Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution

www.rocelec.comwww.rocelec.com
Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution
Dan Deisz
Director of Design & Technology
December 2015
Inventory Distribution Product Manufacturing Manufacturing Services

• Background & Definitions
• Overview of Standards
• The Big-3 Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution
• Commercial Traceability
• AS6081
• “Component Testing”
• Doing the Minimum
• Doing it Right
• Conclusions
Table of Contents

Background & Definitions
SAE
Standard
WIP or
Approved Description
AS6496 WIP
This SAE Aerospace Standard (AS) identifies the requirements for mitigating counterfeit products in the
Authorized Distribution supply chain by the Authorized Distributor. If not performing Authorized Distribution,
such as an Authorized Reseller, Broker, or Independent Distributor, refer to another applicable SAE standard.
AS6174A Approved
This SAE Standard standardizes practices to: a. maximize availability of authentic materiel, b. procure
materiel from reliable sources, c. assure authenticity and conformance of procured materiel, including
methods such as certification, traceability, testing and inspection appropriate to the commodity/item in
question, d. control materiel identified as fraudulent/counterfeit, e. and report suspect or confirmed
fraudulent/counterfeit materiel to other potential users and Authority Having Jurisdiction.
AS5553A Approved
This standard is for use by organizations that procure and/or integrate electronic parts and/or assemblies
containing such items. The requirements of this standard are generic and intended to be applied/flowed
down through the supply chain to all organizations that procure electronic parts and/or assemblies,
regardless of type, size and product provided. The mitigation of fraudulent/counterfeit EEE parts in this
standard is risk-based and will vary depending on the desired performance or reliability of the
equipment/hardware.
AS6462A Approved
This set of criteria shall be utilized by accredited Certification Bodies (CBs) to establish compliance, and
grant certification to AS5553A, Aerospace Standard; Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection,
Mitigation, and Disposition.
AIR6273 WIP
This document is to be used and cited as a standard reference by other SAE G-19 Committee documents
that address the mitigation of Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts.
AS6081 Approved
This SAE Aerospace Standard standardizes practices to; a. identify reliable sources to procure parts, b.
assess and mitigate risk of distributing fraudulent/counterfeit parts, c. control suspect or confirmed
fraudulent/counterfeit parts, d. and report suspect and confirmed fraudulent/counterfeit parts to other
potential users and Authority Having Jurisdiction.
AS6301 WIP
This set of criteria is intended for use by accredited Certification Bodies (CBs) to establish compliance, and
grant certification to AS6081, Aerospace Standard; Fraudulent/Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance,
Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition-Distributors: It may also be used by others to assess compliance to
AS6081 requirements.
ARP6178 Approved
This SAE Aerospace Recommended Practice is applicable for all organizations that procure electronic
components from sources other than the original component manufacturer. It is especially applicable for
assessing distributors that sell electronic components without contractual authorization from the original
component manufacturer.
AS6171 WIP
This document standardizes practices to detect suspect counterfeit electronic parts, to maximize the use of
authentic parts, and to ensure consistency across the supply-chain for test techniques and requirements.

A View of Standards
• Standards for Independent Suppliers
– AS6081
– AS6301 (WIP)
– ARP6178
– AS6171 (WIP)
• Standards for Authorized Suppliers
– AS6496 (WIP)
• Standards for any Source of Semiconductor Product
– AS5553A
– AS6174A
• There are no standards for Commercial Traceability
You Can’t Invent Standards for Product That’s Already Inactive!

The Big-3 Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution
– There is no standard for Commercial Traceability
• Packing slips
• Shipping records
• Labels
– None of these may exist on inactive commercial product
– No standard means they’re easily and often forged
– Traceability says nothing about storage and handling methodologies
• Once you are out of the Authorized Channel, it’s no longer
Authorized Product
– Neither Commercial Traceability or Authentication says anything
about Reliability
– Commercially Traceable and Authentic product can fail
Reliability Testing
Commercial Traceability does not make
a product Authorized or Reliable.

AS6081 – this isn’t a test standard, but an inspection standard
Clones have defeated this standard since introduction.
Level A: Mostly visual and
external-based inspection of
product
Below this line are
optional levels typically
not tested

• AS6081
– Level A of this standard hopes to find old-fashioned visual
defects in board-pulled, used product
– While this is a step in the right direction to document and
make visual methods consistent, it provided the playbook
to the counterfeiters
• Here is what they are looking for….
AS6081 (clones) combined with Commercial Traceability
(forged or handling & reliability) do not keep out all Counterfeit
Silicon nor ensure Reliable Silicon.

• Component Testing
– AS6171 is meant to address test but has been, and will be, a
WIP for some time.
– Regardless of a standard; where do test programs come
from? Not the OCM!
– OCM test programs are way beyond a datasheet and far
superior to any datasheet-oriented test program
– Datasheet parameter testing is not Reliability Testing
– Vast majority of Independents subcontract Testing
– Very little knowledge of what should be tested
– Very cost-driven and cut corners if not explicitly directed
– Good component-level testing is done over full temperature
and voltage ranges covering all datasheet parameters
• Needs to be destructive for Reliability Testing
– Should be done per lot
– Is expensive

– Room Temperature & Nominal Voltage testing will
confirm that many clones work just fine
• Sentry desktop testing (done at room temp) provided the spec
Component Testing is difficult and expensive if done correctly.
It’s not merely a checkbox item.
Case Study 2 from ABI’s website
“Our experiments show the diagnostic potential
of the I-V characteristics comparison method.
That method is not a replacement for
parametric and functional tests.”

Example of Doing the Minimum
• Go to one Authorized Source (Arrow or Avnet) and find “no longer
active” or “nothing available”.
• Go directly to Independent Sources
– Stating compliance to AS6081
• Independent Sources contract with their test lab partner to
“test product”
– Under what conditions?
– Testing what parameters?
– With what test program?
– Per lot of parts?
– Price-driven?
– Good parts?
Authorized Aftermarket should be on your AVL.
Testing should be extensive and a very directed activity.

Example of Doing it Right
• Go to Authorized Sources including Authorized Aftermarket
and find “no longer active” or “nothing available” or “this is a
development item”.
• Go to Independent Sources if no Authorized Solution is acceptable
– Stating compliance to AS6081 as a minimum
• OEM contracts with their fully vetted test lab partner to “test product”
– For all datasheet parameters across temperature and voltage
– For destructive Reliability screening across lots
Even this is not as good as buying an Authorized Solution.

Conclusions
• Approved Standards do not screen out Counterfeits
• The Big-3 Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution are:
• AS6081
• When done without explicit direction
• There is no combination of Commercial Traceability, AS6081,
or Component Testing that equals Authorized Product
• There is “Doing it Right” and there is “Doing the Minimum”

Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (14)

Similar to Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution

Similar to Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Fallacies of DMSMS Resolution

Editor's Notes