its related with OBE

1. Department of Electronics and Communication
Engineering
Module II – Engineer's Responsibility For Safety
and Work Place Rights
Subject Code & Title: 16EE215 – Organizational Behaviour
and Ethics
1/8/2024 1

2.  Safety and Risk
 Assessment of Safety and Risk
 Risk-Benefit Analysis
 Reducing Risk
 The Government Regulator’s Approach to Risk
 Chernobyl Case Study
2
OBE

3.  Imagine you are a fresh graduate.
 You get a job as an engineer in a large atomic
power plant.
 Would you take it or not?
 Under what conditions would you take it?
 Under what conditions would you not?
 Why?
3
OBE

4.  One of the main duties of an engineer is to
ensure the safety of the people who will be
affected by the products that he designs.
 The code of ethics of the professional
engineering societies make it clear that safety is
of paramount importance to the engineer.
 The engineering codes of ethics show that
engineers have a responsibility to society to
produce products that are safe.
 Nothing can be 100% safe, but engineers are
required to make products as safe as reasonably
possible.
 Thus safety should be an integral part of any
engineering design.
4
OBE

5.  What may be safe for one person may not be safe for
another person.
 Ex 1: A Power Saw in the hands of a child is
unsafe, but it is safe in hand of adult.
 Ex 2:A sick adult is more prone to ill effects from
air pollution than a healthy adult.
 What is safe to Entrepreneurs, may not be so to
Engineers.
 e.g., Pilots: “Indian Airports are not safe; Low
Vision in Fog”
 What is safe to Engineers, may not be so to Public.
 Typically several groups of people are involved in
safety matters but have their own interests at stake.
Each group may differ in what is safe and what is not.
5
OBE

6.  “A ship in harbor is safe, but that is not what ships
are built for”
 “A thing is safe if its risks are judged to be
acceptable”
 Definition for Safety
 “A thing is safe (to a certain degree) with respect
to a given person or group at a given time if,
were they fully aware of its risks and
expressing their most settled values, they
would judge those risks to be acceptable (to that
certain degree).
6
OBE

7.  Safety must be an integral part of any engineering
design.
 In other words of William W. Lawrence, “A thing is
safe if its risks are justified to be acceptable”.
 So a design or thing is said be safe, if for the person
who judges, the perceived risk is high. In short,
safety means an acceptable risk.
 But, the drawbacks of definition of Lawrence are
 Under estimation of risks
 Over estimation of risks
 No estimation of risks
OBE 7

8.  Under estimation of risks
Example: We judge that the local made bread
toster is safe to use.
 Over estimation of risks
 Example: We judge fluoride in drinking water
can kill lots of people.
 No estimation of risks
 Example: We hire a taxi, without thinking
about its safety.
 A thing is NOT SAFE, if it exposes us to
unacceptable danger or hazard
OBE 8

9.  Risk in technology could include dangers of
 bodily harm
 economic loss
 environmental degradation
 a situation involving exposure to danger
 RISK is the potential that something unwanted and
harmful may occur.
 Absolute safety is not possible.
 Any improvement in making a product safe involves an
increase in the cost of production.
 It is very important for the manufacturer and the user to
have some understanding to know about the risk
connected with any product and know how much it will
cost to reduce those risk.
 We take a risk when we undertake something or use a
product that is not safe.
9
OBE

10.  Acceptable Risk
 Voluntary risk and Control
 Job related risks
OBE 10

11.  Acceptable risk refers to the level of human and property
injury or loss from an industrial process that is considered
to be tolerable by an individual, household, group,
organization, community, region, state, or nation in view of
the social, political, and economic cost-benefit analysis.
 Example: For instance, the risk of flooding can be
accepted once every 500 years but it is not acceptable in
every ten years.
 It is management's responsibility to set their company's
level of risk. As a security professional, it is your
responsibility to work with management and help them
understand what it means to define an acceptable level of
risk.
 Each company has its own acceptable risk level, which is
derived from its legal and regulatory compliance
responsibilities.
OBE
11

12. OBE 12

13.  A person is said to take ‘VOLUNTARY RISK’
 when he is subjected to risk by either his own actions
or action taken by others
 volunteers to take that risk without any apprehension
(fear).
 Voluntary risks have to do with lifestyle choices. They are
the risks that people take knowing that they may have
consequences. These risks include smoking tobacco,
driving a car, skydiving and climbing a ladder.
 Involuntary risks are the risks that people take either not
knowing that they are at risk, or they are unable to
control the fact that they are at risk, such as secondhand
smoke. These risks often include environmental hazards
such as lightning, tsunamis and tornadoes.
OBE 13

14. OBE 14

15. OBE 15

16.  Many workers are taking risks in their jobs in their stride
(complete team communication).
 Exposure to risks on a job is in one sense of voluntary
nature since one can always refuse to submit to the
work or may have control over how the job is done.
 But generally workers have no choice other than what
they are told to do since they want to stick to the only job
available to them.
 But they are not generally informed about the exposure
to toxic substances and other dangers which are not
readily seen, smelt, heard or otherwise sensed.
 Occupational health and safety regulations and unions
can have a better say in correcting these situations but
still things are far below expected safety standards.
OBE 16

17.  The study of risk analysis covers other areas such as
 Risk identification
 Risk analysis
 Risk assessment
 Risk rating
 Suggestions on risk control
 Risk mitigation
OBE 17

18. OBE 18

19. OBE 19
P – Primary cost of products, including cost of safety measures involved.
S- Secondary costs including warranty, loss of customer goodwill and
maintenance cost
T – total cost = P + S
Minimum total cost occurs at M.
H – Highest acceptable risk may fall below risk at least cost M.

20.  Some commonly used testing methods:
 Using the past experience in checking the
design and performance.
 Prototype testing. Here the one product
tested may not be representative of the
population of products.
 Tests simulated under approximately
actual conditions to know the performance
flaws on safety.
 Routine quality assurance tests on
production runs.
OBE 20

21.  The above testing procedures are not always
carried out properly.
 Hence we cannot trust the testing procedures
uncritically.
 Some tests are also destructive and obviously it
is impossible to do destructive testing and
improve safety.
 In such cases, a simulation that traces
hypothetical risky outcomes could be applied.
OBE 21

22.  Several analytical methods are adopted in testing
for safety of a product/project.
1. Scenario Analysis
2. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
3. Fault-Tree Analysis
4. Event Tree Analysis
OBE 22

23.  Hazards identification
 Failure modes and frequencies evaluation from
established sources and best practices.
 Selection of credible scenarios and risks.
 Fault and event trees for various scenarios.
 Consequences-effect calculations with work out from
models.
 Individual and societal risks.
 ISO risk contours superimposed on layouts for various
scenarios.
 Probability and frequency analysis.
 Established risk criteria of countries, bodies, standards.
 Comparison of risk against defined risk criteria.
 Identification of risk beyond the location boundary, if
any.
 Risk mitigation measures.
OBE 23

24.  This is the most common method of analysis.
 Starting from an event, different consequences are
studied.
 This is more a qualitative method.
 This exposure analysis can be most effectively
carried out using “loss scenarios”.
 A scenario is a synopsis of events or conditions
leading to an accident and subsequent loss.
 Scenarios may be specified informally, in the form
of narrative, or formally using diagrams and flow
charts.
OBE 24

25.  What can go wrong that could lead to an outcome
of hazard exposure? (identification and
characterization of risk)
 How likely is this to happen? (quantification of
risk, likelihood, and magnitude)
 If it happens, what is the consequences? Scenario
are constructed and the ways and means of facing
the consequences are designed.
OBE 25

26.  Identify the hazard of interest
 State the question to be investigated
 Develop a planned scenario
 Develop a scenario tree
 Collect evidence to evaluate the nodes of the
scenario tree
 Quantify the number of scenario tree
 Link the information generated by scenario analysis
with empirical evidence.
OBE 26

27.  In the method, various parts or components of the
system and their modes of failure are studied.
 The causes of failure or the interrelationships
between the components are not studied.
 FMEA is one of the qualitative tools, which
support proactive quality strategies.
 Successful implementation of FMEA requires
relevant knowledge and insight as well as
engineering judgment.
OBE 27

28.  FMEA is defined as a systematic tool
a) To identify possible failure modes in the
products/process,
b) To understand failure mechanism (process
that leads to failure),
c) For risk analysis,
d) To plan for action on elimination or reduction
of failure modes.
OBE 28

29. 1. Product/process and its function must be understood first. This
is the most fundamental concept to be adopted in this
methodology. This understanding helps the engineer to identify
product/process function that fall with the intended and
unintended users.
2. Block diagram of product/process is created and developed. The
diagram shows the major components or process steps as
blocks, identifies their relations namely, input, function and
output of the design. The diagram shows logical relationship of
components and establishes a structure for FMEA. The block
diagram should always be included in the FMEA form.
3. Header on FMEA form is completed. FMEA form includes
part/process name, model date, revision date, and responsibility.
4. The items/functions are listed logically in the FMEA form, based
on the block diagram.
5. Then failure modes are identified. A failure mode is defined
wherein a component, subsystem, system, and process could
potentially fail to meet the design intent.
6. A failure mode in one component can cause failure in another.
Each failure should be listed in technical terms. Listing should be
done component- or process-wise.
OBE 29

30. 7. Then the effects of each risk/failure mode are
described. This is done as perceived by both internal
and external customers. The examples of risk/failure
effect may include injury to the user, environment,
equipment, and degraded performance. Then a
numerical ranking is assigned to each risk or failure. It
depends upon the severity of the effect. Commonly, in
the scale, No.1 is used to represent no effect and 10 to
indicate very severe failure, affecting system of
operation and user. By this, the failures can be
prioritized and real critical risks can be addressed
first.
8. Then the causes of each failure mode have to be
identified. A cause is defined as a design weakness
that results in a failure. The potential causes for each
failure mode are identified. The potential causes, for
example, may be improper torque or contamination or
excessive loading or external vibration.
OBE 30

31. 9. The probability factor indicating the frequency of occurrence is
considered. A numerical weightage can be assigned to each cause
depending upon the probability of occurrence.
10. Design or process mechanism has to be identified, which can
prevent the cause of failure or detect failure, before it reaches
customer. Accordingly, the item has to identify tests, analysis,
monitoring and other techniques to detect the risk or failure.
11. Assessment of detection rating is done by assigning a numerical
weightage. Value 1 indicates design control will certainly detect
the potential causes, 10 indicates design control will not detect the
cause or mechanism. A normal scale of 1 – 10 is used.
12. Risk Priority Number (RPN) is calculated and reviewed .
RPN = Severity * Probability * Detection
13. Recommended actions are determined to address potential risks
or failures with high RPN.
14. Revalidate each action by reassessing severity, probability and
detection and review the revised RPN. Check any further action is
needed. FMEA has to be updated as and when the design or
process is modified or changed.
OBE 31

32. OBE 32

33.  This is a qualitative method and was originated by
Bell Telephones.
 It is technology-based deductive logic.
 The failure (undesirable event) is initially defined,
and the events (causal relationships) leading to that
failure are identified at different components level.
 This method can combine hardware failures and
human failures.
 Example 1: Consider the failure of the steam
flow in a thermal station. The water is pumped
from a big reservoir nearby. The details are
shown in Figure.
OBE 33

34. OBE 34

35. OBE 35
 The common mode event in this case is an earthquake. This
quake has affected many systems or components at the same
time. Hence, we can call the “earthquake” as the common
mode/cause.

36.  Example 2: An automobile car does not start.
The details of this case are shown in Fig.
OBE 36

37.  Event tree analysis evaluates potential accident
outcomes that might result following an equipment
failure or process upset known as an initiating event.
 It is a “forward-thinking” process, i.e. the analyst
begins with an initiating event and develops the
following sequences of events that describes potential
accidents, accounting for both the successes and
failures of the safety functions as the accident
progresses.
OBE 37

38. 1. Identify an initiating event of interest.
2. Identify the safety functions designed to deal with
the initiating event.
3. Construct the event tree.
4. Describe the resulting accident event sequences.
OBE 38

39.  Oxidation reactor high temp. Alarm alerts
operator at temp T1.
 Operator reestablish cooling water flow to the
oxidation reactor.
 Automatic shutdown system stops reaction at
temp. T2. T2 > T1
These safety functions are listed in the order in
which they are intended to occur.
OBE 39

40. Construct the Event Tree
a. Enter the initiating event and safety functions.
SAFETY
FUNCTION
Oxidation reactor
high temperature
alarm alerts
operator
at temperature T1
Operator
reestablishes
cooling water flow
to oxidation
reactor
Automatic
shutdown system
stops reaction at
temperature T2
INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
FIRST STEP IN CONSTRUCTING EVENT TREE
OBE 40

41. Construct the Event Tree
b. Evaluate the safety functions.
SAFETY
FUNCTION
Oxidation reactor
high temperature
alarm alerts
operator
at temperature T1
Operator
reestablishes
cooling water flow
to oxidation
reactor
Automatic
shutdown system
stops reaction at
temperature T2
INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
REPRESENTATION OF THE FIRST SAFETY FUNCTION
Success
Failure
OBE 41

42. Construct the Event Tree
c) Evaluate the safety functions.
SAFETY
FUNCTION
Oxidation reactor
high temperature
alarm alerts
operator
at temperature T1
Operator
reestablishes
cooling water flow
to oxidation
reactor
Automatic
shutdown system
stops reaction at
temperature T2
INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
REPRESENTATION OF THE SECOND SAFETY FUNCTION
Success
Failure
If the safety function does not affect the course of
the accident, the accident path proceeds with no
branch pt to the next safety function.
OBE 42

43. d. Evaluate safety functions.
SAFETY
FUNCTION
Oxidation reactor
high temperature
alarm alerts
operator
at temperature T1
Operator
reestablishes
cooling water flow
to oxidation
reactor
Automatic
shutdown system
stops reaction at
temperature T2
INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
COMPLETED EVENT TREE
Success
Failure
Completed !
OBE 43

44. Describe the Accident Sequence
SAFETY
FUNCTION
Oxidation reactor
high temperature
alarm alerts
operator
at temperature T1
Operator
reestablishes
cooling water flow
to oxidation
reactor
Automatic
shutdown system
stops reaction at
temperature T2
INITIATING EVENT:
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
ACCIDENT SEQUENCES
Success
Failure
Safe condition,
return to normal
operation
Safe condition,
process shutdown
Unsafe condition,
runaway reaction,
operator aware of
problem
Unstable condition,
process shutdown
Unsafe condition,
runaway reaction,
operator unaware
of problem
B
A
C D
A
AC
ACD
AB
ABD
OBE 44

45. Reactor
TIA
TIC
Alarm
at
T > TA
Figure 11-8 Reactor with high temperature alarm and temperature controller.
Cooling Coils
Thermocouple
High Temperature Alarm
Temperature
Controller
Reactor Feed
Cooling Water Out
Cooling
Water In
OBE 45

46. OBE 46

47.  Risk-benefit analysis is the comparison of the risk
of a situation to its related benefits.
 Exposure to personal risk is recognized as a
normal aspect of everyday life.
 We accept a certain level of risk in our lives as
necessary to achieve certain benefits.
 In most of these risks we feel as though we have
some sort of control over the situation.
 For example, driving an automobile is a risk most
people take daily.
 "The controlling factor appears to be their
perception of their individual ability to manage
the risk-creating situation."
OBE 47

48.  Analyzing the risk of a situation is, however, very
dependent on the individual doing the analysis.
 When individuals are exposed to involuntary risk,
risk which they have no control, they make risk
aversion their primary goal.
 Under these circumstances individuals require the
probability of risk to be as much as one thousand
times smaller than for the same situation under
their perceived control.
OBE 48

49.  Real future risk as disclosed by the fully matured
future circumstances when they develop.
 Statistical risk, as determined by currently
available data, as measured actuarially for
insurance premiums.
 Projected risk, as analytically based on system
models structured from historical studies.
 Perceived risk, as intuitively seen by individuals. It
is not so reliable.
OBE 49

50.  Flight insurance company - statistical risk.
 Passenger - perceived risk.
 Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) - projected
risks.
 Hopefully the real risks turn out to be less than the
projected risks.
 Although many people feel that flying is more risky
than driving, statistics show otherwise.
 Perception of control is a very important factor that
explains why voluntary activities have risks of 100
to 1000 times greater than involuntary activities.
OBE 50

51.  Risk communication involves communicating risks that
are involved in a situation.
 People are generally apathetic when it comes to risks,
and it is difficult to get them concerned.
 Catch phrases such as, "Watch out!" and "Stop
worrying" reflect the poles of risk communication.
 The former demonstrates an urgent need, whereas the
latter demonstrates no urgent need.
 Assumptions about risk communication:
 One-way communication, with an identifiable
audience to be warned and a source to do the
warning.
 The source knows more about the risk than the
audience.
 The audience's interests are at heart.
 The source's recommendations are based on real
information, not values or preferences.
OBE 51

52.  Risk communication, as described above, does not
always follow these assumptions.
 Therefore, risk communication should be multi-
directional rather than one-directional.
 Industry, government, and the media should talk
less and listen more. Using a multi-directional
approach, "...it is easier to design effective
messages if the source pays attention to what the
prospective audience thinks and feels.“
 Another approach, although not multidirectional, is
to measure success by what the audience knows
and not by what the audience decides.
 Just by letting people know puts pressure on the
companies to keep risk below a certain point.
OBE 52

53.  Risk management is the consideration of social, economical and
political factors in the decision making process of controlling risks.
 The basic task of a risk manager is to take a risk assessment and
integrate it with the best available sociological, economical and
political information.
 In reality, the reliability of the data on which risk and cost calculations
are leads to risk management to cross the line of risk assessment.
 Theoretically, however, a risk assessor should stick to his or her
scientific approach and present the reliable and objective information
to the risk manager while the risk manager should take the
assessment at its face value for integrating other factors and making
decisions.
 A risk manager should start with setting priorities on the factors
below:
 the degree to which the risk can be controlled;
 the costs of control;
 the social and political feasibility and acceptability of the control;
 the benefits of the product;
 the degree to which the risk-taking activities is voluntary or
involuntary.
OBE 53

54.  Pond dipping is a fun and simple way for children to
explore an aquatic habitat.
 Children will be able to observe a diversity of different
creatures from leeches to dragonfly nymphs.
OBE 54

55. OBE 55

56. OBE 56

57.  The risk management has to be viewed in a wider
angle at times when sudden disasters occur due to
lack of proper care and assessment.
 The government which has the responsibility to
take care of all the public needs to take some risk.
 The government’s approach towards the public
lies in saving as many lives as possible.
OBE 57

58.  The two major approaches of the government are −
 Lay person − Wants to protect himself or herself
from risk.
 The government regulator − Wants as much
assurance as possible that the public is not being
exposed to unexpected harm.
 For example, at the times of flood or some fire
accident, the government of any place should aim at
protecting as many lives as possible rather than
looking for a benefit or protecting some property.
 It will count as a successful attempt towards facing
risk if the authority is able to protect its people
even after the destruction of property.
OBE 58

59. OBE 59

60.  Be prepared to evacuate
 Discuss flood management plan
 Decide where you will meet if separated
 Identify alternative travel routes that are not prone
to flooding
 Plan what to do with your precious belongings and
hazardous materials
 Fill your car’s gas tank
 Seal vents to basements to prevent flooding
 If told to leave, do so quickly
OBE 60

61.  Such as sudden drop-offs, fallen trees or fallen
power lines.
 Do not drive through flood water.
 Flood water is dangerous there may be hidden
hazards.
 Do not turn on electricity and gas supplies until a
qualified electrician / engineer has checked them.
 Be alert for gas leaks – do not smoke or use candles
or open flames.
OBE 61

62.  In the study of safety, the ‘safe exit’ principles are
recommended.
 The conditions referred to as safe exit are:
 The product, when it fails, should fail safely.
 The product, when it fails, can be abandoned safely.
(it does not harm others by explosion or radiation.
 The user can safely escape the product. (e.g. ships
need sufficient number of life boats for all passenger
and crew)
OBE 62

63. OBE 63

64. OBE 64

65. OBE 65

66. OBE 66