This includes topics such as the Theory of Justice, the role of justice, the subject of justice, the main idea in the theory of justice, what is original position and justification, classical utilitarianism, intuitionism and some remarks moral theory. for the second part, it includes principles of justice, democratic theory, social good and social security.

1. CHAPTER 1
THEORY OF JUSTICE
John Rawls

2. 1. The Role of Justice
In Part 1, Rawls establishes the conceptual ground against which he will build his theory of
justice as fairness and provides an overview of the main lines of this theory.
Because "justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought,"
unjust institutions and laws must be reformed. Justice means each individual has equal rights
and liberties, which cannot be diminished or denied for the benefit of any other person or
even for society as a whole. He calls this "an inviolability founded on justice." Injustice is
permissible only when it offers protection from a still larger injustice. These ideas constitute
the notion of "the primacy of justice."
Rawls defines a society as "a cooperative venture for mutual advantage." It is an association of
persons bound by rules of conduct and who work together for their mutual benefit. Because
people in society work cooperatively toward advantageous ends, there is an "identity of
interests" among citizens. However, a "conflict of interests" arises with regard to the important
matter of how society's duties, burdens, benefits, and advantages are to be distributed among
citizens. Because it is natural for each individual to desire fewer burdens and more advantages,
principles of social justice are necessary to determine a fair scheme of distribution.

3. While societies and individuals almost always have some concept of justice,
there is usually disagreement between their various conceptions of justice. In
other words, everyone agrees it is important to uphold justice, but there is much
disagreement about the specific principles that define what is just and what is
unjust. This lack of agreement on what constitutes justice is no trivial matter. A
society's structure reflects its conception of justice, and so the idea of justice has
significant effects on the life of each citizen. When there is a shared public
conception of justice in a society, that society is said to be well ordered.
Still, a shared public conception of justice is not the only element necessary for a
society to function well. There must be coordination among the various plans of
individuals, and the outcome of these plans should be efficient and just. The
society must possess the quality of stability, which arises when individuals
comply with its laws and cooperative schemes. These three issues of
coordination, efficiency, and stability are some of the consequences of the sense
of justice.

4. 2. The Subject of Justice
Inequality among individuals is a feature of every society. The distribution of advantages and burdens
among citizens determines the very structure of society by shaping its political, economic, and social
institutions. The principles of social justice should address these fundamental inequalities by regulating
the distribution of advantages and burdens, creating "distributive justice.“
Rawls imagines a hypothetical society, isolated from other societies, whose members each do their best
to behave justly. It is from the perspective of this well-ordered society that Rawls will derive principles for
the just distribution of social burdens and advantages. These principles will allow Rawls to infer the
structure of a perfectly just society. The degree of justice of actual societies can then be assessed by
comparison with this hypothetical society. Such analysis belongs to what Rawls calls strict compliance
theory because it is based on an assumption that all members of a society comply with the dictates of
justice. In contrast, partial compliance theory is concerned with the nature of and response to injustice.
Rawls's approach to justice as a matter of distribution is in harmony with the conception of justice put
forth by the Greek philosopher Aristotle during the fourth century BCE. For Aristotle, justice existed when
individuals did not seek an unfair advantage, either through theft or through failure to give what is owed.
This idea implies the violation of an individual's rightful claim to something valuable. Rawls seeks
principles that will establish a basis for such claims.

5. 3. The Main Idea of the Theory of Justice
Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness" takes the form of a social-contract theory. Historically,
philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Kant advocated founding societies on the basis of an
agreement, or contract, which specified the principles of the government. In justice as fairness, the
foundational idea is not specific principles but rather the conditions under which people arrive at
these principles. These conditions are for a hypothetical situation known as the "original position."
Persons in the original position hold a meeting to choose the principles that will specify the basic
structure of society.
The persons in the original position are rational, mutually disinterested, and under a "veil of
ignorance." The veil of ignorance means they have general knowledge about humanity and society
but are completely ignorant about themselves. They do not know what their particular interests,
goals, psychological makeups, talents, and difficulties are, nor do they have information regarding
their own social class, ethnicity, sex, or any other distinguishing characteristic. They know they each
have beliefs, interests, and goals, but not the specific content. This veil of ignorance creates a
condition of equality that ensures personal bias will not influence their choices. The persons are
rational, meaning they wish to pursue "the most effective means to given ends." Their mutual
disinterest means they are not moved by benevolence but rather seek to advance their own
interests, whatever those may be.

6. Rawls asserts that these limitations ensure the persons in the original position will agree on only principles that
are fair. These fair principles, in turn, will act as instructions for the creation of a truly just society. He argues that
the persons under the veil of ignorance will first choose a principle that "requires equality in the assignment of
basic rights of duties." Second, they will choose a principle specifying that "social and economic inequalities" are
just only as long as they benefit all members of society, but especially the "least advantaged" members.
4. The Original Position and Justification
A conception of justice is justified when it would be favored by the persons in the original position.
These persons are equal, moral persons, meaning they possess "a conception of their good" and are
"capable of a sense of justice." Because these persons are disposed to choose rationally, "this connects
the theory of justice with the theory of rational choice."
While the original position is hypothetical, it provides a perspective that can be adopted by anyone for
the purpose of checking if their own convictions about what constitutes justice are indeed justifiable. It
is easy to see that certain ideas are unjust, such as slavery, but not every conviction is so obvious. Rawls
recommends checking such convictions against the point of view of the original position. If the original
position would not permit a certain conviction, the conviction can be modified and rechecked against
the perspective of the original position. This process of modification and rechecking can be repeated
until the conviction falls into line with the principles of justice. This end point is a state known as
"reflective equilibrium," wherein "at last our principles and judgments coincide."

7. 5. Classical Utilitarianism
Rawls intends for his theory of justice as fairness to provide an alternative to utilitarianism. There are many variations of
utilitarianism, but the specific conception Rawls criticizes is the classical doctrine proposed by Henry Sidgwick in the
early 20th century. The principle of utility claims society is just when "its institutions maximize the net balance of
satisfaction." Utilitarian theories are teleological because of the way they construe the relationship between the two
primary ethical concepts: the right and the good. Teleological theories define the right as "that which maximizes the
good." The good is defined independently of the right and is variously held to mean pleasure, or happiness, or the
"realization of human excellence." For the purpose of his argument, Rawls takes the classical definition of the good as
"the satisfaction of rational desire.“
An individual person acts rationally by choosing to maximize what he or she considers to be good for him or her. This
"principle of choice" or "principle of rational prudence" for the individual is extended, in utilitarianism, to be the
"principle of choice for an association of men." In utilitarianism, it is unimportant how satisfactions are distributed
among various members of a society. Equality or fairness is not a consideration; what matters is that the sum of
satisfaction of society as a whole is maximized. A few individuals may suffer a loss of liberty as long as the situation
brings a greater satisfaction to the majority.
In classical utilitarianism, the mass of individuals comprising society are "fused into one" person, an imaginary
"impartial spectator." This spectator is perfectly rational and sympathetic to a degree that he experiences the
satisfactions of other people as his own satisfaction. It is the impartial spectator who quantifies the satisfaction felt by
each individual and arrives at a sum that reflects the total satisfaction of society. Then, an "ideal legislator" adjusts the
structure of society in order to maximize this sum. Rawls criticizes utilitarianism for failing to "take seriously the
distinction between persons."

8. 6. Some Related Contrasts
Rawls asserts "persons in the original position would reject the utility principle,"
illustrating his assertion through comparisons between justice as fairness and
utilitarianism. "Justice as fairness begins with the idea" that each individual has an
inviolable "natural right" to justice. In utilitarian theory, the natural rights of
individuals are respected inasmuch as they are useful to the maximization of total
satisfaction. But when they do not maximize that satisfaction, they are
subordinate and not guaranteed. In fact, because utilitarianism does not place any
restrictions on the definition of the "good," a utilitarian society would permit a
situation in which people find satisfaction in discriminating against one another.
Because this would be the "good," society would therefore seek to maximize it.
Such a situation is not possible in justice as fairness, where the veil of ignorance
ensures that a foundation principle of equal liberty is the only rational choice. In
contrast with utilitarianism, in justice as fairness "the concept of right is prior to
that of the good."

9. 7. Intuitionism
While justice as fairness takes as its first principle that of equal liberty, intuitionism holds that there are a
multitude of contradictory first principles and no way to assign priority between them other than relying on
intuition. To illustrate the problems with intuitionism, Rawls uses the example of the "aggregative-
distributive dichotomy." This conception contains two principles: the principle that society should be
ordered to maximize total satisfaction and the principle that satisfaction should be equally distributed.
Using graphs called "indifference curves" to plot equality against total welfare, Rawls demonstrates the
wide range of possible configurations that arise as a result of the two principles. Intuitionism asserts that
such configurations may be described but that to attempt to prioritize among principles leads only to
triviality or oversimplification, as in utilitarianism's single standard of maximizing utility.
8. The Priority Problem
Rawls contends that any rational approach to justice must find a way to prioritize, or assign weights to, the
various principles that might be accepted. There are two ways of approaching this "priority problem": either
by the choice of a single overarching principle that is accepted as self-evident or through a serial ordering of
various principles, wherein a principle does not apply until the one previous to it has been satisfied. In
justice as fairness, the reliance on intuition is not completely eliminated but is made more manageable by
the constraints embedded in the original position.

10. 9. Some Remarks about Moral Theory
Moral capacity is the complex ability, possessed by all persons of
sufficient age and intellectual capacity to support judgments of
justice and injustice with reasoned arguments. Moral theory
seeks to account for the moral capacity of humans. Rawls argues
that our conception of justice should properly align with our
moral sensibilities and that the way to achieve this alignment is
through the examination of our considered judgments—those
ideas we have arrived at by a sincere desire for truth—through
the process of reflective equilibrium.

11. CHAPTER 2

12. 10. Institutions and Formal Justice
Society's structure is the arrangement of its major institutions into a cooperative system.
Institutions are public systems of rules that define positions and regulate actions, and they are
the basic component of society. The principles of justice that regulate institutions are different
from those that regulate individuals.
There is a distinction between the theoretical institution as the sum of its rules and the
institution as it actually functions. It is the actual institution that is subject to judgments of
justice. Parts of an institution may be unjust without the entire institution being so in the same
way the existence of an unjust institution does not necessarily mean the entirety of society is
unjust. "Formal justice" exists when an institution carries out its own rules and regulations
fairly, consistently, and impartially. "Substantive justice" refers to the inherent justice of those
rules. Formal justice, or "obedience to system," does not always characterize institutions, as
rules and laws are subject to interpretation and manipulation. Additionally, formal justice may
exist when an unjust institution nonetheless executes its own rules and laws with consistency
and fairness. Nonetheless, it is usually the case that when there is formal justice, there is also
substantive justice, because "obedience to system" tends to arise within institutions that are
already dedicated to upholding justice.

13. 11. Two Principles of Justice
Rawls makes the first, provisional statement of the two principles of justice that he contends would be
selected in the original position, and they are principles that apply to institutions. The first principle
guarantees each individual "an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties"
possible. The second principle specifies that "social and economic inequalities" must bring benefit to
everyone and be "attached to positions and offices open to all." The second part of the second principle
means public offices and other positions of authority must be open to all citizens. The first principle of
equality is serially prior to the second, meaning the basic liberties cannot be bargained with or
diminished for any reason including a compensating increase in social or economic advantage.
Inequality is permitted, but it becomes injustice when it does not benefit everyone.
Primary goods are "things that every rational man is presumed to want," including liberties,
opportunities, and economic security, as well as self-respect. The distribution of primary goods is a
function of the nature of the institutions that constitute society. The standard for judging whether an
inequality in the distribution of primary goods is permissible is to first imagine a society in which the
primary goods are equally distributed. Each person, therefore, has a certain measure of well-being. If an
inequality of primary-goods distribution would improve the welfare of all beyond that which exists
when primary goods are equally distributed, then it is permissible. If not, the inequality is unjust. In
other words, an inequality is permissible when any representative person in this society would "prefer
his prospects with the inequality to his prospects without it."

14. 12. Interpretations of the Second Principle
The second principle of justice as fairness states that inequalities must be to "everyone's advantage"
while positions and offices must be "equally open." The ambiguity of this language means that,
depending on interpretation, four different social systems could be said to satisfy the principle. It is
possible to interpret "to everyone's advantage" as referring to either the "principle of efficiency" or the
"difference principle."
In this context the principle of efficiency claims that a social system is efficient when there is no possible
change to the rules of primary-goods distribution that could advantage at least one person without
disadvantaging at least one person.
When "everyone's advantage" is interpreted as the "principle of efficiency," and "equally open" is taken
to mean "equality as careers open to talents," the resulting system is called the "system of natural
liberty." This system provides everyone the same legal access to opportunity and a free market
economy. Over time, injustice can enter this system when the theoretical equality of opportunity
becomes practically impossible for some despite its legal basis. In the free market, those who have
greater natural assets like intelligence as well as better luck tend to accumulate wealth and power,
which gives them a competitive advantage of opportunity compared to those who have not
accumulated wealth.

15. To correct for this occurrence, a liberal interpretation seeks to level the social playing field by replacing
"equality as careers open to talents" with "the principle of fair equality of opportunity"—thereby instituting
social protections to ensure that social class does not determine actual opportunity. Nonetheless, this liberal
interpretation must be rejected because it still makes the arbitrary distribution of natural talent the basis of
wealth. A third system, natural aristocracy, limits the advantages of the naturally blessed to those that can be
used to help the disadvantaged. Because the "natural lottery" of genetic and social circumstances is arbitrary, it
cannot provide a moral basis for a just society.
13. Democratic Equality and the Difference Principle
The combination of the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle gives rise to the
preferred system, that of democratic equality. Several arrangements are permitted by the difference principle:
one in which the expectations of the worst-off are maximized and another in which inequality raises but does
not maximize the expectations of society's most disadvantaged. Both are just unless the inequalities are
excessive and egregious or there is a violation of basic liberties, although the first is more just. A third possible
arrangement supposes that expectations in society are "chain-connected," meaning an advantage for the
lowest position causes an advantage for all intermediate positions. Expectations may also be "close-knit,"
meaning to raise or lower expectations for anyone results in raising or lowering expectations for all. Rawls then
proposes a restatement of the second principle of justice as fairness with the ambiguous language clarified. The
principle now requires inequality be "to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged" and specifies
"conditions of fair equality of opportunity."

16. 14. Fair Equality of Opportunity and Pure Procedural Justice
Rawls renames the second part of the second principle of justice as fairness as "the
liberal principle of fair equality of opportunity." He considers the optimal situation of
being able to design the principles to structure society so that "pure procedural
justice" prevails. This means following a just procedure gives rise to a just outcome.
There are no independent criteria for the outcome; only following the procedure itself
is important. By contrast, "imperfect procedural justice" pairs a just procedure with
independent criteria for a just outcome. An example is the procedures of the criminal
justice system, which may be just but cannot guarantee a correct verdict in a criminal
trial, even when followed diligently. The principle of fair opportunity has the role of
ensuring that pure procedural justice characterizes the social order of the resulting
society. As long as opportunity is kept open and fair, justice exists. Rawls notes that
"the two parts of the second principle are lexically ordered," meaning the difference
principle must be in place for the liberal principle of fair equality of opportunity to
apply.

17. 15. Primary Social Goods as the Basis of Expectation
Utilitarianism seeks to maximize "expected utilities" or satisfactions although it
gives no objective grounds for assigning values so that a maximum can be
calculated. In justice as fairness, the difference principle also requires some
assignment of value to advantages or expectations, and it provides objective
grounds for this value. The judgment of expectations emerges from the
position of "the least advantaged representative man," and in terms of
"expectations of primary social goods." This means absolute values are not
necessary to assign to expectations but only that the position of any one
person with regard to the least advantaged in society needs to be considered.
These primary social goods, which all people rationally prefer more rather than
less of, include rights, wealth, and self-respect. Because these things help
people pursue their aims, they are good. Rawls provides a definition of the
good as "the satisfaction of rational desire."

18. 16. Relevant Social Positions
In justice as fairness, each individual can be said to have two positions within society. The
first, citizenship, is a position equally shared by all. The second position is "defined by his
place in the distribution of income and wealth." This second position is the one affected
by inequalities in the distribution of primary goods. "Representative persons" who
occupy "relevant social positions" must be identified to provide a point of view from
which to judge such inequalities. It is important to identify the least advantaged social
group, for it is from this representative position that a "reasonable social minimum" of
expectation may be defined and the difference principle fulfilled. Other relevant social
positions include those whose "fixed natural characteristics," such as sex or ethnicity,
tend to make them the object of discrimination and, therefore, provide them with a
disadvantaged starting point within the social system. The relevant social positions are
the means by which a variety of interests are protected and the inequalities produced by
"natural accident and social circumstance" are addressed.

19. 17. The Tendency to Equality
Contained within the difference principle is the idea of the "principle of redress," which states that "undeserved
inequalities," including those arbitrary "inequalities of birth and natural endowment," deserve compensation. Society
must be structured so as to provide supports for those who are disadvantaged by the "natural lottery," so they have a
fair opportunity within the social system. The difference principle implies an agreement to regard natural talent as a
shared asset among all of society. Its unequal and arbitrary distribution doesn't mean these differences should be
eliminated but rather that society be arranged "so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate."
Also contained within the difference principle is the idea of reciprocity or mutual benefit. The cooperation of all is
required in order that all may have a good life, and so it is to the benefit of the most advantaged as well as the least
advantaged to ensure that the social system encourages cooperation by offering reasonable expectations to all.
Rawls rejects the idea that those with greater natural talent, ambition, or position deserve to further their own ends
as much as possible without considering those who are less well endowed. They have a right to their greater abilities,
but they did not do anything to deserve them; such advantages are the result of contingencies and, therefore, have no
moral weight. Rather, the principle of fraternity, which expresses a sort of civic friendship that does not wish to be
advantaged unless others are also advantaged, is encouraged by the difference principle. The two principles of justice
as fairness, for all these reasons, will not produce a meritocratic society, where "equality of opportunity means an
equal chance to leave the less fortunate behind" in the exclusive pursuit of ever greater personal advantage.
Meritocracy results in an ever-widening chasm between those gifted in intelligence, ambition, and social position and
those who are not so gifted, creating an instability that threatens the order of society. Instead, justice as fairness
counts self-worth as among the essential primary goods. Self-worth is fostered when inequalities are constrained by a
society that seeks to provide enrichment and support for all of its members.

20. 18. Principles for Individuals: The Principle of Fairness
Rawls presents a schematic diagram that illustrates all the necessary components of a full
"concept of right" and the order in which principles for each component are properly
chosen. First, principles for institutions are chosen so as to give society its basic structure.
Next, the principles for individuals are selected because their rights and duties are ordered
by the institutional structure of a society. Principles governing "the law of nations" are
chosen last. In justice as fairness, the right is what is fair; therefore in this context, the idea
of rightness can be understood as that which would be chosen by persons in the original
position.
The principle of fairness describes the nature of the obligations individuals have to the
social institutions that benefit them. Individuals are to keep these obligations, which are
defined by the rules of the institution, as long as the institution is just and the individual
has chosen voluntarily to interact with the institution. It follows that an individual cannot
have an obligation to an unjust institution. However, if an institution is just, it is unjust for
individuals to choose to benefit themselves through "the cooperative labors of others"
that compromise the institution unless they do their "fair share."

21. 19. Principles for Individuals: The Natural Duties
Natural duties are different from obligations because they do not arise from our consent, voluntary
action, or through specific contact with an institution. While obligations are owed to specific entities or
persons, natural duties are owed by each person to all other persons in general. The natural duties may
be positive (requiring action) or negative (requiring abstaining from action). The positive natural duties
include the duty of mutual aid, which requires we offer help when it is needed as long as we do not enter
into danger ourselves in doing so. Another is the natural duty of justice, requiring we support and
participate in "just institutions that exist and apply to us." In other words, we have a duty to participate in
the society in which we live, as long as that society is basically just. An example of a negative natural duty
is the prohibition that we should not kill.
Individuals are not only subject to natural duties and obligations but to another class of actions called
"permissions," which we are free either to do or not to do. These include the "supererogatory" acts such
as heroism and self-sacrifice. While we are required by the duty of mutual aid to help another when we
can be reasonably safe while doing so, imperiling ourselves to help another is a choice rather than a duty.