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Matthew Pipes
Political Science 342 Government and Politics of the Middle East
Professor Zaman Stanizai
January 27th
, 2015
The Feud Between ISIS and Al-Qaeda- The Fracturing of the Syrian Opposition
and the Melding of the Civil Wars in Iraq and Syria.
The civil war in Syria is a multidimensional conflict with multiple sides, all fighting each
other. In the most violent of the uprisings of the Arab Spring, many different factions have come
to challenge the seat of power in Syria held by Bashar Al-Assad. These opposition forces are not
united, in fact they are continually in conflict with each other as well as the Assad Regime.
Neighboring Syria is Iraq that has gone through its own civil war in the past decade that ended
inconclusively. The seeds of the conflict in Syria are independent of the conflict in Iraq, but once
started, the Syrian Civil War was a prime target for Jihadists in Iraq to gain ground.
Those Jihadists hit Jihadi gold in Syria, seeing far more success than they had enjoyed in
Iraq. Now stronger due to their success in Syria, those same Jihadists returned to Iraq to take the
Sunni portions of that country including, Mosul, Tikrit, much of Al-Anbar Province, and most of
Salahuddin Province ("How Much of Iraq Does ISIS Control?") . In the south, they advanced all
the way to the outskirts of Baghdad to Samarra and Falluja before they were halted by Iraqi
government forces and Shia militias. In the north, they advanced to the Mosul Dam, and to the
west they made it to the outskirts of Irbil and Kirkuk before being turned back by the Kurdish
Peshmerga ("How Much of Iraq Does ISIS Control?"). This advance had the effect of erasing the
internationally recognized border between Iraq and Syria in the east. The opposition forces to the
Jihadists in Iraq are also not united, the jihadists are not united ,and by extension, the Syrian

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opposition is not united. The only effective alliance is the Assad Regime, Hezbollah, Iran, Iraqi
Shia Militias, and the Iraqi government. These two conflicts on the borders of each other make
the other worse, creating one large quagmire where all sides are warring against each other.
In the aftermath of the toppling of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Al-Qaeda took
the opportunity to establish a franchise, or what we call today the Islamic State (IS) 1
. During this
period, individuals were dispatched to neighboring nations to help funnel soldiers into Iraq. One
of those individuals who had been dispatched to Syria was a man named Abu Mohammad al-
Julani ("Al-Qaeda Leaks”), who was eventually forced to return to Iraq in 2007 following the
reversal of the Syrian regimes tolerance for such groups (Benotman 2). Following many
leadership changes and a rejection by the local Sunni population in Iraq during the Sunni
Awakening ("Guns Not Enough to Beat IS."), IS became less active until the Syrian conflict
started and American soldiers were no longer safeguarding the Shia government in Iraq ("Al-
Qaeda Leaks”). The Shia government in Iraq lost the trust of the Sunni community as well in the
aftermath of the withdrawal of American troops ("Guns Not Enough to Beat IS."). On top of all
that, the Kurds want an independent country from the Shia government in Baghdad, and tensions
between the two have grown considerably over the last few years, although they both have forces
battling IS ("Leader of Iraq's Kurdish Region Calls for Independence Referendum."). Due to
their success and brutality in Syria, IS recruited many foreign fighters and their numbers swelled
("Al-Qaeda Leaks”). Eventually they grew strong enough to not only mount an attack on Mosul,
Iraq, but to take the entire city almost without a fight ("Guns Not Enough to Beat IS.").
1
Islamic State was originally founded as Al- Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). They changed their name to
the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and eventually to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) when
they melded with Nusra and joined the conflict in Syria. After declaring themselves to be the
Caliphate they changed their name to the Islamic State (IS) as they will be referred to for the rest
of this paper, even though at the time being mentioned they were known under a previous name.

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The secular regime of Bashar Al-Assad is the most entrenched of any force in Syria. The
regime is tyrannical and anti-democratic, and is a single party system. The Ba’ath party is the
only party and is dominated by Shia Alawites. The regime had controlled all of Syria until March
2011. In March 2011, a protest movement began that attempted to implement democratic
reforms inside Syria. The regime retaliated by violently cracking down on the protesters
(Benotman 2). Due to the violent crackdown, the opposition began to militarize and the first
formal military opposition was the Free Syrian Army (FSA) made up of civilians and soldiers
who had defected. The FSA is also the only secular opposition force in Syria.
The FSA was continually outmanned and outgunned by the regime and its Shia allies;
Hezbollah and Iran both sent troops and supplies to assist the regime ("New Sanctions Target
Iran, Hezbollah and Syria: US."). Sunni Gulf nations sought to undermine the Syrian regime not
only by assisting the secular FSA, but also finaning radical Sunni jihadists who sought to push
back the Shia Alawites in Syria, as well as push back the Shia of Iran and Southern Iraq in order
to establish a Sunni state (“Al-Qaeda Leaks”). As the FSA was continually hammered by the
regime, the radical Sunni Islamist grew in strength and eventually eclipsed the FSA as the main
opposition to the regime.
There are many militant groups with Islamist ideologies in Syria, but the two most
effective fighting forces of those groups are the Al-Nusra Front (Nusra) and IS, both of whom
were started by Al-Qaeda. Nusra operates exclusively inside Syria; IS operates in both Iraq and
Syria, battling the governments in Iraq and Syria as well as Kurds and Shia militias in Iraq. This
expansion of the role of IS, as well as their extremist ideology and execution of American
prisoners, has prompted the United States to militarily adopt a strategy of engagement with IS. In
addition, the United States has brought pressure to bear on Gulf patrons of IS to pressure them to

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cease their support for Islamist groups and to become militarily engaged against the extremists.
This is how there came to be three main factions of the Syrian Civil War; they are the regime, the
Islamists extremests, and the secular FSA.
The two opposition factions, the FSA and the Islamists, are anything but united. After the
support from Gulf nations dried up, IS and Nusra began taking hits from coalition aircraft. The
ire of the Islamist faction began to turn towards the FSA, who was not being bombed by the
coalition but was being supplied by them. This inevitably led to clashes between Islamist
opponents of the regime and secular opponents (FSA) of the regime. IS taking land for an
Islamic State was also a cause for conflict between the groups. The regime took that opportunity
of the division and clashes between the two factions to hammer the FSA and nearly wipe them
out.
Additional divisions exist within the Islamist faction; they are split by a fierce rivalry
between Nusra and IS. After the uprising against the regime in Syria began in March 2011, Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS who is actually from Samara, not Baghdad, and a member the
Bou Abbas clan with suspicions bordering on paranoia, personally asked Julani to return to Syria
and form an Al-Qaeda franchise there ( "Al-Zawahiri Statement Raises…”). IS decided to send a
contingent of non-Iraqi jihadist to fight against the regime in Syria; this group was led by Julani
and is today the Al-Nusra Front. IS felt pressure to start an operation in Syria to prevent their
soldiers from leaving IS to join groups that were active in Syria. By having an operation in Syria,
IS could hold onto their recruits better at the time ("Al-Qaeda Leaks”). It was not publicly clear
if Nusra was its own independent franchise of Al-Qaeda, or if they were simply an extension of
IS (Benotman 2). What was publicly known was that IS was giving Nusra financial and
ideological support (Aboudi).

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Tensions between the two groups occurred mostly because Baghdadi feared the
spectacular rise of Nusra. Baghdadi eventually demanded that Nusra and Julani publicly
announce their allegiance to IS, which Julani refused to do. Tensions came to a head when
Baghdadi ordered Julani to attack the FSA and he denied that request as well. This led Baghdadi
to take steps to try and disband Nusra. He recruited mostly foreign fighter to defect from Julani
and Nusra, some of whom were arrested by Nusra for Takfir. Baghdadi decided after that to
disband Nusra and publicly announce a new group combining both groups ("Al-Qaeda Leaks”).
Before the merger Julani apparently attempted to break clean from the influence of IS because he
did not wish to make the same mistakes that were made in Iraq by IS, mainly the targeting of
civilians (Alluni). Julani claims that Baghdadi sent a man named Abu-Ali al Iraqi to watch over
his shoulder, and he eventually tried to impose his own will on Julani and Nusra ( "Al-zawahiri
Statement Raises…”). Julani then tried to circumvent both Baghdadi and Iraqi by
communicating directly with Al-Qaeda Central chief Ayman Al-Zawahiri. In response, Baghdadi
organized a meeting of all the leaders of IS, excluding Julani and all Syrians. The meetings
conclusion was to officially absorb Nusra by publicly announcing their cooperation.2
This they
hoped would reign in Julani and bring him back under their command ( "Al-zawahiri Statement
Raises…”).
The rift appeared publicly between the two groups shortly after the meeting in April 2013
when Baghdadi declared the groups were one and the same and that Nusra was under his
command (Aboudi). Julani pressed ahead and refused to meld Nusra with IS. Two days after
Baghdadi’s announcement, he issued a statement that he and Nusra had not been consulted about
the joining of the two groups, and he and his organization were loyal to al-Qaeda Central chief
2
They also changed the name of the group to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to
demonstrate that cooperation ( "Al-zawahiri Statement Raises…”).

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Ayman al-Zawahiri, not Baghdadi and IS. In a sign of the tensions at the time, Julani had learned
about Baghdadi’s intention to combine the groups through the media ("Al Nusra Pledges
Allegiance to Al Zawahiri." Agence France Presse). Either way, Baghdadi was not backing down
from his claim that IS was the legitimate leader of Sunni Jihadists in both Iraq and Syria.
Baghdadi sent many of his fighters into Syria in order to pressure people to pledge their
allegiance to IS and Baghdadi as opposed to Julani and Nusra. Mass rallies (which included the
majority of the foreign fighters in Syria) were held in which large number of people would
pledge allegiance to IS (Alluni). As the tension mounted, clashes and assassinations took place.
Zawahiri attempted to calm the situation (Alluni)( "Al-zawahiri Statement Raises…”), although
he eventually sided with Julani and Nusra and gave them the mandate to carry out the wishes of
Al-Qaeda Central (Jazib). He went as far as to attempt to disband IS and return them to Iraq, but
eventually severed all ties with Baghdadi and IS.
There are many reasons why Nusra would not want to be so publicly and closely
associated with IS, but one more important than all the others. Nusra has a positive reputation
amongst Syrian civilians because they direct most of their attacks at military targets. IS on the
other hand is greatly despised by the people of Iraq for their targeting of mostly civilians during
the civil war and American occupation ("Al Nusra Pledges Allegiance to Al Zawahiri." Gulf
News).
Through the feud between Julani and Baghdadi, the membership of IS stayed mostly
loyal to Baghdadi, while Nusra splintered into three factions. One faction supported Baghdadi,
the other Julani, and another wished to remain neutral ("Al-Qaeda Leaks…”). IS made a strategy
of recruiting other Islamist who make up the rest of the Sunni Islamist opposition to the regime,
and labelling those that will not join them as apostates while seeking to eliminate them ("Al-

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Qaeda Leaks II”). In early 2014, Zawahiri issued a statement in which he cut all ties with IS and
claimed they took part in the spilling of sacred blood, the blood of other jihadists, and of
oppressive and seditious behavior (Philp). Zawahiri’s statement continued that the advance of IS
in Syria was done without his approval. Al-Qaeda Central wished to have one franchise
operating in each country, rather than one organization trying to handle both. The statement from
Al-Qaeda central continued that IS did not know “the enormity of the catastrophe” that had been
caused by the fracturing of the anti-Assad opposition (Philp). Nusra was completely focused on
the toppling of the Assad regime and the unity of the opposition, while IS was not. IS began to
form their Islamic State in the areas they controlled (Philp).
It appears as though the two civil wars occurring simultaneously in Iraq and Syria are
feeding off each other. The American invasion of Iraq created a situation in which Al-Qaeda was
able to set up a successful franchise there. During the American occupation of Iraq, IS built a
jihadist network in Syria to funnel foreign fighters to their ranks. When Syria became
destabilized by an increasingly violent and sectarian civil war, IS called on their experienced
hands from the American occupation to wage war against the Assad regime and establish another
Al-Qaeda franchise, Nusra. IS was worried that Nusra would eclipse them, and they preempted
this by usurping Nusra and engaging fulltime in operations in Syria and Iraq under one banner.
IS found much more success in Syria than they had achieved at the time in Iraq, so much so that
Baghdadi even moved fulltime to Syria. IS used that success in Syria to make huge gains back in
Iraq. Once back in Iraq and in control of Mosul, IS looted $425 million from the banks and is
now in control of American made weaponry that was abandoned by the fleeing Iraqi Army
(Baker). This money and weaponry will undoubtedly be used in both of the conflicts IS is
engaged in. In Iraq, IS is fighting against the government in Baghdad, the Kurds, and the Shia

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militias from Southern Iraq. In Syria, the Assad regime and their Hezbollah allies as well as the
FSA, Nusra, and any other opposition organization that does not pledge allegiance to IS (Baker).
Shortly after taking Mosul, IS declared themselves to be the Caliphate in the areas they
controlled in both Iraq and Syria in addition to naming Baghdadi the Caliph, or leader of true
Muslim believers all over the world. In order to reflect this world wide ambition the words ‘Iraq
and Syria’ were dropped from the name, making them now just the Islamic State (IS) ("ISIL
Announces Establishment…”).