3. 3
1. INTRODUCTION
On 20 March 2003, while sitting behind his desk in the oval office, President George W.
Bush announced the invasion of Iraq in a special address to the nation. In his opening statement,
Bush outlined three main purposes that justified the rationale behind what would become known
as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world
from grave danger.”1 To accomplish these tasks, the United States planned to expel Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein and his loyal Ba’athist regime from power. Consequently, soon over
160,000 coalition troops surged into the country, expeditiously sweeping away large swaths of
the Iraqi military. By 9 April 2003, only three weeks after OIF began, American troops marched
down the streets of Baghdad with the support of thousands upon thousands of ordinary Iraqi
civilians behind them.2 On news outlets around the world, images of American soldiers tearing
down statues of Saddam burgeoned. It was a fitting act of symbolism for the state of the
Ba’athist regime in Iraq.
But it is important to understand that the American invasion was not the only situation
unfolding in Iraq during this time period. In the first few days of the invasion, a desperate
Saddam Hussein issued a plea to the Muslim world to fight alongside his Ba’athist regime in
order to oust the Western infidels.3 One of the first to answer this call was none other than
Osama bin Laden, who (even before the US invasion) planned for an Iraqi insurgency in an
attempt to create a land of “perfect Islamic fighters.”4 It is no surprise then, that al-Qaeda directly
funded the creation of Ansar al-Islam in Northern Iraq two years prior to OIF. In fact, later raids
by US Special Forces found identical bomb-making tapes in camps operated by al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and by Ansar al-Islam in Iraq.5 Moreover, according to British intelligence sources
during the invasion, many of their Ba’athist detainees reported fighting alongside al-Qaeda
4. 4
members.6 It is important to note that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would later come to be
considered the grandfather of the Islamic State, first attached himself to Ansar al-Islam before
becoming the full-fledged commander of al-Qaeda in Iraq.7
With the expulsion of Saddam and his Ba’athist regime, the United States set up a
temporary government, called the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The main goal of the
CPA, as stated by their 16 May 2003 First Order, was to complete the de-Ba’athification of
Iraqi society. This led directly to the alienation and marginalization of former Ba’athists in Iraq,
as many ended up in jail or exile. Ultimately, 100,000 IIS (Iraqi Intelligence Service) members,
30,000 ministry workers, and all military members above the rank of Colonel were indefinitely
expelled.8 This process, which was undoubtedly modeled after the de-Nazification programs in
post-1945 Germany, berated former Ba’athists and essentially attempted to vilify them.
Ultimately, it resulted in a Shia-dominated government that regularly mistreated its Sunni
minority.
As a result of contemporaneous Shia empowerment, side effects of the de-Ba’athification
process proliferated to the majority of Iraqi Sunnis and therefore, increased tensions between the
two groups. Consequently, during the CPA (and the subsequent Interim and Transitional
governments), radicalized Islam began becoming more and more attractive to many of the
alienated Ba’athist/Sunni groups. It is no surprise then, that by the time of the Shia Maliki
government in 2006, an explosion of radical Sunni groups occurred throughout Iraq due to their
shared interest of self-defense against worsening oppression.9 Thus, the insurgencies in post-
Ba’athist Iraq were not explicitly aimed at ousting coalition troops (albeit this obviously played a
major role), but rather at promoting self-defense against the Shia government. This rationale
(when taken into context) is understandable, for the Maliki government regularly sent out death
5. 5
squads to slaughter Sunnis and ex-Ba’athists. It is no mere coincidence then, that the Maliki
takeover paralleled the heightened rise of insurgent groups, such as the Salafist Mujahedeen
Shura Council (which was set up by Zarqawi for a single reason: to create combat brigades to
defend against Maliki).10
By this time, under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was
gradually diverging away from its parent organization. The reason for this was due to differing
strategic and tactic preferences between al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden. In October 2006,
Zarqawi’s successor (al-Masri) boldly announced that AQI had officially rebranded itself as the
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).11 This rebranding came after al-Qaeda essentially disowned AQI after
expressing weariness of their particularly brutal tactics against the civilian population.
Fast forwarding to 9 May 2013, while under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISI
officially became the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) after announcing a merger with the
al-Nusra Front (which was also an al-Qaeda offshoot).12 It is important to note that al-Nusra,
which was an al-Qaeda affiliate, never actually agreed to the merger. Nonetheless, less than a
year later (on 4 January 2014), ISIS forces marched through the war torn city of Fallujah (which
is situated only 43 miles West of Baghdad).13 It was at this point that the infamous ISIS became
common-tongue in the lives of ordinary Americans. Within days, analysts and strategists went on
air and spoke of ISIS as “al-Qaeda on steroids.” Stories and tales of their brutality became the
top story on CNN and FOX. But it wasn’t until the beheading of James Foley, an American
reporter, that the reality of their gruesomeness became comprehendible. Images of ISIS carrying
out subsequent beheadings and other mass killings soon became almost mundane.
It does not take more than a simple Google search to see the true atrocities that those
bannered under ISIS commit each and every day. From mass rape, sexual slavery, group
6. 6
killings/beheadings, and crucifixion, to limb dismemberment and child molestation, the human
rights violations occurring under the Islamic State are nothing less than blaring. When combined
with the nature of their occupation in large portions of Iraq and Syria, exactly why the Islamic
State must be stopped boils down to a simple humanitarian and moral dilemma.
Yet a major problem in exploring this predicament can be derived from the lack of
understanding of the roots of success in the Islamic State’s rise to power. What many fail to
realize is that the Islamic State is not simply composed of hardliner terrorists and former al-
Qaeda operatives that have gone haywire. The group is a “melting pot” of professional,
radicalized, and militarized personnel from various ethnic, social, national, and political
backgrounds. Moreover, the term “terrorist” group is rashly misplaced when assigned to the
Islamic State. With a fully functioning political structure, intelligence bureau, welfare system,
educational apparatus, economy, and organized military, the Islamic State has a more practical
regime than even some sovereign and internationally recognized countries.
As previously stated, the Islamic State is a melting pot of varying ethnic, social, national,
and political backgrounds. Many have joined the group in search of common goals or because of
shared grievances. The influence these different factions have on the Islamic State cannot be
ignored when attempting to understand both their rise to power and how to potentially end their
reign of terror. The most influential of these recruits, and the focus of this paper, are the ex-
Saddamist Ba’athists that have joined up with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his predecessors. Not
only have certain blocs of these Saddamist exiles merged with the Islamic State, but they have
also found themselves leading the group. In fact, when it comes to actually operating day-to-day
functions, it is mainly ex-Ba’athists, not ordinary jihadists, who have led the organization. For
example (to name a few), Abu Ali al-Anbari (served as Emir of Syria), Abu Muslim al-Turkmani
7. 7
(served as Emir or Iraq), and Haji Bakr (who developed the top-down structure and intelligence
capabilities of the Caliphate) were all officers in the Iraqi Military under Saddam Hussein.14 In
fact, nearly every single one of Baghdadi’s closest advisors in Iraq are ex-Ba’athists.15
The simple and often-neglected truth about the Islamic State is that Baghdadi’s closest
companions are nearly all ex-officers of Saddam’s military corps. The implications of this are
conspicuous: Ba’athists played a crucial role in the rise of the Islamic State. Therefore, it does
not take much to deduce that understanding their role is vital in producing a more realistic
picture of the Islamic State phenomena (and in determining how to defeat them).
On the surface, this seems counterintuitive, for the fundamental ideologies of both the
Islamic State and Ba’athists are naturally opposed. Ba’athists, for instance, traditionally believe
in secularism, socialism, and liberty. In effect, nowhere in Ba’athism is there a prescribed notion
of political Islam. The Islamic State, on the other hand, believes in a pure Islamic theocracy
governed by their interpretations of the earliest form of Shari’a law. What many fail to realize is
that the Iraqi Ba’ath party, particularly under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, gradually
diverged from the ideals of its founder, Michel Aflaq, and towards Islamism over time.
Ultimately, the trend towards political Islam set the stage for the radicalization of Ba’athists
during the de-Ba’athification process after 2003.
But exactly how and why did these Ba’athists find their way to the highest ranks of this
theocratic regime? And what subsequent impacts can we conclude these Ba’athists have made on
the Islamic State’s success? This paper will answer both of these questions and in the process of
doing so, alleviate many other mysteries regarding how exactly Ba’athists have come to lead the
most infamous Islamist organization on the planet.
8. 8
2. SETTING THE STAGE FOR RADICALIZATION
How the Transformation of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party Set the Foundation for Ba’athist
Radicalization in Post-2003 Iraq (1947-2003)
“There is much to be said for having an
experienced international jurist who is entirely
unconnected with allied invaders, on the
tribunal…”
-Saddam Hussein
To reiterate, the fundamental ideologies of both the Islamic State and Iraqi Ba’athists
naturally seem opposed on the surface. This is to say that Ba’athist secularism and socialism is
the antithesis to Salafist, seventh-century-oriented, Islamic theocracy modeled by today’s Islamic
State. How could it be possible then, that factions of the old Ba’athist Saddam regime have come
to lead the Islamic State? The fact is that the political ideology of Iraqi Ba’athists shifted towards
that of Islamists over time. In short, under the direction of Saddam Hussein, the secularist beliefs
of Aflaqian Ba’athism underwent a gradual transformation towards political Islam.
Consequently, this general trend laid the groundwork for the radicalization of Ba’athists during
the de-Ba’athification process after 2003.
This gradual ideological shift is often overlooked by Western scholars. Ultimately, by the
time of the 2003 invasion, the version of Ba’athism in Iraq was no longer Ba’athism by the
standard definition. Understanding this point is crucial, for when realized, the apparent
“paradox” of an extremist-Ba’athist connection no longer seems unnatural. But to fully
comprehend the nature of Iraqi Islamized-Ba’athism, one must trace back the ideology to its
roots and study its steady, progressive metamorphosis over time. Even more importantly, one
must also look at the parallel rise of Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein, for they were
9. 9
unintentionally the key forgers of the modern day Ba’athist-ISIS connection (bin Laden created
AQI, later called ISIS, while Saddam led the Islamization process of the Iraqi Ba’ath party).
I. A Brief Reflection on the Rise of Ba’athism (1947-1979)
On 7 April 1947, the Arab Ba’ath party officially adopted its constitution after forming in
Damascus, Syria in 1943.16 The ideology was derived from the philosophies of its main leader,
Michel Aflaq and was summed up in the party’s slogan: Unity, Freedom, and Socialism.17 The
party first rose to power in Syria after success in the 1954 Parliamentary elections (ninety-
percent of Ba’athists that ran for office were elected).18 In 1958, the Ba’ath party’s power was
consolidated when General Nasser agreed to merge Egypt with Syria, thus creating the United
Arab Republic (UAR).19 Since the very start, the goal of the Ba’athists was to create a single,
unified Arab state and consequently, the creation of the UAR gave credence to this prospect.
In Iraq, Ba’athism became a formal political element in 1951 when the Mesopotamian
branch was established.20 Interestingly enough, the Iraqi Regional Ba’ath Party’s founder, Fuad
al-Rikabi, was a Shia Muslim and consequently, the party was initially Shia-dominated before
gradually becoming majority Sunni.21 At only 20 years of age, Saddam Hussein joined the
growing Ba’ath party in 1958 in hopes that Iraq would soon join the UAR. When Abd al-Karim
Qasim, Iraq’s Prime Minister at the time, refused to enter the UAR, a young Saddam and his
fellow Ba’athists became enraged. On 8 February 1963 (despite the UAR breakup in 1961 after a
Syrian military takeover), the dissidents staged a coup that brought the Ba’athists into control of
Iraq for the first time.22 Albeit the first Ba’athist takeover only lasted a few months, it was
nonetheless a major stepping-stone for the party.
In 1966, after years of infighting, the Arab Ba’ath party essentially split in half. For all
intents and purposes, the Iraqi sector stationed itself in Baghdad while the Syrian sector stationed
10. 10
itself in Damascus. Ironically, the Syrian-born Michel Aflaq retreated alongside his Iraqi
counterparts and served as National Secretary for the Iraqi Branch until his death in 1989. Due to
the internal power vacuum immediately following the breakup, Saddam Hussein was elected
Assistant General Secretary of the Iraqi Ba’ath party during the very same year. The
consequences of this were all too important, as only two years later he staged a coup that would
finally consolidate Iraq’s political power into the hands of the Ba’ath.23 General Ahmad Hasan
al-Bakr, Saddam’s blood relative, took charge and implemented many social changes. In fact,
during al-Bakr’s reign, Iraq underwent rapid educational and economic growth that resulted in
high earnings, increased welfare/healthcare, and the nationalization of oil (with help from the
USSR).24 The promises of Ba’athism seemed to be genuine (at least from an economic
standpoint) and in less than 10 years, the party’s membership increased from 5,000 to over 1.2
million.25
But the hopeful enterprise of Iraqi Ba’athism would not last. In 1979, Saddam Hussein
used his growing influence to push aside the weakening al-Bakr, thus becoming the fifth and last
President of Ba’athist Iraq. In addition to the Presidency, Saddam also appointed himself
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of Iraq and Secretary General of the Ba’ath
party during this same year.26 It is important to note that Michel Aflaq remained as the National
Secretary under Saddam – a ceremonial gesture that would prove quite convenient (for reasons
specified later in this paper). Like many new leaders before him, paranoia struck a nerve within
Saddam within days of taking office. In order to consolidate power, he decided to eliminate any
Ba’ath opposition to his rule by executing several high-ranking party members.27 Moreover, in
1982, Saddam forced many other high-ranking officials to resign for similar reasons. The
11. 11
totalitarian nature of these power-tightening acts shocked many at the time, but in retrospect,
they were merely indicative of even worse actions to come.
II. 1979: The Twin Births of Saddamism and Modern Radicalization
For reasons that will be mentioned, the wielding of power by Saddam Hussein gradually
undermined any notion of true Ba’athism. In fact, it can easily be said that Saddam’s 1979 power
consolidation was the beginning of the end for Iraqi Ba’athism. Instead, although resembling
Ba’athism in several key areas, a new form of governance took place – something that can be
labeled “Saddamism.” As will be shown, Saddamism was a political dynamic in itself, as it
trended away from secularism and towards political-Islamism over time (for the remainder of
this paper, the terms Saddamism and Ba’athism will be used interchangeably, but note that they
refer to the former). Understanding this trend is crucial when taking into account exactly how
and why the radicalization of Ba’athists occurred as rapidly as it did in post-2003 Iraq.
On the economic front, Saddam partially privatized al-Bakr’s nationalized industries, thus
leading to an increase in corporatism and clientelism in the Iraqi oil markets. Essentially, this
cult of patronage was derived from businessmen pursuing their ambitions through members of
the Saddamist Ba’ath party.28 Since the goal of Ba’athism was originally Arab nationalism in
every sense of the word, the privatization of markets was a major shift from Michel Aflaq’s idea
of Ba’athism. But, it is important to note that this patrimony wasn’t limited to the economic
sector. All around Iraq, Saddam ordered statues and other portraits of himself to be erected in
near-deity-like fashion. Moreover, as previously stated, Saddam immediately began killing off
opposition that he deemed as imminent threats to his legitimacy. His use of violence against
potential opposition (something that would be repeated many times over after 1979) is yet
another leap away from the Arab socialist ideal prescribed by his National Secretary, Michel
12. 12
Aflaq. It is quite evident that the year 1979 was a turning point for Iraq. But, in retrospect, what
is even more evident are the implications that come along with the fact that on 29 December
1979, the United States placed Iraq on its first ever “State Sponsor of Terrorism” list for its
involvement in funding the militant group Abu Nidal.29 Although not quite to the degree of later
decades, this shows that Iraq was already attempting to forge an Islamic dimension within its
foreign policy (at least covertly).
Meanwhile, as Saddam was consolidating power in Iraq, Afghanistan was rapidly
plunging into chaos. In 1978, a Soviet-backed military coup brought left-winger Nur Mohammad
Taraki into power. During this time, Moscow began sending advisors to Kabul in order to
advance a “Soviet version of socialism” that would align with Soviet interests in the region.30
This new regime began implanting liberal policies (such as educating women) that directly
contradicted with traditional beliefs. Because these new policies strayed from the fundamentalist
perspective of the Islamic faith, those on the right side of the political spectrum became
increasingly agitated. In their eyes, the communists were disrupting and replacing the Shari’a
law that they have governed themselves with for centuries.31 Due to the increasing resentment
towards the still-young regime, opponents began burning down schools and violently-protesting
in the streets.32 Shortly thereafter, these protests worsened into full-fledged rebellions and by
March of 1979, entire cities plunged into anarchy. It was out of this turmoil that the Afghan
Mujahedeen, or jihadists, became relevant on the international stage.
On 24 December 1979, the Soviet Union began a ground invasion in an effort to
overthrow the Afghan government once more. Less than a week after the Soviet 40th Army
invaded, a Spetsnaz raid killed Hafizullah Amin (Taraki’s Prime Minister who took power
through a coup) and the Soviets installed a new socialist puppet government led by Babrak
13. 13
Karmal.33 In an attempt to signify the new Afghan government’s allegiance to the USSR, Karmal
even implemented a new national flag that near-perfectly mirrored the iconic Soviet “hammer
and sickle.” Not surprisingly, this attempt (and many others like it) at integration only worsened
the situation. By 1980, fighting had increased dramatically between the Soviets and the
Mujahedeen, who were now gaining international support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia34 (not
to mention arms and supplies from the US under the CIA’s Operation Cyclone35). According to
the 1991 Central Asian Survey, over 1.5 million Afghan civilians died as a result of the bloody
war that ensued. There is little reason to doubt that this further alienated a large portion of not
only the Afghan community, but also Muslim sympathizers around the Arab world. For this
reason, thousands of foreign jihadists flooded into Afghanistan to join the Mujahedeen.
One of these foreigners was a young, 22-year old Saudi millionaire named Osama bin
Laden. After graduating school with a degree in civil engineering (and after joining the Muslim
Brotherhood in 1976), bin Laden traveled to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia in 1979 to aid the
Mujahedeen.36 Along with fighting in a few skirmishes, he was instrumental in both building
roads for jihadists and in working with CIA officials to transfer funds from Saudi Arabia to
Afghanistan via the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI).37 In these dealings
(among many others), bin Laden developed a relationship with three-star general and head of the
ISI, Hamid Gul, who would later openly support bin Laden’s jihad against the West.38
In fact, it was the connections that bin Laden made while with the Mujahedeen that led to
his success as a jihadist. In the early 1980s, he met Egyptian doctor and jihadist Ayman al-
Zawahiri: the future leader of al-Qaeda. By the time he met bin Laden, Zawahiri was already an
experienced jihadist. At age 14, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood, and supported their anti-
Nasser rhetoric. At age 15, he helped found and lead a terrorist cell within the group Muhammad
14. 14
abd-al-Salam Faraj, which would later merge to become Egyptian Islamic Jihad – the very group
he traveled to Peshawar and Afghanistan with only a few years later.39 In 1978, he earned his
master’s degree in surgery from Cairo University.40 Only three years after this, he was among
thousands arrested in connection to the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat (although he
denies this account).41
In the 1980s, after his release in Egypt, he fled to help the Mujahedeen in their fight
against the Soviets. Before coalescing with bin Laden, Zawahiri ran his own operation in
Peshawar and Eastern Afghanistan, where he funneled millions of dollars into the hands of
jihadists. However, in 1984, the two finally teamed up and formed Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK –
also known as the Afghan Services Bureau), which was fundamental in transferring funds to the
Mujahedeen.42 The MAK is generally regarded as the father of al-Qaeda and thus, it is justified
to say that it is the grandfather of the Islamic State.
As the precursor to al-Qaeda gradually developed in Afghanistan in the 1980s, a second
war was raging to the west. On 3 December 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became the
First Supreme Leader of Iran after leading the ‘79 Iranian Revolutionaries to victory (he was
even named “Person of the Year” by Time Magazine for his efforts). Throughout the revolution,
Khomeini consistently spoke of the necessity for Iran to take on the role of leading Pan-
Islamism. Immediately after taking office, this rhetoric continued and undermined Saddam’s
similar claims and desires.43 The tensions that came along with the question of who was leading
the Pan-Islamist movement only hauled century-old, Arab-Persian and Shia-Sunni disputes
between the two factions. But it is important to note that these tensions in themselves were not
powerful enough to escalate the situation between Saddam and Khomeini.
15. 15
The real roots of conflict stemmed from Saddam’s expansionist and territorial ambitions
– something that would spark his downfall only a decade later. Ultimately, he wanted to seize
control of rich, Iranian oilfields in Khuzestan, as well as the Shatt al-Arab waterway (where
several skirmishes had been fought in the weeks after Khomeini took power). Additionally, since
it was largely Arabs that inhabited Khuzestan, Saddam felt it was necessary to reassert his
control over that area.44 As tensions rose in the early months of 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini began
broadcasting into Iraq in an attempt to spark a Shia revolt.45 The personal animosity between
Saddam and Ayatollah increased with each passing day and only furthered religious schisms,
political rhetoric, and border disputes between their respective nations. Soon enough, a rapid
mobilization effort was underway by Saddam’s Ba’athists, making it nothing less than apparent
that war was inevitable.
On 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran after claiming sovereignty over the Shatt al-
Arab. On this day alone, six Ba’athist army divisions entered Iran while formations of MiG-21s
and MiG23s simultaneously bombed Khomeini’s air facilities.46 The Saddamists easily swept
through Western Iran, but were pushed back only two months later after failing to take Abadan.47
Two years later, after failed peace talks, Iran began its push into Iraqi territory. For the next six
years, the back-and-forth nature of the bloody conflict would be the norm.
III. The 1980s: Saddam’s Blunders and The Maturation of Modern Radicalization
As Iranian forces pushed into Iraqi lands for the first time in 1982, Saddam was en route
to meet with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in a desperate attempt to better relations.48 Iraq
needed friends, as international weariness and accusations towards Saddam Hussein were only
increasing with time. Attempts to talk to Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood,
16. 16
showed Saddam’s willingness to prioritize Ba’athist security over secularist ideologies (note that
this would also cause him to engage in talks with extremists during the 1990s).
Furthermore, what was also increasing during this time was Ayatollah Khomeini’s anti-
Sunni/anti-Ba’athist rhetoric.49 Again and again, he insisted that Iraqi Shias’ revolt against their
Sunni government. From the very start of the war, anti-Ba’ath Shias gave credence to
Ayatollah’s pleads and rose against their Sunni rulers. In 1982, the Shia Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq formed in order to ally with Iran and organize Shi’ite resistance against
Saddam’s Ba’athists.50 But perhaps more importantly, Iran also funded Iraq’s Islamic Dawa
Party, which was responsible for terrorist bombings in places such as the Iraqi Embassy-Beirut in
1981 and the US Embassy-Kuwait in 198351 (and, ironically, which was also the party of future
US-installed leader Nouri al-Maliki). Moreover, Iran supported the Kurdish Democratic Party
(KDP) and helped train them during the early years of the Iraq-Iran War.52 Partially due to the
Iranian support, the KDP had early victories against the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK – the
KDP’s regional rival). Pro-Iranian sentiment grew within the ranks of the KDP, and by 1983,
they fully allowed the Iranians to take over the Haji Omaran (a key border crossing).53
In short, Saddam realized Iran’s rhetoric needed to be shut down by any means necessary.
In his totalitarian fashion, Saddam sent out death squads to hunt down certain Shia factions. For
example, on 8 July 1982, he ordered the killing of 148 Shia men and children peacefully working
on an orchard.54 Additionally, in 1983 (in response to the KDP-Iranian alliance), Saddam
attempted to punish the KDP’s leaders by abducting – and presumably slaughtering – more than
5,000 Kurdish males.55 His attempts (such as the two examples just discussed) to quell the
growing Shia resentment would be the very things that prosecutors used against him to justify his
hanging (in fact, the orchard incident was the case used against him).
17. 17
And yet, even despite Saddam’s violent attempts to quiet down opposition, dissidence
continued to grow. By 1984, the Iran-Iraq War was becoming costly (in terms of lives and
monetary funds) and it would remain this way until its very end. But the high costs of war didn’t
stop a power-hungry Saddam from expanding his military efforts. In addition to furthering
military conscription in an effort to escalate the situation to total war, Saddam also increased his
use of chemical weapons against Iran—something the Iranians reported regularly to a concerned
United Nations.56 Khomeini, on the other hand, continued giving armaments and funds to the
KDP in hopes of creating an insurgency within Iraq.
To reiterate, in addition to the 300,000 dead Iranians and 150,000 dead Iraqis (by 1984),
the economic costs were already mounting heavily.57 With most of Saddam’s resources going
towards the war effort, poverty increased in Iraq, consequently causing increased dissatisfaction
towards the Ba’athist regime (mainly by the Shia majority). It was within this turmoil that the
roots of the Islamization of the Ba’ath party are situated.
Furthermore, with public dissidence mounting, Saddam once again embarked on a quest
for allies. In July 1986, he held a meeting with Pan-Arab leadership in hopes of fabricating peace
among the Iraqi Ba’athist party and popular Islamist movements, such as the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood (of which Zawahiri was a member of – and who had been a bitter rival to Ba’athist
regime since the 1940s in Syria and the 1960s in Iraq).58 Once again, endeavors with the Muslim
Brotherhood showed Saddam’s growing desperation to gain control of the situation in Iraq. By
this time, poverty and inflation in Iraq had manifested overwhelming starvation. Much of
Saddam’s opposition was now turning to religion as a means of diminishing their suffering.
Realizing this, Saddam finally turned to Islam as the means for controlling his population. Before
long, portrayals of Saddam making pilgrimages and praying in Mosques flooded throughout
18. 18
Iraqi media outlets.59 In public speeches, Saddam began referring to Mohammad’s guidance. In
retrospect, it is clear that Saddam was about to plummet down a path that would ultimately end
the dying notions of Aflaq’s Ba’athism in Iraq.
In 1987, Saddam committed one of his largest human rights atrocities in response to
continued Kurdish support for an Iranian takeover. In his so-called al-Anfal Campaign, Saddam
systematically slaughtered nearly 100,000 Kurds and Shias in Northern Iraq.60 The means used
were gruesome: chemical weapons, airstrikes, army regulars, forced deportation, and firing
squads. The following year, Iraqi MiGs dropped chemical weapons atop Halabja, killing nearly
5,000 Kurds – with 75% being women and children.61 Massive disappearances of men, women,
and children became the norm in northern Iraq during the years 1987-1988.62 It was later found
that these (usually innocent) people were shipped off to concentration camps akin to those of
Nazi Germany. According to Human Rights Watch:
“Throughout Iraqi Kurdistan, although women and children
vanished in certain clearly defined areas, adult males who were
captured disappeared in mass ... It is apparent that a principal
purpose of Anfal was to exterminate all adult males of military
service age captured in rural Iraqi Kurdistan."63
Accounts of the Anfal Campaign tell tales all too familiar to events that transpired in
Europe only four decades previously. Men, women, and children were separated, loaded onto
trucks, and shipped off to concentration camps, whereby they were stripped down and deemed
“fit” or not. Then, they were rushed into rooms and systematically slaughtered by several
different means: firing squads, rape, poison gas, incineration, and starvation, to name a few.64
Almost two decades later, mass graves filled with thousands of corpses (that date back to these
killings) were found by US and Iraqi forces.65
19. 19
Meanwhile, as Iraqi Ba’athists focused on eliminating interior opposition to their rule, the
most notorious terror group in history was being created in Peshawar, Pakistan. As Mujahedeen
forces were staring victory in the face in 1988, bin Laden and Zawahiri were meeting privately to
discuss the future of their movement. Out of this meeting came the evolved manifestation of their
group Maktab al-Khidama – something they would call al-Qaeda. Immediately following their
formation of the terror group, bin Laden and Zawahiri – a dynamic duo that would shape the
organization until bin Laden’s death – began creating training camps in Afghanistan.66
The announcement of al-Qaeda remained relatively quiet within Western circles. But
contrary to this, the establishment of the organization was one of the most pivotal points of the
20th century, and consequently, it would shape foreign policies for the next twenty years. No
longer was jihad to be limited to specific regions within “dar al-Islam” (the house of Islam).
Upon realizing their success in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan, bin Laden and Zawahiri
(among others), sought to expand their cause beyond their region of operations. They stated the
goal of al-Qaeda was to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by ousting “non-
Islamic” systems of government.67 This was the only way, they argued, that Muslim unity was
ensured. Islam was the common bond between people within the House of Islam and to pay
virtue to this, they believed Muslims had to return to the true way. This ultra-conservative
ideology, commonly referred to as Salafist Islam, shaped and continues to shape cultural
paradigms within groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS to this day (NOTE: Salafism developed as a
result of Western domination in 19th century Egypt and therefore, it is important to understand
that its reactionary rise occurred many, many decades before al-Qaeda68). Realizing their
military, economic, and political inferiority to state institutions of target regimes, they decided
20. 20
the best means to accomplish their goals were through guerilla attacks and terrorism. Thus, with
the fall of the Soviet Union, the Age of Terrorism had begun.
As will be seen, the economic turmoil and decrease in nationalism caused by the Iran-
Iraq War fabricated a desperate need for Ba’athists to regain control of Iraq. With the
Mujahedeen victory in Afghanistan, and the continuation of the Salafist movement, Iraqi’s
ultimate decision to turn to Islam (as will be discussed) was a dangerous one. In fact, Iraq’s pivot
towards political Islam came at the same exact time as the rise of al-Qaeda, making it almost
natural that the two parties expressed degrees of curiosity towards each other (this curiosity led
to the establishment of contacts between Ba’athists and the future leaders of the Islamic State in
Iraq – but this too, will be discussed later).
IV. The Necessity for Saddam to Win Over the Iraqi People
In the very same month that al-Qaeda formed in Peshawar, Saddam and Khomeini finally
made peace in Mesopotamia and Persia. In total, the war cost Iraq 561 Billion US dollars,69 over
100,000 civilian deaths (not including the al-Anfar campaign and other Ba’athist killings), and
up to 375,000 soldier-KIAs.70 The preexisting problems of poverty, inflation, and starvation were
only increasing. Furthermore, to make matters worse, Iraqi oil production and economic growth
slowed dramatically, while at the same time, government debt increased to nearly $130 Billion
(Iraq’s GDP was only $38 Billion in 1989).71
With nationalism on the decline, Saddam had no choice but to use Islam to counter public
disillusionment and to gain support. Since the start of the Iran-Iraq War, he gradually increased
Islamic rhetoric of doing “justification” for God in order to contrast Shi’ite and Kurdish
movements, such as the KDP, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and the Dawa Party. In short, the
21. 21
Ba’athists needed to regain control and public confidence—and to accomplish this, they deemed
it necessary to appease Islamic sentiment.
Less than a year after the August cease-fire that ended the Iran-Iraq War, the evidence of
Ba’athist Islamization efforts became clear when on 23 June 1989, Michel Aflaq died.
Interestingly enough, immediately following his death, the Ba’athist regime in Baghdad released
a statement confirming that the revered “Father of the Ba’athist Party” embraced Islam prior to
his death (Aflaq was a known Christian throughout his life).72 Regardless of the validity of this
statement, the implications of it were clear: Saddamists was continuing to branch away from
traditional Ba’athism.
As time rolled forward, Iraq’s debt crisis continued to be rather bothersome to the
Ba’athist regime. To Saddam, the reason his economic recovery was failing was due to OPEC’s
indifference regarding Kuwait’s attempts to increase oil quotas; thus causing a decrease in oil
prices. According to Tariq Aziz, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, “every $1 drop in the price of a barrel
of oil caused a $14 Billion drop in annual Iraqi oil revenue…triggering a financial crisis in
Baghdad.”73 Additionally, Saddam accused Kuwait of drilling into Iraqi oil fields.
Whether or not the Kuwaitis were waging economic warfare on the Iraqis is irrelevant to
the backstory of the Islamization of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party. But what is relevant is Saddam’s
solution to his own allegations. By mid-1990, his troops were mobilized and ready to execute
plans to conquer Kuwait. Moreover, with his troops primed for invasion, his Islamic rhetoric
stepped up. Three days before the war’s commencement, Saddam wrote a new constitutional
draft that described martyrdom as an honor before God.74 On 2 August 1990, Ba’athist forces
finally invaded and two days later, Kuwait was in Saddam’s hands. Then, on 7 August, Saddam
22. 22
said (referring to the successful conquest of Kuwait) that: “our brains were worthless in this
matter. It was God who guided us and it was God who has blessed us.”75
Concurrently, in the next few months, Saddam reported to the media on numerous
occasions that the Prophet Muhammad had appeared to him in dreams in order to give him
military advice (I suppose with the impending US invasion, this advice failed).76 Along with this,
came Saddam’s assumption of the title “Server of God.” Subsequent to the announcement of his
being the “Servant of God,” the media, in turn, began to commonly portray Saddam as a Mahdi
(meaning a redeemer of Islam).77 Evidently, in the months following the Invasion of Kuwait,
Islam became fully politicized in Iraq – something inherently conflicting with the late Aflaq’s
secular, Ba’athist values.
With Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait came a plethora of international opposition. In fact, every
single member on the United Nations Security Council (among others) publically denounced the
actions of the Ba’athists. To name a few:78
China enacted an arms embargo.
12 of 20 Arab League members voted to create a Multinational Force
based in Saudi Arabia.
The US froze all assets while also sending troops to Saudi Arabia.
The USSR froze all assets and sent two warships to the Gulf.
France froze assets and sent warships to Gulf.
Economic Community (Europe) imposed a trade embargo against Iraq.
Belgium and Germany sent minesweepers to gulf and enacted an oil
embargo.
Moreover, on the first day of the invasion, the United Nations Security Council enacted
Resolution 660, which both:79
1. Condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
2. Demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in
which they were located on 1 August 1990.
23. 23
In the closing months of 1990, major world powers and Ba’athist Iraq held numerous
negotiations to peacefully resolve the situation – but to no avail. In November of that year,
Saddam responded to reporters questioning his decision to gamble Iraq at the expense of a US-
led invasion by saying: “If God wills something, there is no stopping his will.”80 Essentially, he
was blaming God for his decision to stay in Kuwait despite UN/US ultimatums. Moreover,
immediately following these reports, Saddam told the media that “only through jihad” would the
true spirit of Islam return.81 Not only did this show conclusively that Saddam was dependent
upon Islamic rhetoric to quell concerns within his country, but also that his divergent path from
Ba’athism was nearly to the point of no return. He linked himself to the Prophet Muhammad and
to Islam in general in order to stop critics and gain control (he was more or less “playing the
Islam card”).
But, perhaps unbeknownst to him then, his Islamization efforts would consequently open
the door for religion to fully conquer politics within the near future. As previously stated, with
the integration of the Ba’athists and Islam, religion became a thick veil covering the totalitarian
nature of Saddamists. The fact is that the promotion of the simple idea of an Islamic political
system opened the door for such a system to exist in the future (due to increasing perceptual
intellections that began to unleash themselves at this time).
According to many within his inner circle, not only did Saddam seek to create his own
school of jurisprudence within Islam, but also he deeply desired to be the Muslim leader of the
world.82 Again and again he attempted to vindicate the idea that he was indeed a Mahdi. To
reiterate once again, the increasing grandiloquence of these statements created a perfect
environment for setting future radical jihadist spirits free in post-2003 Iraq – which, in turn,
helped facilitate the radicalization of his own, fellow Ba’athists.
24. 24
On 14 January 1991, one day before the UN ultimatum for Iraq to disembark from
Kuwait collapsed, Saddam imprinted the phrase “Allahu Akbar” (God is Great) on the Iraqi
national flag.83 The reason for this was simple: Saddam realized a war with the West was
inevitable and he needed to spur non-existent nationalist spirits. Understanding that nationalism
was at an all-time low in Iraq (due to increasing economic difficulties and frustration towards the
Ba’athist regime), the Ba’athists sought to exploit the Muslim faith in order to “religiousize” the
impending conflict; thus, consequently replacing nationalist incentives to fight with religious
ones.
Two days later, on 16 January 1991, Operation Desert Shield (the codename for the
buildup of troops in preparation for a potential Iraq war) escalated into Operation Desert Storm.
The United States led 33 coalition countries into battle; proudly declaring “we will not fail.”84 In
only 1.5 months, over 60,624 tons of bombs were dropped by the USAF (this number does not
include bombs dropped by coalition nations) – which on a monthly average is comparable to
both Vietnam and World War II.85 Media images of enflamed, blackened oil fields quickly
spread throughout the world (but the reality of the destruction caused by these bombing runs
went well beyond what was viewed by the public). It was clear that the coalition planned to hit
Ba’athist forces relentlessly.
By 27 February 1991, coalition forces fully occupied Kuwait and forced Saddam to order
a retreat. One day later, President Bush officially announced the liberation of Kuwait and the
commencement of a cease-fire. But, although ground operations against the West were over, Iraq
still had an interior conflict to fight. Throughout the Gulf War and in the months leading up to it,
President Bush directly addressed Iraq’s Shia and Kurdish opposition. For example, on 1 March
1991 he stated the following:86
25. 25
“In my own view...the Iraqi people should put Saddam aside, and
that would facilitate the resolution of all these problems that exist
and certainly would facilitate the acceptance of Iraq back into the
family of peace-loving nations.”
Statements like these, which ran parallel with CIA attempts to operate “pro-freedom”
radio stations in Iraq, gave dissidents the hope of Western support they needed to rebel.
Consequently, in March 1991, Iraq saw the largest Shia revolt since 1920.87 Groups involved in
these uprisings were mainly under the umbrella of al-Dawa or the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, the two largest Shia factions at the time.88 Contemporaneously to the Shia
rebellions, the KDP and PUK began revolting in the north. In short, when the simultaneous
uprisings were finally quelled, Saddam had the blood of another 100,000 citizens on his hands.89
Ultimately, over 10 percent of the country was displaced and millions more were traumatized.
Many scholars have pointed to this revolt as the “last straw” for Iraqi Shias. From this point
forward, the Shia-Sunni chasm in Iraq deepened to a point of no return. Understandably so,
Saddam lost a considerable degree of both political legitimacy and support. To counteract the
growing animosity towards his Ba’athist regime, Saddam once again embarked on winning his
people over through the use of Islam. It is no wonder, then, that by the end of the rebellion the
Ba’athists had already initiated their public Islamization effort, known as the “Return to Faith”
Campaign.
But what was even more destructive than the internal dissidence caused by Saddam’s
endless wars was the ensuing and debilitating economic costs. In fact, from 1989-1991, Iraq saw
a massive drop in its oil supply (to be exact: 2,643,000 barrels/day). The crippling cost of the
Gulf War would be something the Ba’athists ultimately failed to recover from fully (see Figure
1).
26. 26
(Figure 1) Data Source: eia.gov
Furthermore, consequential to the drop in oil production, Iraq’s GDP per capita also
suffered greatly – giving even greater credence to the notion that Iraq’s economy was crumbling
to ashes (see Figure 2).
(Figure 2) Data Source: indexmundi.com
27. 27
Source: Wikimedia
ABOVE: Thousands of refugees roam Iraq in 1991 as a result of the Shia rebellions. The
Ba’athists’ extreme methods used to cripple the revolt led to the decrease in legitimacy of
Saddam’s regime and thus, (in the absence of nationalism) an increase in Ba’athist tendency to
rely on Islamic rhetoric for support.
28. 28
In 1990, two years after the war with Iran, Iraq’s Human Development Index (HDI) was
ranked 50th in the world.90 However, by 1995 Iraq’s HDI plummeted to 106th, further showing
the failure of the increasingly Islamized Ba’athist society under Saddam Hussein.
The reason for pointing out these statistics is simple: to further provide a fundamental
understanding as to the degree of necessity for Saddam to win over the hearts and minds of the
Iraqi people. With a collapsing economy, public dissidence, poverty, hunger, and unemployment
all increased dramatically. As you will see, winning his people over is very thing Saddam
Hussein intended to embark on doing. While his Islamization protocol was in full swing by the
end of 1991, it only increased with time as the final decade of the twentieth century progressed.
In fact, by the early 1990s, not only were Ba’athists expanding domestic Islamic initiatives, but
they were also seeking to further Islamist components to their foreign policy.
V. The Islamization of Domestic and Foreign Interests (1992-2002)
In the midst of the Gulf War in 1991, Osama bin Laden begged his home government in
Saudi Arabia to oust the Americans, whose boots were touching the same dirt that covered the
holy cities of Mecca and Medina. After refusing the middle-aged, ex-Mujahedeen, logistic
manager, rising tensions between the two parties culminated in the expulsion of bin Laden from
his home country. It is needless to say that bin Laden was furious with the Saudis and thus, he
traveled to Sudan whereby he continued expanding operations with al-Qaeda (AQ).91 It is here in
Sudan that the first known meeting between AQ and the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) occurred.
It is important to note (for clarification purposes) that while the paths of Osama bin
Laden and Saddam Hussein did not directly intercept in the past forty years of history just
discussed, understanding the divergent and increasingly Islamic nature of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party
from its predecessor is crucial when pondering how these perceptually ideologically opposed
29. 29
parties finally merged in post-2003 Iraq. Thus, the willingness for the IIS to engage in talks with
al-Qaeda showed how serious the Ba’athists were about consolidating their power from both
internal and external threats.
To reiterate, the disillusionment of the Iraqi populace fabricated a dire necessity for
Saddam to win over the hearts and minds of his people. With the overwhelming defeat after
promises of victory in the Gulf War, nationalistic fervor was not an option to take advantage of.
Therefore, the Ba’athists once again turned to Islam as a means of control. Whether or not
Saddam Hussein himself became a genuine devout to the Muslim faith (as he consistently
insisted) is trivial to this argument. What is important is the fact that his claims to piousness
opened the door for religious excitement within the ranks of his fellow Ba’athists. This
consequently set the foundation for the radicalization of these Ba’athists after their
marginalization under the Coalition, Interim, and Maliki governments.
Furthermore, the overwhelming scrutiny of a bin Laden-Saddam Hussein connection has
caused many simple facts to be ignored when it comes to Ba’athist cooperation with jihadists. It
is true that the evidence of their direct cooperation in the 9/11 attacks is virtually nonexistent, but
nonetheless a general relationship did, in fact, exist (and what’s important for our purposes is
the fact that this relationship increased with time). Many Americans tend to overlook the obvious
fact that attacks (like 9/11) were not the sole operational activity of al-Qaeda. Iraqi Ba’athists
often used al-Qaeda to channel funds or help procure arms (and vice versa). But these facts,
which will be discussed, are beside the point. What is important is the willingness for Ba’athists
to engage with bin Laden/AQ in the first place. Not only did this show the desperation of the
Ba’ath party to hold onto power, but also the turmoil enslaving Iraq during the 1990s. Therefore,
it must be kept in mind that this section was not designed to support any argument for an Iraqi
30. 30
linkage to 9/11, but rather to show the establishment of contacts between Ba’athists and radical
Islamists (which helped ally factions of the two groups after 2003). The fact is that these contacts
set the groundwork for further collaboration (and ultimate merging) after Operation Iraqi
Freedom. By focusing on the connections between jihadists and Ba’athists in the 1990s, one can
fully grasp the extent of the relationship building that occurred between the two parties during
this time period.
More importantly, the establishment of contacts between Ba’athists and extremists, such
as al-Qaeda, showed Saddam’s desire to Islamize particular dimensions of Iraqi foreign policy
(at least covertly) in order to reassert his domestic claims of being a Pan-Islamic Mahdi. As
previously stated, the growth of bin Laden paralleled Saddam’s Islamization efforts and
therefore, meetings between their respective groups were only a natural occurrence (regardless of
their outcomes) when their mutual desperation for allies is taken into account.
In 1992, the IIS began listing bin Laden as an intelligence asset (as revealed in a
document the Defense Intelligence Agency reported to be authentic).92 Additionally, during the
2003 Iraq War, numerous high-level Ba’athist prisoners in Iraqi Kurdistan reported to The New
Yorker that Saddam Hussein had hosted a leader of al-Qaeda during 1992 (the leader specified
was Zawahiri).93 Interestingly enough, when Kurdish officials tried to get the CIA to interrogate
these men, they were met with no answer. This meeting was verified by an independent Iraqi
intelligence official, who stated that a third-party group (named al-Turabi) brokered the meeting
between the Ba’athist IIS and Zawahiri.94 This source also claimed that these meetings persisted
during throughout the 1990s in varying locations, such as Sudan, Pakistan, and even in a safe
house in Baghdad. Moreover, a leaked Defense Department document written by Undersecretary
31. 31
for Policy Douglas J. Feith maintained that Saddam wished any relationship between the IIS and
al-Qaeda be kept secret (in fear of foreign probes).95
The initiation of these meetings came as Saddam was preparing for his “Return to Faith”
campaign. Not surprisingly, the developments during Return to Faith directly led to the rise of
Salafist ideology in Iraq. To lead the campaign, Saddam selected Izzat al-Douri – a Ba’athist
official who would later lead the insurgency group Naqshbandi Army and work with ISIS in
taking several key Iraqi cities. Interestingly enough, it was during this time of Islamization when
al-Douri first began to develop connections to future-ISIS top commanders (then-Saddam
loyalists) al-Turkmani and Abu Ayman al-Iraqi.96 Due to this, it is only logical to conclude that
the Return to Faith Campaign eventually aided (directly and indirectly) the success of the Islamic
State nearly 20 years later.
The first order of the campaign (although before its “official” start) occurred in August
1992, when Saddam instructed the Iraqi Ministry of Education to test every single teacher’s
knowledge of the Quran.97 In meetings with advisors and top Ba’athist-officials, Saddam
officially made public his goal to create a Pan-Islamic state – something that many of his fellow
Ba’athists agreed with.98 By definition, Iraqi Ba’athists who were loyal to Saddam could no
longer be considered Aflaqian Ba’athists. The U-turn from secular Pan-Arabism to full-fledged
Pan-Islamism that had been gradually occurring since Saddam’s taking of office was now fully
manifested.
On 1 June 1993, Saddam ordered 30,000 new Quran teachers and made Quranic study a
required subject on the general matriculation exams.99 In short, he enacted numerous programs to
further the study of Islamic law. For example, in order to acquire the 30,000 teachers he sought,
he offered generous stipends on top of increased base salaries; thus, making the job extremely
32. 32
desirable. Moreover, new laws were passed that reformed capital punishments akin to
reactionary-Shari’a resolutions (for example thievery was now able to be punished by the
amputation of the hand).100
Meanwhile, in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, a second al-Qaeda-
Iraqi Intelligence Service meeting materialized a nonaggression pact between the two parties.101
While only speculative, it seems logical to conclude that the reasoning behind this was
preemptive – Saddam didn’t want to undermine his Pan-Islamic ambitions and his Return to
Faith Campaign by dealing with religiously inspired attacks on his soil (although these were
occurring already in relatively small numbers). It is important to note that despite the fact that
this meeting was between the leadership of both parties, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein
were both absent.
In 1994, however, bin Laden made his first face-to-face meeting with the IIS. This
meeting was initiated by al-Qaeda in order to secure arms training and weapons from the
Ba’athists. More specifically, bin Laden attempted to persuade the Iraqi Intelligence Service to
assist al-Qaeda in the “procurement of an unspecified number of Chinese-made anti-ship limpet
mines” among other foreign-made weapons.102 This was well documented in US intelligence
circles. In fact, according to page 19761 of the Congressional Records of the United States
Senate, Iraqi officials allegedly traveled to Sudan to meet with al-Qaeda three times before the
meeting with bin Laden himself.103 In addition to the procurement of arms, bin Laden also
wanted anti-Saudi rhetoric to be broadcasted throughout Iraq and joint IIS-AQ operations in
Saudi Arabia.104 Interestingly enough, the Congressional Record reveals that it was in fact the
Sudanese government that brokered the meeting between AQ and the Ba’athists (but after 1994,
33. 33
the two parties decided it was best to meet through alternative communication channels). To
quote directly from page 61 of the 9/11 Commission Report:
“With the Sudanese regime acting as an intermediary, Bin Laden
himself met with senior Iraqi Intelligence officers in Khartoum in
late 1994…Bin Laden is said to have asked for space to establish
training camps [within Iraq], as well as assistance in procuring
weapons.”105
In the decade and a half since 9/11, facts such as these have been largely forgotten. The
reason for this is the channel(s) in which we attain our information (which is mainly largely
deceitful, opinionated, and sometimes uninformed media outlets). Thus, to say there was “no
connection” between al-Qaeda and the Ba’athists is simply misleading. To reiterate, albeit the
evidence for IIS-AQ cooperation in the attacks on 9/11 is nonexistent, a relationship did exist for
other purposes.
To continue, the head of the CIA, George Tenet, said the following regarding the
contacts:
“We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and
al-Qaeda going back a decade…Credible information indicates
that Iraq and al-Qaeda have discussed safe haven and reciprocal
nonaggression.”106
Furthermore, Ba’athists and al-Qaeda shared an interest in Algerian terror group “Groupe
Islamique Arme” (GIA) during this time. Interestingly enough, the GIA was one of the largest
AQ affiliates throughout the mid-90s. According to the CIA, Iraqi Ba’athists used al-Qaeda as an
intermediary to transfer funds to the GIA, thus solidifying the premise of Islamization within
Ba’athist ranks.107
With the paths of radicals and Iraqi Ba’athists finally converging, Saddam was also
furthering his Faith Campaign. In 1994, he announced his plan to build the “Grand Saddam
Mosque, which was to be the largest in the world (it also was to be encapsulated by a manmade
34. 34
lake that stretched 70,000 yards in the shape of the Arab world).108 In addition to this, Iraqi
Ba’athists also established the “Saddam High Institute for the Study of the Blessed Quran and
the Prophet’s Esteemed Sunna” in an attempt to further his policy of Islamizing Iraqi education
and politics.109
Perhaps it is only suitable to pause for a moment and reflect on the happenings just
discussed. The domestic Islamization in Iraq and the expanding radical contacts of the IIS (such
as al-Qaeda and their affiliate GIA) are not separate entities. Together, they represent a fervent
effort by Iraqi Ba’athists to revamp Iraq into a system able to radiate the perception of Pan-
Islamic leadership. But even more importantly, they established the foundations for the post-
2003 radicalization of Ba’athists.
To continue, in 1995, after years of persuading the Iraqis to help AQ develop chemical
and conventional weapons, bin Laden’s associates began receiving bomb-making training from
IIS technical expert Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed (who was observed at bin Laden’s farm in
Khartoum in 1995 and 1996).110 To reinforce this evidence, page 19760 of the Congressional
Record quotes the CIA directly:
“Al-Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them
acquire WMD capabilities…Iraq has provided training to al-
Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making
conventional bombs.”111
Interestingly enough, according to the Pentagon, alongside bin Laden in Khartoum was
the director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service, Mani-abd-al-Rashid-al-Tikriti.112 These training
sessions came as Saddam once again announced to Arab leaders (in a closed-door meeting) that
Iraq was officially a supporter of a Pan-Islamic world.113 The goal to create a Pan-Islamic state –
something the modern-day Islamic State also strives to do – now became paramount to Ba’athist
doctrine in Iraq.
35. 35
The year 1995 also saw many meetings between the IIS and Abu Hajer. “The Iraqi,” as
he was known, was an al-Qaeda operative who was crucial in orchestrating meetings between
radicals in AQ and Ba’athists in the IIS. According to the 2002 CIA report, titled Iraq and al-
Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, Abu Hajer had a great relationship with Iraqi
Intelligence and even helped negotiate the 1993 nonaggression pact.114 Moreover, in addition to
confirming his involvement in the nonaggression pact, the CIA reports that he was involved in
the 1998 embassy bombings and in the Khartoum meetings.115 Lastly, according to the Senate
Congressional Record, on 19 February 1995, the (Ba’athist) former Director of Iraqi Intelligence
Directorate 4 met with bin Laden to discuss unspecified topics.116
Furthermore, the July 2004 Intelligence Committee report stated the following regarding
the operations of the IIS:
“From 1996 to 2003, the Iraqi Intelligence Service focused its
terrorist activities on Western interests, particularly against the
United States and Israel…[and during this time] the general
pattern that emerges is one of al-Qaeda’s enduring interest in
acquiring CBRN expertise from Iraq.”117
It is no surprise then, that in 1996 the National Security Agency intercepted telephone
calls between AQ and IIS chemical weapon experts.118 Interestingly enough, during this same
year, a chemical weapons program began in Sudan, just south of Khartoum; while, at the same
time (according to Colin Powell), bin Laden was meeting with IIS officials in the same city (just
before his move to Afghanistan).119
Continuing on, as described in the 2004 Intelligence Committee Report, in 1997 AQ sent
Abu Abdullah al-Iraqi to Baghdad in order to (once again) persuade the IIS for CBRN
technology.120 According to Colin Powell, he met with Iraqi Intelligence numerous times that
year in order to purchase poison gas. Whether or not CBRN technology was provided by the
36. 36
Ba’athists (if it even existed), is beside the point. Once again, regardless of actual negotiated
pacts/trade deals, the most important things these meetings produced were connections and
relationships.
Furthermore, it is well reported that AQ fighters were observed in training camps within
Iraq in 1997 – showing the effectiveness of bin Laden’s requests only a few years prior.121
Meanwhile, during the same time period, Saddam began to call for jihad against the West after
coming under major scrutiny over the prospect of UN weapons inspections. This event was well
reported in the Iraqi newspaper “babel.”122 But it is important to remember that Saddam’s call for
religious holy war against the West was not a rare event. In 1991 for example, Saddam called for
jihad against the United States and Saudi Arabia123 – an eerily similar cry to what Osama bin
Laden would make in due time.
In 1998, the Clinton-era Justice Department accused Iraqi Ba’athists of helping al-Qaeda
develop and procure weapons.124 Perhaps it was for this reason then, that CIA Director Tenet
declared “war” on al-Qaeda during this same year. But regardless of the reasons for the CIA’s
statement, it is nonetheless an extraordinary coincidence that this “war declaration” came as
future Iraqi Intelligence Service chief Forouk Hijazi traveled to Kandahar to meet with bin
Laden.125 Moreover, it is also an incredible coincidence that only days after the 1998, four-day,
US bombing campaign in Iraq, bin Laden and Zawahiri met with two senior Ba’athist IIS
officials (in the same month as at least three more meetings between AQ and the IIS).126 During
this time, Ba’athists vigorously attempted to build an Arab alliance against the attacks, but to no
avail. Consequently, it would be no stretch of the imagination to assume that indulging within
the ranks of al-Qaeda was their only option in trying to build allies against the West. Therefore,
37. 37
it is logical to deduce that Western military intrusions and UN sanctions directly pushed the Iraqi
Intelligence Service and al-Qaeda into increasing cooperation with each other.
It is important to note that as meetings between AQ and the IIS were increasing in 1998,
Ba’athist rhetoric of Islamization was also increasing. For example, Izzat al-Douri openly stated
during this time that Islam was the official stance of the Iraqi Ba’ath party.127 This occurred
contemporaneously with Saddam’s continuing push for Islamic education reform and superficial
calls for holy war.
As time pushed forward into the final year of the twentieth century, speculation continued
to grow surrounding the purported Ba’athist-Jihadist connection. Once again, regardless of the
relationship between the leaders of each party, one cannot deny the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s
willingness to work with al-Qaeda (and vice versa). In 1999, an official under President Clinton
told the Washington Post that US Government Intelligence was “sure” that the IIS helped al-
Qaeda in developing weapons.128 Furthermore, according to the 2002 Intelligence Committee
Report, this came as the US intelligence community received word that al-Qaeda was planning to
strike a major landmark in New York City.129 A second report of this potential attack came only
a month later from British intelligence sources. It is needless to say that many within the US
inner circle were on their toes.
In 1999, Hijazi traveled to meet with bin Laden once again (the same CIA source says
this was extremely unlikely to happen unless ordered by Saddam himself).130 Also, by this time,
it was open knowledge that al-Qaeda had set up operational training camps in northern Iraq. As a
direct consequence to this, it seems that the IIS had deliberately given in to al-Qaeda’s requests
regarding the providing of a safe haven for AQ terrorists.
38. 38
Furthermore, during the same year, the so-called “father of the Islamic State,” Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi (a Jordanian street thug by trade), traveled to Afghanistan. Here, he made his
first connections to al-Qaeda and even set up his own terrorist organization (back in Jordan)
called Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (Tawhid or JTJ for short).131 Interestingly enough, JTJ was
fully funded by the Afghan Taliban regime and its efforts focused on training suicide bombers
within Afghanistan and Pakistan Taliban-dominated areas.132 The implications of this are of the
utmost importance, as Tawhid (or “unity”) was one of the first to surge across the border into
Iraq after the 2003 US invasion.
In the year of the millennium, experts believe Zarqawi met again with bin Laden in
Kandahar.133 Reportedly, al-Zarqawi denied an invitation to join al-Qaeda despite their obvious
mutual interests. The reason for this, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, was due to
bin Laden’s insistence on focusing on the US, rather than enemies nearer to their area of
operations, such as Israel and Jordan. But regardless of the rift, many in the intelligence
community still maintain that their cooperation remained strong in the years preceding their
eventual merge. The evidence for this is solid, for after receiving rejection to his proposition, bin
Laden then gave funds to Zarqawi’s in order to help set up training camps in Herat,
Afghanistan.134
Then, in 2001, photographs showed al-Qaeda members heading to Ba’athist-funded
compounds in Northern Iraq.135 This came only weeks before the founding of Ansar al-Islam,
which was established by direct funding from Osama bin Laden (who, with knowledge of the
upcoming September 11th attacks, sought to expand operations to secure al-Qaeda’s survival
against an impending American onslaught). According to prisoners in the Kurdish camp
Sulaimaniya, Ansar al-Islam developed as a result of a joint-control operation between the
39. 39
Ba’athists and al-Qaeda. While many may doubt this, it is nonetheless coincidental that in early
2002 a Ba’athist IIS official awarded Ansar over $100,000.136 Yet, it is important to note that
both the Ba’athists and the Islamists viewed the Kurdish people (among others) as a common
enemy. Albeit the well-documented evidence regarding Ba’athist-AQ cooperation in fighting
Kurdish groups may be over emphasized, it nonetheless is still important for our purposes, as it
shows the willingness for both parties involved to work with one another.
However, it is noteworthy to mention that one of the main leaders of Ansar al-Islam, Abu
Wail, was also an Iraqi Intelligence Service Officer under Saddam Hussein.137 In fact, many in
Iraq reported intercepting radio traffic between the Iraqi Army and Ansar. It is no surprise then,
that the leader of the PUK, Barhim Salih, claimed Ansar al-Islam was operating out of Ba’athist-
controlled Mosul.138 Moreover, according to the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, it was in
Ba’athist interest to have Ansar al-Islam opposing the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Having Ansar al-
Islam as a proxy force would have given Saddam Hussein a stronghold to oust American and
foreign ambitions within the region. Thus, with this proxy force, he would have subsequently
consolidated power in Iraqi Kurdistan (which is something he always strived to do).
Interestingly enough, in 2002 both Ansar al-Islam and the Ba’athists targeted the same
PUK and KDP forces139 – this suggests organizational cooperation in the attempts to
systematically destroy their common opposition. Additionally, during the same year, Zarqawi
was given protection in Baghdad in order to get medical treatment from a hospital operated for
the Iraqi elite.140 In fact, this hospital was owned and run by Saddam Hussein’s own son. It is no
coincidence that during this year, Zarqawi also attached himself (and his group, Tawhid) to
Ansar al-Islam (which was a known client of al-Qaeda training). Therefore, whether known or
not known by the IIS, Saddam Hussein and his fellow Ba’athists directly aided an al-Qaeda
40. 40
affiliated leader and played a role in helping him return to his leadership position (whereby he
was healthy enough to lead al-Qaeda in Iraq, which later turned into the Islamic State).
VI. A Brief Reflection on Ba’athist Islamization Until 2003
It is important to pause at this time to summarize the happenings prior to the 2003 US
invasion and reflect upon their implications. To begin, Ba’athism started out as a secular,
socialist ideology focused on the philosophies of Christian-devout Michel Aflaq. Upon taking
power in 1979, Saddam’s Ba’athists began a gradual transformation towards totalitarianism and
the inclusion of Political Islam. The undermining of Saddam’s legitimacy by Khomeini’s
rhetoric and funding for Shia/Kurdish rebel factions during the Iran-Iraq War decreased Ba’athist
popularity in Iraq. The short war promised by Saddam Hussein quickly turned into the longest
conventional war of the 20th century. Poverty, starvation, and economic woes all increased
during and after the war, making it increasingly difficult for the average Iraqi to make a living.
Thus, notions of nationalism no longer were suitable for Ba’athists to exploit for control –
essentially the “rally around the flag” effect was no longer working. Public dissidence (that often
manifested in forms of rebellion) was mounting and the Ba’athists needed to quell the situation.
To accomplish this, the Ba’athist regime turned to Islam. Rather than renewing a “rally
around the flag” effect, they decided to establish a “rally around Islam” system. Saddam declared
it an honor to die in the name of God and increasingly began referring to the Quran in public
speeches. But, by the aftermath of the Gulf War, Iraq’s economy tanked. Consequently, the
largest Shia rebellion since 1920 quickly erupted and nearly overthrew Saddam Hussein; who
responded by killing over 100,000 members of his opposition. As one would expect, the mass
killing of civilians did not roll over well with the public and thus, dissidence continued to rise. In
attempts to wither down the billowing resistance, Islamization continued to the point of a
41. 41
perceptual quasi-theocracy. Saddam told stories of meeting the Prophet Muhammad in dreams
and being guided by his infinite wisdom. Under the “Return to Faith” Campaign, Quranic
teachings expanded, Mosques were built, “Allahu Akbar” was written on the national flag,
Ba’athist calls for jihad became more frequent, and Islamic rhetoric became commonplace. Izzat
al-Douri even proclaimed that Islam was the official stance of the Ba’athist party. Consequently,
Saddam was named a redeemer of Islam, or a Mahdi, by the Iraqi media.
Interestingly enough, at the exact same time of the Islamization of Iraqi Ba’athists, the
forefathers of the Islamic State were on the rise. After succeeding in ousting the Soviets during
the Afghan War (which happened contemporaneously with the Iran-Iraq War), many within the
jihadist resistance, or Mujahedeen, sought to expand their fundamentalist operations outside of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Two of these jihadists were Osama bin Laden and Aymann al-
Zawahiri, who went on to co-found al-Qaeda (“the base”) – the father group of the Islamic State.
During the same time, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad,
established relations with al-Qaeda and eventually (over a decade later) helped them establish
Ansar al-Islam in Iraq.
During the 1990s, Iraqi Ba’athists realized they needed allies; however, international
scrutiny under the leadership of the U.N. essentially made this nearly impossible. Thus, in order
to gain influence/control, the Ba’athist Iraqi Intelligence Service began seeking relationships
elsewhere (mainly within the ranks of foreign organizations, such as al-Qaeda and the Groupe
Islamique Arme, to name a few). This relationship coincided perfectly with Iraqi Islamization
and consequently, cooperation with radicals became an integral part of Ba’athist foreign policy
(at least covertly within the intelligence community).
42. 42
Whether or not this relationship in 1990s was merely a type of “marriage of
convenience,” as stated by many scholars, is irrelevant to the argument at hand. The important
takeaway is that increasing relations between jihadists and Ba’athists, especially in the 1990s, set
the groundwork for the future merging of their separatist factions in post-2003 Iraq. Moreover,
this time period is crucial in the development of radicalized Ba’athist leadership within groups
(such as ISIS) due to the fact that the connections between leadership members first manifested
through these IIS-AQ meetings and dealings. With their belittlement, diminishment, and
marginalization under the CPA, Interim, and Maliki de-Ba’athification programs, the Ba’athists
turned to the closest “allies” they had left: the jihadists who they dealt with before the invasion.
Thus, while on the surface it may seem that Saddamist-Ba’athists and jihadists are
presently unlikely allies, quite the opposite is true. Many have pondered exactly how a secular
faction could merge with an Islamist one. The answer, as shown up until this point, is rather
simple: The Ba’athists that merged with ISIS in post-2003 Iraq were no longer following secular
guidelines, but rather ideologies that gradually shifted over time towards Islamization (see Figure
3 on next page—NOTE that Figure 3 only depicts the Ba’athists who aligned themselves with
groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq after the 2003 war. It does not depict Ba’athists who fled to
their Syrian sister-party, nor does it represent the Ba’athists who created their own rebel groups
inside Iraq). As will be shown in the following sections of this paper, although there was a
degree of cooperation and converging ideologies between the Ba’athists and radical Islamists, it
failed to manifest into a full-fledged merge until after the de-Ba’athification program ensued.
However, the purpose for laying out the connections of the 1980-1990s is to show that the
merging of Ba’athists and radicals occurred over a great expanse of time for varying reasons and
was not caused by solely the US invasion, or solely the Ba’athists thirst for control.
44. 44
VII. Unleashing The Alliance From Hell
There has been much scrutiny surrounding Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and the
subsequent nation-building effort – and deservingly so. While the situation the Bush
administration faced was complex and convoluted, there is no question that their ultimate
strategy spurred unrest in the region. Just as the 1991 Shia uprising was purportedly the “point of
no return” for Sunni-Shia relations, the de-Ba’athification following the 2003 Iraq War was the
“point of no return” for many Ba’athists.
Whether or not the US had the evidence to back its claims of Saddam’s CBRN transfers
to al-Qaeda is viewed by many as inconclusive, despite traces of evidence (some of which that
was presented in preceding sections of this paper). In the US, the fierce debate of Saddam’s
connection to the 9/11 attacks blinds many from seeing the truth. The fact is that there were (as
shown) Ba’athist ties to radical groups, such as al-Qaeda. Did the cooperation include Ba’athist
aid in fabricating 9/11? No. But, did this cooperation exist on a limited, multifaceted level of
financial, political, and military affairs? Yes.
Three weeks after the initiation of OIF, the Ba’athist regime crumbled under the force of
American firepower. Documents captured after the conflict subsided show that the Ba’athist
regime harbored Iraqi Abdul Rahman Yasin, the man responsible for mixing the chemicals for
the 1993 World Trade Center bombings.141 Moreover, Iraqi prisoners taken under British
authority reported fighting alongside a joint Ansar al-Islam and al-Qaeda force throughout the
course of the war.142 This was a crucial development, for it was the first direct cooperation
between radical and Ba’athist forces.
Ultimately, by May 2003, the Ba’athists’ worst fear had been realized: the loss of
political control in Iraq. It is no question that desperation ensued within Ba’athist ranks. This
45. 45
Source: MSNBC
ABOVE: Crowds of Iraqi civilians watch as a statue of Saddam is toppled, alongside his regime.
The ousting of Saddam Hussein marked a critical turning point for Iraqi Ba’athists, as in the
ensuing months and years, a largely oppressive de-Ba’athification process would lead them to
complete their gradual radicalization process and join Islamist groups, such as the Islamic Sate.
46. 46
desperation is the reason for the initial military cooperation between Ba’athist troops and radical
groups, like Ansar al-Islam. In fact, it is only logical to conclude that the very reason they began
the Islamization process (to re-consolidate control over the population) was the same reason that
they joined radical militants in the fight to oust the foreigners.
After taking Baghdad, the US helped set up the Coalition Provisional Authority. This
temporary government was led by American Paul Bremer and held full executive, judicial, and
legislative powers over Iraq. Immediately following its onset, the CPA released CPA Order
Number 1, which called for the “rigorous” de-Ba’athification of Iraqi society. To quote the Order
directly:143
“This order implements the declaration by eliminating the
party’s structures and removing its leadership from positions
of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means,
the Coalition Provisional Authority will ensure that
representative government in Iraq is not threatened by
Ba`athist elements returning to power…”
Moreover, as stated by the second CPA Order, Senior Ba’athist members were to be
exiled without financial compensation:144
“No payment, including a termination or pension payment,
will be made to any person who is or was a [Ba’athist] Senior
Party Member.”
Thus, with the advent of de-Ba’athification came a mass exile of jobless and moneyless
government officials, intelligence officers, and military leaders. In short, there were three main
outstanding flaws with de-Ba’athification that led to the radicalization of those affected. For one,
the Ba’athists were exiled based off of rank, meaning that their actual actions committed were
not taken into account whatsoever.145 Secondly, the program alienated Ba’athists – what were
these jobless, moneyless men supposed to do after their expulsion? Turning to terror
organizations, it seems, gave them the means to live they desperately needed. Lastly, de-
47. 47
Ba’athification polarized Iraqi politics and left a gaping void that an incompetent and repressive
government later filled.
Ultimately, 100,000 IIS (Iraqi Intelligence Service) members, 30,000 ministry workers,
and all military members were either released without compensation and/or indefinitely
expelled.146 Understandably enough, many of these exiled Ba’athists were extremely disgruntled
at what they viewed as unfair treatment and the destruction of their livelihoods. To be fair, the
process was poorly planned: Ba’athists in the military were expelled indefinitely based on rank
and not the actual actions they performed under Saddam Hussein. In only months, the
marginalization and alienation of Ba’athists began and with only a small number of allies, many
turned to their connections developed in the 1990s to restore their ability to live.
The disenfranchisement from the exclusion of Ba’athists from their previous political and
social stature caused stirring animosity to develop towards the US and their subsequent CPA,
Interim, and Maliki governments. The humility that was attached to de-Ba’athification brought
many Ba’athists over the edge. Those who were religious fell victim to the attractiveness of
Islamist principles and avenged their circumstance by promising to wage jihad to secure their
still-prominent goal of Pan-Islamism. Yet, at the same time, those who were simply steaming
with hatred formed their own groups and vowed to wage war to re-secure their place in power.
Either way, organized opposition was quickly mounting.
In the summer of 2003, the first resistance groups began to develop. In addition to Ansar
al-Islam, Ba’athists began to attach themselves to other resistance factions. For instance, al-
Adwa formed during this time and was almost entirely composed of former Ba’athist intelligence
and military exiles.147 In fact, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, al-
Adwa was one of the first groups to attack coalition forces after the war. Furthermore, other
48. 48
Ba’athists joined with the Fida’iyin Saddam, a paramilitary organization that was infamous for
its use of human shields during OIF. Others, however, found themselves joining more hardliner
Salafist groups, such as the 1920s Revolution Brigade and Islamic Army in Iraq – both of which
operated (at least for a time) under the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Joint
Leadership of the Mujahedeen.148
In 2003, al-Zarqawi also declared war on Shias due to their involvement in supporting the
Americans and their policies of alienating Sunnis, such as the Ba’athists.149 Zarqawi, like many
others, cited the unfair treatment of “innocents” within Iraq. Ironically enough, his declaration of
war came as Camp Bucca, one of the key prison camps that led to the rise of ISIS, was erected
near Umm Qasr.
Only a year later, after a raid on a home in Fallujah, Camp Bucca gained its most
notorious resident: Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badry – or as we today know him, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi (the Islamic State’s leader and the self-proclaimed “Caliph” of the Islamic world).150
But this camp wasn’t just home to Baghdadi – its importance for the development of Ba’athist
leadership in ISIS cannot be stressed enough. In fact, according to the Soufan Group, the
expansive detention center was the breeding ground for the surpassing of any “marriage of
convenience” between ex-Ba’athists and Islamists. If inmates weren’t radicalized by the time
they entered the camp, they were surely radicalized on their way out of it. The list of ISIS leaders
who circulated through Bucca is expansive. To name a few:151
-Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (leader of Islamic State [IS])
-Abu Muslim al-Turkmani (IS number two)
-Abu Ayman al-Iraqi (senior military leader)
-Haji Bakr (brought Baghdadi into power)
-Abu ‘Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi (Operational leader—responsible for Mosul
strategic conquest plans)
-Abu Qasim (in charge of foreign fighters and suicide bombers)
-Abu Lu’ay (senior military leader)
49. 49
-Abu Shema (in charge of logistics)
-Abu Suja (in charge of welfare programs fro martyrs)
There is no question that Camp Bucca played an integral role in furthering connections
between disgruntled Ba’athists and jihadists. The merging of these two groups created a
seemingly perfect entity. According to the Soufan Group, the Ba’athists were strong in
organizational skills and popularity among the populace, but they lacked the motivation and
inspiration after suffering crushing defeats by the CPA, Interim, and Maliki governments. The
jihadists filled this missing inspiration perfectly; while on the other side of the coin, the
Ba’athists-turned-Islamists helped their new jihadist partners form a viable, professional
organization.152 More importantly, due to the ex-Ba’athist transformation to violent extremism
before, during, and after Camp Bucca, both factions were on the same ideological page; thus,
coalescing in the first mass-merger of the two groups after nearly forty years of gradual
convergence (as described previously).
In 2004, as Baghdadi and his future commanders were becoming allies in US prison
camps, bin Laden and Zarqawi finally teamed up to form al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the direct
predecessor to the Islamic State.153 Immediately, the group led a plethora of insurgencies, the
most famous of which located in Fallujah (which was, by this time, deemed an AQI
stronghold).154 The main focus of AQI’s efforts was towards killing Shia personnel rather than
US troops, but nonetheless both enemies were targeted. Consequently, the Sunni-Shia chasm
worsened yet again and the US, as well as its newly installed Iraqi Interim Government, began to
lose control of the situation.
To attempt to quell the situation, President George W. Bush appointed John Negroponte
as the first ambassador to Iraq on 6 May 2004. Under the influence from Bush, Negroponte then
brought in Mr. John Steele (who worked with Negroponte in Honduras and helped oversee
50. 50
numerous human rights abuses there).155 Together, the two implemented counter-insurgency
tactics – also known as a “divide and conquer” strategy. Additionally, they began to mobilize
what is referred to by Wikileaks as “death squads” in order to shut down Sunni uprisings,
resulting in the deaths of thousands.156 But, it is now clear that their means to quell the rebels had
the opposite effect. Sunni militant groups continued to form by virtue of self-defense against
Shia-dominated security forces, death squads, and untouched militias. In fact, many groups
claimed that the purpose of their insurgency was not focused towards Coalition forces at all, but
rather solely materialized for the defense of the Sunni community.157
When one looks at the side effects of de-Ba’athification, this notion is not a surprise. The
United States purposely oversaw the marginalization of Sunnis due to the nature of their alliance
with Shia representatives, such as Maliki. The Shia were empowered by the US for one purpose:
to give the US a friendly regime in Iraq. Consequently, Shia atrocities against Sunnis were
largely overlooked out of national interest (it is important to note that the main reason the Shias
felt bitter towards the Sunnis was due to the totalitarian means used by Saddam’s Ba’athists).
On another note, in a potential foreshadowing of future ISIS strategy, bin Laden said the
following in 2004 regarding Iraq:158
“One of the most important reasons that made our enemy
controls our land is [for] the pilfering of our oil. Exert all that
you can to stop the largest stealing operation in history…”
Not long after, the same source says that Zawahiri told Muslims to focus on attaining
control of the oil fields. It is clear that al-Qaeda leadership already had their eyes on Iraqi oil in
the midst of the turmoil. Interestingly enough, Zarqawi made a similar statement in 2005 after
publically announcing his connection to bin Laden.159 According to the same source, Ba’athist
groups, such as al-Adwa, also had plans to secure Iraq’s oil. Thus, it is only fitting that the only
51. 51
two groups to express any real interest in Iraqi oil at the time were generally the same factions
that merged to form the Islamic State several years later.
On 19 October 2005, Saddam Hussein stood trial before the Iraqi Special Tribunal – a
US-handpicked group of judges bestowed with the responsibility of determining Saddam’s fate.
Throughout the trial, Saddam constantly yelled God is great and that Islam is Iraq’s true law.160
A year later, on 5 November 2006, Saddam was sentenced to death by hanging (which took place
on 30 December 2006). Fittingly enough for the story of Ba’athist Islamization was Saddam’s
last words: “God is great, praise Muhammad and kill his enemies!” It is important to note that
this event was televised around the entire world. Furthermore, many high-level Ba’athist leaders
were sentenced to jail (such as Abdullah Kadhim Ruweid) on terms viewed by many as unjust.161
In fact, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch deemed the trial “unfair”
and a “flawed” process that was a major step away from a law-abiding Iraq.162 These groups also
called the trial impartial due to the US and Shia-government selected jurors. Richard Dicker of
Human Rights Watch said the following regarding the trial:163
“We saw this trial, along with the others, as an
opportunity to bring justice to those Iraqis who had suffered
horribly under Ba’ath Party rule. Unfortunately, we believe
the serious shortcomings in the fairness of the proceedings
undermined the legitimacy and credibility of the trial.”
Dicker went on to say that the courtroom proceedings were marred by “some disturbing
court practices” including the court’s failure to deliver documents to the defense in a timely
manner, the government’s public criticism of Rizgar Amin (the trial’s first judge) for being to
“sympathetic” to Saddam, and the failure for Amin’s replacement (Mr. Rahman) to “demonstrate
proper judicial demeanor in his management of the proceedings.”164 All in all, the trial was
marked by numerous delays, political pretense, and courtroom hysterics. In fact, many Sunni
52. 52
Arabs still, to this day, criticize the verdicts as the product of a “political charade” designed to
appease the agendas of the Bush administration and his puppet, Shi’ite-led Iraq government. It is
no wonder, then, that the US Military prepared in advance for an uproar of Ba’athist insurgencies
after the trial.165
Even Saddam himself sarcastically stated that “there is much to be said for having an
experienced international jurist entirely unconnected from the allied invaders, on the tribunal”
during his testimony. Nonetheless, it is no surprise then, that in the weeks following the
execution, a mass influx on Sunni protestors sprawled throughout Iraq.166 In Samarra, Sunni’s
rioted and shot weapons into the air. The failure to give Saddam a fair trial only alienated
Ba’athists and Sunnis even more, giving all the more reason for them to radicalize against an
oppressive Shi’ite government.
In 2006, the first post-OIF Iraqi-run government came into power under Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki. Immediately, Maliki furthered the use of death squads as prescribed by
Negroponte and Steele in accordance with the Interim Government.167 He hunted down AQI and
planned to expel all 2 million Ba’athist sympathizers within the country. His bloody-minded
tactics became too much for already-marginalized ex-Ba’athists and other Sunni Muslims and, in
turn, forced them into extremism as a means of personal protection. Furthermore, his policies
directly caused sectarianism to begin to increase within Iraq, as Sunni Muslims began moving to
Sunni neighborhoods to escape Shia discrimination (before 2003, Iraq’s cities were generally
semi-integrated).168
According to documents revealed through Wikileaks, US officials realized that the
policies under the CPA, Interim, and (mainly) the Maliki government were furthering the Shia-
Sunni divide well beyond what it was under Saddam and his Ba’athists – yet nothing was done to
53. 53
fix the problem. Moreover, a mainly Shia Iraqi Army and Security Forces oftentimes clashed
with a majority Sunni police force.169 There is no doubt that the lack of cooperation between the
two allowed groups, such as AQI (later ISIS), to spread as quickly as they did. Ultimately, if
affected Ba’athists and other Sunnis weren’t radicalized prior to 2006, the Maliki brutality and
oppression almost ensured their ideological tendencies to shift towards extremism.
To counter this, more rebel groups began to emerge. In January 2006, AQI set up the
Mujahedeen Shura Council in order to create a more unified resistance. In July, the Council
declared it would create combat brigades to defend against Shi’ite militias and government
forces.170 Only a month later, AQI suffered a heavy blow when its leader, al-Zarqawi, was killed
in an airstrike. But, the group quickly rebounded and began to increase its recruiting efforts. One
way in which they did this (under the leadership of al-Masri) was by rebranding their
organization as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).171 Immediately after selecting Abu Omar al-
Baghdadi as its leader, the ISI released the following statement:172
“Since the beginning of the Crusader invasion of Iraq, our
country, the best of the Sunni Mujahedeen have been busy
pushing the attacking enemy out of their country…until the
black hatred of the Shia in Iraq for the Sunnis became
obvious to all eyes.”
Moreover, contemporaneously with the announcement of the Islamic State in Iraq,
cooperation began to increase with the Naqshbandi Order – the very group that Izzat al-Douri
(who was in charge of the Return to Faith Campaign) was a leader of since the 1970s. The Order
formed a militant group on 30 December 2006 known as Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqa al-Naqshbandia,
or JRTN for short. Until 2011, the group was mainly composed of disgruntled Sunnis and Sufis.
But more important for our purposes is the fact that it was led by ex-Ba’athist officers.173 Time
and time again, they have directly financed ISI attacks that were focused on ousting the US and
54. 54
the Shia government. Although many scholars have cited the JRTN’s relationship with the
Islamic State as merely a marriage of convenience, there is evidence to prove that it has gone
beyond this (at times). For example, the JRTN was instrumental in helping ISIS take both
Fallujah and Mosul in 2014 by offering military and economic assistance.174 Therefore, during
these times al-Douri directly cooperated with the Islamic groups his party was secretly meeting
with in the 1990s.
Moreover, in 2006 the ISI was continuing the late Zarqawi’s Shia-targeted strategy and
expanding it throughout the Province of Anbar (with great success, as Anbar became largely
under ISI control by this time). For instance, in November they repeatedly attacked the Shia-
dominated Sadr City in Baghdad. According to ISI spokesmen, the Sadr City assault was a
revenge effort for Shi’ite attacks on Sunni neighborhoods.175 While many Sunnis agreed with
their motives, their means were viewed as largely inhumane, as they regularly brutalized women
and children. It was during these attacks in Sadr and elsewhere that many Ba’athists not aligned
with those radicalized in the Islamic State in Iraq began to see the true nature of ISI’s methods.
Thus, albeit not all Ba’athists were allied with each other after 2003, the conquest of Anbar
Province by AQI/ISI directly led to a lasting chasm between ex-Ba’athists. Those more
radicalized sided with the Islamic State in Iraq, while those less radicalized sided with other
resistance groups. Consequently, many of the rebel groups teamed up with US forces to fight ISI
(in what became known as the Anbar Awakening). The coalition against ISI had profound
impacts on their operational ability and until the US withdrawal in 2011, the group mainly
focused on rebuilding itself.
Ultimately, the de-Ba’athification process in Iraq completed the Ba’athist Islamization
process that began under Saddam Hussein. But for many of these ex-Ba’athists, their political
55. 55
transformation did not stop at mere Islamization, but rather a more reactionary paradigm:
something that many refer to as Islamic extremism. The de-Ba’athification led to millions of
unemployed and disgruntled ex-governmental personnel in Iraq. Many different groups formed
(see Figure 4 on page 56), such as the JRTN and later (in 2014) the General Military Council for
Iraqi Revolutionaries (GMCIR), which was also tied to Izzat al-Douri.176 When combined, these
two groups have upwards of 100,000 of ex-Ba’athists within their ranks. But despite the
ideological differences between groups akin to JRTN/GMCIR and ISI/ISIS, they have regularly
cooperated in military and economic affairs.
In an ironic twist of fate, the fears of a full-fledged al-Qaeda-Ba’athist connection under
the Bush Administration ultimately manifested themselves into reality through the means of
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent de-Ba’athification process. In short, the years of
1979-2003 saw a gradual shift within Iraqi Ba’athist ranks towards Islamization. No matter the
reasoning behind the push for political Islam (which was surely the desire for gaining control of
Iraq), it was nonetheless instrumental in setting the groundwork for the future radicalization of
Ba’athists. But even despite the willingness to engage in limited cooperation with groups akin to
al-Qaeda in the 1990s, the Iraqi “Return to Faith” was not enough to set radical spirits free by
itself. In post-2003 Iraq, the policies of the Shia dominated government after OIF were the
breaking point for many Ba’athists and consequently caused them to plummet into extremism as
a means for revenge, livelihood, and protection. Many of these Ba’athists found refuge in
Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq, which later evolved into the Islamic State, as we know it today. With
their political, military, and organizational expertise, it is no wonder how they came to run the
Islamic State.
57. 57
CONCEPTUAL DEGREE OF BA’ATHIST
RADICALIZATION OVER TIME
(Figure 5)
OIF/De-
Ba’athification
Return to
Faith/Gulf
War
Khomeini steps up
anti-Saddam
Rhetoric
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