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Posted September 24th, 2018 • Posted in Reports • Author: U.S. Department of
State
Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State
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Executive Summary
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), with funding support from the Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), conducted a survey in spring 2018 of
the firsthand experiences of 1,024 Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar District,
Bangladesh. The goal of the survey was to document atrocities committed against
residents in Burma’s northern Rakhine State during the course of violence in the
previous two years.
The survey used a representative sample of refugee camp populations to provide
insights into the violence they witnessed. Any hearsay testimony was not recorded.
Survey results reveal the pattern of events refugees experienced. There may be cases
when multiple refugees reported witnessing the same event, so the percentages from
this survey should not be extrapolated to come up with a definitive overall number of
events. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) worked with INR to map and
analyze the resulting data (see Map 1).
The results of the survey show that the vast majority of Rohingya refugees experienced
or directly witnessed extreme violence and the destruction of their homes. They
identified the Burmese military as a perpetrator in most cases.
Most witnessed a killing, two-thirds witnessed an injury, and half witnessed sexual
violence (see Figure 1).
Rohingya identified the Burmese military as a perpetrator in 84% of the killings or
injuries they witnessed.
10/4/2018 Progressive Voice » Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State
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Three-quarters say they saw members of the army kill someone; the same
proportion say they witnessed the army destroying huts or whole villages. Police,
unidentified security forces, and armed civilians carried out the rest of the observed
killings.
One-fifth of all respondents witnessed a mass-casualty event of killings or injuries
(either in their villages or as they fled) with more than 100 victims.
The two main phases of violence—the first in October 2016 and the second beginning in
August 2017—followed attacks against Burmese security forces by the Rohingya
insurgent group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The vast majority of reported
incidents against Rohingya took place from August to October 2017. The survey shows
that the military, which used the ARSA attacks to justify its so-called counterinsurgency
operations in northern Rakhine State, targeted civilians indiscriminately and often with
extreme brutality.
Forty-five percent of refugees witnessed a rape, and the majority of rapes witnessed
were committed, in whole or in part, by the army. Overall, nearly 40% of refugees
saw a rape committed by members of the Burmese security services—either police
or military—including 18% who saw them commit a gang rape.
Members of the security services, as well as non-Rohingya civilians in some cases,
targeted children and pregnant women.
Those who were left behind because they were elderly, sick, or otherwise infirm
were frequently found dead when their relatives returned to check on them.
The survey reveals that the recent violence in northern Rakhine State was extreme,
large-scale, widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population
and driving out the Rohingya residents. The scope and scale of the military’s operations
indicate they were well-planned and coordinated. In some areas, perpetrators used
tactics that resulted in mass casualties, for example, locking people in houses to burn
them, fencing off entire villages before shooting into the crowd, or sinking boats full of
hundreds of fleeing Rohingya.
Download full report HERE.
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Statement by Mr. Marzuki DARUSMAN, Chairperson of the Independent International
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, at the 39th Session of the Human Rights Council
Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on Myanmar
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D O C U M E N T A T I O N O F
A T R O C I T I E S I N
N O R T H E R N R A K H I N E
S T A T E
• S O L O P I A N I S T •
August, 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR),
with funding support from the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL),
conducted a survey in spring 2018 of the
firsthand experiences of 1,024 Rohingya refugees
in Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh. The goal of
the survey was to document atrocities committed
against residents in Burma’s northern Rakhine
State during the course of violence in the
previous two years.
The survey used a representative sample of
refugee camp populations to provide insights into
the violence they witnessed. Any hearsay
testimony was not recorded. Survey results
reveal the pattern of events refugees experienced.
There may be cases when multiple refugees
reported witnessing the same event, so the
percentages from this survey should not be
extrapolated to come up with a definitive overall
number of events. The National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) worked with INR to
map and analyze the resulting data (see Map 1).
The results of the survey show that the vast
majority of Rohingya refugees experienced or
directly witnessed extreme violence and the
destruction of their homes. They identified the
Burmese military as a perpetrator in most cases.
• Most witnessed a killing, two-thirds witnessed an injury, and half witnessed sexual
violence (see Figure 1).
• Rohingya identified the Burmese military as a perpetrator in 84% of the killings or
injuries they witnessed.
• Three-quarters say they saw members of the army kill someone; the same proportion say
they witnessed the army destroying huts or whole villages. Police, unidentified security
forces, and armed civilians carried out the rest of the observed killings.
• One-fifth of all respondents witnessed a mass-casualty event of killings or injuries (either
in their villages or as they fled) with more than 100 victims.
1
The two main phases of violence—the first in October 2016 and the second beginning in August
2017—followed attacks against Burmese security forces by the Rohingya insurgent group
Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The vast majority of reported incidents against
Rohingya took place from August to October 2017. The survey shows that the military, which
used the ARSA attacks to justify its so-called counterinsurgency operations in northern Rakhine
State, targeted civilians indiscriminately and often with extreme brutality.
• Forty-five percent of refugees witnessed a rape, and the majority of rapes witnessed were
committed, in whole or in part, by the army. Overall, nearly 40% of refugees saw a rape
committed by members of the Burmese security services—either police or military—
including 18% who saw them commit a gang rape.
• Members of the security services, as well as non-Rohingya civilians in some cases,
targeted children and pregnant women.
• Those who were left behind because they were elderly, sick, or otherwise infirm were
frequently found dead when their relatives returned to check on them.
The survey reveals that the recent violence in northern Rakhine State was extreme, large-scale,
widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving out the
Rohingya residents. The scope and scale of the military’s operations indicate they were well-
planned and coordinated. In some areas, perpetrators used tactics that resulted in mass
casualties, for example, locking people in houses to burn them, fencing off entire villages before
shooting into the crowd, or sinking boats full of hundreds of fleeing Rohingya.
2
3
INTRODUCTION
In spring 2018, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) worked with funding from the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) to design and carry out a survey to
document claims of atrocities committed against the ethnic Rohingya in Burma’s northern
Rakhine State since October 2016. INR combined a quantitative approach to sampling with a
qualitative, semi-structured questionnaire. This approach allowed investigators to systematically
collect data on events that refugees encamped in Bangladesh had witnessed in their northern
Rakhine State villages. Expert and well-trained investigators and their translators took special
steps to create a comfortable interview structure that reduced possible stress on the respondents,
allowed for the investigator to obtain clarifying detail on perpetrators and events, and separate
firsthand experience from hearsay testimony.
DRL contracted with an expert outside group to gather a team of 18 experienced human rights
investigators from around the world to conduct the research. INR trained the team on sampling
methodology, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) created a map atlas that
allowed the investigators to identify and locate where events occurred. The 1,024 survey
respondents included only adults who left northern Rakhine State on or after October 1, 2016,
though reports of violence date from as early as January 2016.1
What follows is an analysis of the resulting data, which illuminates the excessive use of force the
Burmese Army and police unleashed on the Rohingya population in the name of
counterinsurgency clearance operations after the October 2016 and August 2017 Arakan
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacks. The survey’s most salient findings fall into the two
periods that coincide with these Burmese military operations: the first focused during October
2016 and the second, and far more violent period, from August-September 2017 (see Figure 2).
1
While the survey was open to respondents of any ethnicity, only Rohingya were captured in the sample.
4
Background on Systematic Abuse
The Rohingya have experienced decades of persecution and violence, largely perpetrated by
Burmese security services and the government. The roots of anti-Rohingya sentiments and
discrimination lie in a longstanding belief in Burma that Rohingya are not “native” to Burma
but arrived from Bangladesh during British colonial rule. Rohingya separatist movements in
the 1940s and 1950s, and periodic, low-level unrest since, contribute to the state-sanctioned
narrative that the Rohingya are a security concern to be contained and must be treated
separately from those they consider to be rightful Burmese citizens. Burma’s military
government gradually stripped Rohingya of their citizenship and other rights in a series of
maneuvers, including the 1982 Citizenship Law, and a decision in 2015 to revoke their
temporary registration cards. State violence against the Rohingya in 1977, under the
military’s Operation Dragon King aimed against “illegal immigration,” and again in 1991 in
what they claimed was a response to attacks by the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO),
resulted in two separate waves of refugees when hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled
across the border to find refuge in Bangladesh.
SECTION I: PATTERN OF VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN RAKHINE (2016 AND 2017)
On October 9, 2016 a group of ARSA members and other Rohingya villagers attacked three
border guard police stations, leaving nine policemen dead. The military responded by using
what it called counterinsurgency tactics against the Rohingya population in the area. Few
witnessed killings (2%) or destruction of huts (3%) between October and November 2016, most
likely because the military targeted villages in only a few areas (see Map 1; see Tab 2 for
background on ARSA).
Authorities Targeted Men for Abduction, Arrest (October 2016-August 2017)
As part of their military operations beginning in October 2016, Burmese security officials would
take Rohingya men into custody, ostensibly to question them about ties to or knowledge of
ARSA. As tensions rose between Burmese officials and Rohingya in northern Rakhine State,
increasing numbers of men and boys were taken into custody. To avoid being taken away by
security services, men spent nights hiding in the woods, leaving their wives and children
vulnerable to invasive searches by security services. Many of these women reported being
groped, stripped, or violated while intruders searched their homes and their bodies for valuables
or possible weapons.
Abductions of Women (October 2016-August 2017)
Refugees also reported abductions of women. In the year before the attack on her village, one
woman said that the military would take the “beautiful” girls and they never came back. In
another notable case, four months before the major attack, one refugee said the military told each
village in his area that they had to provide 20 women so they could “teach them tailoring,” but
the village never heard from them again.
5
Though in many cases the victim’s fate is unclear, refugees reported instances in which women
had been raped after abduction. The week prior to an attack on his village, a man was walking in
a forest near a military outpost when he saw four Rohingya girls tied up with ropes, heavily
bleeding and “half dead.” They told him the military had kept them there for three days raping
them.
Increased Restrictions (2017)
On August 25, 2017, ARSA launched attacks against about 30 police and army posts in northern
Rakhine state, triggering a harsh military reaction. The majority of the attacks and three-quarters
of the reported killings witnessed by the refugees in our survey occurred between August and
October of 2017. Before the most acute violence broke out, a majority reported increased
movement restrictions—even above the normal levels.
Dozens reported that Burmese authorities removed fences before the attacks, either by doing so
themselves or by forcing Rohingya villagers to do so. In some cases, the military said they did
not want Rohingya hiding militants. Removing fences also was meant to humiliate Rohingya, as
it forced them to urinate and defecate in the open air. In at least 50 cases, respondents reported
that the military and other actors removed knives, tools, iron, and other sharp objects that could
be used as weapons. In some cases, local authorities photographed these objects as evidence of
ARSA presence in the village.
• One-third who had these items taken said such restrictions had existed in their village for
years. In about one-quarter of the cases, local authorities took these objects after the
October 2016 attacks, and through summer 2017. Three-in-ten said the objects were
removed between a month and a day before the attack, while the remaining 11% said they
were removed while the attack was in progress or immediately prior.
• Rohingya most often cited the military as the culprit (in 88% of cases), but in some cases,
civilians (31%) and police (22%) participated. In each, the removal of these objects
facilitated the subsequent ground assaults, killings, and property destruction.
“When the military came, they would steal whatever we had, including knives—we could
not cut vegetables or fish.” Female, age 30
Systematic, Large-Scale Violence Strikes Villages (August-September 2017)
After August 25, on the days when violence broke out in their villages, some respondents
reported the attacks began in the early morning before most residents were awake. These attacks
explicitly targeted Rohingya, and left neighboring non-Rohingya sites (e.g. Buddhist stupas) and
critical infrastructure (e.g. cell phone towers) untouched during the assaults (see Image 1, next
page). During these large-scale attacks, homes and property were destroyed, and scores of
Rohingya were killed as they fled their villages. These attacks generally lasted 1-4 days,
depending on the size of the village. Rohingya said the army was involved in nearly all (92%) of
the ground assaults—at times alone (32%), but sometimes accompanied by other security forces
(26%), civilians (11%), or both (23%).
The stories from some refugees show a pattern of planning and pre-meditation in their villages
on the part of the attackers. In one case, the local heads of the military and police called together
6
25 Muslim leaders from the surrounding villages to tell them to leave or they would be killed or
burned. Other respondents reported non-Rohingya neighbors leaving shortly before the outbreak
of violence.
Image 1
SECTION 2: TYPES AND PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE WITNESSED BY ROHINGYA
Burmese Army Overwhelmingly Identified as Main Actor
The results of the survey overwhelmingly show that Burmese security forces, and the army in
particular, primarily are responsible for the violence that has driven the nearly 800,000 Rohingya
from their homes since October 2016 (see Map 2, next page).
• Three-quarters witnessed a killing by a member of the army. In contrast, only one-
quarter witnessed a killing by non-Rohingya civilians or any police force.
• Victims named the army as perpetrators in an overwhelming majority (88%) of the
killings witnessed, as well as in nearly all armed ground assaults (92%) and aerial attacks
(88%).
“The military surrounded us and shot at people. They wore green uniforms. They wore red
scarves and red patches on their shoulders. They had long guns held on their shoulders and
helmets.” Female, age 18
7
8
In many cases—and in half of the armed ground assaults reported—additional security services
such as the Border Guard Police (BGP), the Rakhine State Police, or the Combat Police forces
accompanied the army. Non-Rohingya civilians also participated in the violence and the looting
that often accompanied it. In some cases, refugees said the military provided civilians uniforms
and weapons to be used in the assault.
Official Rhetoric, Attackers’ Language Coincide
Official statements portrayed the Rohingya as a foreign jihadist enemy group, and those who
fled as guilty of belonging to, supporting, or sympathizing with a terror group.
“Rakhine State sees an increasing number of Bengali populations. Later the Bengalis
in Rakhine State drove out the natives including Rakhine, Dainet, Mro, Khami and
Maramagyi. Conflicts between Rakhine ethnics and Bengalis occur as Bengalis try to
establish a separate region… Arrangements are being made to launch the Jihad holy
war in the whole Rakhine State before October 2017.” (Army Spokesman Maj-Gen
Aung Ye Win on August 31, 2017)
“ARSA extremist Bengali terrorists were not successful in attacking the security
outposts, and they fled to Bangladesh for fear of the retribution of the security troops.
As the terrorist took their families together with them, the number of people who fled
had become large.” (Min Aung Hlaing, in comments to U.S. Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson on November 16, 2017)
Those Rohingya who were able to understand their attackers frequently heard similar
themes—soldiers, policemen, and civilians telling them that they did not belong in Burma and
that they must leave or face death. During the attacks on their villages and rapes, many
Rohingya reported hearing perpetrators using explicit language and calling them
“Bangladeshi/Bengali” or the racial slur “Kalar.” Many Rohingya cannot speak Burmese and
thus were unable to say what was being shouted at them during the attacks. Others said the
attackers approached their task in silence.
Killings, Destruction, Heavy Weaponry Pervasive
The violence respondents witnessed was extensive and followed consistent patterns across
northern Rakhine State.
• Overall, eight-in-ten refugees said they witnessed a killing, most often by the Burmese
security forces—either police or military. Over half (54%) of the killings witnessed
were from shooting, 20% by machete or knife, and 11% by burning. Only 3% the
killings were from drowning, though refugees reported that more drowned during their
escape.
• Two-thirds said that they were taken into army or police custody or that they saw other
Rohingya being taken.
• Eight-in-10 reported they saw the destruction of homes or villages. Many more reported
that others had confirmed their homes were destroyed, but this hearsay testimony was
not recorded by the investigators. Imagery analysis from August 30 to October 23, 2017
9
indicates that more than 38,000 buildings were destroyed by fire, significantly more than
the estimated 1,500 observed in October and November 2016. Most villages where
burning occurred were totally destroyed.
In some cases, refugees said several cars or trucks would arrive to take part in a coordinated
attack—speedboats were also mentioned in some areas. More than 100 respondents from
villages spread across northern Rakhine State mentioned seeing helicopters, though they did not
always take part in the attacks; some saw them drop “bombs” or “rockets.”
• Across northern Rakhine State, but especially near Maungdaw and areas further north,
respondents reported the use of heavy, explosive weapons such as rocket launchers (or
“launchers”) and grenades. They most often said the army or security forces were using
these weapons.
• Others said the soldiers were using long and short guns or knives. Several respondents
also said the local ethnic Rakhine (also known as “Mogh”) were using long knives or
machetes to take part in the attack.
• In many areas, refugees mentioned the use of flamethrowers or incendiary devices.
Security forces most often used these weapons to burn down houses, but also used them
to kill and injure Rohingya.
“The whole village was under random fire like rain.” Male, age 20
Refugees reported that the perpetrators of the violence singled out community or religious
leaders as their targets in some areas. Thirty percent of the respondents reported they witnessed
explicitly religious targeting or harassment. Respondents also detailed cases of the military’s
desecration of sacred texts, and some saw soldiers burning or urinating on Korans.
Theft of livestock and personal property—often jewelry and cooking vessels—was
commonplace. One-third said their food resources were stolen or destroyed. Though the
military was most commonly named as the perpetrator (involved in 76% of reported cases), non-
Rohingya civilians were involved in one-third of the thefts witnessed. Some refugees lamented
that their families had been living comfortable lives and that they owned small shops, acres of
agricultural land, and cows, all of which had been destroyed, leaving them with virtually nothing
with which to rebuild their lives. In some villages, community elite were targeted in the theft
and violence, including those who were wealthier or more educated. In other areas, respondents
described the actions as more random.
The Burmese government officially ceased operations in northern Rakhine on September 5,
2017. An analysis of imagery shows villages still burning on that date (see Image 2, next page),
and reports from refugees indicate the violence continued, tapering through September and early
October.
10
Image 2
Mutilation, Possible Torture Prevalent
Investigators heard reports of mostly Burmese soldiers, and sometimes civilians, mutilating or
possibly torturing Rohingya before and during the attacks. One-in-ten refugees witnessed these
acts.
• Reports of mutilation included the cutting and spreading of entrails, severed limbs or
hands/feet, pulling out nails or burning beards and genitals to force a confession, or being
burned alive.
• Thirty-three respondents reported groups of Rohingya were forced to stay outside for
hours as a form of punishment, or as part of interrogations.
• Thirty-two respondents reported either seeing victims being decapitated or dismembered.
Others reported passing mutilated corpses on their way to Bangladesh, but were unable to
confirm what had happened.
Many reported passing dead bodies as they escaped from their home village to Bangladesh.
Some appeared to have died due to various injuries—sometimes described as mutilations—while
others seem to have died from exhaustion or other stresses on the journey. One-in-ten reported
seeing the disposal of bodies in pits, graves, mass graves, or using other methods. In a few
cases, witnesses said Rohingya were either killed in pits or buried alive, but in the majority of
events, the victims were already dead when the bodies were being dumped, covered, or
destroyed.
11
• Some reported seeing dead bodies being dropped into a pit or a grave dug by the
military—sometimes with the assistance of bulldozers. Perpetrators also took advantage
of village wells for body disposal.
• In other cases, soldiers burned dead bodies, aided by kerosene, hay, or wrapped blankets.
• One refugee reported that the military put acid into victims’ eyes so they could not be
identified. Others reported the military dismembered bodies.
• Rohingya often saw bodies floating in water—one described seeing “heads floating in
the river like footballs.”
“The military shot our honorable old Imam. They shot him twice, but he was not dead
yet. So they stabbed him and hung his torso on a tree.” Female, age 30
Weak, Vulnerable Bear Brunt of Violence
During the attacks on Rohingya communities, refugees report that the military and, to a lesser
extent, the state police, injured and killed those who were not able to dodge the attacks–often
women, children, and the elderly. In some cases the violence against these vulnerable
populations was indisciminate, as soldiers shot rounds of bullets into the air. At other times, it
was specifically targeted. In some villages, soldiers went door-to-door to kill those who had
been unable to flee after the initial phase of violence.
“I had to choose between my children and my mother… I had only two hands and two
children” Male, age 35
“The military and BGP slaughtered my son, who was 5 years old. When military came, I
was pregnant. The situation was very horrific. I could not get all of my children. I could
not go to my son. He was killed.” Female, age 25
One-hundred and seventeen refugees from across northern Rakhine State witnessed infants and
children being beaten or killed, or saw the corpses of children with gunshot wounds or cut
throats in villages and along roads as they fled to Bangladesh. When the military shot adult
families, multiple reports indicate they included the children in the executions. In some cases,
witnesses report seeing soldiers or police grab infants out of their mother’s arms to kill them, and
some reported seeing them physically brutalize young children by stomping on them, beating
them or throwing infants on the ground. Most of these events occurred in August and September
2017.
• Multiple witnesses report soldiers throwing infants and small children into open fires or
burning huts. Witnesses also report seeing soldiers throw children into rivers and seeing
children’s bodies that had been thrown into a village well. One refugee reported seeing a
police officer throw an infant in a river, then shooting the mother when she ran into the
water to save her child.
• One refugee told of soldiers following a group of Rohingya as they fled to Bangladesh.
At one point, she said they suddenly shot into a group of children who were playing on
the ground, killing a 5-year-old, a 3-year old, and a 3-month old infant.
12
• In one report, a group of Rakhine civilians joined the military in attacking villagers in a
rice paddy. One of the civilians stopped a man who was holding an infant, threw it in the
air and caught it on his long knife.
• Soldiers attacked women, and their infants, during or just after childbirth. Several
refugees from different villages also reported that soldiers killed pregnant mothers by
slashing their stomachs open and ripping out their fetuses.
Consistent with the military’s attacks on vulnerable segments of the Rohingya population, the
military and police also appear to have targeted elderly men and women by beating, shooting, or
stabbing them during attacks on their villages. Many respondents reported that the elderly were
burned alive after their houses were set on fire and they were unable to escape.
• As his village was burning, one man witnessed soldiers physically push four disabled and
elderly men who could not walk inside burning homes.
• Soldiers killed one witness’s 70-year-old mother in front of her, then mutilated her body
and threw it into a fire.
• Witnesses also report seeing the dead bodies of many elderly people as they fled to
Bangladesh.
Respondents Escaped, but Many Did Not
In many of the reported cases, Rohingya left their villages and escaped across the border to
Bangladesh. In other areas, however, there seemed to be a concerted effort by the attackers to
prevent the Rohingya from escaping, and to inflict maximum damage upon them.
• Some reported that during assaults, villagers were locked into houses, and those houses
were set on fire.
• Two refugees witnessed the military blocking all roads or exits from the village before
opening fire on the Rohingya population.
• Nine respondents reported the army, navy, or ethnic Rakhine civilians took their boats, or
scuttled or destroyed them during the violence to prevent their use.
One-fifth of all refugees said they witnessed a mass-casualty event of killings or injuries with
more than 100 victims. In some cases, respondents said the events occurred in their own
villages, while in other cases they reported seeing massacres as they fled to Bangladesh. In one
case, the respondent said men were forced to lie face-down on the ground, and more than two
hundred men and one woman were killed by being cut across the neck.
• One respondent witnessed Rohingya being shot and cut while hiding in the hills outside a
village. Another mentioned seeing a “flood of bodies” from the same massacre there.
• Twenty-eight respondents reported the army or navy attempting to sink boats full of
refugees, or shooting refugees trapped in the boats. Nine of these respondents said this
caused the deaths of 100 people or more.
“All nine cousins drowned in the river after their boat was sunk by military. The soldiers
beat them as boat was going down to make sure they drowned.” Female, age 30
13
Sexual Violence Endemic
The survey uncovered widespread sexual assault and rape against Rohingya women by the
military. Rape incidents appear to have increased in number and brutality in the direct lead-up to
and during the August and September attacks. Gang rape was reported across northern Rakhine
State, suggesting at least some level of cooperation between the multiple perpetrators (see Map
3, next page).
In general, the military and police did not appear to try to hide the rapes from their peers or from
those above them in their chain of command. Rather, rapes were largely public in nature, with
many assaults either taking place in public view, or with perpetrators leaving evidence of such
assaults–including the victims’ corpses which clearly portrayed marks of rape–in public view.
Twenty-seven women said they were themselves raped, a low number that could reflect a
cultural stigma against admitting one was raped or discussing sexual violence openly, as well as
the reports that Burmese soldiers often killed women after they were raped. However, 45%
witnessed women and girls being raped, including the 20% who witnessed gang rape. More
witnessed some form of sexual violence, including forced stripping of clothing, touching of
women’s breasts or genitals, and sexual assault. The fact that the refugees identified the security
forces as having committed so many rapes and assaults publicly likely contributes to these high
numbers.
“Two police from my village raped me. I know these men by sight, but not their names.
After they were done, they told me to leave the country, this is not your country.” Female,
age 23
The security forces’ sexual assaults generally occurred in one of several ways, trends consistent
throughout northern Rakhine State as identified below:
1. Home searches
Respondents reported that the military would routinely visit their villages, ostensibly to
search for insurgents, and such searches would often involve groping, sexually assaulting, or
raping the women inside their homes. Many women said the soldiers would steal valuables,
particularly their gold jewelry, during the assaults. One 25-year-old reported particularly
brutal home searches, saying the soldiers “raped women until they were half-dead.” Another
said a soldier raped her sister because she refused to give him her gold nose ring. Women
whose husbands had fled their homes to hide from the military were especially vulnerable to
abuse.
“When soldiers came to the village and “searched” women, they groped our breasts,
entire body. Today when I think about those days, this is what makes me sick. Our
husbands were never there and cannot find out.” Female, age 25
14
15
2. Mass rapes in fields, mosques, schools
Refugees from multiple villages across northern Rakhine state reported that for at least a year
leading up to the August 2017 violence, military would arrive at their villages and demand
that many or all the women gather in a public space or a nearby field. Some reported that if
women did not leave their homes, soldiers found and raped them. Soldiers interrogated the
women about their male family members, beating them if they failed to answer. They would
then choose a smaller number of women—often 4 or 5, but some refugees reported up to
20—whom as many 15 soldiers would then take to fields, forests, houses, schools, mosques
or latrines to gang rape. Many victims were reportedly killed afterwards, though not in all
cases. In some cases, instead of making all the women gather, the military would go door-to-
door, choosing the “prettiest” girls to take away likely to be raped, instead.
• In one report, in the days before a village massacre, local Rakhine police and army
soldiers made more than 20 women leave their home to go sit outside in direct sunlight,
threatening that if the women didn’t bring their husbands to them, they would beat and
rape them. Women who didn’t cooperate were beaten. They chose the younger women,
taking them to nearly homes and the madrassa and raping them.
• On some occasions, large numbers of women were taken to be raped. One woman said
she saw some 50 of the village’s “prettiest women” taken to the hills, where two of the
survivors later told her they were all raped, and about 35 were shot afterwards.
• One refugee said that the military demanded that all the women in her village gather in
the mosque, but that one woman did not, because she had just given birth. Upon
discovering this, soldiers pulled her out into her home’s yard and publicly raped her.
“They took women out and made them sit in the sun in the field, and questioned them,
’where are the men?’ They took away breastfeeding moms, babies were not allowed to
eat, kept them in the field for one day. They took away the young and beautiful women
and raped them, gang rape, 5-7 men raping one woman.” Female, age 35
3. Rapes During Attacks on Villages
Refugees reported that on the day their villages were attacked, soldiers would grab and rape
women who were fleeing from the burning homes and shooting.
• Witnesses from multiple locations report women were raped in the fields or hills, outside
their homes in their own yards, or on roads in town where others could clearly see what
was happening. One man saw 10 women being raped all along a road as he was fleeing,
4-6 soldiers attacking each woman, who were later killed.
• Many respondents reported seeing women’s naked corpses as they fled through villages,
saying it was apparent from their gruesome injuries that the women had been raped. For
example, a 19-year-old was fleeing her village when she said she passed a naked
woman’s body bound to a tree “with clear signs of gang rape.”
“About 100 women were rounded up and raped in the hills, on the road, in front of their
homes, wherever they could find them” Female, age 60
16
Witnesses reported that many women did not survive the rape attacks. In some cases they died
from the brutality of the rape and the accompanying violence, and in many other cases the
soldiers shot, hung, or hacked their bodies after they finished raping them.
“They were so brutal.” Male, age 55
• Those who did survive gang rapes often sustained serious injuries. One interviewee
reported that her cousin was raped by six military officers, after which she has been
virtually unable to walk or stand up.
• Witnesses reported exceptionally violent attacks where multiple soldiers raped women
for hours at a time while beating them, sexually assaulting them with their weapons, or
inflicting other injuries on them in addition to the rape.
• Nine respondents from unique locations in Rakhine state reported witnessing attacks or
evidence of attacks in which soldiers cut off the breasts of women they raped during the
assaults. Soldiers also reportedly mutilated genitals or other parts of bodies.
“The soldiers chased me. I couldn’t escape. Everyone managed to flee but I was
pregnant so I wasn’t able to get away. Three soldiers raped me. One kicked me and I
fell unconscious… When I got my senses back, I saw that my fetus had come out dead… I
have seen my baby die and I find myself numb.” Female, age 25
Refugees from villages throughout Rakhine State reported that the perpetrators often killed their
victims after the rape, typically by shooting or stabbing them. In multiple cases, soldiers killed
some of the women during a mass rape, while releasing a small number alive.
• One refugee reported that the military abducted a woman along with some 80 others,
taking them to a military camp in the village to rape for five days. Afterwards, she said
soldiers killed half and let the remaining go free.
• In another village, one mother said that during a rape of roughly 100 women, her
daughter was raped, then mutilated and killed, while her niece’s body was cut in half
after rape.
• In yet another village, a man said he saw about twenty soldiers select five women, gang
rape each one, then kill the women by shooting some, and hanging others from trees.
Others reported soldiers cutting babies out of their pregnant mothers’ bellies, or killing
both mother and child during or immediately after birth.
17
TAB 1: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
This report is based on a DRL-funded, INR-designed survey conducted in the refugee camps in
Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Face-to-face interviews were conducted among a random sample of
1,024 Rohingya adults, 18 years old and older, who had left northern Rakhine State after October
1, 2016. The fieldwork took place from April 1 to April 22, 2018 by a team of 18 experienced
human rights investigators from around the world. The investigators hailed from nearly every
continent; many have previous experience with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; some are sexual and
gender-based violence and/or trauma experts, some are former law enforcement officers, and all
have previous experience in trauma-sensitive human rights documentation for the purposes of
accountability. None were U.S. government officials. The investigators were trained by INR on
sampling as well as the survey tool, which included open-ended questions and follow-up probes
designed to draw out a narrative on the violence. They also received training from an expert
with knowledge of the Burmese security services, which aided them in correctly identifying
perpetrators.
This hybrid survey combined quantitative and qualitative methodology, and it is unique among
existing research into the current Rohingya crisis because the random sampling of refugees
ensured that the results represent the entire refugee population in camps in Cox’s Bazar,
providing context for other qualitiative research efforts.
The interviews were conducted via translator in a semi-structured format, often within the
respondent’s camp residence. The translators were recruited locally, and an expert provided a
two-day training on translation in the context of sensitive interviews. The qualitative content of
the interview was then coded by the investigator to capture events that the respondent directly
witnessed, as well as the events’ perpetrator–to the extent they could be determined.
NGA created a map atlas to aid in locating the respondents’ village of origin. The atlas broke
northern Rakhine State into a grid covering areas that open-source analysis had identified as
containing villages burned in the violence. Even when the respondent was unable to locate his or
her exact village on the map, with the guidance of the investigator, the respondent was in most
cases able to locate events to a general area within the grid. NGA analysts were able to locate
approximately 9 out of every 10 of the locations identified by investigators, and conducted
geospatial analysis based on the overall grid.
A large majority of the respondents left northern Rakhine State in either August or September
2017, which mirrors NGO accounting of the ebb and flow of refugees since unrest began in
October 2016. Though the survey was open to refugees of all ethnicities, only Rohingya were
captured by the random sampling method.
The margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points, and the study is representative of the
population of camps sampled (see Map 1). Those who were living outside the officially
administered camps were not included in the sample design. Though the survey results showed
the vast majority of the most violent incidents occured during a relatively brief two month period
of time (see Figure 2, page 4), further analysis of the data is planned in order to reveal patterns of
violence across space and time, and provide more information on specific mass-casualty events.
18
The analysis also benefits from additional insight provided by the expert on Burma’s security
services and an informal focus group conducted among victims of sexual violence by an
investigator.
There are some limitations to the data collected in the study:
• The methodology chosen for the study focuses on the pattern of events refugees
experienced, and thus there are some cases when two or more refugees report witnessing
the same event. Though the report accurately reflects the typical experiences of a
Rohingya refugee, it cannot be used to calculate death rates or other losses in northern
Rakhine State without combining this dataset with additional information.
• The presence of ARSA in the refugee camps likely gave pause to some refugees who
might otherwise identify ARSA as perpetrators. ARSA’s involvement in the violence
thus is likely under-reported. However, based on other credible research into the attacks
in northern Rakhine State, we have no reason to conclude the group was responsible for
more than a small fraction of the violence.
• We do not have any insight into events that occurred outside of the study time frame.
The survey also did not capture any experiences from Rohingya who chose to stay in
northern Rakhine State or from Burmese of any other ethnicity who resided there.
19
TAB 2: ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND BACKGROUND
Some Restrictions Predated Attacks
Rohingya interviewed for this survey indicated that human rights abuses within their villages
increased significantly following the anti-Muslim riots in Rakhine State in June 2012, and an
outbreak of civilian-led violence in 2014. Interviewees described numerous restrictions and
abuses they faced in daily life. Local officials forced Rohingya to pay sometimes-exorbitant fees
to marry or have children, and they enforced limits on family size. Restrictions on movement
were particularly severe, with a complex web of regulations making it extremely difficult for
Rohingya to move freely, though sometimes it was possible if a bribe was paid. Some areas
reported frequent incidences of forced labor, beatings, and sexual violence. The severity of these
restrictions differed village-to-village, but Rohingya generally found their lives more restricted
than those of their non-Rohingya neighbors.
Many also said they were unable to practice their religion because the military had shuttered or
burned mosques, closed their children’s madrassas, and banned mosques from issuing a call to
prayer. In some cases, people said the military had threatened them that if they were found
praying in their homes they would be beaten, arrested, or killed. In some areas, local authorities
forced women to go outside unveiled, or forced men to shave their beards—and, in a few cases,
tugged or pulled out their beards.
What do we know about ARSA?
ARSA, also known by its former name Harakah al-Yaqin, or HaY, frames its objectives as
those of an ethnic insurgency seeking greater rights for Burma’s Rohingya population. It has
stopped short of calling for outright autonomy for Rohingya and disavowed terrorism writ
large, as well as specific terrorist organizations like al-Qaida, ISIS, and Lashkar-e-
Tayyiba. Any ties to these or other foreign extremist groups remain unconfirmed. Though
ARSA reportedly receives financial support from members of the Rohingya diaspora in the
Middle East and South Asia, participants in ARSA attacks were poorly equipped and
resourced.
The group comprises a shadowy network of Rohingya militants in Burma and Bangladesh led
by its senior leader, Ata Ullah (also known as Abu Umar al Junooni). ARSA’s size and
support among Rohingya in Burma and Bangladesh are unclear. The group has only
conducted one significant attack since August 2017, a January 2018 attack on a Burmese
military truck. Recent murders and intimidation of ARSA critics and government
collaborators inside Rohingya refugee camps have also been blamed on the group.
Only a handful of respondents mentioned ARSA as a perpetrator—some mentioned attempted
recruitment or a presence in their village, some mentioned the October 9 attacks, and a few
mentioned threats or violence against those who “collaborated” with the military.
20
1
UN Human Rights Council creates a mechanism on Myanmar to gather evidence and prepare
files for prosecution of Mass Atrocity Crimes
(Geneva 27 September 2018) Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), Equality
Myanmar, Progressive Voice, Women’s Peace Network-Arakan, Kachin Women’s Association Thailand,
and Rohingya Women Welfare Society welcome the UN Human Rights Council’s resolution today on
Myanmar as an important landmark in the quest for justice and accountability. The resolution creates a
new mechanism to collect and preserve evidence, and prepare case files on perpetrators of mass
atrocities for use in future criminal proceedings. The resolution follows a report by the Council’s Fact
Finding Mission on Myanmar, which calls for the investigation and prosecution of the Myanmar military
for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
“The establishment of a UN body to prepare files for prosecution and to collect evidence of mass
atrocity crimes is a ray of hope for victims and survivors of horrific atrocities in Myanmar,” said Wai Wai
Nu of Women’s Peace Network-Arakan. This is will ensure that these crimes and perpetrators are not
forgotten and strengthen the hope for actual trial and prosecutions in the near future,” she added.
The resolution condemns gross violations and recalls the authority of the Security Council to refer
Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and takes note of the ICC decision that it may
exercise jurisdiction on the deportation of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh. “Now the logical
next step is for the UN Security Council to take the cue from the Human Rights Council and urgently
refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court so that it could examine the full spectrum of mass
atrocity crimes committed in Myanmar,” said Khin Ohmar of Progressive Voice. “The longer the Security
Council waits, the longer justice will be denied,” she added.
The resolution’s calls for accountability addresses gross violations all over Myanmar including in Rakhine,
Kachin and Shan states. “The resolution’s inclusive call that covers egregious violations in Kachin and
Shan states comes at a time when these regions face ongoing armed conflict amidst failing peace talks
and atrocities on civilians by the Myanmar military,” said Stella Naw, a Kachin woman activist. “There is
an urgent need for the international community to act towards ending conflict and taking steps to hold
those accountable,” she added.
The resolution also encourages the UN to independently inquire into its own involvement in Myanmar
since 2011. This follows the Fact-Finding Mission’s observation that UN actors in Myanmar prioritised
development and quiet diplomacy while ignoring human rights concerns when mass atrocities took
place. “UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres’ silence on this observation is deafening. He must act
immediately to set up an inquiry to review and rectify the UN’s system-wide engagement in Myanmar,”
said R. Iniyan Ilango of FORUM-ASIA. “This is not the first time this has been said about the UN’s role in
situations of mass atrocities. The same observation was made six years ago on Sri Lanka by a UN internal
inquiry. The Human Rights Upfront Action Plan was created following this and was meant to be
operational in Myanmar when gross violations unfolded. Clearly something is very wrong within the UN
system,” he added.
2
The resolution also appeals to all states and stakeholders to assist victims including through a possible
trust fund. “This is key and the UN General Assembly should act on this appeal and set up a trust fund to
provide livelihood and psychosocial support to victims,” said Wai Wai Nu. “In addition to such support,
the General Assembly should also stipulate that refugees are not returned unless their citizenship rights,
safety and equality are fully guaranteed and security upon their return is supervised by UN Human
Rights bodies,” she added.
The resolution also calls on all business enterprises to cooperate with the new mechanism it creates.
The Fact-Finding Mission’s findings highlighted the impact of social media on the mass atrocities that
took place in Myanmar. It particularly focused on Facebook’s role as a medium for the spread of hate
speech. “Facebook should fully commit to handing over all evidence it holds on incitement to atrocities
to the new mechanism and it should take immediate steps to prevent the spread of hate speech on its
platforms,” said John Samuel of FORUM-ASIA.
ENDS
For more information contact:
 R. Iniyan Ilango, UN Advocacy Programme Manager, FORUM‐ ASIA: iniyan@forum‐asia.org
 Khin Ohmar, Chairperson, Advisory Board, Progressive Voice: khinohmar@progressive-voice.org
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September 25, 2018
U.S. Assistance to the Rakhine State Crisis in Burma and Bangladesh
Richard Albright, Deputy Assistant Secretary For The Bureau Of Population, Refugees, And Migration
New York, New York, United States
FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING WITH RICHARD
ALBRIGHT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU
OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION
TOPIC: U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE RAKHINE STATE CRISIS IN
BURMA AND BANGLADESH
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2018, 1:30 P.M. EST
NEW YORK FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, 799 UNITED NATIONS
PLAZA, 10TH FLOOR
MODERATOR: Well, thank you all for coming through the rain. I
think we’ll – you’ll find it useful to your reporting exercises later. It’s
my pleasure to introduce our Deputy Assistant Secretary in our
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Richard Albright. He has been in his position since July 2018 but already very busy
and active throughout the region, where he oversees humanitarian assistance in both Africa, Near East, and in Asia. So no small
job for our deputy assistant secretary.
So I’m going to ask him to give a few opening remarks, and then we can take questions. Thank you.
MR ALBRIGHT: Excellent. Thanks very much. Thank you for coming here today on this bleak, rainy day. So – but we all have
important, really important, work to do here. And I just wanted to highlight some of the support that we’re providing for the
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh as well as elsewhere in the region and some of the displaced population and the conflict-affected
population inside of Burma.
So I think you’ve seen Ambassador Haley’s press statements that – and the announcement that she made yesterday on the 24th.
We announced – the United States announced just over $185 million in new humanitarian assistance for those affected by the
Rakhine State crisis in Burma and in Bangladesh. In Burma, the funding supports more than 300,000 people in Rakhine State,
including internally displaced people. And in Bangladesh, 156 million of these funds will reach approximately one million Rohingya
who are displaced refugees inside of Bangladesh, and it will support also Bangladeshi communities that are hosting these refugees.
The United States is very proud to be the leading donor responding to the Rakhine State crisis, and our assistance provides
lifesaving help to crisis-affected communities on both sides of the border in both countries as well as the refugees and the host
communities in Bangladesh. And it provides, more specifically, assistance in the areas of protection, emergency shelter, food,
water, sanitation, health care, and psychosocial support for people who are affected by the crisis.
This assistance, this new assistance – the $185 million announced yesterday – brings our total assistance that we’ve provided for
this particular response to $389 million since the outbreak of violence in August 2017, when the Burmese security forces began
committing widespread atrocities against the Rohingya villages across the northern Rakhine.
We continue to support Bangladesh in its response, and we’re calling on other donors to do the same.
This is not – this doesn’t complete the exercise. There’s going to be considerably more assistance that’s required of the
international community. The United States will continue to do its part, but we will ask others to support as well.
So I think with that, I would just want to commend really the support from and the generosity of the Government of Bangladesh
and the Bangladeshi people in hosting over a million refugees who have arrived in – very suddenly since last year. And we
continue to work closely and appreciate their strong cooperation in working to address the needs of this population.
I’m happy to take your questions.
QUESTION: Yes. I am reading this one, but I have a question. No doubt America is doing a lot for those countries who are
deprived, the people who are the refugees. But I don’t know why people have this thinking, whatever is happening on the name of
terrorism, America is doing. If they will not make a situation worst so people will not this type of – people not face this type of
situation. If you think some bad elements are there like Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, you can do a surgical operation. When you
do operation of worst level, so people, they get homeless and they want to move somewhere else.
MR ALBRIGHT: Well, I mean, that’s an interesting question. I mean, I think what I would say to you with regard to this particular
crisis in Burma and Bangladesh is that this is a crisis that was generated by the Government of Burma and its mistreatment of its
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population declaring them not citizens of the country, not giving them basic civil and human rights, and a significant amount of
oppression and atrocities committed by the Burmese armed forces..
We – the UN has – factfinding mission has put out a report on those atrocities. The United States has also published a report also
yesterday. That’s not the subject of my discussion here today, but it’s online that we published this report yesterday documenting
some of the atrocities committed by the government against this population.
So our focus here is working with the Government of Burma to improve the conditions for the Rohingya population as well as all of
its minority populations to enable those people to return in safety to their homes. I mean, that’s what most displaced people and
most refugees want is to go home. And so we’re trying to keep the focus on the government to create those conditions, and we’re
also very concerned about accountability for those people who committed these crimes against the population.
QUESTION: I have a couple of questions to begin with. First of all, how is money to be disbursed? Who handles this money? UN,
other agencies, U.S. directly? How does money – both in Bangladesh and in Myanmar.
MR ALBRIGHT: So these funds – very good question. These funds are – we are distributing and some we’ve already distributed to
our key humanitarian partners. We’re talking about the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for
Migration, UNICEF. These are the key partners that we work with on crisis response and humanitarian assistance. And I should say
the World Food Program. So that’s the other kind of the fourth major – the fourth major partner. And through the International
Organization for Migration we’re also supporting a number of nongovernmental organizations that provide assistance to the
refugees as well as to populations inside of Burma.
QUESTION: Will this amount be on top of the amount already pledged or would be placed for the global UN appeal for Burma?
MR ALBRIGHT: So these funds will be counted as part of the UN appeals, the humanitarian response plan. So they will – as those
funds are disbursed, they will start showing up in the UN’s documentation for the funding.
QUESTION: Thank you so much for the generosity, but one question: What about granting refugee status to some of these
Rohingyas?
MR ALBRIGHT: Well, I think one thing that – what is happening right now is that the Government of Burma – Bangladesh, excuse
me, and UNHCR are in – doing a verification exercise in which they are providing identity documents to the Rohingya who are in
Bangladesh. This is a – this will take some time. It’s a large population. And – but they’re very carefully verifying the people and
giving them identity documents. And so that’s – and that gives them a basic form of protection inside of Bangladesh that’s
recognized by the Bangladeshi authorities.
QUESTION: Does it mean that you will consider granting them?
MR ALBRIGHT: Well, their status is considered by – is determined by the Bangladeshi Government. It’s not our status
determination. It’s --
QUESTION: What I’m trying to say is that many of them are fleeing already.
MR ALBRIGHT: Yes.
QUESTION: Different directions. Pakistan, for example. India, Saudi Arabia. Why not the U.S. grant some of them even as a
gesture of goodwill?
MR ALBRIGHT: Are you referring to – you’re referring to resettlement of people into the United States?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR ALBRIGHT: All right. That’s – I mean , we have a – the U.S. has a longstanding refugee resettlement program. We’ve
resettled more refugees in our country than any other. Generally, refugee resettlement starts to happen for a population after
several years. It’s not generally the focus. Resettlement in a third country is not generally the focus in a newly displaced
population. And this population has – most of them – I mean, I recognize some of the Rohingya have been in Bangladesh for
several years, but the big flow of people came just under a year ago. So for the time being, the focus is on emergency response
and also working to try to create the conditions for them to return home. Most of the refugee resettlement that occurs around the
world occurs in populations that have been displaced for longer periods of time.
QUESTION: So no plan? In other words --
MR ALBRIGHT: So there’s not – not immediately. It’s also based on – UNHCR makes referrals of individual cases who particularly
– usually vulnerable cases, particularly who are in need of resettlement because that’s the only alternative. So that’s usually the
third durable solution that UNHCR seeks out.
QUESTION: One last question from this (inaudible) time. On sanctions, would you be able to talk a little bit about sanctions?
MR ALBRIGHT: The only thing I could say for you on that is, I mean, we have imposed some sanctions on some --
QUESTION: Six individuals, yes.
MR ALBRIGHT: -- six individuals. So I – there could be other measures coming, but I don’t have anything for you on that today.
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QUESTION: Sir, very honestly, these sanctions are aimed at people to freeze their assets in the U.S. and they are not in the U.S.
So are these symbolic? Do they have – do they carry any meaning?
MR ALBRIGHT: I think we have to look at – they – those are the actions that we’ve taken so far. That doesn’t mean that we’re
finished. And we are – we publish this – the documentation report yesterday, and I think that that will – there’ll be – there’s great
interest in developing further information on the atrocities that occurred inside of Burma and looking at the whole issue of
accountability. And that’s not just something that the U.S. is looking at. As you know, there’s the fact-finding mission at the UN.
Other countries and organizations are looking at that.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Yesterday the Malaysian Government came out and spoke about helping refugees – IDPs, I mean, resettle also partly
in Malaysia. Since Myanmar – sorry, I’m using the current moniker.
MR ALBRIGHT: Good for you.
QUESTION: Since Myanmar is part of the ASEAN Community, would the U.S. like ASEAN to do anything?
MR ALBRIGHT: Well, we certainly – I mean, there are Rohingya who have moved and fled to other ASEAN countries – a
significant number, over 100,000 I think. And we certainly appreciate those countries’ efforts to host these people who have fled
and give them shelter and provide services, access to services for them. And that’s a very good thing and it’s very commendable.
QUESTION: One question. It’s a bit political in nature. To what extent are you willing to exercise some kind of pressure on Aung
San Suu Kyi to speak out? She’s been conspicuously very quiet.
MR ALBRIGHT: Look, I can’t comment on the internal dynamics within the Burmese Government, in the – or the Myanmar
Government. But I mean, the – we have been very consistent in our messaging to everyone there, whether it’s officials in the
military, in the civilian government, up and down the line, about our concerns for what happened, our concerns about
accountability, our concerns about improving the conditions for this population so that people can return in safety and dignity and
security.
QUESTION: But there’s a certain limit to which the U.S. is willing to go, considering that it might upset the balance of power
within Myanmar. Although she’s de facto the leader of Myanmar, her hands are tied.
MR ALBRIGHT: I mean, I – all I can say to you is that we are very clear about what our concerns are and what our expectation
are. And this is a matter that we continue to work with the government to improve these conditions and address these problems.
QUESTION: May I take one more sure?
MR ALBRIGHT: Sure.
QUESTION: One concern that we have – we in Bangladesh have – is the rising extremism in the Rohingya camp, the rebels in the
camps who are believed to extremists. And one complaint that Myanmar had about this whole thing is about the role of ARSA.
Where do you stand on that? I mean, is there a role that U.S. can play to stem this rising tide?
MR ALBRIGHT: I mean, we’re – of course we’re very concerned about extremism. We talk to the – certainly to the Bangladeshi
authorities. I haven’t seen significant reports of extremist activity emerging from the camps. I would also note that the population
is heavily – is predominantly women and children, and – but I think the security measures are good. But it’s an important – over
the longer term, it’s important to provide people with not just immediate -- taking care of their immediate needs, but providing
education and livelihoods and the thing – the kinds of support and opportunities that give people a chance and hope for their
future. And so that’s a part of our programming and something we’ll be – we’re continuously talking to the government about.
QUESTION: It seems that many of them are not going back, many of them don’t want to go back. What happens to them if they
stay back in Bangladesh for the next 10, 20, 40 years?
MR ALBRIGHT: I think if you – some – a figure that I hear often from UNHCR, from the World Bank, is that the average stay of
refugees in a country outside of their own is about 10 years, so – because people are fleeing complex crises and emergencies. And
these situations take time to resolve. They don’t resolve overnight, and so that’s why we need to look beyond the immediate
lifesaving assistance for these people and ensure that they have healthcare and education and – so that they can become good
citizens and they can contribute to the development of – hopefully of their own country and – but so that they can also provide a
positive impact on the countries that are hosting them if they have to stay there for longer periods.
QUESTION: Am I to surmise that, based on your comment, that you’re expecting these people to stay in Bangladesh the next ten
years, and you’d be committing yourselves to providing help to (inaudible)?
MR ALBRIGHT: Well, I can’t tell you exactly how long they will stay in Bangladesh, but I mean, I can --
QUESTION: No, but given the average that you just mentioned --
MR ALBRIGHT: I can say that the U.S. and others in the international community will continue to provide assistance to refugees
and continue at the same time to look for durable solutions for these populations, just as we have in many other refugee situations
around the world.
QUESTION: Most of them unresolved, by the way.
10/4/2018 U.S. Assistance to the Rakhine State Crisis in Burma and Bangladesh
https://fpc.state.gov/09/286245.htm 4/4
MR ALBRIGHT: Many of them are unresolved, but some are resolved.
QUESTION: I can’t think of one.
MR ALBRIGHT: Well, we try to remain hopeful. Thank you. Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Any last question? Okay, with that, thank you so much DAS Albright --
MR ALBRIGHT: Sure.
MODERATOR: -- for speaking with our group today. We will try to do the transcript – it will depend a little bit on what the
Secretary’s doing today – and then send it out to you as soon as we have it available.
QUESTION: Thanks.
MR ALBRIGHT: Thank you, you’re most welcome.
# # #

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DOCUMENTATION OF ATROCITIES IN NORTHERN RAKHINE STATE By U.S. Department of State

  • 1. 10/4/2018 Progressive Voice » Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2018/09/24/documentation-of-atrocities-in-northern-rakhine-state/ 1/5 OUR WORK မိမိတုိ႔၏အလုပ္  RESOURCES မွီျငမ္းစရာမ်ား  PV IN THE NEWS သတင္းမ်ားထဲမွ ေရွ႕ေျပးအသံ CONTACT ဆက္ သြယ္ ရန္   ရွာေဖြရန္
  • 2. 10/4/2018 Progressive Voice » Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2018/09/24/documentation-of-atrocities-in-northern-rakhine-state/ 2/5 Posted September 24th, 2018 • Posted in Reports • Author: U.S. Department of State Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State a Facebook d Twitter v Email
  • 3. 10/4/2018 Progressive Voice » Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2018/09/24/documentation-of-atrocities-in-northern-rakhine-state/ 3/5 Executive Summary The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), with funding support from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), conducted a survey in spring 2018 of the firsthand experiences of 1,024 Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh. The goal of the survey was to document atrocities committed against residents in Burma’s northern Rakhine State during the course of violence in the previous two years. The survey used a representative sample of refugee camp populations to provide insights into the violence they witnessed. Any hearsay testimony was not recorded. Survey results reveal the pattern of events refugees experienced. There may be cases when multiple refugees reported witnessing the same event, so the percentages from this survey should not be extrapolated to come up with a definitive overall number of events. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) worked with INR to map and analyze the resulting data (see Map 1). The results of the survey show that the vast majority of Rohingya refugees experienced or directly witnessed extreme violence and the destruction of their homes. They identified the Burmese military as a perpetrator in most cases. Most witnessed a killing, two-thirds witnessed an injury, and half witnessed sexual violence (see Figure 1). Rohingya identified the Burmese military as a perpetrator in 84% of the killings or injuries they witnessed.
  • 4. 10/4/2018 Progressive Voice » Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2018/09/24/documentation-of-atrocities-in-northern-rakhine-state/ 4/5 Three-quarters say they saw members of the army kill someone; the same proportion say they witnessed the army destroying huts or whole villages. Police, unidentified security forces, and armed civilians carried out the rest of the observed killings. One-fifth of all respondents witnessed a mass-casualty event of killings or injuries (either in their villages or as they fled) with more than 100 victims. The two main phases of violence—the first in October 2016 and the second beginning in August 2017—followed attacks against Burmese security forces by the Rohingya insurgent group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The vast majority of reported incidents against Rohingya took place from August to October 2017. The survey shows that the military, which used the ARSA attacks to justify its so-called counterinsurgency operations in northern Rakhine State, targeted civilians indiscriminately and often with extreme brutality. Forty-five percent of refugees witnessed a rape, and the majority of rapes witnessed were committed, in whole or in part, by the army. Overall, nearly 40% of refugees saw a rape committed by members of the Burmese security services—either police or military—including 18% who saw them commit a gang rape. Members of the security services, as well as non-Rohingya civilians in some cases, targeted children and pregnant women. Those who were left behind because they were elderly, sick, or otherwise infirm were frequently found dead when their relatives returned to check on them. The survey reveals that the recent violence in northern Rakhine State was extreme, large-scale, widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving out the Rohingya residents. The scope and scale of the military’s operations indicate they were well-planned and coordinated. In some areas, perpetrators used tactics that resulted in mass casualties, for example, locking people in houses to burn them, fencing off entire villages before shooting into the crowd, or sinking boats full of hundreds of fleeing Rohingya. Download full report HERE.
  • 5. 10/4/2018 Progressive Voice » Documentation of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2018/09/24/documentation-of-atrocities-in-northern-rakhine-state/ 5/5 Related Posts: UN Human Rights Council Creates a Mechanism on Myanmar to Gather Evidence and Prepare Files for Prosecution of Mass Atrocity Crimes US Should Promote Justice for Rohingya: State Department Report Finds Atrocities, but Silent on Policy Response Statement by Mr. Marzuki DARUSMAN, Chairperson of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, at the 39th Session of the Human Rights Council Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံမွ အက် ပ္အတည္ း – အျပည္ ျပည္ ဆိုင္ရာ တာဝန္ယူမႈ၊ တာဝန္ခံမႈ လုပ္ထံုးလုပ္နည္ း ယႏၱရားမ်ား COPYRIGHT © 2017 - 2018 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED - PROGRESSIVE VOICE MYANMAR Follow us on • FACEBOOK • TWITTER • CONTACT WEBSITE BY BORDERMEDIA
  • 6. D O C U M E N T A T I O N O F A T R O C I T I E S I N N O R T H E R N R A K H I N E S T A T E • S O L O P I A N I S T •
  • 7. August, 2018 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), with funding support from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), conducted a survey in spring 2018 of the firsthand experiences of 1,024 Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar District, Bangladesh. The goal of the survey was to document atrocities committed against residents in Burma’s northern Rakhine State during the course of violence in the previous two years. The survey used a representative sample of refugee camp populations to provide insights into the violence they witnessed. Any hearsay testimony was not recorded. Survey results reveal the pattern of events refugees experienced. There may be cases when multiple refugees reported witnessing the same event, so the percentages from this survey should not be extrapolated to come up with a definitive overall number of events. The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA) worked with INR to map and analyze the resulting data (see Map 1). The results of the survey show that the vast majority of Rohingya refugees experienced or directly witnessed extreme violence and the destruction of their homes. They identified the Burmese military as a perpetrator in most cases. • Most witnessed a killing, two-thirds witnessed an injury, and half witnessed sexual violence (see Figure 1). • Rohingya identified the Burmese military as a perpetrator in 84% of the killings or injuries they witnessed. • Three-quarters say they saw members of the army kill someone; the same proportion say they witnessed the army destroying huts or whole villages. Police, unidentified security forces, and armed civilians carried out the rest of the observed killings. • One-fifth of all respondents witnessed a mass-casualty event of killings or injuries (either in their villages or as they fled) with more than 100 victims. 1
  • 8. The two main phases of violence—the first in October 2016 and the second beginning in August 2017—followed attacks against Burmese security forces by the Rohingya insurgent group Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The vast majority of reported incidents against Rohingya took place from August to October 2017. The survey shows that the military, which used the ARSA attacks to justify its so-called counterinsurgency operations in northern Rakhine State, targeted civilians indiscriminately and often with extreme brutality. • Forty-five percent of refugees witnessed a rape, and the majority of rapes witnessed were committed, in whole or in part, by the army. Overall, nearly 40% of refugees saw a rape committed by members of the Burmese security services—either police or military— including 18% who saw them commit a gang rape. • Members of the security services, as well as non-Rohingya civilians in some cases, targeted children and pregnant women. • Those who were left behind because they were elderly, sick, or otherwise infirm were frequently found dead when their relatives returned to check on them. The survey reveals that the recent violence in northern Rakhine State was extreme, large-scale, widespread, and seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population and driving out the Rohingya residents. The scope and scale of the military’s operations indicate they were well- planned and coordinated. In some areas, perpetrators used tactics that resulted in mass casualties, for example, locking people in houses to burn them, fencing off entire villages before shooting into the crowd, or sinking boats full of hundreds of fleeing Rohingya. 2
  • 9. 3
  • 10. INTRODUCTION In spring 2018, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) worked with funding from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) to design and carry out a survey to document claims of atrocities committed against the ethnic Rohingya in Burma’s northern Rakhine State since October 2016. INR combined a quantitative approach to sampling with a qualitative, semi-structured questionnaire. This approach allowed investigators to systematically collect data on events that refugees encamped in Bangladesh had witnessed in their northern Rakhine State villages. Expert and well-trained investigators and their translators took special steps to create a comfortable interview structure that reduced possible stress on the respondents, allowed for the investigator to obtain clarifying detail on perpetrators and events, and separate firsthand experience from hearsay testimony. DRL contracted with an expert outside group to gather a team of 18 experienced human rights investigators from around the world to conduct the research. INR trained the team on sampling methodology, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) created a map atlas that allowed the investigators to identify and locate where events occurred. The 1,024 survey respondents included only adults who left northern Rakhine State on or after October 1, 2016, though reports of violence date from as early as January 2016.1 What follows is an analysis of the resulting data, which illuminates the excessive use of force the Burmese Army and police unleashed on the Rohingya population in the name of counterinsurgency clearance operations after the October 2016 and August 2017 Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacks. The survey’s most salient findings fall into the two periods that coincide with these Burmese military operations: the first focused during October 2016 and the second, and far more violent period, from August-September 2017 (see Figure 2). 1 While the survey was open to respondents of any ethnicity, only Rohingya were captured in the sample. 4
  • 11. Background on Systematic Abuse The Rohingya have experienced decades of persecution and violence, largely perpetrated by Burmese security services and the government. The roots of anti-Rohingya sentiments and discrimination lie in a longstanding belief in Burma that Rohingya are not “native” to Burma but arrived from Bangladesh during British colonial rule. Rohingya separatist movements in the 1940s and 1950s, and periodic, low-level unrest since, contribute to the state-sanctioned narrative that the Rohingya are a security concern to be contained and must be treated separately from those they consider to be rightful Burmese citizens. Burma’s military government gradually stripped Rohingya of their citizenship and other rights in a series of maneuvers, including the 1982 Citizenship Law, and a decision in 2015 to revoke their temporary registration cards. State violence against the Rohingya in 1977, under the military’s Operation Dragon King aimed against “illegal immigration,” and again in 1991 in what they claimed was a response to attacks by the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), resulted in two separate waves of refugees when hundreds of thousands of Rohingya fled across the border to find refuge in Bangladesh. SECTION I: PATTERN OF VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN RAKHINE (2016 AND 2017) On October 9, 2016 a group of ARSA members and other Rohingya villagers attacked three border guard police stations, leaving nine policemen dead. The military responded by using what it called counterinsurgency tactics against the Rohingya population in the area. Few witnessed killings (2%) or destruction of huts (3%) between October and November 2016, most likely because the military targeted villages in only a few areas (see Map 1; see Tab 2 for background on ARSA). Authorities Targeted Men for Abduction, Arrest (October 2016-August 2017) As part of their military operations beginning in October 2016, Burmese security officials would take Rohingya men into custody, ostensibly to question them about ties to or knowledge of ARSA. As tensions rose between Burmese officials and Rohingya in northern Rakhine State, increasing numbers of men and boys were taken into custody. To avoid being taken away by security services, men spent nights hiding in the woods, leaving their wives and children vulnerable to invasive searches by security services. Many of these women reported being groped, stripped, or violated while intruders searched their homes and their bodies for valuables or possible weapons. Abductions of Women (October 2016-August 2017) Refugees also reported abductions of women. In the year before the attack on her village, one woman said that the military would take the “beautiful” girls and they never came back. In another notable case, four months before the major attack, one refugee said the military told each village in his area that they had to provide 20 women so they could “teach them tailoring,” but the village never heard from them again. 5
  • 12. Though in many cases the victim’s fate is unclear, refugees reported instances in which women had been raped after abduction. The week prior to an attack on his village, a man was walking in a forest near a military outpost when he saw four Rohingya girls tied up with ropes, heavily bleeding and “half dead.” They told him the military had kept them there for three days raping them. Increased Restrictions (2017) On August 25, 2017, ARSA launched attacks against about 30 police and army posts in northern Rakhine state, triggering a harsh military reaction. The majority of the attacks and three-quarters of the reported killings witnessed by the refugees in our survey occurred between August and October of 2017. Before the most acute violence broke out, a majority reported increased movement restrictions—even above the normal levels. Dozens reported that Burmese authorities removed fences before the attacks, either by doing so themselves or by forcing Rohingya villagers to do so. In some cases, the military said they did not want Rohingya hiding militants. Removing fences also was meant to humiliate Rohingya, as it forced them to urinate and defecate in the open air. In at least 50 cases, respondents reported that the military and other actors removed knives, tools, iron, and other sharp objects that could be used as weapons. In some cases, local authorities photographed these objects as evidence of ARSA presence in the village. • One-third who had these items taken said such restrictions had existed in their village for years. In about one-quarter of the cases, local authorities took these objects after the October 2016 attacks, and through summer 2017. Three-in-ten said the objects were removed between a month and a day before the attack, while the remaining 11% said they were removed while the attack was in progress or immediately prior. • Rohingya most often cited the military as the culprit (in 88% of cases), but in some cases, civilians (31%) and police (22%) participated. In each, the removal of these objects facilitated the subsequent ground assaults, killings, and property destruction. “When the military came, they would steal whatever we had, including knives—we could not cut vegetables or fish.” Female, age 30 Systematic, Large-Scale Violence Strikes Villages (August-September 2017) After August 25, on the days when violence broke out in their villages, some respondents reported the attacks began in the early morning before most residents were awake. These attacks explicitly targeted Rohingya, and left neighboring non-Rohingya sites (e.g. Buddhist stupas) and critical infrastructure (e.g. cell phone towers) untouched during the assaults (see Image 1, next page). During these large-scale attacks, homes and property were destroyed, and scores of Rohingya were killed as they fled their villages. These attacks generally lasted 1-4 days, depending on the size of the village. Rohingya said the army was involved in nearly all (92%) of the ground assaults—at times alone (32%), but sometimes accompanied by other security forces (26%), civilians (11%), or both (23%). The stories from some refugees show a pattern of planning and pre-meditation in their villages on the part of the attackers. In one case, the local heads of the military and police called together 6
  • 13. 25 Muslim leaders from the surrounding villages to tell them to leave or they would be killed or burned. Other respondents reported non-Rohingya neighbors leaving shortly before the outbreak of violence. Image 1 SECTION 2: TYPES AND PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENCE WITNESSED BY ROHINGYA Burmese Army Overwhelmingly Identified as Main Actor The results of the survey overwhelmingly show that Burmese security forces, and the army in particular, primarily are responsible for the violence that has driven the nearly 800,000 Rohingya from their homes since October 2016 (see Map 2, next page). • Three-quarters witnessed a killing by a member of the army. In contrast, only one- quarter witnessed a killing by non-Rohingya civilians or any police force. • Victims named the army as perpetrators in an overwhelming majority (88%) of the killings witnessed, as well as in nearly all armed ground assaults (92%) and aerial attacks (88%). “The military surrounded us and shot at people. They wore green uniforms. They wore red scarves and red patches on their shoulders. They had long guns held on their shoulders and helmets.” Female, age 18 7
  • 14. 8
  • 15. In many cases—and in half of the armed ground assaults reported—additional security services such as the Border Guard Police (BGP), the Rakhine State Police, or the Combat Police forces accompanied the army. Non-Rohingya civilians also participated in the violence and the looting that often accompanied it. In some cases, refugees said the military provided civilians uniforms and weapons to be used in the assault. Official Rhetoric, Attackers’ Language Coincide Official statements portrayed the Rohingya as a foreign jihadist enemy group, and those who fled as guilty of belonging to, supporting, or sympathizing with a terror group. “Rakhine State sees an increasing number of Bengali populations. Later the Bengalis in Rakhine State drove out the natives including Rakhine, Dainet, Mro, Khami and Maramagyi. Conflicts between Rakhine ethnics and Bengalis occur as Bengalis try to establish a separate region… Arrangements are being made to launch the Jihad holy war in the whole Rakhine State before October 2017.” (Army Spokesman Maj-Gen Aung Ye Win on August 31, 2017) “ARSA extremist Bengali terrorists were not successful in attacking the security outposts, and they fled to Bangladesh for fear of the retribution of the security troops. As the terrorist took their families together with them, the number of people who fled had become large.” (Min Aung Hlaing, in comments to U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on November 16, 2017) Those Rohingya who were able to understand their attackers frequently heard similar themes—soldiers, policemen, and civilians telling them that they did not belong in Burma and that they must leave or face death. During the attacks on their villages and rapes, many Rohingya reported hearing perpetrators using explicit language and calling them “Bangladeshi/Bengali” or the racial slur “Kalar.” Many Rohingya cannot speak Burmese and thus were unable to say what was being shouted at them during the attacks. Others said the attackers approached their task in silence. Killings, Destruction, Heavy Weaponry Pervasive The violence respondents witnessed was extensive and followed consistent patterns across northern Rakhine State. • Overall, eight-in-ten refugees said they witnessed a killing, most often by the Burmese security forces—either police or military. Over half (54%) of the killings witnessed were from shooting, 20% by machete or knife, and 11% by burning. Only 3% the killings were from drowning, though refugees reported that more drowned during their escape. • Two-thirds said that they were taken into army or police custody or that they saw other Rohingya being taken. • Eight-in-10 reported they saw the destruction of homes or villages. Many more reported that others had confirmed their homes were destroyed, but this hearsay testimony was not recorded by the investigators. Imagery analysis from August 30 to October 23, 2017 9
  • 16. indicates that more than 38,000 buildings were destroyed by fire, significantly more than the estimated 1,500 observed in October and November 2016. Most villages where burning occurred were totally destroyed. In some cases, refugees said several cars or trucks would arrive to take part in a coordinated attack—speedboats were also mentioned in some areas. More than 100 respondents from villages spread across northern Rakhine State mentioned seeing helicopters, though they did not always take part in the attacks; some saw them drop “bombs” or “rockets.” • Across northern Rakhine State, but especially near Maungdaw and areas further north, respondents reported the use of heavy, explosive weapons such as rocket launchers (or “launchers”) and grenades. They most often said the army or security forces were using these weapons. • Others said the soldiers were using long and short guns or knives. Several respondents also said the local ethnic Rakhine (also known as “Mogh”) were using long knives or machetes to take part in the attack. • In many areas, refugees mentioned the use of flamethrowers or incendiary devices. Security forces most often used these weapons to burn down houses, but also used them to kill and injure Rohingya. “The whole village was under random fire like rain.” Male, age 20 Refugees reported that the perpetrators of the violence singled out community or religious leaders as their targets in some areas. Thirty percent of the respondents reported they witnessed explicitly religious targeting or harassment. Respondents also detailed cases of the military’s desecration of sacred texts, and some saw soldiers burning or urinating on Korans. Theft of livestock and personal property—often jewelry and cooking vessels—was commonplace. One-third said their food resources were stolen or destroyed. Though the military was most commonly named as the perpetrator (involved in 76% of reported cases), non- Rohingya civilians were involved in one-third of the thefts witnessed. Some refugees lamented that their families had been living comfortable lives and that they owned small shops, acres of agricultural land, and cows, all of which had been destroyed, leaving them with virtually nothing with which to rebuild their lives. In some villages, community elite were targeted in the theft and violence, including those who were wealthier or more educated. In other areas, respondents described the actions as more random. The Burmese government officially ceased operations in northern Rakhine on September 5, 2017. An analysis of imagery shows villages still burning on that date (see Image 2, next page), and reports from refugees indicate the violence continued, tapering through September and early October. 10
  • 17. Image 2 Mutilation, Possible Torture Prevalent Investigators heard reports of mostly Burmese soldiers, and sometimes civilians, mutilating or possibly torturing Rohingya before and during the attacks. One-in-ten refugees witnessed these acts. • Reports of mutilation included the cutting and spreading of entrails, severed limbs or hands/feet, pulling out nails or burning beards and genitals to force a confession, or being burned alive. • Thirty-three respondents reported groups of Rohingya were forced to stay outside for hours as a form of punishment, or as part of interrogations. • Thirty-two respondents reported either seeing victims being decapitated or dismembered. Others reported passing mutilated corpses on their way to Bangladesh, but were unable to confirm what had happened. Many reported passing dead bodies as they escaped from their home village to Bangladesh. Some appeared to have died due to various injuries—sometimes described as mutilations—while others seem to have died from exhaustion or other stresses on the journey. One-in-ten reported seeing the disposal of bodies in pits, graves, mass graves, or using other methods. In a few cases, witnesses said Rohingya were either killed in pits or buried alive, but in the majority of events, the victims were already dead when the bodies were being dumped, covered, or destroyed. 11
  • 18. • Some reported seeing dead bodies being dropped into a pit or a grave dug by the military—sometimes with the assistance of bulldozers. Perpetrators also took advantage of village wells for body disposal. • In other cases, soldiers burned dead bodies, aided by kerosene, hay, or wrapped blankets. • One refugee reported that the military put acid into victims’ eyes so they could not be identified. Others reported the military dismembered bodies. • Rohingya often saw bodies floating in water—one described seeing “heads floating in the river like footballs.” “The military shot our honorable old Imam. They shot him twice, but he was not dead yet. So they stabbed him and hung his torso on a tree.” Female, age 30 Weak, Vulnerable Bear Brunt of Violence During the attacks on Rohingya communities, refugees report that the military and, to a lesser extent, the state police, injured and killed those who were not able to dodge the attacks–often women, children, and the elderly. In some cases the violence against these vulnerable populations was indisciminate, as soldiers shot rounds of bullets into the air. At other times, it was specifically targeted. In some villages, soldiers went door-to-door to kill those who had been unable to flee after the initial phase of violence. “I had to choose between my children and my mother… I had only two hands and two children” Male, age 35 “The military and BGP slaughtered my son, who was 5 years old. When military came, I was pregnant. The situation was very horrific. I could not get all of my children. I could not go to my son. He was killed.” Female, age 25 One-hundred and seventeen refugees from across northern Rakhine State witnessed infants and children being beaten or killed, or saw the corpses of children with gunshot wounds or cut throats in villages and along roads as they fled to Bangladesh. When the military shot adult families, multiple reports indicate they included the children in the executions. In some cases, witnesses report seeing soldiers or police grab infants out of their mother’s arms to kill them, and some reported seeing them physically brutalize young children by stomping on them, beating them or throwing infants on the ground. Most of these events occurred in August and September 2017. • Multiple witnesses report soldiers throwing infants and small children into open fires or burning huts. Witnesses also report seeing soldiers throw children into rivers and seeing children’s bodies that had been thrown into a village well. One refugee reported seeing a police officer throw an infant in a river, then shooting the mother when she ran into the water to save her child. • One refugee told of soldiers following a group of Rohingya as they fled to Bangladesh. At one point, she said they suddenly shot into a group of children who were playing on the ground, killing a 5-year-old, a 3-year old, and a 3-month old infant. 12
  • 19. • In one report, a group of Rakhine civilians joined the military in attacking villagers in a rice paddy. One of the civilians stopped a man who was holding an infant, threw it in the air and caught it on his long knife. • Soldiers attacked women, and their infants, during or just after childbirth. Several refugees from different villages also reported that soldiers killed pregnant mothers by slashing their stomachs open and ripping out their fetuses. Consistent with the military’s attacks on vulnerable segments of the Rohingya population, the military and police also appear to have targeted elderly men and women by beating, shooting, or stabbing them during attacks on their villages. Many respondents reported that the elderly were burned alive after their houses were set on fire and they were unable to escape. • As his village was burning, one man witnessed soldiers physically push four disabled and elderly men who could not walk inside burning homes. • Soldiers killed one witness’s 70-year-old mother in front of her, then mutilated her body and threw it into a fire. • Witnesses also report seeing the dead bodies of many elderly people as they fled to Bangladesh. Respondents Escaped, but Many Did Not In many of the reported cases, Rohingya left their villages and escaped across the border to Bangladesh. In other areas, however, there seemed to be a concerted effort by the attackers to prevent the Rohingya from escaping, and to inflict maximum damage upon them. • Some reported that during assaults, villagers were locked into houses, and those houses were set on fire. • Two refugees witnessed the military blocking all roads or exits from the village before opening fire on the Rohingya population. • Nine respondents reported the army, navy, or ethnic Rakhine civilians took their boats, or scuttled or destroyed them during the violence to prevent their use. One-fifth of all refugees said they witnessed a mass-casualty event of killings or injuries with more than 100 victims. In some cases, respondents said the events occurred in their own villages, while in other cases they reported seeing massacres as they fled to Bangladesh. In one case, the respondent said men were forced to lie face-down on the ground, and more than two hundred men and one woman were killed by being cut across the neck. • One respondent witnessed Rohingya being shot and cut while hiding in the hills outside a village. Another mentioned seeing a “flood of bodies” from the same massacre there. • Twenty-eight respondents reported the army or navy attempting to sink boats full of refugees, or shooting refugees trapped in the boats. Nine of these respondents said this caused the deaths of 100 people or more. “All nine cousins drowned in the river after their boat was sunk by military. The soldiers beat them as boat was going down to make sure they drowned.” Female, age 30 13
  • 20. Sexual Violence Endemic The survey uncovered widespread sexual assault and rape against Rohingya women by the military. Rape incidents appear to have increased in number and brutality in the direct lead-up to and during the August and September attacks. Gang rape was reported across northern Rakhine State, suggesting at least some level of cooperation between the multiple perpetrators (see Map 3, next page). In general, the military and police did not appear to try to hide the rapes from their peers or from those above them in their chain of command. Rather, rapes were largely public in nature, with many assaults either taking place in public view, or with perpetrators leaving evidence of such assaults–including the victims’ corpses which clearly portrayed marks of rape–in public view. Twenty-seven women said they were themselves raped, a low number that could reflect a cultural stigma against admitting one was raped or discussing sexual violence openly, as well as the reports that Burmese soldiers often killed women after they were raped. However, 45% witnessed women and girls being raped, including the 20% who witnessed gang rape. More witnessed some form of sexual violence, including forced stripping of clothing, touching of women’s breasts or genitals, and sexual assault. The fact that the refugees identified the security forces as having committed so many rapes and assaults publicly likely contributes to these high numbers. “Two police from my village raped me. I know these men by sight, but not their names. After they were done, they told me to leave the country, this is not your country.” Female, age 23 The security forces’ sexual assaults generally occurred in one of several ways, trends consistent throughout northern Rakhine State as identified below: 1. Home searches Respondents reported that the military would routinely visit their villages, ostensibly to search for insurgents, and such searches would often involve groping, sexually assaulting, or raping the women inside their homes. Many women said the soldiers would steal valuables, particularly their gold jewelry, during the assaults. One 25-year-old reported particularly brutal home searches, saying the soldiers “raped women until they were half-dead.” Another said a soldier raped her sister because she refused to give him her gold nose ring. Women whose husbands had fled their homes to hide from the military were especially vulnerable to abuse. “When soldiers came to the village and “searched” women, they groped our breasts, entire body. Today when I think about those days, this is what makes me sick. Our husbands were never there and cannot find out.” Female, age 25 14
  • 21. 15
  • 22. 2. Mass rapes in fields, mosques, schools Refugees from multiple villages across northern Rakhine state reported that for at least a year leading up to the August 2017 violence, military would arrive at their villages and demand that many or all the women gather in a public space or a nearby field. Some reported that if women did not leave their homes, soldiers found and raped them. Soldiers interrogated the women about their male family members, beating them if they failed to answer. They would then choose a smaller number of women—often 4 or 5, but some refugees reported up to 20—whom as many 15 soldiers would then take to fields, forests, houses, schools, mosques or latrines to gang rape. Many victims were reportedly killed afterwards, though not in all cases. In some cases, instead of making all the women gather, the military would go door-to- door, choosing the “prettiest” girls to take away likely to be raped, instead. • In one report, in the days before a village massacre, local Rakhine police and army soldiers made more than 20 women leave their home to go sit outside in direct sunlight, threatening that if the women didn’t bring their husbands to them, they would beat and rape them. Women who didn’t cooperate were beaten. They chose the younger women, taking them to nearly homes and the madrassa and raping them. • On some occasions, large numbers of women were taken to be raped. One woman said she saw some 50 of the village’s “prettiest women” taken to the hills, where two of the survivors later told her they were all raped, and about 35 were shot afterwards. • One refugee said that the military demanded that all the women in her village gather in the mosque, but that one woman did not, because she had just given birth. Upon discovering this, soldiers pulled her out into her home’s yard and publicly raped her. “They took women out and made them sit in the sun in the field, and questioned them, ’where are the men?’ They took away breastfeeding moms, babies were not allowed to eat, kept them in the field for one day. They took away the young and beautiful women and raped them, gang rape, 5-7 men raping one woman.” Female, age 35 3. Rapes During Attacks on Villages Refugees reported that on the day their villages were attacked, soldiers would grab and rape women who were fleeing from the burning homes and shooting. • Witnesses from multiple locations report women were raped in the fields or hills, outside their homes in their own yards, or on roads in town where others could clearly see what was happening. One man saw 10 women being raped all along a road as he was fleeing, 4-6 soldiers attacking each woman, who were later killed. • Many respondents reported seeing women’s naked corpses as they fled through villages, saying it was apparent from their gruesome injuries that the women had been raped. For example, a 19-year-old was fleeing her village when she said she passed a naked woman’s body bound to a tree “with clear signs of gang rape.” “About 100 women were rounded up and raped in the hills, on the road, in front of their homes, wherever they could find them” Female, age 60 16
  • 23. Witnesses reported that many women did not survive the rape attacks. In some cases they died from the brutality of the rape and the accompanying violence, and in many other cases the soldiers shot, hung, or hacked their bodies after they finished raping them. “They were so brutal.” Male, age 55 • Those who did survive gang rapes often sustained serious injuries. One interviewee reported that her cousin was raped by six military officers, after which she has been virtually unable to walk or stand up. • Witnesses reported exceptionally violent attacks where multiple soldiers raped women for hours at a time while beating them, sexually assaulting them with their weapons, or inflicting other injuries on them in addition to the rape. • Nine respondents from unique locations in Rakhine state reported witnessing attacks or evidence of attacks in which soldiers cut off the breasts of women they raped during the assaults. Soldiers also reportedly mutilated genitals or other parts of bodies. “The soldiers chased me. I couldn’t escape. Everyone managed to flee but I was pregnant so I wasn’t able to get away. Three soldiers raped me. One kicked me and I fell unconscious… When I got my senses back, I saw that my fetus had come out dead… I have seen my baby die and I find myself numb.” Female, age 25 Refugees from villages throughout Rakhine State reported that the perpetrators often killed their victims after the rape, typically by shooting or stabbing them. In multiple cases, soldiers killed some of the women during a mass rape, while releasing a small number alive. • One refugee reported that the military abducted a woman along with some 80 others, taking them to a military camp in the village to rape for five days. Afterwards, she said soldiers killed half and let the remaining go free. • In another village, one mother said that during a rape of roughly 100 women, her daughter was raped, then mutilated and killed, while her niece’s body was cut in half after rape. • In yet another village, a man said he saw about twenty soldiers select five women, gang rape each one, then kill the women by shooting some, and hanging others from trees. Others reported soldiers cutting babies out of their pregnant mothers’ bellies, or killing both mother and child during or immediately after birth. 17
  • 24. TAB 1: METHODOLOGICAL NOTE This report is based on a DRL-funded, INR-designed survey conducted in the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. Face-to-face interviews were conducted among a random sample of 1,024 Rohingya adults, 18 years old and older, who had left northern Rakhine State after October 1, 2016. The fieldwork took place from April 1 to April 22, 2018 by a team of 18 experienced human rights investigators from around the world. The investigators hailed from nearly every continent; many have previous experience with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; some are sexual and gender-based violence and/or trauma experts, some are former law enforcement officers, and all have previous experience in trauma-sensitive human rights documentation for the purposes of accountability. None were U.S. government officials. The investigators were trained by INR on sampling as well as the survey tool, which included open-ended questions and follow-up probes designed to draw out a narrative on the violence. They also received training from an expert with knowledge of the Burmese security services, which aided them in correctly identifying perpetrators. This hybrid survey combined quantitative and qualitative methodology, and it is unique among existing research into the current Rohingya crisis because the random sampling of refugees ensured that the results represent the entire refugee population in camps in Cox’s Bazar, providing context for other qualitiative research efforts. The interviews were conducted via translator in a semi-structured format, often within the respondent’s camp residence. The translators were recruited locally, and an expert provided a two-day training on translation in the context of sensitive interviews. The qualitative content of the interview was then coded by the investigator to capture events that the respondent directly witnessed, as well as the events’ perpetrator–to the extent they could be determined. NGA created a map atlas to aid in locating the respondents’ village of origin. The atlas broke northern Rakhine State into a grid covering areas that open-source analysis had identified as containing villages burned in the violence. Even when the respondent was unable to locate his or her exact village on the map, with the guidance of the investigator, the respondent was in most cases able to locate events to a general area within the grid. NGA analysts were able to locate approximately 9 out of every 10 of the locations identified by investigators, and conducted geospatial analysis based on the overall grid. A large majority of the respondents left northern Rakhine State in either August or September 2017, which mirrors NGO accounting of the ebb and flow of refugees since unrest began in October 2016. Though the survey was open to refugees of all ethnicities, only Rohingya were captured by the random sampling method. The margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points, and the study is representative of the population of camps sampled (see Map 1). Those who were living outside the officially administered camps were not included in the sample design. Though the survey results showed the vast majority of the most violent incidents occured during a relatively brief two month period of time (see Figure 2, page 4), further analysis of the data is planned in order to reveal patterns of violence across space and time, and provide more information on specific mass-casualty events. 18
  • 25. The analysis also benefits from additional insight provided by the expert on Burma’s security services and an informal focus group conducted among victims of sexual violence by an investigator. There are some limitations to the data collected in the study: • The methodology chosen for the study focuses on the pattern of events refugees experienced, and thus there are some cases when two or more refugees report witnessing the same event. Though the report accurately reflects the typical experiences of a Rohingya refugee, it cannot be used to calculate death rates or other losses in northern Rakhine State without combining this dataset with additional information. • The presence of ARSA in the refugee camps likely gave pause to some refugees who might otherwise identify ARSA as perpetrators. ARSA’s involvement in the violence thus is likely under-reported. However, based on other credible research into the attacks in northern Rakhine State, we have no reason to conclude the group was responsible for more than a small fraction of the violence. • We do not have any insight into events that occurred outside of the study time frame. The survey also did not capture any experiences from Rohingya who chose to stay in northern Rakhine State or from Burmese of any other ethnicity who resided there. 19
  • 26. TAB 2: ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND BACKGROUND Some Restrictions Predated Attacks Rohingya interviewed for this survey indicated that human rights abuses within their villages increased significantly following the anti-Muslim riots in Rakhine State in June 2012, and an outbreak of civilian-led violence in 2014. Interviewees described numerous restrictions and abuses they faced in daily life. Local officials forced Rohingya to pay sometimes-exorbitant fees to marry or have children, and they enforced limits on family size. Restrictions on movement were particularly severe, with a complex web of regulations making it extremely difficult for Rohingya to move freely, though sometimes it was possible if a bribe was paid. Some areas reported frequent incidences of forced labor, beatings, and sexual violence. The severity of these restrictions differed village-to-village, but Rohingya generally found their lives more restricted than those of their non-Rohingya neighbors. Many also said they were unable to practice their religion because the military had shuttered or burned mosques, closed their children’s madrassas, and banned mosques from issuing a call to prayer. In some cases, people said the military had threatened them that if they were found praying in their homes they would be beaten, arrested, or killed. In some areas, local authorities forced women to go outside unveiled, or forced men to shave their beards—and, in a few cases, tugged or pulled out their beards. What do we know about ARSA? ARSA, also known by its former name Harakah al-Yaqin, or HaY, frames its objectives as those of an ethnic insurgency seeking greater rights for Burma’s Rohingya population. It has stopped short of calling for outright autonomy for Rohingya and disavowed terrorism writ large, as well as specific terrorist organizations like al-Qaida, ISIS, and Lashkar-e- Tayyiba. Any ties to these or other foreign extremist groups remain unconfirmed. Though ARSA reportedly receives financial support from members of the Rohingya diaspora in the Middle East and South Asia, participants in ARSA attacks were poorly equipped and resourced. The group comprises a shadowy network of Rohingya militants in Burma and Bangladesh led by its senior leader, Ata Ullah (also known as Abu Umar al Junooni). ARSA’s size and support among Rohingya in Burma and Bangladesh are unclear. The group has only conducted one significant attack since August 2017, a January 2018 attack on a Burmese military truck. Recent murders and intimidation of ARSA critics and government collaborators inside Rohingya refugee camps have also been blamed on the group. Only a handful of respondents mentioned ARSA as a perpetrator—some mentioned attempted recruitment or a presence in their village, some mentioned the October 9 attacks, and a few mentioned threats or violence against those who “collaborated” with the military. 20
  • 27. 1 UN Human Rights Council creates a mechanism on Myanmar to gather evidence and prepare files for prosecution of Mass Atrocity Crimes (Geneva 27 September 2018) Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), Equality Myanmar, Progressive Voice, Women’s Peace Network-Arakan, Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, and Rohingya Women Welfare Society welcome the UN Human Rights Council’s resolution today on Myanmar as an important landmark in the quest for justice and accountability. The resolution creates a new mechanism to collect and preserve evidence, and prepare case files on perpetrators of mass atrocities for use in future criminal proceedings. The resolution follows a report by the Council’s Fact Finding Mission on Myanmar, which calls for the investigation and prosecution of the Myanmar military for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. “The establishment of a UN body to prepare files for prosecution and to collect evidence of mass atrocity crimes is a ray of hope for victims and survivors of horrific atrocities in Myanmar,” said Wai Wai Nu of Women’s Peace Network-Arakan. This is will ensure that these crimes and perpetrators are not forgotten and strengthen the hope for actual trial and prosecutions in the near future,” she added. The resolution condemns gross violations and recalls the authority of the Security Council to refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and takes note of the ICC decision that it may exercise jurisdiction on the deportation of Rohingyas from Myanmar to Bangladesh. “Now the logical next step is for the UN Security Council to take the cue from the Human Rights Council and urgently refer Myanmar to the International Criminal Court so that it could examine the full spectrum of mass atrocity crimes committed in Myanmar,” said Khin Ohmar of Progressive Voice. “The longer the Security Council waits, the longer justice will be denied,” she added. The resolution’s calls for accountability addresses gross violations all over Myanmar including in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan states. “The resolution’s inclusive call that covers egregious violations in Kachin and Shan states comes at a time when these regions face ongoing armed conflict amidst failing peace talks and atrocities on civilians by the Myanmar military,” said Stella Naw, a Kachin woman activist. “There is an urgent need for the international community to act towards ending conflict and taking steps to hold those accountable,” she added. The resolution also encourages the UN to independently inquire into its own involvement in Myanmar since 2011. This follows the Fact-Finding Mission’s observation that UN actors in Myanmar prioritised development and quiet diplomacy while ignoring human rights concerns when mass atrocities took place. “UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres’ silence on this observation is deafening. He must act immediately to set up an inquiry to review and rectify the UN’s system-wide engagement in Myanmar,” said R. Iniyan Ilango of FORUM-ASIA. “This is not the first time this has been said about the UN’s role in situations of mass atrocities. The same observation was made six years ago on Sri Lanka by a UN internal inquiry. The Human Rights Upfront Action Plan was created following this and was meant to be operational in Myanmar when gross violations unfolded. Clearly something is very wrong within the UN system,” he added.
  • 28. 2 The resolution also appeals to all states and stakeholders to assist victims including through a possible trust fund. “This is key and the UN General Assembly should act on this appeal and set up a trust fund to provide livelihood and psychosocial support to victims,” said Wai Wai Nu. “In addition to such support, the General Assembly should also stipulate that refugees are not returned unless their citizenship rights, safety and equality are fully guaranteed and security upon their return is supervised by UN Human Rights bodies,” she added. The resolution also calls on all business enterprises to cooperate with the new mechanism it creates. The Fact-Finding Mission’s findings highlighted the impact of social media on the mass atrocities that took place in Myanmar. It particularly focused on Facebook’s role as a medium for the spread of hate speech. “Facebook should fully commit to handing over all evidence it holds on incitement to atrocities to the new mechanism and it should take immediate steps to prevent the spread of hate speech on its platforms,” said John Samuel of FORUM-ASIA. ENDS For more information contact:  R. Iniyan Ilango, UN Advocacy Programme Manager, FORUM‐ ASIA: iniyan@forum‐asia.org  Khin Ohmar, Chairperson, Advisory Board, Progressive Voice: khinohmar@progressive-voice.org
  • 29. 10/4/2018 U.S. Assistance to the Rakhine State Crisis in Burma and Bangladesh https://fpc.state.gov/09/286245.htm 1/4 September 25, 2018 U.S. Assistance to the Rakhine State Crisis in Burma and Bangladesh Richard Albright, Deputy Assistant Secretary For The Bureau Of Population, Refugees, And Migration New York, New York, United States FOREIGN PRESS CENTER BRIEFING WITH RICHARD ALBRIGHT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION TOPIC: U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE RAKHINE STATE CRISIS IN BURMA AND BANGLADESH WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2018, 1:30 P.M. EST NEW YORK FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, 799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA, 10TH FLOOR MODERATOR: Well, thank you all for coming through the rain. I think we’ll – you’ll find it useful to your reporting exercises later. It’s my pleasure to introduce our Deputy Assistant Secretary in our Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Richard Albright. He has been in his position since July 2018 but already very busy and active throughout the region, where he oversees humanitarian assistance in both Africa, Near East, and in Asia. So no small job for our deputy assistant secretary. So I’m going to ask him to give a few opening remarks, and then we can take questions. Thank you. MR ALBRIGHT: Excellent. Thanks very much. Thank you for coming here today on this bleak, rainy day. So – but we all have important, really important, work to do here. And I just wanted to highlight some of the support that we’re providing for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh as well as elsewhere in the region and some of the displaced population and the conflict-affected population inside of Burma. So I think you’ve seen Ambassador Haley’s press statements that – and the announcement that she made yesterday on the 24th. We announced – the United States announced just over $185 million in new humanitarian assistance for those affected by the Rakhine State crisis in Burma and in Bangladesh. In Burma, the funding supports more than 300,000 people in Rakhine State, including internally displaced people. And in Bangladesh, 156 million of these funds will reach approximately one million Rohingya who are displaced refugees inside of Bangladesh, and it will support also Bangladeshi communities that are hosting these refugees. The United States is very proud to be the leading donor responding to the Rakhine State crisis, and our assistance provides lifesaving help to crisis-affected communities on both sides of the border in both countries as well as the refugees and the host communities in Bangladesh. And it provides, more specifically, assistance in the areas of protection, emergency shelter, food, water, sanitation, health care, and psychosocial support for people who are affected by the crisis. This assistance, this new assistance – the $185 million announced yesterday – brings our total assistance that we’ve provided for this particular response to $389 million since the outbreak of violence in August 2017, when the Burmese security forces began committing widespread atrocities against the Rohingya villages across the northern Rakhine. We continue to support Bangladesh in its response, and we’re calling on other donors to do the same. This is not – this doesn’t complete the exercise. There’s going to be considerably more assistance that’s required of the international community. The United States will continue to do its part, but we will ask others to support as well. So I think with that, I would just want to commend really the support from and the generosity of the Government of Bangladesh and the Bangladeshi people in hosting over a million refugees who have arrived in – very suddenly since last year. And we continue to work closely and appreciate their strong cooperation in working to address the needs of this population. I’m happy to take your questions. QUESTION: Yes. I am reading this one, but I have a question. No doubt America is doing a lot for those countries who are deprived, the people who are the refugees. But I don’t know why people have this thinking, whatever is happening on the name of terrorism, America is doing. If they will not make a situation worst so people will not this type of – people not face this type of situation. If you think some bad elements are there like Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, you can do a surgical operation. When you do operation of worst level, so people, they get homeless and they want to move somewhere else. MR ALBRIGHT: Well, I mean, that’s an interesting question. I mean, I think what I would say to you with regard to this particular crisis in Burma and Bangladesh is that this is a crisis that was generated by the Government of Burma and its mistreatment of its
  • 30. 10/4/2018 U.S. Assistance to the Rakhine State Crisis in Burma and Bangladesh https://fpc.state.gov/09/286245.htm 2/4 population declaring them not citizens of the country, not giving them basic civil and human rights, and a significant amount of oppression and atrocities committed by the Burmese armed forces.. We – the UN has – factfinding mission has put out a report on those atrocities. The United States has also published a report also yesterday. That’s not the subject of my discussion here today, but it’s online that we published this report yesterday documenting some of the atrocities committed by the government against this population. So our focus here is working with the Government of Burma to improve the conditions for the Rohingya population as well as all of its minority populations to enable those people to return in safety to their homes. I mean, that’s what most displaced people and most refugees want is to go home. And so we’re trying to keep the focus on the government to create those conditions, and we’re also very concerned about accountability for those people who committed these crimes against the population. QUESTION: I have a couple of questions to begin with. First of all, how is money to be disbursed? Who handles this money? UN, other agencies, U.S. directly? How does money – both in Bangladesh and in Myanmar. MR ALBRIGHT: So these funds – very good question. These funds are – we are distributing and some we’ve already distributed to our key humanitarian partners. We’re talking about the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration, UNICEF. These are the key partners that we work with on crisis response and humanitarian assistance. And I should say the World Food Program. So that’s the other kind of the fourth major – the fourth major partner. And through the International Organization for Migration we’re also supporting a number of nongovernmental organizations that provide assistance to the refugees as well as to populations inside of Burma. QUESTION: Will this amount be on top of the amount already pledged or would be placed for the global UN appeal for Burma? MR ALBRIGHT: So these funds will be counted as part of the UN appeals, the humanitarian response plan. So they will – as those funds are disbursed, they will start showing up in the UN’s documentation for the funding. QUESTION: Thank you so much for the generosity, but one question: What about granting refugee status to some of these Rohingyas? MR ALBRIGHT: Well, I think one thing that – what is happening right now is that the Government of Burma – Bangladesh, excuse me, and UNHCR are in – doing a verification exercise in which they are providing identity documents to the Rohingya who are in Bangladesh. This is a – this will take some time. It’s a large population. And – but they’re very carefully verifying the people and giving them identity documents. And so that’s – and that gives them a basic form of protection inside of Bangladesh that’s recognized by the Bangladeshi authorities. QUESTION: Does it mean that you will consider granting them? MR ALBRIGHT: Well, their status is considered by – is determined by the Bangladeshi Government. It’s not our status determination. It’s -- QUESTION: What I’m trying to say is that many of them are fleeing already. MR ALBRIGHT: Yes. QUESTION: Different directions. Pakistan, for example. India, Saudi Arabia. Why not the U.S. grant some of them even as a gesture of goodwill? MR ALBRIGHT: Are you referring to – you’re referring to resettlement of people into the United States? QUESTION: Yes. MR ALBRIGHT: All right. That’s – I mean , we have a – the U.S. has a longstanding refugee resettlement program. We’ve resettled more refugees in our country than any other. Generally, refugee resettlement starts to happen for a population after several years. It’s not generally the focus. Resettlement in a third country is not generally the focus in a newly displaced population. And this population has – most of them – I mean, I recognize some of the Rohingya have been in Bangladesh for several years, but the big flow of people came just under a year ago. So for the time being, the focus is on emergency response and also working to try to create the conditions for them to return home. Most of the refugee resettlement that occurs around the world occurs in populations that have been displaced for longer periods of time. QUESTION: So no plan? In other words -- MR ALBRIGHT: So there’s not – not immediately. It’s also based on – UNHCR makes referrals of individual cases who particularly – usually vulnerable cases, particularly who are in need of resettlement because that’s the only alternative. So that’s usually the third durable solution that UNHCR seeks out. QUESTION: One last question from this (inaudible) time. On sanctions, would you be able to talk a little bit about sanctions? MR ALBRIGHT: The only thing I could say for you on that is, I mean, we have imposed some sanctions on some -- QUESTION: Six individuals, yes. MR ALBRIGHT: -- six individuals. So I – there could be other measures coming, but I don’t have anything for you on that today.
  • 31. 10/4/2018 U.S. Assistance to the Rakhine State Crisis in Burma and Bangladesh https://fpc.state.gov/09/286245.htm 3/4 QUESTION: Sir, very honestly, these sanctions are aimed at people to freeze their assets in the U.S. and they are not in the U.S. So are these symbolic? Do they have – do they carry any meaning? MR ALBRIGHT: I think we have to look at – they – those are the actions that we’ve taken so far. That doesn’t mean that we’re finished. And we are – we publish this – the documentation report yesterday, and I think that that will – there’ll be – there’s great interest in developing further information on the atrocities that occurred inside of Burma and looking at the whole issue of accountability. And that’s not just something that the U.S. is looking at. As you know, there’s the fact-finding mission at the UN. Other countries and organizations are looking at that. Yeah. QUESTION: Yesterday the Malaysian Government came out and spoke about helping refugees – IDPs, I mean, resettle also partly in Malaysia. Since Myanmar – sorry, I’m using the current moniker. MR ALBRIGHT: Good for you. QUESTION: Since Myanmar is part of the ASEAN Community, would the U.S. like ASEAN to do anything? MR ALBRIGHT: Well, we certainly – I mean, there are Rohingya who have moved and fled to other ASEAN countries – a significant number, over 100,000 I think. And we certainly appreciate those countries’ efforts to host these people who have fled and give them shelter and provide services, access to services for them. And that’s a very good thing and it’s very commendable. QUESTION: One question. It’s a bit political in nature. To what extent are you willing to exercise some kind of pressure on Aung San Suu Kyi to speak out? She’s been conspicuously very quiet. MR ALBRIGHT: Look, I can’t comment on the internal dynamics within the Burmese Government, in the – or the Myanmar Government. But I mean, the – we have been very consistent in our messaging to everyone there, whether it’s officials in the military, in the civilian government, up and down the line, about our concerns for what happened, our concerns about accountability, our concerns about improving the conditions for this population so that people can return in safety and dignity and security. QUESTION: But there’s a certain limit to which the U.S. is willing to go, considering that it might upset the balance of power within Myanmar. Although she’s de facto the leader of Myanmar, her hands are tied. MR ALBRIGHT: I mean, I – all I can say to you is that we are very clear about what our concerns are and what our expectation are. And this is a matter that we continue to work with the government to improve these conditions and address these problems. QUESTION: May I take one more sure? MR ALBRIGHT: Sure. QUESTION: One concern that we have – we in Bangladesh have – is the rising extremism in the Rohingya camp, the rebels in the camps who are believed to extremists. And one complaint that Myanmar had about this whole thing is about the role of ARSA. Where do you stand on that? I mean, is there a role that U.S. can play to stem this rising tide? MR ALBRIGHT: I mean, we’re – of course we’re very concerned about extremism. We talk to the – certainly to the Bangladeshi authorities. I haven’t seen significant reports of extremist activity emerging from the camps. I would also note that the population is heavily – is predominantly women and children, and – but I think the security measures are good. But it’s an important – over the longer term, it’s important to provide people with not just immediate -- taking care of their immediate needs, but providing education and livelihoods and the thing – the kinds of support and opportunities that give people a chance and hope for their future. And so that’s a part of our programming and something we’ll be – we’re continuously talking to the government about. QUESTION: It seems that many of them are not going back, many of them don’t want to go back. What happens to them if they stay back in Bangladesh for the next 10, 20, 40 years? MR ALBRIGHT: I think if you – some – a figure that I hear often from UNHCR, from the World Bank, is that the average stay of refugees in a country outside of their own is about 10 years, so – because people are fleeing complex crises and emergencies. And these situations take time to resolve. They don’t resolve overnight, and so that’s why we need to look beyond the immediate lifesaving assistance for these people and ensure that they have healthcare and education and – so that they can become good citizens and they can contribute to the development of – hopefully of their own country and – but so that they can also provide a positive impact on the countries that are hosting them if they have to stay there for longer periods. QUESTION: Am I to surmise that, based on your comment, that you’re expecting these people to stay in Bangladesh the next ten years, and you’d be committing yourselves to providing help to (inaudible)? MR ALBRIGHT: Well, I can’t tell you exactly how long they will stay in Bangladesh, but I mean, I can -- QUESTION: No, but given the average that you just mentioned -- MR ALBRIGHT: I can say that the U.S. and others in the international community will continue to provide assistance to refugees and continue at the same time to look for durable solutions for these populations, just as we have in many other refugee situations around the world. QUESTION: Most of them unresolved, by the way.
  • 32. 10/4/2018 U.S. Assistance to the Rakhine State Crisis in Burma and Bangladesh https://fpc.state.gov/09/286245.htm 4/4 MR ALBRIGHT: Many of them are unresolved, but some are resolved. QUESTION: I can’t think of one. MR ALBRIGHT: Well, we try to remain hopeful. Thank you. Thank you very much. MODERATOR: Any last question? Okay, with that, thank you so much DAS Albright -- MR ALBRIGHT: Sure. MODERATOR: -- for speaking with our group today. We will try to do the transcript – it will depend a little bit on what the Secretary’s doing today – and then send it out to you as soon as we have it available. QUESTION: Thanks. MR ALBRIGHT: Thank you, you’re most welcome. # # #