Pamela Campa, Calgary University, and Michel Serafinelli, University of Toronto.

1. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:
Female Workers under State-socialism
Pamela Campa Michel Serafinelli
University of Calgary University of Toronto
TRANSITION AFTER 25 YEARS
SITE, Stockholm, December 5 2016
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

2. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
The research question
To what extent are attitudes affected by politico-economic regimes and government
policies?
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

3. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Our focus
1 Female attitudes toward work
2 Gender role attitudes (of males and females)
These attitudes differ significantly across space and over time (Giavazzi, Schiantarelli and
Serafinelli, 2013)
They have also been shown to have quantitatively important effects on labor market
outcomes (Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004; Fortin, 2008; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009;
Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan, 2015)
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

4. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
What we do
We study the extent to which these attitudes are endogenous to politico-economic regimes
that promote women’s economic inclusion
Ideal setting would be random assignment of political regimes
Exploit two (related) historical events:
1 Advent of state socialism in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs)
2 Separation of Germany
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

5. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Why state socialism in East-Germany and CEECs?
1. State-Socialist (St-So) experience in East-Germany and CEECs as a quasi-experimental
setting
New regime was imposed
East and West-Germany part of the same country before separation.
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

6. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Why state socialism in East-Germany and CEECs? (cont.)
2 St-So governments made efforts to promote women’s economic inclusion during late
1945s-mid 1960s (Wolchik, 1981; Fodor, 2003; De Haan, 2012)
Ideological and instrumental reasons
Principle of equal pay for equal work adopted in new constitutions, education and
training policies, new family laws supporting the independence of women, abortion
legalized
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

7. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
East vs. West Germany
East Germany - 1960s: policies that favored female qualified employment; early 1970s:
public provision of extensive childcare (East Germany)
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

8. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
East vs. West Germany
East Germany - 1960s: policies that favored female qualified employment; early 1970s:
public provision of extensive childcare (East Germany)
West-German system deterred women from full-time employment (lack of public child
care; income splitting)
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

9. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
East vs. West Germany
East Germany - 1960s: policies that favored female qualified employment; early 1970s:
public provision of extensive childcare (East Germany)
West-German system deterred women from full-time employment (lack of public child
care; income splitting)
”It is probably correct to say that in no other area of women’s struggles for equal rights
are the differences between West and East Germany as enormous as in the area of
education - especially in the field of higher education” (Shaffer 1981)
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

10. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
East vs. West Germany
East Germany - 1960s: policies that favored female qualified employment; early 1970s:
public provision of extensive childcare (East Germany)
West-German system deterred women from full-time employment (lack of public child
care; income splitting)
”It is probably correct to say that in no other area of women’s struggles for equal rights
are the differences between West and East Germany as enormous as in the area of
education - especially in the field of higher education” (Shaffer 1981)
Christian Petzold’s Barbara
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

11. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
East vs. West Germany
East Germany - 1960s: policies that favored female qualified employment; early 1970s:
public provision of extensive childcare (East Germany)
West-German system deterred women from full-time employment (lack of public child
care; income splitting)
”It is probably correct to say that in no other area of women’s struggles for equal rights
are the differences between West and East Germany as enormous as in the area of
education - especially in the field of higher education” (Shaffer 1981)
Christian Petzold’s Barbara
in the West: East German mothers Rabenm¨utter “Raven Mothers” [reference to legends
claiming the black bird pushes its chicks out of the nest]
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

12. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
East vs. West Germany
East Germany - 1960s: policies that favored female qualified employment; early 1970s:
public provision of extensive childcare (East Germany)
West-German system deterred women from full-time employment (lack of public child
care; income splitting)
”It is probably correct to say that in no other area of women’s struggles for equal rights
are the differences between West and East Germany as enormous as in the area of
education - especially in the field of higher education” (Shaffer 1981)
Christian Petzold’s Barbara
in the West: East German mothers Rabenm¨utter “Raven Mothers” [reference to legends
claiming the black bird pushes its chicks out of the nest]
In this paper we try to analyze the role of the regime in a detailed manner
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

13. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Preview of Results
Germany: women have more positive attitudes towards work in the East
Increased female access to higher education and fulltime employment, (arguably two of
the very few positive aspects of living under state-socialism) may have served as channels
for regime influence.
Suggestive evidence of significant change in gender-role attitudes in CEECs: less
“traditional” after the advent of St-So regime
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

14. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Germany
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
3 CEECs
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
4 Conclusions
5 Appendix
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

15. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Chronology and Survey
German Democratic Republic: 1949–1990
Nov 9, 1989: Fall of the Berlin Wall; Jun 30, 1990: Monetary Union; Oct 3, 1990: Full
Unification
1990: German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) interviews 7,036 German native
individuals in West Germany (around March), and 4,453 in East Germany (around June)
Question: “Where did you live in 1989: East or West?” ⇒ Generated variable: East = 1 if
East
County of residence at time of interview (restricted access) → Geocoded, lat and long of
county centroid
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

16. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Survey
Question about what matters in life:
West: “How important are the following things to you today? SUCCEED IN ONE’S
OCCUPATION”
East: “Which of the following things are very important, important, not so important, or unimportant
to your sense of well-being and personal satisfaction? YOUR CAREER SUCCESS”
⇒ Generated variable: Job success important= 0: Unimportant, Not Very Important; 1:
Important, Very Important
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

17. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Spatial RD
Simple comparison of attitudes between East and West may be biased by unobserved
heterogeneity ⇒ Spatial RD (Black, 1999; Lalive, 2008; Dell, 2010; Schumann, 2014)
Compare women close to the East-West border, on the assumption that attitudes of those
who lived in these areas had been similar before separation
Collapse two-dimensional running variable into one-dimensional one: distance from
border (Imbens and Zajonc, 2011).
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

18. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Germany east-west border and counties centroids
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

19. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Regression Equation
Yicb = β0 + β1Eastc + β2Distancec + β3Distancec ∗ Eastc + ϕb + εicb
Local linear RD polynomial (Gelman and Imbens, 2014)
Sample of women
Observations weighted using triangular kernel:
pw = max (0, bandwdith − abs(Distancei))
For comparison we report estimates `a la Dell (2010)
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

20. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Success at work important
Sample of women
.5.6.7.8.9
Jobsuccessimportant
-200 -100 0 100 200
Distance from border, Km
Figure: Bin-averages (30 bins on each side of threshold, left side is West Germany) and 2nd order
polynomial fit, bandwidth chosen with KI criterion.
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

21. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Spatial RD Estimates
Table: Female attitudes towards work: Successful at work important.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
<= 200 km <= 150 km <= 100 km <= 50 km
Panel A: Local linear polynomial in distance from border
East 0.072 0.083 0.105 0.165
(0.035)** (0.041)** (0.052)** (0.077)**
(0.041)* (0.048)* (0.061)* (0.089)*
Adjusted R-squared 0.017 0.013 0.009 0.009
Panel B: Third order polynomial in distance from border
East 0.152 0.168 0.301 0.341
(0.082)* (0.099)* (0.136)** (0.248)
(0.071)** (0.086)* (0.119)** (0.270)
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.018 0.011 0.007
Panel C: Third order polynomial in lat. and long.
East 0.096 0.093 0.140 0.165
(0.041)** (0.045)** (0.051)*** (0.062)***
(0.035)*** (0.040)** (0.047)*** (0.061)***
Adjusted R-squared 0.026 0.018 0.009 0.008
Counties 252 180 118 64
Observations 3,853 2,870 1,915 978
Mean y 0.704 0.707 0.703 0.694
Border segment F.E.s YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses (below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations within counties)
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

22. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Selective migration in divided years
Table: Successful at work important: accounting for East to West movers.
(1) (2) (3)
Women in East in 1949 All women in 1990
Original East-West migrants
Sample coded as East-Germans
Moved E to W 49-56 -0.314
(0.085)***
(0.085)***
Moved E to W 57-89 -0.164
(0.093)*
(0.093)*
East 0.143 0.131
(0.015)*** (0.015)***
(0.017)*** (0.017)***
Observations 1,878 3,853 3,853
Adjusted R-squared 0.011 0.024 0.020
N movers 49-56 35
N movers 57-89 29
Mean y 0.763 0.695 0.695
Robust standard errors in parentheses (below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary
correlations within counties).
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

23. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Potential Channels
Why is women’s likelihood of reporting that career success is important higher in the
East?
1 Increased female access to education
2 Increased female full-time employment
3 Propaganda?
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

24. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Potential Channels
Figure: Womens’ Education and Employment in East and West Germany
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

25. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
We also estimate:
Yi = γ0 + γ1Completed College + γ2Xi + εi (1)
and
Yi = δ0 + δ1Full Time Employment + δ2Xi + ui (2)
where the dep. variable is Job Success Important, Completed College is a dummy for having
completed college education, Full Time Employment is a dummy for being in full-time
employment in 1989, and Xi includes a rich set of demographic characteristics
Estimates for γ1 and δ1 positive
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

26. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Potential Channels
Why is women’s likelihood of reporting that career success is important higher in the
East?
1 Increased female access to education
2 Increased female full-time employment
3 Propaganda?
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

27. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Figure: International Women’s Day
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

28. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Propaganda
Dep. var: Successful at work important
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dist. from
Inner Border > 100
Party Support -0.002
(0.058)
(0.055)
Satisfaction with Democracy -0.013
(0.011)
(0.013)
No West Germany TV 0.049 0.010 0.020
(0.023)** (0.027) (0.025)
(0.024)** (0.022) (0.023)
Distance from Inner Border 0.000
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
Observations 1,488 1,749 1,752 1,752 655
Adjusted R-squared 0.318 0.369 0.371 0.373 0.444
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Ideology is measured in Column 1 with the variable Party Support and in Column 2 with the dummy variable
Satisfaction with Democracy. The variable Satisfaction with Democracy takes a higher value, the larger is one’s
reported satisfaction with democracy; the dummy variable Party Support takes on value 1 if the respondent ex-
presses support for the PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism), which was the successor of the SED (Socialist Unity
Party of Germany), and ruled the GDR. The variable No West Germany TV is a dummy for lack of reception
of West German TV. Robust standard errors in parentheses (below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations
within counties). Significance levels: 1% ***, 5% ** and 10% *.
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

29. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
TV consumption
Idea: more exposed to East propaganda if not reached by West TV
Figure: Source: Bursztyn and Cantoni, 2015
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

30. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Propaganda
Dep. var: Successful at work important
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dist. from
Inner Border > 100
Party Support -0.002
(0.058)
(0.055)
Satisfaction with Democracy -0.013
(0.011)
(0.013)
No West Germany TV 0.049 0.010 0.020
(0.023)** (0.027) (0.025)
(0.024)** (0.022) (0.023)
Distance from Inner Border 0.000
(0.000)***
(0.000)***
Observations 1,488 1,749 1,752 1,752 655
Adjusted R-squared 0.318 0.369 0.371 0.373 0.444
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Controls for Satisfaction with HH Income, Catholic, Protestant, Other Christian and Live in Urban Area are
included in all the regressions. For demographic and socioeconomic factors, only coefficients that are possibly
statistically significant are shown. Standard errors clustered by county (results unaffected when robust standard
errors are estimated).
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

31. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Estimates For 1992
Table: Successful at work important. 1992
(1) (2) (3) (4)
<= 200 km <= 150 km <= 100 km <= 50 km
East 0.104 0.104 0.147 0.168
(0.038)** (0.044)** (0.057)** (0.084)**
(0.044)** (0.051)** (0.063)** (0.095)*
Observations 3,405 2,510 1,654 838
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 0.021 0.019 0.023
Robust standard errors in parentheses (below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary
correlations within counties).
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

32. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Success at work important: Men
.6.7.8.91
Jobsuccessimportant
-200 -100 0 100 200
Distance from border, Km
Figure: Bin-averages (30 bins on each side of threshold, left side is West Germany) and 2nd order
polynomial fit, bandwidth chosen with KI criterion.
Note: mean in main estimation sample = 0.83, sd = 0.37; women: 0.695, 0.46.
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

33. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Success at work important: Women
.5.6.7.8.9
Jobsuccessimportant
-200 -100 0 100 200
Distance from border, Km
Figure: Bin-averages (30 bins on each side of threshold, left side is West Germany) and 2nd order
polynomial fit, bandwidth chosen with KI criterion.
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

34. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
Gender role attitudes (higher values: less traditional)
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

35. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Germany
Context and Data
Empirical Strategy
Evidence
3 CEECs
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
4 Conclusions
5 Appendix
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

36. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
CEECs: Diff-in-Diff Analysis
Goal: estimate the impact of the politico-economic regime change
A general trend in gender attitudes might have been in place, due for instance to WWII
(Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti, 2004)
We compare the evolution of attitudes in countries that experienced state-socialism versus
WECs
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

37. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
How we measure gender-role attitudes
Need a measure for attitudes with inter-temporal variation
There is no long-time series of gender-role attitudes
Our strategy: employ gender-role attitudes of US immigrants and their offsprings (⇒)
Recent work noted relation between the behavior of immigrants and that of residents in
the country of origin (Giuliano, 2007)
Cold War and Iron Curtain significantly reduced East-West migration, but did not bring it
to a complete halt (⇒)
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

38. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
Statement
General Social Survey (GSS 1972-2014)
It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the
woman takes care of home and family
1: Strongly Agree, 2: Agree, 2.5: Don’t Know, 3: Disagree, 4: Strongly Disagree
the higher its value, the less traditional is the individual’s attitude (i.e. the higher is
disagreement with the above statement)
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

39. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
Table: GSS Sample: Source Countries of U.S. Immigrants
Country of family
origin Freq. Percent
Austria 156 0.950
Belgium 59 0.360
Czechoslovakia 398 2.420
Denmark 236 1.430
Finland 145 0.880
France 662 4.020
Greece 123 0.750
Hungary 162 0.980
Ireland 4,124 25.07
Italy 1,788 10.87
Lithuania 91 0.550
Netherlands 510 3.100
Norway 595 3.620
Poland 896 5.450
Portugal 94 0.570
Romania 37 0.220
Spain 263 1.600
Sweden 560 3.400
UK 5,550 33.74
Total 16,449 100
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

40. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
Framework and Identifying assumptions
Yigrcp = β0 + β1CEECc + β2Post1945p + βDiDCEEC · Post1945c,p+ (3)
β4Xicrp + ρg + ηr + igrcp
g: generation, c: country of origin, r: US region, p: period (1. before 1945; 2. 1945-1990)
1 Absent the St-So regime, evolution of gender attitudes in CEECs countries would have
followed a path that cannot, on average, be distinguished from that in WECs
2 The selection of immigrants in terms of unobservables does not change differentially after
the advent of state-socialism in CEECs VS. WECs in a way that may affect gender-roles
attitudes
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

41. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
Selection of immigrants on observables
xigrcp = β0 + β1Post1945p + βDiDCEEC · Post1945c,p + ρg + ηr + igrcp (4)
The incentives for immigrating from Eastern European countries were likely to be
different before and after WWII
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

42. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
Table: Selection of immigrants on observables: difference in changes between state-socialist
and non state-socialist group. Within estimates.
Male Age Education Married Household Satisfied with Employed Children
(Cat.) Income (Cat.) financial situation
CEEC x post-1945 0.066 1.639 0.320 0.070 -0.029 -0.137** 0.022 -0.095
(0.040) (2.366) (0.401) (0.072) (0.261) (0.059) (0.057) (0.224)
Observations 16,516 16,516 16,504 16,514 15,091 15,632 16,515 16,487
Adjusted R-squared 0.003 0.177 0.046 0.005 0.018 0.011 0.041 0.038
Mean y 0.447 48.24 13.53 0.563 10.61 2.094 0.611 1.859
Mother’s Father’s Catholic Protestant Jew Orthodox Other Politically
Education Education Religion Conservative
CEEC x post-1945 0.982 0.344 -0.017 -0.029 0.053 -0.009 -0.002 -0.302**
(0.595) (0.766) (0.056) (0.052) (0.054) (0.007) (0.015) (0.147)
Observations 14,726 13,122 16,474 16,474 16,474 16,474 16,476 15,278
Adjusted R-squared 0.147 0.095 0.284 0.263 0.091 0.088 0.027 0.020
Mean y 11.43 11.33 0.283 0.565 0.0117 0.00170 0.0291 4.181
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

43. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
Diff-in-Diff estimates
Disagreement with Better for Man to work: women tend home
Post-1945: 1945-1990 Post-1945: 1945-1967
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEEC 0.121*** 0.083*** 0.122*** 0.080***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027)
Post-1945 0.461*** -0.086* 0.489*** -0.071*
(0.053) (0.046) (0.052) (0.039)
CEEC x Post-1945 0.193* 0.323** 0.237* 0.357**
(0.112) (0.124) (0.119) (0.148)
Male -0.156*** -0.220*** -0.157*** -0.221***
(0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018)
Observations 8,846 6,083 8,707 6,002
Adjusted R-squared 0.048 0.229 0.049 0.230
Regional Dummies YES YES YES YES
Generation Dummies YES YES YES YES
Additional Controls NO YES NO YES
Number of Countries 19 19 19 19
Mean y 2.699 2.762 2.700 2.763
SD y 0.839 0.828 0.840 0.828
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

44. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Empirical Strategy
Data and Validity Checks
Evidence
Placebo
Disagreement with Better for Man to work: women tend home
(1) (2)
CEEC -0.107 0.163
(0.186) (0.150)
Post-1900 0.656*** 0.204***
(0.026) (0.058)
CEEC x Post-1900 0.164 -0.082
(0.204) (0.161)
Male -0.183*** -0.229***
(0.016) (0.019)
Observations 7,230 4,967
Adjusted R-squared 0.151 0.241
Regional Dummies YES YES
Generation Dummies YES YES
Additional Controls NO YES
Number of Countries 19 19
Mean y 2.697 2.759
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism

45. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
What have we learned?
Germany: likelihood of reporting that career success is important is around 11 p.p. higher
for women in East. This compares to a mean likelihood of reporting that career success is
important of around 70%
We also find evidence that increased female access to higher education and fulltime
employment may have served as channels for regime influence.
Suggestive evidence of a significant change in gender-role attitudes in CEECs: 1/3 of a
SD less “traditional” after the advent of St-So regime
Next: historical county-level data: 1840-1940 non-marital fertility (Kl¨usener and
Goldstein, 2014), 1834-1905 childcare coverage (Bauernschuster and Falck, 2015), we
recently obtained 1925 female employment (Wyrwich, 2015). Diff-in-Diff: post-2014
GSS survey.
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Relation to Previous Literature
1 Institutional changes and attitudes
a. Historical empires (Peisakhin, 2010; Becker et al. , 2014; Grosfeld and
Zhuravskaya, 2015; Wysokinska, 2015; Lowes et al., 2015)
b. State-socialism (Germany: Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007; Beblo and
Goerges, 2016; Lippmann, Georgieff, and Senik 2016; Bauernschuster and Rainer,
2011; Korea: Kim et al., 2016)
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
→ Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007): preferences for redistribution in 1997 and 2002
higher among people who lived in East vs West-Germany. How we extend their approach:
Female attitudes toward work and gender-role attitudes - which have been shown to have
significant effects on labor market outcomes
Exploit imposition of state-socialism across the whole Central and Eastern European
region
Germany:
i. Account directly for East-West migration (observe historical place of residence)
ii. Attitudes measured in June 1990: isolate effect of exposure to state-socialism vs
post-socialism
iii. Guard against possibility of bias from local unobervables (Bauernschuster and Falck,
2015; Kl¨usener and Goldstein, 2014). Restricted-access info on place of residence and
spatial RD
iv. Substantial attention to investigation of mechanisms
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
*Relation to Previous Literature (cont.)
2 Determinants of cultural attitudes and their transmission
a. Attitudes have a component which is quite persistent (Alesina et al., 2013;
Voigtl¨ander and Voth 2012; Durante, 2009; Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Tabellini, 2008;
Farr´e and Vella, 2013; Fernandez, 2007; Guiso et al., 2006)
b. Yet, this does not imply that attitudes are absolutely invariant (Algan and Cahuc,
2011; Giavazzi et al., 2014; Di Tella et al., 2007; Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009;
Bau, 2016)
c. Our study blends these different views: an element of attitudes can be transmitted
within families, but attitudes can also change as a reaction to large shocks in
institutions
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Inner border
At Tehran conference inner border defined based on boundaries of state of Mecklenburg
in the north, Prussian province of Saxony in the centre, and state of Thuringa in the south
General delimitation using historical boundaries was straightened in many places for
practical reasons soon after the war (Hanns Bucholz, The Inner German Border, in
EURASIA, World Boundaries (1994))
The borders between states had lost significance during the long process of unification
into the German Empire started in 1870
“The geography of trade costs suggests that by the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933,
Germany was an economically integrated area” (Wolf, 2009)
We are looking for geocoded data of historical state borders to run placebo regressions
Additional test using data for female employment in 1925
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
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CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Figure: German Empire, 1870
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53. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
**Summary Stats
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Job Success Important 0.695 (0.46) 0 1 3853
East 0.471 (0.499) 0 1 3853
Distance from Border 100.194 (58.106) 2.475 199.241 3853
Age 43.798 (17.547) 16 95 3853
Education (yrs) 11.202 (2.14) 7 18 3833
Log yearly household income 10.21 (0.659) 0 12.388 3737
Satisfaction with HH Income 6.152 (2.408) 0 10 3810
Married 0.635 (0.482) 0 1 3852
Full Time Empl. 1989 0.399 (0.49) 0 1 3853
Children in HH 0.614 (0.907) 0 5 3853
Catholic 0.209 (0.407) 0 1 3853
Protestant 0.456 (0.498) 0 1 3852
Other Christian 0.015 (0.122) 0 1 3852
Other Religion 0.001 (0.023) 0 1 3853
Live in Urban Area 0.496 (0.403) 0 1 3853
Satisfaction with Democracy 2.35 (0.696) 1 4 1811
Party Support 0.027 (0.163) 0 1 1540
No West Germany TV 0.102 (0.303) 0 1 1815
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
*Donut (Barreca et al., 2011) Spatial RD Estimates
Table: Successful at work important. No counties with centroid within 10 km from border
(1) (2) (3) (4)
<= 200 km <= 150 km <= 100 km <= 50 km
East 0.075 0.088 0.118 0.210
(0.037)** (0.044)** (0.059)** (0.097)**
(0.044)* (0.052)* (0.070)* (0.127)
Observations 3,735 2,752 1,797 860
Adj R-squared 0.019 0.015 0.012 0.018
Mean y 0.703 0.705 0.701 0.687
Robust standard errors in parentheses (below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary correlations
within counties).
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Table: Women as a Percentage of Students in German Institutions of Higher Learning:
1949-1978
Year West Germany East Germany
1949 17.7 18.6
1960 22.4 25.2
1965 22.9 26.1
1970 30.2 35.4
1972 29.0 40.7
1975 33.4 48.2
1976 33.8 47.7
1977 34.4 47.5
1978 35.3 47.6
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
**
Table: Trends in part-time and full-time employment in East and West Germany: 1950-1989/90
West Germany East Germany
Activity
rate of
women
aged
16-60
(%)
Part-time work-
ers (% of em-
ployees)
Female
full-
time
work-
ers
(%)
Activity
rate of
women
aged
16-60
(%)
Part-time work-
ers (% of em-
ployees)
Female
full-
time
work-
ers
(%)
M F Total M F Total
1950 45 1 6 3 45
1960 49 2 9 4 32 62
1965/67 2 16 7 30 3 29 16 42
1970 50 2 24 9 28 66 3 33 18 43
1975 2 29 12 29 71 3 33 19 44
1980 53 1 29 12 30 73 3 29 17 46
1985 2 31 13 30 76 2 27 16 46
1990/89 60 2 33 14 33 78 2 27 15 45
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Conclusions
Appendix
Table: Women as a Percentage of the Labor Force
Central and Eastern Europe
Year Chzecosl. GDR Hungary Poland Romania
1950 38.4 38.4 33c
1960 42.8 44.3 32.5 32.8 27.1
1970 46.7 47.7 40.6 40 30.1
1974 47.8 49.4 42.6 42.1 34.0
1978 45.3 50.1 43.8 36.2
Western Europe
Year Aust Belg Den Finl W.Ger Italy Norway Spain Sweden UK
1950 31.7 22.5a 27.4c 32.5 28.6 23.1 24.1 14.2 26.7 30.8b
1960 34.9d 25.3 29.3 34.1 31.6d 23.4 21.1 16.7 29.5 35.4
1970 35.8e 28.4 33.8 39.7 32.3 26.1 26.2 18.8 36.7 37.0
1974 37.2 32.4 38.3 45.6f 34.3 25.6 35.0g 40.8
1978 38.7 34.7 40.5 42.8h 35.7 30.3 38.9 26.0 44.0
Source: Table 3 p.452 in Wolchik (1981)
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
**Estimates For Men
Table: Successful at work important. Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
<= 200 km <= 150 km <= 100 km <= 50 km
East 0.022 0.030 0.040 0.048
(0.028) (0.033) (0.041) (0.058)
(0.033) (0.039) (0.048) (0.068)
Observations 3,689 2,732 1,840 956
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.002 -0.000 0.005
Mean y 0.832 0.832 0.830 0.833
Robust standard errors in parentheses (below: clustered, allowing for arbitrary
correlations within counties).
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Berlin
Table: Successful at work important. East vs West Berlin
East Berlin 0.113**
(0.058)
Observations 246
Adj R-squared 0.016
Mean y 0.724
Robust standard error in parentheses.
Note: important issue of selection
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
*Conceptual Framework
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Measure of Attitudes
Attitudes pre-1945: 1st gen Americans who migrated in before 1945; 2nd gen Americans
born in before 1945; 3rd gen Americans born before before 1965; 4th gen Americans born
before before 1985
We assume that parents on average give birth when they are 20
Attitudes 1945-1990: 1st gen Americans who migrated in between 1945 and 1990; 2nd
gen. US residents born before 1990 and after 1945, 3rd gen. US residents born after 1955,
and 4th gen. US residents born after 1995
(⇐)
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
European east-west migration
Fassmann and Munz (1994)
Cold War and Iron Curtain significantly reduced East-West migration, but did not bring it
to a complete halt.
distinct ’waves’ of migration directly linked to political events or even to political
bargaining between the countries involved.
Between 1950 and 1992, the documented number of European East-West migrants was
about 14 million people.
The overall number must have been higher because cumulated data are only available for
regular ”emigrants.”
(⇐)
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Typology of Migration
75+ % of migrants of the period 1950-1993: ethnic migrants. But it is clear that this
classification is not always precise. Many of the ”ethnic” migrants were taking the
opportunity to leave their home country for economic or political reasons.
10% political refugees and asylum-seekers
Less than 15%: (regular or irregular) labor migrants or as dependent family members of
labor migrants
(⇐)
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Migration to US
1970 Census: 1.6+ million people living in the US as 1st generation immigrants declared
a birth place in Eastern Europe (including the former USSR).
Many of them had come to the US before 1950.
1990: number of 1st generation immigrants with a birth place in Eastern Europe
(including the former USSR) had dropped to just over 1 million
In contrast to the first half of 20th century, not all immigrants from Eastern Europe came
directly to the US.
Many first emigrated to Israel or another 3rd country.
Between 1950 and 1992, however, the US admitted about 700,000 East Europeans,
including persons categorized as political refugees but also ”regular” immigrants from
this area (i.e., 5% of all European East-West migrants)
(⇐)
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
How we measure gender-role attitudes
Gender-role attitudes of descendants of US immigrants
Parents’ attitudes are a good predictor of the attitudes of children (Putnam 2000; Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales 2006)
Farr´e and Vella (2013): a mother’s gender-role attitudes have a significant effect on those
of her children
We use attitudes that US descendants inherited from their forebears who immigrated from
different countries at different dates to detect changes in attitudes formed in the countries
of origin (Algan and Cahuc, 2010)
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
**How we measure gender-role attitudes (con’t)
Gender-role attitudes of descendants of US immigrants
For instance, by comparing US residents with Hungarian and Italian origin whose
forebears migrated between 1945 and 1990, we can detect differences in attitudes formed
in these two source countries between 1945 and 1990
We can get time varying measures of attitudes formed in these two countries by running
the same exercise for forebears who immigrated in other periods, for instance between
1900 and 1945.
Once we have obtained time varying measures of attitudes, we can estimate the impact of
the politico-economic regime change
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Survey
General Social Survey (GSS 1972-2014)
Information about contemporaneous attitudes of US residents and the wave of
immigration of themselves or their forebears (we always include generation dummies)
We perform several tests to investigate the validity of our measure of attitudes
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Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Figure: Percentages agreement from Churchill’s The Second World War
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69. Introduction
Germany
CEECs
Conclusions
Appendix
Table: GSS Sample Description
Panel A: Count of Immigrants
CEECs, Bef CEECs, Aft WECs, Bef WECs, Aft
Count of Immigrants 1463 81 14459 477
- 1st
gen 3 27 15 178
- 2nd
gen 359 39 883 164
- 3rd
gen 661 14 2803 132
- 4th
gen 440 1 10794 3
Respondents to:
Better for Man to Work, 769 41 7772 264
Woman Tend Home
Panel B: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Better for Man to Work, 2.7 0.84 1 4
Woman Tend Home
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Germany
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Conclusions
Appendix
Table: Inherited Gender-role Attitudes in 1945: Disagreement with ”Better for Man to Work, Woman Tend Home”,
Country of Origin Fixed-Effects. Reference: UK
Country of origin
Austria 0.063** -0.058*
Belgium -0.107*** -0.454***
Czechoslovakia 0.049** 0.138***
Denmark 0.018*** 0.000
Finland -0.124*** -0.020
France 0.030*** -0.035***
Greece -0.063*** -0.152***
Hungary -0.007 -0.100*
Ireland 0.073*** 0.054***
Italy 0.027 0.017
Lithuania 0.250*** 0.160***
Netherlands -0.034*** 0.026***
Norway -0.001 0.029**
Poland 0.094*** 0.098***
Portugal 0.027 0.048*
Romania 0.199*** -0.017
Spain -0.005 0.023
Sweden -0.005 0.009
Observations 8,503 5,885
Regional Dummies YES YES
Generation Dummies YES YES
Baseline Controls YES YES
Additional Controls NO YES
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Germany
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Conclusions
Appendix
GDP per capita before and after 1945
Central and Eastern Europe
Year Chzecosl. Hungary Poland Romania
1900 1729 1682 1536 1415
1922 2006 1811a 2117b 1258c
(16%) (8%) (38%) (-11%)
1945 3088d 1721e 2447f 816g
(54%) (-5%) (16%) (-35%)
1967 5964 4894 4103 2743
(93%) (184%) (68%) (236%)
1990 8513 6459 5113 3511
(43%) (32%) (25%) (28%)
Western Europe
Year Aust Belg Den Finl France Greece Ireland
1900 2882 3731 3017 1668 2876 1237 2736h
1922 2877 4413 4166 2058 3610 1963 2598
(-0%) (18%) (38%) (23%) (26%) (59%) (-5%)
1945 1725 4333 5066 3450 2573 938 3019
(-40%) (-2%) (22%) (68%) (-29%) (-52%) (16%)
1967 8297 9072 11437 7947 9907 4951 5352
(381%) (109%) (126%) (130%) (285%) (428%) (77%)
1990 16859 17197 18452 16866 17647 10015 11818
(103%) (90%) (61%) (112%) (78%) (102%) (121%)
Year Italy Netherld Norway Portugal Spain Sweden UK
1900 1855 3329 1877 1302 1786 2083 4492
1922 2231 4599 2678 1430 2284 3054 4637
(20%) (38%) (43%) (10%) (28%) (47%) (3%)
1945 1609 2686 3980 1804 2102 5145 7056
(-28%) (-42%) (49%) (26%) (-8%) (68%) (52%)
1967 7872 10341 9423 4481 5334 11219 10049
(389%) (285%) (137%) (148%) (154%) (118%) (42%)
1990 16313 17262 18466 10826 12055 17609 16430
(107%) (67%) (96%) (142%) (126%) (57%) (63%)
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Germany
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Conclusions
Appendix
*Immigrants representativeness(1) (2) (3)
Immigrants’ Immigrants’ Immigrants’
VARIABLES attitudes attitudes attitudes
1990 1945 1990
Average gender-role attitudes 0.263** 0.015 0.391**
in home country WVS 1990 (0.097) (0.051) (0.158)
Male -0.081 -0.215*** -0.011
(0.081) (0.015) (0.049)
Age -0.072 0.002 -0.058**
(0.047) (0.004) (0.022)
Age squared 0.001 -0.000*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.205** -0.095*** 0.233
(0.070) (0.023) (0.145)
Satisfied with financial situation -0.136 -0.017 -0.024
(0.081) (0.014) (0.131)
Employed 0.221** 0.118*** 0.360*
(0.079) (0.019) (0.155)
Children -0.063 -0.036*** -0.081
(0.065) (0.008) (0.065)
Education (yrs) 0.076*** 0.067*** 0.024
(0.009) (0.002) (0.017)
Additional controls NO NO YES
Observations 235 8,433 151
Adjusted R-squared 0.131 0.193 0.127
Regional Dummies YES YES YES
Generation Dummies YES YES YES
Number of Countries 7 19 7
P-value CGM 0.000 0.808 0.033
Mean y 2.783 2.694 2.805
Mean Average attitudes home country 2.961 2.948 2.933
SD Average attitudes home country 0.212 0.202 0.228
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Conclusions
Appendix
Table: Selection of immigrants on observables: difference in changes between state-socialist
and non state-socialist group. OLS estimates.
Male Age Education Married Household Satisfied with Employed Children
(Cat.) Income (Cat.) financial situation
CEEC x post-1945 0.056 3.127 0.586 0.076 0.010 -0.137* 0.015 -0.097
(0.035) (1.882) (0.382) (0.069) (0.252) (0.068) (0.052) (0.182)
Observations 16,516 16,516 16,504 16,514 15,091 15,632 16,515 16,487
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.143 0.035 0.005 0.017 0.005 0.036 0.029
Mean y 0.447 48.24 13.53 0.563 10.61 2.094 0.611 1.859
DEP. VARIABLES Mother’s Father’s Catholic Protestant Jew Orthodox Other Politically
Education Education Religion Conservative
CEEC x post-1945 1.312** 0.814 -0.155 0.068 0.100*** -0.015 -0.011 -0.318*
(0.581) (0.844) (0.155) (0.119) (0.031) (0.016) (0.029) (0.170)
Observations 14,726 13,122 16,474 16,474 16,474 16,474 16,476 15,278
Adjusted R-squared 0.140 0.088 0.169 0.160 0.047 0.006 0.006 0.014
Mean y 11.43 11.33 0.283 0.565 0.0117 0.00170 0.0291 4.181
Campa, Serafinelli Politico-economic Regimes and Attitudes:Female Workers under State-socialism