AssignmentCritically examine and evaluate Rawlss or Nozicks t

Assignment:
Critically examine and evaluate Rawls's or Nozick's theory of
social justice.* Your examination must include the following:
(a) Clearly outline the essential principles and elements of the
theory you choose to cover.
(b) Evaluate the theory with respects to its strengths and
weaknesses.
(c) State whether you think that the theory is a reasonable basis
upon which a
just society
should be organized. Justify your position with cogent
arguments.
(*) In this essay you are required to focus on only
ONE
of the two theories. Of course, if you so choose, you may
address, compare, or contrast the two theories. However, make
sure you answer all the essay questions fully and thoroughly
regarding at least one theory.
Instructions:
Short writing assignments must be
no less
than two hundred (200)
of

your own words
. This means that
quotations do not count against the two hundred words
. I will not even read assignments shorter than the required
minimum of 200 words (I use a program to monitor word-count)
and you will automatically receive zero (0) points for any such
assignments. I expect a professionally written essay that is well
formulated, without spelling and grammatical errors. I will
deduct points for sloppily written essays (see the rubric below).
In your essay you should address the question posed directly
and thoroughly. You do not need to waste too much space on
background unless the question of the essay specifically
demands such background.
Notes from instructor:
Rawls (2007) and Nozick (2007).
Note
: Remember that you must also read the articles assigned each
week. Instructor’s notes are not a substitute for reading the
original articles.
A. Preliminaries.
Economic justice
is one of the most, if not the most, difficult and important
social problem humanity faced during the 20thCentury and I
venture to say that it will face throughout the 21stCentury.
Below I will state two of the most important social problems
humanity has faced and then offer a brief historicaloutline of
the problems and why are we still facing the problem of
economic justice.

1. As far back as human beings were able to reflect upon their
own society, humanity encountered two intimately related, yet
separate, problems about the best way to organize their social
identity:
(I)
The Problem of Political-Organization
: What justifies the political authority of one agent ruling over
any other agent?
and
(II)
The Problem of Economic-Organization (or Economic Justice)
: What is a just and fair distribution of material goods (i.e.,
resources, wealth, and property)?
2. In order to understand the nature of these two problems and
appreciate their complexity, it is imperative to distinguish
between an
explanatory
versus a
normative
or
justificatory
approach from which each can be examined. The
explanatory
approach aims to give a causal account that
explains
facts about the manner in which a given society is organized on
a variety of different dimensions (e.g., political, economic,
cultural, etc.,). The
normative
or
justificatory
approach, by contrast, inquires about whether those very same

facts are
justified
and if so in what way.
3. Consider, for instance, the problem of Political-Organization
(problem (I) above). Throughout much of human history, the
most common form of Political-Organization has been one form
or another of
Monarchy
. Now, one might
explain
the fact that monarchs obtained and maintained their political
power by appeal to force. However, such an explanation, even if
true, does not address the question of what justifies the
authority of the monarch to rule, since the later question is a
normative
one, not a descriptive one.
4. During the 16th and 17th Centuries the question of the
justification of the authority
of monarchs to rule was explicitly asked by several thinkers
such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, (the so-called Social-
Contract theorists), and others. The prevailing (and only)
normative
answer to this question appealed to
divine authority
. Without going into too much historical detail, several authors
(particularly Locke) demonstrated the inadequacy of this form
of justification for the authority of monarchs to rule.
5. However, challenging the divine authority of monarchs to
rule is one thing; offering an alternative
normative
account that justifies the authority to rule of one agent over
another is an altogether different matter. The Social-Contract-
Theory offered an answer to the later question:

the only
justification for the
authority of one person to rule over another derives from a
contractual agreement based upon the autonomous consent of
the parties involved.
5. The Social-Contract-Theory offered what appeared to be a
viable solution to the Political-Organization Problem. Free and
autonomous persons consent to a contractual agreement to
transfer some of their natural rights to an authority in exchange
for certain services that such an authority provides.
6. While the Social-Contract-Theory addressed the problem of
political organization and offered a viable solution, it altogether
ignored the second problem noted above; i.e., the problem of
Economic-Organization. I suspect that social contract theorists
thought that once an adequate normative account is given to the
political organization problem, the economic organization
problem will take care of itself. This hypothesis seemed to make
sense, since those who controlled political power generally also
controlled economic wealth. As it turns out, the hypothesis was
wrong. Even if one thinks that social-contract theory adequately
solves the political organization problem, the 19th and
20thCenturies have clearly demonstrated that the economic
organization problem still persists. Hence, one of the most
important social problem humanity faces during the 21st century
is the problem of economic organization.
7. It is extremely important to understand that the problem of
economic organization is predicated on the assumption that
material goods are scarce.
8. A second important point to remember is this: once the
normative question is raised about the nature and character of a

just and/or fair economic organization )problem (II) above),
many assumptions taken for granted by the social contract
theorists may be challenged, including the question of the
justification of private property ownership.
9. I hope the above offers you a reasonable historical and
conceptual background to the problem of economic justice and
to Rawls’ and Nozick’s approaches to solving it.
[Below you will find notes for each of the authors courtesy of
Dr. Mark Vuletic. I found his notes very clear and helpful so I
offer them to you intact.]
B. Rawls (2007)
1. Rawls’ theory of justice
Article #52 was extracted from John Rawls’ book, A Theory of
Justice, which is generally
considered the most influential book on political philosophy
published in the last century.
Since we are dealing only with an excerpt, the account you will
get of Rawls will be
very much simplified; however, even the simplification is
complicated enough, and will
provide ample substance for reflection.
Rawls wants to develop and defend the idea of JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS, according to
which “the principles of justice for the basic structure of society
[are] the principles that

free and rational persons concerned to further their own
interests would accept in an
initial position of equality” (Rawls 2007, p. 565). This idea
often is understood as a variation
on a class of ethical theories known as contractarian theories,
according to which
moral obligations arise from mutual agreement among rational
individuals to be bound
by those obligations. However, Rawls’ theory is different in two
main ways: (i) it deals
only with the nature of justice, rather than, more broadly, with
the nature of the right—
considerations of justice may be relevant in determining which
actions are right, but they
are not the only relevant considerations; (ii) its goal is to give
us only broad principles
for “the basic structure of society,” not principles to govern all
of our individual actions.
Rawls’ theory, in short, is a political theory rather than a
comprehensive ethical one.
2 The original position and the veil of ignorance
Two of the key ideas Rawls introduces are the idea of the
ORIGINAL POSITION and the

VEIL OF IGNORANCE. The original position is the “initial
position of equality” Rawls
refers to above, and the veil of ignorance is a device that helps
us to figure out what the
original position would be like.
The veil of ignorance is exactly what it sounds like—veils hide
certain things from
observers, producing ignorance in the observers about what is
hidden. If I place a veil
over my window, and you are walking down the street, you will
not be able to see what
is inside my home, and so will be ignorant of its contents.1 In
the case of Rawls’ veil of
ignorance, the veil in question hides from us virtually all of the
things we know about
ourselves as individuals. For instance, when you imagine
yourself behind the veil of
ignorance, you have to imagine yourself losing all knowledge
about your social status,
your nationality, your economic class, the color of your skin,
your personal talents, and
even your own conception of the good (this last point is very
important, and we will
come back to it in a bit). The veil of ignorance also hides from

us virtually everything we
know about the world, so you would also not know, for
instance, how people and natural
resources are distributed geographically. You lose all of this
when you step behind the
veil of ignorance.
Now, there are a few things you still can know about yourself
and the world when
you are in the original position. The article does not go into
this, so I will quote from the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here to give you a sample:
The parties [behind the veil of ignorance] are not however
completely ignorant
of facts. They know all kinds of general facts about persons and
societies, including
knowledge of the relatively uncontroversial laws and
generalizations
derivable from economics, psychology, political science, and
biology and other
natural sciences. They know then about the general tendencies
of human behavior
and psychological development, about biological evolution, and
about

how economic markets work, including neoclassical price
theory of supply
and demand. As discussed below, they also know about the
circumstances of
justice—moderate scarcity and limited altruism—as well as the
desirability of
the “primary social goods” that are needed to live a good life
and to develop
their “moral powers.”
So, these general items of knowledge, plus ignorance of one’s
particular circumstances,
are components of the original position. The last significant
component of the original position
is the presumption that agents in the original position are self-
interested—they seek
to maximize their own benefit as much as possible. Thus, to
sum up once more, if you
imagine yourself in the original position, you are imagining
yourself being self-interested,
but lacking all knowledge—especially knowledge about
yourself—except knowledge of
the very broad facts listed above.
Now, suppose you were in the original position, and you had to
decide upon “the principles

of justice for the basic structure of society.” Which principles
would you choose?
Rawls believes that the principles a rational person would come
up with under these
circumstances are the true principles of justice.
Mind you, now, Rawls is not suggesting that anyone is, or ever
has been, in the original
position (one would have to have a terrible case of amnesia to
actually be behind the veil of
ignorance, and amnesiacs, of course, do not have the power to
dictate the basic structure
of society). The original position is just a hypothetical device
that is supposed to lead you
to the right answer.
So, what principles would a rational person choose under these
circumstances?
3 Rawls’ principles of justice
One principle Rawls thinks a rational person in the original
position would not choose
is the principle of utility, by which Rawls designates the
principle that says that society
ought to be ordered so as to maximize total individual well -
being. Why? Because it is

quite possible that the principles which maximize total
individual well-being result in
some individuals losing out completely. But, if you had no idea
who you are, then how
could you possibly know you would not turn out to be one of
the individuals who loses
out when the veil of ignorance lifts? Rawls thinks a rational,
self-interested person would
not want to run that risk, and hence would reject the principle of
utility as a principle for
the basic structure of society.
The two principles Rawls thinks people in the original position
would choose are:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty
compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and
(b) attached
to positions and offices open to all. (571)
The first principle is commonly referred to as the LIBERTY
PRINCIPLE. It is conventional

to divide the second principle into two distinct ones based upon
two clauses, clause
(a) being called the DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE, and clause (b)
being called the PRINCIPLE OF
FAIR EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
The “basic liberties” referred to by the liberty principle are
(roughly), the right to vote,
eligibility for public office, freedom of speech, freedom of
assembly, liberty of conscience
/ freedom of thought, freedom to hold personal property, and
freedom from arbitrary
search and seizure.
The principles are ordered, so that violations of the liberty
principle are not permitted
even for the sake of greater social or economic advantages for
all. Also, they are not
absolute, but the best and widest approximation we have to
justice. Where they fail, we
fall back upon the more general principle that unequal
distributions of anything can only
be justified if the distribution is to everyone’s advantage.
One may ask, why would Rawls think that someone in the
original position would

care about all of the basic liberties listed? And why rate them so
important that one
would not be willing to sacrifice some of them for greater social
or economic advantages
for everyone? Remember that, according to Rawls, one doesn’t
even know what one’s own
conception of the good is, when behind the veil of ignorance.
That is, if you envision yourself
in the original position, you have to envision yourself not
knowing what kind of life you
want to live. Given this, Rawls points out that the safest bet for
you is to accept living in
a society in which you are guaranteed the basic liberties in his
list. If, when the veil of
ignorance is removed, it turns out that you do not want to
exercise one of those rights,
you will not have to—but having all of those rights guaranteed
to you is the only way,
behind the veil of ignorance, that you can be sure you will have
the choice to not exercise
one of those rights. That is, even if you realize that you might
turn out to be an opponent
of liberal society, you still will want a guarantee that your
views will not be quashed,

which in turn requires you to have the basic liberties above.
Thus, says Rawls, no one in
the original position can rationally want to trade his or her basic
liberties for anything.
However, as you may have noticed, Rawls takes agents in the
original position to be
risk-averse. The two principles he thinks agents will settle on
express the MAXIMIN RULE,
according to which the best of a set of alternatives is the
alternative with the least bad
worst-case outcome. According to Rawls, the maximin rule is a
rational strategy under
certain conditions, all of which he believes are satisfied when
one stands behind the veil
of ignorance:
1. The probabilities of the various outcomes are unknown
(trivially satisfied by the
original position).
2. The person choosing doesn’t care much whether an outcome
goes beyond merely
good enough (Rawls needs this so people will not gamble with
minimum social
advantages for a chance at greater social advantages—to him,

rational people will
be satisfied when they pass a certain standard of well -being)
3. The situation involves grave risks (also satisfied by the
original position—if you
choose the wrong principles, you may stand to lose everything
when the veil of
ignorance lifts).
If Rawls is mistaken about the veil of ignorance requiring a
rational person to follow
the maximin rule, then he may be mistake n about the principles
of justice a rational
person would choose.
C. Nozick (2007)
4
Nozick’s
theory of justice
Robert Nozick’s understanding of justice is nearly as far
removed from Rawls’ as can be.
According to Nozick, “a distribution is just if everyone is
entitled to the holdings they
possess under the distribution” (579). A person is entitled to a
holding if (and only if) the

holding has been:
1. acquired in accordance with the principle of JUSTICE IN
ACQUISITION, or
2. acquired in accordance with the principle of JUSTICE IN
TRANSFER, from someone
who is entitled to the holding.
One of the unfortunate (and, frankly, bizarre) aspects of
Nozick’s work is that it never
explicitly defines the two alleged “principles” above. Hence, I
will simply drop the word
principle, and simply refer to justice in acquisition and justice
in transfer as properties that
acquisition of holdings can have or lack.
5 A process view of justice
Nozick’s view of justice is a process view: whether or not a
distribution is just is determined
by how a distribution came into being, rather than by the form a
distribution has. According
to Nozick, any distribution, no matter what it looks like, is just,
as long as the
individual holdings in the distribution were acquired in a
manner that satisfies the criteria

for justice in acquisition or justice in transfer.
6 What are the criteria for justice in acquisition?
Nozick does not explain what the criteria of justice in
acquisition are in your reading, so I
will summarize some of his discussion elsewhere to fill in this
gap. First, let’s understand
that when Nozick talks about acquisition in this context, he
means acquisition through a
means other than transfer: he is talking about the original
process by which holdings are
generated in the first place. JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704)
originally argued that we generate
property (holdings) by “mixing our labor” with raw materials;
Nozick proceeds in a similar
vein. For instance, according to the two, if you came across a
patch of unclaimed land,
you wouldn’t simply be able to stipulate that it is yours;
however, if you started to work
the land—say, by tilling the soil—then the land would become
your property because you
have mixed your labor into it. Likewise, you can’t just mark off
a copse of trees as your
own (unless you have planted them), but if you do the work of
cutting them down, the

lumber becomes your property.
Justice in acquisition does not necessarily involve mixing labor
with raw natural resources;
it can involve converting justly transferred holdings into a new
kind of holding.
For instance, to justly acquire shoes, you do not need to procure
leather by hunting and
tanning; you can simply purchase the leather from someone else
(a just transfer of raw
materials), and convert them into shoes. The shoes themselves
are new holdings, and you
have acquired them justly because they derive from the mixing
of your labor with other
materials which you held justly.
There are limits on these processes (for instance, there are
limits to what unclaimed
resources you can justly acquire through labor if the resource is
sufficiently scarce), but
we won’t worry about them. I just wanted to give you a sense of
how it is that one can
generate new holdings where there were no holdings before.
7 What are the criteria for justice in transfer?

Although Nozick does not explicitly say what justice in transfer
is, we can infer his meaning
from the kinds of transfers he says are ruled out, such transfers
based on theft or
fraud. It seems that to Nozick, a transfer is just if it is (i)
voluntary, in the sense of uncoerced,
and (ii) informed, in the sense that both parties in the transfer
know exactly what
is happening (so that neither is being defrauded). It does not
necessarily have to be a wise
transfer, or a compassionate transfer, or a useful transfer, just a
transfer that you freely opt
to make without having been actively deceived by someone.
8 The theory neither precludes nor requires any particular
pattern
of distribution
Let me underscore one of the first things I said about Nozick:
on his theory, we cannot
tell whether a distribution is just simply by looking at the
pattern; any distribution can be
just, and any distribution can be unjust. Why? Let’s consider a
few possible distributions:
Person 1

Person 2
Person 3
Distribution A
5
5
5
Distribution B
7
10
14
Distribution C
2
50
1000
How might each of these distributions come about in a just
manner, according to Nozick?
Here’s one way: let’s suppose that everyone starts out with
nothing whatsoever, so that
there is no question about the justice of the initial distribution.

Each distribution could
represent the product of just acquisitions of goods by initial
labor on raw materials encountered
in nature. Distributions A, B, and C would simply represent the
results of the
three people exerting themselves to different degrees, or with
varying degrees of success.
Here’s another way: let’s suppose that everyone acquires goods
from nature at the
same rate. However, person 3 has (or develops) some special
natural talent, like being
an outstanding story-teller. When persons 1 and 2 discover this,
they start to voluntarily
trade their holdings to person 3 in exchange for entertaining
stories. If the exchange rate is
not steady, it is possible for each of distributions A, B, and C to
be realized over time. Since
the exchanges are voluntary and informed, and the initial
acquisitions of holdings from
the land are stipulated to be just, each of the distributions is
just, on Nozick’s account.
This kind of process really could give you any distribution at
all.
Likewise, distributions A and B could count as unjust on

Nozick’s view, despite being
egalitarian and maximin respectively, if they have come about
through coerced redistributions
of holdings. We cannot tell whether A, B, or C is just or unjust,
unless we know how
each came into being.
References
Nozick, R. (2007). The entitlement theory of justice, in H.
LaFollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice:
Third Edition, Blackwell, MA, Malden, MA, chapter 53, pp.
578–590.
Rawls, J. (2007). A theory of justice, in H. LaFollette (ed.),
Ethics in Practice: Third Edition,
Blackwell, MA, Malden, MA, chapter 52, pp. 565–577.

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