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Quantum
Cryptography
Zelam Ngo, David McGrogan
Motivation
 Age of Information
 Information is valuable
 Protecting that Information
Quantum Security Benefits
 Provably Secure
 Evidence of Tampering
History
 Stephen Wiesner wrote “Conjugate
Coding” in the late sixties
 Charles H. Bennett and Gilles
Brassard revived the field in 1982 by
combining quantum process with
public key cryptography.
Fundamentals
 Measurement causes perturbation
 No Cloning Theorem
 Thus, measuring the qubit in the
wrong basis destroys the information.
BB84
 Set-up
 Alice
• Has the ability to create qubits in two
orthogonal bases
 Bob
• Has the ability to measure qubits in those
two bases.
BB84
 Alice
 Encodes her information randomly in
one of the two bases…
• For example,
Basis A Basis B
ᅵ0〉= 0 ᅵ+〉= 0
ᅵ1〉= 1 ᅵ-〉= 1
BB84
Alice prepares 16 bits
0101100010101100
in the following bases,
BAABAABAAAABBBBA
Thus the following states are sent to Bob:
+10-10+0101+--+0
BB84
Bob receives the stream of qubits and
measures each one in a random basis:
ABAABAAABABBBBAB
Alice’s bits 0101100010101100
Alice’s bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA
States sent +10-10+0101+--+0
BB84
So Bob gets
1-00-0+0+0-+--1+
Alice’s bits 0101100010101100
Alice’s bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA
States sent +10-10+0101+--+0
Bob’s bases ABAABAAABABBBBAB
BB84
Then Alice and Bob compare their
measurement bases, not the results, via a
public channel.
Alice’s bits 0101100010101100
Alice’s bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA
States sent +10-10+0101+--+0
Bob’s bases ABAABAAABABBBBAB
Bob’s results 1-00-0+0+0-+--1+
BB84
 So Bob and Alice are left with 7
useable bits out of 16
_ _ 0 _ _ 0 _ 0 _ 0_ 0 1 1 _ _
These bits will be the shared key they
use for encryption.
BB84
 Now enter Eve… She wants to spy on
Alice and Bob.
 So she intercepts the bit stream from
Alice, measures it, and prepares a
new bit stream to Bob based on her
measurements…
BB84
So how do we know when Eve is being
nosy?
Well… Eve doesn’t know what bases to
measure in, so she would have to
measure randomly and 50% of the
time she will be wrong…
BB84
 Thus, of the bits Bob measures in the
correct bases, there is 50% that eve
had changed the basis of the bit. And
thus it is equally likely that Bob
measure 0 or 1 and thus an error is
detected 25% of the time.
 Eve is found in the errors!
BB84
 Eve creates a detectable error 25% of
the time
Alice Eve Bob Result
No measurement Good bit value
No measurement Discarded
Good value, Eve gains information
50% chance Eve creates an error
Discarded
Discarded
BB84
 In a world with perfect transmissions, all
Bob and Alice have to do is publicly
compare a few bits to determine if any error
exists.
 Errors exist in reality, thus the only way to
detect Eve is to notice an increase in errors.
 Thus the transmission process must not
have an error rate higher than 25%.
BB84
 Alice’s transmitter might sent multiple
photons, which Eve could skim
 Standard Encryption enhancing
protocols can prevent Eve from
gaining partial information
EPR
 Uses entangled qubits sent from a
central source
 Alice and Bob measure qubits
randomly and independently
 After measuring, they compare
measurement bases and proceed as
in BB84
EPR
 Advantage over BB84 is that Eve can
now be detected using rejected qubits
 Eve causes non-violation of Bell
inequality – Eve’s measurement is a
hidden variable
B92
 Uses only two non-orthogonal states:
ᅵθ〉and ᅵθ’〉
 Polarized at θ and –θ from vertical
 0 < θ < π/4
B92
 Example at θ=π/8:
Encoding: Decoding:
B92
 Each bit is either successfully
received or an “erasure”
 Best measurement protocol gives
erasure probability of
|〈θ|θ’〉| = cos(2θ)
B92
 Eve’s presence revealed by:
 High error rate
 High erasure rate
 Erasure rate increase can be avoided;
result is then like BB84
Current State of Affairs
 Commercial
quantum key
distribution
products exist
Current State of Affairs
 Current fiber-
based distance
record: 200 km
(Takesue et al)
Current State of Affairs
 Demonstrated free-space link: 10 km
Future Prospects
 Ground-to-satellite,
satellite-to-satellite links
 General improvement with evolving
qubit-handling techniques, new
detector technologies

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crypto.ppt

  • 2. Motivation  Age of Information  Information is valuable  Protecting that Information
  • 3. Quantum Security Benefits  Provably Secure  Evidence of Tampering
  • 4. History  Stephen Wiesner wrote “Conjugate Coding” in the late sixties  Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard revived the field in 1982 by combining quantum process with public key cryptography.
  • 5. Fundamentals  Measurement causes perturbation  No Cloning Theorem  Thus, measuring the qubit in the wrong basis destroys the information.
  • 6. BB84  Set-up  Alice • Has the ability to create qubits in two orthogonal bases  Bob • Has the ability to measure qubits in those two bases.
  • 7. BB84  Alice  Encodes her information randomly in one of the two bases… • For example, Basis A Basis B ᅵ0〉= 0 ᅵ+〉= 0 ᅵ1〉= 1 ᅵ-〉= 1
  • 8. BB84 Alice prepares 16 bits 0101100010101100 in the following bases, BAABAABAAAABBBBA Thus the following states are sent to Bob: +10-10+0101+--+0
  • 9. BB84 Bob receives the stream of qubits and measures each one in a random basis: ABAABAAABABBBBAB Alice’s bits 0101100010101100 Alice’s bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA States sent +10-10+0101+--+0
  • 10. BB84 So Bob gets 1-00-0+0+0-+--1+ Alice’s bits 0101100010101100 Alice’s bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA States sent +10-10+0101+--+0 Bob’s bases ABAABAAABABBBBAB
  • 11. BB84 Then Alice and Bob compare their measurement bases, not the results, via a public channel. Alice’s bits 0101100010101100 Alice’s bases BAABAABAAAABBBBA States sent +10-10+0101+--+0 Bob’s bases ABAABAAABABBBBAB Bob’s results 1-00-0+0+0-+--1+
  • 12. BB84  So Bob and Alice are left with 7 useable bits out of 16 _ _ 0 _ _ 0 _ 0 _ 0_ 0 1 1 _ _ These bits will be the shared key they use for encryption.
  • 13. BB84  Now enter Eve… She wants to spy on Alice and Bob.  So she intercepts the bit stream from Alice, measures it, and prepares a new bit stream to Bob based on her measurements…
  • 14. BB84 So how do we know when Eve is being nosy? Well… Eve doesn’t know what bases to measure in, so she would have to measure randomly and 50% of the time she will be wrong…
  • 15. BB84  Thus, of the bits Bob measures in the correct bases, there is 50% that eve had changed the basis of the bit. And thus it is equally likely that Bob measure 0 or 1 and thus an error is detected 25% of the time.  Eve is found in the errors!
  • 16. BB84  Eve creates a detectable error 25% of the time Alice Eve Bob Result No measurement Good bit value No measurement Discarded Good value, Eve gains information 50% chance Eve creates an error Discarded Discarded
  • 17. BB84  In a world with perfect transmissions, all Bob and Alice have to do is publicly compare a few bits to determine if any error exists.  Errors exist in reality, thus the only way to detect Eve is to notice an increase in errors.  Thus the transmission process must not have an error rate higher than 25%.
  • 18. BB84  Alice’s transmitter might sent multiple photons, which Eve could skim  Standard Encryption enhancing protocols can prevent Eve from gaining partial information
  • 19. EPR  Uses entangled qubits sent from a central source  Alice and Bob measure qubits randomly and independently  After measuring, they compare measurement bases and proceed as in BB84
  • 20. EPR  Advantage over BB84 is that Eve can now be detected using rejected qubits  Eve causes non-violation of Bell inequality – Eve’s measurement is a hidden variable
  • 21. B92  Uses only two non-orthogonal states: ᅵθ〉and ᅵθ’〉  Polarized at θ and –θ from vertical  0 < θ < π/4
  • 22. B92  Example at θ=π/8: Encoding: Decoding:
  • 23. B92  Each bit is either successfully received or an “erasure”  Best measurement protocol gives erasure probability of |〈θ|θ’〉| = cos(2θ)
  • 24. B92  Eve’s presence revealed by:  High error rate  High erasure rate  Erasure rate increase can be avoided; result is then like BB84
  • 25. Current State of Affairs  Commercial quantum key distribution products exist
  • 26. Current State of Affairs  Current fiber- based distance record: 200 km (Takesue et al)
  • 27. Current State of Affairs  Demonstrated free-space link: 10 km
  • 28. Future Prospects  Ground-to-satellite, satellite-to-satellite links  General improvement with evolving qubit-handling techniques, new detector technologies