SYNERGY INITIAL SECURITY BRF 2023 (1).ppt

Initial Security Briefing
Security Briefing for Synergy Business Solutions
Prepared by: Patrick Gordon, FSO, Synergy Business Solutions
Security@Synergy.Consulting

BRIEFING TOPICS
• BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS
• THREAT AWARENESS
• FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT
• INSIDER THREAT
• SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW
• CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
• SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
• 3 LEVELS OF CLASSIFICATION
• PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE OVERVIEW
• GETTING AND KEEPING A CLEARANCE
• SELF-REPORTING - KNOWING WHAT AND WHEN TO REPORT
• EMPLOYEE REPORTING - KNOWING WHAT AND WHEN TO REPORT
• SECURITY PROCEDURES AND DUTIES APPLICABLE TO THE JOB
• Security Executive Agent Directive – 3 (SEAD3)
• 3 TYPES OF REPORTABLE ACTIVITES
• SECURITY REMINDERS

BRIEFING REQUIREMENTS
• Annual/Refresher Security Briefing -
• Required annually for all cleared personnel
• In accordance with 32 CFR Rule Part 117 NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL
SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL (NISPOM) 117.12(k)
The Defense Hotline
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1900
Hotline Phone Number:
800-424-9098 (Toll-Free)
703-604-8799 (Commercial)
664-8799 (DSN)9

THREAT AWARENESS -
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT
• FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT
• Intelligence Agents gather information, especially in wartime, to gain
superiority over the enemy.
• Intelligence Officers are trained to serve their country by gathering
information.
• Spies, on the other hand, betray their country by espionage. Preventing
this kind of betrayal is the ultimate goal of the entire U.S. Personnel
Security System.

THREAT AWARENESS -
• ESPIONAGE – THE OLD THREAT
• Has existed since countries began to battle. However, it became an area of
concern for the United States during the Cold War.
• Our knowledge of Soviet Cold War espionage began with the
defection of Igor Sergeievitch Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet
Embassy in Ottawa. In September 1945, he defected to Canada with
documents that eventually led to the arrest of several Soviet spies.
• Nobody knows exactly how many spy incidents have occurred since
World War II, because so many have been kept secret or have never
been prosecuted. However, we do continue to have our classical spy
cases.

THREAT AWARENESS -
• ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE – THE NEW THREAT
• Definition: The acquisition by foreign governments or corporations of U.S.
high-technology information (classified or not) in order to enhance their
countries’ economic competitiveness.
• Estimates of current U.S. loss of proprietary business information now range
between $20 billion and $100 billion.
• This loss, and the loss of other technological information is especially
detrimental to our economic vitality and may, by extension, have
deleterious effects on U.S. security interests, since economic and national
security are so closely linked in our highly competitive new world.

THREAT AWARENESS -
• The FBI believes that nearly 100 countries are now running economic
espionage operations against the U.S. The targets are: basic research and
development processes, technology and trade secrets of U.S. high-tech
companies – everything from cost analyses, marketing plans, contract bids
and proprietary software to the high-tech data itself.
• What kind of people are these new spies?
• They may be informal representatives of their countries or people paid by
their countries to spy.
• They may be visiting the U.S. on scientific exchanges or business tours, or
with on-site inspection teams.

• They may be trade representatives or liaison officers at their embassies
here.
• Some may be foreign moles placed in American companies by their
country’s government, or students doing research in the U.S. who serve
as informal conduits to their home governments.
• They may be foreign business people who can manipulate long-distance
the communications systems of U.S. high-tech companies.
THREAT AWARENESS -

• Or, they may be our very own Americans, disgruntled or greedy
employees of U.S. companies who, having been volunteered or
been recruited, are willing to sell classified, proprietary or high-tech
information to other countries.
• Whoever they are, foreign or home-grown, they are generally well
educated and technologically sophisticated, and certainly well able to
navigate in high-tech waters.
• Methods of Espionage
• Basic business intelligence-gathering methods such as the internet and
dozens of commercial databases are widely available, along with such
sources as trade journals and company newsletters and annual reports.
THREAT AWARENESS -

• Extracting information from executives of competing companies under
the guise of job interviews, or hiring away an employee from a
competitor just to acquire that person’s knowledge.
• Through systems designed for exchanging information such as foreign
scientists invited to U.S. research institutes and laboratories, exchange
agreements with other countries to foster research and development,
provide security or technical assistance, and so forth.
• Foreign governments send their representatives to the U.S. on fact-
finding visits or for training.
• Establishing joint venture companies with Americans.
THREAT AWARENESS -

• Purchasing U.S. high-tech companies, preferably those with government
contracts.
• Under the guise of market research by sending surveys from abroad to
ferret out product information.
• The “best” way to acquire information from an organization or company
is to recruit a mole on the inside or to send one of your own people in on
a ruse, posing as someone else.
• Indicators of Espionage
• Attempts to gain access to classified information without a valid
need-to-know or without the required security clearance.
THREAT AWARENESS -

• Unauthorized reproduction or removal of classified material from the
work area and secret destruction of documents.
• Unexplained affluence can be a possible tip-off to ongoing espionage if
a legitimate source of increased income cannot be found. Sudden
prosperity might be of particular concern when it follows a period of
financial difficulties.
• Foreign travel, on a regular basis and without sufficient explanation.
• Job and career dissatisfaction or deep grudges against the company or
the U.S. Government.
THREAT AWARENESS -

Whatis anInsiderThreat?
Defined
The threat an insider will use her or his authorized access wittingly or
unwittingly, to do harm to the national security of the United States, their
organization, or themselves.
This can include damage through espionage, workplace/kinetic violence,
unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss
or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.
THREAT AWARENESS - INSIDER THREAT

How does the damage occur?
Espionage: Intelligence activity directed towards the acquisition of information
through clandestine means
Unauthorized Disclosure: A communication or physical transfer of classified
information to an unauthorized recipient.
Workplace/Kinetic Violence: Any act of violent behavior, threats of physical
violence, harassment, intimidation, bullying, verbal or non-verbal threat, or other
threatening, disruptive behavior that occurs at or outside the work site / Deliberat
application of force to the human body with the intent to do harm.

Reporting
• Immediately report suspicious activities, behaviors, and contacts to
your supervisor, facility security officer, or insider threat program.
• Industry personnel who fail to report are subject to disciplinary action
(including termination), fines, prison, or a combination of all three

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM OVERVIEW
• CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
• Definition: Official government information that has been determined to
require protection in the interest of national security. (Executive Order
12958)
• Forms of classified information include: A piece of hardware, a photograph,
film, recording tapes, notes, a drawing, a document or spoken words.
• Material is classified by the originator. It comes to industry via security
classification guides. The degree of safeguarding required depends on the
information’s classification category.

SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
• When in Use
• Cleared individuals with classified documents are responsible for
safeguarding these materials at all times.
• Classified material should be given sufficient protection to reasonably
ward against loss or compromise.
• Classified information cannot be discussed over unsecured
telephones, in public places, or any manner that may allow
transmittal or interception by unauthorized persons. This includes
not working on classified material on unapproved computers.

• Approved storage containers should remain locked unless they are
under constant surveillance and control.
• Security Markings
• All classified material should be marked in a conspicuous manner by the
originator of the material. Please seek the assistance of your Security
Officer, if you are generating any classified material.
• Reproduction of Classified Material
• Copies of classified materials are subject to the same security controls
as original classified material.

SECURITY REMINDERS
• No reproduction of classified materials is allowed without prior approval
from the contracting authority. Seek assistance from your Security
Officer.
• Copying classified documents on office photocopiers is prohibited
unless the machines are designated for such use and proper controls are
in place.
• Transmittal of Classified Material
• Do not attempt to mail, hand carry or transmit classified material on
your own. Always seek the assistance of the Security Officer.
• If you receive classified material from another person, or through the
mail, contact the Security Officer.

• When employees are working on classified material and leave their
desk, the documents must be locked in an approved storage
container. They must never be tucked in a desk drawer, file cabinet,
credenza, key-lock file, etc., for even the briefest period.
• Classified material should never be taken home.
• When Not in Use
• Classified material should be properly secured in an approved container,
unless it is being guarded by another properly cleared person with a
need-to-know.
SECURITY REMINDERS

• Classified material should never be left unsecured or unattended.
Constant surveillance by an authorized individual (cleared to the
appropriate level and a need-to-know) who is able to exercise control
over the classified material will provide reasonable security.
• When working with classified material in an unsecured area, any
open curtains, blinds or doors should be closed. It is prudent to also
post a sign, declaring “CLASSIFIED WORK IN PROGRESS”. If a visitor or
unauthorized employee is present, a classified document must be
protected by either covering it, turning it face down, or placing it in
an approved storage container.
SECURITY REMINDERS

3 LEVELS OF CLASSIFICATION
• Established based on the criticality of the information or material to
national interests. The three levels are:
• TOP SECRET – Information or material whose unauthorized disclosure
could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national
security.
• SECRET – Information or material whose unauthorized disclosure could
be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.
• CONFIDENTIAL – Information or material whose unauthorized disclosure
could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Other categories of information which, while not classified, also deserve mention.
• For Official Use Only (FOUO) – Unclassified government information which is exempt from
general public disclosure and must not be given general circulation. REPLACED BY (CUI)
• Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) - Executive Order 13556 established CUI on
November 4, 2010. DoD Instruction 5200.48, “Controlled Unclassified Information,”
established DoD CUI policy on March 6, 2020.
• Government created or owned UNCLASSIFIED information that must be safeguarded from
unauthorized disclosure.
• Information requiring specific security measures indexed under one system across the Federal
Government.
• The establishment of CUI was a watershed moment in the Department’s information security
program, formally acknowledging that certain types of UNCLASSIFIED information are
extremely sensitive, valuable to the United States, sought after by strategic competitors and
adversaries, and often have legal safeguarding requirements.
• Unlike with classified national security information, DoD personnel at all levels of
responsibility and across all mission areas receive, handle, create, and disseminate CUI.
• CUI policy provides a uniform marking system across the Federal Government that replaces a
variety of agency-specific markings, such as FOUO, LES, SBU, etc.

• Company private or proprietary information – Business information not to
be divulged to individuals outside the company. Examples of this kind of
information are:
• Salary and wage lists
• Technical and research data
• Trade Secrets

• ACCESS REQUIREMENTS
• Two conditions must be met.
• Recipient must have a valid and current security clearance at a level at
least as high as the information to be released.
• Recipient must demonstrate the need for access to the classified
information. This is referred to as need-to-know.

• GETTING THE CLEARANCE IS A TWO-STEP PROCESS: INVESTIGATION AND
ADJUDICATION
• Investigation. The paperwork you submitted via E-QIP was used to inquire
into your past to gather evidence to help determine whether you can be
trusted with classified information.
• Conducted by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
• SECRET Clearance Requirement
National Agency Check with Local Agency Check and Credit Check
PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE OVERVIEW
GETTING AND KEEPING A CLEARANCE

• Adjudication. The decision whether to grant or deny your clearance based
upon the investigative evidence.
• The Personnel Security Management Office-Industry (PSMO-I)
adjudicates all personnel security clearances for the firms/companies in
the NISP.
• PSMO-I, like all U.S. government departments and agencies, uses 13
adjudicative guidelines that provide consistent evaluation standards.
Financial considerations, criminal conduct, allegiance to the United
States and outside activities are examples of adjudication standards.
• If the PSMO-I adjudicator cannot affirmatively find that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a personnel
security clearance, the case is referred to the Defense Office of Hearings
and Appeals for further review.

• What can you do to increase the chances of being granted a clearance?
• Depends on the nature, extent, and seriousness of any adverse
information in your past
• Voluntarily report the information
• Be truthful and complete in responding to questions
• You sought help and followed professional guidance
• You’ve demonstrated positive changes in your behavior

• How long is your clearance good for?
• 10 Years from your eligibility date. At which time you will be subjected
to a Periodic Re-investigation.
• If you are terminated from the company (voluntarily or non-voluntarily),
you have 24 months for another cleared facility to sponsor your
clearance or your clearance will become inactive.

• RESPONSIBILITIES OF CLEARED INDIVIDUALS
• Comply with security regulations and procedures to protect classified
information.
• Comply with standards of conduct required of persons holding positions of
trust. Recognize and avoid behavior that might cause you to become
ineligible for continued access to classified material.
• The SF312 Nondisclosure Agreement you signed when accepting your
clearance is a legally binding agreement between you and the U.S.
Government in which you agreed to comply with procedures for
safeguarding classified information and acknowledged that there are legal
sanctions for violating this agreement.

• Report to your security office changes in your personal life that are
of security interest, including planned marriage or cohabitation,
certain outside activities, foreign contacts.
• Report to your security office or a counterintelligence office any
information that comes to your attention regarding known or
suspected foreign intelligence activity directed against yourself, a
fellow co-worker, your organization, or any other national interest.
• Report to your security office any information that raises doubts
about the reliability or trustworthiness of any co-worker or other
person with access to classified or other protected information.

• THE 13 ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES
• Exhibiting one or more of the described behaviors does NOT mean an individual is a
security risk. Security judgment is based on pattern of behavior, not a single action. If you
are unsure, talk with your security officer or your supervisor.
• Financial Considerations. Whether you are:
• Paying your bills
• Living or spending beyond your means
• Filing tax returns, tax evasion
• Receiving calls at work from creditors
• Have been denied credit
• Have a record of bounced or bad checks
• Fail to make child or spousal support payments
• Have filed for bankruptcy

(1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to the United States
• The Concern. The willingness to safeguard classified or sensitive information is in doubt if
there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.
(2) GUIDELINE B: Foreign Influence
• The Concern. Foreign contacts and interests, including, but not limited to, business,
financial, and property interests, are a national security concern if they result in divided
allegiance.
(3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign Preference
• The Concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may provide information or make
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
(4) GUIDELINE D: Sexual Behavior
• The Concern. Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense; reflects a lack of judgment
or discretion; or may subject the individual to undue influence of coercion, exploitation, or
duress.

(5)GUIDELINE E: Personal Conduct
•The Concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.
(6)GUIDELINE F: Financial Considerations
•The Concern. Failure to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations
may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and
regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness,
and ability to protect classified or sensitive information.
(7)GUIDELINE G: Alcohol Consumption
•The Concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable
judgment or the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's
reliability and trustworthiness.
(8)GUIDELINE H: Drug Involvement and Substance Misuse
•The Concern. The illegal use of controlled substances, to include the misuse of prescription
and non-prescription drugs, and the use of other substances that cause physical or mental
impairment or are used in a manner inconsistent with their intended purpose can raise
questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness

(9) GUIDELINE I: Psychological Conditions
• The Concern. Certain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair judgment,
reliability, or trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there to be
a concern under this guideline.
(10)GUIDELINE J: Criminal Conduct
• The Concern. Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and
trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to
comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
(11)GUIDELINE K: Handling Protected Information
• The Concern. Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for
handling protected information-which includes classified and other sensitive government
information, and proprietary information-raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness,
judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a
serious security concern.

(12)GUIDELINE L: Outside Activities
• The Concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of
security concern if it poses a conflict of interest with an individual's security
responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of
classified or sensitive information.
(13) GUIDELINE M: Use of Information Technology
• The Concern. Failure to comply with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations
pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an
individual's reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the willingness or
ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and information.
• Exhibiting one or more of the described behaviors does NOT mean an individual
is a security risk. Security judgment is based on pattern of behavior, not a single
action. If you are unsure, talk with your security officer or your supervisor.

• Security Violations
• Unauthorized disclosures (Intentional or not)
• Taking classified information home
• Multiple security infractions
• Downloading or viewing classified information on an unapproved system
• Removing classified study notes
• Deliberate failure to comply with security regulations
• Statements or actions that demonstrate an individual believes the
security rules don’t apply to him/her
SELF-REPORTING - KNOWING WHAT AND WHEN TO REPORT

• CHANGE IN PERSONAL STATUS
• Marital status – married, divorced
• Cohabitation – living in spouse-like relationship; intimate relationship,
engaged
• Change of name
• FOREIGN TRAVEL
• Security Office will provide State Dept advisories on hazardous conditions
and any known security concerns.
• Receive a defensive security briefing. The Defense Hotline
The Pentagon
800-424-9098 (Toll-Free)
664-8799 (DSN)9

• FOREIGN CONTACTS
• You must report contact with individuals of any foreign nationality, either
within or outside the scope of your official duties, in which:
• Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise
sensitive information.
• You may be concerned that you are a target of an attempted
exploitation.
• MEDIA CONTACTS
• Inquiries about your job or organization.
• Ongoing personal contacts with media representatives who cover your
organization.

• PREPUBLICATION REVIEW
• Technical paper, book, magazine article, or newspaper prepared for posting
on internet, or lecture or speech that you prepare to give, must be cleared
if it contains information or knowledge you gained during your current or
any previous classified job.
• Resumes
• LOSS OR COMPROMISE OF INFORMATION
• Inadvertently or accidentally lose or compromise classified or other
sensitive information.
• First Priority: Regain control of the classified material.

• FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
• Filing for bankruptcy
• Garnishment of wages
• Have a lien placed upon your property for failing to pay a
creditor
• Eviction from a residence for failure to pay rent or mortgage
• ARRESTS
• Any, regardless of whether or not you were convicted or charges
were dropped.
• Other Involvement with the Legal System: Target of legal action
such as being sued. Possibility you might be required to discuss
your job under oath.

• PSYCHOLOGICAL COUNSELING
• Psychological treatment is reported unless it is for marital, family or grief
counseling.
• Seeking help for routine life crises does not reflect adversely on an
individual’s judgment.
• WHAT ELSE ?
• Deal with reportable issues in the early stages
• Take advantage of available resources
• Talk with your Facility Security Officer
• Be alert to situational stressors in yourself and your co-workers
• Early intervention is often a key to early resolution

• EMPLOYEE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
• Suspicious Contacts: All contacts with known or suspected intelligence
officers from any country, or any contact that suggests the employee may be
the target of an attempted exploitation by a foreign intelligence service.
Examples,
• Any efforts, by any individual, to obtain illegal or unauthorized access to
classified or sensitive unclassified information.
• Any efforts, by any individual, to compromise a cleared employee.
EMPLOYEE REPORTING - KNOWING WHAT AND WHEN TO REPORT

• Adverse Information: Cleared contractor employees are required to report
to their respective security department adverse information regarding other
cleared employees. As a general rule, adverse information is that which
reflects unfavorably on the trustworthiness or reliability of the employee and
suggests that the person’s ability to safeguard classified information may be
impaired. Examples include:
• Arrest for any serious violation of the law
• Excessive use of alcohol or abuse of prescription drugs
• Any use of illegal drugs
• Bizarre or notoriously disgraceful conduct
• Sudden unexplained affluence
• Treatment for mental or emotional disorders

• Loss or Compromise: Employees are required to report any loss,
compromise or suspected compromise of classified information, foreign or
domestic, to the appropriate security office. Reporting provides employees
with an opportunity to extricate themselves from a compromising situation
and enhances the protection of national security information.
The Defense Hotline
The Pentagon
800-424-9098 (Toll-Free)
664-8799 (DSN)9

• New status as a Representative of a Foreign Interest (RFI)
• Change in RFI status
• Other Reporting Requirements
• Any act of sabotage, espionage or attempted espionage, and any
subversive or suspicious activity.
• Any attempts to solicit classified information, unauthorized persons on
company property, citizenship by naturalization, unwillingness to work on
classified information, and disclosure of classified information to an
unauthorized person, along with any other condition that would qualify
as a security violation or which common sense would dictate as worth
reporting.
The Defense Hotline
The Pentagon
800-424-9098 (Toll-Free)
664-8799 (DSN)9

SECURITY PROCEDURES AND DUTIES APPLICABLE TO THE JOB
• SAFEGUARDING CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
• When in Use
• Cleared individuals with classified documents are responsible for
safeguarding these materials at all times.
• Classified material should be given sufficient protection to reasonably
ward against loss or compromise.
• Classified information cannot be discussed over unsecured telephones,
in public places, or any manner that may allow transmittal or
interception by unauthorized persons. This includes not working on
classified material on unapproved computers.

• Classified material should never be left unsecured or unattended.
Constant surveillance by an authorized individual (cleared to the
appropriate level and a need-to-know) who is able to exercise
control over the classified material will provide reasonable security.
• When working with classified material in an unsecured area, any
open curtains, blinds and doors should be closed. It is prudent to
also post a sign, declaring “CLASSIFIED WORK IN PROGRESS”. If a
visitor or unauthorized employee is present, a classified document
must be protected by either covering it, turning it face down, or
placing it in an approved storage container.

• When employees are working on classified material and leave their
desk, the documents must be locked in an approved storage
container. They must never be tucked in a desk drawer, file cabinet,
credenza, key-lock file, etc., for even the briefest period.
• Classified material must never be taken home.
• When Not in Use
• Classified material should be properly secured in an approved container,
unless it is being guarded by another properly cleared person with a
need-to-know.

• Approved storage containers should remain locked unless they are
under constant surveillance and control.
• Security Markings
• All classified material should be marked in a conspicuous manner by the
originator of the material. Please seek the assistance of your Security
Officer, if you are generating any classified material.
• Reproduction of Classified Material
• Copies of classified materials are subject to the same security controls
as original classified material.

• No reproduction of classified materials is allowed without prior approval
from the contracting authority. Seek assistance from your Security
Officer.
• Copying classified documents on office photocopiers is prohibited unless
the machines are designated for such use and proper controls are in
place.
• Transmittal of Classified Material
• Do not attempt to mail, hand carry or transmit classified material on your
own. Always seek the assistance of the Security Officer.
• If you receive classified material from another person, or through the
mail, contact the Security Officer.

• Emergencies. Protection, removal, or destruction of classified material in
case of emergency such as fire, natural disaster, civil disturbance, terrorist
activities, or enemy attack. Although the importance of protecting classified
material cannot be discounted, it must be accomplished in such a way as to
minimize the risk of loss of life or injury to employees.
• If there is no imminent danger to employees:
• Secure classified material in authorized containers before evacuation.
• If authorized storage is not immediately available, attempt to carry
classified material from the area, seeking assistance from other
cleared personnel as needed.

• Thoroughly check work spaces for unsecured classified material prior
to departure.
• Should circumstances require that classified material be left
unattended, immediately report this fact to your Security Officer.
• When feasible, the Security Officer will then designate personnel to
monitor the area perimeter and note unauthorized access to the
area.
• Upon cancellation of the emergency situation, and when given the
authorization to do so, employees will return to the work area and
inventory any unsecured classified material; reporting the results of
this action to the Security Officer.

• If there is imminent danger to employees:
• Evacuate immediately, leaving classified material in place. Under no
circumstances should employees endanger themselves attempting
to secure or remove classified information from work spaces.
• When possible, report the existence of unattended classified
material to the area supervisor who will then, as conditions allow,
either arrange for monitoring of the area perimeter or contact the
Security Officer to report the situation.
• Upon cancellation of the emergency situation, and when given the
authorization to do so, employees will return to the work area and
inventory any unsecured classified material; reporting the results of
this action to the Security Officer.

• Should classified destruction be warranted (e.g., enemy/terrorist attack):
• When possible, material should be destroyed using a shredder
previously authorized for classified destruction.
• When such equipment is not available, or circumstances otherwise
dictate, material may be destroyed by any means that will ensure
positive destruction of the material. Alternate means include burning.
• If possible, document the destruction of all accountable material by
noting, at a minimum, the control number on the document.
• Report destruction to the Security Officer.

Security Executive Agent Directive – 3
(SEAD-3)
Reporting Requirements for Personnel with Access to
Classified Information
Prepared by: Patrick Gordon, FSO, Synergy Business Solutions
Security@Synergy.Consulting

Reporting Requirements for Personnel with
Access to Classified Information
PURPOSE:
The Security Executive Agent (SecEA) Directive (SEAD) establishes reporting requirements for
all covered individuals who have access to classified information or hold a sensitive position.
APPLICABILITY:
The Directive applies to any executive branch agency or covered individual as defined below.
DEFINITIONS:
As used in the Directive, the following terms have the meanings set forth below:
Covered Individual - Covered individuals are not limited to government employees and
include all persons, … who have access to classified information or who hold sensitive
positions, including, but not limited to, contractors, subcontractors, licensees, certificate
holders, grantees, experts, consultants, and government employees.

DEFINITIONS (Continued):
Foreign Intelligence Entity : Known or suspected foreign state or non-state organizations or
persons that conduct intelligence activities to acquire U.S. information, block or impair U.S.
intelligence collection, influence U.S. policy, or disrupt U.S. systems and programs. The term
includes foreign intelligence and security services and international terrorists.
Foreign National: Any person who is not a U.S. citizen or a U.S. national.
Media: Any person, organization, or entity, other than Federal, state, local, tribal, and
territorial governments: a. Primarily engaged in the collection, production, or dissemination
to the public of information in any form, which includes print, broadcast, film, and Internet;
or b. Otherwise engaged in the collection, production, or dissemination to the public of
information in any form related to topics of national security, which includes print, broadcast,
film, and Internet.

DEFINITIONS (Continued):
National Security: Those activities which are directly concerned with the foreign relations of
the United States, or protection of the Nation from internal subversion, foreign aggression, or
terrorism.
National Security Eligibility: Eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold
a sensitive position, to include access to sensitive compartmented information, restricted
data, and controlled or special access program information.
Sensitive Position: Any position within or in support of an agency in which the occupant could
bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on national
security regardless of whether the occupant has access to classified information and
regardless of whether the occupant is an employee, military service member, or contractor.
Unauthorized Disclosure: A communication, confirmation, acknowledgement, or physical
transfer of classified information, including the facilitation of, or actual giving, passing, selling,
publishing, or in any way making such information available to an unauthorized recipient.

POLICY:
All covered individuals incur a special and continuing security obligation to be aware of the
risks associated with foreign intelligence operations and/or possible terrorist activities
directed against them in the United States and abroad. These individuals also have a
responsibility to recognize and avoid personal behaviors and activities that may adversely
impact their continued national security eligibility.
Covered individuals shall report to Synergy FSO any planned or actual involvement in any of
the reportable activities prior to participation in such activities or otherwise as soon as
possible following the start of their involvement.
Failure to comply with reporting requirements and resultant determinations made by the
agency may result in administrative action that includes, but is not limited to, revocation of
national security eligibility.

Security Executive Agent Directive (SEAD) – 3
REPORTABLE ACTIVITIES :
There are 3 types of reportable activities for Covered Individuals defined by SEAD-3.
1. Foreign Travel
2. Foreign Contact
3. Reportable Activities of Others

REPORTABLE ACTIVITIES FOR ALL COVERED INDIVIDUALS:
Foreign Travel:
Covered individuals shall submit an itinerary for foreign travel to the Synergy FSO or
designee and, except as noted in the subparagraphs below, must receive approval prior to
the foreign travel.
Unanticipated border crossings into any foreign country not included in the traveler's
approved itinerary, regardless of duration, are discouraged.
All deviations from approved travel itineraries shall be reported within five business days of
return.
Travel to Puerto Rico, Guam, or other U.S. possessions and territories is not considered
foreign travel and need not be reported.
Unplanned day trips to Canada or Mexico shall be reported upon return. Reporting shall be
within five business days.

REPORTABLE ACTIVITIES FOR ALL COVERED INDIVIDUALS:
Foreign Contacts: What to Report -
(Note: Heads of agencies or designees shall determine requirements for reporting contact
with a foreign national as part of a covered individual's official duties.)
Unofficial Contacts:
- Unofficial contact with a known or suspected foreign intelligence entity.
- Continuing association with known foreign nationals that involve bonds of affection,
personal obligation, or intimate contact; or any contact with a foreign national that involves
the exchange of personal information. This reporting requirement is based on the nature of
the relationship regardless of how or where the foreign national contact was made or how
the relationship is maintained (i.e. via personal contact, telephonic, postal system, Internet,
etc.).
- The reporting of limited or casual public contact with foreign nationals is not required
absent any other reporting requirement in this directive. Following initial reporting, updates
regarding continuing unofficial association with known foreign nationals shall occur only if
and when there is a significant change in the nature of the contact.

REPORTABLE ACTIVITIES FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH ACCESS TO SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION, "L" ACCESS, OR HOLDING A NON-CRITICAL SENSITIVE POSITION:
In addition Covered Individuals with access to Secret and Confidential information, "L"
access, or holding a Non-Critical sensitive position shall also report:
Foreign Activities:
- Application for and receipt of foreign citizenship.
- Application for, possession, or use of a foreign passport or identity card for travel.
Other Reportable Activities:
- Attempted elicitation, exploitation, blackmail, coercion, or enticement to obtain classified
information or other information specifically prohibited by law from disclosure regardless of
means.
- Media contacts, other than for official purposes, where the media seeks access to classified
information or other information specifically prohibited by law from disclosure, whether or
not the contact results in an unauthorized disclosure. Media contacts related to the
fulfillment of official duties of the position held by the covered individual need not be
reported.
- Arrests.
- Bankruptcy or over 120 days delinquent on any debt.
- Alcohol-and drug-related treatment.

Reportable Actions by Others:
To ensure the protection of classified information … covered individuals shall alert the
Synergy FSO or designees to the following reportable activities of other covered individuals
that may be of potential security or counterintelligence (CI) concern:
- An unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations or to cooperate with security
requirements.
- Unexplained affluence or excessive indebtedness.
- Alcohol abuse.
- Illegal use or misuse of drugs or drug activity.
- Apparent or suspected mental health issues where there is reason to believe it may impact
the covered individual's ability to protect classified information or other information
specifically prohibited by law from disclosure.
- Criminal conduct.
- Any activity that raises doubts as to whether another covered individual's continued
national security eligibility is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
- Misuse of U.S. Government property or information systems.

• ALL PERSONNEL
• Entering or departing any Government/Contractor facility are subject to an
inspection of their briefcase, shoulder bags, handbags, luggage, athletic
bags, etc. for the purpose of detecting the introduction or removal of
classified material.
• Using the photographic, video, or other recording capabilities of any device
is strictly prohibited within all Government/Contractor facilities.
• Anyone attending a classified meeting in Government/Contractor facilities
must surrender all recording capable devices to the receptionist, upon their
arrival and check-in.
SECURITY REMINDERS

• Facility visits
• Shall be processed through the sponsoring foreign government to the U.S.
Government agency for approval
• Visits by Foreign Nationals
• Involving the disclosure of classified information,
• Involving Unclassified information related to a U.S. Government classified
program, or
• Involving only commercial programs and related Unclassified information
may be submitted directly to the contractor.
SECURITY REMINDERS

.
The Defense Hotline
The Pentagon
800-424-9098 (Toll-Free)
664-8799 (DSN)9

10/11/2023 69
SYNERGY ISO Reference:
None
DOCUMENT TYPE: Signature Title: Security Training
Security Training Acknowledgement Form
By signing below, I acknowledge that I have read and understand the
“INITIAL SECURITY BRIEFING for Synergy Personnel”
in its entirety.
Signature
Printed Name
Date
Submit completed form to: Security@Synergy.Consulting

SYNERGY INITIAL SECURITY BRF 2023 (1).ppt

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