Denial of a request for an in camera inspection to unlock a juror's state of ...
motion in limine
1. IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, SEVENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR
PUTNAM COUNTY, FLORIDA
v.
AMANDA K. JACKSON,
Defendant. CASE NO.; 2012-01549-CF-52
/ JUDGE CLYDE E. WOLFE
DEFENDANT AMANDA K. JACKSON’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTOIN
IN LIMININE REGARDING IMPERMISSIBLE LAW ENFORCEMENT OPINION
TESTIMONY THROUGHOUT THE DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT
Defendant Amanda K. Jackson (“Jackson”) moves this court pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.190(a),(h) and Fla. Stat. §90.403 to prohibit presentation before the jury of her written and oral
statement based on the impermissible opinion testimony made by law enforcement throughout
the entirety of her recorded statement.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant seeks to prohibit opinion testimony made by law enforcement before the jury
based on the impermissible opinion testimony made by law enforcement throughout the entirety
of her recorded statement The testimony would cause unfair prejudice to the defendant, thus
violating her constitutional rights under the Florida Constitution and the United States
Constitution.
On August 12nd, 2012, Detective John Merchant of Putnam County Sherriff’s Office
questioned Defendant for the charge of leaving the scene of an accident causing death that
occurred on March 31, 2010. From the beginning of the interview, Defendant was extremely
emotional and she expressed her desire to see her children at her home. Throughout the
2. interrogation, Detective Merchant repeatedly expressed his opinions of Defendant’s guilt, as well
as the victim’s family life and character. Detective Merchant used several interrogation tactics,
such as mentioning Defendant’s kids and husband, which elicited an emotional response from
Defendant. Detective Merchant also made statements to diminish the criminal culpability of the
alleged offense, improperly bolstered the depth of law enforcement’s investigation, speculated
facts about the offense, and repeatedly misstated the law. Even though law enforcement is
permitted to use interrogation tactics to elicit a response from the defendant, expressing opinion
testimony and personal views to the jury is a violation of Florida case law and the United States
Constitution. Seibert v. State, 923 So. 2d 460, 472. Here, Detective Merchant expressed his
personal views on the alleged facts of the case, along with several lies that involved Defendant’s
family. This testimony would cause prejudice to the jury, which violates Defendant’s
constitutional right of due process according to the United States Constitution and the Florida
Constitution. Controlling authority does not allow the State to admit evidence where the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, pursuant to Fla.
Stat. §90.403. Defendant now moves to prohibit presentation before the jury of her written and
oral statement based on the impermissible opinion testimony made by law enforcement.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 31, 2010, a child (11 months old) was struck and killed by a vehicle. The
police briefly investigated several trucks within the neighborhood, one of them belonging to
Defendant. On June 22, 2012, Defendant was arrested for unrelated criminal charges. After 62
days in custody, Detective Merchant interrogated Defendant about the incident that occurred on
3. March 31, 2010. At the start of the investigation, Defendant expressed her desire to go home and
be with her kids. She was in an emotional state before she was read her Miranda rights.
Defendant was crying from the beginning of the interrogation, which was enhanced as Detective
Merchant mentioned her kids and husband.
Detective Merchant started expressing his opinions at the beginning of the interview. One
statement he made was, “…we feel comfortable we know what happened that day, it’s just trying
to put everything together, the pieces of the puzzle.” Further into the interrogation, Detective
Merchant expressed his opinion by saying, “But it would be—it would be tougher for somebody
to sit the rest of their life and have this on their chest knowing it was an accident.” Continuing
with expressing his opinion that Defendant was involved, he said, “And we do feel like a red
Dodge truck was involved, but, you know, once again, we’re only here to get the facts.”
Continuing a few minutes later, he says, “I’m sure whoever is responsible for it probably doesn’t
sleep well at night. They probably think about it every day. I’m sure it’s tough.”
As Detective Merchant continues stating his opinion and brings up Defendant’s kids,
Defendant continues to cry and repeatedlydeny her involvement. Detective Merchant than
mentions his opinion again and he states speculative facts. He begins to accuse her of her
involvement by the following quote:
“You’re a mother, Amanda, you’re an adult, you’re married, you’ve come a long ways in
life. There’s more to what happened that day and we’ve been putting the pieces together
for a long time. People are starting to come forward. People are saying, you know, this is
tough, why won’t they tell the truth, why don’t they tell the truth? It’s an accident. It’s an
accident. Why won’t they tell the truth? I can’t answer that question for the mom right
4. now, but I’d love to. And there’s—there’s one person that can answer that question right
now, and it’s you.”
Detective Merchant continues the interrogation with expressing his opinion with
statements that contain, “I think, I feel.” Detective Merchant states these opinions while
Defendant is crying, denying her involvement, and expressing her desire to go home and be with
her family.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO PROHIBITION BEFORE THE JURY OF HER
WRITTEN AND ORAL STATEMENTS BASED ON THE IMPERMISSIBLE
OPINION TESTIMONY MADE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT
Exclusion of any or all of the evidence is required if the value of such evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading
the jury, and would serve only to inflame the jury. §90.403, Fla. Stat. (2010).
Here, Detective Merchant has repeatedly given his personal opinions on the case.
He went as far as putting the guilt on Defendant when he said, “why won’t they tell the truth? I
can’t answer that question for the mom right now, but I’d love to. And there’s—there’s one
person that can answer that question right now, and it’s you.” Detective Merchant also expressed
his opinion by saying that law enforcement knows Defendant was involved by saying, “And we
do feel like a red Dodge truck was involved, but, you know, once again, we’re only here to get
the facts.”
Allowing one witness to offer a personal view on the credibility of a fellow witness is an
invasion of the province of the jury to determine a witness's credibility." Seibert, 923 at 460, 472
5. (Fla. 2006), quoting Knowles v. State, 632 So. 2d 62, 65-66 (Fla. 1993). Moreover, "[i]t is
especially harmful for a police witness to give his opinion of a witnesses' credibility because of
the great WEIGHT afforded an officer's testimony." Page v. State, 733 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla.
4th DCA 1999).
In Seibert, the defense attempted to suppress opinion statements at trial and the court
ruled against the defense. In comparison to the case at hand, the State may attempt to use the
ruling of Seibert to argue that Detective Merchant’s statements should be allowed. However, the
court concluded in Seibert that the officer did not answer the questions; thus, there was no
bolstering of the witness. Here, however, Detective Merchant answered questions and repeatedly
communicated lies. This creates an unfair biased to the jury since Detective Merchant is a law
enforcement officer, which gives more credibility to the officer’s testimony. Id. at 1081,
Martinez v. State, 761 So. 2d 1074, 1079 (Fla. 1993).
II. REDACTION OF DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT WOULD CONFUSE AND
MISLEAD THE JURY BY PRESENTATION OF HER RESPONSES WITHIN A
VACCUM ABSENT THE PERTINENT FACTS THAT PROMOTED HER
STATEMENT
If the State were to redact certain parts of the interrogation that were biased and
prejudicial, the jury would be misguided and misled from the testimony. In the case of Roundtree
v. State, 145 So. 3d 963, the trial court erred in admitting a video tapped interrogation that
expressed the officer’s opinion. The court stated:
Because a witness's opinion as to the credibility, guilt or innocence of the accused is
generally inadmissible, "it is especially troublesome when a jury is repeatedly exposed to
6. an interrogating officer's opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused."
Jackson v. State, 107 So. 3d 328, 339-40 (Fla. 2012). Nonetheless, "a police officer's
statements during an interrogation are ADMISSABLE if they provoke a relevant
response or provide context to the interview such that a rational jury could recognize the
questions are interrogation techniques used to secure confessions." (Emphasis added) Id. at
340.
The State may argue that Detective Merchant’s statements to Defendant were to provoke
a relevant response, which would be admissible according to McWatters v. State, 36 So. 3d 613,
638 (Fla. 2010). However, McWatters is distinguished from the current case by the fact that
McWatters deals with evidence of the interrogation that provides the context for the
interrogation, and not for proving the truth of the matter assert. In the current case, Detective
Merchant repeatedly lied to Defendant about pertinent facts. Detective Merchant mentioned that
he talked to her husband and neighbors, which elicited an emotional response from Defendant.
Allowing this testimony would prejudice the jury.
There are numerous cases in which the trial court denied witness testimony based on
biased and unfair prejudice. See Martinez v. State, 761 So. 2d 1074, 1079 (Fla. 2000) (stating
that, generally, "a witness's opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not
ADMISSIBLE . . . on the grounds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice to the defendant") (emphasis added); see also Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212, 221
(Fla. 1988) ("[a]ny probative value such an opinion [about the guilt or innocence of an accused]
may possess is clearly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice"); Mohr v. State, 927 So. 2d
1031, 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that appellate counsel's failure to argue the trial court
7. erred in admitting detective's statements advising the jury of his personal belief in the defendant's
guilt, theories as to why the defendant committed the offense, and theories why the victim was
honest, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); Sparkman v. State, 902 So. 2d 253, 257-59
(Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding officer's out-of-court comments indicating his belief the defendant
killed the victim were so prejudicial that the erroneous ADMISSION of the statements could not
be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt) (emphasis added); Pausch [340] v. State,
596 So. 2d 1216, 1218-19 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding that ADMISSION of officer's statement
expressing his disbelief of the defendant's story and accusing her of lying and committing the
crime was reversible error). (Emphasis added) Jackson, 107 at 340.
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that a jury will give more weight to the credibility
of a law enforcement officer when giving his or her witness testimony. See Tumblin v. State, 29
So. 3d 1093, 1101 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Bowles v. State, 381 So. 2d 326, 328 (Fla. 5th DCA
1980)); see also Martinez, 761 So. 2d at 1080 ("there is an increased danger of prejudice when
the investigating officer is allowed to express his or her opinion about the defendant's guilt").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should prohibit presentation before the jury of her
written and oral statement based on the impermissible opinion testimony made by law
enforcement throughout the entirety of her recorded statement.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
8. I hereby certify that on 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing Memorandum
In Support of Motion In Limine Regarding Impermissblae Law Enforcement Opinion Testimony
Throughout the Defendant’s Statement.
Respectfully Submitted,
_______________/s/________________
Rosemarie Peoples, Esq.
Fla. Bar#498238
Assistant Public Defender
Seventh Judicial Circuit
State of Florida