံအကမခခံပက မပငျော် ငျော်ငပီိုးမ ွာ ငျော်ိုးပနငျော်မညျော်
အဓပပွာယျော်ရ ညျော်။ တတ မ ကမမွာ ျော်နငာ့ျော် ကနွာ ျော် ံိုးအခ ျော်မွာ ကရိုးက ွာ ျော်ပွဲ၏ ရလ ျော် အကမခခံငပီိုး
ီမ ရ ျော်တစျော်ြ ျော် ရယျော် မပညျော်ကထွာငျော်စ ထူကထွာငျော်ကရိုး အစိုးရ၏ အနတမရညျော်မနျော်ိုးခ ျော်
ကြွာျော်မပထွာိုး ညျော်။
ငေါိုးနစျော်အတငျော်ိုး ဤမျှက ွာ ပနျော်ိုးတငျော်မ ွာိုး ကရွာ ျော်ရကရိုးမွာ လ ျော်ရနငျော်ငံကရိုး အကမခအကနအရ အကတွာျော်
ရညျော်မနျော်ိုးခ ျော်က ီိုး ညျော် ကမပွာနငျော် ညျော်။
ာ့က ွာျော် က ဂတျော်လ နျော် ပထမအက မျော် ၂၁ ရွာစ ပငျော်လံညီလွာခံက ီိုး ငျော်ိုးပငပီိုး၂ လအက ွာ ယခ
အခ နျော်တငျော်ပငျော် စစျော်တပျော်နငာ့ျော် ခ ငျော်လတျော်ကမမွာ ျော်ကရိုးတပျော်မကတွာျော်၊ တအွာနျော်ိုးအမ ိုး ွာိုး လတျော်ကမမွာ ျော်ကရိုး
တပျော်မကတွာျော်နငာ့ျော် ရမျော်ိုးမပညျော်တပျော်မကတွာျော်ကမမွာ ျော်ပငျော်ိုးတ ာ့အပေါအဝငျော် တငျော်ိုးရငျော်ိုး ွာိုးလ ျော်န ျော် ငျော်မ ွာိုး
အက ွာိုး တ ျော်ခ ျော်မှုမ ွာိုး နယျော်စပက တငျော် အရနျော်မမငာ့ျော်လွာ ညျော်။
ပငျော်လံငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ိုးကရိုး ညီလွာခံ မ ငျော်ိုးပမီ ၂ ပတျော်အလ က ဂတျော်လ ၁၇ ရ ျော်ကန ာ့တငျော် ခ ငျော်မပညျော်နယျော်မ
ယခအက မျော် တ ျော်ပွဲမ ွာိုး စတငျော်ခွဲာ့ ညျော် ။ ထတ ျော်ပွဲမ ွာိုး ညျော် အနညျော်ိုး ံိုး ငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ိုးကရိုး
ညီလွာခံငပီိုးမ ွာ အ ံိုး တျော် ာ့မ တျော် ကလျှွာာ့ မညျော် ကမ ွာျော်လငာ့ျော်ရ ညျော်။ ာ့က ွာျော်
မမနျော်မွာာ့တပျော်မကတွာျော် တ ျော်ကလယွာဉ်မ ွာိုး ံငပီိုး တ ျော်ပွဲအရနျော်မမြှငာ့ျော် ညျော်။ ဤ ာ့မြစျော်ကပေါ် မခငျော်ိုးမွာ
တ ျော် ငျော်မှု ကမပွာရနျော်ခ ျော် ညျော်။ ဤပဋပ ခမ ွာိုးကက ွာငာ့ျော် ခ ငျော်မပညျော်နယျော် ြွာိုး န ာ့ျော်မ မပညျော် ူက ွာငျော်ိုးခီ
လမျော်ိုးမကပေါ်ထ ျော် ွာ နဒမပငပီိုး ထိုးစစျော်ရပျော်ရနျော် စစျော်တပျော် ကတွာငျော်ိုး ွာ အစိုးရ လူမ ိုးစ
လ ျော်န ျော် ငျော်မ ွာိုးနငာ့ျော် ငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ိုးကရိုး က ိုးကနိုးပွဲမ ွာိုး ငျော်ိုးပကနစဉ် ျော်လ ျော်တ ျော်ခ ျော်ကနမခငျော်ိုး
ကဝြနျော်က ညျော်။
ထ ာ့မမနျော်မွာာ့တပျော်မကတွာျော်နငာ့ျော် တငျော်ိုးရငျော်ိုး ွာိုး လ ျော်န ျော် ငျော် အြွဲွဲ့မ ွာိုး တ ျော်ပွဲ ျော်တ ျော်မြစျော်ကန ညျော်နငာ့ျော်
ပတျော် ျော်ငပီိုး အစိုးရမ တခနျော်ိုးတပေါ မျှ တံ ာ့မပနျော် ကမပွာက ွာိုးမခငျော်ိုး မရကပ။
က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော်နငာ့ျော် ူ၏ အစိုးရ ညျော် မမနျော်မွာာ့တပျော်မကတွာျော်၏ KIA အကပေါ် က ီိုးမွာိုးက ွာ
ထိုးစစျော် ကဝြနျော်ကမပွာက ွာိုးမခငျော်ိုး မရ မြငာ့ျော် အက ီိုးအ ယျော် ရှုတျော်ခ ခံရ ညျော်။ ဤ ာ့က ွာ

4. အကမခအကနမ ွာိုး လူထ ာ့ ိုးကက ွာငျော်ိုး ီကလျှွာျော်စွာ ရငျော်မပမခငျော်ိုး မရ မြငာ့ျော့် ာ့အစိုးရ ညျော်
ထကဝြနျော်မှုမ ွာိုးနငာ့ျော် ထ ျော်တနျော် ညျော် ရိုး ွာိုးစွာ ယံက ညျော်ပေါ ညျော်။
ာ့က ွာျော် ကနွာ ျော်ထပျော် ျော်စပျော် ကမိုးခနျော်တခ ရက ိုး ညျော်။ အစိုးရ ညျော် အဘယျော်ကက ွာငာ့ျော် ဤမျှနှုတျော် တျော်
ကနရ နညျော်ိုး ူက ွာ ကမိုးခနျော်ိုးမြစျော် ညျော်။
မမနျော်မွာမပညျော် ူအွာိုးလံိုးနငာ့ျော် နငျော်ငံတ ွာအ ငျော်ိုးအဝနျော်ိုး ညျော် ဤ ွဲာ့ ာ့က ွာ ထိုးစစျော်မ ွာိုးတငျော်
မမနျော်မွာာ့တပျော်မကတွာျော်နငာ့ျော် အစိုးရ ညျော် တ ွာိုးတညျော်ိုး မ တျော် ညျော် နွာိုးလညျော်က မညျော် မ တျော်ကပ။
လူမ ိုးစ လ ျော်န ျော် ငျော်အပျော်စမ ွာိုး တ ျော်ခ ျော်ကရိုးနငာ့ျော် ပတျော် ျော်လျှငျော် တပျော်မကတွာျော် ညျော် အက ငျော်ိုးမွဲာ့
အွာဏွာရ ူ မြစျော် ညျော်။
တပျော်မကတွာျော် ွာ ယျော်ကရိုးဦိုးစီိုးခ ပျော် ဗလျော်ခ ပျော်မိုးက ီိုးမငျော်ိုးကအွာငျော်လှုငျော်နငာ့ျော် နငျော်ငံကတွာျော် အတငျော်ပငျော်ခံပဂ္ လျော်
က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော်တ ာ့ကတွဲ့ ံရွာတငျော် ူတ ာ့၏ မ ျော်နွာမ ွာိုးတငျော်အမပံ ိုးမ ွာိုး လှုငျော်ကန ညျော်
မက ွာခဏ ကတွဲ့ရက ွာျော်လညျော်ိုး မျှမျှတတ ကမပွာရလျှငျော် အစိုးရနငာ့ျော် စစျော်တပျော်အက ွာိုး ျော် ံကရိုး၏
အတမျော်အန ျော် မညျော် ူမျှ အတအ မ က ကပ။ ာ့က ွာျော် က ခ ွာက ွာ အခ ျော်တခ ျော်ရ ညျော်။
၎ငျော်ိုးမွာ တ ျော်ပွဲမ ွာိုးနငာ့ျော် ပတျော် ျော်လျှငျော် အစိုးရ ညျော် မမနျော်မွာာ့တပျော်မကတွာျော် အမန ာ့ျော်ကပိုးရနျော် မညျော် ညာ့ျော်
အွာဏွာမျှ မရ ူက ွာ အခ ျော်မြစျော် ညျော်။ ဤအခ ျော်မွာ ၂၀၁၃ ခနစျော် ထစဉ် မမတ ူ ယျော်တငျော်ပငျော်
ဗလျော်ခ ပျော်က ီိုးက ွာငျော်ိုးမြစျော်ခွဲာ့က ွာ ဦိုး နျော်ိုးစနျော် KIA တ ျော်ခ ျော်မှု ရပျော်ရနျော် တပျော်မကတွာျော်
ညွှနျော်က ွာိုးက ွာျော်လညျော်ိုး တ ျော်ပွဲမ ွာိုး ျော်လ ျော်မြစျော်ကပေါ် ခွဲာ့ ညျော် က ညာ့ျော်လျှငျော် ထငျော်ရွာိုး ညျော်။
ထ ာ့ကက ွာငာ့ျော် အမ ိုး ွာိုး ီမ ကရစီအြွဲွဲ့ခ ပျော် အရပျော် ွာိုး အစိုးရ ထိုးစစျော်ရပျော်ရနျော် တပျော် အမန ာ့ျော်ကပိုးရနျော်မွာ
မညျော်မျှပမ ခ ျော်ခွဲ ညျော်မွာ ထငျော်ရွာိုးလွာ ညျော်။ ဤ ာ့က ွာ အကမခအကနတငျော် အစိုးရ ညျော်
ကရွဲ့ထ ျော်လွာငပီိုး ူတ ာ့ ညျော် မမနျော်မွာာ့တပျော်မကတွာျော် မထနျော်ိုးခ ပျော်နငျော်ကက ွာငျော်ိုး ဝနျော်ခံရနျော် အကနအထွာိုးတငျော်
မရကပ။ မမနျော်မွာနငျော်ငံ၏ ရှုပျော်ကထိုးလက ွာ နငျော်ငံကရိုး အကမခအကန နွာိုးလညျော်က ွာ လူထ ညျော်
ဤ ာ့ရိုး ွာိုးက ွာ ဝနျော်ခံမှု လ ျော်ခံနငျော် ညျော်။ ာ့က ွာျော် စစျော်ဘ ျော် ကခေါငျော်ိုးက ွာငျော်မ ွာိုး အတ ျော်ကတွာာ့
စတျော်ငင မငငျော် စရွာ မြစျော်ကပလမာ့ျော်မညျော်။
ယခ ျော်လ ျော် မြစျော်ပွာိုးကနက ွာ ထိုးစစျော် ညျော် တငျော်ိုးရငျော်ိုး ွာိုးမ ွာိုးထံမ ယံက ညျော်မှုရရနျော်
က ိုးစွာိုးကနက ွာ အစိုးရ၏ အွာိုးထတျော်မှုမ ွာိုး ျော်လ ျော် ထခ ျော်ကစလျှ ျော် ရ ညျော်။

5. မမနျော်မွာာ့တပျော်မကတွာျော် ညျော် ငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ိုးကရိုး လပျော်ငနျော်ိုးစဉ် ခ ညာ့ျော်နွဲ ာ့ကစရနျော် ရညျော်ရယျော်ခ ျော်ရရ မပ လပျော်ကန လွာိုး
ညာ့ျော် ကမိုးခနျော်ိုးအတ ျော် အကမြ မူ မ ရက ိုးကပ။
အစိုးရ၏ ငငမျော်ိုးခ မျော်ိုးကရိုး မူဝေါ တခလံိုး ညျော် လံိုးဝကတွာငျော်တ ျော်ခရီိုးက မျော်ိုး ြယျော် မြစျော်ကန ညျော်။ ာ့က ွာျော်
မမြစျော်နငျော်က ွာ ခရီိုး ကတွာာ့ ၍ မရ။ မ ွာိုးကမမွာငျော်လက ွာ စနျော်ကခေါ်မှုမှုမ ွာိုး အန ျော် အစိုးရ၊
တငျော်ိုးရငျော်ိုး ွာိုး လ ျော်န ျော် ငျော်မ ွာိုးနငာ့ျော် စစျော်တပျော်၏ ပူိုးကပေါငျော်ိုးက ွာငျော်ရ ျော်မှု ညျော် ဤလပျော်ငနျော်ိုးစဉ်
တကလျှွာ ျော်လံိုးတငျော် လံိုးဝအဓ ကန ညျော်။ ူမ၏ ရညျော်မနျော်ိုးခ ျော်ပနျော်ိုးတငျော်မ ွာိုး ကအွာငျော်မမငျော်ရနျော်
က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော် စစျော်တပျော်ကခေါငျော်ိုးက ွာငျော်ပငျော်ိုး ပူိုးကပေါငျော်ိုး က ွာငျော်ရ ျော်ကရိုး အတ ျော်
မညျော် ာ့မညျော်ပံ ကြ ွာငျော်ိုးြ မညျော် ကစွာငာ့ျော်က ညာ့ျော်ရနျော် ွာ ရကပကတွာာ့မညျော်။
(www.irrawaddy.com တငျော် ကြွာျော်မပထွာိုးက ွာ က ွာျော်စွာမိုး၏ An Uphill Mission But Not Mission
Impossible က ွာငျော်ိုးပေါိုး ဘွာ ွာမပနျော် တငျော်မပမခငျော်ိုးမြစျော် ညျော်။ က ွာျော်စွာမိုး ညျော် The Irrawaddy
မီ ီယွာ၏ အဂဂလပျော်ပငျော်ိုး အယျော် ီတွာတဦိုးမြစျော် ညျော်။)
Topics: က ေါ်ကအွာငျော် နျော်ိုးစက ညျော်
ဝ ျာ်စာြြိီးEditorKyaw Zwa Moe is Editor at the Burmese edition of The Irrawaddy.
An Uphill Mission But Not Mission
Impossible
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (C) and Myanmar Military Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing arrive (R) for the handover
ceremony from outgoing President Thein Sein and new Burmese President U Htin Kyaw at the presidential palace in
Naypyidaw on March 30, 2016. / Reuters
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 3.5k
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By KYAW ZWA MOE 29 October 2016

6. Burma’s peace process—the first priority of State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s
political agenda—is at risk due to the military’s ongoing offensives against ethnic armed
groups. The de facto leader is ambitious for aiming both to achieve peace and amend
the undemocratic, military-drafted 2008 Constitution during a specific timeframe.
When the incumbent government led by the State Counselor announced its policy for
national reconciliation and Union-level peace in mid-October, it indicated a certain level
of determination to suggest that this could be completed in accordance with a
predetermined schedule. The policy was published in the government’s newspapers
after Daw Aung San Suu Kyi described them in her speech at the first anniversary of
Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement on Oct. 15.
The first two steps of the government’s seven-point policy are to review and amend the
political dialogue framework that was drafted by the previous government led by ex-
general Thein Sein. The third and fourth steps are to continue convening the 21st
Century Panglong Conference and to sign a Union peace agreement based on the 21st
Century Panglong Conference.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her government never officially disclosed a timeframe for
their political roadmap in establishing a democratic federal union, but she seems to
have a specific deadline in mind. The fifth point clearly mentions amending the current
Constitution in accordance with the Union agreement, while the sixth says to hold multi-
party democratic elections in accordance with the amended Constitution.
These two points reveal her timeframe. The general elections mentioned in the
government’s policy must be a reference to the next election in 2020. Thus, before the
2020 election, the State Counselor must aim to execute the other points of the policy,
including the Union-level agreement, and the amendment of the Constitution.
This clearly shows that the government’s policies do not only aim to achieve peace but
also to change national laws. In fact, such an attempt to amend the Constitution could
be considered the bigger challenge, as the military—which enjoys the Constitutional
privileges—will definitely resist any change to its current status. Yet one of the longtime
goals of the National League for Democracy, led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has been
to create a Constitution that ensures “all the people of Burma can live together in
tranquility and security.” It was officially written as such in the NLD’s 2015 election
manifesto.
Both the State Counselor and her NLD government will need to doggedly pursue this
goal in order to keep their word. But it remains an inconceivably difficult task for any
government, as the military’s main duty is to safeguard the current Constitution, which
protects both its economic benefits and guarantees its privileges in the political arena.

7. The sixth point in the policy states that the election will be held in accordance with the
amended Constitution, meaning that the election is to be held only after the Constitution
has been changed. The seventh and final point of the guideline mentions the building of
a democratic federal union based on the results of the election, revealing the
government’s ultimate aim.
It reads as quite an ambitious guideline to achieve such goals within five years.
But even now, only two months after the 21st Century Panglong Conference convened
for its first round at the end of August, fighting between the military and ethnic armed
groups—including the Kachin Independence Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army
and the Shan State Army-North—has escalated in border areas.
This round of fighting in Kachin State started on Aug. 17, about two weeks before the
Panglong peace conference. It was expected to end or, at the very least, decrease,
after the peace conference. Instead, it has escalated with the military attacking using
fighter jets; it is hard to say whether this timing was a coincidence. The clashes have led
tens of thousands of Kachin people to take to the street in Hpakant, Kachin State,
calling on the Burma Army to stop the offensives, launching criticism of continued
fighting while the government was holding peace talks with ethnic armed groups.
But the government is silent.
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her administration have faced heavy condemnation
because they have not spoken out against the military’s heavy offensive against the
KIA. I sincerely believe the government deserves this criticism as long as they cannot
come out to reasonably explain such circumstances to the public.
But there is another relevant question: why is the government so quiet on this issue?
Not all people Burma and the international community might understand that the military
and the government are not joined together in such offensives. The military is its own
absolute authority when it comes to strikes against ethnic armed groups.
Fairly speaking, no one exactly knows the depth of the relationship between the
government and the military, though we have often seen smiles on the faces of
Commander in Chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi when they
meet. Yet one thing is certain: the government does not seem to have any power to give
orders to the military when it comes to fighting. This was particularly apparent in 2013,
when then-president Thein Sein—himself an ex-general—instructed the military to stop
an offensive against the KIA, but clashes continued.

8. It then becomes clear how much more difficult it would be for the NLD civilian
government to order the military halt such offensives. Under that scenario, the
government is not in position to come out and admit that they cannot control the military.
The public who understand our country’s complex political situation might accept such
an honest statement, but it would just as soon upset the leaders in the military
establishment.
The ongoing military offensives continue to damage the government’s attempts to gain
trust from the ethnic groups. Is the military intentionally undermining the government’s
peace process? The answer remains unknown.
The entire peace policy of the government remains a sheer uphill mission. But we
cannot say it is “mission impossible.” Among the mounting challenges, the military’s
collaboration with the government and the ethnic armed groups is the most crucial
throughout the entire process. We will have to see if and how Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
can coax the military leadership into cooperating to achieve her goals.
Kyaw Zwa Moe is the editor of The Irrawaddy’s English edition.
Topics: Ethnic Issues, Government, Military, Peace Process, Politics
Kyaw Zwa MoeThe IrrawaddyKyaw Zwa Moe is the Editor of the English edition of The
Irrawaddy.
http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/01/is-60-years-of-civil-
war-coming-to-an-end-in-myanmar/
Is 60 years of civil war coming
to an end in Myanmar?
Myanmar President Thein Sein aims to silence the guns of the civil war that devastates the
country’s economic potential. However, until the military is under government control, such
hopes seem far-fetched.
Myanmar holds the unfortunate record of being home to the world’s longest lasting civil war.
Involving many ethnic and political rebel groups, it erupted shortly after independence from
the UK in 1948 and continues to this day, leaving behind thousands of casualties, civilian
suffering on a massive scale and endemic instability in large parts of the country.

9. President Thein Sein, a former general-cum-politician, who in 2011 became head of the first
quasi-civilian administration in two decades, launched an ambitious peace process that
aimed at reaching a final political solution. He has consistently reiterated his belief that a
nationwide ceasefire agreement would be concluded by the end of 2013 and that “the guns
will go silent everywhere in Myanmar for the very first time in over 60 years.” Yet few
observers in Myanmar or abroad share his optimism as the negotiation process has been
plagued by setback and postponement, and there has been renewed or intensified violence
across the country in recent years.
The situation is most serious in Kachin state, which has seen constant warfare since
dialogue between the army (Tatmadaw) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) broke down
in 2011, after 17 years of relative peace. The civilian population, mostly ethnic Kachin, has
been subject to forced relocation, conscripted labor, torture, rape and extrajudicial
killings as government forces have reclaimed territory from rebels, in a war largely
overshadowed by the reforms in Naypyidaw. In July and August 2013 new clashes between
government and rebel troops were reported in northern Shan state, while small-scale
skirmishes have erupted in the Karen state.
However, a new and more sinister development is the outbreak of communal violence
between Buddhists and Muslims. Rakhine State by the Bay of Bengal was hit in 2012
by large-scale ethnic violence between the majority Rakhine population and the Muslim
Rohingyas, an ethnic group officially regarded as illegal Bengali immigrants and thus denied
citizenship and frequently persecuted. The communal violence left more than 250 dead and
150,000 internally displaced with the most recent outbreak October 2013, when 5
Rohingyas were lynched near Thandwe. There have also been isolated incidents of anti-
Muslim riots in northern and central Myanmar.
Still, there has been real progress in recent years. The administration has signed peace
agreements with 14 of the 16 main guerilla groups according to chief government negotiator
and leader of Myanmar Peace Center, Aung Min. “In political dialogue, all must be allowed
to be included. There are 135 ethnic peoples in Myanmar; they must be included,” he said
in August 2013 during a commemoration ceremony of the 1988 protests. “I’d like to mention
here that we are prepared to hold political dialogue at all costs.”
While few questions President Sein’s desire to achieve lasting peace in Myanmar, many
regard the Tatmadaw as the key obstacle in this process. The generals who ruled the
country for more than 20 years retained their institutional autonomy in the 2008 constitution,
effectively operating outside the authority of the government. Despite Sein’s insistence that
the Tatmadaw will not initiate offences in areas controlled by rebels, they have consistently
ignored his request.

10. “The problem is the Myanmar military, they don’t want to withdraw,” said the guerilla leader
Yawd Serk, leader of the powerful Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) in an interview back in
September 2013. He claims there have been over 100 armed clashes with the military since
his group signed a peace agreement with the government in 2011. “In fact, the army
commanders are sending more troops into the contested areas.”
The Shan is of many ethnic groups that for decades have fought for autonomy from the
majority Bamarpopulation, which have traditionally dominated the government and military
in Myanmar. Shan State is a key economic hot-spot today There are significant natural
resources such as jade, a lucrative oil-and-gas pipeline passes through on the way to
China, much of it close to contested territory, and the state is the world’s second-largest
opium producer after Afghanistan and a large producer of methamphetamine, generating
billions in revenue that fuels the guerillas.
The military maintains strong business interests across economic sectors and have become
the key actor in this resource-rich country, providing economic incentives that are not
always compatible with the government’s political objectives. Serk believes that the
economic dimension is paramount for the continued fighting. “They are not prepared to give
up land. They are using the ceasefire talks as a form of technical warfare against the ethnic
groups. The Tatmadaw is benefiting, but the ethnic people are not getting any benefit.”
As long as the military is not controlled by the government there is little hope the President
Sein’s sincerity alone will be able to silence the guns in Myanmar. In a civil war that is
remarkably complex, with several dozen armed groups and huge financial gains at stake,
there is much room for pessimism and predictions for new skirmishes in the future. But
Myanmar has surprised the world in the past. Few believed that the rigged elections in 2010
would lead to any fundamental changes, yet the country liberalized faster than anyone
could imagine. The peace process may bring similar surprises.
Havard Bergo
Håvard is a foreign policy analyst who works in Kampala for LPC Consult International, a
consulting company that specializes on developing projects in East Africa and Mozambique.
He has previously worked with the United Nations in Bangkok and as a project manager for
a research project in Montreal. Håvard graduated with an MSc in International Relations
from the London School of Economics (LSE).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internal_conflict_in_Myanmar
Internal conflict in Myanmar
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

11. Internal conflict in Myanmar
Map of conflict areas in Myanmar (Burma). States
and regions affected by fighting during and after 1995
are highlighted in yellow.
Date 1948 – present
(68 years)
Location Myanmar (Burma)
Status Ongoing
 Insurgency since 1948, shortly
after Myanmar
gained independence from
the United Kingdom

12.  Major ethnic conflicts
in Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine,
and Shan State
 In 2011, the ruling military
junta concedes official rule over
Myanmar
 Numerous ceasefires and peace
agreements signed by various
groups since the beginning
of political reforms in 2011
 Ongoing sporadic violence
between government forces and
insurgent groups
Territorial
changes
Autonomous self-administered
zones created for ethnic minorities in
2010.
Belligerents
Republic of the
Union of Myanmar
 Tatmadaw
Former combatants:
Union of
Burma(1948–1962)
 AFPFL
Military
governments (1962–
2011)
 Socialist Republic of
the Union of
Burma (1962–1988)
 Union of
Myanmar (1988–
2011)
DKBA (1994–2010)
Insurgent groups[note 1]
ABSDF (since 1988)
Arakan Army(since
2009)
DKBA-5 (since 2010)
KIO (since 1961)
 KIA
KNU (since 1949)
 KNLA
Karenni Army(since
1949)
MNLA (since 1958)
MNDAA (since 1989)
NDAA (since 1989)
SSA-N (since 1971)
SSA-S (since 1996)
TNLA (since 1992)
UWSP (since 1989)

13.  UWSA
...and others
Supported by:
China(alleged)[1]
Former combatants:
 CPB (1948–1988)
 RFCP (1948–1978)
 PNA (1949–1991)
 Mujahideen(1950s–
1970)
 SSA (1964–1976)
 WNA (1974–1997)
 MTA (1985–1996)
 SSNA (1995–2005)
 God's Army (1997–2006)
 VBSW (1999–2013)
 ...and others
 Formerly supported by:
 Thailand (1948–
1995)[2][3]
 Republic of
China (1950–1961)[4][5][6]
 United States(1951–
1953)[note 2]
Commanders and leaders
Htin Kyaw
(President of Myanmar)
Sein Win
(Minister of Defence)
Min Aung
Hlaing
(Commander-in-Chief)
Soe Win
Twan Mrat Naing
Naw Zipporah Sein
Saw Mutu Say Poe
Pheung Kya-shin
Yang Mao-liang
Bao Youxiang
Wei Hsueh-kang
Former commanders:

14. (Deputy Commander-in-
Chief)
Former commanders:
 Sao Shwe
Thaik(1948–1952)
 U Nu (1948–1962)
 Ba U (1952–1957)
 Win Maung(1957–
1962)
 Ne Win (1962–
1981)
 San Yu (1981–1988)
 Saw Maung(1988–
1992)
 Than Shwe(1992–
2011)
 Wai Lwin (2011–
2015)
 Thein Sein(2011–
2016)
 Saw Ba U
Gyi †(1949–1950)
 Thein Pe Myint(1948–
52)
 Thakin Than
Tun † (1952–68)
 Thakin
Soe (POW) (1948–70)
 Lo Hsing
Han (POW) (1967–1973)
 Khun Sa (1985–
1996)
 Bo Mya (1976–2000)
 Johnny and Luther
Htoo (1997–2006)
 Pado Phan(2000–
2008)
 Yawd Serk(1996–
2014)
 Bo Nat Khann
Mway (1994–2016)
Units involved
Tatmadaw
 Myanmar Army
 Border Guard Forces
 Local armed
insurgents[7]
 Foreign volunteers[8]
Strength
492,000[note 3]
Previous totals:
 43,000 (1951)[1]
 289,000 (1995)[10]
600[11]
–1,000[12]
1,500[7]
–2,500[13]
1,500[14]
8,000[15]
6,000[12]
–7,000[16]
500[12]
–1,500[16]
800+[17]

15. 3,000–4,000[18]
3,000[19]
–4,000[7]
8,000[7]
6,000[16]
–8,000[7]
1,500[20]
–3,500[21]
20,000[22]
–25,000[23]
Unknown numbers of various
otherfactions
Total:
70,000–75,000[7]
6,000 (1951)[1]
4,000+ (1951)[1]
14,000 (1950)[6]
Previous totals:
 60,000–70,000 (1988)[24]
 50,000 (1998)[25]
 15,000 (2002)[26]
Casualties and losses
130,000[27]
–250,000[28]
killed
600,000–1,000,000 civilians displaced[29]

The internal conflict in Myanmar (also known as Burma) refers to a series of insurgencieswithin
Myanmar that began shortly after the country became independent from the United Kingdom in
1948. The conflict has been described as one of the world's "longest running civil wars".
Background
Prior to independence from the United Kingdom, several anti-colonial groups in Burma (Myanmar)
protested against British rule over the country. The groups became especially influential
during WWII, when the Empire of Japan promised an "independent Burmese state" (restricted under
the status of a puppet state under Japan), and appointed Ba Maw as its head of state.[31] During this
period, left wing groups such as the Communist Party of Burma (CPB; also known as the Burma

16. Communist Party) and ethnic insurgent groups such as the Karen National Union (KNU) began to
emerge in opposition to both the British and Japanese.[32] In 1947, the Panglong Agreement was
reached between Aung San and ethnic leaders, in an attempt to quell hostilities; however, the
agreement was not honoured by the post-independence government following Aung San's
assassination, leading to further ethnic tensions and the eventual outbreak of ethnic conflicts.[33]
After Burmese independence in 1948, communists and ethnic minorities in the country began
growing discontent against the newly formed post-independence government, as they believed that
they were being unfairly excluded from governing the country.[2][31] For example, it was noted that
many Christian Karen military officials, whom were originally appointed by the British, were replaced
with Buddhist Bamars by the new parliament.[citation needed] In the early 1960s, the government refused
to adopt a federal system, to the dismay of insurgent groups such as the CPB, who proposed
adopting the system during peace talks. By the early 1980s, politically motivated armed insurgencies
had largely disappeared, while ethnic-based insurgencies continued.
Several insurgent groups have negotiated ceasefires and peace agreements with successive
governments, which until political reforms that begun in 2011 and ended in 2015, had largely fallen
apart.[30][34]
Timeline[edit]
The conflict is generally divided into three parts: Insurgencies during the post-independence period
under parliamentary rule (1948–1962), insurgencies during post 1962 coup military rule under
General Ne Win during the Cold War (1962–1988), and insurgencies during the modern post Cold
War era, first under military (Tatmadaw) rule (1988–2011), and nowcurrently under the new elected
government.
Post-independence conflict (1948–1962)[edit]
Main articles: Communist insurgency in Myanmar and Karen conflict
Following independence, the two largest insurgent factions in Myanmar (Burma) were the
communists, led by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), and ethnic Karen insurgents, led by
the Karen National Union (KNU). Both groups had fought the government prior to independence,
and had also fought Japanese forces during their occupation of Burma in World War II.[31] Within
eight months of independence, several other ethnic insurgent groups were formed, such as the Pa-O
National Army.[35]
During the post-independence period, the KNU favoured an independent state, administered by the
Karen people. The proposed state would be forged out of Karen State (Kayin State) and Karenni
State (Kayah State), in Lower Burma (Outer Myanmar). The KNU has since shifted their focus from
full independence to regional autonomy, under a federal system with fair Karen representation in the
government.[36]
Post-coup conflict (1962–1988)[edit]

17. "They Go Back": Insurgents of the Communist Party of Burmawalk back to their bases after
failed peace talks. (1963)
After three successive parliamentary governments governed Myanmar (Burma),
the Tatmadaw(Burmese/Myanmar Armed Forces), led by General Ne Win, enacted a coup d'état in
1962, which ousted the parliamentary government, and replaced it with a military junta. Accusations
of severe human rights abuses and violations followed afterwards, and the cabinet of the
parliamentary government and political leaders of ethnic minority groups were arrested and detained
without trial.[24] Around this period, other ethnic minority groups began forming larger rebel factions,
such as the Kachin Independence Army, in response to the new government's refusal to adopt
a federal government structure.
Both immediately after the coup and again in 1972, General Ne Win held peace talks with opposition
forces, but both times they fell apart, partly due to General Ne Win's refusal to adopt a multi-party
system. After negotiations failed, defectors from the Tatmadaw and rebel insurgents walked back to
their bases, with headlines across Myanmar famously reading "They Go Back" ( ူတ ာ့မပနျော်က ကလငပီ).
Private property was confiscated by the government, and the Burmese Socialist Programme
Party (BSPP) was founded in 1974 to govern the country under a one-party system. Under General
Ne Win's 26 year dictatorship, Myanmar became an isolated hermit kingdom, and became one of
the least developed countries in the world. In 1988, nationwide student protests resulted in the BSPP
and General Ne Win being ousted and replaced with a new military regime, the State Peace and
Development Council.[25]
8888 Uprising[edit]
Main article: 8888 Uprising
On 8 August 1988, students began demonstrating in Rangoon (Yangon) against General Ne Win's
rule, and the disastrous Burmese Way to Socialism system. The protests spread across the
country,[37] The uprising ended on 18 September 1988, after a military coup was enacted by
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and Ne Win was overthrown.
Authorities in Myanmar (Burma) claimed that around 350 people were killed,[38][39] whilst anti-
government groups claimed thousands died in the protests, with a high number of deaths attributed
to the military.[40][41][42] According to the Economist, over 3,000 people were killed in the public
uprising.[43] As a result of the uprising, the new government agreed to sign separate peace treaties
with certain insurgent groups. Because the 1988 uprising was mostly politically motivated, ethnic
insurgent groups did not receive much support from political movements in Myanmar. In the 1990s,
the Tatmadaw severely weakened ethnic insurgent groups, destroying most of their bases and
strongholds.
Post-Cold War conflict (1988–present)[edit]
In 2006, the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) conducted a large offensive against the Karen
National Union (KNU) in Kayin State, which resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands
of civilians. One estimate claimed that approximately half a million people were displaced due to
fighting between government forces and the KNU, and forcible relocation of villages by the
government.[44][45]
In 2011, the Tatmadaw launched a military offensive named Operation Perseverance (ဇွဲမနျော် နျော်ိုး)
against insurgents in Shan State.[46] During the offensive, the Tatmadaw captured territory from
the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA) and the Shan State Army - North(SSA-N), with the
SSA-N being involved in most of the fighting. The offensive was in response to the groups' rejections
of the junta's "One Nation, One Army" policy.[47][48][49][50][51][52]

18. On 19 November 2014, government forces attacked the Kachin Independence Army's headquarters
near the city of Laiza, killing at least 22 KIA insurgents, according to the government.[53]
Between February and May 2015, government forces launched several military
operations in Kokang, in northern Shan State;[54] in response to attempts by the Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) to retake territory it had lost in 2009.[55]
On 9 October 2016, unidentified insurgents attacked border posts on the Myanmar-Bangladesh
border, killing nine border officers.[56] Clashes continued, and on 11 October 2016,
four Tatmadaw soldiers were killed by insurgents with recently looted weapons.[57]
Main fronts[edit]
Kachin State[edit]
Main article: Kachin conflict
The Kachin people are a major ethnic minority in Myanmar who mainly inhabit the mountainous
northern regions of the Kachin Hills in Kachin State. They have fought for the self-determination of
their people since Myanmar gained independence, though less so than other ethnic minorities in
Myanmar, such as the Karen people. Kachin regular soldiers previously formed a significant part of
the Myanmar military; however, after General Ne Win's regime seized power in 1962, many Kachin
soldiers defected from the military and reorganized with already active Kachin insurgents to form
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), under the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). Religious
tensions have also been a source of conflict, as Kachin people have historically been
predominantly Christian, while the majority Bamar people have been predominantly Buddhist.[58]
Ceasefire agreements have been signed between the KIA and the government several times; most
notably a ceasefire signed in 1994, that lasted for 17 years until June 2011, when government forces
attacked KIA positions along the Taping River, east of Bhamo, Kachin State.[59]
In 2012 alone, fighting between the KIA and the government resulted in around 2,500 casualties
(both civilian and military); 211 of whom were government soldiers. The violence resulted in
the displacement of nearly 100,000 civilians, and the complete or partial abandonment of 364
villages.[60][61][62][63]
Kayah State[edit]
The largest insurgent group in Kayah State (also known as Karenni State) is the Karenni Army,
whose goal for the past few decades has been to obtain independence and self-determination for
the Karenni people.[64]
The group has claimed that their grievances towards the government include: the (government's)
exploitation and rapid depletion of the natural resources in the region, the forced sale of farmer's
agricultural products for low prices, extortion and corruption within local authorities, forced labour,
forced relocation of whole villages and farms, destruction of houses, planting of mines in civilian
areas, torture, rape, extrajudicial killings, burning of villages, expropriation of food supplies and
livestock, arrests without charge, and exploitation of the poor. The Karenni Army is currently led by
General Bee Htoo,[64] and consists of roughly between 500[12] and 1,500 soldiers.[16]
Kayin State[edit]
Main article: Karen conflict
The Karen people of Kayin State (also known as Karen State) in eastern Myanmar are the third
largest ethnic group in Myanmar, consisting of 7% of the country's total population, and have fought
for independence and self-determination since 1949. In 1949, the commander-in-chiefof
the Tatmadaw General Smith Dun, an ethnic Karen, was fired and replaced by Ne Win,
a Bamar nationalist who would go on to become the dictator of Myanmar, because of the rise of
Karen opposition groups.[35]

19. The initial aim of the largest Karen opposition group, the Karen National Union (KNU), and its armed
wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), was to obtain independence for the Karen people.
However, since 1976 they have instead called for a federal union with fair Karen representation, and
the self-determination of the Karen people.[36] Nearly all of their demands and requests have been
ignored or denied by successive governments, a contributing factor to failed peace talks until political
reforms which begun in 2011 and ended in 2015.
In 1995, the main headquarters and operating bases of the KNU had mostly been destroyed or
captured by the government, forcing the KNLA (the armed wing of the KNU) to instead operate in the
jungles of Kayin State. Up until that year, the Thai government had been supporting insurgents
across its border, but soon stopped its support due to a new major economic deal with Myanmar.[2]
The government of Myanmar has been accused of using "scorched earth" tactics against Karen
civilians in the past, including (but not limited to) burning down entire villages, planting land mines,
using civilians as slave labour, using civilians as minesweepers, and the rape and murder of Karen
women.[65] According to a report by legal firm DLA Piper, whose report was presented to the United
Nations Security Council, these tactics against the Karen can be identified as ethnic cleansing. The
government had however, denied these claims.[66]
Rakhine State[edit]
Main articles: Rohingya insurgency in Western Myanmar, 2012 Rakhine State riots, and 2013
Myanmar anti-Muslim riots
Insurgent groups of the Chin, Rakhine (also known as Arakanese), and Rohingya ethnic minorities
have fought against the government for self-determination in Rakhine State since the early
1950s.[67][68][69]
Rakhine insurgent groups, such as the Arakan Army and Arakan Liberation Army (ALA) continue to
have hostilities towards the government, though major violence has been rare since political reforms
and peace talks. The Arakan Army, founded in 2009, is currently the largest insurgent group in
Rakhine State, with 1,500–2,500 fighters active in the region.[70]
Insurgents of the Rohingya ethnic minority have been fighting local government forces and other
insurgent groups in northern Rakhine State since 1948, with ongoing religious violence between the
predominantly Muslim Rohingyas and Buddhist Rakhines fueling the conflict. The legal and political
rights of the Rohingya people have been an underlying issue in the conflict, with spontaneous bouts
of violence such as the 2012 Rakhine State riots and 2013 Myanmar anti-Muslim riots periodically
occurring as a result. Despite making up a majority of the population in the three northern townships
of Rakhine State,[69] Rohingyas are often targets of religiously motivated attacks. Because the
government does not recognise the Rohingya people as an official ethnic group in Myanmar,
Rohingyas cannot apply for citizenship, and few laws exist to protect their rights.[71]
On 9 October 2016, an estimated 300 unidentified insurgents attacked three Burmese border posts
along Myanmar's border with Bangladesh. According to government officials in the border town
of Maungdaw, the attackers looted several dozen firearms and ammunition from the border posts,
and brandished knives and homemade slingshots that fired metal bolts. The attacks left nine border
officers and "several insurgents" dead.[56] On 11 October 2016, four Tatmadaw soldiers were killed
on the third day of fighting.[57]Though it is not known who the perpetrators were, government officials
in Rakhine State have blamed the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), an insurgent group that
was mainly active in the 1980s and 1990s and had foreign Islamist backers, whilst others pointed to
terrorist groups from Bangladesh.[72]
Shan State[edit]
The Shan people are the largest ethnic group in Shan State, and the second largest in Myanmar. In
1947, the Panglong Agreement was negotiated between Aung San, a prominent founding father of
Myanmar, and Shan leaders, which would have given the Shan the option to split from Myanmar a

20. decade after independence if they were unsatisfied with the central government.[33] This was,
however, not honoured by the post-independence government following Aung San's
assassination.[6] During the Tatmadaw's (Myanmar Armed Forces') heavy militarisation of the state in
the late 1940s and early 1950s, locals accused them of mistreating, torturing, robbing, raping,
unlawfully arresting, and massacring villagers. As a result, on 21 May 1958, an armed resistance
movement, led by Sao Noi and Saw Yanna, was started in Shan State.
One the largest Shan insurgent groups in Myanmar is the Shan State Army - South (SSA-S), which
has around 6,000 to 8,000 soldiers, and was led by Yawd Serk until his resignation on 2 February
2014. The SSA-S maintains bases along the Myanmar-Thailand border, and signed a ceasefire
agreement with the government on 2 December 2011.[73]
Political discontent[edit]
Prior to independence, Aung San, considered a founding father of Myanmar, had convinced local
Shan leaders to join him in his pursuit for independence, and with them, negotiated the Panglong
Agreement in 1947. The agreement guaranteed the right to self-determination, political
representation in the post-independence government, and economic equality amongst the various
ethnic groups. It also gave the Chin, Kachin, and Shan people the option to separate from Myanmar
after a decade if their states' leaders were unhappy with the central government. However, this was
not honored by the government, and has been one of the causes of insurgencies in those states.[6]
Whilst some groups continue to fight for full independence and for the right for self-determination of
their people, groups such as the Chin National Front (CNF) and the Karen National Union (KNU)
have since fought instead for regional autonomy, and a federal system of government in
Myanmar.[74]
During the 1988 uprising, Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as a national symbol for democracy, after
leading the largest opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). The military
junta arranged a general election in 1990 and Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the National League for
Democracy (NLD) won a majority of the vote. However, the military junta refused to recognise the
results and instead placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest for 15 years.
In 2007, hundreds of thousands of monks protested against the military junta's rule, and called
for free elections, minority rights and the release of political prisoners in an event now known as
the Saffron Revolution.[75] The protest originally began in response to the government's removal of
price subsidies for compressed natural gas.[76]
Aung Sun Su Kyi had been silenced by the military government, put under house arrest, and had
been struggling to run in the country's elections for several years. In 2011, the government
introduced a new constitution following political reforms, and thousands of political prisoners were
released, including Aung San Su Kyi. In November 2014, the NLD attempted to make amendments
to the constitution, in response to a clause that made Aung San Suu Kyi ineligible to
become President of Myanmar if her party won an election. These amendments however, were
rejected.[77]
Human rights violations[edit]
The government of Myanmar has been accused of using "scorched earth" tactics against civilians,
most notably in Kayin State. The accusations included burning down entire villages,
planting landmines, using civilians as slave labour, using civilians as minesweepers, and the rape
and murder of Karen women.[65] According to a report by legal firm DLA Piper, whose report was
presented to the United Nations Security Council, these tactics against the Karen have been
identified as ethnic cleansing.[66]

21. Both sides have been accused of using landmines, which have caused hundreds of accidental
civilian injuries and deaths. The Karen National Union (KNU) has been accused of planting
landmines in rural areas, most of which have not been disarmed. The KNU claim that landmines are
vital to repelling government forces, because it "discourages them from attacking civilians".
However, a majority of those who fall victim to KNU planted landmines are local villagers, rather than
government soldiers.[78] Victims of landmines must travel to the Thai-Myanmar border to seek
treatment, as local hospitals and facilities lack proper equipment and funding.[79]
Both sides have also been accused of using thousands of child soldiers, despite the fact that the
government of Myanmar and seven insurgent groups signed an agreement with UNICEF in 2012,
promising not to exploit children for military and political gains. The International Labor
Organization (ILO) has accused both sides of continuing to use child soldiers despite the agreement.
According to the ILO, the Tatmadaw have discharged hundreds of child soldiers since 2012;
however, they estimated that at least 340 child soldiers had been recruited by the Tatmadaw
between 2013 and 2014.[80] The most notable case of the use child soldiers in Myanmar was
of Johnny and Luther Htoo, the leaders of God's Army, a former rebel faction. At the time of their
formation of God's Army, they were both only 10 years old.[81]
Refugee crisis[edit]
Mae La Camp, Tak, Thailand, one of the largest of nine UNHCRcamps in Thailand where
over 700,000 refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless persons have fled.[82]
The conflict has resulted in a large number of both civilian deaths and refugees, with many refugee s
fleeing to Thailand. The UN estimates that between 1996 and 2006, around 1 million people
were displaced inside Myanmar, and that over 230,000 people remain displaced in Southeast
Myanmar, and 128,000 refugees live in temporary shelters on the Thai-Myanmar border.[83][84] In
August 2007, approximately 160,000 refugees fled to nine refugee camps along the Thai-Myanmar
border, and the Thai border provinces of Chiang Mai and Ratchaburi. Approximately 62% of the
refugee population consisted of people from the Karen ethnic minority. Humanitarian organisations
such as Doctors Without Borders have since sent assistance and support to the refugees.[85]
Civilians have allegedly been removed from their homes and have had their land confiscated by the
government to be used in industrial projects.[83][86] Civilians have also been removed from their
homes by the central government, and their land confiscated, in order for development projects and
resource exploitation.[86][87]
In Rakhine State, there are currently about 75,000 Rohingya refugees, according to Refugee
International.[88] UNICEF has reported that living conditions in Rohingya refugee camps in Rakhine
State are "wholly inadequate" and lacks access to basic services.[89] Historically, the persecution
of Burmese Indians and other ethnic minority groups in Myanmar after the 1962 coup has led to the
expulsion of nearly 300,000 people.[90] More than 200,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled to
Bangladesh over the last 20 years to escape persecution.[91] The Rohingya people have been
described by the United Nations as "among the world's least wanted" and "one of the world's most

22. persecuted minorities."[92] Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri has also threatened Myanmar with
terrorist attacks, after their "terror network" expanded into India, Bangladesh and Myanmar.[93]
International responses[edit]
United Nations: Since 1991, the UN General Assembly has adopted twenty five UN resolutions
regarding Myanmar's government, condemning previous military juntas for their systematic violations
of human rights and lack of political freedom.[94] In 2009 they urged the then ruling junta to take
urgent measures to end violations of international human rights and humanitarian laws in the
country.[95]The request was mostly honoured during political reforms that begun in 2011 and ended
in 2015. According to research from Harvard University’s International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC),
three government officials have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in southeast
Myanmar under a previous military regime.[96]
Foreign support[edit]
Bangladesh: The government of Bangladesh has been accused of supporting and training
Rohingya insurgents in Myanmar since gaining independence in 1971.[97]
China: The People's Republic of China allegedly supported the Communist Party of Burma until
its dissolution in 1989, and have recently been accused of supporting insurgent groups across its
border with Myanmar such as the United Wa State Army.[5]
Thailand: Thailand had been a vocal supporter of various insurgent groups in Myanmar, and
allowed weapons and ammunition to be smuggled through Thailand into Myanmar through lax
enforcing of its border.[3] The Thai government however, stopped all logistical support after a major
economic deal with Myanmar in 1995.[2]
Others: A renowned Australian criminal, Dave Everett also fought alongside and trained Karen
insurgents, sympathising with them to the point of committing armed robbery to fund his weapon
smuggling operation in Myanmar.[8]
Ceasefire negotiations[edit]
Under the new constitutional reforms in 2011, state level and union level ceasefire agreements were
made with many rebel factions. 14 out of 17 of the largest rebel factions signed a ceasefire
agreement with the new reformed government. According to the Myanmar Peace Monitoring group,
clashes between Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), its allies, and the government, has
displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and create another severe humanitarian crisis in Kachin
and northern Shan State.[98] All of the 14 signatories wanted negotiations in accordance with
the Panglong Agreement of 1947, which granted self-determination, a federal system of government
(meaning regionol autonomy), religious freedom, and ethnic minority rights. However, the new
constitution, only had a few clauses dedicated to minority rights, and therefore, the government
discussed with rebel factions using the new constitution for reference, rather than the Panglong
Agreement. There was no inclusive plan or body that represented all the factions, and as a result, in
resent, the KNU backed out of the conference and complained the lack of independence for each
party within the ethnic bloc.[99]However, most of the negotiations between the State Peace Deal
Commission and rebel factions were formal and peaceful.[100]
In April 2015, a draft Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement was finalised between representatives from
fifteen different insurgent groups (all part of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team or NCCT),
and the Government of Myanmar.[101]
In October 2015, after two years of negotiations, the government of Myanmar announced that it will
finalise and sign a ceasefire agreement with eight insurgent groups, including the Karen National

23. Union. However, only 8 out of the 15 original signatories signed the ceasefire agreement on 15
October 2015, after seven of members of the NCCT backed out of negotiations in September 2015.
The signing was witnessed by observers and delegates from the United Nations, the United
Kingdom, Norway, Japan, and the United States.
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Further reading[
 International Center for Transitional Justice "Opening up Remedies in Myanmar 12/9/2015"
 International Center for Transitional Justice "Navigating Paths to Justice in Myanmar's Transition
7/18/2014"
 Kipgen, Nehginpao. "Democracy Movement in Myanmar: Problems and Challenges." New Delhi:
Ruby Press & Co., 2014. Print.
External links[edit]
News:
 Democratic Voice of Burma – Norwegian-based radio station that provides news to the people of
Burma
 Mizzima News – Multimedia news organisation based in India, run by exiled journalists. See
also: Mizzima News
 MyanmaThadin – Myanmar (Burma) News & Community Hub

28.  BBC News: The fighting spirit of Burma's Karen (2007)
Organisations:
 Help without frontiers – German relief organisation working with Shan and Karen refugees living
in refugee camps on and around the Thai-Myanmar border
 International Center for Transitional Justice (Myanmar) – Non-profit organisation specialising
in transitional justice
 Myanmar Peace Monitor – Non-governmental organisation based in Thailand that monitors
Myanmar's ongoing peace process
e – Political institute based in Chaing Mai, Thailand focused on achieving political stability and peace in Myanmar
Daw Aung Suu Kyi clear answer “why the civil war are continue in
Myanmar? She answered the question during visited to Japan
on 2-11-2016.
ဂ်ပန္မွာ ေ ျဖလလုု္ၿပီ 💫 💫💫💫💫💫💫💫💫💫💫
ေမ ပျ္ည္တ္ ္း္း္
ဘွာေုုွာတ္္ မ ပ္္း္စဖလတ္ ေင ညွာျ္တာလဲ။
DASSK ေ -ေုုွာတ္ တ္ စ္း္င်ုု္ ဖညက္တာလဲ။
🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟
၁တာလဲ။ ပ္္း္င်တ္္းဖည္ မ ဖျဖလ႔ပ္တာလဲ။
🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟
၂တာလဲ။ ပ္္း္ တ္ုုဖလက္္-ည္ုု္
🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟 🌟
ဘွာေည္ -ုု် ဖ ကလည္မျ္ျဖလ႔ ေည္ ေနုုျဖလ႔ပ္တာလဲ။

29. 


30. 1Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue
Myanmar Policy Briefing Nr 15
July 2015
The renewed violence in the Kokang region
of the northern Shan state in February 2015
has had serious repercussions for efforts to
solve ethnic conflict in Burma/Myanmar1
and
end the decades-old civil war. The fighting
started when troops led by the veteran
Kokang leader Pheung Kya-shin (Peng
Jiasheng) resurfaced in the Kokang region
and attacked government and army positions
after an interval of nearly six years. Pheung
Kya-shin’s Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (MNDAA), a former ceasefire
group and government ally, was ousted
from the Kokang region in 2009 by a rival
Kokang leader with the help of the Tatmadaw
(national armed forces). This coup happened
Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue:
Consequences of the Kokang Crisis for Peace and
Democracy in Myanmar
after Pheung’s MNDAA had refused to
accept the demand of the previous military
government to transform into a Border
Guard Force (BGF).2
The outbreak of renewed conflict in the
Kokang region has, in turn, clouded
the prospects of achieving a nationwide
ceasefire agreement (NCA) in Myanmar.
Battles broke out while negotiations were
ongoing in Yangon. For while other ethnic
armed organisations have called for peace
talks and a halt to the renewed fighting, the
quasi-civilian government under President
Thein Sein has so far refused to address
the Kokang crisis by political means. The
Recommendations
The renewed violence in the Kokang region
has serious repercussions for efforts to solve
ethnic conflict in Myanmar and clouded
the prospects for achieving a nationwide
ceasefire agreement. Fighting has spilled
across the Yunnan province border and
strained relations with China, Myanmar’s
largest foreign investor.
The return of conflict to the Kokang region
follows an unaddressed pattern of increased
military operations and instability in the
Kachin and northern Shan states since
President Thein Sein assumed office in
2011. It is vital that peace is achieved and all
nationality peoples, including the Kachin,
Kokang, Shan and Ta-ang, are included
in nationwide ceasefire talks and political
dialogue. Conflict in any part of the country
can quickly lead to national instability.
The humanitarian consequences of the
renewed fighting in northeast Myanmar
are profound. Since 2011, around 200,000
civilians have been displaced in the Kachin
and northern Shan states, many of whom
have fled towards the China border. Amidst
rising Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar,
the Kokang conflict also raises the risk of
anti-Chinese sentiment in the country.
Failure to address the root causes of armed
conflict and to create an inclusive political
process will have a detrimental impact on
the prospects for peace, democracy and
development. Military solutions to ethnic
conflict must no longer be pursued, and an
inclusive political dialogue should start as
soon as possible. Peace in Myanmar needs
to move from arguments about process to
agreements about delivery. It is time to end
military confrontation and to start political
dialogue.

31. 2 Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue
Tatmadaw has responded with a large
military offensive, supported by air strikes,
in an all-out effort to drive out the MNDAA
from the Kokang region. Although the
MNDAA declared a unilateral ceasefire
in June, the conflict continues and the
MNDAA is still holding ground, with the
Tatmadaw making rare public admissions of
taking casualties.3
Fighting has also spilled across the border
into China, killing five Chinese citizens in
a mis-targeted airstrike by the Myanmar
air force. Such loss of life has put a severe
strain on relations with China, Myanmar’s
largest foreign investor, which has stepped
up security, calling on the government
of President Thein Sein to solve the crisis
through negotiations.4
The Kokang are ethnic
Chinese and enjoy good relations with their
cross-border cousins. In response, the Thein
Sein government has publicly apologized.
But amidst rising Buddhist nationalism
in Myanmar, there are concerns that
government officials are seeking to capitalize
on anti-Chinese sentiment among the general
population. The Tatmadaw has portrayed the
fighting as a defence against foreign intruders
and mercenaries in the protection of national
soil,5
even though the Kokang are officially
recognized as one of Myanmar’s “135 national
races”.6
The resumption of fighting has already had
grave humanitarian consequences. Over
80,000 people have been displaced by the
Kokang conflict, most of whom fled across
the border to China. Equally serious, the
renewed combat in the Kokang region has
caused fighting to escalate in adjoining
Kachin, Shan and Ta-ang (Palaung) areas
of the northern Shan state where other
ethnic armed organisations are in conflict
with the central government. For reasons
never properly explained by the Nay Pyi
Taw authorities, fighting has reignited
across northeast Myanmar since President
Thein Sein assumed office in March 2011.
In contrast to peace initiatives in other parts
of the country,7
the Tatmadaw has broken
old and violated new ceasefires in both the
Kachin and northern Shan states. Military
security rather than political dialogue appears
to be the Tatmadaw’s default strategy in
Myanmar’s resource-rich northeast.
As a result, some 200,000 civilians have
now been displaced from their homes in
the China borderlands during the four
years since President Thein Sein assumed
office.8
At a time of much-hoped for reform
in the country, such suffering is furthering
mistrust about the government’s intentions
and its willingness to settle Myanmar’s long-
standing ethnic challenges through political
negotiations rather than battle-field means.
A blame game is now underway as to who is
responsible for the latest spread in fighting.
But as another general election approaches
later this year, it is vital to recognize that the
present conflict in the Kokang region is not
unique or new. Rather, it is symptomatic of
the failed policies of the past and the need
to find inclusive political solutions in what
remains one of the most militarized and
ethnically-divided countries in Asia.
In a speech in London in July 2013 President
Thein Sein promised to bring a just and
sustainable peace in the country: “Very
possibly, over the coming weeks, we will have
a nationwide ceasefire and the guns will go
silent everywhere in Myanmar for the first
time in over sixty years.”9
As clashes continue
in northeast Myanmar, such words have a
very hollow ring. It is time for all parties to
redouble efforts to halt the fighting and seek
genuine national peace together. The need
has long been urgent to end Myanmar’s cycle
of conflict by political dialogue that will
address ethnic aspirations and grievances,
bringing equality, peace and justice to all
peoples.
The Present Conflict
On 9 February MNDAA troops, after several
months of preparation,10
re-surfaced in the
Kokang region with a claimed 1,000-strong
force and attacked Tatmadaw bases and police
stations in and around the regional capital
Laukkai. Pheung Kya-shin’s son, Pheung
Daxun (Peng Deren) is leading the MNDAA’s
military operations. Since its ousting from
the Kokang region in 2009, Pheung Daxun

32. 3Military Confrontation or Political Dialogue
has been in charge of regrouping and
reorganising the MNDAA, ostensibly with
support from other organisations.11
Taken by surprise, the Tatmadaw sent in
a large number of reinforcements to the
northern Shan state and launched airstrikes
by helicopters and fighter jets against
MNDAA positions.Unlike in 2009, however,
when MNDAA forces were defeated within
a few days, protracted fighting has continued
across the Kokang region ever since.
A week after the fighting erupted, state media
reported that “sporadic fighting continued
all day long” in Laukkai.12
On 17 February,
President Thein Sein declared a state of
emergency and martial law in the Kokang
region, thereby ceding all administrative
and judicial powers to the Tatmadaw for the
first time in any part of the country since
the 2008 constitution had been introduced.13
Nevertheless in early March the state media
acknowledged that “fierce fighting” was still
taking place in the Kokang region,14
and,
in an unusual admission, reported that the
Tatmadaw had suffered 73 fatal casualties
and 189 wounded, claiming that 86 MNDAA
soldiers had also died.15
A few days later,
the Chinese state media reported that
“unconfirmed compiled statistics show that,
as of now, the government side suffered 100
deaths with 246 wounded, while 104 bodies
were seized from the MNDAA with 30 being
arrested.”16
As the fighting raged, the Myanmar state
media featured reports of President Thein
Sein, Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief
Snr-Gen. Min Aung Hlaing and other high-
ranking government members visiting
injured soldiers in hospitals. In a carefully-
orchestrated public relations campaign,
a foreign threat to national sovereignty
was implied, gaining the Tatmadaw some
rare public support for military operations
among Myanmar’s majority Burman (Bamar)
population.17
For Kokang inhabitants, there
was further resonance: as a special operations
commander, Min Aung Hlaing had led the
2009 operation that had ousted the MNDAA
from regional control.18
The patriotic tone,
however, was generally lowered after five
Chinese civilians were killed in a cross-
border airstrike, prompting Beijing to warn of
retaliation.
Despite overwhelming military advantage,
Tatmadaw progress has continued to be slow.
During May, fierce fighting was still reported
to be taking place some 40 kilometres
north of Laukkai,19
while a month later the
government declared that it had gained
control of Laukkai and the surrounding area.
Since this time, fighting has moved into the
mountains in the northern Kokang region
and, although the MNDAA announced
a unilateral ceasefire on 11 June after
coming under Chinese pressure, Tatmadaw
commanders still appear to be striving for
military solutions. At the present time, attacks
on MNDAA positions are still continuing.20
The renewed fighting has also escalated
broader ethnic conflict across the northern
Shan state, hindering the Tatmadaw’s advance
in the rugged terrain. In its initial attack,
the MNDAA was supported by the Ta-ang
National Liberation Army (TNLA: Palaung
State Liberation Front) and the Arakan Army
(AA) which agreed to join the operation.21
In a joint statement released in early March,
the three organisations stated: “Using
fighter planes, tanks and armored cars,
Myanmar Tatmadaw (Army) has launched
offensives against our ethnic armed resistance
organisations in Kokang, Ta’ang etc.
regions, which are regions of the indigenous
nationalities in Northern Shan State, as if it
were against a foreign aggression.”22
Other
ethnic armed organisations are also active
in the surrounding territories, including
the non-ceasefire Kachin Independence
Organisation (KIO), ceasefire Shan State
Army-North/Shan State Progress Party
(SSA/SSPP) and ceasefire United Wa State
Army (UWSA). While the degree of military
cooperation between the different forces
is disputed, leaders of all these nationality
groups presently have close relations. Indeed
government officials accused several of these
organisations of supporting the MNDAA in
its revival, even though they are currently
involved in joint negotiations with the
Thein Sein government for the agreement
of a nationwide ceasefire (see “Towards a
Nationwide Ceasefire?” below).