1. SPEECH/14/264
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
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Štefan Füle
European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy
2013 ENP Package
Presentation to AFET committee European Parliament, Brussels
Brussels, 31 March 2014
Chairman, Honourable Members,
Let me start with the obvious: these are challenging times for the European Union's
relations with its neighbours, East and South. Ukraine springs to mind first of course. It
has seen momentous change triggered by civil protests in support of political
association and economic integration with the European Union. [Its territorial integrity
has been violated and is under further threat from the Russian Federation.]
But the situation is difficult in other parts of the neighbourhood too. [Indeed, not only
Ukraine, but also some other partners are under increasing pressure from Russia in their
efforts to get closer to the European Union. And the continuing brutal civil war in Syria
and its impact on the neighbouring countries, the dramatic political polarisation in Egypt,
and] protracted conflicts [in our neighbourhood] East and South also require the
sustained attention and engagement by the European Union. More than ever, the future
of our collective security is and will be shaped by our course of action in our
neighbourhood.
Three years after the review of the ENP, I would like to take the occasion of this
exchange with you to highlight five messages about our policy.
My first message is that in 2013, cooperation between the European Union and
its partners in the neighbourhood has been comprehensive across all key policy
areas including:
• political dialogue;
• economic reforms and integration;
• sector cooperation;
• improved mobility for citizens from partner countries;
• more engagement with civil society; and
• developing networks of students, researchers and business people.
This extensive cooperation is the ‘bread and butter’ of the ENP and it has delivered
results as the ENP reports just published show very clearly. Allow me to highlight four
examples:
First, reform efforts continued in a number of countries. In Georgia, Moldova, Morocco
and Tunisia, the authorities showed a clear commitment to reform, and reaffirmed the
importance they attach to strengthening and intensifying their relations with the
European Union. [With all these countries, the ENP is a genuine Partnership and
Compass for reform].

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Second, we also worked hard to deliver on our commitment to financially support the
efforts of our partners. Financial assistance to partner countries in 2013 was very
substantial – more than 1.7 billion euro in bilateral assistance.
Third, significant progress was made on the Eastern Partnership in 2013. The Vilnius
Summit marked a decisive step forward in concluding new Association Agreements
including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas between the European Union and
Georgia and Moldova. The Summit Declaration set a jointly agreed and ambitious
agenda for the way ahead to Riga[, stressing the crucial necessity of implementing
agreed commitments, in particular on political, economic and social reforms.]
Fourth, we made progress towards the implementation of the roadmap set with
Southern partners, and intensified our cooperation in the framework of the Union for the
Mediterranean. Ministerial meetings finally resumed in various sectors of common
intersts and work has progressed well for the establishment of a regional structured
dialogue with civil society. After the adoption in late 2012 of our Joint Communication on
EU-Maghreb relations, we have intensified our dialogue with the Maghreb partners[, with
the aim of supporting their efforts towards increased regional dialogue and cooperation.]
We have prepared a concrete action plan that we have proposed to our partners. I will
be glad to share it with this House.
Honourable Members,
My second message today is that when looking back at the objectives we set ourselves
in May 2011 when we reviewed the ENP, we can say that the European Union has
delivered in many areas.
Negotiations on new Association Agreements, Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Areas, Mobility Partnerships and new Action Plans have been launched or have advanced
with many partners. We signed the political chapters of the Association Agreement with
Ukraine ten days ago; Georgia and Moldova are preparing to sign their agreements and
we are doing everything to ensure that this happens no later than June this year.
We made progress towards visa facilitation and liberalisation: indeed, the EU has just
approved visa-free travel to the European Union for Moldovan citizens and we signed
mobility partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia.
We have remained true to our commitment to step up our engagement with, and
support for, civil society. Since May 2011, we have created the ENP Civil society facility
(with a total budget of 74 million euro) and have supported the establishment of the
European Endowment for Democracy (with an initial 6 million euro contribution).
[Cooperation in all sectors – energy, transport, environment, education, to name a few –
intensified. Many of the new European Union programmes for the period from 2014 to
2020 are open to ENP partners, and 11 of our partners have either already signed, or
negotiated, agreements to participate in them.]
My third message is that the ENP remains a relevant policy framework. Let me
tell you why.
First, I am convinced that the broad principles of the policy remain appropriate.
Differentiation and 'more for more' should continue to guide our relations with the
sixteen partners. This does not mean that we intend to neglect any of our partners;
indeed, the ENP is not about a 'one size fits all' approach. However, we will pay greater
attention and have more intense relations with those partners that are committed to
reforms and to respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

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Second, despite all the differences, a number of challenges are common to both our
Eastern and Southern neighbours including democratic and economic transitions and
certain regional security challenges. The key policy instruments of the ENP (political
dialogue, trade agreements, sector cooperation, mobility partnerships, visa facilitation)
allow us to engage with our neighbours and support them.
Third, in exceptional times, the policy allowed us to rise to the challenge and react
rapidly. Let me give two examples:
• In Ukraine, we have proposed an unprecedented support package in order to
stabilise its fragile economic and financial situation.
• In the context of the Syrian crisis, last year, at a very difficult time for the
European Union budget, we mobilised significant additional financial support of
400 million euro. This was provided to Syria and surrounding countries [in order
to alleviate the humanitarian disaster.]
Fourth, the post Lisbon Treaty framework allows the European Union to adopt a joined
up and more coherent foreign policy in its neighbourhood. A framework in which our
interests and values are closely aligned. Of course, this requires the Commission, the
External Action Service and the Member States to espouse common objectives and agree
on a common course of action; but this challenge is not specific to the ENP; it is a
broader challenge for European Union foreign policy.
Honourable Members,
This brings me to my fourth message which is about the current challenges that
our policy is facing.
As I have always argued, we have to keep our policy and all its components under
continued scrutiny. I will be frank with you and admit that the policy has faced
challenges in steering partners towards adopting policies that would bring more security
and more democratic and economic reforms. Also, our collective response – and by that
I mean the European Union with all its institutions and its Member States - has not
always been as fast and as comprehensive as one could have wished.
Based on the experience of the last three years, I see a number of immediate priorities
for improvement.
Clearly, the political and economic contexts, and the challenges that individual countries
face are diverse, and they are becoming more so. So we have to differentiate even more
not only between the two regions but also within them – with the objective of shaping
our bilateral relations in order not only to respond better to the expectations and needs
of each partner but also to safeguard the European Union’s own interests.
We need to be better equipped to react to crises, to emerging needs, or rapidly evolving
situations – faster and more flexible where needed. This may require some creativity in
adjusting some parts of the policy, in finding new instruments or making the ones we
have work better. It will require closer cooperation between the Commission and the
European External Action Service and all other European Union institutions, including
this House.
Programming of ENI support will also require flexibility and responsiveness in the future,
given the dynamic changes in the East and South. While I would like to thank once again
this Committee for its support in the recent Strategic Dialogue on programming, I am
convinced that the mid-term review will give this House ample opportunity to further
review our assistance priorities for all partners, also based on the new features
implementing the 'more for more' principle in our new assistance instrument.

4. 4
One of the biggest challenges our neighbourhood policy faces lies in the fact that not all
have understood that it is not about a geo-political strategic game. It is rather about a
genuine partnership, a deep, sincere effort to help modernise countries which spare no
efforts in democratisation and moving towards social and economic progress. Our offer
of Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova was in response to these
countries’ own sovereign choices, based on the Helsinki principles, to work towards
creating foundations for ever closer relations with the European Union.
From the beginning, we have been willing to discuss with Russia the meaning and impact
of those agreements. We have always been of the opinion and still are that the
Association Agreements and generally speaking our close relationship with the Eastern
European countries is not at the expense of their relations with Russia. On the contrary,
we respect those special traditional ties.
Having heard of anxieties, mainly of an economic nature, we have intensified our
outreach and raised the subject pro-actively at the highest level during the meeting of
the College of Commissioners with the Russian Government at the beginning of last
year. It was only at the last EU-Russia Summit that the Russian Federation decided to
engage in such discussions.
Unfortunately, instead of a dialogue, Russia decided to apply unilateral economic
pressure against Ukraine which clearly was a decisive factor, leading the former
Ukrainian administration to postpone its long proclaimed goal of the signature. Helping
to build a prosperous and democratic neighbourhood requires the neighbours of our
neighbours to play their role in a modern and respectful way and we certainly are
committed to such dialogue at any time.
Finally, my fifth message is about the future challenges to our policy.
Given the momentous geopolitical developments in our continent, we have to reflect
harder on the final objective of the ENP policy. In the East, as stated in the recent
Council conclusions on Ukraine, the Association Agreement is not the end goal of our
cooperation. If we want to be serious about the European aspirations of a number of our
partners, then we have to use the most powerful transformative tool the European Union
has at its disposal.
At the same time, we have to find a better way to support those fledgling Arab
democracies, such as Tunisia, that see the European Union as one of their true friends
and partners. Our dialogue over recent years with our partners has shown that the
prospect of gradual economic integration in the European Union market is not enticing.
Creating a common economic space would be a first step, but other dimensions – such
as people to people exchange - will have to be considered.
Chairman, Honourable Members,
Let me conclude - more than ever, we have to show that we keep up our commitment
not only to engage and to support democratic and economic reforms, but also to tackle
security threats.
We need to show that the European Union is committed to support effectively those
countries in our neighbourhood that embark in the difficult process of transition and
reform.

5. 5
We should not only do this by words but by concrete deeds. On this count, we can and
should aim higher.
Thank you for your attention.
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