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ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
ZMap Fast Internet-Wide Scanning
and its Security Applications
Zakir Durumeric Eric Wustrow J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Previous research has shown promise of Internet-wide surveys
Internet-Wide Network Studies
Mining Ps and Qs: Widespread weak keys in network devices (2012)
EFF SSL Observatory: A glimpse at the CA ecosystem (2010)
Census and Survey of the Visible Internet (2008)
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Previous research has shown promise of Internet-wide surveys
Internet-Wide Network Studies
Mining Ps and Qs: Widespread weak keys in network devices (2012)
25 hours acoss 25 Amazon EC2 Instances (625 CPU-hours)
EFF SSL Observatory: A glimpse at the CA ecosystem (2010)
3 months on 3 Linux desktop machines (6500 CPU-hours)
Census and Survey of the Visible Internet (2008)
3 months to complete ICMP census (2200 CPU-hours)
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
What if…?
What if Internet surveys didn’t require heroic effort?
What if we could scan the HTTPS ecosystem every day?
What if we wrote a whole-Internet scanner from scratch?
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Introducing ZMap
an open-source tool that can port scan the entire
IPv4 address space from just one machine
in under 45 minutes with 98% coverage
With Zmap, an Internet-wide TCP SYN
scan on port 443 is as easy as:
$ zmap –p 443 –o results.txt
34,132,693 listening hosts
(took 44m12s) 97% of gigabit
Ethernet linespeed
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Talk Roadmap
1. Philosophy and Architecture of ZMap
2. Characterizing ZMap's Performance
3. Applications of High Speed Scanning
4. Scanning and Good Internet Citizenship
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
ZMap Architecture
Existing Network Scanners
Reduce state by scanning in batches
- Time lost due to blocking
- Results lost due to timeouts
Track individual hosts and retransmit
- Most hosts will not respond
Avoid flooding through timing
- Time lost waiting
Utilize existing OS network stack
- Not optimized for immense
number of connections
ZMap
Eliminate local per-connection state
- Fully asynchronous components
- No blocking except for network
Shotgun Scanning Approach
- Always send n probes per host
Scan widely dispersed targets
- Send as fast as network allows
Probe-optimized Network Stack
- Bypass inefficiencies by
generating Ethernet frames
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Addressing Probes
1. Scan hosts according to random permutation
2. Iterate over multiplicative group of integers modulo p
How do we randomly scan addresses without excessive state?
Negligible State4
6
23
1
5 4  5 mod 7 = 6
6  5 mod 7 = 2
2  5 mod 7 = 3
3  5 mod 7 = 1
1  5 mod 7 = 5
5  5 mod 7 = 4
1. Primitive Root
2. Current Location
3. First Address
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Validating Responses
How do we validate responses without local per-target state?
Encode secrets into mutable fields of probe packets
that will have recognizable effect on responses
receiver
MAC address
sender
MAC address
length data
V
sender
IP address
data…IHL
receiver
IP address
receiver
port
sender
port
sequence
number
data
ack.
number
…
Ethernet
IP
TCP
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Validating Responses
How do we validate responses without local per-target state?
Encode secrets into mutable fields of probe packets
that will have recognizable effect on responses
receiver
MAC address
sender
MAC address
length data
V
sender
IP address
data…IHL
receiver
IP address
receiver
port
sender
port
sequence
number
data
ack.
number
…
Ethernet
IP
TCP
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Validating Responses
How do we validate responses without local per-target state?
Encode secrets into mutable fields of probe packets
that will have recognizable effect on responses
receiver
MAC address
sender
MAC address
length data
V
sender
IP address
data…IHL
receiver
IP address
sender
port
sequence
number
data…
ack.
number
receiver
port
Ethernet
IP
TCP
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Packet Transmission and Receipt
1. ZMap framework handles the hard work
2. Probe modules fill in packet details, interpret responses
3. Output modules allow follow-up or further processing
How do we make processing probes easy and fast?
Probe
Generation
Configuration,
Addressing,
and Timing
Response
Interpretation
Packet Tx
(raw socket)
Packet Rx
(libpcap)
Output
Handler
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Talk Roadmap
1. Philosophy and Architecture of ZMap
2. Characterizing ZMap's Performance
3. Applications of High Speed Scanning
4. Scanning and Good Internet Citizenship
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
How fast is too fast?
Scan Rate
No correlation between hit-rate and scan-rate.
Slower scanning does not reveal additional hosts.
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Is one probe packet sufficient?
Coverage
Scan Coverage
1 Packet: 97.9%
2 Packets: 98.8%
3 Packets: 99.4%
We expect an eventual
plateau in responsive
hosts, regardless of
additional probes.
Estimated
Ground Truth
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Comparison with Nmap
ZMap is capable of scanning more than 1300 times faster than the
most aggressive Nmap default configuration (“insane”)
Surprisingly, ZMap also finds more results than Nmap
Normalized
Coverage
Duration
(mm:ss)
Est. Internet
Wide Scan
Nmap (1 probe) 81.4% 24:12 62.5 days
Nmap (2 probes) 97.8% 45:03 116.3 days
ZMap (1 probe) 98.7% 00:10 1:09:35
ZMap (2 probes) 100.0% 00:11 2:12:35
Averages for scanning 1 million random hosts
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Why does ZMap find more hosts than Nmap?
Probe Response Times
Response Times
250 ms: < 85%
500 ms: 98.2%
1.0 s: 99.0%
8.2 s: 99.9%
500 ms
timeout
250 ms
timeout
Statelessness leads to both higher performance and increased coverage.
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Talk Roadmap
1. Philosophy and Architecture of ZMap
2. Characterizing ZMap's Performance
3. Applications of High Speed Scanning
4. Scanning and Good Internet Citizenship
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
ZMap
SYN Scan
libevent2
OpenSSL
Custom
Processing
Visibility into Distributed Systems
ZMap enables us to scan the public HTTPS Ecosystem every day
Gaining near real-time perspective into the CA ecosystem
Completed 110 scans of the HTTPS ecosystem in the last year
We collected more than 42 million unique certificates of which
6.9 million were browser trusted. Identified 2 sets of misissued
CA certificates.
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Tracking Protocol Adoption
Examining the growth in global HTTPS adoption
June 2012–May 2013
10%  HTTPS servers.
23%  Use on Alexa
Top-1M sites.
11%  Browser-trusted
certificates.
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Enumerating Vulnerable Hosts
HD Moore disclosed vulnerabilities in several common
UPnP frameworks in January 2013.
Under 6 hours to code and run UPnP discovery scan.
Custom probe module, 150 SLOC.
We found that 3.34 M of 15.7 M
devices were vulnerable.
Compromise possible with
a single UDP packet!
Discovering UPnP Vulnerabilities En Masse
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Enumerating Unadvertised Tor Bridges
Uncovering Hidden Services
Scanning has potential to uncover unadvertised services
We perform a Tor handshake with public IPv4 addresses
on port 9001 and 443
We identified 86% of live allocated
bridges with a single scan
Tor has developed obfsproxy that
listens on random ports to
count this type of attack
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Further ZMap Potential
Further Potential Applications
Detect Service Disruptions
Track Adoption of Defenses
Study Criminal Behavior
Other Security Implications
Anonymous Communication
Track users between IP leases
Snapshot of HTTPS outages
caused by Hurricane Sandy
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Talk Roadmap
1. Philosophy and Architecture of ZMap
2. Characterizing ZMap's Performance
3. Applications of High Speed Scanning
4. Scanning and Good Internet Citizenship
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Ethics of Active Scanning
Considerations
Impossible to request permission from all owners
No IP-level equivalent to robots exclusion standard
Administrators may believe that they are under attack
Reducing Scan Impact
Scan in random order to avoid overwhelming networks
Signal benign nature over HTTP and w/ DNS hostnames
Honor all requests to be excluded from future scans
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
User Responses
Responses from 145 users
Blacklisted 91 entities
(3.7 M total addresses)
15 hostile responses
2 cases of retaliatory traffic
Over 200 Internet-wide scans over the past year (>1 trillion probes)
Entity Type Responses
Small Business 41
Home User 38
Corporation 17
Academic Institution 22
Government 15
ISP 2
Unknown 10
Total 145
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Future Work
10gigE Network Surveys
TLS Server Name Indication
Scanning Exclusion Standards
IPv6 Scanning Methdology?
Use ZMap to do great research!
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Public Release
Releasing ZMap as a fully documented open source project
Downloaded it now from https://zmap.io
Scanning the Internet really is as simple as:
Be sure you have adequate bandwidth and be a good
Internet neighbor!
$ zmap –p 443 –o results.txt
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
Conclusion
Living in a unique period
IPv4 can be quickly, exhaustively scanned
IPv6 has not yet been widely deployed
ZMap lowers barriers of entry for Internet-wide surveys
Now possible to scan the entire IPv4 address space
from one host in under 45 minutes with 98% coverage
Explored potential applications
Ultimately we hope ZMap enables future research
ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
ZMap Fast Internet-Wide Scanning
and its Security Applications
Zakir Durumeric Eric Wustrow J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
https://zmap.io

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Fast Internet-Wide Scanning with ZMap in Under 45 Minutes

  • 1. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications ZMap Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Zakir Durumeric Eric Wustrow J. Alex Halderman University of Michigan
  • 2. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Previous research has shown promise of Internet-wide surveys Internet-Wide Network Studies Mining Ps and Qs: Widespread weak keys in network devices (2012) EFF SSL Observatory: A glimpse at the CA ecosystem (2010) Census and Survey of the Visible Internet (2008)
  • 3. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Previous research has shown promise of Internet-wide surveys Internet-Wide Network Studies Mining Ps and Qs: Widespread weak keys in network devices (2012) 25 hours acoss 25 Amazon EC2 Instances (625 CPU-hours) EFF SSL Observatory: A glimpse at the CA ecosystem (2010) 3 months on 3 Linux desktop machines (6500 CPU-hours) Census and Survey of the Visible Internet (2008) 3 months to complete ICMP census (2200 CPU-hours)
  • 4. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
  • 5. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications
  • 6. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications What if…? What if Internet surveys didn’t require heroic effort? What if we could scan the HTTPS ecosystem every day? What if we wrote a whole-Internet scanner from scratch?
  • 7. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Introducing ZMap an open-source tool that can port scan the entire IPv4 address space from just one machine in under 45 minutes with 98% coverage With Zmap, an Internet-wide TCP SYN scan on port 443 is as easy as: $ zmap –p 443 –o results.txt 34,132,693 listening hosts (took 44m12s) 97% of gigabit Ethernet linespeed
  • 8. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Talk Roadmap 1. Philosophy and Architecture of ZMap 2. Characterizing ZMap's Performance 3. Applications of High Speed Scanning 4. Scanning and Good Internet Citizenship
  • 9. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications ZMap Architecture Existing Network Scanners Reduce state by scanning in batches - Time lost due to blocking - Results lost due to timeouts Track individual hosts and retransmit - Most hosts will not respond Avoid flooding through timing - Time lost waiting Utilize existing OS network stack - Not optimized for immense number of connections ZMap Eliminate local per-connection state - Fully asynchronous components - No blocking except for network Shotgun Scanning Approach - Always send n probes per host Scan widely dispersed targets - Send as fast as network allows Probe-optimized Network Stack - Bypass inefficiencies by generating Ethernet frames
  • 10. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Addressing Probes 1. Scan hosts according to random permutation 2. Iterate over multiplicative group of integers modulo p How do we randomly scan addresses without excessive state? Negligible State4 6 23 1 5 4  5 mod 7 = 6 6  5 mod 7 = 2 2  5 mod 7 = 3 3  5 mod 7 = 1 1  5 mod 7 = 5 5  5 mod 7 = 4 1. Primitive Root 2. Current Location 3. First Address
  • 11. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Validating Responses How do we validate responses without local per-target state? Encode secrets into mutable fields of probe packets that will have recognizable effect on responses receiver MAC address sender MAC address length data V sender IP address data…IHL receiver IP address receiver port sender port sequence number data ack. number … Ethernet IP TCP
  • 12. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Validating Responses How do we validate responses without local per-target state? Encode secrets into mutable fields of probe packets that will have recognizable effect on responses receiver MAC address sender MAC address length data V sender IP address data…IHL receiver IP address receiver port sender port sequence number data ack. number … Ethernet IP TCP
  • 13. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Validating Responses How do we validate responses without local per-target state? Encode secrets into mutable fields of probe packets that will have recognizable effect on responses receiver MAC address sender MAC address length data V sender IP address data…IHL receiver IP address sender port sequence number data… ack. number receiver port Ethernet IP TCP
  • 14. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Packet Transmission and Receipt 1. ZMap framework handles the hard work 2. Probe modules fill in packet details, interpret responses 3. Output modules allow follow-up or further processing How do we make processing probes easy and fast? Probe Generation Configuration, Addressing, and Timing Response Interpretation Packet Tx (raw socket) Packet Rx (libpcap) Output Handler
  • 15. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Talk Roadmap 1. Philosophy and Architecture of ZMap 2. Characterizing ZMap's Performance 3. Applications of High Speed Scanning 4. Scanning and Good Internet Citizenship
  • 16. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications How fast is too fast? Scan Rate No correlation between hit-rate and scan-rate. Slower scanning does not reveal additional hosts.
  • 17. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Is one probe packet sufficient? Coverage Scan Coverage 1 Packet: 97.9% 2 Packets: 98.8% 3 Packets: 99.4% We expect an eventual plateau in responsive hosts, regardless of additional probes. Estimated Ground Truth
  • 18. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Comparison with Nmap ZMap is capable of scanning more than 1300 times faster than the most aggressive Nmap default configuration (“insane”) Surprisingly, ZMap also finds more results than Nmap Normalized Coverage Duration (mm:ss) Est. Internet Wide Scan Nmap (1 probe) 81.4% 24:12 62.5 days Nmap (2 probes) 97.8% 45:03 116.3 days ZMap (1 probe) 98.7% 00:10 1:09:35 ZMap (2 probes) 100.0% 00:11 2:12:35 Averages for scanning 1 million random hosts
  • 19. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Why does ZMap find more hosts than Nmap? Probe Response Times Response Times 250 ms: < 85% 500 ms: 98.2% 1.0 s: 99.0% 8.2 s: 99.9% 500 ms timeout 250 ms timeout Statelessness leads to both higher performance and increased coverage.
  • 20. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Talk Roadmap 1. Philosophy and Architecture of ZMap 2. Characterizing ZMap's Performance 3. Applications of High Speed Scanning 4. Scanning and Good Internet Citizenship
  • 21. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications ZMap SYN Scan libevent2 OpenSSL Custom Processing Visibility into Distributed Systems ZMap enables us to scan the public HTTPS Ecosystem every day Gaining near real-time perspective into the CA ecosystem Completed 110 scans of the HTTPS ecosystem in the last year We collected more than 42 million unique certificates of which 6.9 million were browser trusted. Identified 2 sets of misissued CA certificates.
  • 22. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Tracking Protocol Adoption Examining the growth in global HTTPS adoption June 2012–May 2013 10%  HTTPS servers. 23%  Use on Alexa Top-1M sites. 11%  Browser-trusted certificates.
  • 23. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Enumerating Vulnerable Hosts HD Moore disclosed vulnerabilities in several common UPnP frameworks in January 2013. Under 6 hours to code and run UPnP discovery scan. Custom probe module, 150 SLOC. We found that 3.34 M of 15.7 M devices were vulnerable. Compromise possible with a single UDP packet! Discovering UPnP Vulnerabilities En Masse
  • 24. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Enumerating Unadvertised Tor Bridges Uncovering Hidden Services Scanning has potential to uncover unadvertised services We perform a Tor handshake with public IPv4 addresses on port 9001 and 443 We identified 86% of live allocated bridges with a single scan Tor has developed obfsproxy that listens on random ports to count this type of attack
  • 25. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Further ZMap Potential Further Potential Applications Detect Service Disruptions Track Adoption of Defenses Study Criminal Behavior Other Security Implications Anonymous Communication Track users between IP leases Snapshot of HTTPS outages caused by Hurricane Sandy
  • 26. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Talk Roadmap 1. Philosophy and Architecture of ZMap 2. Characterizing ZMap's Performance 3. Applications of High Speed Scanning 4. Scanning and Good Internet Citizenship
  • 27. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Ethics of Active Scanning Considerations Impossible to request permission from all owners No IP-level equivalent to robots exclusion standard Administrators may believe that they are under attack Reducing Scan Impact Scan in random order to avoid overwhelming networks Signal benign nature over HTTP and w/ DNS hostnames Honor all requests to be excluded from future scans
  • 28. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications User Responses Responses from 145 users Blacklisted 91 entities (3.7 M total addresses) 15 hostile responses 2 cases of retaliatory traffic Over 200 Internet-wide scans over the past year (>1 trillion probes) Entity Type Responses Small Business 41 Home User 38 Corporation 17 Academic Institution 22 Government 15 ISP 2 Unknown 10 Total 145
  • 29. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Future Work 10gigE Network Surveys TLS Server Name Indication Scanning Exclusion Standards IPv6 Scanning Methdology? Use ZMap to do great research!
  • 30. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Public Release Releasing ZMap as a fully documented open source project Downloaded it now from https://zmap.io Scanning the Internet really is as simple as: Be sure you have adequate bandwidth and be a good Internet neighbor! $ zmap –p 443 –o results.txt
  • 31. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Conclusion Living in a unique period IPv4 can be quickly, exhaustively scanned IPv6 has not yet been widely deployed ZMap lowers barriers of entry for Internet-wide surveys Now possible to scan the entire IPv4 address space from one host in under 45 minutes with 98% coverage Explored potential applications Ultimately we hope ZMap enables future research
  • 32. ZMap: Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications ZMap Fast Internet-Wide Scanning and its Security Applications Zakir Durumeric Eric Wustrow J. Alex Halderman University of Michigan https://zmap.io