3. Key Term: Integrity
Do the right thing,
Do not do (as we do today)
The wrong things righter.
Dr. Russell Ackoff
4. Global Threats
OLD (STATE) EMPHASIS
• Inter-State Conflict
• Civil War
• Proliferation
• Failed States
• Refugees
NEW (HYBRID) EMPHASIS
• Poverty
• Infectious Disease
• Environmental Degradation
• Inter-State Conflict & Civil War
• Genocide & Other Atrocities
• Proliferation
• Terrorism
• Transnational Crime
5. Peacekeeping
OLD (STATE) EMPHASIS
• Sovereignty
• Borders
• Governments
• Armed Forces
• No Intelligence
• Veto Possible/Decisive
• Marginal Outcomes
NEW (HYBRID) EMPHASIS
• Legitimacy
• Human Rights
• Public Health
• Precision Giving
• Precision Intelligence
• Veto Unlikely/Irrelevant
• Sustainable Outcomes
6. Air Power
OLD (STATE) EMPHASIS
• Limited Fixed Wing
– Imagery
– Transport
• Limited VSTOL
– Gunships
– Hand-held Imagery
– VIP Transport
– Medevac
NEW (HYBRID) EMPHASIS
• Contracted Long-Haul
• Regional Management
– Big Air/Boats to Small
• Long Loiter Surveillance
• Air-Enabled M4IS2
• VSTOL for All Purposes
• Precision Cargo Drops
• Peace Jumpers
7. Modern Intelligence I of III
OLD (STATE) EMPHASIS
• Depend on Members
• Depend on Secrets
• Depend on Active Lies
• Lack 90% of what is
needed to do mandate,
force structure,
campaign plan, and day
to day tactics.
NEW (HYBRID) EMPHASIS
• Harness World Brain
• 90% Open Source
• Lies quickly exposed
• Can have—if leaders will
be leaders—90% of what
is needed to do precision
peacekeeping and
“peaceful preventive
measures” IS Open Source
8. Modern Intelligence II of III
M4IS2: Multinational, Multiagency, Multidomain, Multidisciplinary
Information-Sharing and Sense-Making
10. Strategic Opportunity Lost: Iraq II
My name is Colin Powell and I
believe, based largely on
overhead imagery and one
human CURVEBALL, that….
Failure of UN Strategic
Airpower including Space
Reconnaissance
Failure of UN Strategic
Intelligence (non-existent,
co-equal with NATO)
11. Operational Opportunity Lost: Haiti
AIR DROP KITS OR CREATE
LOCAL FACTORIES OVERNIGHT
Big Air Re-Sort Small Air Delivery Light Nested Plastic + Design Intelligence
12. Tactical Opportunity Lost: Pakistan
Undeclared Air War, Atrocities? Video Air War Bad Intelligence, Atrocities?
13. Technical Opportunity Lost: Nuclear
Predictable & Preventable by UN IAEA 2012 Earthquakes & Tsunamis Expected
16. The Future of UN Intelligence III
1990 Expeditionary Environment Analytic Model
17. The Future of UN Intelligence IV
Make the Case for Peaceful Preventive Measures
Cost of War Today: 3X Cost of Peace & Prosperity
18. Peace from Above
Intelligence-Driven Precision Peace Targets, Space, Cyber, Air
19. The Future of UN Air Power I
Peace Jumpers
• Global Public Awareness
• Strip Alert Each Continent
• Regularly Exercised with Tangible Deliveries
• Jump with one day’s rations and comms
• Immediate begin calling in “peace strikes”
• Back office database of needs created
• Reverse TPFDD created and published
• All parties offering assistance must do so in
relation to the Reverse TPFDD
• Priority to precision air drops (see II)
• Regional air management controls big air arriving
at distribution points, breaks down to small air or
cross-ships to small boats
TPFDD : Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
21. The Future of UN Air Power III
UN
East Congo
1:50,000 Need
22. The Future of UN Air Power IV
Big Air Re-Sort Small Air Delivery
Manage Air-Sea Lift
• Regional Traffic Management
• Aircraft Origins Load to TPFDD
• FedEx & UPS Used
• Create a precision Berlin Airlift
• Peace Jumpers are the
“strategic corporal” guiding
precision deliveries loaded to
specified need
• Intelligence-driven logistics
• Intelligence-driven operations
• Focus on people & needs, not
on governments & armed force
23. The Future of UN Air Power V
Regional Influence via Intelligence with Integrity
24. The Future of UN Air Power VI
Liberation Technology & Open Spectrum
25. The Future of UN Air Power VII
Air Requirements Officers (ARO)
Global Range of Nano-Needs Online
27. Peace from Above
Intelligence-Driven, Space, Cyber, Air, Sea, Ground
See Also:
2011 Cyber-Command or IO 21 + IO Roots
Reference: Building a Global Intelligence Web
2010 M4IS2 Briefing for South America — 2010 M4IS2
Presentacion por Sur America (ANEPE Chile)
2009 The Ultimate Hack: Re-Inventing Intelligence to Re-
Engineer Earth (Denmark 27-28 October 2009)
2009 DoD OSINT Leadership and Staff Briefings
2009 The Ultimate Hack: Re-Inventing Intelligence to Re-
Engineer the World (British Columbia for Engineers)
2009 Briefing: Open Everything at UNICEF in NYC
2008 DIA NDIC Multinational Intelligence Fellows
2007 Amazon as Hub of World Brain
2007 Open Everything: We Won, Let’s Self-Govern
http://tinyurl.com/SteeleUNAir
http://tinyurl.com/SteeleUNAir
2007 United Nations “Class Before One” Information-Sharing and Analytics Orientation
2006 Briefing to the Coalition Coordination Center (CCC) Leadership at the U.S. Central Command
(USCENTCOM)–Multinational Intelligence: Can CENTCOM Lead the Way? Reflections on OSINT & the
Coalition
Version 3.3 As Presented
ONLINE SHORT-CUT:
http://www.tinyurl.com/SteeleUNAir
Planned words in Notes format.
robert.david.steele.vivas@gmail.com
Web: http://www.phibetaiota.net
Phi Beta Iota the Public Intelligence Blog
These slides—with Notes—are online at Phi Beta Iota under Briefings & Lectures, and I have also created a Tiny URL,
SteeleUNAir
I have learned from all of you,and especially from LtGen Dallaire. He and I are on the same page. There is an ethics of service that we must all embrace, and it demands integrity.
Integrity is not just about honor. It is about wholeness of perspective, openness to diversity of view, and the ability to embrace and apply truth.
Speaking only to the American example, we have to stop doing the wrong things righter, and start doing the right things. The future of UN Air Power—and the future of Canadian Air Power—demands integrity in intelligence. We don’t have that right now.
The new threats are both much more human—I list them on the right here—and demand two things the UN does not do well now:
Hybrid operations with diverse multinational players sharing an operations centre; and
Deep honest timely decision-support not available from Member nations.
UN operations demand multinational, multiagency, multidisciplinary, multidomain intelligence. LtGen Dallaire and I are of one mind on this point.
Peacekeeping is much more nuanced, and we cannot any longer ignore the role that intelligence can play in warning and peaceful preventive measures.
Precision intelligence using all open sources of information in all languages is the new standard, and there is no government I know of that is even remotely close to meeting that standard.
With respect to Air Power, and bearing in mind my focus on hybrid operations in which the UN may be, at best, a coordinator rather than a commander , I believe intelligence from above and agility from above will be signal contributions.
The future of intelligence as decision-support is not federal, not secret, and not expensive.
I did Top Secret Codeword for 30 years, from 1976 to 2006, and it does not work. As General Tony Zinni has said, secret sources and methods provided him with, “at best,” 4% of what he needed to know as CINCENT.
I have been speaking to the eight tribes of intelligence since the 1990’s but we still are incapable of doing Col Jan-Inge Svensson and I call, Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing and Sense-Making, or M4IS2.
LtGen Dallaire touched on this—the FACT is that government is making decisions based on 2% of the available information, because it is not serious about respecting and harvesting the knowledge of all eight tribes in all languages all the time.
Here is my newest slide, inspired by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change, and my own professional reflections on the craft of intelligence. The UN is going nowhere unless it gets a grip on both of these concepts … eight tribes, and M4IS2.
The US Government has for almost a quarter century—since 1988—refused to consider these ideas. Now is the time for Canada—and the Canadian Air Force in particular—to step into the breach and be the first to fully develop and implement M4IS2 at the strategic, operational, tactical, and technical levels.
Although I and many others tried to speak truth to the public on Iraq, our cash up-front full page newspaper ads were rejected by the mainstream media. The FACT is that Dick Cheney led us to war on the basis of 935 now-documented lies, and Colin Powell went along.
Since 1988 I have been committed to creating a new multinational intelligence discipline that emphasizes sharing and openness instead of secrecy and deceit. We need that. Without it the UN will continue to be largely a quagmire.
Haiti is another opportunity lost. Not only did the US Southern Command show its lack of intelligence by sending in 20,000 troops with their very large logistics needs, but it demonstrated ZERO understanding of operational campaign management or the utility of shared information to orchestrate long-haul air into the region and short-haul air into all six of the working airports.
As an educated and ethical officer I am personally offended by the manner in which the USA is killing people all over the world—not just in Pakistan—with remote controlled Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and covert special operations teams. I consider the current NATO attacks against Tripoli to be war crimes, apart from their lack of accurate targeting intelligence.
In my view, the UN should be able to stop these kinds of campaigns using public intelligence.
I believe the UN, because it is not trained, equipped, or organized to “do” global intelligence or “intelligence from above,” has been a failure at encouraging proper planning across nuclear and other energy options, and also unable to prevent or retroactively punish covert attacks on nuclear capabilities.
Nuclear power needs to be safe, and it needs to be developed in conjunction with a proper understanding of the true cost over the full life cycle of all possible sources of energy.
Here, based on direct interviews and my work in developing the Class Before One for the UN in Beirut in August 2007, I depict the actual inputs to a typical UN mission, with a genuflection toward presumed secrets, and show the eight tribes that the UN is NOT exploiting properly.
This graphic shows how any UN intelligence endeavor must—in partnership with both the participating Members and the regional Members—consider all ten high-level threats in relation to all twelve core policies, and do so continuously and simultaneously.
Right now the UN is incoherent and generally not under the control of the Secretary General, here I refer to the Specialized Agencies in particular.
Coherent integrated intelligence is how the UN can influence and lead through shared and generally unclassified or open source intelligence.
I have the great advantage of having been able to learn from all of you during these past three days, and decided to add this slide—and the link to the complete Expeditionary Environment Model that I and others developed in 1988.
I am as certain as I can be of anything that the next big leap in UN effectiveness will require the creation of a UN Department of Decision Support that is completely independent, is fully multinational, and is able to provide intelligence support to the strategic mandate, the operational force structure, the tactical campaign plan, and the technical future plans.
The day will come when nations, publics, and markets can be influenced overnight by properly developed public intelligence. Peace costs less than war but information asymmetries have allowed the few to profit at the expense of the many for centuries.
Repeatedly throughout this conference, but most especially during the moving presentation by LtGen Dallaire, my view has been confirmed that we must educate the public and do public information operations, public intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
This is the strategy that I have devised for the UN, emphasizing multinational open source intelligence and peace from above. It begins with accepting reality, sharing information openly, coming together across all boundaries to focus on the long-term. Faith matters—accountability matters. Ultimately Gandhi had it right, not just because he sought the truth, but because he changed the game.
I’ve written an entire book around this slide, INTELLIGENCE for EARTH, as with all my books it is for sale at Amazon and also free online.
And now I move toward my conclusion with some specifics about the future of UN Air Power.
I believe that the UN absolutely must develop cadres of what I call Peace Jumpers, one cadre per region, each cadre qualified in the relevant language or languages of the region.
On day one of Haiti I would have had a string of Peace Jumpers across the country, each calling in Peace Targets—actual needs of the moment—to a multinational decision-support center.
There are some very exciting developments in precision air drops, and while provision must be made for recovering the guidance units, this is in my view the single greatest advance in the possibilities of Peace from Above when combined with Peace Jumpers and a multinational decision-support centre.
Flocking of sets of parachutes, active collision avoidance, multiple locations hit accurately with one string of parachutes, each to a separate village, these are all possible today.
I helped General Cammaert when he was Force Commander in the Eastern Congo, and in the middle you can see his priorities for 1:50,000 combat charts that did not exist at the time. They were eventually created by the Dutch. The US does not have adequate maps for 90% of the world, at the same time that the Russians do. Laptops don’t work with bullet holes in them. I want the world at 1:50,000 on the shelf ready to go.
For me, the future of UN Air Power demands that the UN be able to both provide truth from above, and ground truth, to any hybrid mix of parties from the eight tribes. Air C4I and regional C4I matter.
C4I: Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence
Now we come to regional air-sea lift management. I was totally stunned to watch the US Southern Command make a complete mess of this. Even without Peace Jumpers and Precision Parachutes, it would have been a simple matter to set up a regional air and sea lift command to route all big air and big sea into the regional facilities able to receive them, breaking everything down into smaller loads. Using all six ports would have had the added advantage of attracting over a million displaced persons away from Port au Prince and toward the distributed ports. I am told Canada did this on its own initiative, bravo.
I knew in the mid-1990’s what we are just learning today with respect to cyber-threats, mercenaries, blood diamonds, and so on. No intelligence endeavor that is limited to one country can be effective.
We MUST have regional multinational intelligence centers as well as a global multinational intelligence center.
We MUST be able to create intelligence on all threats, all policies, all demographics, all the time—by the country, by the region, and globally to include the Artic.
Recently I had something to do with thinking about how to empower publics in Iran and Syria, among other locations.
I am not happy with the “shadow Internet” the US Government claims to be building, I believe it will be under-funded and generally out of touch with what is already available in the way of solar-powered Internet hubs, wireless mesh, and $169 adapters that turn any cell phone into a satellite phone. Free satellite and airborne relay stations should in my view be a big part of UN Air Power.
Most charities deliver less than 10% of the donations to the field—the rest goes to salary and expenses. In the case of Bono, the figure is 1%. It’s time we put the intermediaries out of business.
All countries are reachable by C-130 aircraft, over half the countries in the world are NOT reachable by sealift due to shallow ports, limited turning radiuses for gray and black ship bottoms, and poor port and supply line development.
I believe that aviation—and multinational intelligence under the aviation umbrella—will make possible reverse time-phased force and deployment data--TPFDDs at the neighborhood level of granularity. Instead we do needs in time phased para-deliverables, generally NOT boots on the ground other than to call in Peace from Above.
The Americans are not going to be a serious player in the future of UN or hybrid intelligence, nor will the ground forces or naval forces.
For various reasons, I believe that the future of air power is deeply intertwined with the future of multinational intelligence, and for this reason I recommend that this center sponsor, in early to mid-July a conference on M4IS2 and the Future of Canadian Peacekeeping and Canadian Air Power.
Madame Frechette, LtGen Dallaire, BGen Cox, are all Canadian pioneers who could—who should—lead a small workshop whose results can be briefed to Canadian leaders and to the Secretary General of the UN.
My life’s ambition is to spend the next twenty years creating the World Brain and Global Game centered on a Multinational Decision-Support Centre. I’m having trouble finding anyone willing to actually champion such a construct.
Here are a number of hot links in the online version that could be helpful to studying these ideas more deeply.
The truth at any cost reduces all other costs. That is my view and that is my calling.
I remind you that all of these slides with words in Notes format are online at Tiny URL forward slash SteeleUNAir.