Training Provision Impact on Diverse Workforce Performance

Human Resource Management, September–October 2014, Vol.
53, No. 5. Pp. 749–772
© 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com).
DOI:10.1002/hrm.21583
Correspondence to: Tabea Scheel, Department of Applied
Psychology: Work, Education, Economy, University of
Vienna, Universitätsstr. 7, 1010 Vienna, Austria, Phone: +43-1-
4277-473 66, Fax: +43-1-4277-473 39, E-mail: tabea
[email protected]
TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE
OF A DIVERSE WORKFORCE
TA B E A S C H E E L , T H O M A S R I G O T T I , A N D
G I S E L A
M O H R
The moderating role of work contracts on the relationship
between human
resource management (HRM) and the self-reported performance
of 1,311
permanent and 924 temporary employees across three sectors
was studied
using a multilevel design in 103 organizations in three European
countries.
The HR practice examined was training and its allocation to the

different
workforce groups. The relationship between training for
permanent employ-
ees and performance was moderated by work contract as well as
country.
In the Spanish sample, the performance of temporary employees
was more
negatively related to training for permanent employees as
compared to the
Dutch and the Swedish sample. Unexpectedly, in the Dutch
sample, training
provision was negatively related to the workforce group it was
provided for.
It is the temporary employees that seemed to be the cause of the
interac-
tions, underlining the call for special treatment of this
workforce. Results
indicate a considerable role of the interplay of job dependence
and labor
market conditions. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Keywords: HR practices, temporary employment, training,
multilevel,
performance
A
t least every tenth employee in the
European Union as well as in the
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development
(OECD) countries has a temporary
work contract. OECD figures reveal that tem-
porary employment has been relatively stable
in recent years, at 11.4 percent of total em-
ployment in 2004 and 12 percent in 2010

(OECD, n.d.). This contemporary workforce
composition challenges HR practices to be
tailored to such diversity in work contracts.
Training and development—aimed at im-
proving employees’ knowledge, skills, and
abilities—are core HR practices for organiza-
tional effectiveness (Peretz & Rosenblatt,
2011). According to recent developments in
the resource-based theory of the firm (Barney,
1991), this human capital builds the “micro-
foundations” of organizations’ resources and
capabilities for competitive advantage (Coff
& Kryscynski, 2011). Retaining and motivat-
ing human capital is essential for value cre-
ation (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Foss, 2011),
and skill development is one of the means of
achieving this. However, training is not nec-
essarily equally applied to the whole work-
force of a given organization, but rather may
750 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, SEPTEMBER–
OCTOBER 2014
Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm
We will argue
that employability
as well as the
wider economic

and legislative
context in relation
to job security
may influence
the strength of
the relationship
between training
and employee
performance,
especially when
comparing
temporary and
permanent
employees.
indicator of status within an organization
(Ho, 2005), employee comparisons with
coworkers become highly salient.
Country-Level Perspective
We propose that different patterns will exist
for the aforementioned relationships within

three European countries (the Netherlands,
Spain, and Sweden), all of which belong to
different societal clusters (GLOBE study;
House, Hanges, & Javidan, 2004). We believe
that in each country the link between train-
ing allocation and performance reports will
depend on the type of work contract held,
but also on country-related factors. It is
believed that context may play a crucial role
because specific external factors, such as dif-
fering regulatory, economic, and cultural
environments, can influence both organiza-
tional actions and employee attitudes. For
instance, Peretz and Rosenblatt (2011) dem-
onstrated that organizational investment in
training depends on national, cultural, and
organizational differences. Most research is
still conducted in and around North America,
as reflected in a meta-analysis on training by
Blume et al. (2010), within which 85 percent
of the studies were from the United States
and Canada. Although in the United States
the share of temporary employment as a
proportion of total employment is roughly a
quarter of that within the European Union
(4.2 percent versus 16.8 percent in 2005;
OECD, n.d.), employment protection is also
much less in the United States as compared
to the average of OECD countries (index of
0.65 versus 2.10; OECD, n.d.). Accordingly,
the need for cross-national research to under-
stand HR management from a European per-
spective is emphasized (Stavrou, 2005). Of
course, differences between countries within
Europe are also quite pronounced; in Spain,
the share of temporary work was the highest

of all OECD countries (OECD, n.d.) until
Poland surpassed this level in 2009.
Cross-Level Perspective
Studying the influence of organizational-level
practices on individual-level outcomes is pro-
moted by many scholars who advocate the
depend on features of the individual work
contract. As such, HR politics often differ be-
tween temporary and permanent employees
(cf. Burgess & Connell, 2006). Since individ-
ual expectations and psychological contracts
differ between these two groups (e.g.,
Connelly & Gallagher, 2004; Rigotti, De
Cuyper, De Witte, Korek, & Mohr, 2009), a
given HR practice may not be suitable for all
employees. Accordingly, dealing effectively
with contract diversity demands that a “one-
size-fits-all” approach to managing human
resources be replaced with contract appropri-
ate practices.
Objectives and Research
Questions
Our objective in this study is to
investigate the association
between training as an HR prac-
tice and the self-reported perfor-
mance of employees with both
permanent and temporary work
contracts. The association of train-
ing with performance varies con-
siderably across studies (Blume,

Ford, Baldwin, & Huang, 2010),
thus moderating factors may play
a major role. We will argue that
employability as well as the wider
economic and legislative context
in relation to job security may
influence the strength of the rela-
tionship between training and
employee performance, especially
when comparing temporary and
permanent employees. We are
interested in whether the relation-
ship between training and self-
reported performance differs
between temporary and perma-
nent employees, and whether
knowledge of training allocated to
the respective other workforce
group is related to performance.
Temporary and permanent work-
force groups are mutually referent
“others” for social comparison, comparing
what they receive with what they feel entitled
to. Since access to key HR practices is an
TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE OF A DIVERSE
WORKFORCE 751
Organizations’
attempts to

accumulate and
develop their unique
and inimitable
resources in order
to gain competitive
advantage make
human resources an
extremely valuable
target.
respect to performance and different work
contracts. The context of the countries in
the study is also considered. Both aspects
are discussed in relation to job security and
employability.
Theory and Hypotheses
Training and Performance
HR practices within strategic HR
management have been found to
be related to overall organiza-
tional performance (Becker &
Huselid, 1999; Delery & Doty,
1996). These high-performance
work practices (Huselid, 1995) are

meant to increase employees’
knowledge, skills, and abilities
while empowering and motivat-
ing them to leverage this human
capital for organizational benefit
(Delery & Shaw, 2001).
Organizations’ attempts to accu-
mulate and develop their unique
and inimitable resources in order
to gain competitive advantage
(Colbert, 2004) make human
resources an extremely valuable
target (Li, Chu, Lam, & Liao, 2011)
and training a crucial means of achieving this
(Peretz & Rosenblatt, 2011). Training is
described as the “extensiveness of formalized
programs to develop knowledge, skills and
abilities” (Evans & Davis, 2005, p. 760), which
are provided with the intention of enhancing
job performance (Guzzo, 1988).
Much evidence is provided for the link
between training and organizational per-
formance. Training increases productivity
(Birdi et al., 2008; Guzzo, 1988; Ichniowski,
Shaw, & Prennushi, 1997) and is positively
associated with long-term effects (Cascio,
2002), future as well as past operational per-
formance (Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, &
Allen, 2005), and a variety of organizational
performance measures in a meta-analysis
of 92 studies (Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen,
2006). The superiority of training over other
HR practices (such as operational practices,
Birdi et al., 2008) has been demonstrated for
achieving better organizational performance

adoption of a systemic multi- and cross-level
perspective (e.g., Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, &
Mathieu, 2007; Rousseau, 2000), including
the cross-level components of human capi-
tal–based advantages (Coff & Kryscynski,
2011). In line with these recommendations,
we adopt a multilevel approach in studying
the 2,235 workers employed in the study’s
103 sample companies.
This study extends previous research on
workers with different employment contracts
in two ways. First, the relationship between
training (the provision of which is measured
separately for temporary and permanent
workforces) and temporary and permanent
employees’ self-reported performance is
examined. While Kuvaas and Dysvik (2009)
analyzed temporary employees’ reactions to
HR practices applied to permanent employees,
this study takes into account the provision of
training and self-reported performance out-
comes for both groups, including the associa-
tion of performance reports of the employee
group that did not receive training. Second, by
adopting a multilevel approach and a cross-
national perspective, the generalizability and
implications of the study’s findings are much
broader than for a study with a homogeneous
country sample analyzed using a single-level
approach. Furthermore, this research focuses
on the European workforce, providing much-
needed insight in this regard. There is also
value in the cross-level approach we have
taken, given that the majority of studies

investigate either the organizational-level or
the individual-level relationships between
training and performance.
As such, we contribute to the research
of micro-foundations for resource-based
theory and its explanation of competitive
advantage. Individual action and interac-
tion are seen as mediating between (aggre-
gate) macro-level variables, and seen as
improving stability of predictions and add-
ing explanatory leverage (Foss, 2011). We
aim to highlight how firm-level distribution
of the HR practice training among workforce
groups interacts with individual-level work
performance.
In the following sections we provide an
overview of the literature on training with
OCTOBER 2014
A mixed workforce
composition
requires that HR
practices be tailored
to the nature of work

contracts employed.
In organizational
reality, however,
HR practices are
typically developed
with mainly
the permanent
workforce in mind.
coworkers—with the help of obvious work-
force differences like formal contracts. The
nature of work contracts is one particularly
meaningful feature in organizational con-
texts (Burgess & Connell, 2006; De Cuyper
et al., 2008).
Training, Performance, and Diverse
Work Contracts
Contemporary organizations employ individ-
uals on a variety of contracts (Chambel &
Castanheira, 2007). Although the use of a
temporary workforce provides a company
with flexibility during times of change
(Kuvaas & Dysvik, 2009), data show that over
the last decade the extent of temporary
employment usage has leveled off: in the
European Union, temporary employment of

13.8 percent (as a proportion of overall depen-
dent employment) in 2004 was matched by
14.7 percent in 2010. A mixed workforce com-
position requires that HR practices be tailored
to the nature of work contracts employed. In
organizational reality, however, HR practices
are typically developed with mainly the per-
manent workforce in mind (e.g., Koene & van
Riemsdijk, 2005). Little consideration is given
to those on fixed-term work contracts or with
temporary status—despite findings that
training for temporary employees is an
investment with return (e.g., in terms of affec-
tive commitment; Chambel & Sobral, 2011).
While there is little obvious reason for
employees on different work contracts to
perform differently, there are important
divergences in what motivates their perfor-
mance. However, findings are inconsistent:
Chambel and Castanheira (2007) found a
significant zero-order correlation between
performance and status, which indicated
higher performance among temporary
workers than permanent workers, while
Kinnunen, Mäkikangas, Mauno, Siponen,
and Nätti (2011) found higher self-rated job
performance for permanent employees as
compared to their temporary counterparts.
Furthermore, Stavrou (2005) found tem-
porary employment to be associated with
increased staff turnover, but not with organi-
zational performance.
as well as perceived organizational and mar-
ket performance (Harel & Tzafrir, 1999;

Rodwell & Teo, 2008). In a large-scale study
among EU countries, Stavrou, Charalambous,
and Spiliotis (2007) found training and devel-
opment to be the most important HR factor
for service quality, productivity, and profit-
ability—across nations. In a meta-analysis,
Arthur, Bennett, Edens, and Bell (2003)
found medium-to-large effect sizes for the
effectiveness of organizational training, with
larger effects for self-reported reaction mea-
sures comparable to more distal measures like
behavior.
Despite consensus on the
importance of training for orga-
nizational effectiveness (Peretz &
Rosenblatt, 2011), it is motivation
and cognitive ability that seem
to contribute most to the effec-
tive transfer of training to actual
job tasks (Bell & Kozlowski, 2008;
Blume et al., 2010; Colquitt,
LePine, & Noe, 2000; Noe, Tews,
& McConnell Dachner, 2010). In
their meta-analysis of 89 studies,
Blume et al. (2010) also found
that a supportive environment
was among significant predictors
of perceived effective training
transfer, underlining the recom-
mendations of Noe et al. (2010)
to investigate social relation-
ships that further explain the link
between motivation and training.
This may reflect a relationship
between motivation and processes

among coworkers that are aligned
to broader employment features.
As such, workforce composition comes into
play when investigating mechanisms of the
training-performance interface. For instance,
intrinsic motivation was found to be corre-
lated with staff function (Dysvik & Kuvaas,
2008) while mediating the significant asso-
ciation of perceived training opportunities
(e.g., sufficiency) with (self-reported) task
performance. Bearing in mind that Dysvik
and Kuvaas asked about training perceptions,
employees may very well compare their
share of training with the share allocated to
WORKFORCE 753
Training for
employees’
coworkers may
increase the
coworkers’
employability and
thus be the subject

of social comparison
between
workforce groups.
Hence, training
for temporary
employees may
be perceived as a
threat by permanent
employees who feel
entitled to favored
treatment.
therefore (besides motivational aspects) be
an important issue for social comparison
between workforce groups. On the one hand,
training may be beneficial for performance,
but on the other training provided to cowork-
ers may lead to lower performance by increas-
ing job-insecurity perceptions.
In the first place, training potentially
heightens employability by increasing an
employee’s human capital. This
effect on employability was
explicitly identified by tempo-

rary workers as being very impor-
tant in the study of Chambel and
Sobral (2011). Second, training
for employees’ coworkers may
increase the coworkers’ employ-
ability and thus be the subject of
social comparison between work-
force groups. Hence, training for
temporary employees may be per-
ceived as a threat by permanent
employees who feel entitled to
favored treatment. This competi-
tion is reflected in a positive rela-
tionship between job insecurity
among permanent workers and
the rate of temporary employees
in the organization (De Cuyper,
Sora, De Witte, Caballo, & Peiro,
2009). Well-trained temporary
colleagues may be perceived as a
direct threat by permanent staff,
whereas training provided to
permanent employees may be
regarded by temporary staff as
unfair and unequal treatment,
which may in turn reduce their
performance. However, employ-
ees may alternatively judge train-
ing as a sign of organizational
investment and thus react posi-
tively even if it is allocated to other work-
force groups. There is partial support for this
suggestion, at least for temporary employees,
as training provided to permanent work-
forces has been found to be positively related
to temporary employees’ task performance

(Kuvaas & Dysvik, 2009).
The comparison of training provi-
sion between workforces is not especially
Among the factors discussed to have an
impact on (temporary) employees’ perfor-
mance are job insecurity, employability, and
volition (i.e., to what degree the temporary
employment contract was chosen deliberately).
Job insecurity could be shown to be negatively
(Clinton, Bernhard-Oettel, Rigotti, & de Jong,
2011) and employability to be positively related
to in-role behavior of temporary employees
(Kinnunen et al., 2011). Volition of temporary
employment was found to be associated with
organizational citizenship behavior (Connelly,
Gallagher, & Webster, 2011), satisfaction, and
performance (Chambel & Castanheira, 2007),
but was also found to be of little predictive
value in the context of temporary work con-
tracts (De Cuyper & De Witte, 2007).
Job insecurity, relating to employees’ per-
ceived probability of job loss (Mohr, 2000),
was shown to be negatively related to work
performance in a meta-analysis (Cheng &
Chan, 2008). The authors explain this rela-
tionship via the job dependence perspective
(Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984), which pre-
dicts how employability and economic inse-
curity moderate the relationship between job
insecurity and its consequences. For tempo-
rary employees, not only job insecurity but
also economic need is higher because they
earn less as compared to permanent employ-

ees (Wagenaar et al., 2012). While economic
insecurity is a central issue in the discussion
of context (see the next section), employ-
ability is directly targeted by training. This
way, reducing job dependence with training
may equally lower job insecurity.
Sverke, Hellgren, and Näswell (2002)
report a moderating function of occupa-
tional status, reflecting job dependence, for
the relationship between job insecurity and
work performance, being more negatively for
manual workers as compared to nonmanual
workers. For temporary employees, employ-
ability can be expected to be more relevant,
as compared to permanent employees due to
the termination of their contracts, they have
to cope with a relatively higher perceived job
insecurity.
Thus, training should be more relevant
to temporary employees as it builds human
capital (i.e., knowledge-skills-abilities), and
OCTOBER 2014
market economy with comprehensive social
security (Stavrou, 2005), considerable differ-
ences in labor force structures between coun-
tries exist. By referring to the GLOBE study
(House et al., 2004), we selected a sample

of three countries belonging to different
European societal clusters for our research;
specifically, the Germanic (the Netherlands),
the Nordic European (Sweden) and the
Latin European (Spain) clusters. Already the
Eurostat study (European Social Survey; see
http://ess.nsd.uib.no) has revealed differ-
ences in societal core dimensions of these
clusters. The Netherlands and Sweden are
affluent societies that spend large percent-
ages of their high gross domestic product
(GDP) on social welfare and tend to experi-
ence lower unemployment rates. Spain has a
low GDP, of which only a small percentage
is spent on social welfare, and it also has sig-
nificantly higher unemployment than the
other two countries. The following figures
refer to the year 2004, when the field data for
this study were gathered. We will discuss later
to what extent these country differences still
hold true.
Following the line of reasoning from the
previous section, we generally expect provi-
sion of training to be more important for
performance if job insecurity is high, employ-
ability is low, and volition to work under a
temporary contract is low. A number of eco-
nomic and legislative indicators may addi-
tionally affect job insecurity and, therefore,
economic need (job dependence): (1) the ratio
of temporary to permanent employees, (2) the
unemployment numbers, and (3) employ-
ment protection regulation (see Table I).
1. Percentage of temporary employees. In Spain,

32.5 percent of the workforce with depen-
dent employment is on temporary con-
tracts, more than twice the rate of the
Netherlands at 14.8 percent and Sweden
at 15.1 percent (OECD, 2004).
2. Unemployment rate. Spain had a higher
rate (10.9 percent) as compared with the
Netherlands (5.1 percent) and Sweden
(7.4 percent; OECD, 2004). Also, long-
term unemployment (exceeding one year)
is higher in Spain (32 percent of the
surprising given that it may be directly related
to employment prospects. As Dysvik and
Kuvaas (2008) found that perceived training
opportunities were related to motivation, this
perception will likely be influenced not only
by what the person receives, but also what
the person receives in comparison to salient
others. Consistent with the previous discus-
sion, we generally expect to find a positive
relationship between the provision of train-
ing and self-reported performance, and this
relationship should be moderated by the type
of work contract. We expect the training-per-
formance relationship to be strongest for the
group it is being provided to (e.g., training
for permanents being more strongly associ-
ated with performance reports of permanent
employees), but still existent if allocated to
the other workforce group.
Accordingly, our first set of hypotheses is:
Hypothesis 1a: The relationship between training

for permanent employees and employees’
self-reported performance is moderated by work
contract. This relationship is more strongly posi-
tive for permanent than for temporary employees.
Hypothesis 1b: The relationship between train-
ing for temporary employees and employees’
self-reported performance is moderated by work
contract. This relationship is more strongly posi-
tive for temporary than for permanent employees.
Training Put Into Context
Since the association of training with perfor-
mance varies considerably across studies
(Blume et al., 2010), it is reasonable to assume
that moderating factors may be at play. In the
following, we argue that the wider economic
and the societal context may have an influ-
ence on the strength of the relationship
between training and the performance of
employees, especially when comparing tem-
porary and permanent employees.
The majority of EU countries have com-
mitted themselves to coordinating their
legislative systems for the implementation
of a supranational regime of HR manage-
ment practices (Stavrou, 2005). Although the
European context complies with a regulated
WORKFORCE 755

(2.12) and Sweden (2.24), with especially
high regulation of temporary work in Spain
and of permanent work in the Netherlands.
High regulation also leads to low chances
for a permanent job—once unemployed,
employees in Spain have a higher chance
of temporary employment for a longer
period as compared to other European coun-
tries (e.g., Austria, Denmark, the United
Kingdom; Dieckhoff, 2011). As such, Spain
had the highest amount of temporary work-
ers—despite the low regulation for tempo-
rary work in the Netherlands (see Table I).
For instance, the maximum cumulative dura-
tion for fixed-term contracts is unlimited in
the Netherlands but limited to 24 and 12
months in Spain and Sweden, respectively.
Likewise, temporary agency work is limited
to 36 months in the Netherlands, but to
only 6 and 12 months in Spain and Sweden,
respectively.
In summary, while job insecurity and eco-
nomic need is higher for temporary workers
as compared to permanent, this should addi-
tionally be of greater magnitude in Spain.
For employees with high economic need
and low employability—that is, highest job
dependency—consequences of job insecurity
are most negative (Sora, Caballer, & Peiro,
2010). These authors imply that job depen-
dence is reinforced by indications of depri-
vation, including a high unemployment rate
and scant unemployment benefits—like in

Spain. Economic deficits and a high unem-
ployment rate may jeopardize performance
via perceived job insecurity but may be buff-
ered by training as a sign of organizational
unemployed) and in the Netherlands
(34.2 percent) as compared with Sweden
(17.8 percent). Thus, job insecurity should
be highest in Spain, followed by Sweden,
though with a shorter expected duration
of unemployment as compared to the
Netherlands. In fact, the security index
(OECD, 2004), covering worry about job
loss, is generally lowest in Spain, with
Spanish permanent employees even scor-
ing lower than Dutch and Swedish tem-
porary employees. Temporary employees
in all three countries scored lower than
permanent employees in “perceived secu-
rity,” but the gap between temporary and
permanent employees’ scores was again
highest in Spain as compared to Sweden
and the Netherlands.
3. Employment protection legislation (OECD,
n.d.) includes regulations on permanent
and temporary work as well as on dismiss-
als. High regulation on employment pro-
tection correlates negatively with total
employment rates and tendentiously pos-
itively with unemployment rates across
countries (OECD, 2004). In line with that,
the aforementioned security index of em-
ployees correlates significantly negatively
with employment protection legislation,
and positively with unemployment ben-

efits. The very low expenditure on active
labor market policies per unemployed in
Spain may explain the especially low se-
curity index.
Spain scores highest in employment pro-
tection (2.98) as compared to the Netherlands
T A B L E I Overview—National Legislative and Economic
Indices
2004
Sweden Netherlands Spain
Employment rate 71.5% 73.1% 61.8%
Unemployment rate 6.2% 4.6% 10.6%
Temporary contracts (%) 15.1% 14.8% 32.5%
Employment protection (EP):
Overall EP strictness 2.24 2.12 2.98
EP strictness for regular employment 2.86 3.05 2.46
EP strictness for temporary employment 1.63 1.19 3.50
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (stats.oecd.org).
OCTOBER 2014

In more prosperous
countries, training
may be less relevant
for performance—
as chances for
new jobs are
higher, economic
need is lower (e.g.,
unemployment
benefits),
and, likewise,
employability is less
important.
Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between train-
ing for temporary employees and employees’ self-
reported performance is stronger in Spain as com-
pared to Sweden and the Netherlands.
Hypothesis 2c: The work contract will show
stronger moderation for the training-performance
link in Spain as compared to the Netherlands and
Sweden.

Method
Procedure
For the purpose of having comparable samples
across three countries, we restricted sampling
to three broad sectors. The sectors had to be
present in all participating countries, have a
sufficient amount of nonpermanent workers
within them, and be represented by a diverse
level of skills and educational background.
Against these criteria the following three sec-
tors were chosen: the food industry, educa-
tion, and retail. We do not claim that our
samples are representative of the overall work-
force. However, focusing on employees in the
core business of the three sectors, our aim was
to increase heterogeneity, while at the same
time ensuring comparability between coun-
tries. In the food sector, employees invited to
participate were mainly blue-collar workers
with low levels of education, whereas in the
retail sector it was salespeople with average
levels of education, and in the educational
sector academics were invited to participate.
Data were collected in 2004 from 103
organizations in the food, education, and
retail sectors within three European coun-
tries (the Netherlands, n = 32; Spain, n = 44;
Sweden, n = 27). Participation was volun-
tary and anonymous. Data were assessed at
two levels: HR managers were questioned
using semistructured interviews and 2,235
employees completed hard-copy question-
naires (1,311 with permanent and 924 with

temporary work contracts), which were
forward-backward-translated.
Participating organizations from the
Netherlands had an average size of 735
employees (SD = 1,275) and were mainly from
the food sector (43.8 percent). Participating
organizations from Spain averaged 459
investment. In more prosperous countries,
training may be less relevant for perfor-
mance—as chances for new jobs are higher,
economic need is lower (e.g., unemployment
benefits), and, likewise, employability is less
important.
As such, training as an investment in
employee development and employabil-
ity (Chambel & Sobral, 2011) may be more
important in Spain than in the Netherlands
and Sweden. Despite this notion, data of the
fourth European Working Conditions Survey
(2005) provide evidence for con-
siderable differences in the pro-
vision of training to employees
across countries, which is con-
trary to what seems functional:
“[…] northern European coun-
tries come at the top of the league:
more than 50 percent of work-
ers received training at work in
[…] Sweden. At the other end
of the scale are most southern
and eastern European countries,
where the levels of training are

very low, hardly reaching 20 per-
cent of employees in Spain….”
The Netherlands scored around 32
percent (only slightly above the
EU average; European Working
Conditions Survey, p. 48f).
Therefore, we expect that the
positive relationship between
training and self-reported per-
formance differs in magnitude
between countries, with it being
stronger in Spain. As the type of work con-
tract may be more salient in an environment
where the chance of permanent work is low,
moderation by work contract is also likely to
be stronger in that situation. In summary,
we believe that training will be more impor-
tant when the rate of unemployment as well
as temporary work is high, combined with
high employment protection regulation, and
social welfare is low.
Hypothesis 2a: The relationship between train-
ing for permanent employees and employees’ self-
reported performance is stronger in Spain as com-
pared to Sweden and the Netherlands.
WORKFORCE 757

and .79 for Spain. We performed a confir-
matory factor analysis (CFA) on the perfor-
mance items. The unconstrained model of a
one-factor solution provided reasonable fit to
the data (χ2 = 384.11, df = 27, goodness-of-fit
index [GFI] = .94, comparative fit index [CFI] =
.90, root mean square error of approximation
[RMSEA] = .08). Constraining the factor load-
ings to be invariant between countries, still
results in a good fit (χ2 = 476.37, df = 37, GFI
= .93, CFI = .87, RMSEA = .07). Following the
recommendations by Cheung and Rensvold
(2002)—“Values between –0.01 and –0.02
should be viewed with increasing suspicion,
while values greater than –0.02 indicate a
likely difference between the constrained and
unconstrained models” (p. 254)—we used
ΔCFI in the comparison of the unconstrained
model with a model constraining factor
loadings to be equivalent between coun-
tries. Comparing the Spanish with the Dutch
sample, ΔCFI was .01; for the comparisons
between the Spanish and Swedish, as well as
between the Swedish and Dutch sample, ΔCFI
was .02. Thus, we can conclude that measure-
ment invariance between country samples is
not perfect but may still be acceptable.
Control variables at the employee level
were tenure (years in the organization), age
(measured continuously), gender (dichoto-
mous variable with 0 for females and 1 for
males) and educational level (measured with
a Likert-scale format using the six-level inter-
national educational classification scheme,
ISCED; OECD, 1999).

Statistical Analysis
Multilevel analysis is appropriate if employee
data (level 1) is nested within organizations
(level 2), as it allows examination of “within-
subjects” and “between-subjects” variances
separately. We used hierarchical linear model-
ing (HLM) by Bryk and Raudenbush (1992)
and conducted models—separately for each
country—with the corresponding HLM6R
software (Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon,
2005).
Analyses for variance (ANOVAs) for
self-report performance (Table II) showed
significant mean differences between
employees (SD = 1,080) and were from the
educational sector (45.5 percent) for the most
part. Swedish organizations had, on average,
180 employees (SD = 179), and were mainly
from the retail sector (40.7 percent). Detailed
description of the samples is provided in the
Results section as well as in Table III.
Measures
Organizational Variables (Level 2)
The extent of training as an antecedent vari-
able was identified by HR managers, who were
asked to rate separately the percentage (in
decimal points) of temporary and permanent
employees who receive training. This resulted
in two independent predictors, with each

scale ranging from 0 percent to 100 percent.
Countries were included as dummy vari-
ables for Spain and the Netherlands (coded
with a value of 1), with Sweden used as refer-
ence. The value of 0 represented the respec-
tive other two countries.
Control Variables
Organizational size, measured by the number
of employees, was included as a continuous
variable. Sectors were included as dummy
variables for the retail and food manufactur-
ing sectors, with the education sector used as
reference.
Employee Variables (Level 1)
Work contract type, as a moderator variable,
was dummy-coded, with a value of 0 repre-
senting employees with temporary contracts
and 1 for those with permanent contracts.
Performance—the dependent variable—
was assessed by employees rating six items
(Abramis, 1994) related to their performance
during their last working week on the follow-
ing tasks: making decisions, performing with-
out mistakes, devoting themselves to work,
achieving their objectives, taking initiative,
and taking responsibility. Answers were pro-
vided using a five-point Likert scale from 1
(very bad) to 5 (very good) and a self-reported
performance mean was computed. Internal
consistency, assessed using Cronbach’s α,

was .76 for the Netherlands, .78 for Sweden,
OCTOBER 2014
Table II. In the Dutch and Swedish samples,
permanent workers report higher perfor-
mance relative to temporary workers
(Netherlands: df = 604, t = –3.61, p < .01;
Sweden: df = 724, t = –1.99, p < .05), while
there was no significant difference in the
Spanish sample.
Of the 610 Dutch employees (level 1) ana-
lyzed, 235 (or 38.5 percent) had a temporary
contract and 375 (61.5 percent) had perma-
nent status. Of the 899 Spanish employees
(level 1) analyzed, 351 (39.0 percent) had a
temporary contract and 548 (61.0 percent)
had a permanent contract. Of the 726 Swedish
employees (level 1) analyzed, 198 (27.3 per-
cent) had a temporary contract and 528 (72.7
percent) had permanent status. Years of ten-
ure in organization and age were significantly
lower for those with temporary contracts
(Table II; Netherlands: tenure t = –15.12; age
t = –8.26; Spain: tenure t = –13.81; age t =
–12.74; Sweden: tenure t = –7.66; age t = –4.45;
all p < .01). Education level was higher for
temporary employees in the Netherlands and
in Sweden (t = 2.00, p < .05; t = 3.81, p < .01,
respectively), while it was significantly lower

for those with temporary contracts in Spain
(t = –2.16, p < .05). While the percentage of
female employees did not differ significantly
between the temporary and permanent sub-
samples in the Netherlands (48 percent) and
Sweden (54 percent), in Spain more female
employees were found in the temporary sub-
sample (56.5 percent) than the permanent
subsample (47.9 percent, χ2 = 6.31, p < .01).
Country Differences
We conducted a series of ANOVA tests to ana-
lyze significant differences in the key vari-
ables between countries. Results show
(Table II) the highest level of performance in
the Netherlands.
In Table III, descriptives of organizational
variables are presented. Training allocated to
permanent employees correlated significantly
and positively with training allocated to tem-
porary employees in all countries, while orga-
nizational size did not correlate with training
allocation. Specific sectors were associated
with training provision in Sweden only; the
organizations in each country (Netherlands:
df = 31, F = 1.57, p = .03; Spain: df = 43,
F = 2.60, p = .00; Sweden: df = 23, F = 2.67,
p = .00). Furthermore, the impact of group
belonging—calculated by an intercept-only
model (Table IV, model 1)—showed a signifi-
cant error term u0 (τ = 0.02, χ2 = 151.93, p =
.00), justifying a multilevel approach. The
intra-class correlation ICC(1) for performance
was .073, meaning that differences between

organizations accounted for 7.3 percent of
the total variance (Table IV, model 1).
All but the dichotomous variables were
z-transformed at first. Level 1 variables have
been grand mean centered, as the primary
interest is with level 2 predictors (Enders &
Tofighi, 2007). However, gender as well as work
contract type are dichotomous and therefore
uncentered. The same applies to the sector
dummies and country on level 2. The training
variables as well as size have been grand mean
centered to reduce covariance between inter-
cepts and slopes (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).
Intercepts vary randomly in hierarchical lin-
ear models; slopes are held fixed (Snijder &
Bosker, 1999). Only the moderator slope on
level 1 was modeled as random (Nezlek, 2001).
The HLM procedure, like stepwise regres-
sion modeling, is one of subsequent variable
inclusion. Subsequent to the empty model
(model 1), controls of level 1 and level 2 are
included in all models. In model 2, the level
1 predictor (work contract type) and the level
2 predictor (training), as well as their interac-
tion terms are introduced. Model 3 and 4 are
calculated in three versions, comparing one
country to the respective others. In model 3,
the interactions between training variables
and country are tested. Finally, in model 4,
the threefold interactions between work con-
tract type, training variables, and country are
added. In an attempt to further identify the
main source of significant moderations, slope
difference tests were conducted for the three-

fold interactions.
Results
The correlation matrices for level 1 variables
and statistical descriptions of both perma-
nent and temporary workers can be found in
WORKFORCE 759
T
A
B
L
E
I
I
D
es
cr
ip
tiv

es
fo
r T
ot
al
, P
er
m
an
en
t,
an
d
Te
m
po
ra
ry
E
m
pl
oy
ee
s

Sa
m
pl
es
, P
ea
rs
on
C
or
re
la
tio
ns
(T
w
o-
Ta
ile
d)
fo
r E
m
pl

oy
ee
V
ar
ia
bl
es
(L
ev
el
1
)
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
C
o
u
n
tr
y

M
(
S
D
)/
f
F/
χ2
(d
f1
, d
f2
)
Pe
rm
an
en
t
E
m
p
lo
ye
es

M
(
S
D
)/
f
Te
m
p
o
ra
ry
E
m
p
lo
ye
es
M
(
S
D
)/

f
T
1
2
3
4
5
6
1.
Te
n
u
re
(
ye
ar
s)
N
et
h
er
la
n
d

s
6.
77
(
8.
71
)
10
.4
0
(9
.2
4)
1.
04
(
2.
68
)
–1
8.
34
**

S
p
ai
n
8.
04
(
9.
15
)
4.
41
*
11
.1
8
(9
.5
6)
3.
17
(
5.
75

)
–1
5.
48
**
S
w
ed
en
7.
07
(
8.
23
)
(2
, 2
19
5)
8.
46
(
8.
79

)
3.
34
(
4.
98
)
–9
.7
4*
*
2.
A
g
e
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
37

.1
0
(1
0.
93
)
39
.8
3
(1
0.
70
)
32
.6
8
(9
.8
0)
–8
.2
6*
*
.5

6*
*
S
p
ai
n
34
.4
4
(9
.8
5)
15
.0
0*
*
37
.6
1
(9
.9
7)
29
.5

8
(7
.3
9)
–1
3.
54
**
.7
8*
*
S
w
ed
en
37
.1
5
(1
2.
87
)
(2

, 2
18
9)
38
.4
3
(1
2.
84
)
33
.7
2
(1
2.
32
)
–4
.4
5*
*
.5
6*
*

3.
G
en
d
er
(
fe
m
al
e)
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
48
.0
%
48
.5
%

46
.4
%
0.
27
.1
1*
*
.1
1*
*
S
p
ai
n
51
.0
%
5.
48
47
.9
%
56

.5
%
6.
31
*
.0
6
.0
4
S
w
ed
en
54
.0
%
54
.5
%
53
.5
%
0.
04

–.
02
–.
13
**
4.
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
3.
57
(

1.
32
)
3.
49
(
1.
33
)
3.
71
(
1.
29
)
2.
00
*
–.
11
**
–.
03
.0

2
S
p
ai
n
4.
07
(
1.
66
)
28
.3
3*
*
4.
17
(
1.
56
)
3.
92
(

1.
79
)
–2
.1
0*
–.
11
**
–.
04
–.
07
*
S
w
ed
en
3.
61
(
1.
29
)

(2
, 2
20
5)
3.
50
(
1.
33
)
3.
91
(
1.
15
)
4.
06
**
–.
03
.1
7*
*

–.
13
**
5.
W
o
rk
c
o
n
tr
ac
t
ty
p
e
N
et
h
er
la
n
d

s
61
.6
%
.5
2*
*
.3
2*
*
–.
02
–.
08
*
S
p
ai
n
61
.0
%
28
.7

8*
*
.4
3*
*
.4
0*
*
.0
9*
.0
7*
S
w
ed
en
72
.7
%
.2
8*
*
.1
6*

*
–.
01
–.
14
**
6.
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
4.
03
(

0.
41
)
4.
08
(
0.
38
)
3.
95
(
0.
44
)
–3
.6
1*
*
.0
7
.0
9*
.0

4
–.
06
.1
5*
*
.7
6
S
p
ai
n
3.
88
(
0.
53
)
20
.5
8*
*
3.
89

(
0.
52
)
3.
85
(
0.
53
)
–1
.1
1
.0
3
.0
6
–.
03
.0
3
.0
4
.7

9
S
w
ed
en
4.
00
(
0.
53
)
(2
, 2
22
6)
4.
03
(
0.
52
)
3.
94

(
0.
56
)
–1
.9
9*
.0
7
.1
9*
*
–.
10
**
.0
7
.0
7*
.7
8
*p
≤
.0

5,
*
*p
≤
.0
1;
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s:
N
=
6
10
; p
er
m
an
en
t

em
p
lo
ye
es
: 3
75
(
61
.5
%
),
t
em
p
o
ra
ry
e
m
p
lo
ye
es

: 2
35
(
38
.5
%
).
S
p
ai
n
: N
=
8
99
; p
er
m
an
en
t
em
p
lo

ye
es
: 5
48
(
61
.0
%
),
t
em
p
o
ra
ry
e
m
p
lo
ye
es
: 3
51

(3
9.
0%
).
S
w
ed
en
: N
=
7
26
; p
er
m
an
en
t
em
p
lo
ye
es
: 5

28
(
72
.7
%
),
t
em
p
o
ra
ry
e
m
p
lo
ye
es
: 1
98
(
27
.3
%

).
OCTOBER 2014
Temporary Agency Worker (TAW) comprise
a considerable proportion (20.1 percent). In
the following section we present the results of
hypothesis testing with multilevel analysis.
In model 2 (Table IV), type of work con-
tract was significantly positively related to
self-reported performance (B = .07, p < .05),
indicating higher performance of permanent
employees. Training for permanent employees
retail sector correlated significantly and nega-
tively with the percentage of training for both
permanent and temporary employees, and
the education sector had a positive associa-
tion with training for temporary employees.
The majority of temporary employees across
all countries held fixed-term contracts, rang-
ing from 55.3 percent in Spain to 65.5 percent
in Sweden. Only in the Dutch sample did
T A B L E I I I Descriptives and Pearson Correlations (Two-
Tailed) for Organizational Variables (Level 2)
Variables Country M (SD)/f
F

(df1, df2) 1 2 3
1. Size Netherlands 735.4 (1,275.8)
Spain 459.3 (1,079.7) 2.24
Sweden 179.6 (178.9) (2, 100)
2. Training permanents % Netherlands 44.0 (26.3) –.23
Spain 62.4 (30.6) 6.17** .08
Sweden 71.5 (37.0) (2, 100) .21
3. Training temporaries % Netherlands 26.2 (28.7) –.15 .69**
Spain 56.2 (33.9) 9.30*** –.16 .59**
Sweden 60.4 (41.5) (2, 100) .21 .72**
Sectors
4. Food (% of all sectors
per country)
Netherlands 43.8% .06 –.05 –.23
Spain 34.0% .07 .02 .08
Sweden 25.9% .78** .25 .12
5. Retail (% of all sectors
per country)
Netherlands 31.3% –.16 –.04 –.08

Spain 20.5% .31* .26 .16
Sweden 40.7% –.53** –.51** –.53**
6. Education (% of all
sectors per country)
Netherlands 25.0% .11 .10 .35
Spain 45.5% –.32* –.23 –.21
Sweden 33.4% –.17 .30 .44*
Type of temporary work
as % of the temporary
workforce per country
7. Temporary agency
workers (TAW)
Netherlands 20.1%
Spain 0%a
Sweden 0%a
8. Fixed-term workers Netherlands 62.4%
Spain 55.3%
Sweden 65.5%
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01; Netherlands: N = 32. Spain: N = 44.
Sweden: N = 27.
asecond-largest subgroup in Spain: 17.3% seasonal workers,
Sweden: 24% daily/on call.

WORKFORCE 761
lending support for Hypothesis 2c. The same
three-way interaction with training for tem-
porary employees was not significant, thus
not supporting Hypothesis 2c in this regard.
Figure 2 illustrates the link between training
for permanent employees and performance
as moderated by work contract as well as
country. Slope difference tests showed that
Spanish temporary employees’ performance
was significantly more negatively related to
training for permanent employees as com-
pared to temporary employees of the other
countries (t = –2.68, p < .01) or permanent
employees.
While the same analysis with Sweden
(model 4/SW) showed no significant three-
way interactions, both training variables had
unexpectedly significant three-way interac-
tions (B = –.22 and B = .21, p < .01) when
testing the Dutch against the other countries
(model 4/NL). The Dutch temporary employ-
ees’ performance had a significantly more pos-
itive relationship with training for permanent
employees (Figure 2) as compared to tempo-
rary employees of the other two countries
(t = 1.98, p < .05). Figure 3 shows the relation-
ship between training for temporary employ-
ees and performance, as moderated by work

contract and country. Slope difference tests
for training for temporary employees revealed
a reversed picture as compared to training
for permanent employees. Dutch temporary
employees’ performance had a significantly
more negative association with training for
temporary employees as compared to the
temporary employees of the other countries
(t = –2.44, p < .05). Additionally, the slope of
the Spanish temporary employees was signifi-
cantly more positive as compared to the other
temporary employees (t = 2.49, p < .05).
Hypothesis 2c is supported with regard to
the results of training for permanent employ-
ees, but not with regard to the results of train-
ing for temporary employees. For the latter, a
moderation by work contract was only found
for the Netherlands as compared with the
other two countries. The country differences
in the training-performance link seemed to
emanate mainly from the temporary work-
forces. Specifically, the Spanish and the Dutch
temporary employees show diverging results.
was significantly negatively related to self-
reported performance (B = –.06, p < .05),
but training for temporary employees was not.
Similarly, training for permanent employees
was moderated by work contract (B = .07, p <
.05), supporting Hypothesis 1a, but training
for temporary employees was not, not sup-
porting Hypothesis 1b. As Figure 1 illustrates,
the relationship between training for perma-
nent employees and performance was espe-
cially negative for the temporary employees,

while the performance of the permanent
target group seemed largely unaffected. In
fact, simple slope analysis did not indicate
a significant relationship for the permanent
workforce, but instead showed a significantly
negative relationship between training for
permanent employees and self-report per-
formance within the temporary sample (B =
–.06, p < .05).
As to Hypotheses 2a and 2b, both stated
that relationships between training and per-
formance would be more pronounced in
Spain as compared to the Netherlands and
Sweden. The level 2 interactions of train-
ing variables and Spain (vs. Netherlands/
Sweden) produced significant coefficients
in both cases (B = –.08, p < .05; B = .11, p <
.01, respectively; Table IV, model 3/SP). Thus,
training for permanent as well as for tempo-
rary employees differed in their relationship
with performance between countries. These
interactions in model 3 were only significant
if Spain was tested against both other coun-
tries, but not if the Netherlands (model 3/NL)
or Sweden (model 3/SW) were tested against
the respective other countries. That the train-
ing-performance link is more pronounced in
Spain as compared to the Netherlands and
Sweden holds true, as a direct relationship for
both was only found in Spain (i.e., training
for permanent as well as training for tempo-
rary employees). Thus, Hypotheses 2a and 2b
were supported.
Work contract was assumed to show stron-

ger moderation for the training-performance
link in Spain as compared to the Netherlands
and Sweden (Hypothesis 2c). Model 4/SP
(Table IV) shows a significant three-way inter-
action for training for permanent employees,
work contract, and Spain (B = .13, p < .05),
OCTOBER 2014
T
A
B
L
E
I
V
Re
su
lts
o
f H
ie

ra
rc
hi
ca
l L
in
ea
r M
od
el
in
g:
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p
of
F
re
qu
en

cy
o
f T
ra
in
in
g
an
d
Se
lf-
Re
po
rt
ed
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
M
o
d

el
1
N
u
ll
M
o
d
el
M
o
d
el
2
H
1a
/b
M
o
d
el
3
/S
P

H
2a
/2
b
M
o
d
el
4
/S
P
H
2c
M
o
d
el
3
/N
L
H
2a
/2
b

M
o
d
el
4
/N
L
H
2c
M
o
d
el
3
/S
W
H
2a
/2
b
M
o
d
el

4
/S
W
H
2c
Fi
xe
d
E
ff
ec
ts
B
(
S
E
)
B
(
S
E
)
B
(

S
E
)
B
(
S
E
)
B
(
S
E
)
B
(
S
E
)
B
(
S
E
)
B

(
S
E
)
In
te
rc
ep
t
3.
96
(
.0
2)
**
*
4.
01
(
.0
4)
**
*
4.

04
(
.0
4)
**
*
4.
02
(
.0
4)
**
*
4.
02
(
.0
4)
**
*
4.
04
(
.0

5)
**
*
4.
02
(
.0
4)
**
*
3.
99
(
.0
5)
**
*
Le
ve
l 1
Pe
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an
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E
ff
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ts
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)
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=
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ce
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en
t;
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p
≤
.0
5,
*
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≤
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*

**
p
≤
.0
01
.
M
o
d
el
s
2–
4
ad
d
it
io
n
al
ly
c
o
n
tr

o
lle
d
f
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te
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re
, a
g
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, a
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n
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ve
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as
r
ef
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ce
)

o
n
le
ve
l 2
; S
P
=
S
p
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n
, N
L
=
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s,

S
W
=
S
w
ed
en
.
WORKFORCE 763
FIGURE 1. Training Permanent Employees and
Performance
FIGURE 2. Training Permanent Employees and
Performance Moderated by Work Contract and
Country (NL = Netherlands, SW = Sweden)
FIGURE 3. Training Temporary Employees and Per-
formance Moderated by Work Contract and Coun-
try (SP = Spain, NL = Netherlands, SW = Sweden)
Thus, the results speak not for the assumed
difference in the strength of moderation, but
for different patterns of the moderation by
work contract between countries.

Discussion
Our goal in this study was to investigate the
relationships between an HR practice—
namely, training—and employee self-reported
performance as influenced by type of work
contract. The association of organizational
percentage of training with self-reported per-
formance differs between temporary and per-
manent employees, as well as across three
European countries. While training for tem-
porary employees had no direct association
with performance, training for permanent
employees was negatively related to perfor-
mance. Also, only training for permanent
employees was moderated by work contract,
indicating a more negative relationship with
performance for the temporary workforce
group as for the largely unaffected permanent
employees.
The relationship between both training
variables and performance was significantly
different for Spain as compared to the other
countries, and only in Spain both train-
ing variables had direct relationships with
performance. Also, training for permanent
employees as moderated by work contract
had different associations with performance
of the Spanish sample as compared to the
other countries. However, no such three-way
interaction was found for training for tem-
porary employees, but instead both training
variables showed significant three-way inter-
actions for the Dutch sample in comparison

to the other countries’ samples.
Country differences mainly emanated
from the temporary employees. While the
Spanish temporary employees showed lower
performance the more the other, permanent
group received training, the Dutch temporary
employees’ performance showed a reverse pat-
tern. That is, the Dutch temporary employees
OCTOBER 2014
compared to permanent contracts as well as
across countries. An alternative reason may
be the quantitative training measurement.
Thus, qualitative differences of training types
will likely exist both between training types
for temporary and for permanent employees
as well as within training types for diverse
temporary employees.
Training, Work Contract, and Country
In the Netherlands, training for temporary
employees is negatively related to perfor-
mance of that group and positively to perma-
nent employees’ performance, and in Spain
and Sweden the opposite picture emerged.
Kuvaas and Dysvik (2009) focused solely on
temporary workforces’ responses, so no com-
parison can be made with respect to the per-

manent group.
The main source of these interactions in
Spain as well as in the Netherlands seems to
be the temporary workforce, which appears
especially sensitive to training targeted
at their own group in the Dutch sample.
In Spain, the temporary workforces’ self-
reported performance was negatively asso-
ciated with training provided for the other,
permanent group. One explanation might be
the higher unemployment rate and higher
usage of a temporary workforce in Spain com-
pared to both other countries, indicating a
more competitive employment environment
in Spain with high employee visibility of
other-group benefits. The widespread use of
temporary employment in Spain may imply
an absence of a perceived minority-group
status. Thus, temporary employees seeking
permanent contracts (i.e., volition) may react
negatively to incentives offered to the per-
manent workforce. In the Netherlands, with
rather low unemployment and a smaller tem-
porary workforce, permanent employees may
profit from training for temporary employees,
as their coworkers will become more quali-
fied and need their assistance less, but also
a less competitive environment may be the
source of this relationship. The link between
training for temporary employees and their
performance decline could have a simple
explanation: maybe temporary employees are
showed higher performance the more the
other, permanent group received training. The

same held true if the temporary group received
training: the Spanish temporary employ-
ees had a positive and the Dutch a negative
relationship with performance. Thus, while
in Spain training for permanent employees
was more relevant in connection with spe-
cific workforce groups, in the more wealthy
Netherlands training for temporary employ-
ees also was of significance for performance.
Training and Work Contract
Contrary to the findings of Kuvaas and Dysvik
(2009), we found that training provided to
permanent employees decreased temporary
employees’ self-reported performance espe-
cially in the Spanish sample. Training for per-
manent employees was positively related to
the Dutch temporary employees’ perfor-
mance, a finding that is in line with Kuvaas
and Dysvik (2009), who conducted their
study in the Northern context. The Dutch
temporary employees may interpret the train-
ing for permanents as a sign of a caring and
investing organization, as Kuvaas and Dysvik
(2009) suggested for their Norwegian sample.
Thus, in general, our results speak for social
comparison processes, as the performance of
the workforce group not targeted shows an
association to that training provision. Given
that the Dutch sample had several unique
features (as discussed later) that are represen-
tative for the differences between countries
(e.g., 2.5 percent TAW of total workforce in
the Netherlands, 1.0 percent in Sweden, and
0.8 percent in Spain; EIRO Foundation/

European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions, 2006), the
findings for the Spanish and Swedish tempo-
rary employees speak for a rather competitive
view. Training for permanent employees may
activate job insecurity perceptions of tempo-
rary employees in terms of inferior employ-
ability prospects.
We did not find moderation by work con-
tract for training for temporary employees
unless moderation by country is included.
For one, that may be due to the greater het-
erogeneity of temporary work contracts as
WORKFORCE 765
The results suggest
a systematic
influence of the
national economic
and legislative
situation, since
in Spain, with

its low GDP and
high employment
protection, the
picture differed
as compared to
the more wealthy
Netherlands and
Sweden with their
lower employment
protection (when
compared with
Spain).
Strengths and Limitations
One strength of our study is the use of two
data sources: the HR managers’ report about
training for two groups of workers and the
reports of temporary and permanent workers
about their performance. As our
study’s sample was international
and spanned three business sec-
tors, we included several poten-
tially important control variables,
including organizational size and
business sector, in addition to

d e m o g r a p h i c v a r i a b l e s .
Considering cultural bias, coun-
tries were accounted for in all
analyses. Finally, all question-
naires were backward-forward-
translated for each country’s
national language.
Focusing on a comparative
study res tricted the number of
individual-level variables in order
not to “blow” the models, as we
would have had to model job
security, job dependence (i.e., eco-
nomic need and employability),
and more features of the sample
organizations. Furthermore, we
did not include volition as an
explanatory variable due to its
inconclusive research state regard-
ing temporary contracts (e.g.,
De Cuyper & De Witte, 2007).
However, we used the OECD
“security index” (i.e., worry about
job loss), which is in line with
economic indices showing that
Spain scores lower in security as
compared to the Netherlands
and Sweden to describe societal differences.
Overall, we aimed to study differences on the
country level; accordingly, we did not include
any measures of the context in our statisti-
cal models (other than country). We believe
that country differences are polycontextual.
Thus, differences are not based on single indi-
cators (like job insecurity, job dependence, or

employability) but on a complex pattern. In
general, comparative cross-national studies
face the problem that any differences found
less skilled or educated and actually receive
training because of performance deficits. In
the Netherlands, differences in performance
between workforce groups were the most
pronounced of the countries, with tempo-
rary employees reporting lower performance.
The Dutch sample of our study was unique
in that it included 20 percent TAW, which
have especially poor work quality (Wagenaar
et al., 2012). Also, 44 percent of the Dutch
sample worked in the food industry, a sector
with high manual work. Together with legis-
lative support for TAW, job dependence and
insecurity may be high and decrease moti-
vation and performance. While that might
be one explanation why Dutch temporary
employees perceived lower performance by
training for their own group, the alternative
reason could simply be that this special group
receives training because their performance is
lower. Nevertheless, TAW and manual work
could be two sample-specific explanations for
the findings.
The results suggest a systematic influence
of the national economic and legislative situa-
tion, since in Spain, with its low GDP and high
employment protection, the picture differed
as compared to the more wealthy Netherlands
and Sweden with their lower employment
protection (when compared with Spain). The
salience of permanent employees in compar-

ing training allocation might be especially
high for temporary employees in a context
where permanent contracts are hard to come
by. Conversely, social comparison might
also be less relevant in countries with lower
employment protection as well as unemploy-
ment, where permanent contracts are easier
to get. However, the Dutch sample showed
significant divergence too, though the pat-
terns were in an unexpected direction. In the
Netherlands, the high percentage of long-
term unemployment is comparable to Spain,
and employment protection supports tempo-
rary work, allowing a much longer duration
as compared to Spain or Sweden. Hinting at
a considerable influence of macroeconomic
forces in the countries under study, acknowl-
edging national economic, legislative, and
social conditions should play a more central
role in organizational research.
OCTOBER 2014
Since culture is not a
static phenomenon,
any differences
may not be stable

in the long run but
still may serve as
groundings for
further refinement
of knowledge
on macro-level
antecedents
to employees’
attitudes.
mainly located at a single site, thus height-
ening visibility of organizational practices.
But even within multisite, large organiza-
tions, personal relationships throughout the
organization frequently allow feelings of any
perceived preferential treatment to spread
quickly; the proverbial “rumor mill” is often
more effective at disseminating information
than official corporate communications.
Though anonymity of respondents should
limit social desirability effects, the use of
self-report data will likely have influenced
performance perceptions. However, relation-
ships between self-reported variables are not
routinely upwardly biased (Conway & Lance,
2010). This study relied on self-assessed per-
formance for two reasons. First, the extra

resources involved in gathering performance
data by supervisors were beyond the scope of
the study, which was conducted in over 100
organizations. Second, even if self-report biases
can be reduced by other data sources, super-
visor ratings may be even more biased (e.g.,
Gardner, Van Dyne, & Pierce, 2004; Murphy,
2008; Sharma, Rich, & Levy, 2004). Though
overestimation of employee performance is
likely, it should not have affected the results.
Finally, given the cross-sectional design
of the study, we cannot infer causal relation-
ships that may exist between variables. Future
research would benefit from a longitudinal
design and a more fine-grained measurement
of both the quality and quantity of training
provided.
Implications
Our sample consisted of three countries, so it
is uncertain to what degree our results apply
to countries with different economic features.
However, it would not be unreasonable to
extend our conclusions to countries from the
same cultural clusters. Training provision for
different workforce groups might be especially
monitored by employees in countries with a
lower GDP (as demonstrated in Spain from
the Latin cluster), while in countries from the
wealthy cluster (Germanic or Nordic), the dif-
ferentiation of training between workforce
groups seems to be less important for employee
performance. However, as demonstrated by
the Dutch sample, training distribution may

may also be caused by unmeasured third vari-
ables (confounding variables), as a result of
unbalanced sampling methods, or metric (and
conceptual) invariance between the measures
used (especially in multilingual studies). Since
culture is not a static phenom-
enon (Tsui, Nifadkar, & Ou, 2007),
any differences may not be stable
in the long run but still may serve
as groundings for further refine-
ment of knowledge on macro-
level antecedents to employees’
attitudes.
Level 2 variables relied on HR
data provided by only one person
per organization, making idio-
syncratic data a possible source of
bias. Training was measured in a
broad manner, with no informa-
tion reported as to the scope and
significance of the implemented
programs or as to the manner in
which they were implemented.
For instance, different types of
training may be effective for the
respective groups of employees. In
Europe, formal training heightens
future employability, so informal
training may not be of as great
value to temporary workers, unless it gives the
opportunity to gain permanent employment
status. Permanent workers, on the other hand,
may benefit from informal training, as it may

lead to promotion within the organization.
Even though percentage provision may seem
a crude measure, the proportion of training is
significantly related to training policies, which
in turn are related to culture-dependent orga-
nizational investment in training (Peretz &
Rosenblatt, 2011). Thus, percentage of train-
ing is nonetheless deemed a useful measure.
It is important to note that in order to
provide objective data, HR managers, rather
than the employees themselves, indicated
which group more frequently received train-
ing. However, organizations in this study
were mainly chosen due to their consider-
able proportion of temporary workers; thus,
workers were possibly aware of the (un)equal
treatment between groups. Furthermore,
organizations participating in the study were
WORKFORCE 767
HR managers
should take care
to offer rewarding
development
programs to

all employees,
regardless of
employment
contract type,
but that it is
important to take
into consideration
the different
motivational
characteristics
of the respective
employee groups.
to treating temporary employees as expend-
ables or ignoring that they are any different.
In recognizing their specific needs but also
the opportunities they provide
for the organization, this special
attention was connected to fewer
“no-shows,” less quitting and sick-
ness absence, and better handling
of the temporary workforce and
overall climate.

Since training and especially
its distribution among workforce
groups correlates across levels
with self-rated performance, the
distribution could be shifted from
a quantitative to a qualitative dif-
ference: training contents could
be specified to the unique needs
of the workforce groups. Besides
the given economic and legisla-
tive situation of a country that
might lead to certain job insecu-
rity perceptions, job dependency
may be one underlying mecha-
nism for moderating outcomes—
thus, employability should be of
concern to employees. As tempo-
rary employees naturally perceive
higher job insecurity, training
targeting at employability would
include firm-nonspecific skills. As
stressed in resource-based theory,
firm-specific human capital (skills)
may be critical for the competi-
tive advantage of a firm (Coff &
Kryscynski, 2011), which could be inher-
ent in training for permanent employees.
Employees may not be motivated to invest in
skills that effectively decrease their opportu-
nities outside of the firm (Coff & Kryscynski,
2011)—temporary employees even less—
thus, regarding firm-specific human capi-
tal, HR policies and line managers should
concentrate on the permanent workforce.
Because employees may actively choose to
invest in firm-specific human capital due to

socialization processes with organizational
norms, which can be reinforced by HR poli-
cies to integrate new hires (Coff & Kryscynski,
2011), socialization will be more relevant for
permanent employees, as their time horizon
still be relevant for temporary employees but
show diverging patterns. In general, it seems
to be the temporary workforce that is more
sensitive than its permanent counterparts
with regard to training distribution.
If temporary work as well as unemploy-
ment and/or long-term unemployment are
high and employment protection legislation
on permanent work is tight, job insecurity
will likely be higher and jeopardize work
performance. In situations like this, training
provision may be relevant for, for example,
fostering perceived employability. However,
employment protection for temporary work
may likewise lead to increased usage of, for
example, TAW, as in the Netherlands. Still,
due to low unemployment rates, training
may be less relevant in the Netherlands as
compared to Spain.
As our data was collected in 2004, it
might be questioned if differences between
countries are still the same. Albeit due to
economic crisis, which affected all countries
under study, the relation of indicators basi-
cally stayed the same or is even more accentu-
ated today (OECD, n.d.): Compared to 2004,
the rate of temporary employment dropped in
2011 in Spain (25.3 percent) and rose in the

Netherlands (18.4 percent). Also, unemploy-
ment rates rose extremely in Spain (21.8 per-
cent), only slightly in Sweden (7.6 percent),
and stayed the same in the Netherlands (4.4
percent). While overall employment protection
in 2011 was equally strict as compared to
2004, strictness for regular employment
dropped in the Netherlands (2.7) and for tem-
porary employment in Sweden (0.9).
In summary, our results indicate that HR
managers should take care to offer reward-
ing development programs to all employees,
regardless of employment contract type, but
that it is important to take into consideration
the different motivational characteristics of
the respective employee groups and tailor the
programs and policies offered to reflect those
factors that effectively drive individual (and
thus organizational) performance. Koene and
van Riemsdijk (2005) found that paying spe-
cial attention to temporary workforce with
regard to operational HR management was
superior (in that it evoked better outcomes)
OCTOBER 2014
TABEA SCHEEL is currently holding a postdoctoral research
fellowship (Humboldt
Foundation) at the University of Vienna (Austria), Faculty of
Psychology/Department of

Work, Education, Economy. She obtained her PhD from the
University of Leipzig, and
her work has been published in journals such as the
International Journal of Human
Resource Management and European Journal of Work and
Organizational Psychology.
Her research interests cover HRM and nonpermanent as well as
volunteer work con-
tracts, psychological contracts, employee well-being and
attitudes, and individual re-
sources like passion and humor.
THOMAS RIGOTTI is full professor of work, organizational
and business psychology at
the Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz. He received his
PhD from the University
of Leipzig. His current research interests include health-
promoting leadership, stress and
Training is
an important
non-pecuniary
incentive, and
providing learning
opportunities may
motivate permanent
employees to invest
in firm-specific

skills.
country (e.g., when unemployment is low
but rather long-term and legislation protects
mainly temporary employment—like in the
Netherlands). Similarly, policies that drive
performance during a recession may not be
as effective during periods of economic sta-
bility or growth. We also note that training is
but one component of a comprehensive HR
program and, applied in isolation, is unlikely
to result in meaningful increases of organiza-
tional performance.
Finally, more cross-national research on
HR management is warranted, as not only
do the United States and Europe diverge, but
so too does Asia from Western countries (Li
et al., 2011). However, the disparate results
we observed between the three countries in
our study imply it may not be strictly rel-
evant to consider a “European” perspective,
per se, as an alternative to North American–
based studies (cf. Stavrou, 2005). We sug-
gest, rather, that the varying legislative and
economic factors within Europe may be of
greater significance than intercontinental
differences when determining an organiza-
tion’s HR practices.
Acknowledgment
This study is part of a larger research study
funded by the European Union within the
5th framework program (HPSE-CT-

2002-00121).
An earlier draft of this article was pre-
sented at the 25th Conference of the Society
of Industrial and Organizational Psychology
in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2010.
with their firm is potentially unlimited, and
also because their quality of working life
(Wagenaar et al., 2012) is more favorable,
and therefore more motivating.
Our results underline the notion of
Coff and Kryscynski (2011) that acknowl-
edges idiosyncratic challenges
for firms—depending on the
“unique mix of people—there is
no one size that fits all” (p. 1439),
demanding cross-level solutions.
Drilling beneath the aggregate
phenomena enables managers to
intervene strategically for gain-
ing and sustaining competitive
advantage—by creating condi-
tions that favor the accumulation
of certain kinds of human capital
(Foss, 2011), like training distri-
bution with regard to workforce
composition. Skill-based value
creation by training may be
jeopardized by impaired motiva-
tion, which is the complex and
difficult challenge if skills are to
be increased. Training is an important non-

pecuniary incentive, and providing learn-
ing opportunities may motivate permanent
employees to invest in firm-specific skills.
We also suggest that HR managers con-
template the relevant macroeconomic and
legislative characteristics of the countries
in which they do business when crafting
these programs, as what may work well in
one country could yield an unexpected,
even undesirable, result in a neighboring
WORKFORCE 769
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