1. On the Problem of Demarcation and the Falsifiability of Theoretical Science
Before one can consider the ramifications of any particular hypothesis, one
must take into account the nature of that which has been hypothesized and
whether or not it can be observationally proven false. This attribute of falsifiability
is a rather important aspect of what the hypothesis entails and is constituted of.
Even more elementary and essential to the nature of any practice is the
demarcation of it as either being of the scientific sort or of the pseudo-scientific
type. To many, the answer may appear obvious in the fact that “science is
distinguished from pseudo-science … by its empirical method, which is
essentially inductive, proceeding from observation or experiment.”(Popper,
PoSHA, p472, P2) Is this the only basic distinction that can be applied in hopes
of demarcating that which is science and what is pseudoscience? The use of an
empirical method alone is not adequate to demarcate a practice as a science
when some pseudo-sciences often use empirical or quasi-empirical methods for
the collecting of their data or justification for certain held pseudo-scientific beliefs.
Within the science of theoretical physics we often find phenomena that can be
explained or exemplified through mathematical prediction and calculation but fail
to have any observational aspect to them and are thus unobservable. Through
experimentation and further calculation, particular conclusions could be derived
in a laboratory setting by observing the data collected through observation but
this would not be observing the particular phenomena as it happens in nature
but, rather, as it happens in a controlled environment. Without the scientific tool
2. of natural observation, theoretical physics can and will run into difficulties in
terms of confirming and verifying particular hypotheses and theories. This innate
uncertainty with the nature of theoretical sciences provides the question of
whether or not theoretical physics is truly a hard-science or if it is just a game of
mathematical formation, prediction, and calculation. Although mathematics is the
universal language of science and it is one of the most reliable tools that human
beings can use in order to pursue scientific knowledge, the truth may not be
within the numbers if that which we are in pursuit lies outside of the natural order
of things.
When looking to what is science and what is pseudoscience, people often
look for examples throughout history that exemplify obvious differences in the
manner the practice is carried out. One of the most quintessential examples of
pseudo-science is astrology which purports the mythological, psychological, and
social significance of the Sun's movement along the elliptic as it makes its way
across individuating constellations. The demarcation of astrology as a pseudo-
science is instantiated by the lack of complexity and problem solving capabilities
of the practice of astrology as opposed to the ever diligent and complex practice
of astronomy. This fundamental distinction between that which is science and
that which is pseudo-science shall serve as a prime example for the purpose,
nature, and practice of demarcating practices as science or not. As this example
serves to demonstrate the nature of demarcation, the nature of such can possibly
be difficult to determine with cases that bring up questions of whether or not a
3. particular theory or practice has come about through strong justification and
confirmation.
For the sake of argument, let X and Y be two different theories or
practices. Within these particular practices are human subjects that will be
observed and the data compiled through observations shall be used in confirming
whatever has been hypothesized and, thus, letting us draw a conclusion based
on what we have observed. X is distinct from Y in so far as that which has been
hypothesized differentiates from one another but both practices aim to draw
confirmation and conclusion from what has been observed from the respective
human subjects. After experimentation and observation, data is collected from
the subjects. As it turns out, the people that participated in X demonstrated a
specific behavior identical to those of whom participated in Y but with
differentiating motives. The behaviors demonstrated by the subjects in both X
and Y have been purported as adequate and sufficient justification and
confirmation of their differing goals. The problem with this is not a problem of
whether or not what had been observed was essential to the confirmation of their
theories but whether or not one can adequately rely on the interpretation of a set
of data when that set of data can hold many differentiating interpretations. Karl
Popper claims that
“ … the criterion of falsifiability was neither a problem of
meaningfulness or significance, nor a problem of truth or
acceptability. It was a problem of drawing a line (as well as
4. can be done) between the statements, or systems of statements,
of the empirical sciences, and all other statements – whether
they are of religious or of a metaphysical character, or
simply pseudo-scientific.” (Popper, PoSHA, pg475, P3)
In making such a claim, Popper is implying that a major problem for the
demarcation and falsifiability of any such practice or theory is that of a linguistic
and epistemological difficulty. There is no doubt that any good science requires
the formation of a hypothesis and experimental data. A truly unbiased individual
would make a purely logical and sufficient interpretation of any set of data.
However, the world in which we live in is not perfect and not all scientists are
purely unbiased towards their work. For example, a scientist that has toiled on a
specific problem for years or even decades has finally made an adequate
amount of observation and carried out a sufficient number of experiments in
order to collect data. This scientist is just as human as the rest of us and desires
nothing more than to prove that his theory is correct and is irrefutably justified by
his data. Unfortunately, a very conservative review of his data does not yield any
significantly conclusive evidence but he desires to interpret the data in such a
way that he could potentially provide a seemingly strong argument for the
verification of his theory. Such a misinterpretation of data is not unheard of in the
scientific and mathematical world. An example of the problem of multiple
interpretations for the same set of data can be seen and heard on television
news shows with guests that offer contrary points of view and their own
5. interpretations of the same data. The particular motives behind such
interpretations may be valiant or may serve to bury any truthfully logical
interpretation of the data in question. As important as it is for a science, practice,
or theory to be falsifiable, it is just as important to interpret the data gathered
from observation and experimentation in an unbiased manner as to maintain the
reliability and status of whatever practice has been utilized.
The nature of theoretical sciences and systems follow the same path
towards justification and confirmation that all established hard-sciences traverse,
however, the nature of the interpretation of the data and the possibility for
falsifiability differ harshly. With a scientific practice such as chemistry, the data
that is collected from experimentation can be directly observed through the
execution of experimental procedures ultimately resulting in the desired (or
undesired) outcome. Measurements can be taken, variables can be manipulated
as needed, and the data can be received directly through observational methods.
This transparency of the processes and reactions of the chemicals being
experimented on or with provides a manner in which any particular hypothesis
could be falsifiable, confirmed, and verified. When it comes to theoretical
sciences, there is much less access to that which is observable through nature. It
is true that a lot of camps in the theoretical sciences operate with data and
calculations on that which is unobservable but can be proven through
mathematical means or the simulation of variables pertaining to a particular
6. unobservable theory. But is that just an attribute of the nature of theoretical
constructs? Carl Hempel suggests that
“ The history of scientific endeavor shows that if we wish to
arrive at … well-confirmed general laws, we have to rise above the
level of direct observation. The phenomena directly accessible
to our experience are not connected by general laws of great scope or
rigor.
Theoretical constructs are needed for the formulation of such
higher-level laws.” (Hempel, PoSHA, pg399, P6)
What does this mean for the criterion of falsifiability if that which is theorized by a
cosmologist cannot be directly observed? Hempel may seem to implying that a
theoretical system need not be falsifiable in so far as the purpose of theoretical
science is to expand our understanding of a particular field. After all, without the
practice of theoretical science, we would have never discovered subatomic
particles or the existence of exoplanets. Perhaps what Hempel is getting at is the
primordial nature of theoretical sciences and systems in so far as they are
necessary for the initialization of a new science. One problem that could be seen
with this interpretation of Hempel is that a theoretical science can come into
existence and remain as such and never become truly falsifiable.
Cosmology is perhaps one of the most intriguing and thought-provoking
theoretical sciences that has been in existence since before science was what it
is today. Historically, cosmology was originally a school of philosophy wherein
7. philosophers would contemplate and formulate ideas and theories about the
nature, formation, and purpose of the physical universe. These theories had wide
spreading effects and ramifications on the cultures of the ancient world and often
times caused a great uneasiness within the religious world. Today, cosmology
has been adopted by physicists, astronomers, and mathematicians alike. One of
the most fundamental topics in cosmology is the proposed existence of multiple
universes other than our own. The ramifications of the existence of universes
other than our own exceed our humanistic understanding but theoretical
physicists and mathematicians are hard at work to prove or disprove the
existence of such. A major complication with the reliability of cosmology and the
study of multiple universes is the fact that despite whatever mathematical
calculation is carried out to prove that one could theoretically exist, such an
alternate universe could not possibly be observed and would thus be
unfalsifiable. By Popper's criterion for the demarcation of what is science and
what is pseudo-science, it would appear that cosmology would fall under the
category of the pseudo-scientific. Nevertheless, the study and practice of
cosmology is heavily rooted in physics and mathematics which are based on
observation and logic respectively. Perhaps in this example of cosmology have
we arrived at a metaphysical and epistemological conundrum.
Although mathematics is the most reliable language through which we can
communicate science, in attempting to determine or demonstrate the nature of
the multi-verse could potentially falsify the reliability of our mathematical system.
8. This also challenges the notion of the uniformity of nature and whether or not that
uniformity is carried over to other universes throughout the inter-universal
medium. How can we be sure that our mathematical system is comparable or
even useful in describing phenomena that lies outside of our physical universe?
The correct answer is that we can never know whether or not our system of
mathematics is capable of explaining such phenomena because in attempting to
describe that which we have never known, we are free to interpret the data in any
way we would see fit in accordance or our system of logic. Just as logical as it
would be to suggest that 2+2=4 in Universe X, it would be just as logical to
suggest that 2+2=5 in Universe K due to the possibility that in any given
universe, other than ours, the rules of logic, physics, and mathematics with which
we have become accustomed could no longer apply. In fact, it would be highly
probable that, in the guise of the existence of multiple universes, each universe
possesses its own corresponding set of physical and mathematical laws and
thus, the uniformity of nature would be rendered relativistic with respect to the
individuating universes. This assumption would possibly be corroborated by
Gottfried Leibniz in so far as he asserts that “ … space denotes, in terms of
possibility, an order of things which exist at the same time, considered existing
together, without inquiring into their particular manner of existing.”(Leibniz,
PoSHA, pg216-217, P8) If Leibniz were alive today to take part in the
cosmological discussion, it would logical to assume that the multi-verse and the
nature of the universes that are a part of the set of all universes exhibit a
9. relativistic nature such that each individual universe would be crucially distinct
from one another. This proposed relativistic nature of the multiverse would bring
about more consequences for the demarcation and falsifiability of cosmology and
the ramifications of the nature of theoretical sciences. With multiple sets of
relativistic laws belonging to the corresponding universes, there could possibly
be a myriad of paradigm shifts throughout the whole of all sciences. The
realization that the logical and physical laws that govern our universe do not
parallel those that govern other universes would render a wide array of math and
science that we hold to be true as unfounded and unconfirmed.
A central objective of any science is the formulation and creation of a
unified theory of everything that aims to outline and explain the very existence of
the universe and all that it is composed of. The very notion of the existence
multiverse and its probable relativistic nature would quite directly negate the
possible existence of any theory of everything. With such a realization, would be
too far to suggest that the whole of scientific endeavor would have been
undertaken completely in vain on account of there being no possible or definite
goal for which we can reach within the confines of our humanistic cognition?
Scientific exploration and experimentation is not about reaching any specific goal
or limit; there is no metaphorical finish line that scientists should aspire to cross
one day. Given the nature of theoretical science and its relationship with common
everyday science, science can only serve a purpose of further strengthening and
advancing our understanding of the world in which we have been thrown in to
10. regardless of whether or not the inter-universal medium is relativistic. Even if we
were to live in a Universe Z and all of the laws that govern Z greatly differ from
those that govern Universe G, our efforts in scientific exploration and
experimentation would not be in vain. The garnering of knowledge and
intelligence could never be in vain despite the whole of creation being relativistic.
The practice of theoretical science is to further advance what is currently
known in the scientific community. Without the courage to contemplate outside of
that which is already deeply rooted and confirmed within the whole of science,
science would have no future. The demarcation of practices and the manner in
which the theories proposed by those practices are verified necessitate a strong
justification on the reliability of any such system that aims to be considered as a
scientific system. Theoretical science, despite the difficulties that arise from the
inability to directly observe particular phenomena that pertains to a hypothesis, is
instantiated as the device through which science prods the universe for answers
and, subsequently, even more questions. The nature of the theoretical is similar
to the nature of the multi-verse such that what is theoretical lies outside of the
tangible universe and is only accessible through introspection. To demarcate any
theoretical science as a pseudo-scientific endeavor is to demarcate all that
science stands for as pseudo-scientific. Albeit there exists phenomena that lacks
any possible falsifiability within theoretical science, one must realize the
primordial nature of any theoretical system. Without the contemplation of
scientists and philosophers about that which transcends our current
11. understanding about the world, the whole of all knowledge would fail to advance
as we advance through life. Theoretical science and the practice of forming
hypotheses and theories are at the heart of the pursuit of knowledge as we apply
that which we know to the fleeting world of the unknown.