Burundi, radio and genocide lessons learned Cambodia Rwanda Kosovo - Frank Chalk

1. RADIO, GENOCIDE, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM CAMBODIA,
RWANDA, KOSOVO, AND BURUNDI
Presented by
Professor Frank Chalk
Department of History
and the
Montreal Institute for
Genocide and Human
Rights Studies
Concordia University
16 June 2015

2. FOCUS
WHAT LESSONS HAVE
WE LEARNED ABOUT
THE USES OF RADIO
FROM OUR PRACTICAL
EXPERIENCES SINCE
1992?
HOW SHOULD THEY BE
APPLIED IN BURUNDI
TODAY?

3. Cases for
Discussion
CAMBODIA
RWANDA
KOSOVO
BURUNDI

4. CAMBODIA,
1992-1993
THE UNITED NATIONS
TRANSITIONAL
AUTHORITY FOR
CAMBODIA (UNTAC)
TASKS
ORGANIZE NATIONAL
ELECTIONS
MAINTAIN SECURITY
EDUCATE FOR
DEMOCRATIC DEBATE
ENCOURAGE
GROWTH OF CIVIL
SOCIETY

5. THE POLITICAL
SITUATION
CAMBODIA RUN BY
HUN SEN
KHMER ROUGE BASED
ON THAI FRONTIER
FROM 1979 TO 1990,
THE WEST AND CHINA
AIDED THE KHMER
ROUGE (KR)
ASSOCIATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN
NATIONS (ASEAN)
ALSO HELPED THE KR

6. Map of Cambodia and
Its Neighbors

7. 1979-1993
Under President Jimmy Carter, the
United States responded to the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia
in December 1978-January 1979
by condemning Vietnam at the
United Nations and voting to retain
the Khmer Rouge delegation as the
official representative of
Democratic Kampuchea at the UN.
The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) demanded that
Vietnam withdraw its troops from
Cambodia.

8. 1979-1993
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore and other ASEAN
states, joined by China, Britain
and the United States, furnished
the Khmer Rouge with arms,
military training, food, and medical
aid.
The Khmer Rouge were allowed
to dominate the Khmer refugee
camps on the Cambodian-Thai
border and were encouraged to
use them as bases for attacks on
the Vietnamese occupiers of
Cambodia.

9. 1979-1993
Western and ASEAN backing of the
Khmer Rouge arose from:
Insistence on the sanctity of
borders
ASEAN fear of Vietnamese, Soviet-
backed expansionism
American bitterness over loss of the
Vietnam war
Western determination to join China
in the exploitation of South China
Sea undersea oil deposits and
China’s hostility to Vietnam

10. 1979-1993
On 28 February 1992, the United
Nations Security Council
authorized the establishment of
the U. N. Transition Authority for
Cambodia (UNTAC)
The Party of Democratic
Kampuchea, representing the
Khmer Rouge, withdrew its
cooperation later that year, and
elections proceeded without its
participation

11. 1979-1993
UNTAC was staffed by 15,991
troops and 3,359 civilian police
officers
362,209 Cambodian refugees
were repatriated from Thailand
into Cambodia
The election campaign began on
7 April 1993

12. UNTAC RADIO
ORGANIZED BY UNTAC
“INFORMATION DEPT.”
HEADED BY TIMOTHY
CARNEY, U.S. STATE
DEPARTMENT
OPPOSED BY THE
VOICE OF
DEMOCRATIC
KAMPUCHEA (VODK)
(KR RADIO) BASED ON
THE THAI BORDER

13. UNTAC RADIO
STRATEGY
EMPHASIZE THAT
BALLOTS SECRET
ENCOURAGE
PEASANTS TO VOTE
BROADCAST NEWS
WITHOUT DISTORTION
OFFER EQUAL RADIO
TIME FREE TO ALL
POLITICAL PARTIES
PLAY GOOD MUSIC
AND ENTERTAIN
DISTRIBUTE TAPES TO
DISTRICT ELECTORAL
OFFICES

14. NEAR
DISASTERS
TEMPTATION: BLOW
UP KHMER ROUGE
RADIO TRANSMITTER
VICTORY OF UNTAC
OFFICIALS OPPOSED
TO KNOCKING KR OFF
THE AIR
ALLEGATIONS OF
VIETNAMESE
INFILTRATING UNTAC
RADIO STAFF
DISPROVED

15. UNTAC
ELECTION
RESULTS
More than 4.2 million
votes were cast,
representing 90 percent
of the registered voters
(23 to 29 May 1993)
FUNCINPEC defeated
Hun Sen’s ruling party,
the CPP
But Hun Sen used
patronage, bribery, and
the inexperience of the
Opposition parties to
remain in power

16. RWANDA,
1990-1994
Invasion of Rwanda from
Uganda by the Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF),
Oct. 1990
International intervention
resulted in two cease fire
accords negotiated at
Arusha, Tanzania in 1992
and 1994
Hate propaganda banned
from Radio Rwanda, the
Government station, and
Radio Beacon, the RPF’s
radio station

17. RTLM FORMED
In the summer, 1993,
Radio-Télévision Libre
des Mille Collines
(RTLM) was formed by
business and
government leaders
close to President
Habyarimana’s wife’s
political circle, the Akazu
(the Little House in
Kinyarwanda)
RTLM featured
Rwanda`s first
broadcasts of talk radio,
hot Zairois music, and
telephone call-in shows

18. RTLM’S GOALS
Attract the youth
audience to the
Interhamwe militia
Disseminate anti-Tutsi
hate propaganda
Broadcast disinformation
Mirror the editorials in
low-circulation hate
publications like Kangura
for the largely illiterate
masses of Rwanda
Undermine respect for
the UN military force,
UNAMIR

19. 6 and 7 April 1994
Shooting down of Pres.
Habyarimana’s airplane as
he returned from Arusha
Killings began at roadblocks
around Rwanda’s capital,
Kigali
RTLM broadcasters incited
listeners to avenge the
death of the President and
to find and kill pro-human
rights Hutu and Tutsi
On 7 April, RTLM said: “The
graves are not yet quite full.
Who is going to do the good
work and help us fill them
completely?”

20. Failures
Western governments
refused to provide
General Romeo Dallaire
with the radio jamming
equipment he requested
(or to support an
operation to blow up
RTLM’s transmitter)
Neither the Rwanda
Patriotic Front’s Radio
Beacon nor Western
broadcasters warned
Tutsi that a genocide was
underway and not to
seek sanctuary in
churches

21. Rationales for
Inaction
Lawyers at the White
House argued that
jamming RTLM would
violate the First
Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and be too
expensive
RPF officials opposed
the broadcast of
warnings which
emphasized the separate
identity of Tutsi as
playing into the hands of
the hate propagandists

22. Results and
Aftermath
At least 500,000-800,000
Tutsi and pro-human
rights Hutu murdered
between 6 April and early
July 1994
After the genocide had
ended, in February 1995,
the UN initiated its own
radio station in Rwanda,
Radio MINUAR
Editors at the French-
language service of the
Voice of America denied
that they could have
known a genocide was
underway

23. KOSOVO,
1998-1999
Early warnings of gross
violations of human rights
by Serb forces in Kosovo
were numerous in the
1990s
Ethnic cleansing of
Kosovars was feared
In 1989, Milosevic had
stripped Kosovo of its
political autonomy,
formerly guaranteed by
Yugoslavia’s 1974
constitution
About 90% of the
population of Kosovo
was of Albanian Muslim
origin, the rest Serb, etc.

24. A Chronology of
Violence, 1998
July: Serb forces
recapture areas
controlled by separatist
Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA)
September: NATO issues
ultimatum to Yugoslav
Pres. Milosevic to stop
violence in Kosovo or
face air strikes
October: Serbian forces
withdraw from Kosovo
and air strikes are
averted

25. 1999: Year of
Decisions
January: Violence
escalates in Kosovo;
bodies of 45 ethnic
Albanians discovered in
Racak; William Walker,
head of international
inspectors, calls Racak a
Serb police massacre;
Louise Arbour is refused
entry to Kosovo to probe
killings
February: Six nation
contact group summons
Serbs and ethnic
Albanians to talks at
Rambouillet

26. 1999 (continued)
19 February: Milosevic
declares Serbs will not
give up Kosovo, even if
bombed
1 March: Milosevic
rejects international
peacekeepers for Kosovo
20 March: All 1,380
international monitors
withdraw from Kosovo
23 March: Serb
parliament rejects NATO
peackeepers for Kosovo;
Holbrooke declares way
open for NATO air strikes

27. 1999 (continued)
24 March: NATO
bombing of Serb bases
begins and mounts to
about 34,000 air strikes
over 78 days
24 March: All
independent media in
Kosovo closed by
Milosevic
31 March: Clinton
Administration estimates
over one-third of
Kosovo’s nearly 1.8
million ethnic Albanians
have been forced from
their homes by Serbian
troops

28. The Role of Radio
2 April 1999: Serb
government officials shut
down independent radio
station B92 and dismiss
its manager
B92 continues to
broadcast via the Internet
and satellite. Local radio
stations across Europe
re-broadcast B92’s radio
signal
All independent Serb
newspapers were closed
by Milosevic

29. NATO Initiatives
23-24 April: NATO missiles
destroy Serb State
Television studios and
transmitters; it resumes
broadcasts 6 hours later
Tony Blair defends the
attack as justified since it
was part of the “apparatus
of dictatorship and power of
Milosevic.”
U.S. operated C-130
Commando Solo Hercules
jammed Serb radio and TV
broadcasts throughout the
war

30. Commando Solo
C-130 Hercules

31. Errors of U.S.
Psy-Ops Radio
Commando Solo
broadcasters frequently
jammed their own
transmissions by mistake
The broadcasters spoke
archaic Serbo-Croatian
and were not believed
Their messages were
unsophisticated and had
little impact
Much more successful,
was Radio Free Europe,
which phoned Serbs and
Kosovars and let them
broadcast their concerns

32. Kosovo War
Ended
May: The U.S. prepared
to introduce large
numbers of ground
troops to end the war
9 June: NATO and
Yugoslavia signed a
peace accord providing
for Serb troop withdrawal
from Kosovo
10 June: The UN
Security Council, voting
14 to 0 with China
abstaining, accepted the
Kosovo peace settlement

33. BURUNDI,
1972
Like Rwanda, 85 percent
of Burundi’s population is
Hutu, about 14 percent
Tutsi,
In 1972, about 100,000
educated Hutu were
killed in cold blood by the
Tutsi-led Burundi military
to pre-empt any
possibility of a Hutu
takeover of the country,
as had happened in
Rwanda from 1959 to
1963

34. Impact of 1972
and 1993
For the Hutu leaders of
Rwanda, the Burundi
genocide of 1972 stood
as a warning that given
the chance, one day the
Tutsi of Rwanda might
commit a parallel
genocide against them
In October 1993, the first
democratically-elected
Hutu president of
Burundi, Melchoir
Ndadaye, was killed in an
abortive coup d’état four
months after his election

35. October 1993
Widespread communal
killing erupted in Burundi
150,000 were killed and
800,000 to one million
fled as refugees into
Rwanda, Tanzania, and
Zaire
100,000 became
internally displaced
refugees

36. 1994 in Burundi
Hutu Cyprien Ntaryamira
became president of
Burundi under an accord
brokered by the Catholic
Church. Hutu and Tutsi
parties shared power in
January
6 April: President
Ntaryamira was killed. He
was a passenger on
President Habyarimana’s
plane when it is shot
down over Kigali by
persons unknown

37. 1994-1996
Low intensity warfare kills
thousands of Hutu and
Tutsi in Burundi amidst a
chaotic security situation
400,000 are internally
displaced in Burundi
Of these, some 350,000
people were held in
armed camps
In 1996, President
Ntibantunganya was
overthrown in a coup and
succeeded by former
President General Pierre
Buyoya

38. 1996-2001
Peace talks began at
Arusha in June 1998
In October 2001,
President Buyoya agreed
to the deployment of
about 550 South African
troops in his country
under a deal brokered by
President Nelson
Mandela

39. Burundi’s
Dilemma
Burundi in 2001 was heading
towards another genocide
To quote Ted Gurr, “the basic
political dilemma . . . is that
democracy inevitably leads to
Hutu ascendancy
commensurate with their
numerical superiority, even
while the mechanisms of
coercion, particularly the
military, remain solidly within
the Tutsi sphere of
competence.”

40. The Role of
Radio: Building
Common Ground
In 1995, Search for Common
Ground, a Washington, DC-
based NGO, established
Studio Ijambo in Bujumbura,
the capital of Burundi
Funded by the US Agency
for International
Development (USAID),
Studio Ijambo employ's Hutu
and Tutsi writers, editors,
and producers to broadcast
an original soap opera called
“Our Neighbors, Our Selves”
and the magazine show
“Pillars of Humanity” about
local heroes

41. Achievements of
Studio Ijambo
Encouraged returnees from
concentration camps to
return to their homes in
Bujumbura
Achieved a mass audience
for broadcasts
Pressured government to
import condoms for anti-
AIDS work
Broke the state’s monopoly
on public information (e.g.
broadcast a Kirundi version
of Pres. Mandela’s key
address on the framework of
the peace process after
state-owned media refused

42. Breakthrough of
2003
A new Arusha Accord
opened the door to a new
Constitution for Burundi
based on shared
authority between Hutu
and Tutsi in the military,
police and government
A freer media emerged in
Burundi with many
independent radio
stations

43. Lessons Learned
1. Straight news and
balanced truth-telling can
overcome disinformation
(UNTAC Radio)
2. Where hate radio
messages are being
broadcast in explosive
situations, it is vital to
either provide a trusted
alternative source of
honest news reporting or
to interdict the
transmission of hate
messages through
jamming or destruction of
hate radio (Rwanda and
Kosovo)

44. Lessons Learned
(continued)
3. Humanitarian
broadcasting to strengthen
civil society and interdict
genocides requires a radio
presence before the crisis
erupts to be effective; trust
must be built (Cambodia,
Kosovo and Burundi)
4. Native language
speakers without
suspicious accents are
required for this work to
succeed (Cambodia and
Kosovo)

45. Lessons Learned
(continued)
5. The export of modern
radio broadcasting
equipment to countries
violating their human
rights treaty obligations
should be banned
(Rwanda)
6. The creation of a
Security Council
authorized, rapidly-
deployable radio
jamming unit is essential
(Rwanda)

46. Lessons Learned
(continued)
7. In countries afflicted by
extreme ethno-national
tensions and violence,
there is no substitute for
joint production teams
with members drawn
from the rival ethnic
groups (Burundi)
8. Soap operas aimed at
the young and straight
news are the primary
means of countering hate
propaganda (Burundi)

47. Simulation
Burundi, June 2015
Pres. Nkurunziza insists
he can run for a third term
and wants to destroy power
sharing between Hutu and
Tutsi
Coup failed
Street protestors and
some opposition leaders
shot, independent radio
stations closed down
Arms being distributed to
militants of Pres.’s party,
the CNDD-FDD

48. Your reponse:
strategy and
tactics?
How do you give
Burundians access to an
alternative source of
independent news?
What themes should
radio serial drama give
prominence to in
broadcasts?
What political strategies
might head off new mass
atrocity crimes in
Burundi?
How do you neutralize
the Imbonerakure
“youth”?

49. Contact
Information
Prof. Frank Chalk
E-mail: drfrank@alcor.concordia.ca
URL: http://migs.concordia.ca