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1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
2. Security Classification Authority:
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION
STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR
PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.
5. Name of Performing Organization :
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS
DEPARTMENT
6. Office Symbol :
C
7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207
8. Title (Include Security Classification): FOREIGN DENIAL
AND DECEPTION: MINIMIZING THE IMPACT TO
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (UNCLASSIFIED)
9. Personal Authors : Major Brian P. Cyr, USMC
10.Type of Report: FINAL 11. Date of Report: 4 February
2002

12.Page Count : 26 12A Paper Advisor (if any): Professor
Richard Martin
13.Supplementary Notation : A paper submitted to the Faculty
of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this
paper reflect my own personal views and are not
necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the
Navy.
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper:
Denial, Deception, Network-Centric Warfare, Operational
Intelligence, North Korea, Kosovo, Iraq, Analyst,
Counterdeception, Sensor
15.Abstract: Foreign Denial and Deception (D&D) is as old as
warfare itself and is still practiced across
the globe today. Both countries and non-state actors use D&D
as a means to gain comparative advantage
over their opponents. Indeed, the weaker one is in relation to
their adversary, the greater the appeal to use
D&D. Since foreign practitioners have frequently employed
denial and deception against the United States,
it is incumbent upon both joint force commanders (JFCs) and
their intelligence staffs (J-2) to increase their
knowledge of this asymmetric challenge.
Countering the foreign D&D threat will not be easy. Since we
will never be able to completely
eliminate D&D, one must take steps to lessen its impact upon
operational art. By defining D&D, examining
denial and deception means & techniques, and looking at
various foreign models, JFCs and their J-2s begin
an important step in understanding the adversary. Perhaps the
best methodology to “knowledge advantage”

over an enemy remains centered on the human dimension.
Increasing D&D awareness, emphasizing a
multi-collection/analytical approach, and incorporating D&D
concepts into our joint doctrine, will allow
both the operational commander and his J-2 to not just mitigate
foreign D&D, but also to exploit an
opponent’s biases and perceptions.
Currently, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) has the potential to
leave us vulnerable to foreign denial
and deception. While most of the news on this Information
Technology Revolution in Military Affairs (IT
RMA) centers around technological development, the
importance of NCW's organizational, doctrinal, and
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Foreign Denial and Deception: Minimizing the Impact to
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14. ABSTRACT
Foreign Denial and Deception (D&D) is as old as warfare itself
and is still practiced across the globe today. Both countries and
non-state
actors use D&D as a means to gain comparative advantage over
their opponents. Indeed, the weaker one is in relation to their
adversary, the
greater the appeal to use D&D. Since foreign practitioners have
frequently employed denial and deception against the United
States, it is
incumbent upon both joint force commanders (JFCs) and their
intelligence staffs (J-2) to increase their knowledge of this
asymmetric
challenge. Countering the foreign D&D threat will not be easy.
Since we will never be able to completely eliminate D&D, one
must take steps
to lessen its impact upon operational art. By defining D&D,
examining denial and deception means & techniques, and
looking at various
foreign models, JFCs and their J-2s begin an important step in
understanding the adversary. Perhaps the best methodology to
?knowledge
advantage? over an enemy remains centered on the human
dimension. Increasing D&D awareness, emphasizing a multi-
collection/analytical

approach, and incorporating D&D concepts into our joint
doctrine, will allow both the operational commander and his J-2
to not just mitigate
foreign D&D, but also to exploit an opponent?s biases and
perceptions. Currently, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) has
the potential to leave
us vulnerable to foreign denial and deception. While most of the
news on this Information Technology Revolution in Military
Affairs (IT
RMA) centers around technological development, the
importance of NCW's organizational, doctrinal, and operational
concepts should not be
lost. Focusing on the human factor side of NCW promises to
offer significant rewards. In the end, it is the education and
training of our JFCs
and their J-2s that holds the key to minimizing the impact of
foreign D&D to operational intelligence.
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operational concepts should not be lost. Focusing on the human
factor side of NCW promises to offer
significant rewards. In the end, it is the education and training
of our JFCs and their J-2s that holds the key
to minimizing the impact of foreign D&D to operational
intelligence.
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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.
FOREIGN DENIAL AND DECEPTION: MINIMIZING THE
IMPACT TO
OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
by
Brian P. Cyr
Major, USMC
A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in
partial satisfaction of
the requirements of the Department of Joint Military
Operations.
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and
are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the
Navy.
Signature:_________________
4 February 2002

Prof. Richard Martin
Faculty
Advisor
ii
Abstract
Foreign Denial and Deception (D&D) is as old as warfare itself
and is still practiced
across the globe today. Both countries and non-state actors use
D&D as a means to gain
comparative advantage over their opponents. Indeed, the
weaker one is in relation to their
adversary, the greater the appeal to use D&D. Since foreign
practitioners have frequently
employed denial and deception against the United States, it is
incumbent upon both joint
force commanders (JFCs) and their intelligence staffs (J-2) to
increase their knowledge of
this asymmetric challenge.
Countering the foreign D&D threat will not be easy. Since we
will never be able to
completely eliminate D&D, one must take steps to lessen its
impact upon operational art. By

defining D&D, examining denial and deception means &
techniques, and looking at various
foreign models, JFCs and their J-2s begin an important step
towards understanding the
adversary. Perhaps the best methodology to achieve
“knowledge advantage” over an enemy
remains centered on the human dimension. Increasing D&D
awareness, emphasizing a
multi-collection/analytical approach, and incorporating D&D
concepts into our joint
doctrine, will allow both the operational commander and his J-2
to not just mitigate foreign
D&D, but also to exploit an opponent’s biases and perceptions.
Currently, Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) has the potential to
leave us vulnerable
to denial and deception. While most of the news on this
Information Technology Revolution
in Military Affairs (IT RMA) centers around technological
development, the importance of
NCW's organizational, doctrinal, and operational concepts
should not be lost. Focusing on
the human factor side of NCW promises to offer significant
rewards. In the end, it is the
education and training of our JFCs and their J-2s that holds the

key to minimizing the impact
of foreign D&D to operational intelligence.
iii
Table of Contents
Abstract………………………………………………………………
………ii
Introduction..…………………………………………………………
……….1
Defining Operational
D&D...………..…………………………………..……2
Successful Operational D&D
planning..………...……………………………3
Operational D&D Means and
Techniques...……….…..……………….…….4
Foreign Operational D&D
Models…………………………………………...6
Minimizing the Impact of Foreign Operational
D&D.……………………….8
Network-CentricWarfare (NCW) and
D&D………………………………...14
Conclusion.……………………………………………………………
……..16

Notes…...……………………………………………………………
……….18
Bibliography.…………………………………………………………
……...21
1
Introduction
To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy
blind and deaf by sealing his
eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by
creating confusion in their minds.
Mao Tse-Tung, Selected
Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung
In a recent commentary, Patrick M. Hughes, a retired U.S.
Army Lieutenant General and
former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
stressed that adversaries did not
want to face the U.S. military head-on. Instead, he pointed out,
our opponents would rely on
“extraordinary denial and deception activities to gain surprise
and to take advantage of our
values and cultural traits.”1 Indeed, foreign denial and
deception (D&D) allows a weaker
country or non-state actor to “level the playing field” by

concealing or misleading United
States intelligence in areas such as military deployments,
political intentions, and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD).
U.S. military operations in Kosovo, the Gulf War, and
Afghanistan have highlighted the
use of adversarial D&D at both the strategic and operational
levels. In fact, the Department
of Defense was so concerned about the Taliban’s use of denial
and deception, that they
provided a first-ever background briefing to the press on the
subject.2 Since future
battlefields will continue to witness the use of foreign D&D, it
is incumbent upon joint force
commanders (JFCs) and their intelligence (J-2) staffs to
increase their understanding of this
asymmetric challenge.
This paper will examine some ways to counter foreign D&D by
emphasizing the human
factor: increasing our awareness through education and
training, stressing both a multi-
discipline collection & intelligence analysis process, and a
greater incorporation of D&D

awareness into our joint doctrine. Network-Centric Warfare
(NCW) will also be reviewed,
because it too, ultimately relies on the human factor to counter
the use of denial and
deception. In the end, this author contends that the human
dimension is the key to
2
minimizing D&D’s impact on operational intelligence. In order
to place this conclusion in
the proper context, however, one must first define operational
D&D, describe how it
succeeds, cover potential means & techniques, and examine a
few foreign models.
Defining Operational D&D
All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable,
feign incapacity; when active,
inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away;
when far away, that you are
near.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War
The earliest recorded example of D&D in warfare was
approximately 1450 BC, when
the Egyptian general Thot captured Jaffa.3 General Thot
feigned defeat against his opponents

and concealed soldiers in baskets as gifts to the city. Once the
gifts were brought into Jaffa,
he was able to seize power with his “hidden” soldiers. From
this example, one can conclude
that denial, refers “to the attempt to block information which
could be used by an opponent
to learn some truth.”4 Deception, on the other hand, refers to
misleading an opponent to
believing something that is false. Although denial and
deception can occur separately, they
are often used together to lead an opponent to believe what the
deceiver wants him to
believe. More importantly, however, the deceiver wants his
opponent to not just believe, but
“to take (or not take) specific actions [emphasis mine].”5
The key difference between strategic and operational D&D is
the target audience.
Strategic D&D is typically aimed at the national level of
government or senior military
leadership.6 Operational D&D, in contrast, is more likely
centered at combatant and
subordinate joint force commanders, along with their component
commanders. Although

intelligence personnel such as the J-2 may not specifically be
the target of denial and
deception, they should be considered “the primary conduit used
by deceivers to get selected
information to the decision maker.”7 This statement highlights
the importance that the J-2
must place on understanding D&D and its impact on friendly
intelligence collection,
3
analysis, and dissemination capabilities. In summary, the
purpose of operational D&D is to
cause commanders to form inaccurate impressions about an
opponent’s capabilities and
intentions, misappropriate intelligence collection assets or fail
to advantageously employ
their forces. Therefore, to mitigate the results of operational
denial and deception to our
operations, it is imperative that we understand how it is
planned.
Successful Operational D&D Planning
You must know what he believes, what he wishes to believe,
and what he is prepared to
believe. Major John LeHockey USMC, FMFRP 15-6

Strategic and Military Deception
Based on historical lessons learned, an operational D&D
campaign should take into
account several factors to increase its chances of success.8
First, the D&D campaign must be
centrally controlled and support strategic/operational
objectives, as well as the Desired End
State (DES).9 D&D guidance also needs to be tied to these
aims and the DES. Moreover,
denial and deception planners should possess a clear
understanding of their commander’s
D&D intent, objectives, targets, and desired perception.
Second, planners must gather and analyze information related
to their opponent. The
identification of key decision makers, their backgrounds, and
psychological profiles are all
critical components. In addition, knowledge of an opponent’s
intelligence collection system
(or information channels), decision-making process, and their
analysis capabilities must be
understood. Finally, the identification of any preconceptions
that the opponent’s leadership
may have about the deceiver force’s intentions and capabilities
needs to be taken into

account.
Next, the operational D&D campaign must develop courses of
action (COAs) that are
capable of accomplishing the commander’s D&D objectives and
the DES. A D&D COA
will not only restate the denial and deception objective, but will
also identify the proposed
target and the desired perception.10 More importantly, the
COA provides the D&D cover
4
story used to create the desired perception. This cover story
must be believable, verifiable,
consistent, and executable.11 Cover stories should also
reinforce an opponent’s
preconceptions and biases. These preconceptions and biases
can be cultural, political, or
doctrinal in nature. Once the cover story is developed, D&D
planners identify the means and
techniques that will be used to convey or deny information to
the target audience. Finally, an
event schedule is developed, along with the identification of
feedback channels (both

operational and analytical). Operational feedback pertains to
D&D information reaching the
target, while analytical feedback addresses the actions the target
is taking because of that
information.12 Feedback channels are difficult to develop, but
at the same time, key to the
success of the D&D plan. Feedback allows D&D practitioners
to determine whether their
plan is believed, and more importantly, being acted upon.
Having a view of how denial and
deception is working (through the opponent’s eyes) allows
planners to modify or cancel their
operation or campaign. While perhaps not as vital as feedback,
it is clear that the mechanism
used to convey or deny information is important in the D&D
process. Accordingly, a variety
of D&D means and techniques will be examined in the next
section.
Operational D&D Means and Techniques
The importance of deception in warfare is often overlooked,
often by the soldiers whose lives
depend on it. James F. Dunnigan and
Albert A. Nofi, Victory and Deceit
D&D means are defined as methods and resources that can be

used to convey or deny
information to the deception target. Joint Publication 3-58,
Joint Doctrine for Military
Deception, categorizes deception means as physical, technical,
and administrative.13 One can
also use these same categories, as described below, to
characterize denial and deception
means since both definitions include the words convey or deny.
1) Physical means : Activities and resources used to
convey or deny selected
information to a foreign power.
2) Technical means : Military material resources and their
associated operating
5
techniques used to convey or deny selected information to a
foreign power
through the deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration,
absorption, or
reflection of energy; the emission of suppression of
chemical or biological
odors; and the emission or suppression of nuclear particles.
3) Administrative means : Resources and methods to convey or
deny oral,
pictorial, documentary, or other physical evidence to a
foreign
power.14

In addition to means, D&D operations require mastery of
various techniques to supply
an opponent’s intelligence system with erroneous information.
These techniques are
designed to dissimulate (hide the real) or simulate (show the
false).15 Dissimulation conceals
or protects something from an adversary’s observation.
Dissimulation includes masking,
repackaging, and dazzling. These are further explained below.
1) Masking: Using natural or artificial material to
evade detection.
Examples include: camouflage paint schemes, use of
cover and terrain, or
maintaining “normal” activities prior to an attack or
withdrawal.
2) Repackaging: Altering the appearance of an object to make
it look
like something else. Examples include: disguising an arms
factory as a
residence, disguising a weapon system as destroyed, and
renaming units to
hide their actual strength.
3) Dazzling: Confusing the sensory processing abilities of the
target with stimuli.
Examples include: signaling false intentions through activity
designed to reflect
something else, the use of notional forces, and radar
reflectors.16

Simulation involves the use of decoys or dummy equipment to
represent something that
does not exist. Simulation encompasses mimicking, inventing,
and decoying.
1) Mimicking: Creates a replica of reality using one or more
distinctive
characteristics of the object being mimicked. Examples
include: displays,
decoys, and heat signature simulation.
2) Inventing: Displays the false by fashioning an alternative
reality. Examples
include: false documents, painted damage (such as craters)
on runways, and
dummy equipment.
3) Decoying: Offers a distracting or misleading option with the
intent of diverting
an opponent’s attention away from the real focal point.
Examples include:
false target generation, decoy radar emitters, and
misinformation.17
The coordinated use of D&D means, combined with techniques,
helps to create the
necessary atmosphere of disinformation that is integral to D&D
operations.
6
Foreign Operational D&D Models

As in Kosovo, enemy ground forces also sought to evade U.S.
airpower by dispersing and
concealing equipment and troops. Bryan Bender,
Kim Burger, and Andrew Koch,
“Afghanistan: First Lessons”
Although a variety of countries and non-state actors
practice D&D today, many share
similar mindsets and methodology. Historical examples make
an excellent tool for both the
operational commander and his J-2 to gather insight into the
mind of the adversary. The
commonality among D&D practitioners also provides a point of
departure for examining how
an adversary may use denial and deception in the future.
The Iraqis have been fast learners in D&D means and
techniques, applying their skills
most vividly during and after the Gulf War. First, Iraqi Scud
missile operations employed a
combination of cover, dispersal, and decoys to undermine U.S.
intelligence collection
capabilities. By not using Scud-associated meteorological
radars and communications that
were a standard part of Soviet doctrine, the Iraqis denied the
United States detectable
indications and warning of launch. This, combined with the

ability of the Scud Transporter-
Erector-Launchers (TELs) to “shoot and scoot,” made it
virtually impossible for the United
States to locate the TELs with the timeliness and accuracy
necessary to effectively respond.18
Second, it was not until the on-the-ground United Nations
Special Commission (UNSCOM)
inspections after the Gulf War that it became known the extent
the Iraqis had achieved in the
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons arena. A striking
example is Iraq’s nuclear
program which relied on an assortment of D&D measures
including: the construction of
buildings within buildings; purposely making buildings
designed for the same purpose look
different; hiding power lines and water feeds to disguise a
facility’s purpose; suppressing
emissions; moving key pieces of equipment at night; and
placing facilities underground.19
Because the Iraqis have prevented subsequent UNSCOM
inspections, their D&D measures
7

continue to provide an important means in preventing anyone
from gaining deep insight into
Saddam Hussein’s WMD program.
The war in Kosovo highlighted a Serbian military that was
also well versed in D&D
means and techniques. First, the Serbs built decoy bridges out
of plastic tarp and logs, and
placed them nearby camouflaged real bridges.20 They also
painted bridges with infrared
patterns to break up their distinguishing shape in order to
mislead U.S. intelligence sensors.
Second, Serbian forces employed numerous decoy tanks
throughout Kosovo; sometimes
simply using wood and plastic to fool Allied pilots flying at
high altitudes. To add more
realism to their deception, they created heat sources--such as
burning trash, tires, and cooking
oil near the decoy tanks to give off a false infrared signature.21
Third, Serbian forces
disguised the results of Allied bombing in order to deny U.S.
intelligence an accurate battle
damage assessment. Besides removing and hiding military
wreckage, they created fake
bomb craters on roads and runways to portray greater damage

than what really existed.
Finally, to lessen the risk of being bombed, Serbian forces
placed equipment in civilian areas
or attempted to blend in their own forces with noncombatants.22
North Korea, like the Iraqis and Serbs, has relied upon total
secrecy to ensure regime
survival. Taking into account the lessons learned from the
Korean War, the philosophy of
Juche or “self-reliance,” and their own mountainous terrain,
North Korea established a
national security policy, known as the “Four Military Lines,” in
1962.23 This policy
emphasized the fortification of their entire country, and was
eventually included in the North
Korean constitution. The resultant massive denial and
deception effort derived from this
national policy has been ongoing for over forty years and must
not be underestimated.
Heavily influenced by Soviet maskirovka (deception), North
Korea has employed a variety of
D&D means throughout their country. Their methodology
includes (but is not limited to):

8
hardening, camouflage, decoys, and signature suppression. An
example of the elaborate
extent that has gone into the effort to deny and deceive is the
Onch’on-Up airfield on the
North Korean west coast. Consisting of three runways
(including one that is underground),
all of which are interconnected by a series of roads, Onch’on-
Up airfield can house an entire
MIG-29 air regiment underground.24 Another example of the
North Korean D&D effort is
their Hardened Artillery Sites (HARTS). HARTS contain long-
range artillery & rockets and
are located in successive defensive belts north of the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). What
makes HARTS such a problem for U.S. intelligence, is that the
sites typically include a cave,
tunnel or bunker that encloses the firing piece. In effect, North
Korea is able to play a “shell
game,” whereby it moves equipment in and out of these
enclosures to mislead U.S. collection
assets and intelligence analysts.25
One of the key items to note in examining different foreign
models is that there are few

differences in D&D means and techniques between cultures. In
Barton Whaley’s Stratagem:
Deception and Surprise in War, Vol. I, a similar conclusion was
reached after examining
eight different cultures and 93 case studies.26 The implications
for today’s J-2 is that there
are common threads among foreign D&D models that can be
determined and studied in order
to provide the commander a picture of how an adversary might
think and act. Armed with
this intimate knowledge of foreign D&D models, JFCs and their
J-2s are better prepared to
come up with solutions to counter the denial and deception
threat. It is in this next section,
that we will examine what specific actions need to be taken in
order to lessen D&D
implications to operational intelligence.
Minimizing the Impact of Foreign Operational D&D
Tomorrow, deception and counterdeception could become
requirements for all warriors, and
many will have trouble thinking in ways such practice demands.
Martin C. Libicki,
“Defending Cyberspace and Other Metaphors”

9
In order to minimize the threat that D&D poses, this author
proposes focusing on the
human dimension of the problem by: 1) Creating greater
awareness among personnel; 2)
Emphasizing both a multi-discipline intelligence collection and
analytical effort; 3)
Encouraging a greater incorporation of D&D concepts into our
joint doctrine.
First, joint force commanders and the Services should ensure
that their staffs and units
(with an emphasis on their intelligence/operations personnel)
understand foreign D&D. The
foundation for this education on D&D should begin in the
schoolhouse. All formal schools
need to emphasize D&D instruction in their curriculums. Why
is this so important?
Because, one must remember that a decision maker is the target
of foreign D&D and the J-2
(or intelligence system) is the means the enemy uses to get to
that target! While most
schools address operational deception and deception planning,
few touch upon the denial

aspect of D&D. With a few adjustments, classrooms can
enhance their operational D&D
instruction through guest lectures, additional seminars, and
expansion of students’ readings
on the subject.28 In addition to formal schools, D&D briefings,
course offerings, and other
such activities can be used to heighten awareness among
intelligence personnel and
operators. For example, since 1998 all new intelligence
analysts at Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) must take at least one introductory D&D
course.29 The growing use of mobile
training teams from DIA’s Joint Military Intelligence Training
Center (JMITC) can also
make D&D awareness a reality for both J-2s and their
commands. The JMITC provides
courses on analysis, collection management, and indications &
warning--all of which touch
upon D&D.30
Armed with D&D knowledge through an educational process,
specific D&D training
can then take place. This operational level training should
emphasize gaming simulation in
order to interact with various scenarios without involving the

high costs of field maneuvers.
10
The creation of “red cells” for the war game process is an
excellent means to aid decision
makers in understanding foreign D&D. Red cells can be as
small as just the J-2, or involve a
variety of multi-disciplined experts and agencies. One of the
major reasons for the
establishment of a red cell is to portray a “thinking” adversary
to a decision maker. Besides
military aspects, red cells need to take into account an
opponent’s distinct cultural/religious/
political perceptions and biases. Use of international officers or
students during war games is
an excellent tool in revealing cultural mindsets, insight into
foreign decision-making, and
unique perspectives on coalition warfare. The advantages that
we garner in the education
and training process does not just rest on greater adversarial
awareness, but also in
discovering our own vulnerabilities to D&D. In fact, the
identification of these critical

vulnerabilities can greatly benefit JFCs in the development of
their operational risk
assessments.
Second, even with the most sophisticated intelligence
capability, there is no list or recipe
that will guarantee the ability to detect and/or minimize D&D.
An emphasis on multi-
disciplined intelligence collection and analysis, however, still
has merit. Through all-source
intelligence collection: open-source intelligence (OSINT),
measurement and signature
intelligence (MASINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), human
intelligence (HUMINT), and
imagery intelligence (IMINT), J-2s are able to receive
information through many different
channels. It is through a variety of channels or collection
means, that the J-2 increases his
ability to detect incongruities in an opponent’s D&D cover
story. A major reason for this is
that the enemy might not have been consistent in portraying his
cover story among all
channels of information available to him. A different collection
platform may pick up on
something that another may have missed, and therefore, provide

a valuable clue that
uncovers the D&D operation. Or a collection source can detect
something in a particular
11
area and “cross-cue” another sensor to look at the same area.
Using a multi-discipline
collection approach, however, requires that intelligence
personnel understand what collection
capabilities are best suited for a foreign D&D problem set.
In addition to understanding capabilities, knowing how
adversaries exploit inherent
weaknesses in our own collection platforms is equally
important. Preventing the knowledge
of these vulnerabilities from falling into the hands of
adversaries has become more difficult
in an increasingly connected and transparent world. Indeed, the
U.S. intelligence community
failed to spot or predict key developments in weapons
proliferation, such as the Indian
nuclear tests in 1998, because countries have taken steps to
conceal their activities from
overhead surveillance. India was successful because it used

means such as: working
underground, in bad weather/at night, and knowing the
scheduled orbits of U.S. satellites.31
Due to these unique challenges, there continues to be an effort
to rethink the deployment of
existing collection systems, the development of new sensors,
and operational security
(OPSEC) measures to foil future D&D operations.
Along with collecting information, a big challenge for the J-2 in
uncovering D&D is
during the analysis and production phase of the intelligence
cycle.32 First, it is important that
intelligence personnel not become too overconfident from their
past analytical successes, or
worse, become complacent. Everyone needs to understand that
they can be denied or
deceived. Clever adversaries have duped even the most
seasoned analysts. Perhaps by
examining an opponent’s effort, we may find a way to detect
D&D even among the best
practitioners. Every D&D operation leaves clues.33 No cover
story will ever be so flawless
that there are not some inconsistencies that can be discovered--
if the J-2 looks in the right

place. Analysts must determine what the most obvious and
reasonable ways an adversary
might act based on his capabilities, even if available evidence
contradicts such possibilities.
12
This is where the importance of knowing an enemy and being
able to think like him becomes
important. In order to do this, analysts need to be open to
evidence that does not fit their own
preconceptions and biases. This is a very difficult matter for
most intelligence personnel to
confront. Perhaps, the best approach to this problem may be to
have other analysts or
operators play the “devil’s advocate,” and see if the available
evidence could add up to a
plausible cover story that the enemy may be using.34 If the J-2
appears to be detecting a
D&D cover story, then the following guidelines will aid in
exposing any inconsistencies
within the denial and deception operation:35
- Determine whether the enemy is capable of even conducting
the action it is

portraying. Is the enemy exaggerating or concealing real
capabilities? How have
they historically used their capabilities? What does their
doctrine state?
- Has information been too forthcoming or flows too neatly into
a single pattern?
- Do you only have a very small body of consistent data in
which to draw conclusions?
Typically, conclusions drawn from very small samples are
highly unreliable.
- Was the information gathered from normally expected
channels? Can the
information be verified by other means? If not, then why not?
- Conversely, what is missing? Is information that is normally
gathered from expected
channels absent? Are normally available channels inaccessible?
Why?
While the above questions are only a start in helping analysts
uncover D&D, they do offer a
means to focus the J-2 on both the military capabilities and
intentions of an adversary--the
essence of operational intelligence.
Finally, increased awareness and collection/analytical
emphasis will be difficult to
achieve without doctrine to support it. Little has been written
on D&D in operational

doctrine, especially in regard to countering it. This is important
because doctrine establishes
a common language for both training and the conduct of
operations.
Beginning in 2000, elements of D&D made its debut into
joint doctrine, albeit only in
cursory fashion. Joint publication 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence
Support to Joint Operations,
13
specifically lists avoiding deception and surprise as a
fundamental intelligence purpose. It
further, states that “intelligence analysts should remain
sensitive to the possibility that they
are being deceived.”36 The publication fails, however, to
provide the reader any advice on
how to escape being deceived. It also does not address the
subject of denial. Moreover,
although Joint publication 2-0 considers “anomalies” in an
opponent’s actions to be
especially valuable to analysts, it does not suggest how these
irregularities may be used to
uncover a foreign D&D operation. Published after Joint
publication 2-0, Joint publication 2-

01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint
Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace does a much better job in providing tools to counter
D&D. It devotes a section
on the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB)
process providing several
examples of how an adversary may deceive an analyst and
achieve surprise. Furthermore,
the publication highlights the need for the intelligence analyst
to develop multiple hypotheses
concerning an adversary’s adoption of various COAs. In fact, it
may be the “throwaway,” or
less likely COA, that an opponent uses in his D&D plan to
maximize surprise. Finally, Joint
publication 2-01.3 also contains an outstanding case study on
Egyptian deception and
“psychological conditioning” against Israel during the Yom
Kippur War in 1973.
Psychological conditioning takes place when the analyst
gradually accepts a level and type of
adversary activity, previously considered abnormal, as
normal.37 In this case, the Egyptian’s
made the Israelis believe that a military exercise was taking
place, when in reality wartime

preparations were ongoing. Again, the only problem with this
short case study is that it does
not specifically state how an analyst was to avoid being a victim
of psychological
conditioning in order to prevent falling into an enemy’s
deception effort.
Alas, even joint publications in the operations realm fall
short in describing how one is to
counter or minimize the impact of D&D. For example, Joint
Publication 3-13, Joint
14
Doctrine for Information Operations, defines counterdeception,
but delineates that it “does
not include the intelligence function of identifying foreign
deception operations.”38
Furthermore, Joint Publication 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for
Command and Control Warfare
(C2W), calls for intelligence analysts to be trained in military
deception methods, but does
not state how to accomplish this task.39 The lack of
intelligence and operational focus on the
D&D problem is even exemplified in Joint Publication 3-58,

Joint Doctrine for Military
Deception, which contains no attempt to define D&D nor offers
any suggestions in
countering it.
In summary, even with D&D concepts starting to make
inroads into joint doctrine, more
work in this regard remains to be done. Additional guidance on
countering D&D, or at least
minimizing its impact, is critical in formulating both
operational and intelligence judgments.
In order for the JFC and their J-2’s to mutually understand
D&D, it first must be prevalent in
the lexicon of joint doctrine.
Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) and D&D
Many countries and disaffected groups will develop techniques
of denial and deception in an
attempt to thwart U.S. intelligence efforts--despite U.S.
technological superiority.
Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, “New World
Coming: American Security in the
21st Century”
NCW is a hot buzzword in the military, offering a way to fight
where forces use a
common network to share and act on information faster than
their adversary. With a major

emphasis on transformation in the military, many in the
intelligence community are looking
for a solution to the D&D problem through NCW. Relying
heavily upon technology as an
enabler, NCW stresses the co-evolution of operational concepts,
doctrine, and organization.40
NCW's framework encompasses sensor, engagement, and
information grids.
The sensor grid is the most important of the three grids and
has had the greatest
investment placed on it so far. Gaining sensor advantage over
an adversary entails not just
15
providing more friendly sensors to the battlespace, but also
denying the enemy his own
sensor access. Of course, having more sensors does not lesson
our susceptibility to foreign
D&D operations. On the contrary, it can open up more channels
for an opponent to apply
denial and deception. An enemy may be able to use the same
cost effective D&D effort as
they are capable of today and reap higher rewards because we

have increased our sensor
grid.41 The key for the U.S. intelligence community as
discussed before, is not just using
more sensors (quantitative), but a variety (qualitative) that can
better separate “signals from
noise” in the battlespace.42 Advanced collection platforms,
such as those involving multi-
spectral or hyper-spectral sensors, can help in detecting specific
forms of D&D. A
drawback, however, is that commercial industries that specialize
in camouflage,
concealment, and deception (CCD) merchandise have done a
remarkable job in keeping pace
with our latest technology. Indeed, commercially available
countermeasures are readily
accessible to any nation or group that has the money to spend
on them.43
The information grid is also potentially vulnerable within the
NCW framework. As we
gather information from our sensors, and then move it through a
network that rapidly forms
our common operational picture of the battlespace, we create
avenues for D&D exploitation.
If an adversary is successful in denying or deceiving our sensor

grid, it is likely that our
common operating picture (COP) will also be affected.44
Foreign D&D impacts the COP by
creating ambiguity for all users, most importantly in the
decision maker and his J-2. By
presenting a false picture of the battlespace, an operational
commander’s own preconceptions
may be reinforced, leading him to misdirect assets or reach an
unforeseen culmination point
in a campaign or major operation.
Because NCW inherently produces vulnerabilities that our
adversaries could capitalize
on--namely, the denial of our ability to collect information
and/or providing misleading
16
information (via deception), we leave ourselves open to
exploitation. NCW, however, is not
just a tech-focused concept, but relies on “human-to-human
connections.”45 To minimize the
battlespace effects of friction, uncertainty, and disorder that
D&D creates, NCW requires
savvy JFCs and J-2s. These individuals must possess an

intuitive sense and ability to
function in an increasingly fast Observe, Orient, Decide, and
Act (OODA) loop. They will
also have to rapidly combine their knowledge of the adversary
(culture, values, modes of
operation) with the real-time picture they receive from sensors
in order to “convert
information advantage to operational advantage.”46 Finally,
JFCs and J-2s must absorb a
multi-dimensional picture without mentally creating information
overload for themselves.
All of these human factors reinforce the fact that NCW will
only become operationally viable
in countering D&D after training, organizational competency,
and doctrine are in place.
Conclusion
High quality intelligence can be developed only when there is a
curiosity about and
respect for the enemy. Professor Michael I. Handel,
Strategic and Operational
Deception in the Second World War
Foreign D&D is nothing new and will continue to be a way our
adversaries will
asymmetrically threaten our operational intelligence
community. From Saddam Hussein to

Kim Jong-Il, there will always be opponents who devise clever
and not-so-clever means to
thwart our sophisticated intelligence system. Regardless of
technological prowess, the
human dimension of countering D&D will remain of greatest
importance. Truly
understanding an adversary, to include his perceptions and
biases, will be paramount for the
J-2 and the operational commander. Because the J-2 will be the
means that adversaries use
to get to the decision maker, it is also important that they are
familiar with a variety of D&D
means and techniques employed throughout the world.
17
In understanding the challenges that NCW creates, JFCs and J-
2s will be better prepared
to operate within its framework. Already early lessons learned
from Afghanistan point to the
importance of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) and networking
capabilities in creating a clearer picture of the battlespace for
military prosecution.47 As we

develop tactics that go along with sharing information between
sensors and shooters, our
emphasis on D&D awareness, intelligence collection/analytical
processes, and doctrine will
collectively minimize the foreign D&D threat to operational
intelligence. In the end, the
importance of the human contribution in achieving success in
this endeavor must not be lost
on JFCs and their J-2s.
18
Notes
1 Patrick M. Hughes, “A Case for Greater Support for the U.S.
Intelligence
Community,” 20 January 2001,
<http://www.homelanddefense.org/journal/
Commentary/ Hughes_Commentary.htm/> [14 December 2001].
2 “Background Briefing on Enemy Denial and Deception,” 24
October 2001,
<http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi/> [14 December
2001].
3 Major John LeHockey, FMFRP 15-6 Strategic and Operational
Military Deception:
U.S. Marines and the Next Twenty Years (Washington, DC:

HQMC 1989), 16-17.
4 Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and
Deception,” International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 13, no. 4
(2000): 425.
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception,
Joint Pub 3-58
(Washington, DC: 31 May 1996), I-3.
6 Godson and Wirtz, “Strategic Denial and Deception,” 425.
7 Joint Pub 3-58, I-3.
8 Major Donald J. Bacon, Second World War Deception:
Lessons for Today’s Joint
Planner, Wright Flyer Paper, no. 5 (Maxwell Air Force Base,
AL: Air Command and Staff
College, 1998), 13-21.
9 Joint Pub 3-58, IV-2 to IV-9. DES is defined in Milan N.
Vego’s, Operational
Warfare, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000), 637.
10 Ibid., IV.
11 Ibid., A-2.
12 Ibid., IV-7, IV-8.
13 Joint Pub 3-58, GL-2, GL-3.
14 Ibid., GL-2, GL-3.
15 LeHockey, 279, 281.

16 Ibid., 279-280.
17 Ibid., 281-282.
18 Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The
Generals’ War: The
Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company 1995), 230.
19
19 David Kay, “Denial and Deception: The Lessons of Iraq,”
Roy Godson, Ernest R.
May, and Gary Schmitt, eds., U.S. Intelligence at the
Crossroads: Agendas for Reform,
(Washington DC: Brassey’s, 1995), 120.
20 Peter Martin, “The Sky’s the Limit: A Critical Analysis of
the Kosovo Airwar,”
1 November 1999,
<http://www.infowar.com/iwftp/cloaks/99/CD_1999-214.txt/>
[18
December 2001].
21 Ibid. See also Steven Lee Myers “Damage to Serb Military
Less Than Expected,”
28 June 1999,
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/062899kosovo-
bomb-
damage.html > [18 December 2001] and Tim Ripley “Kosovo: A
Bomb Damage

Assessment,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, (September 1999):
10-13.
22 Ibid.
23 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea
(London: I.B. Tauris
Publishers, 2001), 8-9.
24 Ibid, 140.
25 Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Denial and
Deception: The
Twenty-First Century Challenge (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 2002), 177-
178.
26 Barton Whaley, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War,
Vol. I (Boston: 1969),
24-85.
28 This author suggests articles from Michael I. Handel’s
Strategic and Operational
Deception in the Second World, Donald C. Daniel and
Katherine L. Herbig’s Strategic
Military Deception, or Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz’s
Strategic Denial and Deception.
29 Jennifer Lasley, “Denial and Deception: A Serious Threat
to Information
Superiorty?,” (Unpublished Research Paper, National Defense
University, Washington, DC:
2000), 11.
30 Based on author’s personal experience after completing the
following JMITC

mobile training team courses: Intelligence Analyst, Indications
and Warning, and Collection
Management.
32 The intelligence cycle consists of six phases: planning and
direction; collection;
processing and exploitation; analysis and production;
dissemination and integration; and
evaluation and feedback.
33 Barton Whaley, “Toward a General Theory of Deception,”
John Gooch and Amos
Perlmutter eds., Military Deception and Strategic Surprise
(London: Frank Cass, 1982), 190.
34 Richard J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis
(Washington DC: CIA
1999), 72-73.
20
35 This list (modified by the author) comes from an unpublished
handout on deception
from the Armed Forces Staff College, dated approximately
1993. See also Handel’s
Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War,
pages 36-37.
36 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to
Joint Operations, Joint
Pub 2-0 (Washington, DC: 9 March 2000), I-4.
37 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Joint
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Joint Pub 2-01.3
(Washington DC: 24 May
2000), II-56.
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Information
Operations, Joint Pub 3-13,
(Washington DC: 9 October 1998), GL-5.
39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Command and
Control Warfare (C2W),
Joint Pub 3-13.1 (Washington, DC: 7 February 1996), III-6, III-
7.
40 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka,
“Network-Centric
Warfare--Its Origin and Future,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, January 1998, 33.
41 Bart Whaley and Jeffrey Busby, “Detecting Deception:
Practice, Practitioners, and
Theory,” Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz eds., Strategic Denial
and Deception (New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 196-200.
42 Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective
(Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1988), 50-53.
43 Mark Hewish and Bill Sweetman, “Hide and Seek,” Jane’s
International Defense
Review (April 1997): 29.
44 Kevin N. Kearney, “Denial and Deception--Network-Centric
Challenge,”
(Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College,

Newport, RI: 1999), 8-9.
45 Commander Sheila Scarborough, “Network-Centric Warfare
Meets the Laws of the
Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (May 2001): 31.
46 Naval War College Faculty, “Network Centric Warfare: A
Capstone Concept for
Naval Operations in the Information Age,” (Unpublished
Smooth Draft, U.S. Naval War
College, Newport, RI: 2000), 7.
47 Bryan Bender, Kim Burger, and Andrew Koch, “Afghanistan:
First Lessons,”
Jane’s Defense Weekly, 19 December
2001,<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2001/s20011217
first.htm>[17 December 2001].
21
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____________. Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War,
Vol. I. Cambridge:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969.
r Academy of Management Journal
2017, Vol. 60, No. 5, 1882–1914.
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0295
RED QUEEN COMPETITIVE IMITATION IN THE U.K.
MOBILE
PHONE INDUSTRY
CLAUDIO GIACHETTI
Ca’ Foscari University of Venice
JOSEPH LAMPEL
University of Manchester
STEFANO LI PIRA
University of Warwick
This paper uses Red Queen competition theory to examine
competitive imitation. We
conceptualize imitative actions by a focal firm and its rivals
along two dimensions:
imitation scope, which describes the extent to which a firm
imitates a wide range (as
opposed to a narrow range) of new product technologies
introduced by rivals; and
imitation speed, namely the pace at which it imitates these
technologies. We argue that
focal firm imitation scope and imitation speed drive

performance, as well as imitation
scope and speed decisions by rivals, which in turn influence
focal firm performance. We
also argue that the impact of this self-reinforcing Red Queen
process on firms’ actions
and performance is contingent on levels of product technology
heterogeneity—defined
as the extent to which the industry has multiple designs,
resulting in product variety. We
test our hypotheses using imitative actions by mobile phone
vendors and their sales
performance in the U.K. from 1997 to 2008.
Once we become self-consciously aware that the
possibilities of innovation within any one company
are in some important ways limited, we quickly see
that each organization is compelled by competition to
look to imitation as one of its survival and growth
strategies. (Levitt, 1966: 38)
The emergence of what has often been referred to
as the “new economy” has greatly expanded re-
search on the power of technological innovation to
create competitive dynamics that can reshape in-
dustries (Baumol, 2004; Teece, 1998). While the fo-
cus on innovation as the engine of industry evolution
reflects both the potential gains that accrue to first
movers (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), and the
dramatic impact of disruptive technologies on the
competitive landscape (Christensen & Bower, 1996),
it inadvertently tends to eclipse the importance of
imitation as an agent of change. Researchers that take
a broader perspective see imitation as the twin pro-
cess to innovation that, arguably like innovation,
also plays a role in industry evolution in all contexts

(Cohen & Levinthal, 1989; Levitt, 1966; Semadeni &
Anderson, 2010), but takes on even greater signifi-
cance in the rapidly changing technology-intensive
industries that constitute the new economy. As
Baumol (2004: 246–247) observed,
in the new economy no firm [. . .] can afford to fall
behind its rivals. [...] If a firm fails to adopt the latest
technology—even if the technology is created by
others—then its rivals can easily take the lead and
make disastrous inroads into the slower firm’s sales.
Formulating an effective imitation strategy is
a problem that confronts managers in any industry
(Lieberman & Asaba, 2006), but in industries with
rapid technological change the problem is com-
pounded by higher levels of uncertainty about the
market performance of new product technologies
(Utterback & Suarez, 1993). This “technological
We would like to thank Associate Editor Dovev Lavie
and three anonymous reviewers for their invaluable com-
ments and guidance during the review process, which
helped strengthen this article. We would also like to thank
Marco Li Calzi, Massimo Warglien, Francesco Zirpoli,
Anna Comacchio, Juan Pablo Maicas, and Gianluca Marchi
for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this arti-
cle. Finally, we thank seminar participants at Ca’ Foscari
University of Venice, and at a 2015 Academy of Manage-
ment Conference paper session, for their astute remarks on
earlier versions of this article.
1882
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https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.0295
uncertainty” presents managers with considerable
challenges when deciding how far and how fast they
should imitate their rivals, and this challenge per-
sists when their decisions, in turn, create competi-
tive conditions that may bring further pressure to
imitate (Gaba & Terlaak, 2013; Rhee, Kim, & Han,
2006). In this paper, we address the questions of the
extent to which, and speed with which, firms should
imitate their rivals, taking into account both the com-
petitive dynamics that ensue as a result of innovation
and imitation decisions, and the level of technological
uncertainty in rapidly changing technology-intensive
industries.
Our analysis of imitation must begin with the
recognition that imitation is a strategic choice that
firms pursue when they wish to lower risks and
costs by learning from their rivals’ actions, espe-
cially when these actions involve pioneering new
technologies, or launching radically innovative
products (Ethiraj & Zhu, 2008; Lee, Smith, Grimm, &
Schomburg, 2000). However, imitation is also
a competitive move that can pose a threat to rivals
that have yet to adopt the pioneering technologies,
or introduce products with similar features. When
some of the laggards react to the threat by also imi-
tating, this gives rise to “competitive imitation,”
a process in which imitation by some of the firms in
an industry puts competitive pressure on the rest to

also imitate. This process is consistent with the re-
lationship between action and reaction that has
been extensively studied by competitive dynamics
research (Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001). The main
premise of competitive dynamics is that the actions
of one firm, or group of firms, trigger reactions by
other firms, which in turn produce a series of ac-
tions and reactions that continue as long as firms
seek to improve their competitive position (Derfus,
Maggitti, Grimm, & Smith, 2008; Smith, Grimm,
Gannon, & Chen, 1991). In technology-intensive
industries, innovation triggers the competitive im-
itation process. Faced with mounting evidence that
the innovator’s new product technologies are find-
ing a market, other firms that previously refused to
match the innovator’s move begin to experience
increasing pressure to imitate. Their imitative move
serves to entrench the new technologies in the
market even further, which in turn not only in-
creases competitive imitation but also accelerates
the evolution of the industry.
The coevolutionary process by which firms act
and react to each other has been shown by organi-
zational scholars to influence both firm performance
and industry structure (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Not
unexpectedly, scholars have also noted that co-
evolutionary processes in competitive environments
have parallels with biological evolution. The paral-
lels have led scholars to borrow from the work of
evolutionary biologists, notably Van Valen’s (1973)
work on the coevolution of dynamically interacting
species. Of particular interest is the “Red Queen”
effect, the allusion made by Van Valen (1973) to
Alice’s encounter with the Red Queen in Lewis

Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass (Carroll, 1960),
when he sought to explain the constant probability of
species’ extinction regardless of the duration of their
evolutionary history.1 Organization researchers have
argued that what holds for biological evolution is
in principle also the case in business contexts.
Thus, firms can be said to engage in a “Red Queen
competition” (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Barnett &
Sorenson, 2002); that is, the continuous and esca-
lating activity of firms trying to maintain relative
fitness in a dynamic system, such that they end up
improving as fast as they can just to stand still rela-
tive to competitors.
We draw on the literature on Red Queen compe-
tition, and research on competitive dynamics, imi-
tation, and technology innovation, to build a model
that captures how decisions to imitate new product
technologies stimulate further imitation by rivals,
and how this “competitive imitation” in turn in-
fluences, and is influenced by, changing industry
conditions. Our study complements the competitive
dynamics and imitation literature in several re-
spects. To begin with, most extant research on imi-
tation of innovations has tended to see imitation as
a binary variable: firms either imitate or they do
not (e.g., Greve, 1998; Hsieh & Vermeulen, 2013;
Makadok, 1998). In practice firms seldom imitate, or
do not imitate, every aspect of their rivals’ offerings,
but instead tend to imitate some of the features of
products introduced by rivals, while retaining
existing features (Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Giachetti &
Dagnino, 2017). From this it follows that managers
face two basic questions when they consider imita-
tion as the best next move: the first is how much to
copy, i.e., “imitation scope” (Csaszar & Siggelkow,

2010; Narasimhan & Turut, 2013), and the second is
1 In reference to Carroll’s tale, when the Red Queen re-
sponds to Alice “here, you see, it takes all the running you
can do, to keep in the same place” (Carroll, 1960: 345), Van
Valen noted that biological evolution features such
change: species must constantly adapt in order to survive,
while confronting ever-evolving rival species in an ever-
changing environment.
2017 1883Giachetti, Lampel, and Li Pira
how quickly to imitate, i.e., “imitation speed” (Lee
et al., 2000). In this paper, we argue that the scope
and speed decisions of one firm influence the scope
and speed decisions of rivals. Rivals’ imitation
scope and speed decisions will then influence the
firm’s subsequent scope and speed decisions. What
applies to the reaction of rivals to the actions of
a single firm is also true for the industry as a whole. If
we step one level of analysis up to consider the entire
group of industry rivals, we can see Red Queen
competition from a wider perspective: the speed and
scope decisions made by firms at different times in-
duce each other’s speed and scope decisions. Our
contribution in this paper is to show that Red Queen
competition in technology-intensive industries es-
calates the magnitude of imitation speed and scope
choices for all competitors.
Second, thus far, competitive dynamics studies
have not examined how changes in the techno-
logical environment may affect the Red Queen
cycle. This analysis is especially important in

technology-intensive industries where technolog-
ical change, for example the emergence or decline
of dominant designs, can dramatically alter com-
petition (Chen & Turut, 2013), render obsolete
a firm’s capabilities (Barkema, Baum, & Mannix,
2002; Bayus & Agarwal, 2007; Utterback & Suarez,
1993), and encourage firms to develop a new
technology imitation strategy (Narasimhan &
Turut, 2013). It is not difficult to see that changes
in the technological environment that drive new
product introductions are often central to the types
of moves that drive Red Queen competition. For
example, recent studies in the imitation and tech-
nology innovation literature (Argyres, Bigelow, &
Nickerson, 2015; Giachetti & Lanzolla, 2016;
Madhok, Li, & Priem, 2010; Posen, Lee, & Yi, 2013)
have shown that as industries evolve, changes in
technologies, and subsequently their diffusion,
can influence rates of imitation. These studies
complement prior work by authors such as
Utterback and Suarez (1993), who pointed out that
as the industries mature they tend to transition
from high to low levels of product technology
heterogeneity—where low levels of product tech-
nology heterogeneity correspond to the emergence
of design dominance. Low product technology
heterogeneity in turn leads to low technological
uncertainty: firms find it easier to know which
design options are more likely to yield good market
performance, and are thus more likely to imitate.
Our paper examines how product technology het-
erogeneity moderates the Red Queen effect.
Third, existing competitive dynamics studies
have tended to examine antecedents and perfor-
mance outcomes of action types such as pricing,

marketing, and capacity expansion, in industries
such as professional services, professional sports,
and motion pictures, where technology is a minor
competitive factor (Lampel & Shamsie, 2009; Ross &
Sharapov, 2015; Semadeni & Anderson, 2010); or in
industries such as airlines, where technology is
more important but is still peripheral to the main
factors responsible for success (Chen & Miller, 1994;
Miller & Chen, 1994; Smith et al., 1991). In contrast,
we chose to examine Red Queen competitive dy-
namics in an industry where “creative destruction”
(Schumpeter, 1942), triggered by the introduction
of new products and technologies, is the primary
competitive force. The mobile phone industry is
a rapidly changing technology-intensive industry
where continuous and swift imitation of rivals’ in-
novation is a key prerequisite for handset vendors to
maintain competitive parity. More specifically, our
research site is the U.K. mobile phone industry from
1997 to 2008, a period during which the industry
evolved rapidly, driven by incessant rivalry among
a dozen handset vendors to get or keep ahead of one
another.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows. We
begin with an overview of Red Queen theory. We
subsequently define and discuss imitation scope,
imitation speed, and product technology heteroge-
neity, and derive hypotheses about how these as-
pects influence Red Queen competitive imitation.
We then describe our methods and present our re-
sults. We conclude with limitations of our study and
suggestions for future research.
THEORY BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Red Queen Competitive Imitation: Focal Firm,
Rivals, and Firm Performance
In this section, we develop a theory that explains
the Red Queen effect in terms of a firm’s imitation of
new product technologies, rivals’ imitation of new
product technologies, and their combined impact on
the firm’s performance. To ensure that our theory
development is consistent and clear, it is important
to define imitation in contrast to innovation before
we move forward. As pointed out by Semadeni and
Anderson (2010), in markets where firms can closely
examine their competitors’ product offerings and
track the market performance of those offerings in
real time, firms can choose between introducing to
1884 OctoberAcademy of Management Journal
the market products with new features, or confining
their actions to copying features previously in-
troduced by rivals. We likewise also distinguish be-
tween introduction and copying, and define
innovation as introducing first to the market prod-
ucts that contain new features, and imitation as
copying others’ innovations.
In this paper we focus our analysis on imitative
actionswhile controlling for innovative actions. Two
types of imitative decisions are examined: imitation
scope and imitation speed. Our decision is based on
evidence provided by different but complementary
streams of literature. On the one hand, the technol-
ogy innovation literature has argued that a wider
imitation scope is an indication that the firm’s

products can stay abreast of new technologies
(Narasimhan & Turut, 2013). Yet, at the same time,
the literature on first-mover advantage, as well as
competitive dynamics literature, has focused more
closely on imitation speed, arguing that higher imi-
tation speed is a signal the firm is one of the first
players committed to adopting new technologies so
as to keep up with innovators and differentiate with
respect to laggard rivals (Lee et al., 2000; Markides &
Geroski, 2004). Though these studies have been in-
terested in whether imitation represents a source of
performance differences, they have posed somewhat
different research questions, and thus have pro-
gressed along independent trajectories. In practice,
when a firm faces a group of rivals who are in-
troducing new products with a variety of features at
different times, they cannot focus only on scope or
speed, but must consider both the question of how
many of the features the firm should imitate, and also
how quickly it should proceed with imitation. In this
article, we propose to bring together the different
analyses of imitation and competition explored in
these bodies of literature in order to obtain a broader
understanding of the roles that imitation scope and
speed play in sustaining the Red Queen competitive
imitation.
Because Red Queen competition describes a re-
ciprocal back-and-forth process, firms play different
roles in different time periods, and it is important to
be clear and consistent about the labels we use when
referring to firms. In Red Queen papers, the “focal
firm” and “rivals” may switch places in the analysis
over time. The “focal firm” is the industry player
whose imitative moves attract attention and call for
a response from other firms, the “rivals” at that spe-

cific point in time. For example, we could say that at
time t the “focal firm,” having observed new product
technologies introduced by one or several of its
“rivals” in t 2 1, must decide how many of these
technologies it should imitate. In this context, “ri-
vals” are all the other firms within the industry that
the “focal firm” sees as competitors. “Rivals,” for
their part, observe the focal firm’s moves, gauge the
resulting performance, and decide on how many of
these moves they should imitate at time t 1 1. This
turns the rival firms into focal firms, who are now
observing and analyzing moves recently made by
rivals. Their actions challenge rivals, who must now
consider their moves, and so on.
To summarize, the baseline Red Queen competi-
tive imitation we develop in this section works as
follows. Focal firms that successfully imitate new
product technologies obtain performance advantages
(e.g., sales increases) by virtue of competitive advan-
tage that they hold vis-à-vis rivals that imitate either
less intensively (i.e., lower imitation scope), or more
slowly (i.e., lower imitation speed). Higher perfor-
mance of focal firms that imitate more intensively, or
more rapidly, combined with performance losses ex-
perienced byrivals, willmotivatethe lattertorespond
by increasing their imitation scope and speed. The
more intense and rapid the rivals’ imitative response,
the more the focal firm experiences a threat to its
performance, and the more it feels pressure to
respond—by innovating or imitating.
It is worth noting that our theory of Red Queen
competitive imitation describes competition as the re-
sult of a sequence of imitative actions after a set of

new product technologies are introduced. We argue
that focal firms imitate innovators (i.e., technology pi-
oneers), and rivals subsequently imitate focal firms
in an incessant race to maintain competitive parity
(Lieberman&Asaba,2006).Morespecifically,whilethe
rationale for the first imitations (by the quickest imita-
tors) is “informationally based”—i.e., when making
imitative decisions first imitators use the information
generated by market performance of the new technol-
ogies introduced by innovators—the rationale for
subsequent imitations is also motivated by “competi-
tive bandwagon” pressure (Abrahamson & Rosenkopf,
1993)—i.e., the pressure on nonimitators when they
face diminishing profit opportunities as more of their
competitors imitate innovative first movers.
The Competitive Advantage of More Active Firms:
Learning and Repertoires of Actions
Taking their inspiration from Joseph Schumpeter,
specifically his concept of “creative destruction”
(Schumpeter, 1942)—which, concisely summarized,
arguesthat competition is adynamicmarket processin
which entrepreneurs trigger and respond to change—
competitive dynamics research has shown that more
“active” firms, defined as those that take more frequent
competitive actions than most of their industry rivals,
are more likely to attain higher performance (Ferrier,
Smith, & Grimm, 1999; Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996).
In contrast, firms that lag behind most of their industry
rivalswhen it comestotaking competitiveactionstend

to be at a competitive disadvantage (Miller & Chen,
1994). There are several related factors that account for
this relationship. First, firms that are more active are
more likely to keep pace with change in a rapidly
changing environment (Chen, Lin, & Michel, 2010;
Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011; Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor,
2001). Second, because they make more moves, these
firms are also more likely to take actions that change
the environment in ways that are favorable to them,
and lessfavorabletolessactivefirms (Rindova, Ferrier,
& Wiltbank, 2010). Finally, in dynamic environments
in which the direction and consequences of change are
uncertain, firms that are more active have a shorter
learning cycle compared to firms that are less active.
Active firms capture and put to use the knowledge
gained from observing their rivals more quickly com-
pared to firms that hesitate (Baum & Ingram, 1998;
Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000; Greve, 1996).
Learning also plays a central role in research on
Red Queen competition. Initial Red Queen studies
sought to show that competition and learning trigger
one another in an ongoing, self- reinforcing process
(Barnett & McKendrick, 2004; Barnett & Sorenson,
2002). As Barnett and Sorenson (2002: 290) put it,
Red Queen is a process that results when “competi-
tion among organizations triggers internal learning
processes; and learning increases the strength of
competition generated by an organization.” More
recent Red Queen research has focused to a greater
extent on learning as a process in which rivals try to
figure out the causal mechanism that links a reper-
toire of competitive moves to performance (Derfus
et al., 2008). The simplest competitive repertoire
consists of a single move. In markets where a single
move type is central to performance (e.g., price re-

duction), Red Queen is confined to single-type tit-
for-tat responses. In most markets, however, the focal
firm’s competitive advantage (or disadvantage) re-
sults from a combination of successful (or failed)
competitive actions,2 and firms face choices about
which combination of moves they should employ. If
the repertoire of possible moves focuses primarily on
product technologies, firms have to assess which of
the new technologies launched by rivals should be
imitated, and which should be avoided.
In the remaining part of this theory section, we
develop a set of hypotheses about our theory of Red
Queen competitive imitation. Our argument is that
focal firms will perform better than “less active”
imitators if they are “more active,” both in terms of
the number of new product technologies they imitate
and the speed at which they are able to imitate.
Further, we argue that product technology heteroge-
neity may constrain focal firms’ learning capabilities,
obstructing their ability to increase performance via
imitative actions.
Scope and Average Speed of a Firm’s Imitation of
New Product Technologies and its Performance
How much to copy: Imitation scope as a com-
petitive response. In the specific context of new
product technology in which we are interested,
multiple imitation opportunities present firms with
the strategic choice regarding how many of the
technologies introduced by rivals they should
imitate. This scenario is typical in technology-
intensive industries, such as consumer electronics
(e.g., mobile phones and personal computers),

where firms constantly face competitive threats
from new product technologies that expand the set
of functionalities that are offered to consumers
(Bayus & Agarwal, 2007). The choice that confronts
firms as new products with new functionalities
enter the market is how many of these functional-
ities they should incorporate into their products.
The choice targets what we call “imitation scope;”
that is, the extent to which a firm (in a given period)
imitates a wide number (as opposed to a narrow
number) of new product technologies introduced
by competitors.
When looking at imitation scope, we have to bear
in mind that consumers evaluate the desirability of
adopting new features in the context of the entire
bundle of functionalities offered by the product
(O’Shaughnessy, 1989). In other words, consumers
compare products with, and without, a given func-
tionality before making a purchase. The inclusion of
a functionality will not necessarily motivate them to
make a purchase, unless the additional functionality
adds to the value of the package as a whole. First
movers (i.e., innovators) must make this evaluation
without prior market data (or at best consumer re-
search data), while imitators can use the market
2 See Chen and Miller (2012) for an extensive review
comparing studies on single actions versus action
repertoires.
performance of new functionalities when making

this decision (Carpenter & Nakamoto, 1989). The
problem, however, is that firms have data on mul-
tiple functionalities. Some of these functionalities
are present in the same product, which makes it
difficult to evaluate them separately, while other
functionalities are spread across multiple products
and present in a variety of combinations—creating
an even greater evaluation challenge (Krishnan &
Bhattacharya, 2002).
If firms cannot analyze the sales potential of indi-
vidual functionalities, the question that arises is
whether they can evaluate the potential of sets of
functionalities. Technology innovation literature that
has examined the consumer buying behavior of
products with multiple functionalities (Chen & Turut,
2013) has suggested that when firms have to assess
how consumers evaluate a set of objects—in our case,
products that offer certain functionalities—they will
evaluate the options they are presented by consider-
ing both the absolute utility of each feature (e.g., text
messaging in mobile phones), and their relative
standing in the choice set (i.e., how valuable text
messaging is relative to other functionalities in the
set). The evaluation relies on reference points that are
endogenous to the choice set (Baucells, Weber, &
Welfens, 2011). This can be the product that the
consumer currently owns, or some idealized combi-
nation of functionalities in the product that the con-
sumer wishes to purchase (Zhou, 2011). Reference
points in a technologically mature industry where
products perform a stable set of well-established
functionalities are more likely to be based on price,
since the difference between the functionalities of old
and new products is not substantial. However, in in-
dustries where technology is evolving rapidly, as in

most technology-intensive industries, consumers’
reference points are future oriented, and tend to
change as new functionalities are introduced. As
Chen and Turut (2013: 2748) put it:
Context dependent preferences are especially rele-
vant for consumers’ adoption of technology in-
novation because the reference points of product
attributes in consumers’ minds are likely to evolve
over time with the advance of technology and the ar-
rival of new products in the market; this influences
consumers’ adoption of products with new technol-
ogy and consequently firms’ innovation strategies.
Introduction of new functionalities in the form of
new product features or attributes tends to shift the
reference point toward the innovative feature, and
away from old features. Put differently, consumers
will value the entire set of functionalities in a prod-
uct more if the product includes new functionalities
that represent the next step in the evolution of un-
derlyingtechnologies. This shift in reference point as
technology evolves strongly influences the compet-
itive logic in these markets. While it creates in-
centives to innovate new functionalities, it creates
even stronger incentives to imitate (Narasimhan &
Turut, 2013).
Narasimhan and Turut (2013) provided empirical
support for the advantages of imitation, showing that
firms attain higher performance if they choose to im-
itate as many pioneering features introduced by rivals
as possible, rather than differentiate by introducing
their own features. Their conclusions are in line with
other empirical studies of consumer attitudes sug-

gesting that in markets where technology is rapidly
evolving, consumers evaluate more favorably brands
with a reputation for staying abreast of new technol-
ogies, while at the same time displaying a strong bias
against brands that lack the latest technologies
(O’Shaughnessy, 1989; Pessemier, 1978). From the
point of view of firms that are considering how many
of the new functionalities they should adopt in the
new product offerings, this suggests that firms are
more likely to gain sales if they adopt as many of the
new features as their capabilities will allow. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a. An increase in the focal firm
scope of imitation of new product technologies
will positively influence its performance.
How fast to copy: Average speed of imitation as
a competitive response. Another question firms
must confront is how quickly to imitate rivals’ moves
(Markides & Geroski, 2004). Similar to our discus-
sion on imitation scope in technology-intensive in-
dustries where firms launch products that combine
multiple technologies, and hence present multiple
imitation opportunities, a related decision that con-
fronts firms is how quickly these multiple technol-
ogies should be imitated. At the product line level,
this choice targets what we call “average speed of
imitation:” the average time it takes for the focal firm
to adopt the set of new product technologies in-
troduced by rivals.
From a decision-making perspective, the question
of how quickly a firm should imitate its rivals has
been explored primarily from the perspective of first-
mover advantage (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988).

The merit of moving first with a new product has
been extensively argued and documented (Makadok,
1998). Researchers, however, have also come to
recognize that firms that move later can avoid many
of the risks that confront first movers by observing,
analyzing, and then imitating their products and
technologies (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998;
Markides & Geroski, 2004). What is less certain is
how quickly late movers have to act if they want to
minimize risks and maximize the advantages of early
information. Studies in the competitive dynamics
and first-mover literature have suggested that, on the
whole, fast imitators—i.e., firms that imitate earlier
than others pioneering innovations—will generally
do better than firms that are slow to imitate (Lee et al.,
2000). The advantages of fast imitation are especially
strong in industries where first adopters of new
product technologies benefit from “spatial pre-
emption”; that is, the filling of product differentia-
tion niches before late adopters enter (Rao &
Rutenberg, 1979; Rindova et al., 2010). Because
spatial preemption limits the product differentiation
opportunities available to late adopters, we expect
rapid imitation of new product technologies to de-
liver higher performance for imitators that move
faster. In other words, higher average speed of imi-
tation of new product technologies offers the focal
firm more differentiation opportunities with respect
to later imitators, and is likely thereafter to lead to
higher sales volume.

The advantages of quick imitation of new product
technologies, however, are not confined to spatial
preemption. Quick imitation also has a significant
impact on consumer perception of firm reputation.
Research has shown that consumers tend to view firms
that quickly adopt new technologies as generally more
innovative (Alpert & Kamins, 1995; Carpenter &
Nakamoto, 1989; Kardes & Kalyanaram, 1992). This
judgment creates a “halo” effect that favorably skews
the evaluation of the firm’s product line, and hence
contributes to sales growth. In contrast, the product
lines of firms that are slow to adopt new technologies
(i.e., have low average speed of imitation) are judged
morenegativelybyconsumers.Thisnegativelyskewed
judgment tends to depress sales growth for slow
adopters. Therefore, in a context of multiple imitation
opportunities, firms with a high average speed of
imitation of new product technologies will be viewed
as technology leaders, and hence will benefit from
a higher reputation among customers that will en-
hance their sales performance. Thus, we predict:
Hypothesis 1b. An increase in the focal firm’s
average speed of imitation of new product
technologies will positively influence its
performance.
Scope and Average Speed of a Firm’s Imitation of
new Product Technologies and the Scope and
Average Speed of Rivals’ Imitative Actions
As noted earlier, Red Queen competition suggests
that as the number of focal firm actions increases, the
number of rival firm actions increases as well (Derfus
etal.,2008). Thatisbecausethe greaterthe focal firm’s
competitive activity, the more competitors are likely

to perceive a threat to their performance, which in
turn makes it more likely that they will respond
(Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Barnett & McKendrick,
2004). In other words, a focal firm’s increase in com-
petitive activity will present rivals with a challenge
that will increase in magnitude if the focal firm moves
ahead with new product offerings that leave rivals
with market spaces that are less and less valued by
customers. This threat will force rivals to respond
with competitive moves of their own in order to close
the gap and maintain their position.
Lieberman and Asaba (2006: 380) noted that
“rivalry-based imitation often proceeds over many
rounds, where firms repeatedly match each other’s
moves.” Generally speaking, rivalry encourages im-
itation, which in turn encourages more rivalry. The
competitive dynamics literature has suggested that
competitors that wish to maintain competitive parity
must imitate intensively (i.e., imitation scope) and
rapidly (i.e., imitation speed). This imitation effort
escalates as rivals struggle for profits and market
share. Indeed, the improved focal firm performance
derived from intense and rapid imitation of new
product technologies comes at the expense of rivals’
performance, which, in turn, may prompt rivals to
trigger aggressive imitative actions that emulate the
focal firm’s successful imitations. This gives us the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a. As the scope of the focal firm’s
imitation of new product technologies in-
creases, the scope of rivals’ imitation of new
product technologies will also increase.
Hypothesis 2b. As the average speed of the focal

firm’s imitation of new product technologies
increases, the average speed of rivals’ imitation
of new product technologies will also increase.
Scope and Average Speed of Rivals’ Imitation of
New Product Technologies and the Focal Firm’s
Performance
Various studies in the management and strategy
literature have analyzed whether and how the
intensity of competitive rivalry affects industry
members’ performance. A study by Young et al.
(1996) showed that increases in the number of rival
actions in a sample of software firms has a detri-
mental effect on the focal firm’s performance. Simi-
larly, Chen and Miller’s (1994) and Smith et al.’s
(1991) analyses of competitive dynamics in the air-
line industry showed that when rivals respond more
strongly to earlier moves by the focal firm, perfor-
mance of the latter will decrease. They suggested that
the more actions rivals carry out, and the greater the
speed of execution, the more the focal firm’s perfor-
mance will be damaged.
Likewise, in their analysis of Red Queen compe-
tition, Derfus et al. (2008) showed that when the focal
firm undertakes a new competitive action, both the
number and speed of rival countermoves increase,
leading to a decrease in focal firm performance.
Overall, extant studies have pointed to broader and
faster imitation by rivals as having a negative impact

on focal firm performance. This gives us the follow-
ing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a. With the scope of the focal firm’s
imitation of new product technologies held
constant, as the scope of rivals’ imitation of new
product technologies increases, focal firm per-
formance decreases.
Hypothesis 3b. With the average speed of the
focal firm’s imitation of new product technolo-
gies held constant, as the average speedof rivals’
imitation of new product technologies in-
creases, focal firm performance decreases.
The Moderating Effect of Product Technology
Heterogeneity in the Market
Recent studies in the strategy and technology in-
novation literature (Argyres, Bigelow & Nickerson,
2015; Giachetti & Lanzolla, 2016; Madhok et al., 2010;
Posen et al., 2013) have suggested that evolving in-
dustry characteristics, in particular changes caused
bythe introduction of newtechnologies, can affectthe
level of uncertainty in the competitive environment.
This in turn constrains the firms’ ability to learn from
rivals, reducing the effectiveness of imitation as
a competitive weapon. These findings are in line with
previous work on the industry life cycle (e.g.,
Utterback & Suarez, 1993), which has pointed out
that as industries mature they tend to transition
from high to low levels of product technology
heterogeneity—where high levels of heterogeneity
correspond to a situation in which there are more
designs contending for consumer attention, and more

product features that can be incorporated into prod-
ucts. In other words, the level of product technology
heterogeneity expresses the extent to which products
launched by all competitors are equipped with simi-
lar or different technologies. A low level of product
technology heterogeneity is the result of a “high de-
gree of design dominance,” while a high level of
product technology heterogeneity is the product of
a “low degree of design dominance.”
Since high product technology heterogeneity entails
a situation in which a clear dominant design has yet to
emerge, often because several key technologies are
vying for acceptance, firms in such an environment
have to cope with technological uncertainty when it
comes to deciding which technologies they should
install in their products (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982;
Makadok, 1998; Utterback & Suarez, 1993). One way
for firms to deal with technological uncertainty is to
observe the technologies that rivals imitated pre-
viously. However, the information obtained from
observing rivals’ imitation when technological un-
certainty is high is more noisy, and hence a less re-
liable guide for judging the merits of new product
technologies (Posen & Levinthal, 2012). In rapidly
changing competitive environments, as is the case in
Red Queen competition, technological uncertainty
can therefore slow down the learning process, con-
strain decision making, and hence adversely affect
performance. As Barkema et al. (2002: 921) pointed
out, “organizations that learn slowly from competi-
tors may find their innovation performance rapidly
deteriorating.”3
This leads us to argue that the extent to which
a focal firm’s and rivals’ imitative actions affect the

focal firm’s performance (Hypotheses 4a and 4b, and
6a and 6b), and the extent to which the focal firm’s
imitative actions trigger rivals’ imitative actions
(Hypotheses 5a and 5b), depends on the level of
product technology heterogeneity.
Product technology heterogeneity: Focal firm’s
scope and average speed of imitation and focal
firm performance. As we noted earlier, high product
technology heterogeneity increases imitative un-
certainty. This means that focal firms are less certain
3 As also remarked by Posen and Levinthal (2012) in
their analysis of turbulent (i.e., rapidly changing) envi-
ronments, “turbulence reduces the value of efforts to gen-
erate new knowledge becausethelifespan of returns to new
knowledge is reduced in a world in which change is more
frequent” (594).
about which product technologies they should imi-
tate, and which they should ignore. It also means that
the learning process for focal firms is more difficult,
since in this uncertain scenario firms need time and
resources to figure out which are the most effective
technology adoption strategies. Thus, although, in
general, we expect focal firms that are particularly
“active” when imitating new product technologies
(i.e., high imitation scope and speed) to stand a better
chance of successfully differentiating their offerings
when compared to imitating rivals that are less active,
this prediction may not hold when product technol-
ogy heterogeneity is high. When product heteroge-

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