This document provides an analysis of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the U.S. response. It discusses the history and nature of ISIS, analyzing their strategy, environment, popular support, organization, and lack of external state support. The document evaluates the U.S. government response and recommends continuing current strategies while advocating for Sunni welfare and autonomy in Syria and Iraq.
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Evaluating the Fight against the Islamic State
Thispaperanalyzesthe U.S. response tothe worldwide insurgencyandterrororganizationknownas
the IslamicState (IS),ISIS,ISIL,andDaesh. i
This paperanalyzesthe historyand nature of the Islamic
State and the geopoliticssurroundingit.Itexploresthe strategiesandtacticsthat the U.S. is currently
conducting,andrecommendsthatthese strategiesandtacticscontinue.The paper’srecommendations
for changesare largelypolitical.The paperrecommends thatthe U.S.become the advocate forSunni
welfare andautonomyinSyriaandIraq.
It isveryimportantto conduct a thoroughevaluationof agovernment’sresponse toinsurgency and
terrorism.Whata governmentdoesorneglectstodoand how it performshasa directbearingon the
strategiesandformsof warfare insurgentsandterroristschoose,andthe nature andextentof
challengesinsurgentsmustcope withastheyseektoaccomplishtheiraims.The more government
responsesare informed,prudent,relevant,determined,anddisciplined,the greaterthe burdenonthe
insurgents. A keytoa government’sresponse toinsurgencyandterrorismisthe recognitionthat
insurgencyandterrorismisa political andmilitaryphenomenon.The primary questionis which
dimensionismostsignificantandwhatto do aboutit. ii
History of the Islamic State
The jihadistgroupIslamicState (IS) burstonto the international scene in2014 whenitseizedlarge
swathesof territoryinSyriaand Iraq.It has become notoriousforitsbrutality,includingmasskillings,
abductionsandbeheadings.The groupthoughhasattracted supportelsewhere inthe Muslimworld -
and a US-ledcoalitionhasvowedtodestroyit. InJune 2014, the group formallydeclaredthe
establishmentof a"caliphate" - a state governedinaccordance withIslamiclaw,orSharia,byGod's
deputyonEarth, or caliph.Ithas demandedthatMuslimsacrossthe worldswearallegiance toitsleader
- IbrahimAwadIbrahimal-Badri al-Samarrai,betterknownasAbuBakral-Baghdadi - andmigrate to
territoryunderitscontrol.IShas alsotoldotherjihadistgroupsworldwide thattheymustacceptits
supreme authority.Manyalreadyhave,amongthemseveral offshootsof the rival al-Qaedanetwork. IS
seekstoeradicate obstaclestorestoringGod'srule onEarth and to defendthe Muslimcommunity,or
umma,againstinfidelsandapostates.The grouphaswelcomedthe prospectof directconfrontation
withthe US-ledcoalition,viewingitasa harbingerof an end-of-timesshowdownbetweenMuslimsand
theirenemiesdescribedinIslamicapocalypticprophecies.iii
IS can trace itsroots back to the late AbuMusab al-Zarqawi,aJordanian.In2004, a yearafterthe US-led
invasionof Iraq,Zarqawi pledgedallegiance toOsamaBinLadenand formedal-QaedainIraq(AQI),
whichbecame a majorforce in the insurgency. AfterZarqawi'sdeathin2006, AQIcreatedan umbrella
organisation,IslamicState inIraq(ISI).ISIwassteadilyweakenedbythe UStroopsurge andthe creation
of Sahwa(Awakening) councilsbySunni Arabtribesmenwhorejecteditsbrutality.Baghdadi,aformer
US detainee,became leaderin2010 and beganrebuildingISI'scapabilities.By2013, itwas once again
carryingout dozensof attacks a monthin Iraq.It had alsojoinedthe rebellionagainstPresidentBashar
al-AssadinSyria,settingupthe al-NusraFront.InApril 2013, Baghdadi announcedthe mergerof his
forcesinIraq and Syriaand the creationof "IslamicState inIraq and the Levant"(Isis).The leadersof al-
Nusraand al-Qaedarejectedthe move,butfightersloyal toBaghdadi splitfromal-NusraandhelpedIsis
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remaininSyria.At the endof December2013, Isisshifteditsfocusbackto Iraq and exploitedapolitical
stand-off betweenthe Shia-ledgovernmentandthe minoritySunni Arabcommunity.Aidedby
tribesmenandformerSaddamHusseinloyalists,Isistookcontrol of the central cityof Falluja. InJune
2014, Isisoverranthe northerncityof Mosul,and thenadvancedsouthwardstowardsBaghdad,
massacringitsadversariesandthreateningtoeradicate the country'smanyethnicandreligious
minorities.Atthe endof the month,afterconsolidatingitsholdoverdozensof citiesandtowns,Isis
declaredthe creationof a caliphate andchangeditsname to "IslamicState".iv
The Nature of the Islamic State
In orderto devise astrategyto defeatIS, we mustfirstdetermineitsnature. Insurgencymaybe defined
as a struggle betweenanon-rulinggroup andthe rulingauthoritiesinwhichthe non-rulinggroup
consciouslyusespolitical resourcesandviolence todestroy,reformulate,orsustainthe basisof
legitimacyof one ormore aspectsof politics. v
ISmeetsthisdefinitionbecause it isusingpolitical
resourcesandviolence toestablishacaliphate.The caliphate wouldbe anenormousIslamicstate that
encompassesall Muslimsworldwide.However, the sectarianforcesof IS aren'tcountingShiaMuslimsin
that equation,onlySunnis.IS’desireandapparentstrategy istooverthrow the existinggovernmentsof
unstable,heavilyMuslimnationsandestablishtheirowntheocraticstate initsplace.vi
Bard O’neill hasidentifiedsevenmajorelementsof insurgenciesthatmustbe identifiedandstudied:
TheirNature,Strategy,Environment,PopularSupport,OrganizationandUnity,External Support,and
GovernmentResponse. vii
Whilethispaperwillfocuson analyzingthe GovernmentResponse,Iwill
outline the firstsix elementsof the ISinsurgencytohelpgive thisresponse context.
IS’nature isa traditionalistinsurgencymixedwithapocalyptic-utopianinsurgency elements.A
traditionalistinsurgencyisone thatseekstorestore a political systemfromthe recentordistantpast. viii
IS’traditionalistsentimentscanbe seeninitsdesire torecreate acaliphate thatwas destroyedwhen
the OttomanEmpire was dissolved. The OttomanEmpire caliphate wasdrasticallydifferentthatthe one
that IS envisions. ix
Unlikethe OttomanEmpire,the IScaliphate followstakfiridoctrine,which proclaims
people tobe apostatesbecause of theirsins.The ISiscommittedtopurifyingthe worldbykillingvast
numbersof people.The lackof objective reportingfromitsterritorymakesthe true extentof the
slaughterunknowable,butsocial-mediapostsfromthe regionsuggestthatindividualexecutions
happenmore or lesscontinually,andmassexecutionseveryfew weeks.Muslim“apostates”are the
mostcommon victims.Exemptedfromautomaticexecution,itappears,are Christianswhodonotresist
theirnewgovernment.Baghdadipermitsthemtolive,aslongastheypay a special tax,knownasthe
jizya,andacknowledge theirsubjugation. IScanalsobe categorizedasa somewhatapocalyptic-utopian
insurgencybecause itsfollowers believethata battle betweenIS andthe forcesof “Rome” will usherin
the apocalypse.x
The Islamic State’s Strategy
IS strategycan be summarizedasa military-focusone,withglobalambitionsbutanimmediate
concentrationonIraq andSyria. A military-focusstrategygivesprimacytomilitaryactionand
subordinatespoliticalaction.Proponentsof the militaryfocusbelievethatpopularsupporteitheris
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alreadysufficientorwill be aby-productof militaryvictories.The Cuban revolutionledbyFidel Castro
exemplifiesamilitary-focusinsurgentstrategy. xi
ThisISstrategywasan amazingsuccessuntil the U.S.
decidedtostart militaryactionagainstIS.WithitseffortstogainterritoryinSyriaand Iraq beingstymied
by U.S.,Iraqi,and Kurdefforts,itappearsthat ISis expandingits strategiceffortsthroughworldwide
terroristattacks.ISISclaimedresponsibilityforthe Parisattackson November13,2015, an IS affiliate
claimingcreditforthe downingof a Russianpassengerplane overEgypt onOctober31, 2015, anda
bombinginLebanonthatkilledmore than40 people onNovember12, 2015. xii
Thisshiftinstrategymay
be causedby the increaseddifficultyinfightinginSyriaandIraq, or itmay justbe the waythat IS is
tryingto entice countriestoinvade sothatitcan fightthe apocalypticbattle thatitenvisions.
Althoughthe mediaportraythe IslamicState asa religion-basedpolitical movement,whichitis,the
more fundamental basisforunderstandingIS istheirperceptual andaspirationalgeographicendgameof
a caliphate.Theirnarrative involveshistorical geographicandculturallyrelevantregions,including
Khorasan,an area spanningpartsof Iran, AfghanistanandTurkmenistan. xiii
Figure 1: IS geographic goal for territorial control by 2020.xiv
The Islamic State’s Environment
The Institute forthe Studyof War map of ISIS (September15,2015) showsthatIS supportand control
zonesencompasscentral andeasternSyria,aswell aswesternandcentral Iraq.xv
Thisarea includesthe
large portionsof the Euphratesand TigrisrivervalleysinbothSyriaandIraq. In Syriaand Iraq, ISIShas
alreadytakencontrol of oil fields,waterandagricultural areas.Inspite of theirmassivevirtual recruiting
effortsandreligious-political characterization,muchof the ISIScampaigniscenteredonhumanand
physical geography.xvi
Inspite of theirtenuouscontrol,ISIShasdividedtheirareaof administrationin
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Syriaand Iraq intoprovinceswithleadershipbyregional governmenttocontrol the people and
resourceswithinthose provinces. xvii
Figure 2: Institute for the Study of War, ISIS Sanctuary, September 15, 2015
IS isfightingagroundwar inside Iraqand Syriaonthree typesof terrain:deserts,cities,andsuburban
areas.IS favorsmaneuverwarfare inopendeserts,allowingIStoattack citiesimmediatelyadjacentto
desertsfrommultipledirections,whichIraqi newssourcesoftenterm“attacksfrommultiple axes.”ISIS
alsospecializesininsidiousurbanoperations,wherebyISISinfiltratesenemydefenseswithinlarge cities,
attacks securityforceswithguerillatactics,andterrorizespopulationstochallengethe state’sabilityto
provide security.Anadditional signature thatemergedinAQI’s2006 campaignwasa “Belt”offensive,
wherebyISISdesignedawayto maneuveraroundlarge citiesandinfiltrate thembyestablishingsectors
of responsibilityinthe surroundingsuburbanterrainandestablishingstagingareasthere.The physical
terraininIraq and Syriadictateshowwell IScan applyitsvariouswarfare techniquestoeachobjective
(see Figure 3below).xviii
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Figure 3: ISIS’s Hybridized Warfarexix
The political geographyof SyriaandIraq isa verypermissive environmentforISto thrive. Sunni
disenfranchisementinbothIraqand Syriacreateda vacuum that the IS hasexploited.InIraq,a Sunni
minoritywassidelinedfromnational politicsafterthe UnitedStatesoustedSaddamHussein,aSunni,in
2003. InSyria,a civil wareruptedin2011 pittingthe rulingminorityAlawis,aShiaoffshoot,againstthe
primarilySunni opposition,spawningsectarianviolence. However,afterrapidexpansionthroughIraqin
much of 2014, IS seemedtorunup againstitslimitsasitpushedupagainstmajority KurdishandShia
Arab regions,where itfacedgreaterresistance fromIraqi forcesandlocal populationsalongwithU.S.-
ledair strikes.Itsmilitantshave failedtoadvance onBaghdador the Kurdishcapital,Erbil.xx
The Islamic State’s Popular Support
Twitteriscrowdedwithpeople who supportandsympathize withIS andwhoare interestedinfollowing
it.It’s a phenomenonwe’veseennothinglike since al-Qaedaattacks. Whenawomantriesto sneak
fromSaudi Arabiato Yemenalongwithherkidsinorder to go toSyria andwork withthe jihadists, then
such an act representsIS’capabilitytomobilizesupport.ItalsomeansthatIS has agentsthat recruit
membersforit.Whenthe numberof WesternMuslimswhojoinedthe fightinginSyriareachesthe
hundreds,thenwe are practicallytalkingaboutthe successof ISIS,the global organizationandnotjusta
groupenthusiastictothe Syriancause.xxi
Howeverenthusiasticthese active ISsupportersare,they
appearto be a small portionof the populationof MuslimandWesterncountries. Ina recentpoll,IShad
foundthe mostsupportin the Africancountryof Nigeriaat14% of the respondents.Eventhere though
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had 66% of respondentswhohadanunfavorable opinionof IS.xxii
The people whorespondedfavorably
to IS inthispoll mayhave onlybeenthe active supportersof IShowever.There maybe avast greater
amountthat passivelysupportIS.These passive supportersdo necessarily notacton theirfeelings,but
theywantIS to succeed.Viewersof Al JazeeraArabicwere askedinananonymouspoll 'Doyousupport
ISISvictoriesinIraqand Syria?'The poll attractedmore than36,000 votes,withastaggering81% in
supportof the ISISand only19% rejectingthe group. Mostof Al JazeeraArabic'saudience comesfrom
the Sunni Muslimworld,withhighviewership inEgyptandSaudi Arabia. Michael WeissandHassan
Hassan explainthe strange allureof ISIStomanySunni Muslims,“Those whosaytheyare adherentsof
ISISas a strictlypolitical projectmake upa weightypercentage of itslowercadresandsupportbase.For
people inthiscategory,ISISisthe onlyoptiononofferforSunni Muslimswhohave beendealtadismal
handin the past decade — firstlosingcontrol of Iraq andnow sufferingnationwideatrocities,which
manyequate to genocide,inSyria.Theyviewthe struggle inthe Middle Eastasone betweenSunnisand
an Iranian-ledcoalition,andtheyjustifyultraviolence asanecessarytool tocounterbalance ordeter
Shiahegemony.Thiscategoryoftenincludesthe highlyeducated.”xxiii
ThispublicsupportforISISextendsintoWesterncountriesaswell.Inasurveydone byICMresearchin
2014 (before the Parisattacks),foundthatnearly16% of French citizenshad a favorable view of ISIS.
That 16% isevenhigherthan the 13% inGaza who were foundtoview ISISfavorably,inasimilarpoll.
Evenmore alarmingisthat more than a quarter (27%) of Frenchcitizensbetweenthe agesof 18 and 24
were foundtosympathize withISIS.xxiv
Organization and Unity
IS has quietlybuiltaneffective managementstructure of mostlymiddle-agedIraqisoverseeing
departmentsof finance,arms,local governance,militaryoperationsandrecruitment.Atthe topthe
organizationisthe self-declaredleaderof all Muslims,Abu Bakral-Baghdadi,aradical chief executive
officerof sorts,whohandpickedmanyof hisdeputiesfromamongthe menhe metwhile aprisonerin
Americancustodyatthe CampBucca detentioncenteradecade ago.He had a preference formilitary
men,andso hisleadershipteamincludesmanyofficersfromSaddamHussein’slong-disbandedarmy.
Theyinclude formerIraqi officerslike Fadel al-Hayali,the topdeputyforIraq,whoonce servedMr.
Husseinasa lieutenantcolonel,andAdnanal-Sweidawi,aformerlieutenantcolonel whonow headsthe
group’smilitarycouncil. Mr.Baghdadi’sdeputiesinclude 12walis,orlocal rulers;a three-manwar
cabinet;andeightotherswhomanage portfolioslike finance,prisonersandrecruitment.xxv
ISappearsto
be quite unifiedbecause there are relatively few newsreportsof defectorsfromthis large
organization.xxvi
External Support
IS doesnotappearto have official supportfromexternalcountries.Saudi Arabiahasdeniedaccusations
that itis supportingISandhas providedabase to train moderate rebel forces.However, wealthySaudis
have sentdonationstothe group andsome 2,500 Saudi menhave travelledtoSyriatofight.xxvii
The
mostimportantexternal supportthatISreceivesisinthe formof fighterstravellingtoSyriaand Iraq to
fightforit. The largesttotal number(accordingtothe International Centre forthe Studyof
RadicalizationandPolitical Violence) IsfromSaudi Arabia.Belgiumhasthe highestnumberof fighters
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percapita of anyWesternnation.AbdelhamidAbaaoud,aBelgian-bornseniorIslamicState operative,
was suspectedtobe the keymastermindbehindthe coordinatedattacksonParisinNovember.He was
killedinaraidat an apartmentbuildinginaParis suburbsix daysfollowingthe attacks.France isthe
biggestsource of fightersinEurope,contributing1,200. Governmentfigureshave putthe numberof
fighterscloserto1,600. The U.S.is verylow on thislistwithonlyabout100 fightershave come fromthe
U.S. Anestimated1,700 fightershave come fromRussia.Most of these are thoughtto be from
ChechnyaandDagestan,accordingto Russia’sFederal SecurityService.xxviii
U.S. Efforts against the Islamic State
On September10, 2014 PresidentObamaannouncedhisstrategytodefeatIS:“we will degrade,and
ultimatelydestroy,ISILthroughacomprehensive andsustainedcounter-terrorismstrategy.”This
strategyentailsfourelements: A systematiccampaignof airstrikes,increasedsupporttoIraqand
Kurdishforces,aswell assupportto SyrianoppositiontoIS,counterterrorismeffortstopreventterrorist
attacks,and humanitarianeffortstosupportthose displacedbyIS.xxix
In September2014, the thendirectorof the US National CounterterrorismCenter(NCTC),Matthew
Olsen,saidIScontrolledmuchof the Tigris-Euphratesriverbasin - anarea similarinsize tothe United
Kingdom,orabout81,000 square miles.A yearlater,the US defensedepartmentdeclaredthatIS
frontlinesinmuchof northernandcentral Iraq andnorthernSyriahad beenpushedbacksignificantlyby
US-ledcoalitionairstrikesandgroundoperations.IScouldnolongeroperate freelyinroughly20-25%of
populatedareasinIraqand Syriawhere itonce could,it said.The defense departmentestimatedthatIS
had lostapproximately5,790-7,720 square milesof territoryinIraq,or about30-37% of whatit
controlledinAugust2014, and 770-1,540 square milesinSyria,orabout5-10%. Despite this,IShasbeen
able to capture newterritoryof strategicvalue overthe same period,includingthe cityof Ramadi in
Iraq's Anbarprovince andPalmyrainSyria'sHoms province. xxx
Soyoucouldsaythat the airstrikeshave
beensomewhatsuccessful indegradingISabilitytogainandholdterritory.
In February2015, US DirectorforNational Intelligence JamesClappersaidIScouldmuster"somewhere
inthe range between20,000 and 32,000 fighters"inIraqand Syria.xxxi
The U.S. AirForce has firedoff
more than 20,000 missilesandbombssince the U.S.bombingcampaignagainstISISbegan,accordingto
the Air Force,leadingtodepletedmunitionsstockpilesandcallstoramp up fundingandweapons
production.xxxii
Thiswouldseemtosupportthe U.S.contentionthatthere hadbeen"substantial
attrition"inIS ranks since US-ledcoalitionairstrikesbeganinAugust2014. InJune 2015, US Deputy
Secretaryof State AntonyBlinkensaidmore than10,000 ISfightershadbeenkilled. xxxiii
While evidence supportsthe contentionthat U.S.airstrikeshave hadsome successindegradingIS,some
feel thatthey are not effectivebecause the U.S.haswantedtoavoidcollateral damage.There isalsoan
elementof miscommunicationthat'slimitinganadvance byIraqi troops.Shiite fighterswiththe Popular
MobilizationCommittee inTikritinApril saidtheyneverknew whenorwhere the airstrikeswouldfall,
whichpreventedthemfrommovingintonew territorytofightISIS. General Joe Dunford,chairmanof
the JointChiefsof Staff,saidanewplanwill aimto fix that.If U.S. Special Forcesare on the frontline,
theycouldnot onlycall inairstrikes,butpassonintelligencetosoldiersonthe ground,closingthe
communicationgap.Butmore than anything,analystssay,the embeddingof U.S.troopsonthe front
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line couldimprove the accuracyof airstrikes,whichcouldmake asignificantdifference incombating
ISIS. "We have neededbettertargetinginIraqforquite some time,thatisclear," Daniel Serwer,an
expertonIraq andSyria at the Middle East Institute said."Thisplanwouldnotonlyimprove the
accuracy of Americanbombing, butitwouldenableit." The U.S.isplanningtohave a limitedamountof
special operationforcesandmilitaryadvisersembedwithIraqi forcesonthe frontline toensure the
logisticsthere are effective,intelligence isaccurate andarms are delivered tothe Sunni tribesefficiently,
Dunfordsaid.According tohis briefing,the planwill make fightingonthe frontline more efficient,a
boostthe Iraqi soldiershave neededsince the rapidexpansionof ISISin2014.xxxiv
But the introductionof U.S.troops on the front line couldangerthe Shiite forcesthatare largelybacked
by Iran,a countrythat iscurrentlycounteringthe U.S.fightinneighboringSyriabyproppingup
PresidentBasharAssad."Ihave seensome signsthatthere are a few battalions[in the Popular
MobilizationCommittee] thatare opposedtothe plan,"saidAlirezaNader,anexpertonIranian
relationsinthe Middle Eastat RANDCorporation,a global thinktank. xxxv
The U.S hasstruggledtofindreliable partnersagainstthe IslamicState onthe ground inSyria otherthan
the Kurdsand an array of Arab-dominatedgroupsthe CIA hasarmedto fight Bashar al-Assad.Inearly
October2015, the Obama administrationannouncedthata $500 millionPentagonprogramtotrain
anti-ISSyrianrebelshad largelyfailedandwasbeingrestructured.The White House'sapproachnow
seemstobe to supportthe Kurdsand nationalistArabsinthe northasintenselyaspossible.It
announcedonOctober30, 2015 that the U.S. woulddeploydozensof special operations forcesto
northernSyriato coordinate airstrikesandarmssupply. Thisstrategyhassome risksbecause Turkeyis
nervousthatthe successof the SyrianKurdswill inspire KurdsinTurkeytotryand carve outtheirown
mini states,anditpointedtothe Euphratesas a redline whenannouncingits recentattacksonthe
SyrianKurds.AnkarafearsSyrianKurdishforceswill connectthe areastheycontrol innortheastSyriato
theirthirdregion,orcanton,in the northwest,therebycreatingapowerful Kurdish corridoralongthe
Turkey-Syriaborder.xxxvi
There isa greatdeal of criticismconcerningthe currentU.S.counterterrorismpolicy. CaptainRobert
Newson,aNavySEAL whoservedasdirectorof the JointInteragencyTaskForce-CounterTerrorism, told
an intervieweratWestPoint’sCombatingTerrorismCenterthat“drone strikes,mannedairstrikes,and
special operationsraids…buyspace and time.Butby themselvestheyare onlyadelayingaction,and
everywhere Ihave been,inIraq,Afghanistan,Yemen,everymilitarypersonupanddownthe chainof
commandacknowledgesthis.This‘CTconcept’ — the solutionthatsome people championwhere the
mainor whole effortisdrone strikesandspecial operationsraids — isa fantasy.”A StimsonCenter
commissiononU.S. drone policywithretiredGen.JohnAbizaidconcludedinJune 2014 that“the Obama
administration’sheavyrelianceontargetedkillingsasapillarof US counterterrorismstrategyrestson
questionable assumptions,andrisksincreasinginstabilityandescalatingconflicts.Whiletactical strikes
may have helpedkeepthe homelandfree of majorterroristattacks,existingevidence indicatesthat
bothSunni and ShiaIslamicextremistgroupshave growninscope,lethalityandinfluence inthe broader
area of operationsinthe Middle East,Africaand SouthAsia.” xxxvii
Thisreportfindsthat the defeatof ISISmustaddresstwoCentersof Gravity.The firstis a classical
militarycenterof gravitythatISISusesto wrestphysical control frommodernstatesandholdwhatit
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has gained.The secondISIScenterof gravityisa political capacitytoprovide essential state functions
withinthe territorythatISIScontrols.ISISstrengthemanatesfromthe abilitytotranslate military
control intopolitical control,andtherebytoclaimthatthe Caliphate ismanifest.A strategytodefeat
ISISmust breakthissynergyamongthe militaryandpolitical operationsof ISISanditslayered
leadership.The U.S.mustconsiderwaysto accomplishthisinordertopropel the strategic defeatof ISIS.
DestroyingitsCritical Capabilities,denyingitsCritical OpportunitiesandCritical Requirements,and
exploitingitsCritical Vulnerabilitiesare additional componenteffectsthatmustbe synchronizedinorder
to achieve thisstrategiceffect.
Knowingthatitwouldtake tensof thousands,perhapshundredsof thousandsof troopstodefeatISand
holditsterrainfor an indeterminate amountof time,Iagree withGraeme Woodof the Atlanticthat
“giveneverythingwe knowaboutthe IslamicState,continuingtoslowlybleeditappearsthe bestof bad
militaryoptions.”xxxviii
Iconcur withPresidentObama’sstatementthat "ISILisnot goingto pose an
existential threattous,theyare a dangerousorganizationlikeal Qaedawas,butwe have hardenedour
defenses,ourhomelandhasneverbeenmore protectedbymore effective intelligence andlaw
enforcementprofessionalsateverylevel thantheyare now.The coordinationismuchbetterthanitis
now.If you lookat the numberof successful terroristattacksthathave occurred,you know,we have
disruptedalotof them,butthe dangersare still there andsowe just have tokeepthingsin
perspective"xxxix
Thatbeingsaid,Ialsoagree that more can be done shortof an invasionof Syriaand Iraq
of tensof thousandsof U.S. troops.I agree withthe Institute forthe Studyof War findingsthata
strategywherebyISISremainsincontrol of Mosul,Raqqa,andotherurban centersinIraq and Syriawill
fall shortof the desiredoutcome.Settlingforlesseraimsor resolvingtodonothingare equal.The threat
of ISISisreal and expanding,butISISisalsovulnerable atitspresentpolitical formationstage.xl
The onlyway to defeatISisto guarantee a groundforce that will occupy,secure,andrebuild Syria,and
Iraq to a lesserextent.More limitedsolutionsare insufficienttoshape groundconditionsthatpromote
stabilityandreduce the opportunityforgroupslike IStoremain.The difficultyinaccomplishingthis isin
the detailshowever.The U.S.mustcontinue toworkwithlocal forcesinSyria andIraq to accomplishthis
goal because the U.S. isnot a suitable unilateral occupyingforce because anti-U.S.sentimentinthese
countrieshasrisentostaggeringlevels.Iranisalsonot suitable orcapable,asdemonstratedbyits
inabilitytohelpthe AssadregimewinitswarinSyria,itstactical inabilitytoclearISISfromTikritin Iraq,
itsstate sponsorshipof terrorism, anditsstrategicobjectivestodestroy otherstatesinthe region.The
Arab coalitioncurrentlyfightingthe HouthisinYemenislikewise unsuitable,giventhe likelihoodthatit
wouldalsocondone persecutionof minorityShi’apopulations.The Arabcoalitionisalsoriskybecause it
treatsIraq and Syriaas battle groundsfora sectarianwaragainstIran insteadof unifiedstate-building
missionsthatare necessarytodefeatIS.xli
I agree withthe Democraticpresidential candidateHillaryClintonwhenshe saidthat "We needtolay
the foundationfora secondSunni awakening,"inherNovember19Council onForeignRelationsspeech.
"We needtoput sustainedpressure onthe governmentinBaghdadtoget itspolitical house inorder,
move forwardwithnational reconciliation,andfinallystandupa national guard.Baghdadneedsto
accept,evenembrace,armingSunni andKurdishforcesinthe waragainst[IS].But if Baghdadwon’tdo
that, the coalitionshoulddosodirectly."xlii
Ithinkthata verypublicdirectarmingof SunnisandKurds
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wouldplace us on the side of the majorityof the Islamicworld.Itmightplace a wedge betweenmany
Jihadistintellectuals,whowilllikelysupportISregardlessof ouractions,andthe vastmajorityof Sunni
IslamwhopassivelysupportIS.The U.S.shouldarticulate a policythatSunniswouldreceive protection
and autonomy(if notindependence)inanypost-AssadregimeinSyriaandIraq in conjunctionwiththis
supplyof armaments.If the U.S. can be seenas the championof Sunni rights,thiscouldsignificantly
reduce the appeal thatIS has to potential Sunni recruits.
i Irshaid,F.(2012, December2).Isis,Isil,ISor Daesh?One group,manynames. BBC Monitoring.
Retrievedfromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277.
ii
Oneill,BardE.(2005). Insurgency &Terrorism: From
Revolution to Apocalypse.Dulles,VA:PotomacBooks,Inc.
iii
What is ‘IslamicState’?(2012, December2). InBBC News Retrieved December5,2015, from
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144.
iv
What is ‘IslamicState’?(2012, December2).InBBC News Retrieved December5,2015, from
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29052144.
v
Oneill,BardE.(2005). Insurgency &Terrorism: From
Revolution to Apocalypse.Dulles, VA:PotomacBooks,Inc.
vi
Tognotti,Chris(2014, September2) WhatDoesISIS Want,Exactly?The Terrorists'StatedGoal Has
BeenMade. Bustle, Retrievedfrom http://www.bustle.com/articles/38192-what-does-isis-want-exactly-
the-terrorists-stated-goal-has-been-made-clear
vii
Oneill,BardE. (2005). Insurgency &Terrorism: From
Revolution to Apocalypse.Dulles,VA:PotomacBooks,Inc.
viii
Oneill,BardE.(2005). Insurgency &Terrorism: From
Revolution to Apocalypse.Dulles,VA:PotomacBooks,Inc.
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