GEM_2015-020

Vol. 3, No. 2 (February2015)
IN THIS ISSUE
01 Does Australia Energy Export Future Lie with the Asian
Supergrid?
Samantha Mella (Freelancer)
10 Southeast Asia’s nuclear push: the need for better
regional communication and nuclear accident
response capabilities
Denia Djokic (University of California, Berkeley)
15 Ammonia as a Fuel for Passenger Vehicles: Possible
Implications for Greenhouse Gas Reduction in Korea
David von Hippel and Doo Won Kang (Nautilus Institute)
22 Open-source Seed System and Intellectual Property on
Global Food Security
Eun Chang Choi (GP3 Korea)

Global Energy MonitorVol.3, No.2, 2015-2
1
Does Australia Energy Export Future Lie with the Asian Supergrid?
Samantha Mella
A dominant narrative in Australia has been that Australian, Asian and global prosperity is
inextricably linked to the production and consumption of coal. In 2014, Australia’s
conservative Prime Minister, Tony Abbott made his position clear:
“Coal is good for humanity, coal is good for prosperity, coal is an essential part of our
economic future, here in Australia, and right around the world ... Energy is what
sustains our prosperity, and coal is the world's principal energy source and it will be
for many decades to come.”1
Abbott’s position continues the trajectory of his conservative predecessor, John
Howard. Howard’s vision was of an Australian energy super power – a global leader in the
export of coal, gas, petroleum and uranium.2 The Rudd-Gillard Labour government that
served between the administrations of Howard and Abbott controversially introduced
carbon pricing as a measure to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions. This
administration, however, also shared the vision of an Australian economy dominated by
fossil fuel exports. In 2011, when the price of Australian thermal coal reached its post-
recession peak at $US136.30 per ton, 3 the Gillard government’s position was:
“Australian coal production is expected to continue its strong growth over the course of
the decade and beyond. This will largely be to meet export opportunities in our region.”4
1
Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) (2014) Coal good for humanity, Prime Minister Tony Abbott says
at $3.9b Queensland Mine opening” ABC, 13 October 2014. available at : http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-
10-13/coal-is-good-for-humanity-pm-tony-abbott-says/5810244
2
Wendy Frew (2006), “We'll be an energy superpower: PM”. Sydney Morning Herald, July 18, 2006, available
as http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/well-be-an-energy-superpower-
pm/2006/07/17/1152988475628.html
3
Edited by Ed Davies, (2014) “Australia’s coal sector defies all comers to keep on mining,” Sydney Morning
Hearald, October 13, 2014 available at: http://www.smh.com.au/business/mining-and-resources/australias-coal-
sector-defies-all-comers-to-keep-on-mining-20141013-1154av.html
4
Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism (2011), Strengthening the Foundation for Australia’s Energy
Future, Draft Energy White Paper 2011. Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism Australian Government.

2
Australia began exporting coal to Asia during Japan’s post-war reconstruction in the late
1940s. Export markets grew to include South Korea, Taiwan and China. Abbott’s vision
sees past and future coal export as a cornerstone to Asian economic growth.5 Asian
“energy poverty”—the relative paucity of domestic energy sources in many of the major
economies in Asia—is frequently cited as a reason for the expansion of coal production
and use. 6 The impact of Australian coal’s “downstream” emissions—that is, the
emissions of greenhouse gases when Australia’s exported coal is consumed—is not
acknowledged as Australia’s problem. This is despite the costly domestic impacts of
extreme weather events in Australia that appear to be consistent with the climate
predictions made by agencies such as the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change), and the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and the CSIRO (Commonwealth
Scientific and Industry Research Organization). Some of these climatic events affect the
coal industry itself. Flooding has lead to mine closures, infrastructure damage, and
billions in lost production in Queensland in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2013.7 8 9 In
addition, bushfires have set alight the brown coal seam at Hazelwood in Victoria in 2006
Available as http://www.afr.com/rw/2009-2014/AFR/2011/12/12/Photos/70eee99a-250a-11e1-a799-
d611028b2128_Draft-EWP.pdf.
5
Tristan Edis (2014), “Abbott's kinda right – coal was ‘good for humanity’”, Business Spectator,
14 Oct 2014, available as http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/14/renewable-
energy/abbotts-kinda-right-%E2%80%93-coal-was-good-humanity.
6
Brendan Pearson (2014), “Coal the answer to energy poverty”, The Drum, 7 April, 2014, available as
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-08/pearson-coal-the-answer-to-energy-poverty/5371462.
7
Sarah Jane Tasker (2011) “Queensland floods cause another mine closure”, The Australian, 11 January,
2011
Available as: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/queensland-floods-force-another-coal-
mine-closure/story-e6frg9df-1225985677568.
8
Reserve Bank of Australia (2011) The Impact of the Recent Floods on the Australian Economy, Statement on Monetary
Policy, February 2011. Accessed online: http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/smp/boxes/2011/feb/a.pdf
9
Matt Chambers (2013) “BHP’s Bowen Basin Coal Mines hit by floods”, The Australian, 29 January 2013
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/mining-energy/miners-spared-but-queensland-storm-closes-rail-and-
ports/story-e6frg9df-1226563790140.

3
and 2014.10 The 2014 fire burned for 45 days, cost $100 million, and was subject to a
state government inquiry due to local residents’ exposure to toxic fumes.11
The Climate Council’s 2014 report, Counting the Costs, Climate Change and Coastal
Flooding, stated that $226 billion worth of Australian infrastructure was at risk with a
1.1m sea level rise.12 This is includes ports, domestic and international airports, rail and
light rail infrastructure, hospitals, schools, and housing. The flood maps for a 1.1m sea
level rise are available on the Australian government’s own Department of Environment
website 13 . The fossil fuel super power goal pursued by successive Australian
governments can be viewed as highly damaging to Australia’s future. From the
perspective of climate movement, the downstream emissions from Australian coal export
are, “a menace to the planet and would have to be left in the ground if the world had any
hope of avoiding catastrophic global warming.”14
In 2013-14 Australia exported 375 million tons of coal, valued at almost $A40
billion.15 Meat, wheat, and wool combined yielded $A18 billion in export revenue. Only
iron ore exports exceeded the value of exported coal. Given the importance of coal to
Australia’s economy, the challenges posed by climate change and the need for
greenhouse gas emissions reductions, both domestically and internationally, have been
10
AAP (2006), “Massive coal mine blaze still burning”, The Age, 13 October 2006. Available at
http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Massive-coal-mine-blaze-still-
burning/2006/10/13/1160246290407.html.
11
James Fetts (2014), “Hazelwood mine fire inquiry: Authorities too late in warning Morwell residents of
health risks”, Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2 September, 2014. Available at:
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-02/authorities-too-late-with-hazelwood-fire-health-warnings-
report/5713790
12
Will Steffen, John Hunter and Lesley Hughes (2014), available as
http://www.climatecouncil.org.au/uploads/56812f1261b168e02032126342619dad.pdf.
13
The Australian Government, Department of Environment Available at :
http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/adaptation/australias-coasts/mapping-sea-level-rise
14
Bill McKibbon (2013) “How Australian Coal is causing global damage,” The Monthly, June 2013. Available
at: http://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2013/june/1370181600/bill-mckibben/how-australian-coal-causing-
global-damage
15
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade statistics, available from
http://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/australias-trade-in-goods-
services/Pages/australias-trade-in-goods-and-services.aspx#imports.

4
extremely difficult for Australia to assimilate into its energy policy. Serious incorporation
of climate considerations would curtail Australia’s current fossil fuel exports-based
superpower path.
As a consequence of this climate considerations/fossil-fuel export dependence mismatch,
“business as usual” has prevailed. Australia continues to operate on the assumption
that other nations won’t act to meet their emissions reduction targets, and as a result
Australia’s coal exports will not be threatened by climate considerations. In China, the
2014 energy transition created a 3 % drop in thermal coal consumption, even with an
overall 3.8% increase in electricity output. This has taken Australia and the coal industry
by surprise, even though China’s transition was forecast in Australia by the well-known
economist Professor Ross Garnaut.16
As Australia continues to invest in coal export infrastructure, Australian coal is in
trouble. The global coal glut has caused a marked decline in prices, down to $US57.10
per ton as of mid-January, 2015.17 The industry has responded by increasing production
volumes to make up for the low price, and by shedding workers to cut costs.
Climate change concerns and the impacts of the coal fuel cycle on health,
environment, agriculture and tourism are driving local resistance to the coal industry and
legal challenges to new coal mining and transport projects. A global divestment
campaign, aimed at restricting the fossil fuel industry’s access to capital, is starting to
gain traction. Pressure from activists led four European banks to rule out involvement in
16
Ben Potter (2015), “China cuts thermal coal use by 3pc”, Financial Review, 27 January, 2015, available as
http://www.afr.com/Page/Uuid/6a490ad8-a5ce-11e4-9dae-b62d8445140
17
Greg McKenna (2015), “CHART OF THE DAY: Newcastle Coal Is Quietly Crashing”, Business Insider
Australia, January 14, 2015, available as http://www.businessinsider.com.au/chart-of-the-day-newcastle-coal-is-
quietly-crashing-2015-1

5
financing the expansion of the Abbott Point Coal Terminal in Queensland, based on
concerns about the Great Barrier Reef.18 19
Goldman Sachs has warned investors to pull out of stocks in thermal coal production
companies.20 Citibank, HBSC, and the Deutsche Bank acknowledge that the carbon in
the world’s fossil fuel reserves, if extracted, burned, and emitted as carbon dioxide,
exceed any safe limit for atmospheric carbon stabilisation, and warn investors about
investing in projects that cannot be realized.21 Carbon pricing—placing taxes on fossil
fuels to reflect the potential costs of greenhouse gas emissions in fuel prices—is
gradually gaining momentum. According to the World Bank, 40 countries and 20 cities
and provinces are currently using or implementing some kind of carbon pricing
mechanism.22 This is a major global structural reform that will have a further impact on
coal production and sales worldwide.
Australia may benefit from reconsidering what it means to be an energy superpower
in 2015. In the era of an altered climate and carbon constraints, the need to “think
different” has never been greater. Australia has vast reservoirs of solar energy within
reach of South East Asia (SEA), where energy demand is forecast to increase by 80% by
2035.23 The Asian Development Bank (ABD) has stated that “business as usual” in the
18
Julien Vincent (2014), “What I did on my ‘holiday’: European banks won’t fund Abbot Point”, Market
Forces, May 27, 2014, available as http://www.marketforces.org.au/what-i-did-on-my-holiday-european-banks-
wont-fund-abbot-point/.
19
Coal wire (2014), “Congratulate the Royal Bank of Scotland for dumping Abbott Point”,
enewsletter, dated June 19 June 2014.
20
See, for example, Goldman Sachs (2013), “The window for thermal coal investment is closing”, dated July
24, 2013, and available as http://d35brb9zkkbdsd.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/GS_Rocks__Ores_-_Thermal_Coal_July_2013.pdf.
21
Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (2014), Briefing Note Fossil Fuels, Energy
Transition and Risk, dated April 18, 2014, and available as http://ieefa.org/briefing-note-fossil-fuels-energy-
transition-risk/.
22
World Bank (2014), “What Does It Mean to Put a Price on Carbon?”, June 11, 2014, available as
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/06/11/what-does-it-mean-to-put-a-price-on-carbon.
23
International Energy Agency (2013), Southeast Asia Energy Outlook, Executive Summary: World
Energy Outlook Special Report, available as

6
energy sector is not sustainable for SEA, and calls for greater efficiency and increased
rollout of renewable energy.24
A regional energy agreement between Australia and the ASEAN states to mobilise
Australia’s desert solar resources to SEA via a subsea High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC)
interconnector has the potential to address the key regional challenges of energy security
and emissions reduction. In addition, ASEAN nations have committed to interconnect
their electricity grids by 2020 to enhance energy security and sustainability. Realistically,
fully realizing the ASEAN interconnection within that timeframe seems optimistic,
however the goal of a regional grid exists.
A subsea HVDC interconnector between Australia and the ASEAN grid is an ambitious
proposal with significant challenges, but does have historical precedents. In 1871, an
1100-mile subsea telegraph cable was laid by sailing ships from Jakarta to Darwin.25
The subsea telegraph cable revolutionized Australian communications by connecting it to
the global Morse code network.
Around the world, nations are connecting their electricity grids to create multi-lateral
electricity markets.
Grid integration is most advanced in Europe where interconnection stretches from
Finland to Portugal. At 580 km, the “NorNed” powerline is currently the longest subsea
HVDC Interconnector in the world. NorNed delivers Norwegian hydroelectricity to the
Netherlands, where the power is sold by auction on the European market.26
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/WEO_Special_Report_2013_Southeast_Asia_Ener
gy_Outlook_Executive_Summary.pdf.
24
Asian Development Bank (2013), “Power Swaps Can Help Asia-Pacific Manage Daunting Future Energy
Needs – Report”, dated 14 October 2013, and available as http://www.adb.org/news/power-swaps-can-help-
asia-pacific-manage-daunting-future-energy-needs-report
25
Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory, “History of Parliament House Site”, available as
http://www.nt.gov.au/lant/about-parliament/history-of%20parliament-house-
site.shtml#PortDarwinPostandTelegraphOffice.
26
Tennent (2008), “NorNed turnover exceeds EUR 100 million”, dated 1 December, 2008, and avail

7
Grid integration is also occurring in Asia. Bilateral electricity trade is occurring via
single interconnectors in SEA, for example between Thailand and Malaysia, and between
Russia and China in North Asia (NA). Many other interconnectors are planned or in across
Asia.
The Asia Super Grid (ASG) is the concept of multilateral electricity trade in an
integrated grid between Japan, Russia, China, Korea, Mongolia and beyond. 27 28
Mongolia has major ambitions to mobilise its wind and solar resources to become NA’s
energy hub, and to export 100 GW of renewable energy into the ASG by 2030. It is
interesting to note that despite Mongolia’s huge coal reserves, and recent large
increases in its coal exports to China, it aspires to become a renewable energy
superpower.
Is dependence on the fossil fuel economy a wise path for Australia in 2015 and
beyond? Will the coal narrative lead to a 1.1m sea level rise and $226 billion in lost
infrastructure, including the ports and railways that export coal? Does Australia’s political
leadership have the courage to have a discussion about climate change,coal exports, and
downstream emissions?
Will the ASG evolve to become an integrated electricity market as in Europe?
WillAustralia be isolated from Asia’s future electricity market if it continues to focus on
coal exports? Is an HVDC interconnector with Asia more appropriate energy infrastructure
than more coal loaders?
Transitions in energy supply and demand in SEA, and globally, are bound to continue.
The need for electricity in the countries of SEA seems certain to persist, and likely expand.
able as http://www.tennet.eu/nl/news/article/norned-turnover-exceeds-eur-100-million.html.
27
Mano S, Ovgor B, Samadov Z et al (2014) Gobitec and Asian Super Grid for Renewable Energies in
North East Asia, Energy Charter Secretariat, Available at
http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/Gobitec_and_the_Asian_Supergrid_2014_ENG.p
df.

8
The rate of expansion will depend on the balance between energy efficiency improvement
and expanding electricity service needs in SEA nations, but a large and persistent market
for Australian renewable electricity exports seems highly likely.
Challenges to renewable energy exports—ranging from the technical challenges of
configuring HVDC interconnections, to the environmental challenges of generation sites
and powerlines, to the political and economic challenges of settling management and
pricing arrangements with trading partners—should not be underestimated. If an
effective and substantial Asian Super Grid results from overcoming these challenges,
however, access to that grid may help to pave the way for Australia’s transition to being
an exporter of clean energy.

9
Possible Australia-Asia Electricity Interconnector (graphic prepared by Kellie O'Hare, 2015)

10
Southeast Asia’s nuclear push: the need for better regional
communication and nuclear accident response capabilities
Denia Djokic
Last month, in January 2015, the Nuclear Power Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur brought
representatives of the global nuclear industry and Asian nations together for a
conversation on the status of nuclear energy growth in Asia. Although many Asian
countries reconsidered their nuclear ambitions in the aftermath of the tragic Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident of March 2011, plans to introduce nuclear energy
into their long-term energy mix have not been permanently deterred. Although most of
the additions to Asia’s nuclear power plants fleet are being planned and built in China,
India, and South Korea, the level of interest in nuclear power in an increasing number of
members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) remains high. OECD
projections of economic growth in the Southeast Asian region predict an annual average
5.6% increase in gross domestic product (GDP) between 2015 and 2019.29 This growth,
accompanied by expected rapidly increasing energy (and particularly electricity) needs,
coupled with energy security issues and concerns about greenhouse gas emissions, has
led many Southeast Asian countries to take a renewed interest in nuclear energy
development.
On the forefront of this regional nuclear energy push are Vietnam, Indonesia, and
Malaysia, according to a recent report on the sustainability of nuclear energy in
Southeast Asia, published last October by the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies
29
OECD (2015), Economic Outlook for Southeast Asia, China and India 2015: Strengthening Institutional
Capacity, OECD Publishing, Paris. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/saeo-2015-en

11
(NTS) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS).30 All of these nations
have plans to acquire nuclear energy capability in the next decade. After some delays,
Vietnam is determined to commission its first nuclear power plant, two Russian-built
1000 MWe reactors, at Phuoc Dinh (Ninh Thuan Province) after 2020. Indonesia’s
National Nuclear Energy Agency, BATAN, and the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency,
BAPETEN, have conducted feasibility studies and undergone extensive preparations to
ready the country for a possible nuclear energy expansion. BATAN has also performed a
number of site selection processes, focusing on Muria (Central Java Province), Banten
(West Java Province), and Bangka Island (east of Sumatra Island), identifying these areas
as those with lowest risk of natural disasters. Last September, Russia’s state nuclear
energy corporation Rosatom expressed interest in constructing two nuclear power plants
on Batam Island. Malaysia announced last July that it plans to conduct a feasibility study
aimed at the possibility of building a nuclear power plant in the next ten years. Other
ASEAN countries have also been part of the nuclear discussion, historically as well as
currently. Thailand has drafted proposals to implement nuclear energy, including it in its
Power Development Plan starting in 202631. The Philippines constructed a 621 MW
(megawatt) nuclear power plant at Bataan, about 75 km west of Manila. Though the
Bataan plant was essentially complete and had undergone non-nuclear testing by 1984,
it never went into operation due to public and political opposition. Cambodia and
Myanmar have also identified themselves as “aspirants” to nuclear energy. Some of the
smaller countries in the region, however, such as Brunei, Singapore, and East Timor, have
30
Caballero-Anthony, Mely, Alistair DB Cook, Julius Cesar I. Trajano, and Margareth Sembiring (2014). The
Sustainability of Nuclear Energy in Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Challenges. NTS Report No. 1, Centre
for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. October 2014.
Available as http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NTS-Report-October-2014.pdf.
31
Summary of Thailand Development Plan, 2012-2030. Energy Policy and Planning Office, Ministry of Energy,
Thailand. Available as http://www.egat.co.th/en/images/about-egat/PDP2010-Rev3-Eng.pdf

12
said they will abstain from pursuing a commercial nuclear energy option.32
There are many responsibilities that these nuclear aspirants must fulfill in order to be
able to utilize nuclear energy responsibly. These include technical capacity-building for
the nuclear workforce and the strengthening of programs of nuclear engineering
education, as well as enhancing the rigor and robustness of their regulatory
infrastructure. Independence of the nuclear energy regulators from the government
bodies and/or private industries that promote nuclear energy must be ensured, so as to
not repeat the conflicts of interest that arose from the pre-Fukushima Japanese nuclear
regulatory structure. 33 Emerging nuclear energy countries also must improve
cooperation with international oversight bodies, most notably the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), in light of proliferation and nuclear accident risks. For a region that
is prone to natural disasters, including typhoons, tsunamis, and earthquakes, assurance
of preparedness to respond to a nuclear incident is indispensable. According to the NTS
report from October 2014, “It is imperative for ASEAN member states to work together to
ensure effective governance of nuclear facilities, materials, and wastes and to adopt a
regional disaster preparedness mechanism. ASEAN can facilitate regional cooperation on
capacity-building, information dissemination, and emergency preparedness and
response frameworks.”34
Even though the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011 was geographically
distant enough to not prompt a large-scale immediate crisis response (for example,
related to the health impacts of radiological emissions from the accident) in Southeast
Asian nations, the events at Fukushima spawned effects that transcended national
32
Parameswaran, Prashanth (2009). “Southeast Asia’s Nuclear Energy Future: Promises and Perils.” Project
2049 Institute, Futuregrams 09 6 (2009): 23. Available as
http://project2049.net/documents/southeast_asia_nuclear_energy_future.pdf.
33
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (2012). The Official Report of the
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission: Executive Summary. National Diet of
Japan, 2012. Available as https://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf.
34
Caballero-Anthony, Mely et al (2014), ibid.

13
boundaries. The nuclear accident created far-reaching confusion about radiological
fallout, shifted public opinion of nuclear energy, and complicated many national nuclear
energy policies globally in the midst of what had been considered a “nuclear
renaissance”, including a reconsideration of nuclear energy in Southeast Asian countries
previously enthusiastic about adopting developing or acquiring reactors. 35 In the
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, the need for a coordinated and coherent
approach to responding to natural disasters in an effective and timely manner was
immediately acknowledged in ASEAN. Notably, on April 9, 2011, almost a month after the
Great East Japan Earthquake, a Special Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held in
Jakarta, at which ASEAN countries expressed solidarity with Japan in the context of
natural disasters, and which stressed the importance of international cooperation in
disaster management. In his opening speech, President Yudhoyono of the Republic of
Indonesia emphasized “the need to further enhance capacity for disaster preparedness
and management by building upon the existing mechanisms and frameworks.”36
The two devastating natural disasters in Southeast Asia in the last decade, the 2004
Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis, presented lessons in and
demonstrated the indispensability of disaster response readiness. If Southeast Asia is to
gain significant nuclear capacity in the near future, nuclear-specific disaster preparation
is a pressing need. To address “the peculiar nature of a radiation-related disaster,” the
NTS report recommends the establishment of “a special coordinating body, such as a
nuclear crisis centre, which is expected to be conversant in the appropriate responses to
35
Melissa Low (2011), “Nuclear Power, Tectonic Collision Zones and Climate Targets: ASEAN’s Risky
Convergence?” ESI Bulletin on Energy Trends and Development, Volume 4, Issue 1, April 2011. Available as
http://esi.nus.edu.sg/docs/default-source/esi-bulletins/volume-4-issue-1-april-2011.
36
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2011), “Japan and ASEAN Vow Closer Cooperation in Disaster
Management: Special Japan-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Held in Jakarta. April 15, 2011”. Available as
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/jfpu/2011/4/0415.html.

14
this type of disaster affecting people in the region.”37 An existing example of such a
crisis center, though it does not target nuclear-related issues, is the ASEAN Coordinating
Centre for Humanitarian Assistance located in Jakarta. Furthermore, this type of center
could be established to respond to not only nuclear reactor accidents, but also nuclear
security and terrorism incidents. Currently, the two ASEAN sub-organizations that
promote regional cooperation on nuclear energy are the ASEAN Network of Regulatory
Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) and the Nuclear Energy Cooperation Sub-sector
Network (NEC-SSN). This existing infrastructure could be built upon to enhance regional
coordination, communication, and training on nuclear disaster-related issues.
In light of Southeast Asia’s near-term nuclear ambitions, it is imperative to cultivate a
regional culture of response readiness, cohesion and communication, as well as policies
to facilitate this goal. To prepare for nuclear safety and security-related incidents, all
ASEAN and neighboring nations, independent of whether they have plans to utilize
nuclear energy, need to develop an early warning system for nuclear accidents and a
thorough regional emergency preparedness and response plan. This could be achieved
by more regional preparedness exercises, specifically radiological disaster training,
coupled with training and assistance from the IAEA and countries with greater technical
experience in nuclear power, such as the US, Russia, France, Japan, and South Korea.
This preparation must start sooner rather than later; the earlier that gaps and limitations
in response readiness to a nuclear incident are identified, the sooner and more
thoroughly they can be addressed.
37
Caballero-Anthony, Mely et al (2014), ibid.

15
Ammonia as a Fuel for PassengerVehicles: Possible Implications for
Greenhouse Gas Reduction in Korea
David von Hippel and DooWon Kang
Among the goals of “green growth” in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are shifting to use of
renewable fuels in place of fossil fuels. Renewable options—including solar space heating,
biomass-fueled heating and power, and solar and wind displace coal and gas used in
electricity generation (along with, possibly, more nuclear power) are available for many
sectors, but fossil fuels are hardest to displace in the transportation sector. Fossil fuels
offer a difficult-to-match combination of energy density and availability for vehicle use.
Given Koreans’ increasing appetite for ownership of road vehicles, there is an important
role for a fuel that is carbon-free, portable, energy-dense, and compatible with existing
cars and fueling systems. Ammonia (NH3) fulfills many of these requirements, as it
produces no carbon dioxide when it is burned, is usable in existing vehicles with only
modest engine modifications, is familiar to producers as an industrial and agricultural
chemical traded worldwide, and requires only low-pressure tanks for storage, similar to
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG, or “propane”). The degree to which shifting to ammonia as
a fuel fulfills green growth objectives, relative to other ways of reducing carbon emissions
from road transport, depends in large part, however, on how ammonia is produced.38
A key goal of green growth policies in the ROK, as elsewhere, is to reduce emissions
of the pollutants that lead to climate change. Climate change, and specifically, global
warming, is caused by increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the
atmosphere, especially carbon dioxide (CO2). The atmospheric build-up of GHGs is
38
This article is based in part on Doo Won Kang (2014), “Combating climate change with ammonia-fueled
vehicles”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17 February 2014, available at http://thebulletin.org/combating-
climate-change-ammonia-fueled-vehicles.

16
largely the result of combustion of fossil fuels and other human activities, as reaffirmed
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in September of 2013.39
A significant portion of CO2 emissions come from the tailpipes of cars and trucks.
Practically all of current Korean vehicles run on gasoline and diesel, and as those fuels
are burned, CO2 is released. The transportation sector contributed 12% of total ROK
greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions in 2011. Within the transportation sector, road-
transportation, including passenger cars, trucks and buses, contributed 95% of those
emissions.40
A projection of the composition of the future passenger vehicle fleet in Korea
prepared in late 2012 by the Korea Energy Economics Institute (KEEI) suggests that
without aggressive application of measures to reduce road transport GHG emissions,
those emissions will continue to increase, probably significantly faster than population.41
KEEI’s projections show that although the ROK’s population will stabilize at about 52
million people in 2030, and begin to fall thereafter, the number of passenger transport
vehicles will continue to increase, from about 13 million in 2010 to over 21 million by
2035, implying an increase in the number of cars per person from about 0.27 in 2010 to
about 0.40 by 2035. Moreover, KEEI’s projections show very limited penetration of high-
efficiency or alternative-fueled vehicles, with only about 1.7 percent of vehicles being
hybrid (driven by both fossil-fueled and electric motors) by 2035, and with a scant 3,500
electric-only vehicles in the fleet by that year.
Reducing road vehicle GHG emissions can involve a number of potential “fixes”.
39
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 27 September 2013. IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (WGI
AR5).
40
“2013 National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report of Korea,” Greenhouse Gas Inventory & Research Center
of Korea, Feb, 2014 (Korean). Available as
http://www.gir.go.kr/home/board/read.do;jsessionid=9Y0S23c1aQqsFwoLR1oxYgiIfTaLz1jsVXTJbE1FsVNz
CFcYS7z09PnC78u7cAX3.og_was_servlet_engine1?pagerOffset=0&maxPageItems=10&maxIndexPages=10&
searchKey=&searchValue=&menuId=36&boardId=22&boardMasterId=2&boardCategoryId=.
41
“Analysis of the influence of dissemination of electric vehicles on Korea’s energy supply and demand,”
KEEI, Dec. 2012 (in Korean).

17
Moving more transit from private vehicles to mass transit in other, more efficient forms of
transportation including rail, subway, and buses, is one approach, and is to some extent
underway in the ROK, though based on the appetite for personal transport in Korea
projected by KEEI, there will be limits to the effectiveness of this “mode shifting”. How,
then, can Korea achieve deep reductions in CO2 emissions from the transportation sector?
Other approaches to reducing GHG emissions by private vehicles require modifications to
the makeup of the private passenger fleet itself, either through improvements in vehicle
efficiency (including the dissemination of vehicles with hybrid powertrains), and the use
of vehicles that use alternative fuels. One alternative fuel and powertrain combination is
electric vehicles (EVs). The battery technologies required by EVs, however, though
improving rapidly in storage capacity and falling in cost, still do not match the range and
cost-effectiveness (from the standpoint of vehicle purchase costs) of gasoline and diesel-
fueled vehicles. Other fuels that have received significant attention are compressed
natural gas (CNG), which burns cleanly and can be used in most internal combustion
engines, with some modifications, but requires high-pressure tanks for on-board gas
storage, and hydrogen, which can be made using electricity and water (or from fossil fuels
or biomass), and can be used in either internal combustion engines or in fuel cells that
convert the hydrogen to electricity without combustion, and therefore work more like a
battery than an a typical gasoline or diesel motor, and at an efficiency typically much
higher than that of a typical auto engine. When hydrogen burns (or is converted to
electricity in a fuel cell) water vapor is the main product. LPG is widely used in lightly-
modified vehicles, including much of Korea’s taxi fleet, and produces slightly lower
emissions than gasoline or diesel. A fifth alternative fuel is ammonia, which, like

18
hydrogen, produces practically no GHGs when burned.42
Although ammonia-fueled vehicles have a number of enthusiastic proponents
around the globe, most notably in the farm belt of the United States, NH3 vehicles have
received generally less attention than CNG or hydrogen-fueled vehicles.43 NH3-fueled
vehicles have the potential to reduce CO2 emissions to levels far below those achieved by
some alternative-fueled cars, such as those fueled with natural gas or ethanol derived
from corn. The mode of operation of NH3-fueled vehicles is similar to conventional
gasoline-fueled internal combustion-engine vehicles: Liquid ammonia is burned with
oxygen in order to move an engine’s pistons, producing power that is harnessed to drive
the vehicle’s wheels. This familiar technology means NH3-fueled vehicles can generally
be built and maintained in the same way as the current vehicle fleet. NH3-fueled vehicles,
however, unlike conventionally-fueled vehicles (and like hydrogen and electric vehicles),
do not directly release any carbon dioxide. 44 Ammonia can be used in internal
combustion engine (ICE) vehicles with minor modifications, and is environmentally
friendly, as it produces only molecular nitrogen (N2) and water (H2O) at the tailpipe, even
when only low-cost emissions controls are used. Any unburned ammonia and NOx in the
engine’s exhaust are removed by a selective catalyst reduction (SCR) system in NH3-
fueled vehicles.45
Recent research suggests that ammonia could also be used as a high-density, low-
pressure means of storing hydrogen, with a compact on-board conversion device
42
A small amount of nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions are produced when ammonia or hydrogen are burned.
NOx has an indirect impact on GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, but the impact is much smaller than
direct emissions of CO2 from fossil fuels.
43
See, for example, the presentations prepared for the 11th Annual NH3 Fuel Conference, “NH3, the Renewable
Carbon Free Fuel”, held September 21 – 24, 2014 in Des Moines, Iowa, USA, and available as
http://nh3fuelassociation.org/events-conferences/2014-nh3-fuel-conference/.
44
N. Olson and J. Holbrook, Iowa Energy Center (2012), NH3 – “The Other Hydrogen”, available from:
http://www.iowaenergycenter.org/grant-and-research-library/nh3-the-other-hydrogen-report.
45
William Jacobson, Gasoline/Ethanol/Ammonia Mixture as a Transition Fuel “Solution”, SY-Will
Engineering, Available from: http://www.sy-will.spyang.com/.

19
producing hydrogen for fuel cell vehicles with low, or possibly no, nitrogen oxide (NOx)
emissions.46
Compared to gasoline vehicles, NH3-fueled vehicles do not produce CO2 during
operation. When GHG emissions from vehicles are considered, however, it is important to
look at not just the direct emissions associated with vehicle operation, but at the full
energy-cycle emissions associated with fueling the vehicles. A full consideration of
emissions of electric vehicles, for example, must include the emissions associated with
producing and delivering the electricity stored in vehicle batteries. Similarly, a full
accounting of GHG emissions from CNG vehicles must include emissions from gas
production, processing, transportation, distribution, and compression. GHGs from
hydrogen-fueled vehicles should include emissions associated with hydrogen production,
and an accounting of GHG emissions from gasoline, diesel, and LPG vehicles should
include not only emission from the tailpipe, but from oil refining and product distribution.
Similarly, an accounting of GHG emissions from NH3-fueled vehicles must include the
GHGs associated with NH3 manufacture. Current industrial ammonia production plants
run principally on fossil fuels, most commonly natural gas and emit approximately 1.2 –
1.8 metric tons of CO2 per ton of ammonia produced.47 Ammonia can be and is also,
however, produced using electricity through the catalytic reaction of nitrogen from air
(which is 78 percent N2) and hydrogen from water. Current industrial electricity-to-NH3
production is somewhat over 50 percent efficient, but once advanced ammonia
production methods (such as solid state ammonia synthesis) that are now working at the
lab scale are commercialized, with the use of electricity from non-fossil sources
46
Autoblog (2014), “Is ammonia the secret to better hydrogen cars?”, dated June 30th , 2014 , and available
as http://www.autoblog.com/2014/06/30/ammonia-secret-to-better-hydrogen-cars/.
47
Jason C. Ganley, John H. Holbrook, Doug E. McKinley, "Solid State Ammonia Synthesis," 2007 Annual
NH3 Fuel Conference, San Francisco, CA, Oct. 15-16, 2007, available as http://www.claverton-
energy.com/wordpress/wp-content/files/NHThree_SSAS_Oct2007_Final.pdf.; Sam Wood and Annette Cowie,
"A Review of Greenhouse Gas Emission Factors for Fertiliser Production," June 2004, available as
http://task38.org/publications/GHG_Emission_Fertilizer_Production_July2004.pdf.

20
(renewable energy sources or nuclear power), virtually no CO2 emissions will be emitted
during ammonia production process, with only modest emissions even including, for
example, GHGs associated with power plant construction and operation. The same, of
course, applies to fuel sources for electric or hydrogen-fueled vehicles.
The graph below presents the authors’ estimates of the total GHG emissions per
kilometer, estimated over the full energy cycle, including fuel extraction, transmission,
distribution, refining, electricity generation, fuel consumption, and, for generation
facilities, emissions related to fuel production and power plant construction/operations.
The vehicles shown are illustrative example chosen to be generally comparable—most are
commercially-available compact and, in one case, medium-sized sedans. For vehicles
using electricity (“All-electric”) or fuels derived from electricity (“Hydrogen”, “NH3 (H2
electrolysis)”, and “NH3 (solid state)”), emissions were estimated in two ways, first using
emission factors related to the average generation fleet in the ROK as of 2012 (blue
bars),48 and second, assuming renewable generation in a 50/50 wind/solar PV mix (red
bars). Several conclusions are clear from this graph. First, electric vehicles offer the
lowest emissions per km. Second, NH3 and H2 vehicles in which electricity is used to
produce the fuel have higher energy-cycle emissions because of the conversion losses in
electricity generation (coupled with the lower efficiency of internal combustion, relative to
electric drive, in ammonia-fueled vehicles).49 Third, in order for H2 and NH3 vehicles to
be competitive with other vehicles on an overall GHGs-per-km basis, their fuels must be
made using fossil-free electricity.
48
Data from KEEI (2013) 2013 Yearbook of Energy Statistics, pages 172 through 177. Available as
http://www.keei.re.kr/keei/download/YES2013.pdf.
49
Note that using NH3 in a hybrid vehicle, in this comparison, would reduce emissions by roughly a third from
those shown.

21
That said, other considerations, including cost of vehicles, costs of fuel production,
vehicle range, fuel safety, 50 51 and adaptability of fuels to existing vehicles, will also
play roles as the ROK and global vehicle fleets evolve. The advantages of ammonia as a
motor fuel—including its portability, compatibility with familiar fueling systems, existing
industrial infrastructure, and the ability of conventional cars to easily be modified to run
on a mixture of up to 85 percent ammonia,52—make the concept of NH3-fueled vehicles
and companion NH3-from-renewable-energy production technologies well worth pursuing.
50
Nijs Jan Duijm, Frank Markert, Jette Lundtang Paulsen, “Safety assessment of ammonia as a transportation
fuel,” Riso National Laboratory, Denmark, February 2005; “Comparative Quantitative Risk Assessment of
Motor Gasoline, LPG and Anhydrous Ammonia as an Automotive Fuel,” Quest Consultants Inc., June 2009.
Available as http://www.iowaenergycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/NH3_RiskAnalysis_final.pdf.
51
George Thomas and George Parks (2006), Potential Roles of Ammonia in a Hydrogen Economy: A Study of
Issues Related to the Use Ammonia for On-Board Vehicular Hydrogen Storage, US DOE, February 2006.
Available as http://www.hydrogen.energy.gov/pdfs/nh3_paper.pdf.
52
Helen Knight, “Portable ammonia factories could fuel clean cars,” NewScientist, 01 September 2011.
Available as http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128285.100-portable-ammonia-factories-could-fuel-
clean-cars.html#.VLrGKC7ruPU.
-
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
GHGEmissions,gmCO2eperkm
Fuel, Drivetrain, and Fuel Origin
Total GHGs, Average ROK
Generation
Total GHGs, Renewable
Electricity

22
Open-source Seed System and Intellectual Property on Global Food
Security
Eun Chang Choi
It is well-known that food security and nutrition is an unquestionable prerequisite for
hunger eradication. In essense, the future of food secuity lies with seeds, and food
insecurity is directly connected to seed insecurity. The Food and Agriculture Organization
noted that global hunger reduction continues in 2012-14, but 805 million people are
estimated to be chronically undernourished. With the growing demand of an expected 9
billion of world population by 2050, the world is supposed to face tremendous challenges
in securing adequate food. As world agriculture industrialises, the irreversible destruction
of biological resources raises critical policy issues regarding food security.
Today, the proprietary seed market accounts for a staggering share of the world’s
commercial seed supply. The global proprietary seed market is highly concentrated
because the top ten multinational enterprises —including Monsanto, Syngenta, Bayer,
DuPont, Dow Agrosciences and BASF— own staggering shares of two-thirds (67%) of the
world market. This proprietary seed, almost the genetically modified (GM) seeds, is
meant to serve mono-cultural, industrial farming systems. Small farmers notice that big
seed companies steadily carry out the agricultural practice with modern varieties, which
are always cultivated as monocultures over a wide area. The growing market power of
multinational food corporations threaten the capacity of small producers to ask for
sustainable prices. What is more, seed security has been hampered by constrained seed
supply chain. The situation suggests that control over seed is nothing but the first link in
the food chain.
Conversely, there is also non-proprietary seed supply system, which allows farmers
to sow plants without charge. While the proprietary seed market concerns seeds

23
produced by private companies, the non-proprietary seed market is made up of
harvested seeds that re-sown by small farmers. It is widely believed that small farms are
key to global food security who practice conventional ways of farming with non-proprietary
seeds. The United Nations’ sustainable development project found that 500 million small
farms provide up to 80 % of food consumed in a large part of the developing world. These
figures explain that small farmers are contributing significantly to poverty reduction and
food security. In the same light, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
suggests that Africa’s small farmers key to reducing poverty, increasing food security.
African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) recognized that small-
scale farmers constitute the bedrock of the agricultural farming population. But they are
being squeezed out as mega-farm, and are being literally enforced to purchase
proprietary seeds. It enforeces monoculture farming with GM seeds provided by global
scale of agricultural biotechnology industry. This type of farming practice currently causes
many problems : rise of excessive costs, failure to yield crops, and vulnerability to local
diseases. When crop species lacks diversity in the field, conditions favor the spread of
plant diseases. These are simply because GM seeds failed to meet the different settings
of the soil-forming factors, rainfall types, and temperature fluctuations in all parts of the
world. Large biotech firms are looking for innovations with the greatest profit-generating
potential, so they tend not to invest in solving small-scale, local problems. For example,
the most economically devastating crop epidemic was caused by the intentional use of
cytoplasmic male sterility genes, which also unknowingly created susceptibility to a
disease. Nonetheless but, the widespread use of commercial, proprietary seeds made
small farmers highly dependent on gigantic multinational corporations to supply inputs.
The argicultural strategies based on proprietary seeds largly ignored the value of seed
diversity.

24
Seeds are deeply related to a controversial question: whether food insecurity in
developing countries has been exacerbated because of dominant proprietary seed supply
chain across the world? Or do scientific improvements of GM seeds basically enhance
crop productivity to feed the world? Regardless of standpoint,one point seems very clear.
GM seeds cannot fight hunger as effectively as traditional farming, at least, in poor
countries. In 2005 the World Bank and United Nations funded 900 scientists in 110
countries to examine the complex issue of world hunger for three-year of collaborative
effort. The final report in 2008 clearly stated that the use of GM crops is an ineffective
solution to the situation of world hunger. Its conclusion suggested that GM seeds bassed
industrial farming models were outperformed by traditional agro-ecological methods that
provided the most viable means to enhance food security. Industrial large-scale
agriculture is unsustainable because such farming is highly dependent on cheap oil and
subsequently causes inevitable negative impacts on ecosystems.
As seed regulations are being introduced across the world that requires registration
procedure of seeds, many countries passed legislations on seeds with regards to
intellectual property protection. But small farmers do not know how to register their own
traditional seed diversity, thus they become easily dependent on global seed
corporations. As such it eventually became impossible for small farmers or breeders to
save their own seed or develop their own new varieties without paying fees to a private
company. Novel biotechnologies have been used to gain corporate control over the first
link in the food chain - the seed. These biotechnologies are being developed and
controlled by gigantic seed corporations. It would be science-based solutions for global
sustainability focusing on food security, but at the same time it undermines biodiversity
conservation which is also critical part of food security. Agriculture and biodiversity have
often been regarded as separate concerns. Many policymakers, however, still consider

25
agricultural biodiversity very important in food and agriculture. Throughout agricultural
history, seed diversity, has been essential for food security and nutrity. Farmers’ intimate
knowledge has made possible the evolution of seed diversit. For this, the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD), signed by 150 world government leaders at the 1992 Rio
Earth Summit, represents a meaningful step forward in the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of genetic resources. Despite the purport of CBD, it does
not seem to work well in terms of securing seed diversity. As matters stand at present s,
it seems that CBD implementation had failed to achieve that target. To protect seed
diversity, CBD member governments decided to give themselves another 5 years to adopt
the Aichi Biodiversity targets for 2020.
A broad variety of ideas need to be taken into policy consideration in order to
determine the best approach for food security, in particular, in the least developed
countries and developing countries. Ensuring food security, adequate nutrition can be
maintained by seed biodiversity. Should we allow seed diversity to be a subject of
proprietary rights in order to guarantee key resource of the global biotech industry
excluding general non- proprietary use of seeds? Otherwise, can seed be used by small
farmers without any concern over patent license permission and patent royalty? To
determine this question, we must understand the following: what sort of long-term risks
are associated with GM crops, and can GM seeds help to alleviate the causes of food
insecurity in direct and indirect ways? Amidst one of the worst threats from famine in
2002, the Zambian Government has rejected a huge American donation of maize?
Uganda, Bolivia, Columbia, and Ecuador also rejected US food aid containing GM food;
and in 2002 India halted the import of 23,000 tons of corn-soy blend (CSB) originating
from the USA. Chronic poverty and its hunger crisis, followed by the governments’
rejection of food aid, brought the GM food aid debate into the spotlight. Before calling it

26
“irrational fears” and “despicable” treatment, we need to see it was not a matter of the
ungrounded myths over potential hazards of eating GM crops as the US Food and Drug
Administration said that GM corn had been consumed worldwide without side-effects. It
was because that these crops were from genetically modified seed. These poor countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa are concerned that letting in food aid containing genetically
modified material will lead to the planting of seeds and the contamination of domestic
crops.
Southern African nations resisted the donation crops precisely because they were
concerned that donation crops from GM seeds will have transported across their territory
contaminating its original seeds. Many African nations have noticed that GM food aid can
be used to grow new crops then could encroach on their local food chain. If so, ultimately,
even poor countries inevitably buy patent-protected seed along with nonselective
herbicide supplied by multinational seed companies. Then, seed companies that
dominate the seed business will be utterly delighted with it: selling their own proprietary
varieties or hybrids. To avoid this problem, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe later
accepted food aid only after crops has been milled, so that crops would only be good for
consumption and not cultivation.
Accordingly, even small farmers gradually become dependent on proprietary seeds,
which they cannot freely sow and save for the next growing season. In the very first step
to purchase GM seeds, all farmers must sign a boilerplate legal agreement that limits
what can be done with them. The legal terms in a licensing agreement are considered
necessary to protect proprietary companies’ patents, and justifiably preclude the
replication of the genetic enhancements that make the seeds unique.
To put it simply, these days, seeds are intellectual property, and the private sector
sets the rules of the global food system. Therefore farmers must get permission from the

27
patent holders to use them, and they are not supposed to harvest seeds for replanting.
Some proprietary vegetable seeds are hybrids come with a built-in security lock; if
farmers replant proprietary seed from a hybrid, they will not get exactly the same plant.
Initially proprietary seeds gave earlier promise of delivering yield growth to farmers
since its herbicide-tolerant crop technologies enabled farmers greatly simplified weed
management. But, for instance Monsanto’s soybeans Roundup Ready, brought farmers
in less revenue because the average cost of planting an acre of soybeans had risen 325%
between 1995 and 2011. Furthermore, in 2013, the US Supreme Court came down on
the side of the agricultural giant Monsanto, ruling that a farmer could not use patented
genetically modified soybeans Roundup Ready to replicate seeds without paying a seed
patent holder ( Bowman v. Monsanto Co.). Vernon Bowman, an American farmer, bought
Monsanto’s Roundup seeds from a local grain elevator and planted them for a second,
late-season crop. He took the soybeans he purchased home; planted them in his field.
But the patent license attached to the soybeans stipulated a term that farmers who plant
Monsanto soybeans have to sign an agreement which prohibits farmers from saving the
“second-generation” seeds and using them for the next harvest. Monsanto filed a lawsuit
arguing that Bowman had signed a contract when he initially bought the Roundup Ready
soybeans in the spring, agreeing not to save any of the harvest for replanting. Mr.
Bowman argued that Monsanto’s patent was exhausted when he had bought the seeds
from a grain elevator. He contended that “if patent rights in seeds sold in an authorized
sale are exhausted, patent rights in seeds grown by lawful planting must be exhausted as
well. Due to the self-replicating nature of the invention, subsequent generations of seeds
are embodied in previous generations.” His claim, however, ended up in an anticlimax.
The court clarified that patent exhaustion doctrine does not permit a farmer to reproduce
patented seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder’s permission.

28
This case suggests that seeds are not self-replicating products anymore; farmers cannot
freely plant GM seeds for the next seeding season. That is, agriculture is not an open
process for small holders who are now at the teeth to firms who insist monoculture with
their own seed patents in this area. It is undeniable that Bowman’s story not just cast
shadows on seed diversity, but also poised a fundamental challenge to local small
farmers’ right to practice of sowing, harvesting and saving for the next season, especially
when patent based GM seeds increasingly dominate farm fields and seed industry. GM
seeds will probably put further pressure on developing countries by encouraging firms to
move deeper into agricultural business. Then, small family farmers will be more driven off
their lands.
A series of campaigns organized by non-profits and advocacy groups aiming to
emphasize the high importance of biodiversity are against corporate control of food and
seeds claiming that Africa is the battlegrounds for two very different positions to
agriculture: non-proprietary and proprietary seeds. These critical voices contend that
patenting seeds— mostly genetically-modified organisms —has led to food crisis and
enormous amount of profits for biotechnology corporations. Oxfam and Greenpeace
found that GM foods accepted as attractive agribusiness but, ignored the broader and
much more important problem of chronic and pervasive marginalization of, smallholder
agriculture by the private sector. That is, most of the transgenic crops on the market have
been designed to meet the needs of industrial farmers rather than small farmers. Based
on seed patents, many seed companies have been suing farmers whose fields are
inadvertently contaminated with GM seeds. Monsanto alone has filed 144 patent-
infringement cases over the past 13 years. Legal threats wielding patents are at forefront
in expanding proprietary seed market. In this light, many researchers admit the need to
protect the intellectual property rights that have spurred the investments into research

29
and development t y, but also ask that agricultural technology companies should remove
the restrictions from the end-user agreements. That seems an oxymoron that doesn’t go
together.
On the flip-side, Open source seeds are regarded as a tool for food security because
it prevents seeds from being patented by big seed companies. Shared seeds turned out
to be the foundation of a more sustainable and more just food system around the world.
The Open Source Seed Initiative(OSSI)I nurtures growing plants without patent barriers
without concern over patents on seeds (Self-Replicating Technology). The OSSI aims to
keep seeds free from patents, it is an attempt to pass out patent-free seeds and a
counter-attack to the push by big agricultural companies who hold patents over nearly all
of seed market. It includes 14 different food crops with 29 total varieties, including
carrots, quinoa, kale, and broccoli. In this way, open source seeds create a parallel
system, a new space where breeders and farmers can share seeds. The OSSI has been
launched by a group of scientists and farmers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in
2011, is one answer to the heated debate between small farmers and the world’s largest
seed companies which holds patents on plants and seeds. Irwin Goldman, a vegetable
breeder helped open source seeds campaign to restore the practice of open sharing.
Sociologist Jack Kloppenburg has been against seed patents for 30 years. The OSSI was
inspired by the open-source software movement, that codes can be freely used, changed,
and shared by anyone. Open source software is made by volunteer engineers, and
distributed under GPL (GNU General Public License), which prohibits proprietization of
the software, but allow redistribution and modification. The development of Linux is one
of the most prominent examples of free and open-source software collaboration. The
underlying source code may be used, modified, and distributed—commercially or non-
commercially. The outputs of collaboration are free to be used, altered, and shared by

30
anyone instead of restriction from property law and conditional terms of contracts. Unlike
the comprehensive open source software licenses the OSSI adopted a fairly concise
license term, called the Open Source Seed Pledge. Therefore, it is a parallel licensing
system designed to keep seeds in the hands of the public without patent.
Open-source seeds movement, simply called as “Linux for Lettuce”, is an alternative
counterattack given the smallholder continues to be a key player in developing countires
including the African continent. Public domain seeds substitute corporate appropriation
of plant genetic resources, and relieve the global imposition of intellectual property rights.
These serious constraints often justified as an scientific innovation for increased food
production, but prohibited the free exchange of seeds and the development of new
cultivars by ordinary farmers, and public breeders. A new initiative will help farmers
overcome the intellectual property laws. It has not widely spread yet, however, it will give
a meaningful impact on small farmers in the developing world. If newly enhanced
varieties, developed by national research institutions, are publicly available as open
source seeds, it will shift farming from increasingly industrialized seed market to a more
sustainable model of agriculture that gives more benefits to small farmers. In this context,
open-source seeds are related to restoring the traditional rights of farmers as well as
food security in a long-term perspective. It also gives policy option to recognize the false
promise of GM seeds and to support farming that meets the needs of local communities
and to help access to plant genetic resources that underpin food security.

31
References
Mulle, Emmanuel et al., (2010) “Exploring the Global Food Supply Chain
Markets,Companies”, Systems Companion Publication to Seeds of Hunger, Backgrounder
No. 2 in the THREAD series
Jasanoff, Sheila (2006) “Biotechnology and Empire: The Global Power of Seeds and
Science”, Osiris 21: 273-92
Final Report, The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and
Technology for Development (IAASTD)(2008)
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S.Ct. 1761 (U.S. 2013).
Sunderland, T.C.H (2011), “Food security: Why is biodiversity important?” International
Forestry Review 13(3): 265-274
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Amy Orr (2012), GM Crops for Food Security in Africa – The Path
Not Yet Taken, Working Paper 2012-018: UNDP
Lisa Hamilton (2014), Linux for Lettuce, Summer 2014, Virginia Quarterly Review
The Open Source Seed Initiative (OSSI) http://osseeds.org/
FAO,(2014), State of Food Insecurity in the World 2014 Report www.fao.org/3/a-
i4037e.pdf

32
About the authors:
Samantha Mella is a freelance writer and research consultant based in Hunter Valley,
New South Wales, Australia. She has been following trends in international electricity grid
integration, HVDC interconnection and the emergence of the renewable energy trade.
Denia Djokic is a postdoctoral researcher in Nuclear Engineering at the University of
California, Berkeley. Her interests include advanced nuclear fuel cycles and radioactive
waste management, energy and sustainability, nuclear security, engineering ethics, and
nuclear engineering education.
David F. von Hippel is a Nautilus Institute Senior Associate working on energy and
environmental issues in Asia, as well as on analysis of the DPRK energy sector.
Eun Chang Choi is currently a Visiting Fellow at the Information Society Project at Yale
Law School. Choi has also held an appointment as a Visiting Scholar at the University of
Oxford in the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies (CSLS) and the Programme in Comparative
Media Law and Policy (PCMLP).

GEM_2015-020

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (10)

Similar to GEM_2015-020

Similar to GEM_2015-020 (20)

GEM_2015-020