EXAMPLE OF STUDENT IRAC ANALYSIS (This is to show you the .docx

EXAMPLE OF STUDENT IRAC ANALYSIS
(This is to show you the basic format only. If you happen to be
assigned this same case do not
copy this example. Do your own analysis)
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Student Name
Date
ACCT 261-01
Ayers
IRAC Analysis
United States v. Stewart (pg. __)
Issue(s)
Issue 1
The issue in the case United State v. Stewart is whether or not
Stewart has
confidentiality rights to protect her from submitting an email
she sent to her
attorney and her daughter to the United States. For this case, the
court is
deciding if Stewart is protected by attorney-client privilege, or
work product
privilege.

Issue 2 (or 3 or 4) (If there is more than one)
Rule(s)
Rule as to Issue 1
The United States argued that any attorney-client privilege
Stewart had in this
case was surrendered when she forwarded the email to a third
party. The work
product privilege states that all materials that an attorney is
using to prepare for
a case, are protected from subpoena.
Rule as to Issue 2 (or 3 or 4) (If there is more than one)
Analysis
Rule 1, Issue 1
The United States was right that Stewart had waived her
attorney-client
privilege, however, the work product privilege still applies
unless she takes an
action that increases the risk that the United States would gain
access to such
materials. The court had to decide on whether or not forwarding
the email to a
close family member is considered an action that would increase

such risk.
Rule 2 (or 3 or 4), Issue 2 (or 3 or 4) (If there is more than
one)
Conclusion
The court ruled that Stewart did not in fact have to submit any
emails to the
United States, for use in court. The court found that forwarding
an email to a
close family member does not reasonably increase the risk that
the government
would gain access to it.
What I Learned from this Case
From this case I learned the finer details on both the attorney-
client privilege,
and the work product privilege. It helped illustrate both rules
and how they are
applied. I also learned how you can forfeit one right but not the
other, and that
an action such as sharing a document from your own legal case
with a family
member can void a protection you have against that document’s
seizure.
Page 569

121 Wn.App. 569 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2004)
89 P.3d 717
STATE of Washington, Appellant,
v.
Matthew Allen STINTON, Respondent.
No. 29474-5-II.
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.
May 4, 2004
[89 P.3d 718]
[121 Wn.App. 570] Eleanor Marie Couto, Longview, WA,
for Respondent.
Michelle L. Shaffer, Cowlitz Co. Pros. Attorney Office,
Kelso, WA, for Appellant.
SEINFELD, J.
The trial court dismissed a residential burglary charge
against Matthew A. Stinton, reasoning
Page 571
that the State lacked proof of Stinton's intent to commit a
crime inside the victim's home, as required under RCW
9A.52.025. The State had argued that Stinton's harassment
of the victim inside her home in violation of a protection

order constituted proof of this element of residential
burglary. The State appealed, and we now reverse and
remand for trial, holding that the violation of a provision of
a protection order can serve as the predicate crime for
residential burglary.
FACTS
Tyna McNeill and Stinton lived together with their two
children. In October 2001, the Cowlitz County Superior
Court issued a valid protection order prohibiting Stinton
from harassing contact with McNeill and excluding him
from the residence.
Later that month, Stinton went to McNeill's residence.
Apparently McNeill was home and she consented to
Stinton's visit. But when Stinton began taking personal
property that McNeil claimed she owned, McNeill objected
and asked Stinton to leave.
Stinton eventually went outside, but he applied force to the
door to prevent McNeill from shutting and locking it.
Although McNeill warned Stinton that she would call the
police, Stinton continued pushing. Finally he broke the door
by kicking it; he then reentered the residence.
McNeill again told Stinton to leave, but Stinton refused.
The two continued to argue and, eventually, McNeill called
911 for assistance. In response, Stinton twice stated to
McNeill, "Thanks a lot Tyna, this is a felony." Clerk's
Papers (CP) at 7.
The State charged Stinton with residential burglary and
violation of a protection order. Stinton moved to dismiss the
residential burglary charge under State v. Knapstad, 107

Wash.2d 346, 729 P.2d 48 (1986), contending that the State
could not prove the "crime therein" element of residential
burglary. The State responded that Stinton's violation of
Page 572
the protection order provision against harassing McNeill
served as the predicate crime for residential burglary. [1]
The trial court granted Stinton's Knapstad motion and
dismissed the residential burglary charge, reasoning that
"the alleged violation of the valid protection order inside the
residence, does not constitute a crime against persons or
property" and that this violation did not satisfy the "intent to
commit a crime therein as defined by the burglary statute."
CP at 22. The State appeals. [2]
ANALYSIS
I. REVIEW OF KNAPSTAD MOTION
To prevail on a Knapstad motion, the defendant must show
that "there are no [89 P.3d 719] material disputed facts and
the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of
guilt." 107 Wash.2d at 356, 729 P.2d 48. A trial court may
dismiss a criminal charge if the State's pleadings and
evidence fail to establish prima facie proof of all elements
of the charged crime. State v. Sullivan, 143 Wash.2d 162,
171 n. 32, 19 P.3d 1012 (2001).
Our review of a Knapstad motion is similar to our review
for sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Jackson, 82
Wash.App. 594, 607-08, 918 P.2d 945 (1996). "An
appellate court will uphold the trial court's dismissal of a
charge pursuant to a Knapstad motion if no rational finder
of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the

essential elements of the crime." State v. Snedden, 112
Wash.App. 122, 127, 47 P.3d 184 (2002), affirmed, 149
Wash.2d 914, 73 P.3d 995 (2003); see alsoState v. Groom,
133 Wash.2d 679, 693, 947 P.2d 240 (1997) (appellate
review of a Knapstad motion "does not include deciding
whose version of events is correct," but concerns [121
Wn.App. 573] whether the State has established "a prima
facie case of guilt.").
II. RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY CHARGE
Residential burglary has two elements: "[(1) ] intent to
commit a crime against a person or property therein, [and
(2) ] the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling
other than a vehicle." RCW 9A.52.025. Although the State's
evidence must independently satisfy both elements, "the
Legislature has adopted a permissive inference to establish
the requisite intent whenever the evidence shows a person
enters or remains unlawfully in a building." State v. Grimes,
92 Wash.App. 973, 980 n. 2, 966 P.2d 394 (1998) (citing
RCW 9A.52.040 and State v. Brunson, 128 Wash.2d 98,
107, 905 P.2d 346 (1995)). But this permissive inference
does not relieve the State from meeting its evidentiary
burden to prove a defendant's intent to commit a crime
therein; "[t]he standard of proof regarding a permissive
inference is more likely than not." Snedden, 112 Wash.App.
at 127, 47 P.3d 184; see alsoBrunson, 128 Wash.2d at 111,
905 P.2d 346 ("We can perceive of few, if any, cases in
which intent to commit a crime would not have a rational
connection to unlawful entry into a building.") (citations
omitted).
At the Knapstad hearing, the court reviewed a stipulation

that contained a summary of the State's evidence of
Stinton's intent to commit a crime in McNeill's residence:
13. The State contends that the "crime therein" for the
purposes of this Residential Burglary allegation is violating
the No Contact Order by intending to contact Tyna
McNeill. The State's theory is that this direct personal
contact with Ms. McNeill inside the residence is a violation
that is separate from the violation of the provision that
prohibited the defendant coming to and entering the
residence.
14. The contact included having a harassing and
argumentative confrontation with Ms. McNeil after entering
the home that second time, a home which he was not
supposed to enter in the first place.
CP at 7 (emphasis added).
Thus,
Page 574
the issue Before us is whether, as a matter of law, Stinton's
alleged violation of the protection order provision that
restrained him from harassing contact with McNeill can
serve as the predicate crime for residential burglary. In
other words, can the violation of a protection order serve as
the predicate "crime against a person" under the burglary
statute, RCW 9A.52.025? To answer this question, we
apply a "common sense" analysis. State v. Snedden, 149
Wash.2d 914, 919, 73 P.3d 995 (2003); see alsoState v.
Barnett, 139 Wash.2d 462, 469, 987 P.2d 626 (1999) (in
context of a community sentencing provision, "[a] plain and
ordinary definition of the phrase 'crime against a person'

would be one encompassing any offense involving unlawful
injury or threat of injury to the person or physical autonomy
of another.").
A person violates a protection order by "knowingly"
violating one or more of its provisions that expressly protect
the petitioner from future domestic violence by the
respondent. RCW 26.50.110(1) [3] ; RCW 26.50.060;
[89 P.3d 720]Spence v. Kaminski, 103 Wash.App. 325, 331,
12 P.3d 1030 (2000). The violation of a protection order is a
crime of domestic violence and harassment. Former RCW
10.99.020(3)(r) (2002) [4] ; former 9A.46.060(35) (2002).
[5] Thus, applying a common sense interpretation, a
protection order violation is "a crime against a person" as
the residential burglary statute uses that term.
Here,
Page 575
the State presented evidence that when Stinton unlawfully
entered McNeill's residence, he knew of the order and
intended to violate its provision restraining him from
making harassing contact with McNeill. And it is
undisputed that Stinton entered or remained unlawfully in
McNeill's residence. Thus, the State established a prima
facie case that Stinton violated a provision of the protection
order forbidding him from harassing contact with McNeill.
[6]
Nonetheless, Stinton asserts that the State's theory would
improperly "elevate all violation of protection orders to
burglaries." Br. of Respondent at 8. We disagree.
The court may specifically tailor a protection order to the

petitioner's circumstances by including multiple provisions
forbidding the respondent from a variety of misconduct
toward the petitioner. RCW 26.50.060; Kaminski, 103
Wash.App. at 331, 12 P.3d 1030. Thus, the respondent may
violate a protection order by disobeying one or several of
multiple provisions. See RCW 26.50.110(1) ("a violation of
the restraint provisions, or of a provision excluding the
person from a residence, workplace, school, or day care, or
of a provision prohibiting a person from knowingly coming
within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance
of a location.") (emphasis added).
Stinton's protection order contained two provisions
prohibiting separate and distinct conduct toward McNeill.
And the evidence of Stinton's harassing and threatening
McNeill was separate and distinct from the evidence
supporting his unlawful entry.
Stinton cites State v. Miller, 90 Wash.App. 720, 954 P.2d
925 (1998), for the proposition that it is not appropriate to
imply proof of one element of a burglary by proving
another element. He appears to be suggesting that it is
improper to prove his intent to commit a crime therein
merely with evidence that he unlawfully entered the
premises. We agree, but find this contention irrelevant.
Page 576
In Miller, the defendant lawfully entered a public car wash
with an alleged intent to steal money from coin boxes. 90
Wash.App. at 723, 954 P.2d 925. The State attempted to
prove unlawful entry by arguing that Miller's entry violated
an implied privilege or license. Miller, 90 Wash.App. at

723, 954 P.2d 925. But the Miller court rejected this
argument, holding that the facts did not support the State's
argument. 90 Wash.App. at 725, 954 P.2d 925.
Here, Stinton concedes the unlawful entry element of
residential burglary and the State presented independent
evidence of Stinton's intent to commit a crime therein,
harassing McNeill. As the State has presented proof of both
prongs of residential burglary, Miller is distinguishable.
And contrary to Stinton's contention, this analysis will not
allow the State to elevate every trespass to burglary.
Given the requirement that we broadly interpret the "intent
to commit a crime therein" element of residential burglary,
we hold that a violation of a protection order provision can
serve as a predicate crime for residential burglary. SeeState
v. Bergeron, 105 Wash.2d 1, 4, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985) (
"The [89 P.3d 721] intent required by our burglary statutes
is simply the intent to commit any crime against a person or
property inside the burglarized premises.") (emphasis
added); State v. Pollnow, 69 Wash.App. 160, 166, 848 P.2d
1265 (1993) (following Bergeron's intent analysis); see
alsoState v. Sweet, 138 Wash.2d 466, 478, 980 P.2d 1223
(1999) (discussing the burglary "anti-merger" statute, RCW
9A.52.050). We also note that although "the elements of the
crime of burglary vary substantially from state to state,"
only Hawaii and Colorado share our burglary statute's
requirement that the defendant's intent to commit a crime
therein be against "a person or property." Bergeron, 105
Wash.2d at 5, 711 P.2d 1000; RCW 9A.52.025. And
notably, the Colorado Supreme Court has found that a
protection order violation can serve as a predicate crime
under its burglary statute. [7] People v. Rhorer, 967 P.2d
147, 148 (1998).

The legislative policy supporting both the residential
burglary and the protection order statutes also supports our
holding. An important purpose of both is to protect one's
personal safety and prevent violence in the sanctity of the
home. RCW 9A.52.025(1); 26.50.060(1)(a)(b); see also
1989 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 51st Leg., SB
5233 [which became RCW 9A.52.025] at 209 ("In light of
the steady increase in residential burglaries and the
potential for personal injury inherent in such crimes, it is
recommended that a separate crime of residential burglary
be created."); Laws of 1992, ch. 111, at 442 (highlighting
certain implementation problems, but stating that "the
existing protection order process can be a valuable tool to
increase safety for victims and to hold batterers
accountable").
Sanctions against residential burglary provide heightened
protection for crimes committed inside a home partly
because "burglary laws are based primarily upon a
recognition of the dangers to personal safety created by the
usual burglary situation." 13 AM.JUR. 2D BURGLARY §
3 (2003). Accordingly, residential burglary can be a crime
of domestic violence. Former RCW 10.99.020(3)(u) (2002).
[8]
The Domestic Violence Prevention Act has a similar
purpose; it authorizes the issuance of protection orders to
"restrain the respondent from committing domestic
violence, from entering the petitioner's residence or
workplace, and from contacting the petitioner." Hecker v.
Cortinas, 110 Wash.App. 865, 869, 43 P.3d 50 (2002);
RCW 26.50.060. According to the Legislature, "domestic
violence, including violations of protective orders, is
expressly a public, as well as private, problem." State v.

Dejarlais, 136 Wash.2d 939, 944, 969 P.2d 90 (1998)
(citation omitted).
In conclusion, we hold that the violation of a protection
order provision can serve as the predicate crime for
residential burglary. Because the State presented evidence
that
Page 578
Stinton unlawfully entered and remained in the residence
with the intent to commit a crime therein, the trial court
erred in dismissing the charge. Consequently, we reverse
the trial court's dismissal of the residential burglary charge
and remand for trial.
We concur: MORGAN, A.C.J., and HUNT, J.
---------
Notes:
[1] The record indicates that the trial court focused on a
stipulated facts document signed by the attorneys.
[2] The State moved to dismiss without prejudice the
protection order violation charge.
[3] RCW 26.50.110 states in pertinent part:
(1) Whenever an order is granted under this chapter ... and
the respondent or person to be restrained knows of the
order, a violation of the restraint provisions, or of a
provision excluding the person from a residence,

workplace, school, or day care, or of a provision prohibiting
a person from knowingly coming within, or knowingly
remaining within, a specified distance of a location ... is a
gross misdemeanor except as provided in subsections (4)
and (5) of this section.
....
(3) A violation of an order issued under this chapter ... shall
also constitute contempt of court, and is subject to the
penalties prescribed by law.
(emphasis added).
[4] Recodified as RCW 10.99.020(5)(r) (2004).
[5] Recodified as RCW 9A.46.060(36) (2004).
[6] Violation of a protection order constitutes harassment.
Former RCW 9A.46.060(35).
[7] CRSA § 18-4-202; HI ST § 708-810. Hawaii courts
have not addressed the legal issue Before us.
[8] Recodified as RCW 10.99.020(5)(u) (2004).
---------
Citing References :
981 A.2d 1098 (Del. 2009), 613, 2008, Buchanan v. State
_____________________________________________________

_______
Supreme Court of Delaware09/08/2009 981 A.2d 1098
114 P.3d 1222 (Wash.App. Div. 1 2005), 52817-3, State v.
Spencer
_____________________________________________________
_______
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 106/20/2005 114
P.3d 1222 128 Wn.App. 132
125 P.3d 215 (Wash.App. Div. 3 2005), 23290-5, State v. J.P.
_____________________________________________________
_______
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3, Panel
Four12/20/2005 125 P.3d 215 130 Wn.App.
887
Henjum
_____________________________________________________
_______

P.3d 1170 136 Wn.App. 807
Wilson
_____________________________________________________
_______
P.3d 144 136 Wn.App. 596
271 P.3d 264 (Wash.App. Div. 3 2012), 29592-3-III, State v.
Sanchez
_____________________________________________________
_______
P.3d 264 166 Wn.App. 304
326 P.3d 876 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2014), 44086-5-II, State v.
Kindell
_____________________________________________________
_______
P.3d 876 181 Wn.App. 844

State v. Zuniga, 102610 WACA, 39449-9-II
_____________________________________________________
_______
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 210/26/2010
State v. Greene, 083110 WACA, 39618-1-II
_____________________________________________________
_______
State v. Brady, 061411 WACA, 41056-7-II
_____________________________________________________
_______
State v. Busev, 073015 WACA, 31908-3-III
_____________________________________________________
_______
Court of Appeals of Washington07/30/2015

State v. Morris-Wolff, 020116 WACA, 72141-1-I
_____________________________________________________
_______
No negative treatment in subsequent cases
M1 Discussion: State v. Stinton
11 unread reply.11 reply.
Original Post: "After reading the case, assume you are a
lawyer, your client, was charged with residential burglary.
Have the elements of the crime been proven by the State of
Washington?
Consider AND Discuss:
1. the elements of the crime
2. the defendant's rights, if any were violated
3. the ruling of the court and what it means
4. other issues discussed by the court
You, as a lawyer must be objective and NOT insert your
personal beliefs in the answer. Use the IRAC analytical format
to respond to each separate issue you find (there are more
issues than listed)"
CASE Assigned to Analyze:
state v. stinton.pdf
Response Posts:Respond to another student that gives advice

different from yours. List why you think yours is correct or list
how you might modify your response based on their post.
Respond to the posts of at least 2 other students.
It is preferred if you prepare your response in Word and upload
the file. Use spell and grammar check and have Word check
the document for readability before uploading (be advised that
Word will not indicate an error if you use a word that is an
anagram ("trail" instead of "trial") or a homophone
see, http://users.tinyonline.co.uk/gswithenbank/homophon.htm#
T (Links to an external site.)Links to an external site. ). Please
include the readability score with your submission.
To insure that the settings in Word will give you the readability
statistics:
Go to "Word Options"--"Proofing"--"when correcting spelling
and grammar in Word" (make sure all boxes are checked,
especially "show readability statistics") writing style should be
"grammar and style"-- finally in "settings" check all boxes.
M1 Discussion: State v. Stinton
See Calendar above for original post and response post due
dates. Be sure that this course is selected in the side menu.
REMEMBER: IF YOU LEAVE OUT ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING SECTIONS, YOU WILL LOOSE AT LEAST 1/5
OF THE TOTAL POINTS FOR EACH MISSING SECTION
I-Issue
R-Rule
A-Analysis
C-Conclusion
W-What I learned

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