CASE STUDY ON MUMBAI TERROR ATTACKS 26-11-2008

1. TERROR STORY
OF
PRESENTED BY:
NITIKA

2. FRAMEWORK
 THE ATTACK
 MOTIVE BEHIND ATTACK
 STRATEGIES
 RECONNAISSANCE & PLANNING
 CHRONOLOGY
 CRITICAL ANALYSIS
 PRE – DISASTER MANAGEMENT
 POST – DISASTER MANAGEMENT
 FINAL ANALYSIS

3. S.NO PARAMETERS DESCRIPTION
1. DATE 26 November, 2008
2. LOCATION Mumbai, India
3. TERRORIST
GROUP
LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba)
4. WEAPONS USED AK-47, RDX, IEDs, Grenades
5. TIME SPAN 60 Hours
6. DEATH TOLL 166+
7. INJURED 600+
8. DEFENDERS 1. NSG (National Security Guard) 2. MARCOS
3.Mumbai Police 4. Indian ATS
5. Mumbai Fire Brigade
THE ATTACK

4. TERRORIST
ATTACK
CYCLE
TARGET
SELECTION
PLANNING
ATTACK
ESCAPE
EXPLOITATION
DEPLOYMENT

5. MOTIVE BEHIND ATTACK
LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba) was considered as a group that posed a regional threat.
LeT planned attacks in the west, to include the US.
One attack was already in the planning stage. It was targeted for the
newspaper in Denmark.
The attack was to be in retaliation for the newspaper’s publication of cartoons
depicting the Prophet Mohammed.
With respect to the Mumbai attack, LeT wanted to kill as many Westerners and
Jews as it could.

6. Thus target selection was done accordingly:
• CST railway station
• Leopold café and bar
• Taj Mahal Hotel
• The Oberoi-trident Hotel
• Nariman House
MOTIVE BEHIND ATTACK

7. STRATEGIES BY TERRORISTS
Precise Planning
Detailed Reconnaissance
Thorough Preparation
Surprise
Creating Confusion
Determined Execution
Sequential & Highly Mobile
Multiple Attacks at once
Targeted Killings
Building Takeovers
Hostage

8. PATHLINE
 10- man team chartered the MV Alpha cargo ship out of
Karachi (506nm from Mumbai).
To avoid detection by Indian coast guard,
hijacked a fishing trawler.

9. Inflatable rafts carried teams to Indian gateway.

10. Here, four teams split off.

11. CST Railway Station &
Cama Hospital: TEAM 1
Nariman House: TEAM 2
Oberoi Hotel: TEAM 3
Café Leopold & Taj Mahal Hotel:
TEAM 4
CHRONOLGY

12. KEY
1. 1st TEAM
2. 2nd TEAM
3. 3rd TEAM
4. 4th TEAM
1
2
4
3
1

13. CHHATRAPATI SHIVAJI TERMINUS (CST)

14. CST : TEAM 1(2 MEN)
 Left behind grenades in taxi.
 Took out their weapons and opened fire on commuters killing
indiscriminately for 90 minutes.
 Killed 58 people and injuring 104
 A railway announcer saved several lives by alerting the commuters and
asking them to leave the station from the back gate.
Took a taxi to the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST).

15. Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST).

16. CAMA HOSPITAL: TEAM 1
 After Kasab and Khan’s failed attempt to climb up the CST
office due to resistance from the railway police.
 Then headed to the Cama & Albless Hospital, where they
renewed the killing.
Entered the hospital from the rear entrance.
Engaged by a group of policemen for 45 minutes.
Threw hand grenades on the policemen, thus killing two and
injuring several others.

17.  Escaped with a police car.
 Then headed towards the Oberoi/Trident Hotel, firing along the
way.
 Hijacked another vehicle but were intercepted by police.
 In the ensuing gun battle, One terrorist was killed.
 The second was wounded and captured.
 This team alone was responsible for a third of the fatalities.
CAMA HOSPITAL: TEAM 1

18. CAMA HOSPITAL: TEAM 1

19. NARIMAN HOUSE: TEAM 2 (2 MEN)
 The second team walked to Nariman House, a commercial-
residential complex run by the Jewish Chabad Lubavich movement.
 Threw grenades at a gas station across the street from the complex.
 Opened fire on the building, and then entered the lobby shooting.
 Took 13 hostages, five of whom they murdered.
 This team accounted for eight of the total fatalities.

20. NARIMAN HOUSE: TEAM 2 (2 MEN)

21. HOTEL OBEROI: TEAM 3 (2 MEN)
 The third team headed from the landing site to the Oberoi/Trident Hotel.
 Killing people indiscriminately.
 In a call to the media, they claimed to be seven.
 They demanded that India release all Mujahedeen (Muslim fighters)
prisoners in return for the release of the hostages.
 The siege continued for approximately 17 hours before the terrorists were
killed.
 By the time they died, they had killed 30 people.

22. HOTEL OBEROI: TEAM 3 (2 MEN)

23. On Nov 26, 2008, the cafe was attacked by two attackers, Shoaib and Nazir
Spraying gunfire and grenades during peak hours between 9:30 pm and 9:50 pm.
Killing 10 people and injuring several others.

24. LEOPOLD CAFE

26. HOTEL TAJ MAHAL: TEAM 4 (4 MEN)
 The fourth and largest team moved toward the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel.
 They briefly entered the Café Leopold, spraying its occupants with fire
weapons, killing ten.
 Then they moved to the rear entrance of the Taj Mahal Hotel.
 They walked through the ground floor, killing along the way.
 Then moved to the upper floors, setting fires and moving constantly in
order to confuse and delay government commandos.
 The siege at the Taj ended 60 hours later, when Indian commandos
killed the last of the four terrorists.

27. TAJ HOTEL DURING
THE ATTACK

29. RESCUE & RELIEF
 Paramilitary forces lie on the ground as they look towards the Taj
Mahal Hotel, where militants were holed up during an assault

30.  Employees and guests of the Taj Mahal hotel being rescued by
firefighters after fire engulfed the top floor of the hotel
 Firefighters try to douse a fire at the Taj Mahal Hotel

31. RESCUE & RELIEF
 Security forces personnel led released hostages to safety from
the Nariman House

32. Critical Analysis -

33. INTELLIGENCE FAILURES
 The Indian intelligence had 6 threat calls of an attack
through the sea.
 No timely alerts were passed.

34. GAPS IN COASTAL SURVEILLANCE
 The attacks highlighted India’s inability to effectively monitor its coastline.
 This also reflects the coast guard’s shortage of equipment for coastal
surveillance.
Seven years after the most brutal attack,
the situation remains the same.

35. INADEQUATE
“TARGET HARDENING”
 The metal detectors at the CST were of questionable reliability.
 Although the Railway Protection Force (RPF) officers were
armed, their weapons were relatively antiquated and in short
supply (one for every two officers).

36. FAILURES OF POLICE FORCE
 Police force not fully equipped and trained.
 Lack of specialized weapons with the police force.
 The bulletproof vests that were available could not withstand AK-47 or
AK-56 rounds.
 The head of the ATS, Chief Karkare, died after bullets penetrated, the
vest he was wearing.
 Helmets were of World War II vintage.
 Most of the responding detachments involved in the incidents were
carrying 303 bolt-action rifles used by the British Army in the 1950s.

37. Critical Analysis -

38. UNGUARDED INVOLVEMENT OF MEDIA
 Media was involved recklessly.
 Lack of authorities in guiding the media properly.
 Media giving the handlers in Pakistan live coverage of NSG commando
operation.
 NSG commandoes landed on Nariman house via helicopters and the
location was exactly revealed by the media in live coverage.
 The handlers in Pakistan used this information to guide the terrorists inside.

39. LIMITATIONS OF MUNICIPAL FIRE
AND EMERGENCY SERVICES
 Firemen were slow to respond.
 They failed to coordinate with both the local police and national
paramilitary forces.
 They suffered from inadequate equipment, even in a major, bustling,
economically vibrant city such as Mumbai.

40. NSG FAILURES
 The slow response of the NSG is especially noteworthy given its mandate to act as the
country’s premier rapid-reaction force.
 This underscores two main organizational and logistical issues,
 The unit is headquartered, South of Delhi and lacks bases anywhere else in the country.
 The NSG has no aircraft of its own and it cannot count on dedicated access to Indian Air
Force aircraft in an emergency.
 Any rapid-reaction force must reach the scene of a terrorist incident no later than 30–60
minutes after it has commenced.
 But, in Mumbai, nearly 10 hours elapsed.

41. Commando's in charge

43. FINAL ANALYSIS
 Lack of strategy led to loss of these many.
 Pre- disaster management is highly questionable.
 Satellite monitoring was not carried out properly.
 Conventional methods like lighthouses are practiced less.
 Availability of Kasab’s full confession video online, suggests that, the
enemies of state, exactly know, what Kasab revealed.
 Breaches of basic information security protocols provided the terrorists
with vital operational intelligence.

44. THANK YOU