Positioning Your Portfolio: What's Fear Got to Do With It?

1. Please refer to important information, disclosures and qualifications at the end of this material.
GLOBAL INVESTMENT COMMITTEE FEB. 17, 2016
MICHAEL WILSON
Chief Investment Officer
Morgan Stanley Wealth Management
M.Wilson@morganstanley.com
+1 212 296-1953
Fear Is Contagious
For the year to date, 2016 is absolutely the worst year on
record for many if not most equity markets. The strange
thing, however, is that no one seems to be able to pinpoint
exactly why. Sure, there are plenty of reasons for markets to
be concerned but if you read the newspapers or listen to the
TV or radio, the rhetoric around what’s actually going on
has been as volatile as the stock prices.
Go back to the beginning of the year when we experienced a sharp sell-off on the first
day of trading. The rationale back then was that China was devaluing its currency again,
stoking fears of a hard landing for China’s economy and worldwide deflation. Next, it
was the Saudi/Iran conflict and the presumed death of OPEC, which led to a quick 25%
fall in oil prices and further fears of bankruptcies in the oil patch and credit contagion to
the banks. Then came concern about a US recession as the manufacturing/industrial/
energy profits recession was surely about to spill over to the consumer. Finally, talk
shifted to another banking crisis emanating from Europe, or maybe China or even Japan.
Meanwhile, investors even sold stocks in leading companies with strong earnings
reports. The bottom line is we do have a recession—on Wall Street—driven by fear.
Fear is a mighty beast. It’s also contagious. And, truth be told, fear is the close sister of
another contagion known as greed. When the investment circle becomes vicious or
virtuous, it can be quite powerful. Emotion is hard to control and it’s actually the most
important determinant of asset prices in the short term. It can also affect how we
interpret the real information about the economy or companies’ prospects. All news can
become either bad or good, depending on which emotion is currently gripping us. Today,
that emotion is fear and it’s telling us to not trust anything and to sell first and ask
questions later. “Better to take a loss today and live for tomorrow” is the mantra du jour.
This is not to say there aren’t things to worry about. There are, and the Global
Investment Committee (GIC) believes that the risk of bad outcomes has increased since
December. We’re just not as hysterical about actual developments as perhaps some
others. What concerns us is that markets have become a bit hysterical, too, and the very
real impact that has had on client portfolios. Markets have a way of convincing investors
they know something about the future; something we acknowledge, but it hardly has a
Positioning

2. Please refer to important information, disclosures and qualifications at the end of this material. Feb. 17, 2016 2
POSITIONING
perfect track record. According to David Rosenberg of Gluskin
Sheff + Associates, an independent wealth management firm,
“Mr. Market” has predicted 27 of the last 11 recessions.
As far as the fundamental data go, things have actually held up
fairly well this year when talking about the economy and
earnings. Let’s start with the economy. The fourth quarter was
weak and came in at 0.7% growth, hardly inspiring. However,
much of the quarter’s weakness was caused by an inventory
drawdown; personal consumption remained okay. Meanwhile,
the real-time first-quarter data looks pretty decent, starting with
the 151,000 jobs created in January. The unemployment rate is
now firmly below 5%, the official “full employment” level.
Second, the consumer remains confident and unfazed by the
market turmoil. Sure, at the high end we’ve seen some softness
and New York City real estate is starting to feel the effects, not
to mention Sotheby’s and Tiffany’s—which Wall Street notices
for sure. But, the heart of America is doing better and holding
up. So is spending, with January’s national retail sales beating
lowered estimates and showing a nice acceleration to 3.4% on a
year-over-year basis. Gas prices trump stock prices for most
Americans and perhaps this dividend is finally starting to
translate into better spending, rather than saving.
The bottom line is that the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow forecast
model has risen substantially in the past few weeks and
currently predicts 2.7% GDP growth for the first quarter (see
Exhibit 1). This real-time forecasting tool has a pretty good
track record of getting the number right, just like it did for the
weak fourth quarter. I would suggest keeping a close eye on this
for signs about whether we are slipping into a recession. Right
now, we are not in recession and, in our view, the probability
that we will be remains low.
What about corporate earnings? After all, equity markets might
react to economic data releases but what it really cares about is
corporate profits. Here, the score remains much like it has been.
Just under half of corporate America is experiencing a profits
recession and the fourth-quarter earnings support that view.
Meanwhile, more than half continue to show profit growth with
stable margins. What the fourth-quarter earnings season also
confirmed is that things aren’t deteriorating as if we are about to
enter a recession—2016 earnings forecasts remain relatively
stable for the S&P 500, falling approximately 2% since the
beginning of the year, far less than the 10% decline in the index.
For Japan, the disconnect is even more dramatic; 2016 earnings
estimates for the Topix are down less than 1% while the index
was down more than 20% at its worst point last week.
So what gives? In less than two months, average company
valuations declined by approximately 15% globally. Has the
world really changed that much? We think it has changed at the
margin somewhat and uncertainty around China, oil prices,
credit and central-bank potency has increased for sure. But
we’re not sure a wholesale 15% valuation reduction is justified
given the assumption that the economy and earnings look fairly
stable and may actually begin to accelerate later this year based
on key leading indicators. Keep in mind that a weaker-to-stable
US dollar could add significant upside to current S&P 500
estimates. On that note, we believe last year’s dollar strength
subtracted close to $9 per share from S&P earnings, about 7%.
Nevertheless, equity markets are unlikely to revalue
significantly higher until there is more clarity around some of
the uncertainties mentioned above or the vicious cycle of fear
subsides. Top of the list of things to monitor on whether this
cycle of fear is subsiding is the state of financial conditions.
Financial Conditions Are Critical
As already noted, our base case is for no US or global economic
recession in 2016. At the same time, we are not looking for a
boom, either. Nevertheless, we agree with Mr. Market that
valuations needed to be reset based on all of the uncertainties
mentioned above. We just think this adjustment may have
overshot to the downside. An easy way to estimate whether
valuations are too rich or too cheap can be determined from
looking at financial conditions, which are a good real-time
measure of what risk appetite should be. Financial conditions
are determined by many things, including monetary policy,
Exhibit 1: Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow Model
Sees Snapback in First-Quarter Growth
Source: Bloomberg as of Feb. 12, 2016
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Atlanta Fed GDPNow Forecast
US Real GDP (quarter over quarter, seasonally adjusted annual rate)
%

3. Please refer to important information, disclosures and qualifications at the end of this material. Feb. 17, 2016 3
POSITIONING
yield curves, credit spreads and equity volatility, all of which
have deteriorated since the beginning of the year. What’s
interesting is how closely aligned equity valuations are with
financial conditions. Exhibit 2 shows the remarkable
relationship between the price/earnings ratio for the S&P 500
and the Morgan Stanley Financial Conditions Index. This should
not be all that surprising but it also illustrates just how critical it
is for financial conditions to stabilize and even improve for
equity markets to recover and do better from here even if
economic and earnings growth improves. Importantly, financial
conditions can also impact the fundamentals directly—both
positively and negatively.
During the past several years, we have had many and more
frequent bouts of tightening financial conditions. Three in
particular standout—October 2014, August/September 2015 and
our current situation. In all three cases, central bankers reacted
to these tighter financial conditions by increasing monetary
stimulus either directly via larger or new programs or, as in the
case of the Fed last fall, backing off from an expected rate hike
(see Exhibit 2). This time around, central bankers have once
again reacted to the tighter financial conditions. First, the Bank
of Japan (BOJ) cut interest rates to negative levels for the first
time in history. Next, various Federal Reserve governors began
jawboning that they are paying attention to financial conditions,
suggesting further rate hikes will be delayed if these conditions
don’t improve. Meanwhile, the G20 is meeting in China later
this month to discuss global monetary policies, which could lead
to announcements about how to address tightening financial
conditions; and finally, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) next
policy meeting in March is expected to result in further
Quantitative Easing measures with possible purchases of
corporate debt. This should reduce credit spreads directly and
thus ease financial conditions. In short, central bankers are apt
to keep trying to ease financial conditions until they succeed.
Still, in each successive episode of tightening financial
conditions, markets seem to be losing faith in central bankers’
ability to soothe. After all, the central bankers have been at it
pretty aggressively now for seven years and have yet to slay the
fears of deflation. In fact, for most investors, deflation remains
the primary risk. Central bankers seem to agree this is the
biggest risk but have not been able to prevent a relentless
decline in inflation expectations, which has been a huge drag on
nominal GDP growth. Weak nominal GDP growth in a world
that is still highly leveraged is a potential path toward embedded
deflation. This is why the fear is so great at the moment.
However, much of the recent decline in inflation expectations
and nominal GDP could prove to be transitory, as the Fed
believes, given the collapse in oil and commodity prices.
Furthermore, the divergent monetary policy from the Fed over
the past several years has led to a strong US dollar which has
proven to be a headwind for US inflation, in particular, but also
a huge reason why nominal global trade growth has been slower,
too. However, markets in the past month appear to dismiss the
transitory arguments.
The GIC is not as pessimistic on inflation or the central bankers’
willingness to try additional unorthodox policies to battle
deflationary threats. More importantly, the weakness in the
dollar so far this year suggests we could be right on the cusp of
a bottoming in inflation. However, the cutting of rates to
negative levels by the ECB and BOJ appears to be a potential
policy error. Clearly, these decisions have been quite negative
for the financial sector and, in particular, the banks. Such
damage, if it persists, could easily lead to even tighter lending
standards and actually short circuit the intentions of easier
monetary policy in the first place. We suspect central bankers
understand this and will likely look to revise the mix of policies
to get it right, perhaps as soon as this month’s G20 meeting.
Watch financial conditions to measure the effectiveness of
ongoing central bank policies. This will give us a signal that
they are working again and asset markets can recover. Until then,
expect volatility and downside risk to remain. In the past few
days, we have seen some positive reactions to central bank
comments and actions, with financial conditions loosening a bit.
This is a start.
Exhibit 2: Equity Valuation Has Tended
to Move With Financial Conditions
*Last 12 months
Source: Bloomberg as of Feb. 12, 2016
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
16.0
16.5
17.0
17.5
18.0
18.5
19.0
Aug '14 Dec '14 Apr '15 Aug '15 Dec '15
S&P 500 Price/Earnings Ratio* (left axis)
Morgan Stanley Financial Conditions Index (right axis)
BOJ Increases
QQE
ECB
Announces QE Fed Delays
Rate Hike
BOJ Cuts
Rates; Fed
Dovish
G20 ECB
Meetings?

4. Please refer to important information, disclosures and qualifications at the end of this material. Feb. 17, 2016 4
POSITIONING
Where Is the Value?
Since the end of the financial crisis in 2009, markets have
oscillated between fear and greed with a risk-on, risk-off
mentality. This all-in, all-out characteristic has created some
powerful relative performance trends between asset classes,
investment styles and factors. While the herd is always present
in markets, it seems like it has been particularly evident in this
cycle. In my opinion, this is due to the financial crisis itself and
the fact that we experienced a secular bear market between 2000
and 2011 that was worse than the Great Depression in terms of
real returns from financial assets. The advent and popularity of
risk-mitigating strategies rather than risk-seeking or enhancing
strategies since the financial crisis has simply exacerbated the
force of the herd. Reduced liquidity provisioning from market
makers constrained by excessive regulatory constraints—also an
outgrowth of the financial crisis—hasn’t helped, either. This has
led to some extremes in relative value as price momentum has
carried the day as the most important driver of investor
sentiment and positioning. So, where is the value today for the
investor with a horizon beyond the next few months?
With the fear of deflation rising to mainstream consciousness,
this trend is getting close to fully priced in some assets.
Specifically, “ultrasafe” bonds are now overpriced unless the
entire world is headed toward a lost decade similar to what
Japan experienced for the prior 20 years. How else can one
justify paying the German or Japanese government to own their
bonds? How is such an “investment” any different than paying
100 times earnings for many large-cap tech company stocks in
the late 1990s? While I am not dismissing the risk of deflation
out of hand, I am suggesting that it has already been priced in
ultrasafe securities. If true, then the converse may be true as
well. This means many stocks are likely undervalued,
particularly those that require some inflation to grow or survive.
Such stocks can likely be found in the value contingent, a cohort
that has been despised for years at this point such that they have
now underperformed their growth brethren by as much as what
we witnessed at the height of the tech, media, telecom (TMT)
bubble (see Exhibit 3).
Importantly, I would argue today’s extreme outperformance by
growth over value has been driven by deep discounting of value
stocks as much as overvaluation of growth, unlike the 1990s
when it was primarily the extreme overvaluation of TMT. As a
result, we recently added to large-cap value stocks in our asset
allocation models as a means to take advantage of the reversal,
which might be happening right now. Whether this becomes a
more sustainable move remains to be seen. We think a weaker-
to-stable US dollar, stable-to-accelerating GDP growth in the
second half of the year, record cheapness for many of the value
sectors combined with easy year-over-year growth comparisons
suggest that indeed it might be time. Nevertheless, that doesn’t
mean portfolios should be devoid of growth stocks, either. In
fact, during the past month, many high-quality growth stocks
have come down from the stratosphere in terms of valuation and
they have been sold by investment managers who perhaps
crowded into them too aggressively. On that point, our prime
brokerage colleagues at Morgan Stanley & Co. track such
ownership and currently measure hedge fund net exposures as
low as those in 2011—one of the best buying opportunities of
the past decade. We think this reflects extreme pessimism that
we have confirmed through many other measures of sentiment
and positioning. In short, a lot of bad news has been priced into
asset prices.
Outside the US, equities are even cheaper, with the spread
between dividend yields and sovereign debt yields in Europe
higher than we have witnessed since World War II. As for Japan,
equity prices reached 11 times forward earnings last week,
providing an equity risk premium equal to what we observed in
2008. Meanwhile, emerging market equities have been cheap
for a while but earnings have continued to deteriorate, leaving
them cheap and a potential value trap. However, in this latest
equity market sell-off, emerging market equities have started to
outperform both US and international developed equities.
Relative strength like this can be a leading indicator of trend
change.
Exhibit 3: Value’s Underperformance
Nears TMT Bubble Years’ Low
*Relative total return, 10-year compound annual growth rate
Source: FactSet of Feb. 12, 2016
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015
MSCI World Value Index vs. MSCI World Growth Index*
%

5. Please refer to important information, disclosures and qualifications at the end of this material. Feb. 17, 2016 5
POSITIONING
I will finish this month’s note with how I began—fear is a
powerful emotion. It makes us do things we don’t necessarily
want to at the worst possible time. A lot of fear has been priced
into financial assets in the past six months starting with the
abrupt sell-off last August on China’s first devaluation move.
Whether this is as good of an opportunity to buy equities
broadly as 2011, 2008 or 2001-2002 is unlikely because we are
further into this recovery. Instead, what we think is happening is
the beginning of the next and perhaps final stage of the global
rebalancing. We acknowledge that fundamentals have
deteriorated; so we will remain vigilant in monitoring the data
for confirmation that our thesis is intact or a signal that growth
is going to deteriorate further. In either case, we believe the
current rally should last a few weeks or months at a minimum
given the extreme measures of sentiment, positioning and
valuation. Key data include consumer metrics like retail sales,
confidence, employment, wages, credit growth and housing. The
important data also includes manufacturing orders and
inventories, both of which have been improving of late;
corporate confidence, which is currently deteriorating; earnings
revisions; and of course, financial conditions. As usual, we will
be reporting our findings in our regular daily, weekly and
monthly publications and look forward to your questions and
comments. 

6. Please refer to important information, disclosures and qualifications at the end of this material. Feb. 17, 2016 6
POSITIONING
Index and Model Definitions
GDPNOW FORECAST MODEL This model,
run by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta,
is updated five or six times a month. It
incorporates reports on manufacturing, trade,
housing and construction.
MORGAN STANLEY FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
INDEX This is a weighted index comprised
of changes in equities, short-term interest
rates, long-term interest rates and the US
dollar.
MSCI WORLD GROWTH INDEX This index
captures large- and mid-cap securities
exhibiting overall growth style
characteristics across 23 developed market
countries. The characteristics for the index’s
construction are long-term forward EPS
growth rate, short-term forward EPS growth
rate, current internal growth rate and long-
term historical EPS growth trend and long-
term historical sales per share growth trend.
MSCI WORLD VALUE INDEX This index
captures large- and mid-cap securities
exhibiting overall value style characteristics
across 23 developed markets countries. The
characteristics for the index’s construction
are book value to price, 12-month forward
earnings to price and dividend yield.
S&P 500 INDEX This capitalization-weighted
index includes a representative sample of
500 leading companies in leading industries
in the US economy.
TOPIX (TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE INDEX)
This free-floated-adjusted index tracks all
domestic companies of the exchange's First
Section.
Risk Considerations
Investing in commodities entails significant risks. Commodity prices may be affected by a variety of factors at any time, including but not limited to,
(i) changes in supply and demand relationships, (ii) governmental programs and policies, (iii) national and international political and economic events,
war and terrorist events, (iv) changes in interest and exchange rates, (v) trading activities in commodities and related contracts, (vi) pestilence,
technological change and weather, and (vii) the price volatility of a commodity. In addition, the commodities markets are subject to temporary
distortions or other disruptions due to various factors, including lack of liquidity, participation of speculators and government intervention.
Bonds are subject to interest rate risk. When interest rates rise, bond prices fall; generally the longer a bond's maturity, the more sensitive it is to this
risk. Bonds may also be subject to call risk, which is the risk that the issuer will redeem the debt at its option, fully or partially, before the scheduled
maturity date. The market value of debt instruments may fluctuate, and proceeds from sales prior to maturity may be more or less than the amount
originally invested or the maturity value due to changes in market conditions or changes in the credit quality of the issuer. Bonds are subject to the
credit risk of the issuer. This is the risk that the issuer might be unable to make interest and/or principal payments on a timely basis. Bonds are also
subject to reinvestment risk, which is the risk that principal and/or interest payments from a given investment may be reinvested at a lower interest
rate.
Yields are subject to change with economic conditions. Yield is only one factor that should be considered when making an investment decision.
Equity securities may fluctuate in response to news on companies, industries, market conditions and general economic environment.
Investing in foreign emerging markets entails greater risks than those normally associated with domestic markets, such as political, currency,
economic and market risks.
Investing in foreign markets entails greater risks than those normally associated with domestic markets, such as political, currency, economic and
market risks. Investing in currency involves additional special risks such as credit, interest rate fluctuations, derivative investment risk, and
domestic and foreign inflation rates, which can be volatile and may be less liquid than other securities and more sensitive to the effect of varied
economic conditions. In addition, international investing entails greater risk, as well as greater potential rewards compared to U.S. investing. These
risks include political and economic uncertainties of foreign countries as well as the risk of currency fluctuations. These risks are magnified in
countries with emerging markets, since these countries may have relatively unstable governments and less established markets and economies.
Companies paying dividends can reduce or cut payouts at any time.
Value investing does not guarantee a profit or eliminate risk. Not all companies whose stocks are considered to be value stocks are able to turn their
business around or successfully employ corrective strategies which would result in stock prices that do not rise as initially expected.
Growth investing does not guarantee a profit or eliminate risk. The stocks of these companies can have relatively high valuations. Because of these
high valuations, an investment in a growth stock can be more risky than an investment in a company with more modest growth expectations.
Rebalancing does not protect against a loss in declining financial markets. There may be a potential tax implication with a rebalancing strategy.
Investors should consult with their tax advisor before implementing such a strategy.
Asset allocation and diversification do not assure a profit or protect against loss in declining financial markets.
Because of their narrow focus, sector investments tend to be more volatile than investments that diversify across many sectors and companies.
The indices are unmanaged. An investor cannot invest directly in an index. They are shown for illustrative purposes only and do not represent the
performance of any specific investment.
The indices selected by Morgan Stanley Wealth Management to measure performance are representative of broad asset classes. Morgan
Stanley Wealth Management retains the right to change representative indices at any time.

7. Please refer to important information, disclosures and qualifications at the end of this material. Feb. 17, 2016 7
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