MYANMAR CORRUPTION REPORT COLLECTION 2017-2018

1/22/2018 Corruption in Myanmar - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corruption_in_Myanmar 1/11
Corruption in Myanmar
Corruption in Myanmar is an extremely serious problem. Owing to failures in regulation and enforcement, corruption flourishes in every sector of government
and business.[1][2][3] Many foreign businesspeople consider corruption “a serious barrier to investment and trade in Myanmar.”[4] A U.N. survey in May 2014
concluded that corruption is the greatest hindrance for business in Myanmar.[5]
Transparency International's 2016 Corruption Perception Index ranks the country 136th place out of 176 countries.[6]
In the Myanmar Business Survey 2014, corruption was the most frequently identified obstacle to business, especially with respect to obtaining firm registration,
business licenses and permits from government authorities.[7]
It is common in Myanmar to charge illicit payments for government services,[8] to bribe tax collectors to secure a lower tax payment, and to bribe customs officials
to avoid paying customs duties.[9]
Background
Saffron Revolution
Factors
Types of corruption
Petty corruption
Business sector
Foreign business and investment
Land
Jade industry
Oil and gas
Logging
Taxation
Contents

Political corruption
Import, export, and customs officials
Buying property
Police and security forces
Health care and education
NGOs
Judiciary
Lobbying groups
Drugs
Anti-corruption efforts
See also
References
In 2007 the then Burmese government revoked several subsidies for various fuel industries, causing prices to soar throughout the nation. This sparked widespread
protests due to the public's dissatisfaction with the military government. It was noted that the average citizen was displeased with the immense levels of
kleptocracy in the nation, allowing members of the military dictatorship to live in a "state within a state"[10][11] with accumulated wealth far beyond that of the
people. The government reacted harshly to the protests through violence and arbitrary detentions. While the official death count tallied thirteen killed, it is widely
surmised that the true number far exceeded this figure. The government had even taken steps to censor internet access within the country, though to no avail.[12]
[13][14][15]
Although the demonstrations were dispersed and suppressed by the military junta, the public would later vote a new government in and wrested power from Than
Shwe by 2011. Nonetheless, elements of the military government retained power.[16][17][18][19]
Myanmar spent five decades under military rule. This period ended in 2011, when a semi-civilian government took power and sought to regenerate the economy
and draw foreign investment. Among its objectives was the reduction of endemic corruption. As of May 2014, however, those reforms were viewed as having had a
minimal effect on corruption.[5]
Background
Saffron Revolution

Every leading official in the former military regime is said to have “committed thousands of offenses related to corruption.”[20]
Most high-level officials in the civil service were related to military officials.[20]
Since the end of military rule, Myanmar has been implementing economic reforms and developing a free market, but according to
one source “its nascent market economy remains bound by myriads of regulations,” which make possible rampant corruption that
“hinders the functioning of the price mechanism, upon which the proper functioning of the market economy is based.”[9] Kim
Ninh of the Asia Foundation said in May 2015 that despite efforts to reduce corruption after military rule, the country's business
environment remained essentially the same, with few new companies emerging since 2011.[5]
An October 2015 article in Wired stated that notwithstanding attempts by the US and other Western countries to promote
transparency, the majority of Myanmar's economy remains in control of a corrupt elite.[21] During the privatization process,
according to a report by the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre that was updated in October 2014, “numerous state assets were
sold to the military, family members, and associates of senior government officials at fire sale prices.”[22]
According to several reports, moreover, the military influenced the results of the 2010 and 2012 elections by means of fraud, restrictions on political participation,
and prohibition of international monitoring.[22]
Some reasons for the high levels of corruption in Myanmar include multiple exchange rates, which enable officials to demand bribes for providing favorable rates;
low civil-service pay rates; and a tradition of nepotism.[20] “As there are no competitive selection processes to enter the public sector,” notes one report, “personal
connections and bribery are maybe more important than qualifications. For instance, it is common practice to select ministers and high-level civil servants from
the military ranks rather than based on expertise.”[22]
It has been observed that post-2011 Myanmar has an expanding informal economy, and that such economies are notoriously vulnerable to corruption.[23]
Petty corruption, meaning the extortion of small bribes or “gifts” in connection with everyday services, is “endemic to the everyday life of Myanmar citizens. It is
particularly prevalent when citizens deal with the bureaucracy of the country and engage with low- to mid-level public officials.” It is common “in application
processes for permits or documents, where bribes or gift-giving end up becoming unavoidable elements of the process, perhaps even becoming culturally
engrained[,] with bribery rather being seen as gift-giving or a kind gesture.” Since gifts up to 300,000 Kyat (USD 300) are not legally regarded as corruption, there
are no penalties for this kind of activity, even though it “represents a huge cost for the government, undermines trust in state institutions, and violates the principle
of equal treatment of citizens.”[9]
Former Burmese Head
of State Than Shwe
Factors
Types of corruption
Petty corruption

“The problem of corruption in Myanmar is particularly severe in the area of business activity,” states one source.[9] A firm wishing a construction permit must go
through an application process involving (on average) 16 procedures, a 159-day wait, and a cost of about 567% of income per capita.[23] A firm wishing to get
electricity must undergo 5 procedures, wait 91 days, and spend over 3000% of income per capita.[23]
In the Myanmar Business Survey 2014, corruption was the most frequently named obstacle to doing business in the country. Myanmar was also near the bottom of
Doing Business 2014's Ease of Doing Business ranking.[4]
According to the Investment Climate Statement 2014, “investors may experience corruption when seeking investment permits or when leasing land in
Myanmar.”[23] The Enterprise Surveys 2014 reported that 38.9% of businesspeople were “expected to give gifts to get an operating licence,” while 55.8% were
expected “to give a gift to get an electrical connection,” and 30.1% were “expected to give gifts to secure a water connection.”[23] Persons applying for import and
export licences are also likely to be charged illegal fees.[23]
Without notice or external review, Myanmar's government routinely promulgates new regulations and laws affecting foreign investors.[23]
Daniel Barrins of the Herbert Smith Freehills law firm, a partner of Australia-based Asialink, has said that corruption is denying Myanmar’s citizens the benefits of
foreign investment. Problems with land ownership, intellectual-property rights, and the rule of law all create difficulties for potential foreign investors, according to
Barrins.[1]
Under the military government which ruled Myanmar until 2011, land was nationalized. According to an October 2015 report in the Wall Street Journal, land in
Myanmar remains largely under the control of the military and their allies. In addition, allegations of forced evictions are still common across Myanmar.[24]
The jade trade accounts for 48% of Myanmar’s official GDP.[21] An October 2015 report by Global Witness noted that Myanmar's jade industry is exploited by the
nation's elites; including military leaders, drug traffickers, and business leaders. This was the finding of a year-long investigation entitled “Jade: Myanmar's 'Big
State Secret,'” which identified that several leading members of the nation's government and economy had siphoned $31 billion USD worth of jade in 2014, a figure
nearly half of Myanmar's economy.[21]
Global Witness estimated that illegal networks in Myanmar had stolen a total $122.8 billion USD worth of jade over the previous decade, and claimed that
Myanmar's jade industry is possibly the greatest natural resource racket in recent history. In addition, the nearly one hundred active jade mining deposits are
located in areas controlled by about 10 to 15 military-connected businessmen, and a result the people living in those areas remain in poverty while a few
businessmen profit greatly.[21][25]
Business sector
Foreign business and investment
Land
Jade industry

Myanmar law requires foreign oil and gas exploration firms operating in the country to be partnered with domestic firms. These
arrangements have been criticized for their lack of transparency and accountability.[22]
As of 2006, illegal logging accounted for at least half of the logging in the country. The smuggling of timber across the Chinese
border is a major activity.[22]
Taxes are collected irregularly. Over one third of respondents to a survey said they were expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials. A medium-sized
company doing business in Myanmar must make 31 separate tax payments annually. On average, this takes 155 hours' work, and involves a tax payment amounting
to 48.9% of annual profits.[8]
In April 2014, a new Union Taxation Law came into effect. It is designed to help eliminate corruption in tax collection.[8]
Political corruption exists at higher levels of government, and comes into play especially “when large infrastructural works or other 'mega-projects' are being
negotiated or implemented.” Companies pay bribes “to avoid trouble or delays,” and often “establish illicit networks of patronage which can be exploited in future
deals.” Companies that establish such networks “are often given monopoly control over the markets or sectors they win by 'bidding,'” and this monopoly control
stifles competition and growth.[9]
In the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, business executives rated the incidence of corrupt diversion of public funds to
companies, individuals, or groups at 2.3 on a 7-point scale (1 being “very common” and 7 “never occurs”). They rated the favoritism of government officials towards
well-connected companies and individuals, as reflected in policies and contracts, a score of 2.2 on a 7-point scale (1 meaning “always show favouritism” and 7
“never show favouritism”).[26]
Government ministries often fail to report their own expenditures on projects.[9]
Myanmar's import and export regulations are not transparent. According to the Global Enabling Trade 2014, corruption at the border and burdensome procedures
are among the major challenges to importation of goods. Business executives gave the efficiency and transparency of border administration in Myanmar a score of
2.2 on a 7-point scale (1 being “non-transparent” and 7 “transparent”). Myanmar ranks 128th out of 138 countries in this regard.[27]
Jade mined in Myanmar
Oil and gas
Logging
Taxation
Import, export, and customs officials

Businesses must bribe customs officials in order to avoid high import and export taxes. 53.5% of businesses surveyed in 2014 said that they expected to give “gifts”
to obtain import licences.[27]
On average, exporting a container of goods from Myanmar involves 9 documents, takes 25 days, and costs USD 670. On average, importing a container of goods
into Myanmar involves 9 documents, takes 27 days, and costs USD 660.[27]
Business executives rate the protection of property rights and financial assets at 2.5 on a 7-point scale (1 being “very weak” and 7 “very strong”). Registering
property involves an average of 6 procedures, a 113-day wait, and a cost amounting to 7.2% of the property's value.[28]
On the World Economic Forum's 2013–14 Global Competitiveness Report, business executives scored the reliability of police services to enforce law and order at
3.0 on a 7-point scale (1 being “cannot be relied upon at all” and 7 being “can always be relied upon”).[29]
Police officers “reportedly often ask victims of crimes to pay substantial amounts to ensure police investigate crimes; in addition, police routinely extort money
from civilians.”[29] Police are said to be involved in human trafficking, accepting bribes from drug lords, and to have extorted local businessmen. When a curfew
was imposed following riots that took place in Mandalay in 2004, police extorted bribes from people who wanted to break the curfew.[30]
One reason for police corruption is that police officers were expected for many years to pay for their own investigations, without any reimbursement or
compensation. This policy not only encouraged corruption but also discouraged serious investigation of crimes.[30]
Security forces “generally act with impunity in Myanmar.” The Human Rights Report 2013 noted that a police escort for a UN rapporteur's convoy “stood by” while
the convoy was attacked.[29]
The low quality of Myanmar’s institutions leads to corruption in health care and education.[9]
It is common for international and domestic NGOs to use money intended to help the public to be spent on expensive offices, residences, or other inappropriate
expenses.[9]
Buying property
Police and security forces
Health care and education
NGOs
Judiciary

The judiciary is corrupt and subject to government and military influence. Judiciary officials in Myanmar accept bribes for various services, such as providing
access to detainees and rendering a favorable verdict. Judiciary corruption “represents a major challenge to businesspeople looking to do business in Myanmar.” In
disputes with foreign firms, local businesses can use bribes to secure favorable judgments.[31] On the World Economic Forum's 2013–14 Global Competitiveness
Report, business executives rate the independence of the judiciary at 2.8 on a 7-point scale (1 being “heavily influenced” and 7 “entirely independent”).[31]
Judicial decisions about land and buildings are often affected by government influence, personal relationships, and bribery.[28] It can take years to enforce a
contract in the Myanmar courts.[9]
There are many lobbying groups in Myanmar, but they are unregulated, and “regularly resort to bribes and concessions to secure favor,” which is “abetted by the
lack of transparency and accountability in Myanmar.”[9]
Myanmar is one of the worlds four major producers of opium and heroin. The government has expanded counter-narcotic efforts, but is “reluctant to investigate,
arrest, and prosecute high level international traffickers,” according to the CIA.[22]
While Myanmar was still under military control, its Central Bank implemented controls in accordance with the IMF’s Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the
Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) guidelines. As a result, Myanmar was removed from the international Financial Action Task Force’s list of “Non-cooperative
Countries and Territories” in October 2006.[9]
President Thein Sein has introduced a number of policies intended to reduce corruption in business.[4] A key theme of his inaugural speech on 30 March 2011, was
fighting government corruption. He said that “democracy will [be] promoted only hand in hand with good governance. That is why our government responsible for
Myanmar’s democratic transition will try hard to shape good administrative machinery.…We will fight corruption in cooperation with the people as it harms the
image of not only the offenders, but also the nation and the people.”[9] Thein Sein has reportedly made “significant efforts to minimise corruption in the extractive
industries” in hopes of attracting foreign investment.[32]
In August 2012, an anti-bribery bill was approved. In August 2013, an Anti-Corruption Law was passed.[9]
In April 2013, several senior government officials charged with corruption were compelled to retire or to leave departments working on investment.[9]
The Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB) was founded in 2013. Its seeks to promote “more responsible business practices in Myanmar.” An MCRB
initiative called Transparency in Myanmar Enterprise (TiME) “publishes information about anti-corruption, organizational transparency, and concern for human
rights, health, and the environment among the largest businesses in Myanmar. Using criteria laid out by Transparency International the project has produced
Lobbying groups
Drugs
Anti-corruption efforts

rankings of companies according to the above criteria by analyzing information they post online.”[9]
Anti-corruption laws “were further amended in 2014 to allow for the parliament to establish a committee to investigate allegations of corruption among
government officials.”[9] The Anti-Corruption Commission was established in February 2014. It focuses mainly on bribery, which can be punished by fines and up
to fifteen years in prison.[9] By December 2014, it had received almost 600 written complaints, but had addressed only three, saying that it could not act without
documented evidence. MP U Ye Tun stated that the commission did not have the authority to take action effectively. An expert in governance and anti-corruption,
stated in December 2014 that the commission would be unlikely to target the government or its ministries, which is where the bulk of corruption in Myanmar takes
place.[1]
A February 2014 report said that the Myanmar Police Force (MPF) had improved its ability to identify and acknowledge corruption. In 2013 the MPF arrested two
senior police officers for involvement in drug smuggling.[30]
In July 2014, Myanmar became an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) candidate country.[4] Myanmar was thereby agreeing to increase
transparency in its extractive industries, notably the logging industry.[32]
The Money Laundering Eradication Law (2015) provides for the recovery of funds tied to illicit or criminal activities. The Anti-Money Laundering Rules, the
establishment of a special police unit for financial crimes, and the passage of Rules Combating the Financing of Terrorism also aid the struggle against corruption.
The Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law and the Foreign Exchange Management Law both criminalize fraud and other crimes committed in financial
institutions. Myanmar’s Competition Law allows for the prosecution of anti-competitive business activities. Prosecution under these laws, however, is relatively
rare, owing largely to a lack of governmental resources.[33]
In October 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and opposition leader, said in a speech that she had looked to Singapore for advice on
combatting corruption in her own country, due to Singapore's incredibly low levels of corruption.[24]
In Myanmar, Coca-Cola adopted a policy of zero-tolerance for corruption at its facilities and trucking routes. All drivers of Coca-Cola trucks carry an anti-
corruption card stating that they are forbidden to bribe the traffic authorities and that they are required to report any solicitation of bribes to their supervisors. This
procedure initially met with resistance but over time has been respected by police.[34]
Telenor has declared that it is “firmly opposed to corruption” and that it requires all parties in Myanmar working with Telenor Myanmar “to adhere to Telenor’s
Supplier Conduct Principles.”[35]
Crime in Myanmar
Anti-Corruption Commission of Myanmar
See also

1. Aung, Nyan Lin (8 Dec 2014). "Myanmar stalls in corruption rankings march" (http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/business/12444-myanmar-stalls-in-corrup
tion-rankings-march.html). Myanmar Times.
2. "Myanma Corruption Levels" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/corruption-levels.aspx). GAN Integrity
Solutions. Retrieved 17 July 2015.
3. "Business Corruption in Myanmar" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/snapshot.aspx). GAN Integrity
Solutions. October 2014. Retrieved 17 July 2015.
4. "Business Corruption in Myanmar" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/snapshot.aspx). Business Anti-
Corruption Portal.
5. "Corruption the biggest concern for Myanmar businesses: survey" (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-corruption-idUSBREA450DS20140506).
Reuters. 6 May 2014.
6. "Corruption Perception Index 2016" (https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016).
7. Abe Masato; Margit Molnar (May 2014). "Myanmar Business Survey 2014: Survey Results" (http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/MBS_Survey_Results.p
df) (PDF). Hanns Seidel Foundation. OECD and UNESCAP. Retrieved 17 July 2015.
8. "Myanmar Tax Administration" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/tax-administration.aspx). Business
Anti-Corruption Portal.
9. Saw, Khaing Sape (Apr 2015). "Tackling Myanmar's Corruption Challenge" (http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=190805).
Institute for Security and Development Policy.
10. The hardship that sparked Burma's unrest (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7023548.stm) BBC News 2 October 2007
11. Burma leader's lavish lifestyle aired (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6109356.stm) BBC, 2 November 2006
12. "Human Rights Concern" (http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/myanmar-burma/page.do?id=1011205). Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/2009021
7100821/http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/myanmar-burma/page.do?id=1011205) from the original on 17 February 2009. Retrieved 7 April 2009.
13. "BBC NEWS | World | Asia-Pacific | Burma leaders double fuel prices" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6947251.stm). news.bbc.co.uk. Retrieved
16 May 2015.
14. UN envoy warns of Myanmar crisis (http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4081D23F-F1A4-46AF-BA50-D47FA2B7A4AE.htm) Archived (https://web.archive.o
rg/web/20080228000000/http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4081D23F-F1A4-46AF-BA50-D47FA2B7A4AE.htm) 28 February 2008 at the Wayback
Machine.
15. [1] (http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/32-1pdfs/Kyaw.pdf) Challenging the Authoritarian State: Buddhist Monks and Peaceful Protests in Burma.
vol.32:1 winter 2008. Retrieved 7 April 2009. Archived (https://www.webcitation.org/5gpOoMHAX?url=http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/32-1pdf
s/Kyaw.pdf) 16 May 2009.
16. Irrawaddy: Burma's junta vows to crack down on human rights activists-Yeni (http://www.burmanet.org/news/2007/04/23/irrawaddy-burma%e2%80%99s-j
unta-vows-to-crack-down-on-human-rights-activists-yeni/#more-7395) BurmaNet News, 23 April 2007. Retrieved 23 April 2007. Archived (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20090116013651/http://www.burmanet.org/news/2007/04/23/irrawaddy-burma%e2%80%99s-junta-vows-to-crack-down-on-human-rights-activi
sts-yeni/#more-7395) 16 January 2009 at the Wayback Machine.
17. Jenkins, Graeme; Paris, Natalie (26 September 2007). "Burma troops charge monks with batons" (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/
2007/09/26/wburma526.xml). The Daily Telegraph. London. Retrieved 22 April 2010.
References

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Corruption_in_Myanmar&oldid=815666099"
18. Burma riot police beat back monks (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7013638.stm) BBC, 26 September 2007.
19. Groups struggle to tally Myanmar's dead (https://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20071001/ap_on_re_as/myanmar_dead___missing_1;_ylt=AsArorhaU7exPZMmVHFs
c5SROrgF) Yahoo News, 1 October 2007
20. "Corruption in Burma: How the causes and consequences reflect the current situations" (https://track.unodc.org/LegalLibrary/LegalResources/Myanmar/Auth
orities/Myanmar%20-%20Corruption%20in%20Burma%20-%20How%20the%20Causes%20and%20Consequences%20Reflect%20the%20Current%20Situa
tions%20%5bBurma%20Digest%5d.pdf) (PDF). Burma Digest.
21. Williams, Greg (22 Oct 2015). "Revealed: Myanmar's jade trade is run by former junta members" (https://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2015-10/23/jade-tr
ade-burma-corruption). Wired.
22. "Overview of corruption in Burma (Myanmar)" (http://issuu.com/cmi-norway/docs/349/1?e=1246952/2680739). Transparency International.
23. "Myanma Public Services" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/public-services.aspx). Business Anti-
Corruption Portal.
24. Mahtani, Shibani; Myo, Myo (12 Oct 2015). "Myanmar's Suu Kyi Puts Corruption Fight at Center of Campaign" (https://blogs.wsj.com/frontiers/2015/10/12/m
yanmars-suu-kyi-puts-corruption-fight-at-center-of-campaign/). Wall Street Journal.
25. Jeijmans, Philip (23 Oct 2015). "The corruption of Myanmar's jade trade" (http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/10/corruption-myanmar-jade-tra
de-151022101916842.html). Al Jazeera.
26. "Myanmar Public Procurement" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/public-procurement.aspx).
Business Anti-Corruption Portal.
27. "Myanmar Customs Administration" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/customs-administration.aspx).
28. "Myanmar Land Administration" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/land-administration.aspx).
29. "Myanmar Police" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/police.aspx). Business Anti-Corruption Portal.
30. Thompson, Rhys (18 Feb 2015). "Corruption and police reform in Myanmar" (http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/02/18/corruption-police-reform-Mya
nmar.aspx). The Interpreter Magazine.
31. "Myanmar Judicial System" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/judicial-system.aspx). Business Anti-
Corruption Portal.
32. "Myanmar Natural Resources" (http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/east-asia-the-pacific/myanmar/natural-resources.aspx). Business
Anti-Corruption Portal.
33. "Myanmar Anti-Corruption Compliance" (http://globalinvestigationsreview.com/insight/chapter/60/myanmar-anti-corruption-compliance). Global
Investigations Review.
34. "Coca-Cola's fight against corruption in Myanmar" (https://www.unglobalcompact.org/take-action/action/case-example/113). United Nations Global Impact.
35. "Anti-Corruption" (http://www.telenor.com/media/in-focus/telenor-in-myanmar/sustainable-business-in-myanmar/anti-corruption/). Telenor.

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Snapshot
Myanmar
Myanmar Corruption Report


Corruption is endemic in Myanmar, presenting companies with high
risks. Many businesspeople rate corruption, a weak rule of law and
complex and opaque licensing systems as serious barriers to
investment and trade in Myanmar. The country su ers from high
levels of corruption across all sectors. In November 2015, Myanmar
held its rst national election, ending 50 years of military rule. Aung
San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory, which is widely
interpreted as a step towards an opening up of the previously isolated country. While the
government is increasingly addressing corruption issues, these remain deeply rooted and
pervasive in the public and private sectors. The Anti-Corruption Law criminalises active and
passive bribery in the public sector, abuse of o ce and attempted corruption. Facilitation
payments are not speci cally addressed in the law, but should be considered illegal. Gifts are
illegal in principle, but there are a number of speci c exceptions. The maximum punishment for
corruption is fteen years' imprisonment and a ne.
Last updated: September 2017
GAN Integrity
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Save it to read later, or share with a colleague


Judicial System
Companies face a high risk of corruption and political interference in Myanmar's judicial
sector. Businesses report very low trust in the independence of the judiciary (GCR 2015-2016).
Bribes and irregular payments in exchange for favorable judicial decisions are very common
(GCR 2015-2016). Two out of ve citizens believe most or all judges are corrupt (GCB
2017). Nevertheless, only a fraction of rms identi es the court system as a major constraint (ES
2016). Institutional corruption is pervasive in the judiciary and there is an appearance of de facto
military and government control over the judiciary (HRR 2016). The Supreme Court has taken the
rst steps in trying to assert its independence during the constitutional review process (BTI
2016). However, challenges remain immense; there is a lack of resources and inadequate legal
education (BTI 2016). The judicial committee in Myanmar's parliament received over 10,000
complaints about problems in the legal sector, primarily alleging corruption (BTI 2016). Enforcing
a contract in Myanmar takes almost twice as long as the regional average (DB 2017).
Companies perceive the judiciary to be ine cient when it comes to settling disputes and
challenging government regulations (GCR 2015-2016). Myanmar incorporated the 1958 New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards into its
domestic legal framework in 2016; allowing companies to seek arbitration in a third country (ICS
2017). There is no solid track record of enforcing foreign awards in Myanmar (ICS
2017). Myanmar is not a state party to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID).


Police
The security apparatus in Myanmar presents high corruption risks. Nearly half of citizens believe
most or all police o cers are corrupt (GCB 2017). The government does not e ectively maintain
control over the country's security forces and police forces act with impunity (HRR
2016). Business executives do not feel they can rely on the police (GCR 2015-2016). The legal
mechanisms that exist to investigate corruption are rarely used and ine ective (HRR 2016).
About one in seven rms indicate they experience losses due to theft and vandalism (ES 2016).
The police frequently require victims to pay substantial bribes to initiate criminal investigations
and the police routinely extorts civilians (HRR 2016). Outside of con ict areas, security forces
generally respect the rule of law and a number of organizations have signalled a decrease in the
pervasive and threatening in uence security forces exert on the population under the new
government (HRR 2016).

Public Services
There is a very high risk of corruption when dealing with public services in Myanmar. More than
a third of businesses expect to give gifts to get an operating license, nearly half expect to give
gifts to get a construction permit, and more than a third expect the same when applying for an
electrical connection (ES 2016). About one in seven businesses indicate they expect to give gifts
"to get things done" (ES 2016). Corruption risks are also high in the process of seeking
investment permits (ICS 2017). Around one in ve citizens consider most or all government


o cials corrupt (GCB 2017). Connections to top bureaucrats and bribery are more important
than personal skills in the selection process for the civil service (BTI 2016).
Business report a heavy burden of government regulations (GCR 2015-2016). There is a lack of
regulatory and legal transparency; in the past, all regulations were subject to change without
advance or written notice (ICS 2017). Presently, ministries have started to consult the public
before issuing new regulations (ICS 2017). The recently passed Myanmar Investment Law which
went into e ect in April 2017 is intended to simplify regulations (ICS 2017). Starting a business
takes more steps and the costs are signi cantly higher than the regional average, but the
required time is signi cantly shorter (DB 2017).
Land Administration
There is a high risk of corruption in Myanmar's land administration. Nearly half of rms indicate
they expect to give gifts to obtain a construction permit (ES 2016). Foreign investors can enter
into long-term leases with private land lords or relevant government agencies (ICS 2017).
Businesses, however, report insu cient con dence in the government's ability to protect
property rights in the country (GCR 2015-2016). Investors should be careful when investing in
large-scale land projects; property rights of large plots are commonly disputed because
ownership rights are often not well-established following half a century of widespread military
expropriations and land grabs (ICS 2017). Foreign rms often face complaints from communities
about inadequate consultation and compensation (ICS 2017). The government announced a new


National Land Use Policy in 2016 which includes provisions for, among others, improving public
access to information about land use management and developing independent dispute
resolution mechanisms (ICS 2017). Myanmar has not incorporated the principle of non-
discrimination into its investment framework; there is no speci c legislation that protects against
expropriation without compensation (ICS 2017). Myanmar's new Investment Law prohibits
nationalization and states that approved foreign investments will not be terminated during the
term of the investment (ICS 2017).
Registering property in Myanmar takes slightly longer than elsewhere in the region (DB 2017).
Tax Administration
Companies face a high risk of corruption in the tax administration in Myanmar. Irregular
payments in connection with tax payments are commonly exchanged (GCR 2015-2016). One in
ve companies indicate they expect to give gifts in meetings with tax o cials (ES 2016). Roughly
a third of citizens believe most or all tax o cials are corrupt (GCB 2017).
Businesses make signi cantly more payments and spend signi cantly more time on paying their
taxes compared to other places in the region (DB 2017).
Customs Administration


There is a high risk of corruption at the border of Myanmar when importing and exporting
goods (GETR 2014). Irregular payments when importing and exporting are commonplace (GCR
2015-2016). A quarter of rms indicate they expect to give gifts in order to get an import license
(ES 2016). Bribing customs o cials in order to avoid paying customs duties and avoiding
regulations is also common (ISDP 2015). Import and export licenses are awarded on a case-by-
case basis, leaving discretionary space to public o cials (BTI 2016). Companies cite burdensome
import procedures, tari s, and corruption at the border as the most problematic factors for
importing (GETR 2014). Trade misinvoicing is ranked as the predominant channel through which
illicit funds are transferred to and from Myanmar; trade misinvoicing makes up 89.2% of total
illicit in ows and 59.6% of total illicit out ows (GF Integrity 2015). Import under-invoicing was
identi ed as the main type of trade misinvoicing. The total of potential tax revenues lost to
deliberate trade misinvoicing over the period 1960-2013, is estimated to be between USD 2.9
and USD 3.6 billion (GF Integrity 2015).
Trading across borders became more di cult in Myanmar in 2017, due to a high number of
delays and cost increases for processing of incoming cargo at the port of Yangon (DB 2017). The
time required to comply with customs regulations is signi cantly higher than elsewhere in the
region, while the costs are largely in line with regional averages (DB 2017).
Public Procurement


There is a moderately high risk of corruption in public procurement in Myanmar. Bribes and
irregular payments are often exchanged in the process of awarding public contracts and licenses
(GCR 2015-2016). Public funds are frequently diverted, and favoritism often in uences the
decisions of government o cials (GCR 2015-2016). In Myanmar, open tendering is not the
default method of procurement (The World Bank 2017). Procurement material such as laws and
regulations, notices of calls for tender, tender documents, and award notices are not publicly
accessible online. There are a few sectors where foreign rms are ineligible to submit bids such
as the defense sector (The World Bank 2017).
The government has started to privatize a number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), because
SOEs prove to be costly for the government (ICS 2017). While traditionally SOEs held a large part
of the economy, the government has started encouraging more private sector development (ICS
2017). The 1989 law on SOEs gives them exclusive right to carry out economic activities in a
number of sectors including banking, teak extraction, and oil and gas, but in practice private
sector development is possible, often in the form of a joint venture (ICS 2017). In a process of
increased privatization, problems of cronyism and nepotism are highlighted in the awarding of
contracts, and the process lacks transparency (FP, Oct. 2015).
Natural Resources
There is a high risk of encountering corruption in Myanmar's natural resources sector. The
Natural Resource Governance Institute indicates that Myanmar has an environment that enables


corruption, complicated by poor licensing procedures, low regulatory quality, and little
accountability (NRGI 2017). Companies should note that Myanmar's natural resource industries
are commonly controlled by state-owned enterprises, but in practice private investment is
possible (ICS 2017). An investigation into allegations that almost USD 100 million in levies from
the jade trade was misappropriated under previous governments is underway (FT, Jun. 2016).
The jade trade in Myanmar is characterized by low levels of transparency and high levels of
corruption (FT, Jun. 2016). Myanmar's internal con ict is also said to have been fuelled by jade
mining (NRGI 2017). Myanmar is an Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative candidate country
(EITI 2017). Myanmar has disclosed some of the legal ownership of the oil, gas, and mining
companies operating in the country (EITI 2017). EITI estimates that up to eighty percent of
gemstone production goes undeclared and bypasses the formal system (EITI 2017).
The Myanma Timber Enterprise (MTE), a state-owned enterprise, has been widely accused of
engaging in corrupt practices and failing to live up to international standards in the sector
(Frontier Myanmar, Mar. 2017). Europe's Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) has warned
that MTE's use of subcontractors comes with high risks of corruption and bribery in the
allocation of harvesting rights due to a lack of transparency in the required procedures
(Myanmar Times, Aug. 2017). Because of the lack of transparency, Denmark has placed an
injunction on all Danish companies preventing them from selling teak imported from Myanmar
on European markets (Mongabay, Mar. 2017). There exists a large-scale illicit timber trade
between China and Myanmar worth hundreds of millions of dollars every year (EIA & EU 2015).


Legislation
Myanmar has a legal anti-corruption framework in place, however - and in spite of renewed
e orts to curb corruption - enforcement remains inadequate (BTI 2016). The Penal Code and
the Anti-Corruption Law cover most forms of bribery in the public sector,
including active and passive bribery, extortion, attempted corruption and abuse of
o ce (Conventus Law 2016). Penalties for these o enses include imprisonment of up to 15
years for public o cials and a ne, imprisonment of up to ten years and a ne for "authorized
persons", and imprisonment of up to seven years and a ne for others (Conventus Law
2016). The Law requires all o cials in the executive, judicial and legislative branches of the
government to declare their assets, allowing penalties for those who do not comply. Facilitation
payments are not explicitly excluded, so they may be considered bribes (Conventus Law 2016).
Guidelines issued in 2016 stipulate that public o cials may accept gifts with a value of up to
MMK 25,000 (approximately USD 25), gifts that are given because of a "personal relationship" (an
unde ned term), or gifts with a value of up to MMK 100,000 given on religious holidays
(Conventus Law 2016). The Anti-Corruption Law gives a mandate to Myanmar's Anti-Corruption
Commission to address graft and bribery. Nonetheless, the Anti-Corruption Commission is
primarily sta ed by former military o cers and members of the ruling party, raising concerns
about its impartiality (BTI 2016). There is no separate de nition of private corruption in
Myanmar's laws, but the de nition of bribery contained in the Anti-Corruption Law could be
read to include certain high level managers at state-owned enterprises and public-private
partnerships; there is no practical evidence of this interpretation as of yet (Conventus Law


2016). Whistleblowers should be protected under the Anti-Corruption Law, but this is untested in
practice (HSF 2015). There is no comprehensive public procurement legal framework; most of
the regulations are contained in various directives; more information from the World Bank is
available here. The latest guidance for government organizations stipulates that all projects with
a value over MMK 10 million are subject to procurement rules.
Companies should note that due to the recent change in governments and low levels of legal
certainty, laws may not always be interpreted by the government and the courts in a consistent
manner (Conventus Law 2016). Myanmar has rati ed the United Nations Conventions against
Corruption but has not signed the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
Civil Society
Press freedoms have signi cantly improved since the country began its transition from military
rule to a democracy, but the government still maintains tight control over the media sector
through the use of defamation and other laws against critics (FotP 2017). The government has
increasingly started restricting the freedom of speech online by prosecuting those who allegedly
insulted or defamed the military (FotP 2017). The police continues to monitor politicians,
journalists, writers, and diplomats (HRR 2016). The press in Myanmar is considered 'not free'
(FotP 2017).


Freedom of assembly is restricted in Myanmar, but the government has recently taken steps to
ease restrictions (HRR 2016). Civil society groups have increasingly been able to operate openly
and freely discuss human rights and political issues (HRR 2016). Freedom house classi ed
Myanmar as "partly free" for the rst time in 2017 (FotP 2017). Civil society organizations (CSOs)
have started being able to in uence policy-making processes, criticize the government, and
advocate for political parties in the last ve years (BTI 2016). CSOs still face a lack of
transparency from government ministries and local authorities are less likely to cooperate with
CSOs (BTI 2016).
Sources
World Bank: Doing Business 2017.
The World Bank: Benchmarking Public Procurement - Myanmar 2017.
US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement 2017.
Natural Resource Governance Institute: Myanmar 2017.
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Myanmar Pro le 2017.
Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2017.
Freedom House: Freedom of the Press 2017.
Myanmar Times: "EIA Accuses MTE of Stepping Back from Reform Commitments", 11 August
2017.
Frontier Myanmar: "Timber Sector Wants MTE to get the Chop", 27 March 2017.


Mongabay: "Denmark Prohibits Companies from Selling Myanmar Teak on European Union
Markets", 20 March 2017.
World Bank Group: Enterprise Survey - Myanmar 2016.
Conventus Law: Anti-Corruption in Myanmar 2016.
World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016.
Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index 2016.
US Department of State: Human Rights Report 2016.
Financial Times: "Myanmar Probes USD 100 Million Jade Levy Misappropriation Claims", 3
June 2016.
Herbert Smith Freehills: Guide to anti-corruption regulation in Asia Paci c 2015.
Global Financial Integrity: Flight Capital and Illicit Financial Flows to and from Myanmar:
1960-2013, published 2015.
ISDP: Tacking Myanmar's Corruption Challenge 2015.
Environmental Investigation Agency: Organised Chaos: The illicit overland timer trade
between China and Myanmar, Sept. 2015.
Foreign Policy: "The Great Burmese Fire Sale - Burma's rulers are selling o the country's
assets — and it's all going to the same old group of insiders", 29 October 2015.
World Economic Forum: Global Enabling Trade Report 2014.
Topics: East Asia & The Paci c


www.transparency.org
www.cmi.no
Author(sMarie Chêne, U4 Helpdesk, Transparency International, mchene@transparency.org updated by Maira Martini,
Transparency International, mmartini@transparency.org
Reviewed by: Marie Chêne, Transparency International, mchene@transparency.org and Robin Hodess, Ph.D. Transparency
International, rhodess@transparency.org
Date: 23 March 2009 updated in 1 October 2012 Number Number: 349
U4 is a web-based resource centre for development practitioners who wish to effectively address corruption challenges in their work.
Expert Answers are produced by the U4 Helpdesk – operated by Transparency International – as quick responses to operational and
policy questions from U4 Partner Agency staff.
Query
Can you please give us an overview of the corruption status in Burma?
Purpose
We are preparing an analysis of our development
cooperation programs in Burma
Content
1. Forms and Extent of Corruption in Burma
2. Anti-Corruption Efforts in Burma
3. Resources
Summary
After more than four decades of military rule, political
violence and systematic repression of democratic
opposition, Burma held its first general elections in
2010, and is passing through major economic and
political reforms. Parliamentarian by-elections were
held in 2012 with Aung San Suu Kyi party (National
League for Democracy) receiving the overwhelmingly
majority of votes. Such reforms and the significant and
seemingly genuine opening up of the country have
encouraged the United States and the European Union
to lift trade embargoes against the country. However,
the military continues to exercise influence in politics
and despite improvements, restriction on media and
civil society organisations, as well as human rights
violations continue.
Against this background, Burma continues to face
major challenges of endemic corruption, consistently
ranking at the bottom of TI’S Corruption Perception
Index (CPI). Little is known on the specific forms and
patterns of corruption in the country, but the scale of the
informal and illicit economy suggests strong links
between the ruling elite and organised crime activities.
In the absence of sound democratic institutions and an
effective system of checks and balance, the legal and
institutional frameworks against corruption appear, to
date, rudimentary and are likely to be misused for
political reasons. On a more positive note, the recent
elected government has demonstrated willingness to
improve the country’s institutional and legal framework
as well as the space for political participation.
Overview of corruption in Burma (Myanmar)

www.U4.no 2
1 Forms and extent of
corruption in Burma
Background
Burma, officially the Union of Myanmar1, has known
more than four decades of military rule after General Ne
Win’s coup in 1962. The country remained under the
tight control of the military led State Peace and
Development Council (SPDC) until when the Junta was
dissolved as a result of the 2010 general elections. The
former Prime Minister Lieutenant General Thein Sein
was appointed as President in 2010. Parliamentarian
by-elections2 took place in June 2012 and despite
several irregularities the National League for
Democracy party of the Nobel Prize winner and former
political prisoner Aung San Suu Kyi received the
majority of votes.
The civilian government has announced several
economic reforms as well as the release of political
prisoners, the right to form trade unions, and an easing
in media censorship. Such economic and political
reforms are seen by the President as key for Burma’s
progress, as according to him, years of military misrule
had left Burma far behind its neighbours in terms of
development (Freedom House, 2012).
A more open dialogue with the popular opposition
leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been playing an
instrumental role in the country’s struggle for
democracy, was launched, and the President has also
called on the government to be more accountable to its
people and focus its efforts on improving their daily
lives. Nevertheless, there are indications that the
military continue to dominate politics (Fund for Peace,
2012), and the country still suffers from restrictive
government controls, inefficient economic policies,
fiscal instability, corruption, rising inflation, human rights
violations, and widespread poverty, especially in rural
areas.
1 The Union of Burma was renamed Union of Myanmar in 1989 by
the military junta. The United Nations endorsed the name while
other countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia and Canada still refer to the country as Burma.
2 Parliamentary by-elections take place when a seat in the
Parliament becomes vacant between general elections.
In the past, the government’s crackdown against a pro-
democracy uprising, including against thousands of
monks, triggered a series of international economic and
targeted sanctions. The European Union banned
investment and trade in Burmese gems, timber, and
precious stones, while the United States tightened
existing economic sanctions on the regime leaders,
their families and supporters, including asset freezing
and travels restrictions against designated individuals
responsible for human rights abuses and public
corruption.
In the first part of 2012, encouraged by the fall of the
regime and recent reforms, the United States and the
European Union suspended economic sanctions, which
provides for many opportunities for investment and
growth, but also for new and ever growing forms of
corruption.
Extent of Corruption
Due to the closed nature of the former military
dictatorship there are very few independent sources of
data on the state of governance and corruption in
Burma.
The available sources and observers agree that
rampant corruption pervades all levels of the political
and administrative systems. The country has
consistently ranked among the world's most corrupt
countries in Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index. In 2011, the country was ranked
180 out of the 183 assessed countries with a score of
1,5 on a 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean) scale.
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators confirm the country’s poor performance in
terms of control of corruption (0,5 on a scale from 0 to
100), regulatory quality (1,4), government effectiveness
(2,4), rule of law (4,2) and political stability (13,7) in
2011. Burma has, nevertheless, improved significantly
in terms of voice and accountability (from 0.9 in 2010 to
2.3 in 2011) (World Bank, 2011).
Forms of Corruption
There is little evidence of the main forms of corruption
in the country. Available reports and country profiles
state that corruption in Burma is widespread, affecting
different sectors in a variety of forms as discussed
below.

www.U4.no 3
Bureaucratic corruption
Burma generally lacks regulatory and legal
transparency, and there is a broad consensus that
corruption in the country is rampant and endemic
(Political Risk, 2011; Heritage Foundation, 2012). The
US Department of State’s Investment Climate
Statement further declares that rent-seeking activities
are supported by a complex and “capricious” regulatory
environment combined with extremely low government
salaries.
According to economists and businesspeople,
corruption is one of the most serious barriers to
investment and commerce in the country as very little
can be accomplished without resorting to illegal
payments often referred to locally as ‘tea money’. The
major areas where investors may face corruption are (i)
when seeking permission for investment in the country;
(ii) in the taxation process; (iii) when applying for import
and export licenses; (iv) when negotiating land and real
state leases (Political Risk, 2011; Heritage Foundation,
2012).
Cronyism
Personal relationships seem to play an import role in
the country’s public sector. As there are no competitive
selection processes to enter the public sector, personal
connections and bribery are maybe more important
than qualifications. For instance, it is common practice
to select ministers and high-level civil servants from the
military ranks rather than based on expertise
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012).
The privatisation process which took place in 2009-
2010 also shows the close relationship between the
government, the military and its close friends. There is
evidence that numerous state assets were sold to the
military, family members, and associates of senior
government officials at fire sale prices (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2012). Several experts have also
denounced that privatisation could actually enhance
conflict of interest and corruption by creating a new
generation of businesses whose control of industries is
dependent on government connections and other forms
of collusion (Currie, 2012).
The first democratic general elections after almost fifty
years of military rule took place in 2010. Burma’s
political system is composed of a bicameral legislature,
which consists of the 440-seat People’s Assembly, and
the 224-seat Nationalities Assembly, or upper house.
25% of the seats in both houses are reserved for the
military and filled through appointment by the
commander in chief. The legislature elects the
president, though the military members have the right to
nominate one of the three candidates, with the other
two nominated by the elected members of each
chamber (Freedom House, 2012). As a result of the
2010 elections, the former Prime Minister Lieutenant
General Thein Sein was appointed as President.
According to several reports, the 2010 elections were,
however, marked by fraud and serious restrictions on
political participation (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012;
Freedom House, 2012).
In order to guarantee a pro-military government, the
regime allegedly made use of advanced votes, which
were collected by force in front of the authorities
(Freedom House, 2012; Bertelsmann Foundation
2012). Moreover, opposition political parties faced
several restrictions3 such as high registration fees, and
no access to the state media. Such restrictions made
the main opposition party, the National League for
Democracy, boycott the elections. Elections monitoring
was also restricted, and the government did not allow
international organisations to support the process. As a
result, the pro-military party USDP (Union Solidarity and
Development Party) won almost 80% of the seats up for
election (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012).
The Parliamentary by-election which took place in May
2012 was also marked by fraud and irregularities, in
spite of the government efforts to show the international
community that democracy was advancing in the
country. Independent candidates have reported
harassment and several restrictions on their campaign
activities. Reports also show irregularities at the pools;
many who sought to vote for opposition candidates
found that wax coating their ballots prevented them
from doing so (Jacobs, 2012). Despite those
irregularities, the NLD still overwhelmingly won the by-
elections (BBC, 2012).
Sectors most affected by corruption
There is no research and data available on sectors
most affected by corruption in Burma, probably due to
3 The Political Party Registration Law, announced in March 2010,
gave new political parties only 60 days to register, mandated that
existing parties re-register, and required parties to expel members
currently serving prison terms, Freedom House, 2012.

www.U4.no 4
the lack of political will for such scrutiny. However,
specific forms of corruption derive from the nature of
the local economy that suggests strong ties between
the current regime and organised crime activities.
According to the CIA’s World Fact book, official
statistics are inaccurate and published statistics on
foreign trade greatly understated because of the
volume of off-book, the size of the black market, illicit
and unrecorded border trade - often estimated to be as
large as the official economy (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2008).
Burma is a resource-rich country. Agriculture and
extractive industries, including natural gas, mining,
logging and fishing provide the major portion of national
income. The country appears to be plagued by traffic
in narcotics, people, wildlife, gems, timber, and other
forms of contraband that flow through Burma’s
permeable borders. Burma’s border regions are indeed
difficult to control. In some remote regions active in
smuggling, continuing ethnic tensions with armed rebel
groups hamper government control. Collusion between
traffickers and Burma’s ruling military junta also
allegedly allows organised crime groups to function with
virtual impunity (United Stated Department of State,
2008).
Illegal logging
A major review conducted for the World Bank in 2006
estimates illegal logging as equal or exceeding the legal
harvest rates in Burma by 80 % (Illegal Logging Info,
website). This has resulted in major deforestation taking
place in the country. Although Burma remains one of
the most forested countries in the Asia-Pacific region,
the amount of land covered by forest in Burma dropped
from 47% in 2005 to 24% in 2008, according to Burma’s
Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation
Committee (UPI, 2012).
Large quantities of timber are being smuggled out of
the country across the Chinese borders. A logging ban
in Thailand has also resulted in Thai loggers crossing
illegally through Burma. The sanctions imposed by the
EU and US on the Myanmar military regime were
extended in 2007 to prohibit the import of all timber
products, but teak products from Myanmar are allegedly
still being imported to the UK through other countries
such as China or Indonesia (Illegal Logging Info,
website).
According to a Global Witness report (2009), imports of
logs and sawn wood across the land border from
Burma fell by 70% between 2005 and 2009 after the
Chinese government sealed the borders4 in 2006.
Nevertheless, illicit trade continues with local authorities
often turning a blind eye to smuggling. Chinese
companies interviewed by Global Witness also reported
that they usually rely on personal relationships and
illegal payments to continue importing illegal wood
(Global Witness, 2009).
Oil and gas
Burma is endowed with oil, gas, hydropower and
minerals, which are located mainly in the ethnic minority
regions that continue to be areas of conflict. There is no
publicly available information on who has the rights for
exploiting what resources in what areas, what the terms
and conditions are, and on how the revenues are being
shared and spent (TrustLaw, 2012). According to
Human Rights Watch, Burma continues to earn billions
of US dollars in natural gas revenues, little of which is
directed into social services such as health care and
education (Human Rights Watch, 2012).
According to the Withholding Tax Law enacted on
January 1, 2011, state-enterprises and military-owned
companies are exempt from taxes. The government
requires that foreign companies conducting oil and gas
exploration be partnered with at least one domestic
energy firm, usually with the state-owned energy firm
MOGE (Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise), which
controls significant portions of key oil and gas projects
in the country. According to the opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi, such joint ventures arrangements lack
transparency and accountability.
For instance, Burma has granted Chinese state-owned
oil firm oil and gas pipeline concessions, but there is no
publicly available information on the terms of those
contracts. In addition, since the US and the European
Union5 have suspended the economic sanctions,
European and American companies are now also
allowed to partner with Burmese oil and gas
companies.
4 For more information on the agreement between Burma
and China please see: Interim Measures to Manage Timber
and Minerals Cooperation between Myanmar and Yunnan
Province
5 Please see:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pres
sdata/EN/foraff/130188.pdf

www.U4.no 5
U.S. companies investing in Burma are, however,
required by the U.S. government to report on their
investment activities including: (i) an overview of
operations in Burma; (ii) summary of investment-related
human rights, labor rights, anti-corruption, and
environmental policies and procedures; (iii) acquisition
of property/land, including processes to identify land
rights and address resettlement practices, if the
property is worth more than US$ 500,000 or over 30
acres; (iv) payments to the Government of Burma, sub-
national authorities, and state-owned enterprises if the
aggregate annual amount exceeds US$10,000; (v)
summary of human rights, labor rights, and
environmental due diligence conducted by the company
(Nolan, 2012).
Recently, Burma’s President Thein Sein vowed to join
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),
a global standard for governments and companies to
voluntarily report how much is paid for extracting
natural resources (Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, 2012). A possible Burmese candidacy to EITI
could mean a big push to hold the government to
account and increase transparency in the sector.
Land management
Land has been a politically and economically sensitive
issue in the country for many decades. All land in
Burma is owned by the government, and farmers are
given land use or tillage rights. The seizure of land has
long been practiced in the country, but in recent years
its dynamics have changed, from direct seizure by army
units and government departments, to seizure by army-
owned companies, joint ventures and other
economically and politically powerful operations with
connections to the military (Asian Legal Resource
Centre, 2012).
According to the Asian Centre and other human rights
organisations, cases of land grabbing are becoming
increasingly common. Many farmers have been forced
to move without receiving proper compensation
because of major projects, such as the oil and gas
pipelines, or smaller projects of firms linked to the
military (Asian Legal Resource Centre, 2012).
The problem is aggravated by the country’s lack of rule
of law, no protection of property rights, and a weak
judiciary, which offer tremendous rent-seeking
opportunities for corrupt officials and their business
partners (Morrell, 2012).
The new Farmland law enacted in 2012 aimed, among
other things, at reducing the prospects of land grabbing.
However, the law still opens the door to confiscation of
agricultural land on any pretext associated with a state
project or the national interest (TrustLaw, 2012).
Drug producing and trafficking
In spite of the government recent steps to tackle money
laundering (see section below), Burma remains a
country at risk of drug money being funnelled into
commercial enterprises and infrastructure due to an
underdeveloped financial sector and the large volume
of informal trade.
According to the United Nations Office in Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), nearly all of the world’s illicit opium
and heroin production is concentrated in Afghanistan,
Burma and Latin America (Mexico and Colombia)
(United Nations Office in Drugs and Crime, 2010).
Burma is also a primary source of amphetamine-type
stimulants in Asia. However, the country’s share of
opium production on the global market is declining
(United Nations Office in Drugs and Crime, 2010), and
although the Burmese Government has expanded its
counter-narcotics measures in recent years, production
and trafficking of narcotics still remain major issues in
the country (Yong-an, 2012).
While the Burmese Government has actively pursued
mid-level and independent traffickers, it remains
reluctant to investigate, arrest, and prosecute high level
international traffickers (Central Intelligence Agency,
2008). The CIA considers that the lack of government
will to take on major narco-trafficking groups and lack of
serious commitment against money laundering
continues to hinder the overall antidrug effort (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2008).
Human trafficking
The CIA also reports that Burma is a source country for
women, children, and men trafficked for the purpose of
forced labour and commercial sexual exploitation.
Burmese women and children are trafficked to East and
Southeast Asia for commercial sexual exploitation,
domestic servitude, and forced labour. According to the
2006 US Department of State Human Rights Report,
while there are no reliable estimates on the number of
Burmese who are trafficked, most observers believe
that the number of victims is at least several thousand
per year. (United States Department of State, 2007).
Some trafficking victims transit through Burma from
Bangladesh to Malaysia, and from China to Thailand

www.U4.no 6
while internal trafficking occurs primarily from villages to
urban centres and economic hubs for labour in
industrial zones, agricultural estates, and commercial
sexual exploitation.
The CIA report further states that Burma does not fully
comply with the minimum standards for the elimination
of human trafficking as military and civilian officials
remain directly involved in significant acts of forced
labour and unlawful conscription of child soldiers
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2008). The Burmese
Government was placed in Tier 3 in the U.S.
Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report
(2007) for not fully complying with the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act’s minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking and not making significant
efforts to do so (United States Department of State,
2007).
2 Anti-corruption efforts in
Burma
Public Initiatives against corruption
There is no in-depth research and analysis on
corruption and anti-corruption efforts in the country and
very little is known on the state of the anti-corruption
legal and institutional framework in Burma. The
following section is based on the information that could
be compiled within the time frame of this query. More
research and resource would be needed to provide a
comprehensive assessment of the corruption situation
in Burma.
The legal framework
The country has a set of anti-corruption laws and since
as early as 1948, corruption is officially a crime that can
carry a jail term. Most relevant laws and legal
instruments against corruption related offences include
Burma Penal Code Volume 8, Public Property
Protection Volume 2, the Money Laundering Law and
the Anti-Drug Law (Burma Lawyer’s Council, 2005).
There has been hardly any prosecution for office abuse
in Burma. However, according to many sources, it was
common practice for the ruling generals to misuse anti-
corruption laws as a means of ousting political
opponents, as when the SPDC arrested then-Prime
Minister General Khin Nyunt and many of his
colleagues and family members for corruption in 2004
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012).
Furthermore, there is no right to information, and public
procurement procedures are opaque (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2012). The budget process also lacks
transparency, and sources of budget revenues remain
undisclosed. In 2012, a budget drafted by the president
was submitted for the first time for the approval of the
Parliament, as required by the 2008 Constitution, which
states: “The Union Government shall draft the Union
Budget Bill based on the annual Union budget, after
coordinating with the Financial Commission, and submit
it for approval to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Parliament) in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution”.
On one hand, the President and its cronies still enjoy
great budgetary autonomy. Transparency and
accountability are further hindered by the fact that there
has been no independent auditing of state spending.
On the other hand, significant legislative reforms are
being undertaken by the government, including the
adoption of the Labour Organizations Law and the
Peaceful Demonstration Law, as well as the
amendment to the Political Party Registration Law.
President Thein Sein is also working with
parliamentarians affiliated with the National League for
Democracy to fight corruption by requiring all
government officials to publicly declare their assets
(Morrell, 2012). These changes are encouraging, but it
remains to be seen how they will be implemented.
Burma is a party to the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and ratified the UN
International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism in August 2006. Burma signed
the UN Convention on Corruption in December 2005,
but has not yet ratified it.
The Institutional Framework
There is no fully independent anti-corruption institution
in Burma. The SPDC power until recently was not
balanced by parliament or any other political institution.
In fact, until 2011 there was no formal separation of
powers. Besides holding the Executive and legislative
powers, the SPDC also exercised control over the
Judiciary.
The new Constitution formally guarantees the
independence of the judiciary and the separation of
powers. In practice, however, the judiciary still faces
political interference. For instance, the head of the
Supreme Court and other members of the
Constitutional Court were still nominated by the
President without the consent of the Parliament in

www.U4.no 7
2011. A March 2012 United Nations report on human
rights in Burma also noted that the country “lacks an
independent, impartial and effective judiciary.”
In addition, courts adjudicate cases according to the
junta’s promulgated decrees. Administrative detention
laws allow people to be held without charges, trial or
access to legal counsel for up to five years for
threatening the state’s security or sovereignty. The lack
of independence of the judiciary allows officeholders to
abuse their position without fear of judicial action.
(Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012)
The body in charge of corruption offences is the Bureau
of Special Investigations that reports to the Ministry of
Home Affairs. It addresses financial crime related
cases, including cases involving trading, tax evasion
and corruption of government officials (Ministry of
Home Affairs, website). However, there is no publicly
available information on the number or status of such
investigations.
Improvements in the area of Money laundering resulted
in the removal of the country from the Financial Action
Task Force’s list of Non-Cooperative Countries and
Territories (NCCT) in October 2006. Burma enacted a
“Control of Money Laundering Law” in 2002. It also
established the Central Control Board of Money
Laundering in 2002 and an investigating Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) in 2003 whose size was
increased to 11 permanent members, plus 20 support
staff in 2005. The government also established a
Department against Transnational Crime in 2004,
staffed by police officers and support personnel from
banks, customs, budget, and other relevant government
departments.
The 2002 law created reporting requirements to detect
suspicious transactions. It set a threshold amount for
reporting cash transactions by banks and real estate
firms. In 2004, the anti-money laundering regulations
were amended to include eleven predicate offenses,
including narcotics activities, human trafficking, arms
trafficking, cyber-crime, and “offenses committed by
acts of terrorism,” among others. Fraud was also added
to the list of predicate offenses. Anti-Money Laundering
regulations further expanded in 2006, requiring banks,
customs officials and the legal and real estate sectors
to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and
impose severe penalties for noncompliance. In 2007,
the Burmese Government amended its “Control of
Money Laundering Law” to expand the list of predicate
offences to all serious crimes to comport with FATF’s
recommendations (US Department of State, 2008).
Recently, however, according to the Financial Action
Task Force, Burma has not made sufficient progress in
implementing its action plan, and important anti-money
laundering deficiencies remain. The country has until
October 2012 to tackle efficiently these deficiencies,
including by (i) adequately criminalising terrorist
financing; (ii) establishing and implementing adequate
procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (iii)
further strengthening the extradition framework in
relation to terrorist financing; (iv) ensuring a fully
operational and effectively functioning Financial
Intelligence Unit; (v) enhancing financial transparency;
and (vi) strengthening customer due diligence
measures. If such measures are not undertaken, Burma
may face countermeasures to be decided by the
Financial Action Task Force (Financial Action Task
Force, 2012).
A national Human Rights Commission (MHRC) was
established in 2011. While it is too early to assess its
activities, the international community has urged the
Government of Burma to take the necessary steps to
ensure the commission’s independent, credible and
effective functioning (United Nations Human Rights,
2012).
The potential for other anti-
corruption Initiatives
During the past decades, the dictatorship nature of the
regime provided little opportunities for public
participation and for holding government accountable
for its actions and decisions. The 2008 Constitution,
which came into effect in January 2011, allows freedom
of association and assembly, but only as long as the
exercise of these rights does not go against existing
security and emergency laws. In spite of recent
improvements related to voice and accountability
mechanisms, both civil society and the media are still
controlled and repressed.
Civil society
Civil society development has always been restricted by
the absence of civil liberties and very restrictive
regulations. In the past five years, political shifts in
Burma have created some openings for civil society
efforts. As mentioned, freedom of association and
assembly is now allowed as long as security and
emergency laws are respected.

www.U4.no 8
Nevertheless, civil society in the country does not have
strong roots, and many organisations or associations
are co-opted by the military (Bertelsmann Foundation,
2012).In addition, in spite of recent improvements, the
ability of civil society organisations to monitor the
elections was strongly restricted. Local NGOs and a
regional monitoring group have to conduct secret
monitoring by sending volunteers to voting stations in
few cities, but several foreign volunteers from the
regional group were caught and deported (Bertelsmann
Foundation, 2012).
The space for international civil society groups is also
opening up. As of 2011, there were approximately 65
international NGOs (INGOs) operating in the country,
often under various framework agreements with the
government, such as Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU) or Letters of Agreement with a relevant ministry
(The Hauser Center, 2011). These INGOs are usually
engaged in advocacy activities with the government,
aiming to inform and promote dialogue with the
government, rather than assess blame (The Hauser
Center, 2011).
Media
There have been a number of positive developments
with regards to the media in Burma. Government’s
reforms have included a reduction in the level of
censorship of the press, the loosening of restrictions on
access to the internet, and the release of political
prisoners (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012).
In 2012, the government stopped censoring private
periodicals before publication, but repressive laws, such
as the Printers and Publishers Registration Law, which
has severely restricted the activities of the press,
and the Electronic Transactions Law, which has
criminalized the sharing of electronic information
deemed threatening to the Union, still offer obstacles
for Burmese to express their opinions, as they have
been used to arrest, detain and imprison journalists and
activists.
Burma ranked 169th out of 179 countries in the
Reporters without Borders’ Press Freedom Index
(2011-2012). A slightly better position than in previous
years as a result of recent political changes that have
raised hopes but need to be confirmed (Reporters
without Borders, 2012).
In spite of recent democratisation reforms, the country
continues to face major governance challenges. It
remains to be seen the impact such reforms will have
on corruption.
3 Resources
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Land-Grabbing Epidemic.
http://www.burmapartnership.org/2012/06/myanmar-
myanmar-at-risk-of-land-grabbing-epidemic/
Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, 2008. Mutual
Evaluation Report on Myanmar.
http://www.apgml.org/documents/docs/17/Myanmar%202008
.pdf
BBC, 2012. Burma'sAungSanSuuKyiwinsby-election:NLDparty.
Published: 1 April, 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-17577620
Bertelsmann Foundation, 2012. Myanmar Country Report.
http://www.bti-project.org/country-reports/aso/mmr
Burma’s Lawyers Council, 2005. Legal Issues on Burma. Nr.
20/2005. http://www.blc-burma.org/pdf/liob/liob20.pdf
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2008. The World Factbook
Burma. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/bm.html
Currie, K., 2012. Burma in the Balance: The Role of Foreign
Assistance in Supporting Burma’s Democratic Transition.
Project
2049.http://project2049.net/documents/burma_in_the_balanc
e_currie.pdf
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2012. Myanmar
reaffirms intention of implementing the EITI.
http://eiti.org/news-events/myanmar-reaffirms-intention-
implement-eiti
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 2012. Myanmar: FATF
Public Statement. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/j-
m/myanmar/documents/fatfpublicstatement-22june2012.html
Fund for Peace, 2012. Myanmar Country Profile.
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/states/ccppr11mm-
countryprofile-myanmar-11r.pdf
Freedom House, 2012. Freedom in the World.
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2012/burma-0
Global Witness, 2009. A Disharmonious Trade.
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/dramatic-decrease-
illegal-timber-trade-between-burma-and-china-smuggling-
continues

www.U4.no 9
Heritage Foundation, 2012. Index of Economic Freedom
2012. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/burma
Huma Rights Watch, 2012. World Report 2012 Burma.
http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-
burma
Jacobs, R., 2012. Keeping Burma’s Elections in Perspective.
Freedom House Blog.
http://blog.freedomhouse.org/weblog/2012/04/keeping-
burmas-elections-in-
perspective.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=em
ail&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+freedomhouse%2FmfKx+%28
Blog%3A+Freedom+at+Issue%29
Morrell, 2012. The path towards democracy in Burma. CIPE
Development Blog
http://www.cipe.org/blog/2012/08/09/the-path-towards-
democracy-in-
burma/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_c
ampaign=Feed%3A+CipeDevelopmentBlog+%28CIPE+Deve
lopment+Blog%29#.UGToyZiR98F
Miles, T.; Nebehay, S., 2012. Suu Kyi says Myanmar needs
responsible investment.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/us-myanmar-
swiss-suukyi-idUSBRE85C1NA20120614
Nolan, C. 2012. It’s Not the Time for Business as Usual in
Myanmar. https://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-view/its-
not-the-time-for-business-as-usual-in-myanmar
Political Risk Services, 2011. Myanmar Country Conditions.
Transparency International, 2011. Corruption Perception
Index. www.transparency.org/cpi
TrustLaw, 2012. Myanmar farmers lose their grip on land.
http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/myanmar-farmers-lose-
their-grip-on-land
TrustLaw, 2012. Steeped in poverty, Myanmar targets natural
resources. http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/steeped-in-
poverty-myanmar-targets-natural-resources
The Hauser Center, 2011. Working Through Ambiguity:
International NGOs in Myanmar. Harvard University
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hauser/engage/humanitarianorga
nizations/research/documents/myanmar_report_final_version
_2011_09_08.pdf
United States Department of State, 2008. International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Vol. II, Money Laundering
and Financial Crimes
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/102588.pdf
United States Department of State, 2007. Trafficking in
Persons Report. http://www.humantrafficking.org/25822AED-
474C-4885-8FD1-
A667B9471B4B/FinalDownload/DownloadId-
3CD13C779E726FB52BB316E04D1128C8/25822AED-
474C-4885-8FD1-
A667B9471B4B/uploads/publications/2007_TIP_Report.pdf
United States Department of State, 2008. Investment Climate
Statement - Burma
World Bank, 2011. Worldwide Governance Indicators.
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World
Drug Report 2010, Vol. 1, New York:
United Nations, 2010.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2005.
Compilation of resources on Myanmar: Strategic framework
for the UN Agencies in Myanmar.
United Nations Info Centre, 2012. UN expert calls on
Myanmar to take ‘active approach’ to protect human rights.
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41523&Cr=
myanmar&Cr1#.UGqxOK41k2c
United Nations Human Rights, 2012. Situation of Human
Rights in Myanmar. http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G12/132/76/PDF/G12132
76.pdf?OpenElement
UPI, 2012. Myanmar in deforestation crisis. Published
August, 22, 2012.
http://www.upi.com/Science_News/2012/08/22/Myanmar-in-
deforestation-crisis/UPI-50031345670650/
Yong-an, Z, 2012. Asia, International Drug Trafficking, and
US-China Counternarcotics Cooperation. The Brookings
Institution.
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012
/2/drug%20trafficking%20zhang/02_drug_trafficking_zhang_
paper

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Myanmar
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Economy Pro le of Myanmar
Doing Business 2018 Indicators
(in order of appearance in the document)
Starting a business Procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum capital to start a limited liability company
Dealing with construction
permits
Procedures, time and cost to complete all formalities to build a warehouse and the quality control and
safety mechanisms in the construction permitting system
Getting electricity Procedures, time and cost to get connected to the electrical grid, the reliability of the electricity supply and
the transparency of tariffs
Registering property Procedures, time and cost to transfer a property and the quality of the land administration system
Getting credit Movable collateral laws and credit information systems
Protecting minority investors Minority shareholders’ rights in related-party transactions and in corporate governance
Paying taxes Payments, time and total tax rate for a firm to comply with all tax regulations as well as post-filing processes
Trading across borders Time and cost to export the product of comparative advantage and import auto parts
Enforcing contracts Time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute and the quality of judicial processes
Resolving insolvency Time, cost, outcome and recovery rate for a commercial insolvency and the strength of the legal framework
for insolvency
Labor market regulation Flexibility in employment regulation and aspects of job quality
About Doing Business
The Doing Business project provides objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 190 economies and
selected cities at the subnational and regional level.
The Doing Business project, launched in 2002, looks at domestic small and medium-size companies and measures the regulations
applying to them through their life cycle.
Doing Business captures several important dimensions of the regulatory environment as it applies to local rms. It provides
quantitative indicators on regulation for starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering
property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving
insolvency. Doing Business also measures features of labor market regulation. Although Doing Business does not present rankings
of economies on the labor market regulation indicators or include the topic in the aggregate distance to frontier score or ranking on
the ease of doing business, it does present the data for these indicators.
By gathering and analyzing comprehensive quantitative data to compare business regulation environments across economies and
over time, Doing Business encourages economies to compete towards more e cient regulation; o ers measurable benchmarks for
reform; and serves as a resource for academics, journalists, private sector researchers and others interested in the business
climate of each economy.
In addition, Doing Business o ers detailed subnational reports, which exhaustively cover business regulation and reform in di erent
cities and regions within a nation. These reports provide data on the ease of doing business, rank each location, and recommend
reforms to improve performance in each of the indicator areas. Selected cities can compare their business regulations with other
cities in the economy or region and with the 190 economies that Doing Business has ranked.
The rst Doing Business report, published in 2003, covered 5 indicator sets and 133 economies. This year’s report covers 11
indicator sets and 190 economies. Most indicator sets refer to a case scenario in the largest business city of each economy, except
for 11 economies that have a population of more than 100 million as of 2013 (Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States) where Doing Business, also collected data for the second
largest business city. The data for these 11 economies are a population-weighted average for the 2 largest business cities. The
project has bene ted from feedback from governments, academics, practitioners and reviewers. The initial goal remains: to provide
an objective basis for understanding and improving the regulatory environment for business around the world.
Doing Business 2018 Myanmar
Page 2

for insolvency
Labor market regulation Flexibility in employment regulation and aspects of job quality
About Doing Business
The Doing Business project provides objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 190 economies and
selected cities at the subnational and regional level.
The Doing Business project, launched in 2002, looks at domestic small and medium-size companies and measures the regulations
applying to them through their life cycle.
Doing Business captures several important dimensions of the regulatory environment as it applies to local rms. It provides
quantitative indicators on regulation for starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering
property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving
insolvency. Doing Business also measures features of labor market regulation. Although Doing Business does not present rankings
of economies on the labor market regulation indicators or include the topic in the aggregate distance to frontier score or ranking on
the ease of doing business, it does present the data for these indicators.
By gathering and analyzing comprehensive quantitative data to compare business regulation environments across economies and
over time, Doing Business encourages economies to compete towards more e cient regulation; o ers measurable benchmarks for
reform; and serves as a resource for academics, journalists, private sector researchers and others interested in the business
climate of each economy.
In addition, Doing Business o ers detailed subnational reports, which exhaustively cover business regulation and reform in di erent
cities and regions within a nation. These reports provide data on the ease of doing business, rank each location, and recommend
reforms to improve performance in each of the indicator areas. Selected cities can compare their business regulations with other
cities in the economy or region and with the 190 economies that Doing Business has ranked.
The rst Doing Business report, published in 2003, covered 5 indicator sets and 133 economies. This year’s report covers 11
indicator sets and 190 economies. Most indicator sets refer to a case scenario in the largest business city of each economy, except
for 11 economies that have a population of more than 100 million as of 2013 (Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States) where Doing Business, also collected data for the second
largest business city. The data for these 11 economies are a population-weighted average for the 2 largest business cities. The
project has bene ted from feedback from governments, academics, practitioners and reviewers. The initial goal remains: to provide
an objective basis for understanding and improving the regulatory environment for business around the world.
The distance to frontier (DTF) measure shows the distance of each economy to the “frontier,” which represents the best
performance observed on each of the indicators across all economies in the Doing Business sample since 2005. An economy’s
distance to frontier is re ected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the lowest performance and 100 represents the
frontier. The ease of doing business ranking ranges from 1 to 190. The ranking of 190 economies is determined by sorting the
aggregate distance to frontier scores, rounded to two decimals.
More about Doing Business (PDF, 5MB)
Ease of Doing Business in
Myanmar
Region East Asia & Pacific
Income Category Lower middle income
GNI Per Capita (US$) 1,315
City Covered Yangon
DB 2018 Rank
190 1
171
DB 2018 Distance to Frontier (DTF)
0 100
44.21
0 100
78.43: Malaysia (Rank: 24)
66.47: Indonesia (Rank: 72)
62.70: Regional Average (East Asia & Pacific)
60.76: India (Rank: 100)
53.01: Lao PDR (Rank: 141)
44.21: Myanmar (Rank: 171)
Page 3

aggregate distance to frontier scores, rounded to two decimals.
More about Doing Business (PDF, 5MB)
Ease of Doing Business in
Myanmar
Region East Asia & Pacific
Income Category Lower middle income
GNI Per Capita (US$) 1,315
City Covered Yangon
DB 2018 Rank
190 1
171
0 100
44.21
0 100
78.43: Malaysia (Rank: 24)
66.47: Indonesia (Rank: 72)
62.70: Regional Average (East Asia & Pacific)
60.76: India (Rank: 100)
53.01: Lao PDR (Rank: 141)
44.21: Myanmar (Rank: 171)
Note: The distance to frontier (DTF) measure shows the distance of each economy to the “frontier,” which represents the best performance observed on each of
the indicators across all economies in the Doing Business sample since 2005. An economy’s distance to frontier is re ected on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0
represents the lowest performance and 100 represents the frontier. The ease of doing business ranking ranges from 1 to 190.
Rankings on Doing Business topics - Myanmar
Starting
a
Business
Dealing
with
Construction
Permits
Getting
Electricity
Registering
Property
Getting
Credit
Protecting
Minority
Investors
Paying
Taxes
Trading
across
Borders
Enforcing
Contracts
Resolving
Insolvency
1
28
55
82
109
136
163
190
Rank
155
73
151
134
177
183
125
163
188
164
Distance to Frontier (DTF) on Doing Business topics - Myanmar
Starting
a
Business
Change:+0.13
Dealing
with
Construction
Permits
Change:+0.35
Getting
Electricity
Change:+0.35
Registering
Property
Change:+1.68
Getting
Credit
Change:0.00
Protecting
Minority
Investors
Change:0.00
Paying
Taxes
Change:+0.26
Trading
across
Borders
Change:+0.27
Enforcing
Contracts
Change:0.00
Resolving
Insolvency
Change:0.00
0
20
40
60
80
100
DTF
75.42
70.33
52.52 52.30
10.00
25.00
63.94
47.67
24.53
20.39
Starting a Business
This topic measures the paid-in minimum capital requirement, number of procedures, time and cost for a small- to medium-sized
Page 4

MYANMAR CORRUPTION REPORT COLLECTION 2017-2018

MYANMAR CORRUPTION REPORT COLLECTION 2017-2018

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MYANMAR CORRUPTION REPORT COLLECTION 2017-2018