Kelsey, m. q method study

A CONVERGING RHETORICAL VISION
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Jordan Peterson, the Intellectual Dark Web, and a Converging Rhetorical Vision:
A Q-Method Study
Mark Kelsey
School of Communication and the Arts
Regent University
May 2019

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Abstract
Even as the world becomes intricately connected by the Internet, many sense their symbolic
foundations splintering. This study investigates the role of psychologist and YouTube celebrity
Jordan Peterson in addressing this problem. The framework of symbolic convergence theory is
paired with Q-methodology to proceed with this inquiry. Sixty-nine participants closely
attending the messages of Peterson represent their perspectives through the Q-sorting procedure
in which they produce an arrangement of a sample of 78 statements of opinion circulating
through the conversation surrounding the work of Peterson and the intellectual dark web. Each
sort is subjected to by-person factor analysis. Three factors are extracted and judgmentally
rotated, bipolar factor 1 is split, non-confounding highly-loaded Q-sorts are flagged, composite
factor arrays are produced and interpreted. The four viewpoints are (1a) the existentialist, (1b)
the spectator, (2) the exacerbated prophet, and (3) the sober saint. Each viewpoint is unpacked
and compared. Implications regarding a potentially emerging rhetorical vision and its evolution
are discussed.

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List of Figures
Figure 1: Blank Q-Sort 59
Figure 2: Principal Component Analysis Scree Plot 62
Figure 3: Composite Q-Sort for Factor 1a 67
Figure 4: Composite Q-Sort for Factor 1b 76
Figure 5: Composite Q-Sort for Factor 2 85
Figure 6: Composite Q-Sort for Factor 3 92
Figure A1: Factor 1b Alternate Array 123

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List of Tables
Table 1: Distinguishing Statements of Factor 1a 72
Table 2: Distinguishing Statements of Factor 1b 82
Table 3: Distinguishing Statements of Factor 2 89
Table 4: Distinguishing Statements of Factor 3 98
Table 5: Consensus Statements and Z-Score Averages 100
Table 6: Factor Score Calculations 101

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Table of Contents
Abstract i
List of Figures ii
List of Tables iii
Chapter 1 - Introduction 1
Digital Sensemaking 1
The Intellectual Dark Web 3
Jordan Peterson 5
Going Viral. 7
Bill C-16. 7
Biblical Series. 8
Channel 4 Interview. 9
Book Tour. 10
Informal Pilot Study 11
Sam Harris Debates 13
Contribution to Scholarly Literature 15
Basics of Q-Methodology. 15
Theoretical and Design Considerations 17
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 19
Web 2.0 20
Polarization. 21
Political Correctness and Moral Cultures. 26
Symbolic Convergence Theory 30
Semiotic Configurations. 31
Dramatized Visions 32
SCT Assumptions. 33
Core Concepts. 35
Applications of SCT. 45
Criticisms of SCT. 46
Chapter 3 - Methodology 51
Introduction to Q-Method 51
Concourse 52
Methodological Considerations 54
P-set 55
General Demographics 57

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Procedure 58
Analysis 60
Chapter 4 - Results 66
Factor 1a: The Existentialist 66
Factor 1b: The Spectator 74
Factor 2: The Exasperated Prophet 84
Factor 3: The Sober Saint 90
Consensus Statements 99
Factor Correlations and Interpretations 101
Chapter 5 - Discussion 105
Symbolic Convergence Theory and Other Implications 106
Limitations 109
Conclusion 111
References 112
Appendices 120
Appendix I: Q-Set 120
Appendix II: Factor Comparisons 124
Appendix IIa: Factor Comparison Between Factor 1a and Factor 1b 124
Appendix IIb: Factor Comparison Between Factor 1a and Factor 2 127
Appendix IIc: Factor Comparison Between Factor 1a and Factor 3 130
Appendix IId: Factor Comparison Between Factor 1b and Factor 2 133
Appendix IIe: Factor Comparison Between Factor 1a and Factor 3 136
Appendix IIf: Factor Comparison Between Factor 2 and Factor 3 139
Appendix III: Factor Defining Sorts Flagged 142
Appendix IV: Q-sort Values for Statements Sorted by Consensus vs. Disagreement 145

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Introduction
People organize their brains with conversation. If they don't have anyone to tell their
story to, they lose their minds. Like hoarders, they cannot unclutter themselves.
—Jordan Peterson, 12 Rules for Life: An antidote to chaos, 2018
The purpose of this study is to apply symbolic convergence theory and Q-methodology to
better understand the phenomenon of one of the intellectual dark web’s most popular
communicators, Dr. Jordan Peterson. The study focuses on him for two reasons: (a) Peterson has
enjoyed enormous success in communicating his ideas in the new and radically different context
of the intellectual dark web (“IDW”), and (b) the symbolic narratives shared collectively by
Peterson’s audience, if true, reveal that Western society continues to grope for symbolic
representations of reality that make sense of an increasingly fractured world. These
communication developments appear to be absent from the present literature, and thus, worth
considering.
Digital Sensemaking
It is safe to assume that the technological marvel of the Internet represents the most
staggering alteration of human communication behaviors. The “how so?” imbedded in this
assertion is not an easy crossing. Perhaps this alteration is more quantitative in nature. That is,
the number of communication acts permitted are greatly enhanced by the Internet, as are the
spatial limitations to such acts severely reduced.
On the other hand, perhaps this new communication technology is more significant for
the qualitative alterations which lay in its wake. The portrait of Katherine Parr requested by King
Henry VIII must be of a different kind, at least in some respect, than that of a snap on Snapchat
or a selfie posted on Instagram. The reasons motivating such acts may be very similar in kind

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indeed. Perhaps the king would say that, at least on Snapchat and Instagram, flattering filters are
to be expected more so than the generous touches of an artist’s paintbrush.
We cannot consider how the recent technological revolution affects our communications
without focusing on those who communicate and what they are communicating. We must arrive
at a restaurant, select a table, and start the conversation. I propose our persons-and-content
conversation should take place at the Internet table and begin with the development of the Web
2.0 platforms, which replaced static web pages with a dynamic interface that allowed users to
create as well as receive content.
One peculiarity common to Web 2.0 conversations is the ambiguity of intimacy. People
tend to treat a face to face dialogue as something distinct from, say, a conference call. This is not
the first time a relatively novel means of communication has caused confusion regarding the
private to non-private nature of an interaction. But this observation makes our task no less
challenging. The anonymity of online messengers, not to mention the anonymity of mere content
viewers who do not directly engage in any manner easy to perceive, with the expansion of the
availability of engagement afforded by the Internet, combine to make the objective of selecting a
table and a conversation far from straightforward. There is even a term used to describe an online
domain with additional measures of intentional anonymity: Dark Web. Typically, this term
indicates data encrypted in such a manner that the spiders utilized by the common web-user
cannot access them. The term has also come to be used to describe a hidden community on the
Internet, not due to covert programming, but due, at least partially, to the anonymity inherent to
Web 2.0 communications in general. This usage also implies the content of the conversation to
be different from the content preferred across other means of mediation. This alternative, perhaps

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ironic, usage of “Dark Web” is operationalized in what has come to be called the Intellectual
Dark Web.
The Intellectual Dark Web
The Intellectual Dark Web (IDW) refers to a group of thinkers, typically academics, who
discuss a broad range of topics. Presently, the term is not a generic one—referring to any
collection of academic discussions principally mediated over Web 2.0 technologies—but refers
to a particular constellation of users on a particular platform. The term was coined by Eric
Weinstein in 2018 during a live event with Sam Harris and Ben Shapiro (which was
subsequently streamed on Harris’ “Waking Up” podcast with the title: “Intellectual Dark Web.”)
(Harris, 2018).
Weinstein (2018) later explained that the term “Intellectual Dark Web” was chosen, in
part, to seem silly in an overly-serious, deadpan manner. One joke imbedded in the title,
explained later by Weinstein, is the word “dark” having the meaning of hidden. It is obvious,
however, that these thinkers are acting as public personas. They are not going dark in this sense.
When that irony is pointed out, however, and treated as a discovery which fundamentally
discredits the group, another layer of irony is added. This is similar to a common use of the
“Pepe the Frog” meme in which creators depict Pepe as an outrageous stereotype in order to jest,
not at the group associated with the stereotype, but at the reaction of those who point it out and
object to the symbolic discrimination. The other irony imbedded in the term “dark” is the
connotation of evil. This too predicts responses to the phenomenon as anathema in one form or
another. In short, a principal aim of the name chosen was to be “highly memetic” (ibid).
There is no shortage of implications to be derived from the term and the intentions behind
its creation. For one, it is obvious that a sense of an objectivated phenomenon has been so

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perceived as to deserve a typified designation. That is to say, this collection of thinkers having
online conversations with one another are sufficiently perceived as pertaining to a conversation
in which all members are involved. The other cursory implications of the naming of this
collection of thinkers relate to this conversation and its circumstances. Both the irony intended in
the title “IDW” and oft-shared sentiments forwarded by its members allude to a broader
rhetorical environment sufficiently lacking explanatory power and is blemished by an inclination
toward moral hysteria (e.g., “fake news” and “outrage culture”). The fact it is expected that old-
media professionals will “miss the point” when discussing the IDW only enhances the suspicion,
held by many in the IDW, that there is a commonsensically palpable incapability among those
trusted to investigate and discuss the issues of the day to do just that.
It is difficult to ascribe a common worldview to the preeminent members of the IDW.
One thread which may run through them all, but likely does not constrain them equally, is a high
regard for free and good-faith speech along with a worry that the widespread capacity to enjoy
and implement this faculty in the public square has been eroding. All of this, of course, deserves
elaboration. But for now, and for the justification of this research effort, it is sufficient to note
that this arena presents an opportunity. In particular, this relatively common sensitivity to an
eroding rhetorical vision/style (overtly evident in traditional media infrastructures) with the
concurrent activity of gathering around a project devoted to a better one, indicate fertile territory
for communication scholarship.
The Intellectual Dark Web has become a subject of debate. Some argue that this
phenomenon is “a bunch of smart people find[ing] a way to make money off of niche political
audiences by spewing opinions without doing much new research” (Dreger, 2018). Of the
members of the IDW,

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What they all share is not a general commitment to intellectual free exchange but a
specific political hostility to “multiculturalism” and all that it entails. In previous decades,
their views were close to hegemonic in the intellectual center … It would not be
surprising to see many of the people [In the IDW] defect to the forces of darkness over
the next couple of years. Instead, it would be surprising if some did not. (Farrell, 2018)
Regarding the IDW phenomenon, others contend that,
The Intellectual Dark Web is the start of something much bigger than edgy teenagers
looking for unpopular opinions to annoy others with; it is an outlet for truth- seekers to
collaborate on the advancement of society. It is a place where ideas are freely exchanged
as they ought to be. It is a place where great minds can express themselves unfettered
from societal constraints. (Brandt, 2018)
Of the members of the IDW,
One thing the members of the intellectual dark web certainly do not have in common is
ideology, philosophy or politics. The intellectual dark web is an intellectually diverse
group of people and that is what sets this group apart. The most obvious commonality is
that they all are willing and happy to engage with people they disagree with, this is where
the value in the group comes from. (Welty, 2018)
Jordan Peterson
One member of the IDW, Canadian psychologist Dr. Jordan Bernt Peterson (JBP), has
arrived to such an environment in which he is commonly referred to as ‘our Internet dad’ and
‘top lobster.’ It is difficult to locate any consensus among those discussing Dr. Peterson, his role,
and his ideas. However, even commenters (particularly journalists) who seemingly lament his
emergence as a public figure acknowledge a ubiquitous perception that his emergence is, indeed,
“surprising” and “odd” (Weiss, 2018). In this regard, it is generally uncontested that something
anomalous is afoot; be it the void of rich public and intellectual discourse unsatisfactorily met by

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present media institutions (as commonly felt among those of the IDW), an upsurge in nefarious
right-wing/conservative online activity (a proposition common to many editorials regarding the
phenomenon), or whatever else (Welty, 2018; Ferrell, 2018).
It is beyond the scope of the present effort to offer explanations for how this surprise
came to be. Likewise, it is not the aim of this paper to explain what, exactly, the public life of
Jordan Peterson and broader IDW indicate in terms of macro-cultural significance. For now, and
until additional scholarship contributes to the investigation, the proposal of such explanations
must be primarily left to the relevant discourse still unfolding. This paper does intend to
investigate those for whom JBP has proved worthy of attention and to observe such individuals’
subjective constellations of meaning and significance, particularly those related to subjects
commonly discussed/debated within the IDW.
Jordan Peterson has spent most of his life as a clinical psychologist and professor of
psychology. Following his attainment of a doctorate in Psychology from McGill University,
Peterson served as a postdoctoral fellow at McGill, then as a professor at Harvard University,
and now holds the position of tenured professor at the University of Toronto. Dr. Peterson has
authored and coauthored over a hundred published academic papers, which have garnered over
ten thousand citations. His early scholarship primarily investigated genetic predictors for
alcoholism. The subjects of his later work include personality psychology, clinical psychology,
creativity, psychology of religion, and more.
These observations indicate that Peterson is a dedicated academic, but not one inclined to
be exclusively dedicated to any single focus of study. During the earlier phases of his career,
Peterson worked for thirteen years on his first book, Maps of Meaning: The architecture of belief
(1999), a work of an exceptionally broad scope combining Jungian psychology, comparative

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religion, comparative mythology, neuropsychology, Continental and Positivist philosophies,
investigations of totalitarian governments, and more. Peterson has put his clinical work, along
with his work teaching at the university, on hold in the aftermath of the explosion of his public
life in 2016.
Going Viral. Jordan Peterson arrived on YouTube in 2013. His earliest uploads were his
interviews and lectures broadcast on public television and recordings of his “Maps of Meaning”
classes at Harvard University. These lectures generated a fair amount of positive attention but his
name did not become commonplace on the Internet until the release of a set of videos titled
“professor against political correctness” (Peterson, 2016)—in which Peterson elaborates on
changes in Western University culture and proposed legislation (Bill C-16) related, in Peterson’s
view, to contemporary assaults on free speech. Although similar to the upsurge of “political
correctness” in the early nineties, this PC resurrection, roughly two decades later, brings with it
the popularity of terms such as “trigger warning,” “microaggression,” and “safe space” (Harvey,
2002; Campbell & Manning, 2014).
Bill C-16. While Peterson was never shy of public appearances before the beginning of
his Internet fame (he had produced content for, and joined discussions and interviews on, public
broadcast television, for example), it is generally agreed that the beginning of Peterson’s
celebrity status can be linked to his video-critique of Canadian legislation, Bill C-16, and the
surprising responses which followed. Protests against Peterson were staged at the University of
Toronto (genuiNEWitty, 2016), McMaster University (Beatty, 2017 & Eggplantfool, 2017), and
elsewhere (Peterson, March 11, 2018). Peterson also joined televised discussions of Bill C-16
and the cultural debates surrounding it, and was invited to elaborate his case in front of
governmental officials.

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There seem to be two levels of disagreement converging in the Bill C-16 controversy.
One level is more culturally and socially relevant, the other legal and philosophical. The former
level includes transgendered rights, the latter includes freedoms of speech. The legislation itself
has since passed. The surrounding controversy, however, has not abated.
Amidst the controversy, Peterson’s YouTube channel spiked in its subscription count and
rate of growth. His number of Patreon (a crowdfunding site) supporters swelled. All of his videos
spiked in view-count as well. This makes intuitive sense in one way—national coverage of
polarized controversy will increase traffic—and is intuitively nonsensical in another: many of the
sorts of people curious in the political controversy are apparently the sorts of people to listen to
hours of lectures on various domains of psychology. Peterson also accepted interviews both on
public broadcast television and online YouTube or podcast settings. As his fame steadily
climbed, so too did the view counts on all of his previous videos. Some of the most successful
videos following this turning point include his Patreon question and answer sessions, where
online patrons submit questions in a live video chat, and his series of videos recording the live
lectures he gave on the psychological interpretation of the early biblical stories.
Biblical Series. Peterson’s most-viewed video is from his first installment of this
consistently sold-out live series on “The Psychological Significance of the Biblical Stories”
(Peterson, 2017). In this series, Peterson sets out to comment on the entire Book of Genesis;
integrating various philosophical, psychological, and religious reflections along the way. He
speaks fast but moves through the text at a very slow pace. Many of the questions in the live
Q&A are political and cultural in nature. The comments on the video, however, are seldom
political: filled more with thoughts on religion and personal confessions. Here are a few
examples:

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“If this is what church was like I'd be there every day.”
“The dude is a genius. I’m an atheist but he finally articulated the role of religion in the
way I knew all along, but did not have the level of study to say.”
“I'm a 64 year old man. Why do I weep when I hear this man?”
“If my therapist would have been as smart and eloquent as Jordan Peterson I would have
cured my existential crisis a couple years ago. But at least I am now starting to fully
understand myself”
“I'm becoming religious, its crazy”
“this man is the reason i now believe in God. he is truly inspiring. he is the reason for my
spiritual awakening, i kid you not.”
“Me 5 years ago: religion is for sheep, it's just the opiate of the masses Me now: Finally,
a two and a half hour lecture on God”
“By far the most interesting thing I’ve ever heard in my entire life and I assume for the
rest of it.” (ibid)
The biblical series began soon after the Bill C-16 controversy. It was also around this
time when Peterson could no longer read all of the e—mails being sent to him.
Channel 4 Interview. Following the surge in Peterson’s popularity approximately
catalyzed by Bill C-16 disagreements, Peterson steadily became increasingly popular online and
appeared on traditional media programs with increased frequency. Though peppered with various
spikes and salient developments, Jordan Peterson grew in popular recognition at a steady and
gradual pace. That changed after his interview with Cathy Newman on the BBC’s Channel 4
(2018). While the Bill C-16 event thrusted Peterson’s name into news feeds of many people who
hitherto never heard of him, the interview conducted in Great Britain a little more than a year
later rocketed his name into public discourse at staggering magnitude.
For example, the weighted average of Google searches including the term “Jordan
Peterson” during his initial Bill C-16 spike is 3 (week of October 23-29, 2016). The result
produced by searches during the BBC interview (centered around the week of January 21-27,
2018) yield a rating of 100. These ratings conform to the time frame selected for search statistics,

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five years in this case (this is the most precise time frame, which also included the beginning-to-
present of Peterson’s online popularity, allowed using Google trends’ basic functions).
On the face of it, there is nothing profoundly unique about the interview. Milo
Yiannopolous, famous for his provocative style and engagement with contentious political
matters, also had an interview with Cathy Newman a few months prior to Jordan Peterson. The
BBC’s Channel 4 YouTube video (Channel 4 News, 2018) of this interview (which is shorter,
and conducted just weeks following the 2016 U.S. presidential election of Donald Trump) yields
under one million views at this time of writing. Also at this time of writing, the BBC’s Channel 4
YouTube post of Jordan Peterson’s interview with Cathy Newman (which happened two months
later) has attracted over 15 million views. Perhaps the comparison is inapt. But the fifteen-fold
difference is not one easily explained. Thankfully, and unfortunately, that explanation is beyond
the scope of this paper.
A brief scroll through the comments on this video will reveal a very consistent and
probably strong reaction: Jordan Peterson displayed remarkable composure and intellectual
precision while Cathy Newman displayed an impenetrable resolve to misunderstand and/or
misrepresent her guest. The result was the production of many Internet memes using the phrase
“so you’re saying...” (an oft-repeated phrase by Cathy Newman in the interview) followed by an
absurd interpretation and evidence of an acute and ubiquitous need for common sense-making.
Book Tour. During the timeframe of the now-infamous Channel 4 interview, Peterson
was traveling throughout the world doing interviews and giving lectures largely to promote his
upcoming book, 12 Rules for Life: An antidote to chaos (2018). Numerous pre-orders of the
book followed the interview, but the size of that effect is difficult to determine. Upon release,

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Peterson’s book made it to the top of many sale indices. On the Amazon.com “Best Sellers of
2018 (So Far)” list (retrieved in October), 12 Rules is ranked in the fifth position.
Jordan Peterson’s schedule in 2018 is filled with lecture events throughout the globe
(primarily in Canada, the U.S., Great Britain, and Australia). These two- to three-hour events are
routinely sold out. During these events, Peterson addresses almost as many topics as attentive
listeners; while generally unpacking concatenated arguments for the meaning of life, individual
responsibility, and an evolutionary basis of morality. The practiced but unscripted lectures are
dense with axiological and ontological reasoning which hold the attention of the audience.
Informal Pilot Study
In June of 2018, I attended a “12 Rules Tour” in Richmond, Va. I had been preparing for
the present project for some time, so I was not expecting to hear many new Petersonian ideas,
and I had not yet developed any hypotheses or precise research questions. But the overall
question, “What is happening?”, was already plaguing my mind. So I hastily devised a short
survey which my father and one of his law clerks helped me administer before people reached
their seat. The survey questions inquired about when and through which form of media people
first heard about Dr. Peterson, frequency of discussions about Dr. Peterson and his ideas,
frequency of Peterson’s ideas spontaneously coming to mind, novelty of Peterson’s ideas,
persuasiveness of Peterson’s ideas, effects on communication patterns, religious orientations of
audience, perception of Peterson’s character, subscription/following Peterson’s social media
accounts, and the frequency of other mediated engagement with Peterson. Most questions were
answered using a five-point Likert scale.
The research design and small sample size (n=30; while a total of 32 surveys were
initially gathered, two surveys were omitted due to the fact the respondents indicated that they

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were invited by a friend/family member and do not know anything personally about Jordan
Peterson) do not allow for much confidence in the results, but they are worth mentioning. Keep
in mind, while basic statistical measures were applied to assess the data, a coherent statistical
algorithm is not applied. Neither the validity of item measurements nor the generalizability of the
findings can be asserted.
The strongest item, with the second-least amount of variance (s= .55), was thinking Dr.
Peterson to be an honest person (m= 4.66). More varied responses appear to the questions, “I
consider myself to be a religious person” (s= 1.25; m= 3.40) and “Dr. Peterson has encouraged in
me a renewed interest in the Bible” (s=1; m=3.36). Reports of style-matching (e.g.,
spontaneously using some of Peterson’s expressions and mannerisms) were also indicated (s=
.73; m= 3.86). The sense that Peterson has enlightened people to entirely new concepts was
consistently strong (s= .51; m=4.53), more so than the sense that Peterson “sheds new light on
old topics” (s= .94; m= 3.50). The results indicate regular discussion about Peterson with friends
and family (s= .90; m= 4.13), a stronger feeling that Peterson has helped respondents understand
their own beliefs (s= .73; m= 4.23) than the still-convincing feeling of Peterson’s ideas
challenging personal beliefs (s= .76; m= 3.90), and an effect of Peterson on how respondents
now communicate their personal beliefs (s= .83; m= 4.07).
Most respondents indicate a regular diet of media about “Jordan Peterson and/or his
ideas” (s= .76; m= 4.33). All respondents, except for three, subscribe to Jordan Peterson’s
personal YouTube channel. About one third of respondents follow Jordan Peterson on Facebook.
About half follow him on Twitter. Most discovered Peterson though either an online interview
with him or on his personal YouTube page; a few discovered him via broadcast media or by

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other means. Most learned of him within a year or two of the event; a couple had known of him
for less than 6 months, three knew of him for more than 2 years, and one for over 3 years.
The general consensus seems to be that people are attracted to the candid nature of Jordan
Peterson, his ideas, and his rhetorical skill in conveying them. The results, and the fact of the
setting in which they were gathered, indicate sustained attention, personal relevance, and a desire
to discuss Petersonian phenomena. Not particularly groundbreaking insights; but they do, even
modestly, strengthen the case that a sense-making community/framework is emerging.
Sam Harris Debates
In addition to the 12 Rules Tour, Jordan Peterson has appeared on various online
interviews and live debates. One of the most popular of these debates are between Peterson and
Sam Harris—a well-known author, podcast host, and atheist. This signifies another interesting
rhetorical development. Rather than a debate between a believer/scholar of religion and an
atheist scholar, the interest is now between an atheist scholar and one sympathetic to religious
meaning who is ontologically ambivalent or undecided on the typical metaphysical positions on
divinity (Peterson & Harris, 2018).
If the IDW is anything, it is an effort to meet the minds of those who seemingly disagree
and to offer and create scaffolding on which everyone can grow their streams of thought.
Members of the IDW naturally emphasize their own maps of reality but, unnaturally, insist that
each map proposed is considered fairly. This insistence, often embodied in the practice of “steel-
manning” (as opposed to straw-manning) a divergent case, requires that one interacts with and
conceptualizes a foreign point of view in a manner one native to that perspective sees as
accurate. This is not agreement; it is a determination to differentiate between true points of
disagreement from haphazard appearances of conflict. This is most readily seen in the evolution

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of the debates between Jordan Peterson and Sam Harris. Similarly, this study seeks to represent
perspectives so-construed according to those maintaining them, before comparing those
perspectives, while, as much as one can reasonably expect, leaving axiological discriminations to
the participants in and readers of this study. The balance of intense intellectual competition with
robust cooperation is akin to one of Peterson’s favorite ideas in which one plays a game in such a
way to win the most games in a set of possible games (i.e. Piagetian equilibrated state).
In the pilot results mentioned above, responses to the questions related to religion were
the least consistent. Perhaps the boundaries between those uncommitted to any definitive
acceptance or rejection of the divine, and those more prone to definitive positions, are blurring.
Within the present rhetorical framework, however, atheistic dogmas (remove negative
connotation) represent a relatively traditional configuration which has yet to be transformed by a
parallel order of magnitude in comparison with these religious adherents. The problem is we do
not yet have a rhetorical tradition which can make sense of these worldview categories. And we
may be reaching a point where describing a category—which has been meaningfully
renovated—merely as an heir to an historical predecessor (e.g., neo-x) no longer fulfills the
demands of Weltanschauung-taxonomic-structure. The same sentiment which both drives people
toward the Intellectual Dark Web and provides them a common perspective of the present is the
same sentiment found once the IDW-rabbit hole is followed to the bottom: shared paradigms of
sensemaking are presently inadequate, uncertainty abounds more than seems reasonable, and this
is a problem which needs to be solved and no one seems to be able to solve. Perhaps the best
solution is the sincere, non-cynical search for the solution.
It was fun making up languages when we were kids; we had the safety of sufficiently
knowledgeable adults and the language we learned from them to protect us while we tried to

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invent another (by the same rules of the one we knew, no doubt). But now, to put it in
tragicomical fashion, we need a language (e.g., shared representational/meaning structure)
without much of one to reply upon (or none left from our heritage which have not been zealously
defaced) and no metaphysical guides to emulate. At some point one may notice there’s not
obviously anywhere else to go from there. Perhaps the reemergence of the problem of religion is
not so surprising after all.
Contribution to Scholarly Literature
Toward the investigation of Jordan Peterson as a communication phenomenon, the
purpose of this study is to assess construals of reality common to people for whom Peterson’s
work has proven to be personally salient. From there, implications for potentially emerging
rhetorical visions can be traced. The grounding theoretical framework, upon which this
assessment is designed, is Ernest Bormann’s symbolic convergence theory (SCT) (Bormann,
1972). Rather than the more common method of rhetorical analysis used to accompany SCT (i.e.,
fantasy theme analysis), this project will employ Q-methodology.
Basics of Q-Methodology. There are a few methodological orientations common to the
social sciences, but the two most familiar are qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the
qualitative study, depth of insight into subjectively constellated perspectives is the primary
objective. It tends to offer what even some of the most creative quantitative designs cannot
thoroughly ground, but also fails to offer what most quantitative designs are adept at measuring:
statistical validation and generalizability of findings from the sample to population. This does not
mean, of course, that either methodology ensures quality and confidence in any particular study.
The same is true of Q-methodology, which is qualiquantilogical. Its aim is investigation into
subjectively held perspectives, or subjectivity itself, rather than the validation of theoretically-

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derived traits, variables, or psychometric dimensions (Brown, 1980). It is at bottom qualitative.
But it approaches such insight by subjecting results to statistical analyses rather than employing
in-depth interviews and the like.
Q-method requires a set of items which will be arranged by participants with respect to
the criteria designated to arrange these items and the sorter’s own psychological-significance/
salience complex. For example, a set of cards, each presenting a different color, could be
presented with the condition of arrangement being “feels most like (and unlike) home.” These
colors could then be arranged according the subjective intuitions of participants and then inter-
subject constellations can be compared, rather than the items themselves, to produce insight into
common patterns of ‘color-hominess’ perspectives. A more thorough explanation of the Q-sort
process is required and will be provided in the section devoted to methodology.
At the time of writing, no scholarly material investigating the IDW or Jordan Peterson’s
new role as a public figure exists. Perhaps it makes sense for a graduate student, who has not yet
specialized in any research sub-field, to be the one to take the first shot at this fairly recent
phenomenon. Given this situation, it will be necessary to rely on relevant theoretical frameworks,
primary sources, and non-scholarly secondary sources. There are many intelligent and
credentialed individuals discussing the IDW, so there is no lack of quality materials to review.
But there is a need for scholarship, particularly communication scholarship. There are many
psychological, religious, philosophical, political, and other experts in on the conversation, but
scholarship dedicated to the investigation of communication phenomena have yet to arrive at the
scene of this new-media anomaly spectacle.
Jordan Peterson is not the only promising candidate to focus on in the contexts of cultural
and academic discourse and the IDW. But he is an obvious contender. For one, Peterson’s case

17
points to this hazy veil through which one passes and moves as one generally held in esteem, to
one subjected to great admiration, great skepticism, and great derision all at once. It is, after all,
of abundant symbolic interest when one moves from, this moment an elephant, to the next, a tree,
a snake, and a wall. A common thread combining many of the IDW is (a) their being surprisingly
rejected or scrutinized by the institution to which they had hitherto belonged and (b) those who
have not been so dramatically excommunicated from any particular institution (if at all) but were
willing to converse with the excommunicated. Like many associating with the IDW, Peterson is
a philosophically-oriented academic. And like all so-described as members of IDW, Peterson
shares an insistence on the value of freedom of speech that is within the bounds of the law (i.e.,
precluding defamation, slander/libel, and calls to violence or otherwise breaches of law) and
urges people to tell the truth as they see it and accept the discomforts which may come along the
way.
Theoretical and Design Considerations
There are two sets of research questions to consider. The first would utilize the
terminology localized in SCT. The second would inquire into the salience of topics elicited in
Peterson’s communication and the relationships of those concepts. The two sets overlap
theoretically to a large degree but require different starting points. The former set requires
explanations of the fundamental concepts in SCT. For this reason, potential research questions
which are more germane to this approach will be detailed in the literature review.
In the broadest sense, and to varying degrees, this study will contribute by extending
SCT’s ongoing assessment of rhetorical visions (particularly those within the anglosphere),
providing a case study of self-educating people in the context of the world’s most recent
revolution in mediated information production and consumption, reassessing the theoretical

18
contours of communication scholarship, and by offering a tool for the investigation of
subjectivity in online communities which will be amenable to alteration and reapplication.
At the time of writing, it is widely held that societies across the globe are in a time of
many converging transitions in political, media, economic, educational, and philosophical
landscapes. For researchers, casual observers, and specialized commentators alike, this presents a
recursive “chicken-or-egg” problem (e.g., “is political phenomenon x the consequence of media
phenomenon y, or is y actually a response to x?”) on top of the problems as felt on the ground.
All social institutions produce a set of socially objectivated knowledge that can be taken for
granted as “the way things are” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). For many people today, the stock
of such knowledge seems to be thinning and poses a problem not only felt by the young. As
distressing as this is, the unique human capacity of communicative sense-making is at the heart
of navigating the waters of confusion which seem to be no less likely, and is perhaps more likely,
during unprecedented times of access to copious amounts of information. It is assumed that the
process of converting information into knowledge is a fundamental operation of symbolic
convergence and is active in the Peterson and IDW phenomenon. In short, the significance of
this study is integrally connected to the aim of watching and describing the dynamic process of
human sense-making in action.

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Literature Review
This review of literature will survey Web 2.0 communications, political and social
polarization, and symbolic convergence theory. Digital media are relevant to the present study
because Jordan Peterson’s rise to public prominence is initially linked to his “going viral” online,
which was sustained by the body of work (e.g., college lectures) already available on YouTube
along with subsequent appearances (which are mostly viewed online).
Furthermore, the title of the “Intellectual Dark Web” itself, with which Peterson is often
associated, implies a self-consciousness of the Internet’s role in facilitating the informal group’s
function. Political and social polarization are also worthy of theoretical attention as Peterson’s
emergence as a public figure was forged in the crucible of cultural strife and the clash of points
of view. While it is not the aim of the present study to establish this causal link, it is quite likely
that the conflict sparked mass attention, but Peterson’s body of work (at least some of it)
sustained and rerouted it. Either way, it is worth taking a look at the dynamics of polarization,
particularly on the college campus (where Peterson first met protests against him) and across
digital networks, in search of theoretical tools germane to the present project.
Finally, this review includes a thorough examination of symbolic convergence theory and
its core concepts. SCT serves as the principal theoretical framework from which the study
proceeds. While a general theory, SCT is particularly interested in rhetorical environments and
their capacity to facilitate or mitigate the “chaining-out” of group consciousnesses. Of the
numerous communication theories at our disposal, SCT is exceptionally suited to address the
phenomena under consideration in this study.

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Web 2.0
Global Internet usage has been skyrocketing for decades. In 2018, the total number of
Internet users among the global population tipped over the 50% mark, potentially indicating
slower rates of future growth (Meeker, 2018). Around 60% of all payments are now processed
digitally (i.e., not in physical store). Offline connections determined by online networks have
steadily risen as well. Online video content generation and engagement continues to rise.
Google, YouTube, and Facebook have increased efforts to remove some of the content
that those companies mediate (these efforts are commonly referred to as accountability
initiatives), altogether hiring around 17,500 content moderators. Most of the content removed is
flagged by algorithms (roughly 80-90%), save for hate speech violations on Facebook, which are
tagged by algorithms at a comparatively lesser rate of 38% (ibid). While perhaps tangentially
related to Jordan Peterson’s protest against an institutionalization of the compulsion of speech,
speech rights and the concept of hate speech in the digital sphere have become another common
point of contention.
All in all, the truly unique qualities of the Internet are (a) its capacity to render all
communication mediums (e.g., print, audio, video, etc.) digitally into a common interpolation,
making it a “one stop shop” so to speak; (b) it’s speed and reach; (c) its hyperlinked, as opposed
to linear, qualities of engagement; and (d) it’s bidirectionality. The path by which one encounters
one piece of online content and moves to another is a little more complicated and idiosyncratic
than the paths of engagement reading through a newspaper or flipping through channels on a
television. (Those prone to losing themselves in YouTube or Wikipedia can relate.) Also, in
contradistinction to the unidirectional transmission of information in the examples of television,
radio, newspapers, and magazines, the Internet allows many opportunities for back and forth

21
between communicators and receivers (both playing, more or less, both roles across
engagements).
For example, Twitch streaming, which primarily involves online video gamers live-
broadcasting their games while online viewers watch and comment, represents a very popular
trend in Internet usage (Meeker, 2018). The streamer plays an online game and interacts with
others players in that shared game world. However, the streamer also interacts synchronically
with viewers, who, along with the streamer, comment on the whole process. Even if one views,
as a mere observer, a pre-recorded video of an event-matrix such as that just described, he or she
still experiences the convergence of many layers of communication. All of this is done with
personal devices and without (or with minimal) need for technicians to facilitate the process.
This distinction is, in short, the difference between a hierarchical form of communication and
communication mediated by a distributed network (Ferguson, 2019).
If any phenomenon were to be meaninglessly considered as existing within a vacuum, it
would be the Internet: engulfing, connecting, and hyperlinking human knowledge, its production,
and its transmission, is precisely what the Internet is all about. And with this comes a
maximization of the chances for unintended consequences (good and bad; Carr, 2011). Just as
the printing press can be linked to quite a political, social, and religious storm in Europe a few
centuries ago, the Internet is a game-changing element of the landscape in our present,
unresolved corporate disagreements. The class of such disagreements are commonly referenced
as “the culture war” or political polarization.
Polarization. Intensified political polarization in the United States and in other Western
democracies is a bewildering issue among social pundits. For one, it is difficult to trace the
fundamental causes of this polarization. There are many routes into the topic of political

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polarization—e.g., personality and other psychodynamics, economics, case studies, ideology,
etc. With respect to the purpose of this paper, and to the basics, here are three broad areas of
inquiry into the nature and causes of political polarization: (a) Internet use, (b) politicians/politics
proper, and (c) polarization proper. While many technical discrepancies must be left to the side
in this limited survey, political research offers many useful findings.
There is demographic evidence that suggests lesser, rather than greater, Internet and
social media usage positively correlates with increased polarization effects (Boxell, Gentzkow,
& Shapiro, 2017). This of course does not mean that the Internet plays no role in the
phenomenon, but the assumption that online activity itself predicts polarization must be
subjected to scrutiny. After all, there is more than politics to encounter online and there are
plenty of opportunities to engage in political matters offline. The authors of the above study did
not include in their analysis a dimension for traditional media consumption.
Generally, when polarization is sufficiently salient, our decision-making faculties are
primed to rely on faction identification and less on otherwise dispassionate assessments of
information (Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013). People assess political propositions with
more sensitivity to the quality of arguments, even despite initial orientations (e.g., political
affiliations), in non-polarized settings—even in settings when political affiliations are explicitly
connected to those propositions. When an issue is drenched with polarization, however, the
effect of argument quality on decisions is overridden by the effect of partisanship. There is a case
to be made that such affiliation coherence is preferable, as a case could be made that this is
alarming(a bit of both depending on the sense). For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that
psychological and social identification have acute effects and are linked to (and may
categorically overlap with) the polarization phenomenon.

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A core aim espoused by members of the IDW (and those closely associated) is the good-
faith exchange of ideas and opinions (Leading Members, n.d.). In order for these often deeply-
held ideas to be optimally subjected to maximum scrutiny, the effects of polarization must be
held at bay. This explicit core value suggests (a) the desire to handle complicated and potentially
provocative ideas, and (b) a common recognition that there exist some social forces which pose a
threat to that endeavor. These values reflect what seems to be a Gordian knot bound up in the
problem of polarization as such.
There are two paradoxes inherent to the concept of polarization: attitudinal and social
polarization both seem equally ubiquitous and rare (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2010). Media
pundits tend to exaggerate the presence of polarization and other pundits’ role in amplifying it.
However, even “false perceptions can lead to real outcomes” (Baldassarri & Bearman, 2010; p.
809). People will reorganize when polarization is salient, proselytizing with greater zeal and
policing the collectivity’s borders with increased vigilance. All the while, and as a consequence,
an abundance of heterogeneous beliefs and attitudes within the polarized camps are left
untouched. This is because charged topic X, around which a camp emerges, occupies the
attention which could be spent on relatively-less-charged topic Y, about which many within the
camp may starkly disagree. While polarization does resonate with social grouping instincts, it is
an issue-specific phenomenon as well. This observation has strong implications on the evolution
of rhetorical visions and the particular vision-establishing project of the IDW.
The case of Jordan Peterson and the IDW also points to social divisions that are not
strictly political. Even the idea of “political correctness” is often attributed to topics that are little
more than tangentially related to formal policy. In Peterson’s case—with the takeoff issue of Bill
C-16— the symmetrical pertinence of formal policies and cultural mores is interesting. It is

24
equally interesting that many people who “follow” Peterson’s work closely first heard of him in
a context of political polarization (e.g., Bill C-16, Cathy Newman Interview, etc.) but generally
look to him for an entirely different sort of content. One would find after a search through
Peterson’s YouTube page, compared to search results pertaining to Jordan Peterson on
Google/YouTube, that content made about him greatly contrasts with content offered by him in
terms of frequency of politically relevant topics.
Web 2.0 media allow for a blurring of media producers and media consumers, along with
other communication transmission roles. This fact alone implies that there will be greater
accuracy of belief representation in this mediated environment compared to traditional media
effect models. This expectation can either succeed or fail depending on how it is used. For
example, there is evidence which suggests that the effects explained by the spiral of silence
theory, which was derived in the context of legacy media, apply to Web 2.0 social media
contexts as well (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015). Put simply, the effect is one where people are
deterred from engaging with political posts with which they disagree, and more inclined to
engage with those with which they do agree. There is, at least, one dimension on which people
vary that mediates the strength of this effect, and one classification of social media users for
whom the deterrent-attractant patterns of behavior are reversed. Respectively, the dimension is
political engagement and the behavior-reversed class is that of the so-called online troll.
Politically engaged individuals are more likely to engage with political content with
which they agree and disagree. Political engagement mediates “speaking out” across the board
(Gearhart & Zhang, 2015; Baldassare & Katz, 1996).
The online troll, however, is more difficult to describe. This is largely because trolling
implies a replacement or additional paradigm. While central to a proper understanding of this

25
phenomenon, this qualification is often missed in academic and mainstream media appraisals of
online trolling (Fichman & Sanfilippo, 2016). While an online debate about the merits of
feminism can be assumed to take place within a paradigm under which two or more opposing
sub-paradigms compete, the same is not as immediately true in the case of a troll on a feminist
message board. On the face of things, it may seem that the troll is arguing against feminism. But
it is more accurate in many respects to propose that the troll is undermining feminists. Both the
perceived humor and perceived horror of trolling behavior stem from the sleight-of-hand
replacement of one game (e.g., political argument) for another (e.g., rhetorical sabotage).
Without the cues of interpersonal communication, expertly-veiled and intentionally-obvious uses
of irony in Web 2.0 communications are both susceptible to misinterpretation. Trolling seems to
be the art of provoking such misinterpretations by playing with the phenomenon of Poe’s Law
(of online satire) which states that, “unless there are unmistakable cues that one is being ironic or
sarcastic, many parodies are not only likely to be interpreted as earnest contributions, they will,
in fact, be identical to sincere expressions of the view” (Aikin, 2009, p. 1). While it is difficult to
thoroughly explain this rapid proliferation of caricature confusion, a spiral of deconstruction is in
effect which both amplifies and fractures the social and communicative effects of polarization. In
such an environment the safest bet is to not engage, to purposely confuse oneself with a
caricature, or to behave as if you care about nothing. This relates back to the paradoxes of
polarization, the spiral of silence, and concurrent opportunities for latent “silent majorities” to
transform into consciousness-raising projects such as the IDW.
There exists some connection between members of the IDW and a resistance to
ideological orthodoxies, whatever those may be. There exists, as well, a connection between the
IDW and the earnest attempt to debate topics according to each participant’s respective point of

26
view with the clearest arguments its members can muster. In other words, troll-types and IDW-
types seem to share a distaste for political correctness but differ sharply in their method of
response. This clip from an article describing the IDW illustrates this view:
But [members of the IDW] all share three distinct qualities. First, they are willing to
disagree ferociously, but talk civilly, about nearly every meaningful subject: religion,
abortion, immigration, the nature of consciousness. Second, in an age in which popular
feelings about the way things ought to be often override facts about the way things
actually are, each is determined to resist parroting what’s politically convenient. And
third, some have paid for this commitment by being purged from institutions that have
become increasingly hostile to unorthodox thought — and have found receptive
audiences elsewhere. “People are starved for controversial opinions,” said Joe Rogan, an
MMA color commentator and comedian who hosts one of the most popular podcasts in
the country. “And they are starved for an actual conversation.” (Weiss, 2018).
Political Correctness and Moral Cultures. Political correctness is commonly perceived
to be more rampant in certain institutions: namely, media companies and sections of the
Academy. While difficult to define with much precision, political correctness is a moral concept
with cultural/social implications—the explicitly political implications (i.e., related to
propositions of governmental policy) of this concept exist but, in the present context, are further
downstream.
Campbell and Manning (2014) investigate this phenomenon of moral frameworks
exhibited on university campuses in a paper, “Microaggressions and Moral Cultures”, published
in the Journal of Comparative Sociology. Working under a sociological theory of social control,
the authors begin with the observation that a fairly new phenomenon (i.e., sharing testimonies of
the microaggressions one has borne) comes with some form of appeal to, or dependence on, third
parties. What is unique in the case of microaggressions is not the fact that there is just any

27
reliance on third parties to resolve disputes (the very operation of courts of law) but the
additional appeal to the otherwise unknown and uninvolved to become partisans on behalf of the
aggrieved. This may be where the proliferation of Web 2.0 technologies most readily connects to
this strategy (e.g., microaggression-incident blogs). But if this truly is a matter of social
hegemony, inequality, and marginalization ubiquitous in Western culture, why the unique appeal
of this moral perspective in (some) universities? It is insufficient to note that the concept of
microaggression itself is a product of academe because it did not receive widespread usage until
four decades after its conception. Perhaps, for a variety of reasons, the utility of this idea
required optimized conditions for realization. Campbell and Manning (ibid) introduce some
concepts to help explain what such a context may be.
“Black (2011: 139) proposes that overstratification conflict varies inversely with
stratification. In other words, a morality that privileges equality and condemns
oppression is most likely to arise precisely in settings that already have relatively high
degrees of equality. In rigidly hierarchical settings or relationships, even subordinates
might take dominance and subordination for granted” (ibid, p. 20).
The concurrence of highly diverse and egalitarian settings with an overarching
administrative culture provide the perfect situation in which students can lobby for support from
institutional peers and superiors in matters pertaining to institutionally-irrelevant status disputes.
Campbell and Manning also bring attention to another sociological phenomenon called
“underdiversity,” which is essentially the trend to reduce the diversity within a culture. Both
genocide and verbal slights can fit under this conceptual umbrella (a rather large umbrella). 
“Attempts to increase stratification, we saw, are more deviant where stratification is at a
minimum; likewise, attempts to decrease diversity are more deviant where diversity is at
a maximum. In modern Western societies, an ethic of cultural tolerance – and often

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incompatibly, intolerance of intolerance  – has developed in tandem with increasing
diversity. Since microaggression offenses normally involve overstratification and
underdiversity, intense concern about such offenses occurs at the intersection of the
social conditions conducive to the seriousness of each. It is in egalitarian and diverse
settings – such as at modern American universities – that equality and diversity are most
valued, and it is in these settings that perceived offenses against these values are most
deviant.” (ibid, p. 21)
Campaigns against microaggressions, along with the above theoretical framework used to
understand them, seem to point to some confusion about (or conflation of matters related to)
status and other kinds of social distinction. There is also a conflict between preferred levels of
analysis in moral reasoning which may relate to a parallel conflict between moral systems or
presuppositions—e.g., cultural perceptions which can be related to a case vs. the claims of the
disputing parties themselves. One taken for granted level is sociological and structural, the other
is individual and focused on personal character. Campbell and Manning (ibid) describe a new
form of conflict between ”honor” and “dignity” moral systems. In honor cultures, one is
generally praised for bravery in protecting one’s honor and shamed for failing to confront
offending parties. In dignity cultures, one is generally praised for letting insults slide (a mark of
fortitude), using peaceful negotiations when necessary, and, in rare cases, appealing to an outside
mediator (e.g., the law).
In the “victimhood culture,” described by Campbell and Manning, a different moral
perspective is in operation. Indeed, after the days of the Old West gangs and gunslingers, the last
vestiges of honor cultures in the United States are most easily found among the young urban
poor (e.g., street gangs), who, if it needs pointing out, do not manage their disputes in the manner
of microaggression activists. Strangely enough, it is almost entirely the highly educated and

29
affluent members of the most diverse and egalitarian sectors of society who brazenly campaign
on behalf of the marginalized and the destitute. The criticism of such activism tends to come
from a purer dignity perspective, which presupposes inherent individual worth, that is not
derived through a publicly conferred status, and so need not be harshly protected. For example,
the colloquial usage of “snowflake” as a derogatory term—likely derived from a quote from the
book Fight Club (Palahniuk, 1996) “you are not special, you are not a beautiful and unique
snowflake”—points to an interesting take within the dignity framework which assumes that
every person has value but perceives cries for custom-tailored social accommodations as
pathetic.
Especially in egalitarian societies in which the suppressive powers of dominant entities
are watched with suspicion rather than merely accepted (e.g., antitrust law, whistle-blower praise
and protection, freedoms of religion, property, pursuit of happiness, speech, and association,
etc.), the drive to climb social ladders is simultaneously praised and policed by vigilant
watchdogs.
Even this activity comes with its unintended consequences. The only (or the only safe)
way to climb to the heights of social acclaim without risking too much attention from the
watchdogs (i.e., to be the squeaky wheel that gets the grease without becoming the risen nail
which is hammered down) is to garner socially-objectivated value in one particular sense without
straying too far from that lane. This is, in part, to play one role at a time and one role only.
Celebrities, for example, may achieve fame for their artistic skill. However, once this
fame achieved by artistic production begins to display diminishing returns, the temptation to
attract notoriety by any means necessary can surface. Acquiescence to such temptations tend to
prove immediately or eventually counter-productive.

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Another type of celebrity achievement can be imagined. Such celebrities could initially
achieve their celebrity-status as a result of their transparency, honesty, or some other mark of
character, rather than a particular talent or novel personality traits. Such celebrities may or may
not be so easy to mythologize but would also be less vulnerable to social-standing watchdogs.
Especially in a context of multiple layers of “public” space (such as that afforded by the
burgenoning of Web 2.0 communicative/social concourses), such celebrities would be selected
by a public’s consciousness for a variety of reasons. This partially highlights why Jordan
Peterson, already a successful academic, found himself in the unforeseen spotlight over which so
many commentators are now struggling for control.
In this context of disputes over the status quo of moral disputes, however, Jordan
Peterson’s aim has been the construction/elaboration of a “from below” explanation of morality
which sits in contrast to “from above” sense-making visions focused on macro-structural powers
or the decrees of deities. The aim of this paper is to investigate what seems to be, at least
partially, a counter-vision to whatever the operant vision of political correctness is.
Symbolic Convergence Theory
This paper significantly leans on the theoretical vantage point provided by symbolic
convergence theory (SCT). SCT is a general theory native to the field of communication. The
theory has been used by many scholars for a variety of projects ever since it was conceived by
Ernest G. Bormann (1972). The theory is closely connected to a method of rhetorical analysis
used to assess symbolic convergence, fantasy theme analysis (FTA), also constructed by
Bormann (ibid). A selection of studies utilizing this framework or that method will be addressed
below. Major criticisms of the theory will also be considered. First, an overview of SCT is in
order.

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A key catalyst for the emergence of SCT can be located in Bormann’s reading of the
work of Robert Bales. Bales, a psychologist studying the dynamics of small groups, observed a
common event in which participants of his studies would get excited at some breaking point in
his experimental procedures. Essentially, they were extemporaneously generating (or
discovering) a common ground though the use of jokes, personal anecdotes, and the like. If these
initial attempts were “successful,” others would spontaneously join in, raise their voices, laugh,
speak over one another, become animated, and depart from a consciousness of self (Bales, 1950).
We have all seen, and participated in, something of the sort. It happens frequently. It is a
different operation entirely, however, to use such observations as items of analysis. But this is
precisely the sort of evidence a rhetorical analyst operating within SCT is actively attempting to
detect. Such occasions are assumed to be potentially indicative of the spontaneous construction
or manifestation of a shared consciousness or interpretation of reality (Bales, 1969). And from
the observed rhetorical events, it is assumed that a variety of implication can be traced. This
applies in groups of various sizes, with differing inferences drawn accordingly.
Semiotic Configurations. Consider the question, “how is everyone doing tonight?”, as
an example. What vision of the situation (and concurrent responses) would you imagine if you
knew that this question was asked by a businessperson walking into the office, a musician
walking on to a stage, or by a prisoner in solitary confinement?
A decent hint that you possess readymade constellations of symbolic reality related to
most of the contents of the past two sentences is the consequence of mixing these elements in
any way you please. Likewise, a decent hint that these maps of reality are inherited (in every
sense of the word) and/or the product of many iterations of use and manipulation by many people
is the fact that you can imagine your response to a given juxtaposition likely to be very similar to

32
the response to the same juxtaposition viewed by another person. All in all, when something
elicits hilarity, terror, sadness, confusion, or disbelief, convergences or divergences of
implicit‒meaning blueprints are likely taking place.
Returning to the three contexts for the “how is everyone doing tonight” question, recall
the class of responses plausible in each. (These come with even more information about the
context than explicitly given, but that’s the nature of these highly connected models of reality of
which we are typically unconscious). Now assign each response by imposing it on one of the
other contexts. The musician taking stage asks “How is everyone doing tonight?” and hears
“Good, Karen. How are you?” The solitary prisoner poses the question and hears thunderous
applause and squealing; and the businessperson...well perhaps your imagination can complete the
sequence. This exercise is wonderful for exploring the space of human meaning and is analogous
to experiencing musical space. The comparative weightings of psychological significance as
used in the example above lies at the heart of the methodological approach selected for this
study. This will be further elaborated in the following chapter.
Dramatized Visions. Symbolic convergence theory is not merely a taxonomy or a post-
hoc description of events as critics such as Mohrmann (1982) and Gunn (2003) have suggested.
But it is interested in the processes which organize and label the present and the past. SCT is
akin to Fisher’s narrative paradigm in that it sees symbolic reality arising from stories which are
acted out and which contain certain values, plotlines, heroes/villains, and the mutually formative
interaction of quotidian, phenomenological experience with the broader dramas we inhabit
(Bormann, 1972). This view is also a departure from the assumption that rhetorical activities are
fundamentally exercises in persuasion.

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Much of what has commonly been thought of as persuasion can be accounted for on the
basis of group and mass fantasies. The fantasizing is accompanied by emotional arousal;
the dreams embodied in the fantasies drive participants toward actions and efforts to
achieve them; the sharing of fantasies provides a social reality peopled by
anthropomorphic forces and imagined and historical personages in dramatic
confrontations. My study of religious and reform speaking confirmed Robert Frost’s
insight that “society can never think things out: it has to see them acted out by actors.”
(Bormann, 1985; p. 9)
This observation shared by Robert Frost and Ernest Bormann is also emphasized by
Jordan Peterson. Peterson, following Jean Piaget, notes:
A child can be “good,” without being a moral philosopher. This idea echoes the
developmental psychologist Jean Piaget’s notion, with regards to child development, that
adaptation at the sensorimotor level occurs prior to – and lays the groundwork for – the
more abstracted forms of adaptation that characterize adulthood. Piaget regarded
imagistic representation as an intermediary between sensorimotor intelligence and the
(highest or most abstract) stage of “formal operations”; furthermore, he believed that
imitation – the “acting out” of an object – served as a necessary prerequisite to such
imagistic representation (portrayal in image or word, instead of behavior). The process of
play appears as a higher-order, or more abstract form of imitation, from this perspective.
(Peterson, 1999; p. 68)
SCT Assumptions. All theories rest on an array of philosophical assumptions. It is
especially useful for those unfamiliar with a given theory to check under the hood, so to speak,
and acquaint oneself with these assumptions before taking the theory out for a ride. Symbolic
convergence theory can combine a few ontological paradigms but principally rests on humanistic
and phenomenological ontological foundations. SCT acknowledges a variety of logical and
axiological tenants but holds these in abeyance until their partial incorporation at the theory-

34
specific conceptual juncture. Symbolic convergence theory packs its main philosophical
assumptions under the branch of epistemology. Cragan & Shields (1998), two of Bormann’s
closest collaborators, outline these assumptions as follows:
“(1) the direct content of the message conveys meaning, emotion, and motive for action;
(2) reality is cocreated symbolically; (3) fantasy-sharing results in symbolic convergence;
(4) fantasy themes occur in all forms of discourse; and (5) on any subject, at least three
deep structures—righteous, social, and pragmatic master analogues—compete as
alternative explanations of symbolic reality.” (Cragan & Shields, 1998; p. 96)
The first assumption places the emphasis of communicative power on, or within, the
message itself. The position of SCT is, generally, that the most relevant unit of analysis is the
content of communication rather than the motivations of communicators or the effects of the
medium on the content. While the means by which the messages of Jordan Peterson and the IDW
are transmitted are important, the present study will allocate its focus primarily on the interaction
of message contents.
This relates to the second assumption—the co-creation of symbolic reality—which holds
that rhetorical visions of reality are generated and evolve within a community of participants,
such as the community selected to participate in the present study. A simple example may be the
fictional worlds and even universes created and refined by writers of comic books and their most
involved fans, who will protest when an intuitive boundary within the shared world has been
transgressed. This assumption holds that rhetorical visions do not merely drop out of the sky or
self-perpetuate within an ontologically non-contingent vacuum. This assumption is a helpful
counterpart to the first. It also flows into the third epistemological assumption: fantasy-sharing
leads to symbolic convergence.

35
Essentially, this contends that various constellations of meaning converge as people share
visions of reality. Such convergence can lead to a superordinate vision of reality and shared
consciousness. As a group of police officers share their stories with one another, a shared
understanding of what it means to be part of their departments will emerge in consequence. The
degree to which those engaging with Jordan Peterson’s messages have constructed such a shared
consciousness remains to be determined.
The fourth assumption holds that there are no forms of discourse in which fantasies (i.e.,
symbolic facts) are not present. In other words, while the ontological grounds for the existence of
electrons and Santa Claus probably differ, neither domain of discourse (i.e., holiday lore and
quantum mechanics) is exempt from these patterns of communication behavior. This
epistemological assumption views all communication, at some level, as representative and
partitions evaluative aims rather than prematurely reducing or rejecting them.
The fifth assumption holds competing explanatory orientations within and between
rhetorical visions of symbolic reality. The explanations tend to align with major motivational
emphases. A single proposition can be explained using the emphasis of moral superiority to other
propositions (i.e., righteous analogue), or the benefits to a particular community (i.e., social
analogue), or with an emphasis on efficiency and efficacy (i.e., pragmatic analogue). A single
rhetorical vision can express a variation of each of these emphases or could rely heavily on one
emphasis and generally omit the others.
Core Concepts. The defining concepts employed by symbolic convergence theory come
with a specialized vocabulary. While these concepts illuminate pertinent rhetorical dynamics in
generic form, the concurrent terminology is not vital to the purposes of this study or the
interpretation of its results. Thus, interested readers are invited to closely consider each concept

36
in turn, and those preferring fewer detours are invited browse the following section at any pace
desired.
According to Cragan & Shield’s (1998) communication metatheory, initial basic concepts
designate the principal units of communication analyzed within a given theoretical framework.
The fantasy theme is the initial basic concept in SCT. “Fantasy” is a technical term in SCT and
possesses a meaning in this sense different than that of ordinary usage (i.e., something wholly
imaginary, not grounded in reality). The technical meaning for fantasy is the creative and
imaginative interpretation of events that fulfills a psychological or rhetorical need (Bormann,
1985; p. 5). The scholar working to reconstruct the consciousness embodied in the sharing of
rhetorical fantasies of the past must depend heavily upon the traces left in the messages that
created those fantasies. Rhetorical fantasies may include fanciful and fictitious characters, but
they often deal with things that have actually happened to members of the community or that are
reported in authenticated works of history, in the news media, or in the oral history and folklore
of the group. The content of the dramatizing message that sparks the fantasy chain is called a
fantasy theme (Bormann, 1985; p. 5).
A fantasy theme is a heavily weighted, and often central, rhetorical fact. Fantasy themes
can be reused and will, more or less, transmogrify depending on the motivational and perceptual
contexts in which the fantasy theme is reintroduced. Among the Puritan communities comprising
the early sojourners to the new world, for example, a common fantasy theme was a spiritual trek
to the Kingdom of God, a passage rife with many temptations and struggles (Bormann, 1972).
Think of the central ideas in Paul Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress (1678/1878) and its
reification through C. S. Lewis’ The Pilgrim’s Regress (1933/2014). Among scholars of quantum
mechanics, one may often hear of the concept of a “probability field.” From the rhetorical-

37
analysis perspective of SCT, the probability field is an “excited” fantasy theme salient within the
rhetorical vision of quantum mechanics.
The temptation which commonly comes along with the specious power of categorization
is worth highlighting once again; identifying a crucial fantasy theme is not synonymous with the
legitimization or repudiation of the weltanschauung, or cosmological standpoint, to which the
theme belongs. For the purposes of symbolic convergence, the identification of such themes is
useful for understanding the contours of a rhetorical vision and its relation to the broader
rhetorical context in which it is situated—much like the purpose of ethnography is to describe a
culture according to the terms endemic to that culture while accepting the translational
requirements necessary for such a description.
From the initial basic concept, the fantasy theme, proceeds the first associated basic
concept: the symbolic cue. A symbolic cue is a sort of synecdochical deputy to a given fantasy
theme. In the way “Washington” or “D.C.” can be a shorthand for “the United States
government,” a symbolic cue points to a shared fantasy theme. Some instances of symbolic cues
will contain explicit reference to their role; i.e., “Remember the Alamo!” Symbolic cues indicate
insider understanding because at least some degree of involvement with a rhetorical vision is
necessary to spot such a cue and the vision of reality to which the cue must serve as a portal.
Humor plays on such cues constantly. It is arguable that, at the advent of Web 2.0
communication, the reliance on symbolic cues has become more commonly apparent than ever
thanks to the fact that it is so easy to find oneself “not getting it” when encountering some
apparently obvious shared understanding which is not so obvious to ourselves. The function and
title of the website “know-your-meme” (Literally Media, Ltd., n.d.) is evidence of this. Symbolic

38
cues in “Petersonian” discourse may include “the West,” “archetypal,” “order/chaos,” “burden-
bearing,” “clean your room,” etc.
A fantasy type is a middle level abstraction, situated between a fantasy theme and a
rhetorical vision. Early into the development of SCT, researchers began to notice the usage of
rhetorical references which pointed to neither the entirety of a rhetorical vision nor any specific
rhetorical fact (i.e., fantasy theme). This gave cause to develop a conceptual middle-ground: the
fantasy type (Bormann, 1982b). The inside joke is an example of a fantasy type. Schools of
thought are often referenced in the manner of fantasy types. For example, pointing to “Freudian
notions” does not necessitate a reference to any specific idea in psychoanalysis or to Freud’s
ultimate philosophy. Fantasy types are stock scenarios or rhetorical archetypes in application.
Such types, in generic form, found in Peterson’s discourse include the relation between the
individual and the collective, a culture in crisis, meaningful living, the encounter with a Faustian
bargain, etc.
A rhetorical saga refers to a collective’s story. A rhetorical saga is exceptionally broad in
scope, compiling various fantasy themes and rhetorical visions into one story. Founding stories
are especially pertinent in the context of sagas. The American Revolution, the story of Abraham,
and the gospels of Jesus are examples of the founding stories common to group sagas. Sagas are
difficult to study in a way, as they are composites of many patterns of belief and perception held
together by the march of time and a selection of key events dotted along that process. However,
reference to rhetorical sagas and ritualistic repetition go hand in hand. Examples include the
performance of the national anthem at the beginning of a sporting event and the retelling of the
last supper before a Christian congregation receives communion: “Do this in remembrance of
me” (Luke 22: 19). Sagas commonly referenced in Peterson’s messages include our common

39
psychological origins, the genesis of western cultures (e.g., what the West got right), the legacy
of academia, the legacy of common law, etc.
If the fantasy theme is the fundamental unit of analysis in SCT, the rhetorical vision is
the principal goal of that analysis. Rhetorical visions are “composite dramas” comprised of many
fantasy themes that make sense of reality for large populations (Bormann, 1982b). A compelling
fantasy theme is a “take,” a compelling photograph, on a situation which proves salient. A
rhetorical vision is the moving picture in which each fantasy image fits into the next.
The concept of fantasy-theme-identification simply refers to the capacity to notice the
emergence or reemergence of collectively-salient themes and, to some degree, to intuit their
implications. This skill may be the very propensity of Jordan Peterson which garnered him
massive amounts of sustained attention in the first place. Peterson’s opening remarks on the first
part of his videos titled “Professor Against Political Correctness” (2016) suggest as much:
So I've been informed about a couple of things this week that have really been bothering
me. And I thought that – I wasn't sure what to do about it. I've been communicating with
some of my friends and colleagues about it, but that wasn't enough. So I thought I'd try to
write my thoughts down and then talk about them a little bit and see where I got with
that. So I've entitled this talk professor against political correctness. And, the reason for
that is because it's blunt and to the point. I'm very concerned about what's happening in
the universities. It's not so bad in Canada; I've been fortunate, very fortunate, at the
University of Toronto. But there are continually things happening—including in the
administration here and in the broader political world—that make me very nervous. I like
to attribute that to the fact that I know something about the way that totalitarian and
authoritarian political states develop. And, I can't help but think that I'm seeing a fair bit
of that right now. (Peterson, 2016)
As Peterson’s strange story reveals, however, the identification and explosive chaining of
fantasy themes does not take place in a rhetorically neutral vacuum. It was not the contents of

40
this video alone, but the protests in response to it, along with his response to the protestors, that
marked a clash between what appear to be incommensurate interpretive frameworks. This clash
also marked the beginning of Peterson’s initiation into top-tier public punditry. Interestingly, the
intermingling of the “who” and “what” considerations concerning the Overton window and its
custody (e.g., which fantasy themes are on the table and who has a chair at that table) were
persistently pertinent questions at the heart of these unforeseen “scandals.” Consider, for
example a book review entitled Jordan Peterson is Having a Moment— We Should Ignore it
(Goggin, 2018) summarizing Peterson’s arrival onto the celebrity-pundit scene so: “Peterson's
philosophies spilled into the world of policy when he began to fight against human rights
legislation in Canada aimed at protecting people from discrimination based on gender identity or
expression in September 2016.” On the face of it, the very title of this book review points to a
perceived struggle over the keys to the Overton window. The fact that its writer is a news editor
(i.e., transmissions gatekeeper) reifies this observation.
The dramatis personae of a rhetorical vision are essentially the relevant characters.
During WWII, for example, American troops and citizens would commonly speak of Hitler as
the principal representative villain in their struggle and Uncle Sam as the respective hero.
Stereotypes can also perform the role of dramatis personae in some rhetorical visions; e.g., mean
girls do this, nerds do this, jocks do this, goths do this, and so on. Not only do such categories
serve as observational tools to sort out social landscapes, they also affect participants’ self-
sorting behaviors within social landscapes. It is interesting to note that this concept of message
structuring, like the others in SCT, is ubiquitous in a variety of contexts. The principal dramatis
personae in the Jordan Peterson/IDW phenomenon are perhaps best embodied in his interview
with Cathy Newman; i.e., honest interlocutor vs. ideologically possessed opportunist.

41
The concept of plot line needs very little explication. Plot lines are the action, the
operative demonstration of the motivational logic inherent to a given vision in a particular
environment.
Scene, as a concept, refers to that environment. It is where the action takes place. The
most salient scenes in a rhetorical vision are seldom arbitrary. If a vision concerns conspiracy, its
principal scene is not likely to be one out in the open. The scenes most ostensibly related to
Jordan Peterson and the IDW are the public sphere itself along with the Academy.
Sanctioning agents serve the rhetorical, sociological, and psychological role of
legitimation. A divinity, the rule of law, or a nuclear threat can be sanctioning agents depending
on the particular vision and the contexts with which they are most concerned. The principles of
liberty, equality, and fraternity were proclaimed as sanctioning agents legitimating the events of
the French Revolution. In the case of Peterson and the IDW, relevant sanctioning agents include
the sovereign individual, empirical evidence, trust, etc. Peterson and others involved with the
IDW may also serve as sanctioning agents.
Bormann and his colleagues found common trends among rhetorical visions in course of
symbolic convergence theory’s development. One of these trends is expressed through the
concept of the master analogue, which asserts that rhetorical visions exhibit, and unevenly stress,
righteous, social, and pragmatic explanatory tendencies. They approximate rhetorical flavors,
attitudes, preferences, tones of voice, or temperamental orientations.
The righteous master analogue tends to explain a vision in terms of moral and
axiological evaluation: “We can’t do that. It would be wrong.” “That type of music is
unbelievably terrible; no one with a modicum of taste would listen to it.” The social master
analogue tends to stress social cohesion, interpersonal relationships, and benevolence: “The most

42
important thing to remember is kindness and teamwork.” The pragmatic master analogue
emphasizes utility, efficiency, commonsense: “We tried that and it didn’t work and wasted our
time and money. It’s time for a simpler approach.” The specific relations of these master
analogues to the present study are examined in the final chapter.
Given the epistemological presupposition that reality is symbolically constructed, it
follows that people serve the role of configuring, refining, testing, and elaborating their shared
and mutually negotiated symbolic world. Within SCT, anyone who can be identified as a
participant in this process is considered a fantasizer.
The concept of rhetorical community refers to the group of fantasizers negotiating a
common symbolic or rhetorical milieu. This could be a football team, a group of coworkers, a
disciplinary matrix shared by a collection of scientists, an ancient monastery, members of a think
tank, or the House of Representatives. Regarding the present study, the fact that a name was
given to a group of otherwise unconnected professionals and Internet users (i.e., Intellectual Dark
Web), points to the possibility that a rhetorical community is under construction. If this is true,
then the beginnings of a shared group consciousness, or even the development of shared
rhetorical vision, may be present as well.
Communication style refers to “the broad usage of a community of people engaged in
significant discourse for which they understand the rules, customs, and conventions” (Bormann,
1985; p. 19). The degrees of sophistication and rigidity of a communication/rhetorical style often
reveal the maturity of the rhetorical vision in question. If a vision is in the early stages of
development, the rules and norms of (and expectations for) discourse may be inconsistent or
fragile. The reverse is true of long-developed visions. An exception to this trend can be found in
the case of style-specific rhetorical visions; that is, in cases where the content and the style could

43
not be understood independently of one another. In such cases, most of the vision’s reality-links
are self-referential or nonexistent. Critical autoethnography has been considered an example of
such a style-specific rhetorical arena generating “symbols without substance” (Shields, 2000).
Peterson’s communication style is marked by reflective pauses, spontaneous intermingling and
elaboration of concepts, and recurrent usage of the second person. The communication style
advanced by visible members of the IDW includes the custom of “steel-manning.” Potential
stylistic norms endemic to less-visible participants remain to be determined.
A shared group consciousness is the result of symbolic convergence. As fresh tracks or
stool indicate that some animal had recently been in the area, the patterns of a shared group
consciousness imply the manifestation of symbolic convergence and fantasy chaining (Cragan &
Shields, 1998; p. 110). Markers of a shared group consciousness include the sharing, repetition,
restructuring, and elaboration of common sets of stories and fantasy themes. Indications of a
shared group consciousness among those engaging with Jordan Peterson and the IDW will be
discussed in the results chapter.
The evaluative concept of reality-link refers to components in a rhetorical vision which
ground it to an objective and/or authenticated body of facts and testimonies. This is an especially
difficult area, as narrative coherence can be as compelling as a thorough presentation of facts,
often more so (Bormann, 1982; Kahneman, 2015). The concept of reality-links basically asserts
that a successful rhetorical vision must adequately account for relevant evidence. That is,
explanatory power cannot persist for long in a vacuum of symbolic abstraction. This is not to say
that any set of evidence cannot be explained by a vast array of divergent accounts. But it does
insist that even a powerful rhetorical vision will phase out eventually if, (a) it does not integrate
or address the facts related to the phenomena the vision concerns, and/or (b) if the vision’s

44
claims are felt to be largely comprised of tautological assertions about the nature of reality. The
term “ideology” is often used by many in the IDW to describe belief systems operating in such
manner.
While worldviews can be somewhere along a continuum of extremely sophisticated to
exceptionally simple, a worldview cannot last long after collapsing the poles into one: effectively
rendering the approach for complete explanation into one. Edwin A. Abbot’s Flatland
(1884/1963) includes a zeroth-dimension character that displays this problem well. Shields
(2000) points to the concept of rhetorical vision reality-links in their paper outlining and
criticizing a rhetorical vision common to a form of scholarship within their field known as
“Critical Autoethnography.” In short, Shields suggests the inevitable failure of purely stylistic
rhetorical visions once exposed to the light of external scrutiny.
If these assumptions hold merit, it is then ironic that an absolute and quixotic cybernetic
meaning structure must collapse. This likely is because a process designed for efficiency, i.e.,
negative feedback, presumes the eternal presence of an ultimately ambiguous external
environment. The observer cannot regard its object as a perspectiveless truth. The drive for
negative feedback needs something not yet calibrated to calibrate. As the environment is treated
as something static, the system becomes a mere closed circuit; the compass becomes the
perimeter, teleological concerns evaporate, and the whole system falls apart at some point on its
exponential course toward singularity.
Reality-links seem to be of special concern to Jordan Peterson (his first book explicitly
aims to harmonize religious and scientific views of reality). Regarding metaphysics, Peterson
often gives unconventional and, to many, unsatisfactory answers. Concerning the more political
side of his public discourse, he is often at odds along different epistemological grounds. For

45
example, the prototypical intersectional, applied postmodern, is given to standpoint
epistemology (in which one’s identity predisposes them to a sociologically reserved body of
knowledge [via lived experience]; e.g., a female knows what it’s like to be marginalized as a
female, a racial minority knows what it’s like to be marginalized as that minority, a female of
that minority class knows what can be known given both standpoints, and so on), while
simultaneously, if that epistemological scheme is to be emphasized, must in effect speak, as from
an objective perspective. There’s little use asserting special knowledge/lived experience based on
one’s characteristics if one without those characteristics—and presumably without the concurrent
special knowledge—cannot be persuaded of it. Thus, another epistemological framework must
be applied to maintain the coherence of the first: presenting something of a reality-link paradox.
Fantasy theme artistry refers to the simple fact that some rhetoricians are more
competent in the craft than others. “In other words, highly skilled fantasizers turn ordinary
statements into dramatic events” (Cragan & Shields, 1998; p. 109). Provisional data from the
pilot study mentioned previously indicate that Jordan Peterson is perceived to be an honest
person whose work has helped people improve their comprehension of their own beliefs. These
effects likely attest to Peterson’s artistry in conveying salient fantasy themes. This will be
unpacked further through participants’ commentary in the results chapter.
Applications of SCT. Symbolic convergence theory and its concurrent method of
rhetorical criticism (FTA) have been used to study diverse communication phenomena.
Examples include the processes of group communication and creative problem solving
(Armstrong, 2015); the nature and effects of team communication (Kafle, 2014); corporate
strategic communication and risk management (Palenchar & Heath, 2002); market segmentation
(Cragan & Shields, 1992); evolution of rhetorical emphases and devices in the United States

46
cultural discourse from Puritan preachers to Abraham Lincoln (Bormann, 1985); the Cold War
rhetorical vision (Bormann, Cragan, & Shields, 1996); political, social, and marketing campaigns
(Bormann, 1982); cultural values and fantasies displayed by superhero mythoi (Kilbourn, 2016);
corporate mythologies and branding techniques (Neuman, 2013); rhetorical themes in ISIS
propaganda (Drischell, 2017); C.S. Lewis’s vision of human agency and the afterlife (Jeffress &
Brown, 2017); and more.
Criticisms of SCT. Criticisms of symbolic convergence theory tend to concentrate on
what it leaves out (such as sociological power dynamics) and its humanistic and egalitarian
vantage point (Olufowote, 2006). Other criticisms insist that SCT, being inspired by Bales’
work, mangles the Freudian roots from which the theory grows and that its vocabulary amounts
to little more than jargon (Mohrmann, 1982). Many of the criticisms leveled by Mohrmann, who
is perhaps the most famous critic of SCT, were also leveled a couple decades later (Gunn, 2003).
These critiques, as put in a response to them (Bormann, Cragan, Shields, et al, 2003) are: (a)
SCT is ontologically and paradigmatically inconsistent, (b) SCT’s Freudian fantasies are
deceptive, and (c) SCT is a deficient theory of invention.
Part of the first critique includes the argument that SCT is in decline and that this is due
to its amalgamation of modern (e.g., humanist ontology) and post-modern (e.g., co-construction
of symbolic reality) elements. The authors of the aforementioned response rebut this particular
point, noting the hundreds of studies generated using SCT across various fields. Furthermore, the
charge of ontological inconsistency must be supported by philosophical argument, not historical
argument. The inclusion of this argument into the broader claim that SCT is ontologically and
paradigmatically inconsistent only makes sense if a generational paradigm of philosophical
development is applied, one which grants favor to those most recent advances. This is precisely

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