This document provides an introduction to maneuver warfare and operational maneuver from the sea. It discusses key concepts like the nature of war, the levels and spectrums of war, and aspects of maneuver warfare such as friction, uncertainty, fluidity, and the human dimension. The document outlines maneuver warfare tactics like penetration, envelopment, and infiltration. It also covers operational maneuver from the sea, which emphasizes achieving objectives rapidly using the sea as maneuver space and integrating all assets to overwhelm the enemy.

1. INTRODUCTION TO
MANEUVER WARFARE
Ops 1.2

2. REFERENCES
MCDP-1 Warfighting
Battle Doctrine for Front-Line
Leaders, A.A. Vandegrift, LtGen,
USMC, (Third Marine division, 1944)
Marine Corps Concept Paper,
Operational Maneuver From The Sea,
1996.

3. OUTLINE
Nature of War.
Spectrums and Levels.
Aspects of Maneuver Warfare.
Operational Maneuver from the Sea.
Mission type orders.
Leadership.
OMFTS.

4. What is War?
“War is thus an act of force to
compel our enemy to do our will.”
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War

5. WAR DEFINED
“War is a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups
characterized by the use of military force.”
“The essence of war is a violent struggle between two hostile,
independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on
the other.”
MCDP-1, Warfighting

6. THE INTANGIBLES OF
WARFIGHTING
Friction.
Uncertainty.
Fluidity.
Disorder.
Human dimension.

7. FRICTION
“Friction…. is the force that makes the
apparently easy so difficult.”
Clausewitz, On War
The force that resists all action.
Makes the simple difficult and.
the difficult seemingly impossible.
Mental.
Physical.

8. UNCERTAINTY
“fog of war”
All the unknowns: enemy, friendly,
environment (lack of info)
Estimate and Accept Risk
Ungovernable element of Chance
TERRAIN
WEATHER
ENEMY
LOCATION
AIR/NAVAL
SUPERIORITY
RISK
All Actions based on incomplete, inaccurate and contradictory
Information.

9. FLUIDITY & DISORDER
FLUIDITY-
- The ever changing battlefield.
- Fleeting opportunities and unforeseen events that
require an original solution.
- Nothing viewed in isolation(Single Battle Concept)
DISORDER
- In the heat of battle, “Plans go awry”.
- Unclear/misinterpreted. Instructions/information.
- Mistakes/unforeseen events common place.

10. THE HUMAN DIMENSION
Danger.
Fear.
Exhaustion.
WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS ON
FIGHTING MAN?
Courage, Morale Leadership.

11. THE THEORY OF WAR
War does not exist for its own sake.
An extension of both policy and politics.
War must serve policy.
Military & Political leaders.
Duration and scope dictated by political
objective.
STRATEGY POLICY

12. THE SPECTRUM OF WAR
Low intensity.
- Military operations other than war, terrorism,
insurgency.
Mid intensity.
- Major regional conflict.
High intensity.
- Theater & strategic nukes.

13. THE LEVELS OF WAR
STRATEGIC
OPERATIONAL
TACTICAL
=FOCUS DIRECTLY ON SECURING
NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES
=THE USE OF TACTICAL RESULTS
TO ATTAIN STRATEGIC
OBJECTIVES
=ART & SCIENCE OF WINNING
ENGAGEMENTS AND BATTLES
(maneuver, fire power, combined arms, etc)

14. STRATEGIC
OPERATIONAL
TACTICAL
STRATEGIC
OPERATIONAL
TACTICAL
THE LEVELS OF WAR

15. INTRODUCTION TO
MANEUVER WARFARE
"Everything in war is simple, but the
simplest thing is difficult." - Clausewitz
WARS OF MANEUVER YIELD GREATER
VICTORIES WITH FEWER LOSSES.
– A Combat Multiplier.
– More Flexible and Responsive OODA Loop.
– Higher and More Effective OPTEMPO.

16. MANEUVER
“The movement of forces in relation to
the enemy to secure or retain a
positional advantage.”
FM 100-5, Operations

17. MANEUVER IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
LT.GEN. GRANT
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC
LT.GEN. LEE
ARMY OF NORTHERN
From 4 May 1864 – 2 June 1864 General Grant attempted to flank
General Lee by a series of marches. While Grants campaign was one
of maneuver, the battles that followed were battles of attrition.

18. From 4 May to June 2 1864 Grant’s Army of the Potomac
(122,000 officers and men) and Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia
(62,000 officers and men) fought a series of battles that collectively
became known as Grant’s 1864 Campaign.

19. MANEUVER
“Maneuver warfare is a warfighting
philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s
cohesion through a variety of rapid,
focused, and unexpected actions which
create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating
situation with which the enemy cannot
cope.”
MCDP-1, Warfighting

20. ATTRITION vs MANEUVER
ATTRITION
- Victory through cumulative destruction of
enemy assets, usually superior firepower.
- Very methodical.
- Does not consider the enemy “Will to fight”.
MANEUVER WARFARE
- Avoids strengths; seeks out weakness.
- EMPHASIZES TIME & TEMPO, SPEED &
SURPRISE.

21. Examples of attrition warfare
U.S. Civil War 1861-1865 565,000 dead
World War I 1914-1917 8,000,000 dead
United States 1917-1918 118,000 dead
British, First day of the Somme 57,000 casualties
World War II 1939-1945 30,000,000 dead
Iran Iraq War 1980-1988 1-2,000,000 casualties
Afghan Wars 1979-present 2,000,000 casualties

22. ATTRITION WARFARE
German gains on the Western Front 1914-1918

23. THE FACE OF MANEUVER

24. EXAMPLES OF MANEUVER WARFARE
German Blitz 1 Sept 1939 - Jun 1942 German KIA 200,000
Allied losses, KIA, POW
Iraq War 1990-1991 U.S. KIA 148
Iraqi KIA 6,000-100,000

25. German gains from 1 Sept. 1939-Jun 1942
MANEUVER WARFARE

26. MANEUVER MINDSET
Understands war is chaos.
Contains friction.
Seeks to create confusion and benefit
from it.
Emphasizes DECENTRALIZED
EXECUTION, COORDINATION, and
INITIATIVE.
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE ZERO-
DEFECTS MENTALITY!

27. MANEUVER WARFARE TERMS
COMBINED ARMS
- Creates a “No-Win” situation.
OPERATIONAL ART
- Pieces together tactical events to achieve a
STRATEGIC end.
CENTER OF GRAVITY
- If attacked, will have greatest impact on his ability to
continue to fight.
FOCUS OF EFFORT
- Identified enemy “CRITICAL VULNERABILITY”
- Main Effort is our unit assigned to exploit this issue.
- All other assets support this effort(Supporting Efforts).

28. MANUEVER WARFARE TERMS
(cont’d)
SURFACES & GAPS
- Identifies points of strength and weakness.
- Gaps to be exploited.
CULMINATING POINT
- That point reached when strength of attacker no longer exceeds
that of the defender.
- Natural Pause
- May result from a number of reasons (ammo, fatigue, log.).
DEFENSE IN DEPTH
- Developed by German Army in WWI.
- When culminating point was reached, Counter-Attack was
launched with reserves.
THICKENING THE BATTLEFIELD
- Weight Main Effort.
- Adjust unit boundaries/reduce sectors of attack/favorable force
ratio.

29. FORMS OF OFFENSIVE
MANEUVER
FRONTAL ATTACK
-Simplest form, yet least economical
PENETRATION
-Used When Enemy Flanks Are Unassailable
ENVELOPMENT
-Single
-Double (Pincer Movement)
-Turning Movement (Operational Level)
INFILTRATION
-covert/avoid decisive engagement/seek rear areas

30. USE OF RESERVES
Historically, these forces were assigned no
specific mission, but were simply expected to
remain ready to react as directed.
Should be used to exploit success, or as a
COUNTER-ATTACK force when enemy reaches
CULMINATING POINT.
Reserve must therefore be “SITUATIONALLY
AWARE” & involved in the planning process from
the start.

31. Boyd’s OODA LOOP
OBSERVE
ORIENT
DECIDE
ACT

32. OODA LOOP
“RECONNAISSANCE
REPORTS MUST REACH
THE COMMANDER
QUICKLY. HE MUST TAKE
HIS DECISIONS
IMMEDIATELYAND PUT
THEM INTO EFFECT AS
FAST AS HE CAN. SPEED OF
REACTION DECIDES THE
BATTLE.”
Field Marshall Erwin Rommel
THE ROMMEL PAPERS

33. MISSION TYPE ORDERS
Why are we doing this ?
-Orders emphasize Cmdr’s Intent.
Everyone understands.
-Two levels up/down.

34. MISSION TYPE ORDERS
CHARACTERIZED BY:
- Initiative.
- Decentralized Execution.
- High level of training.
- NO “ZERO-DEFECTS” MENTALITY!!

35. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
FORWARD PUSH
- Prepositioned stocks and supplies.
ANTICIPATE NEEDS OF FIGHTING FORCE
- Logisticians must be included in the planning process.
- Must understand commander’s intent.
- Must understand the tactical scenario, use of reserves,
culmination points, etc.
DELIVERY IS AUTOMATIC

36. LEADERSHIP
Technical/tactical expertise + initiative =
success.
Train & guide subordinates.
Expectations & accountability.
Supervision at all levels.
“Micro-management”.
DEVELOP SUBORDINATES TO
UTILIZE THEIR FULL POTENTIAL!

37. IMPORTANCE OF
MANEUVER WARFARE
Makes the best use of the limited resources
in an uncertain future.
The USMC’s way of doing business-
MCDP-1.
“Fight like you train”

38. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER
FROM THE SEA
OMFTS
MANEUVER!
FROM THE SEA
FORWARD...FROM THE SEA
SHIP TO OBJECTIVE

39. TENETS OF OMFTS
Focus on operational objective.
Achieve vital objectives rapidly and
decisively using the sea as maneuver space.
Generate faster operational tempo.
Pit strength against weakness.
Emphasis Intel, deception and flexibility.
Integrate all organic, joint and combined
assets.

40. FOCUS ON THE
OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE
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41. ACHIEVE VITAL OBJECTIVES
RAPIDLY USING THE SEAAS
MANEUVER SPACE
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42. OVERWHELM THE ENEMY BY
GENERATING A HIGH
OPERATIONAL TEMPO

43. PIT STRENGTH AGAINST
WEAKNESS
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44. INTEGRATE ALL ORGANIC,
JOINT & COMBINED ASSETS

45. THE WAY WE ARE

46. THE WAY WE NEED TO BE
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47. A TACTICAL
CONCEPT GUIDING
THE
DEVELOPMENT OF
DOCTRINE,
ORGANIZATION
AND EQUIPMENT
FOR OPERATIONS
IN THE 21ST
CENTURY

48. SUMMARY
Nature of War.
Spectrums and Levels.
Aspects of Maneuver Warfare.
Operational Maneuver From the Sea.

49. QUESTIONS????