The PowerPoint slides from Warwick Think Tank's event on Tuesday Oct 14, 2014, edited for public distribution. The discussion was led by Mr Jordan Anderson. Warwick Think Tank is a student society at the University of Warwick. It is the first student-led think tank in the country, affiliated with the prominent national think tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), and the global student think tank network, Campus Policy. Jordan Anderson is an MA Intelligence and International Security graduate from KCL and world-class public speaker and debater. Currently working at a foreign embassy, he is also the 2014 World Debating Masters Champion. He led the discussion on ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Boko Haram - what unites them, what divides them, and various responses to them.

1. EXTREMISM IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND AFRICA
ISIS, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and
Hezbollah
A discussion led by Jordan Anderson
Tuesday October 14, 2014
University of Warwick

2. About Warwick Think Tank
• We are the first student-led think tank in the
country and we are affiliated with the prominent
national think tank, the Institute for Public Policy
Research (IPPR).
• We are also part of CampusPolicy, the global
student think tank network.
• Our members can get published on Polis, our in-house
journal, and Metis, the ippr@universities
journal.
• We also have exclusive internships with

3. About Jordan Anderson
• Jordan Anderson is an MA Intelligence and
International Security graduate from King’s
College London and world-class public speaker
and debater.
• Currently working at a foreign embassy
• 2014 World Debating Masters Champion and
winner of many other national debating
competitions in the UK.
• Previously spoke at WTT in ‘Issues in Drone
Warfare’ and ‘Congo’s Rebel Problem: 1960 to
Present’

4. Outline
• 1. Terminology
• 2. Overview of Groups
• 3. Common Ideological Tenets
• 4. Western Recruits
• 5. Spreading Ideological Tenets
• 6. Approaches to Combating Extremism

5. 1. Terminology
• Media (BBC, NYT, Reuters) “jihadi” ( (جهادي
• “Mujahid” ( مجاهد ), “mujahideen” ( (مجاهدين
– Jihad ( جهاد ): “struggle”
– “People doing jihad”, “people engaged in struggle”
• Controversial
– “Greater jihad” vs “lesser jihad” – “the struggle
against oneself” (Jabir ibn Abd Allah, companion of
Mohammed)
• 11th Century hadith, considered unreliable (early 14th
Century)
• How these groups refer to themselves:
Mujahideen

6. 2. Overview of Groups
• Islamic State (IS) ( ( الدولة الإسلامية
– ISIS, ISIL, Da’esh
– Originated in Jordan 1999, moved to Iraq post-
2003, became “Al Qaeda in Iraq” (AQI) in 2004,
became the “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI) in 2006,
became the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS)
in 2013, expelled from Al Qaeda in 2014, became
IS in 2014
– Declared Caliphate in June 2014 under “Caliph
Ibrahim” (“Abu Bakr al-Bahghdadi”)

7. 2. Overview of Groups
• Islamic State (IS) ( ( الدولة الإسلامية
– CIA Sept. 2014: 20,000 – 31,500 fighters (2,000
Westerners)
– Multiple factions – Sunni grievances:
• Ideological jihadis
• Former Ba’athists
• Sunni Arab tribes
– Non-ideological jihadis being purged gradually
– “Leading brand” globally: jihadi affiliation
pledged from Tunisia to Indonesia ; Boko Haram
and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP)

8. 2. Overview of Groups
• Al-Qaeda ( القاعدة ): “The Base”
– Originated with the “Arab Afghans” in Soviet War in
Afghanistan (not Western allies), then escalating
terrorism: US Embassy bombings in 1998, USS Cole
Bombing 2000, 9/11 attacks 2001
– Main branches:
• Al Qaeda ‘Core’ (led by Ayman al-Zawahiri since 2011)
• Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQIP)
• Al Nusra Front (Syria)
• Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
• Al Shabaab (Somalia)
• Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

9. 2. Overview of Groups
• Boko Haram: “Western Education is forbidden”
– Officially “People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings
for Propagation and Jihad” ) )جماعة أهل السنة للدعوة والجهاد
– Originated as a religious community/sect in 2002,
campaign of violence began in 2009, escalating since then
• School attacks, prison breaks, assassinations, sophisticated
bombings, bank robberies, and kidnappings (April 2014)
– Up to 9,000 fighters
– "Boko Haram are better armed and are better motivated
than our own troops. Given the present state of affairs, it is
absolutely impossible for us to defeat Boko Haram.“
-Governor of Borno, Feb. 2014

10. 2. Overview of Groups
• Hezbollah ( حزب الله ): “The Party of God”
– DISTINCTION: Shia group
– Military leadership: “Jihad Council”
– Originated as amalgamation of Shia militias during
the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990)
• Attacks on US and French personnel 1982-1984
• Worldwide terrorist attacks since the 1990s
– Historically focused on antagonism towards Israel
– Significant involvement in Syria since 2012
• Increasingly sectarian orientation and perception

11. 3. Common Ideological Tenets
• (Relate to the three Sunni jihadi organisations:
IS, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram)

12. 3. Common Ideological Tenets
• Takfir ( تكفير ): declaration of excommunication,
declaring people to be non-Muslims (apostates)
– Orthodox Islamic law: requires declaration by Islamic
scholars/authorities, presentation of evidence –
usually judged on stated beliefs, not actions
– Jihadi groups: “right of any Muslim”, judge on actions
– Jihad cannot be waged against fellow Muslims ; Takfir
makes “permissable”
– Takfiri ( تكفيري ) – sectarian slur

13. 3. Common Ideological Tenets
• Tawhid ( توحيد ): doctrine of Oneness of God,
monotheism (NOT “unity”) and Shirk ( (شرك
“idolatry”, “polytheism”
• Jihadi groups: extreme interpretation
– Democracy, secularism, nationalism (authorities that
are not an “Islamic” state)
– Shia Islam
– “Protected” religions (Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians)
– Graves/tombs
– Traditional Islamic saints, charms, etc.

14. 3. Common Ideological Tenets
• Bid’ah ( بدعة ): “innovation” (connotation: sinful
innovation)
• Jihadi groups: extreme interpretation
– Shirk (religious practices)
– Westernised education
– Technologies (declining)
• Resulting emphasis on modelling all aspects of
life on the practices and teachings (“sunnah”: (سنة
of Mohammed and his Companions
– Salafism

15. 3. Common Ideological Tenets
• ‘Simple’ Islam
– “Open the Qur’an and read the verses on jihad and
everything will become clear ... all the scholars tell
me: “This is a legal obligation or that isn’t a legal
obligation, and this is not the time for jihad” ... forget
everyone and read the Qur’an and you will know what
jihad is.” -Abu Al-Baraa’ Al-Hindi (IS), July 2014
– “Islam is simple, and the Prophet and his Companions
were simple, why complicate Islam? The Companions
were men, and we are men.” (Example)

16. 3. Common Ideological Tenets
• Contrast: Orthodox Islamic law:
– Qur’an must understood in light of hadith
– Hadith must be evaluated for their reliability (three
categories), and considered with the Qur’an and other
hadith
– Thousands of hadith

17. 4. Western Recruits
• Usually not ‘traditionally’ religiously observant
– Two Birmingham Al-Nusra recruits May 2013:
purchased “Islam for Dummies”, “The Koran for
Dummies”
– Leaked 2008 M15 analysis: “far from being religious
zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism
do not practise their faith regularly. Many lack
religious literacy and could . . . be regarded as
religious novices.”
• But not ‘irreligious’ –’simple’ Islam (“YouTube Islam”)
– 2008: “a well-established religious identity actually
protects against violent radicalisation“
• True within established mainstream communities – fringe
groups lure potential recruits away (bid’ah, “irrelevant”)

18. 4. Western Recruits
• Rebellious, ideological, outraged, glory-seekers
– Motivated more by ‘identity politics’ than
theology
– “International Brigades” of the Spanish Civil War
• IS values foreign recruits less than Arabic-speaking
recruits
– Places foreign recruits without otherwise useful
skills in suicide units
– Also uses Westerners for propaganda value

19. 4. Western Recruits
• Female (adults and teenagers)
– Historically recruits overwhelmingly male
– Surge in female recruits with Syria-Iraq crisis
• IS (then ISIS) initially discouraged from coming
• Estimated 250 in the region; 10% of Western recruits
• French hotline reporting jihadi radicalization: 45% of
inquiries involve women
• Recruited via social media (often by other
women) - promised ‘devout jihadi husbands’
– Support roles: wives, doctors, nurses, engineers
– Al-Khansaa' Brigade: armed female modesty police*
– Abused, regret

20. 5. Spreading Ideological Tenets
• Hezbollah and takfir
– Casualties in Syria and Iraq die on “jihad duty”
– October 2013: video of Hezbollah & allied fighters
executing ‘Salafi’ Syrian rebels. One states: "We are
performing our taklif [religious order] and we are not
seeking personal vengeance.”
– December 2013: Iraqi Shi’ite cleric Grand Ayatollah Kazem
Al-Haeri (linked to Hezbollah allies): “The war in Syria is …
a war against infidels fighting Islam and, therefore, Islam
must be defended… all those who die in battle there are
martyrs.”
• Irony: Hezbollah popularised calling Sunni jihadis
“takfiris”, officially decries sectarianism

21. 6. Approaches to Combating
Extremism
• Approaches unlikely to succeed
– Un-orthodox takfir
– Theological arguments based on weak hadith
• Partially: Sept 2014 “Open Letter “ from 126 Sunni scholars
• Approaches more likely to succeed: West
– “Fight social media with social media”
• Increased digital presence and literacy by mainstream
organisations, resources for debunking propaganda and
jihadi ideology
• Quilliam Foundation report May 2104
• Parallel: Islam in the post-Soviet USSR

22. 6. Approaches to Combating
Extremism
• Approaches more likely to succeed: Conflict Zones
– Military operations
• Air strikes on oil refineries in Syria and Iraq
• Alliances with local forces
– Political arrangements
• Mid-2000’s Iraq: Anbar Awakening

23. 6. Approaches to Combating
Extremism
• Approaches more likely to succeed: Conflict
Zones
– Efforts to bring about cosmological shifts that
invalidate jihadi tactics and beliefs
• Military operations alone not enough: cosmology can
explain ‘failures’ of groups internally
– Result: eventual re-emergence of a similar group
• But: when two cosmologies are in competition, tactical
failures can act as ‘information’ that influences cosmological
choices
– E.g. cosmology that validates suicide bombings (shaheedism) vs
cosmology that forbids suicide
• Military operations must coincide with efforts to propagate
anti-jihadi cosmologies