Slides on Geostrategic significance and challenges of Germany

1. GERMANY
Maira Asif, Hafsa Farooqi, Ayesha Rasheed, Shizza Masood

2. The Geographic Challenge of Germany

3. Origins of Germany's Strategy
• Since WW2, the entire structure of modern Europe was created to take advantage of
Germany's economic dynamism while avoiding the threat of German domination.
• The future of German strategy is certainly the most important question in Europe and
quite possibly in the world.

4. Origins of Germany's Strategy
• Before 1871, when Germany was fragmented into a large number of small states, it
did not pose a challenge to Europe. Rather, it served as a buffer between France on
one side and Russia and Austria on the other. Napoleon and his campaign to dominate
Europe first changed the status of Germany, both overcoming the barrier and
provoking the rise of Prussia, a powerful German entity.
• Prussia became instrumental in creating a united Germany in 1871, and with that, the
geopolitics of Europe changed.

5. Origins of Germany's Strategy
• Germany was also inherently insecure. Lacking any real strategic depth, Germany
could not survive a simultaneous attack by France and Russia. Therefore, Germany's
core strategy was to prevent the emergence of an alliance between France and Russia.
• However, in the event that there was no alliance between France and Russia, Germany
was always tempted to solve the problem in a more controlled and secure way, by
defeating France and ending the threat of an alliance. This is the strategy Germany has
chosen for most of its existence.

6. Origins of Germany's Strategy
• Germany was confronted with a strategic problem. By the early 20th century the
Triple Entente, signed in 1907, had allied Russia, France and the United Kingdom. If
they attacked simultaneously at a time of their choosing, these countries could destroy
Germany.
• Therefore, Germany's only defense was to launch a war at a time of its choosing,
defeat one of these countries and deal with the others at its leisure.
• During both World War I and World War II, Germany first struck at France and then
turned to deal with Russia while keeping the United Kingdom at bay. In both wars, the
strategy failed. In World War I, Germany failed to defeat France and found itself in an
extended war on two fronts. In World War II, it defeated France but failed to defeat
Russia, allowing time for an Anglo-American counterattack in the west.

7. Binding Germany to Europe
• Germany was divided after World War II. Whatever the first inclinations of the
victors, it became clear that a rearmed West Germany was essential if the Soviet
Union was going to be contained. If Germany was to be rearmed, its economy had to
be encouraged to grow, and what followed was the German economic miracle.
Germany again became the most dynamic part of Europe.

8. Binding Germany to Europe
• The issue was to prevent Germany from returning to the pursuit of an autonomous
national strategy, both because it could not resist the Soviet forces to the east by itself
and, more important, because the West could not tolerate the re-emergence of divisive
and dangerous power politics in Europe.
• The key was binding Germany to the rest of Europe militarily and economically. Put
another way, the key was to make certain that German and French interests coincided,
since tension between France and Germany had been one of the triggers of prior wars
since 1871.

9. Binding Germany to Europe
• Militarily, German and French interests were tied together under the NATO alliance even after
France withdrew from the NATO Military Committee under Charles de Gaulle. Economically,
Germany was bound with Europe through the emergence of more sophisticated multilateral
economic organizations that ultimately evolved into the European Union.
• After World War II, West Germany's strategy was threefold. First, it had to defend itself against
the Soviet Union in concert with an alliance that would effectively command its military
through NATO. This would limit German sovereignty but eliminate the perception of Germany
as a threat. Second, it would align its economy with that of the rest of Europe, pursuing
prosperity without undermining the prosperity of other countries. Third, it would exercise
internal political sovereignty, reclaiming its rights as a nation without posing a geopolitical
threat to Western Europe.

10. Binding Germany to Europe
• The strategy worked well. There was no war with the Soviets. There was no
fundamental conflict in Western Europe and certainly none that was military in nature.
The European economy in general, and the German economy in particular, surged
once East Germany had been reintegrated with West Germany. With reintegration,
German internal sovereignty was insured. Most important, France remained linked to
Germany via the European Union and NATO. Russia, or what was left after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, was relatively secure so long as Germany remained part
of European structures. The historical strategic problem Germany had faced appeared
solved.

11. Europe's Economic Crisis
• The situation became more complex after 2008. Germany's formal relationship with
NATO remained intact, but without the common threat of the Soviet Union, the
alliance was fracturing over the divergent national interests of its members. The
European Union had become Germany's focus. Germany needed the European Union.
It needed it for the reasons that have existed since World War II: as a foundation of its
relationship with France and as a means to ensure that national interest would not
generate the kinds of conflicts that had existed in the past.

12. Europe's Economic Crisis
• It needed the European Union for another reason as well. Germany is the second-
largest exporter in the world. It exports to many countries, but Europe is a critical
customer. The free-trade zone that was the foundation of the European Union was also
one of the foundations of the German economy. The pricing of the euro aided German
exports, and regulations in Brussels gave Germany other advantages. The European
Union, as it existed between 1991 and 2008, was critical to Germany.
• However, the European Union no longer functions as it once did. The economic
dynamics of Europe have placed many countries at a substantial disadvantage, and the
economic crisis of 2008 triggered a sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis in Europe.

13. Europe's Economic Crisis
• Germany is prepared to bail out other European countries if they impose austerity and then
take steps to make sure that the austerity is actually implemented to the degree necessary and
that the crisis is not repeated. From Germany's point of view, the roots of the crisis lie in the
fiscal policies of the troubled countries From the view of southern Europe, which is that the
crisis was the result of the European Union's design, then what Germany is proposing is the
imposition of German power via economics.
• It is difficult to imagine a vast surrender of sovereignty to a German-dominated EU
bureaucracy, whatever the economic cost. It is also difficult to imagine Germany underwriting
the debt without some controls beyond promises; even if the European Union is vitally
important to the Germans, German public opinion will not permit it. Finally, it is difficult to
see how, in the long term, the Europeans can reconcile their differences on this issue. The issue
must come to a head, if not in this financial crisis then in the next — and there is always a next
crisis.

14. Europe's Economic Crisis
• NATO is badly frayed. The European Union is under tremendous pressure and
national interests are now dominating European interests. Germany's ability to use the
European Union for economic ends has not dissipated but can no longer be relied on
over the long term. Therefore, it follows that Germany must be considering an
alternative strategy. Its relationship with Russia is such a strategy.

15. An Alternative Strategy
• In the meantime, the basic framework of Europe has changed since 1991. Russia
remains a shadow of the Soviet Union, but it has become a major exporter of natural
gas. Germany depends on that natural gas even as it searches for alternatives. Russia
is badly in need of technology, which Germany has in abundance.
• Russia also has a declining population, but even so, it has a surplus of workers, both
unemployed and underemployed. If the workers cannot be brought to the factories, the
factories can be brought to the workers. In short, there is substantial synergy between
the Russian and German economies. Add to this that the Germans feel under heavy
pressure from the United States to engage in actions the Germans want to be left out
of, while the Russians see the Americans as a threat to their interests, and there are
politico-military interests that Germany and Russia have in common.

16. • For Germany, a relationship with Russia does as well as one with France. An ideal
situation for Germany would be a Franco-German-Russian entente. Such an alliance
has been tried in the past, but its weakness is that it would provide too much security
to Germany, allowing it to be more assertive. Normally, France and Russia have
opposed Germany, but in this case, it is certainly possible to have a continuation of the
Franco-German alliance or a Russo-French alliance. Indeed, a three-way alliance
might be possible as well.
An Alternative Strategy

17. • Germany's current strategy is to preserve the European Union and its relationship with
France while drawing Russia closer into Europe. The difficulty of this strategy is that
Germany's trade policies are difficult for other European countries to manage,
including France. If Germany faces an impossible situation with the European Union,
the second strategic option would be a three-way alliance, with a modified European
Union or perhaps outside of the EU structure. If France decides it has other interests,
such as its idea of a Mediterranean Union, then a German-Russian relationship
becomes a real possibility.
An Alternative Strategy

18. • A German-Russian relationship would have the potential to tilt the balance of power
in the world. The United States is currently the dominant power, but the combination
of German technology and Russian resources — an idea dreamt of by many in the past
— would become a challenge on a global basis. Of course, there are bad memories on
both sides, and trust in the deepest sense would be hard to come by. But although
alliances rely on trust, it does not necessarily have to be deep-seated trust.
• Germany's strategy, therefore, is still locked in the EU paradigm. However, if the EU
paradigm becomes unsupportable, then other strategies will have to be found. The
Russo-German relationship already exists and is deepening. Germany thinks of it in
the context of the European Union, but if the European Union weakens, Russia
becomes Germany's natural alternative.
An Alternative Strategy

19. THANK YOU