DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING
9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
JULY 2010 UPDATE
GUARDING AGAINST TERRORISM AND ENSURING
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
RECOMMENDATION: Develop a Risk-Based Plan for
Transportation Security
Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment
In June 2010, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
provided to Congress the
Transportation Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA)
report, a nationwide risk assessment that
examines the potential threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences
of a terrorist attack involving the
Nation’s transportation system. This report will inform the
risk-based development and maintenance
of risk mitigation strategies and actions that include the
development of security standards, grants,
programs, countermeasures, and resource allocations.
Freight Railroad Security Risk Assessment
In June 2010, TSA submitted to Congress the Freight Railroad
Security Risk Assessment and
National Strategy report as required by the 9/11 Act. This
report provides the results of a
comprehensive assessment of the risk of a terrorist attack
involving the Nation’s freight railroad

transportation system. The report also includes a national
strategy for railroad transportation.
Threat Assessment of the Risk of Terrorist Attack on the
Nation’s School Bus System
In early 2010, TSA submitted to Congress the Threat
Assessment of the Risk of Terrorist Attack on
the Nation’s School Bus System, as required by the 9/11 Act.
This report was developed in
conjunction with school transportation and school security
leaders nationwide, outlining the threats
and vulnerabilities this system faces and an analysis of
strategies to mitigate risk.
Transportation Security Funding
To support transportation infrastructure and security, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
provided the following resources to state and local jurisdictions
based on risk and threats in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2010 and through the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA):
o $403 million for the Transit Security Grant Program to protect
critical transit infrastructure
from terrorism, including capital projects, such as
improvements to high-risk, high-density
tunnels, stations, and bridges and law enforcement officers at
transit systems across the
country. ($150 million ARRA/ $253 million FY2010 funding)
o $1.76 billion for state-of-the-art in-line explosive detection
systems to streamline checked
baggage screening at airports throughout the U.S. ($734 million
ARRA/ $1.028 billion
FY2010 funding)

o $14.5 million for the Freight Rail Security Grant Program to
protect critical freight rail
systems infrastructure from acts of terrorism resulting from
railroad cars transporting toxic
inhalation hazardous materials.
o $20 million for Intercity Passenger Rail (Amtrak) to protect
critical surface transportation
infrastructure and the traveling public from terrorism within the
Amtrak rail system.
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Additionally, DHS spent $394 million for the passenger
screening through Advanced Technology X-
Ray machines, Advanced Imaging Technology machines, bottle
liquid scanners, Explosive Trace
Detection machines, and other enhanced threat-detection
equipment. ($266 million ARRA/ $128
million FY2010 funding)
Aviation Security
Fulfilling a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission
Report, TSA implemented Secure Flight for
100 percent of passengers flying domestically and
internationally on U.S. airlines in June of 2010.
TSA expects all international carriers with direct flights to the
United States to be using Secure Flight
by the end of 2010. Under Secure Flight, TSA prescreens
passengers directly against government
watchlists, a function previously performed by individual air
carriers. In addition to facilitating
secure travel for all passengers, Secure Flight helps prevent the
misidentification of passengers who

have names similar to individuals on government watchlists.
Since the attempted terrorist attack on December 25, 2009,
Secretary Napolitano, in conjunction with
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), has been
leading a global initiative to
strengthen the international aviation system against the evolving
threats posed by terrorists, working
in multilateral and bilateral contexts with governments as well
as industry. Over the past six months,
Secretary Napolitano has participated in regional aviation
security summits around the world, forging
historic consensus with her international colleagues to
strengthen the civil aviation system through
enhanced information analysis and sharing, cooperation on
technological development and
modernized aviation security standards. These meetings will
culminate in the ICAO Triennial
Assembly in September where DHS expects member states will
affirm new standards, key measures,
and proposals for increasing aviation security worldwide.
Domestically, DHS has bolstered security measures at all of our
airports, by implementing a variety
of security measures to further improve an enhanced, risk-
based, layered approach to security. DHS
and TSA deploy the most effective technologies available to
counter evolving threats, including next
generation Explosive Trace Detection units, Advanced Imaging
Technology, and next generation
Bottled Liquids Scanners. The deployment of over 50,000
trained Transportation Security Officers,
Transportation Security Inspectors, and Behavior Detection
Officers and 730 canine teams in the
transportation sector add additional layers of security to support
the technology at the checkpoints

DHS has also strengthened partnerships across the federal
government, working with the Department
of Justice (DOJ) on a number of initiatives to enhance risk-
based aviation security countermeasures
and collaborating with the Department of Energy (DOE) and its
National Laboratories to leverage
their expertise in building risk-based technology solutions to
key aviation security challenges.
Further, each year, DHS/TSA conducts international aviation
security training for countries around
the world focusing on risk-based security strategies, including
cargo security, screening technologies,
and airport security management, among other topics. TSA has
also successfully negotiated
agreements with various foreign governments permitting
Federal Air Marshal deployments on
international U.S. carrier flights, based on risk.
Additionally, air cargo carried on passenger aircraft has never
been more secure. Currently, 100
percent of identified high risk internatio nal inbound cargo and
100 percent of total cargo on more
than 95 percent of all flights originating from U.S. airports are
now screened. TSA is on track to meet
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the Congressionally-mandated 100 percent screening
requirement for all air cargo on domestic
passenger aircraft by August 2010.
The FY 2011 DHS budget request strengthens several aviation

security programs by allowing
increased Federal Air Marshal coverage on international flights
and through the deployment of
additional canine teams, Behavior Detection Officers, Explosive
Trace Detection machines and
Advanced Imaging Technology units to increase the
Department’s ability to detect metallic and non-
metallic explosives and other threats at airports across the
country.
Surface Transportation Protection
Recognizing that the risk from terrorism and other hazards for
surface transportation demands a
coordinated approach involving all sector partners and
stakeholders, the Administration initiated a
thorough review of existing U.S. surface transportation security
efforts across all modes of surface
transportation in 2009. The resulting Surface Transportation
Security Priority Assessment, released
on April 2, 2010, identified interagency priorities for the next
four years and provided concrete
recommendations on how to enhance security efforts, maximize
the use of partnerships to optimize
public safety, facilitate commerce and strengthen the resiliency
of our surface transportation system.
DHS has completed risk-based implementation plans for each of
the 20 consensus recommendations
of the Surface Transportation Security Priority Assessment
addressing the potential risks to the
surface transportation system and its four subsectors (mass
transit, highways, freight rail, and
pipelines), and initiatives are underway.
The Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE)
program for mass transit provides a

comprehensive assessment of the security programming in
critical transit systems around the country
in order to identify security concerns and drive program
priorities and resource allocations.
Additionally, TSA has many programs designed to bolster
surface transportation security, including
the deployment of Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) Teams, comprised of Federal
Air Marshals, surface/aviation transportation security
inspectors, Behavioral Detection Officers,
Transportation Security Officers, local law enforcement and
security personnel, and canine teams,
which enhance the protection of surface transportation, provide
deterrent and detection capabilities,
and introduce an element of unpredictability in security
practices and procedures in order to prevent
or disrupt potential terrorist planning activities.
Maritime Transportation Security
In January 2010, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began
enforcement of the Importer Security
Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements interim final rule—
also known as the “10 + 2 rule”—
increasing the scope and accuracy of information gathered on
shipments of cargo arriving by sea into
the United States and bolstering DHS' layered enforcement
strategy to protect against terrorism and
other crimes at U.S. ports of entry.
In FY 2010, DHS provided $288 million in grants for the Port
Security Grant Program—awarded
based on risk—to protect critical port infrastructure from
terrorism, enhance maritime domain
awareness and risk management capabilities, and support the
implementation of the Transportation

Worker Identification Credential, and an additional $150
million in Recovery Act funding.
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The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has many risk-based
initiatives in place that strengthen
maritime transportation security. For example, Operation
Neptune Shield, which includes waterborne
and aerial patrols as well as armed escorts of hazardous cargos
and passenger vessels, helps to reduce
the risk of terrorism to the maritime transportation system,
critical infrastructure and key resources.
The USCG also has developed Advanced Interdiction
capabilities in order to interdict identified
threats, including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosives threats, before they reach
the United States. The USCG conducts intelligence-informed,
risk-based Security Boardings to verify
the identity of crew members and to ascertain if a vessel poses a
threat to the port and whether it
should be permitted or denied entry.
The USCG also utilizes the Maritime Security Risk Analysis
Model, known as MSRAM, to assess
threat, vulnerability, and consequence factors for various
potential terrorist attack scenarios. This
information allows for increased efficiency in the allocation of
maritime security resources to reduce
security risks at a port. Finally, the USCG’s International Port
Security Program (PSP) assesses the
effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in foreign ports that
conduct maritime trade with the United
States and assists in measuring the risk posed by vessels who

have visited international ports prior to
coming to the United States.
RECOMMENDATION: Improve airline passenger pre-screening
New, More Flexible Screening Measures
On April 8, 2010, DHS began implementing new enhanced
security measures for all air carriers with
international flights to the United States to strengthen the safety
and security of all passengers. These
new measures, which cover 100 percent of passengers traveling
by air to the United States, utilize
real-time, threat-based intelligence along with multiple layers
of security, both seen and unseen, to
more effectively mitigate evolving terrorist threats.
Secure Flight
Fulfilling a key 9/11 Commission recommendation, in June
2010, TSA implemented Secure Flight
for 100 percent of passengers flying domestically and
internationally on U.S. airlines, meaning that
TSA, not the air carriers, vets passengers against government
watchlists using passenger name, date
of birth, and gender before a boarding pass is issued. This
accounts for over 90 percent of all travel
to, from, and within the United States. TSA expects to convert
all international carriers to Secure
Flight by December 2010.
Identifying High-Risk Travelers
To identify high-risk travelers and facilitate legitimate travel,
DHS requires airlines flying to the
United States from foreign countries to provide Advance
Passenger Information (API), which
includes basic information such as name, date of birth,
citizenship/nationality and passport number,

and Passenger Name Records (PNR), which includes the
information that travelers provide to airlines
when booking their flights, such as itinerary, address, and
check-in information.
DHS analysis of passenger data played a critical role in the
recent counterterrorism cases against
Najibullah Zazi, who pled guilty to plotting to bomb New York
subways, David Headley, who pled
guilty for his role in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, and
Times Square bombing suspect Faisal
Shahzad.
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Trusted Traveler Programs
In order to facilitate legitimate travel and effectively deploy
screening and security resources, CBP
has vetted and enrolled over 780,000 travelers from over 100
countries in four Trusted Traveler
Programs: NEXUS, the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers
Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), the
Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program, and Global Entry.
These programs expedite travel for
members who voluntarily apply, provide biometric
identification, pass extensive vetting, pay a fee,
and provide comprehensive data to CBP for rigorous security
threat assessment checks.
Pre-clearance Agreements
DHS has five pre-clearance agreements (with Aruba, Bahamas,
Bermuda, Canada and Ireland),
allowing DHS to screen travelers before takeoff through the
same process a traveler would undergo

upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry to better target and prevent
threats while streamlining legitimate
travel. The preclearance agreements with Aruba, Bermuda and
Ireland have been expanded to apply
to private aircraft traveling directly to the U.S.
Immigration Advisory Program
DHS has also implemented 9 Immigration Advisory Program
(IAP) arrangements in 7 countries,
which enable CBP officers posted at foreign airports to use
advanced targeting and passenger analysis
information to identify high-risk travelers at foreign airports
before they board U.S.-bound flights. In
2010, DHS signed agreements to establish similar programs at
Mexico City International Airport and
Paris/de Gaulle International Airport.
RECOMMENDATION: Improve airline passenger explosive
screening
TSA continually assesses intelligence and develops
countermeasures to enhance its multiple layers of
security at airports and onboard aircraft in order to anticipate
and mitigate the constantly evolving
threats to aviation security. TSA has deployed more than 50,000
Transportation Security Officers,
Transportation Security Inspectors, and Behavior Detection
Officers across the U.S. and all officers
receive extensive advanced explosive training. TSA has also
deployed explosive detection
technology, including Advanced Technology X-Ray Machines
(which enhance the detection
capabilities of carry-on bag screening), next-generation
Explosives Trace Detection Machines (which
improve explosives detection capabilities at airports) and
Advanced Imaging Technology Machines

(which allow for increased detection of both metallic and non-
metallic threats) to airports across the
country to detect potential threats.
As noted above, the Recovery Act provided $266 million, the
FY2010 budget provided $128.7
million, and the President’s FY2011 budget request included
$769 million for passenger screening
technologies.
RECOMMENDATION: Improve checked bag and cargo
screening
Checked Baggage
TSA screens 100 percent of all checked and carry-on baggage
for explosives. As noted above, the
Recovery Act provided $734 million and the FY2010 budget
provided $1.028 billion in funding for
new, state-of-the-art in-line explosives detection systems and
other technology to streamline checked
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baggage screening at airports throughout the U.S. and hundreds
of next generation explosives trace
detection units.
Cargo Screening
Air cargo on passenger aircraft has never been more secure.
Currently, 100 percent of identified high
risk international inbound cargo and 100 percent of total cargo
on more than 95 percent of all flights
originating from U.S. airports are now being screened.

TSA is on track to meet the Congressionally-mandated 100
percent screening requirement for all air
cargo on domestic passenger aircraft by August 2010. Effective
May 1, 2010, 75 percent of cargo on
passenger aircraft departing from U.S. locations are screened
under TSA security programs, largely
through the Certified Cargo Screening Program, which permits
entities who have undergone rigorous
inspection and certification processes throughout the air cargo
supply chain to screen cargo.
Currently, there are over 1.5 million shippers in TSA’s Known
Shipper Management System that that
have been certified as meeting specific security standards.
Port Security
CBP has deployed Radiation Portal Monitors and other radiation
detection technologies to seaports,
land border ports, and mail facilities around the world. These
systems scan 100 percent of all
containerized cargo arriving in the U.S., including 100 percent
of vehicles arriving through our
southern border ports, over 99 percent of arriving sea
containers, 100 percent of trucks and 100
percent of personal vehicles arriving at our northern border
ports.
DHS has also implemented the Secure Freight Initiative to scan
U.S.-bound maritime containers for
nuclear material overseas and the Container Security Initiative
to ensure that all U.S.-bound maritime
containers that pose a potential risk are identified and inspected
before they are placed on vessels
destined for the U.S.
Canine Teams
Canine teams are an integral part of DHS’s layered approach to

baggage and cargo security and are
deployed by TSA, CBP and USCG in their respective
environments. CBP deploys canine detection
teams at and between ports of entry, expediting inspections
along the border to combat terrorist
threats and interrupt the illegal smuggling of drugs, currency,
firearms, humans, and agricultural
products. TSA deploys canine teams to screen air cargo at the
nation’s highest cargo volume airports
and provide explosives detection capabilities in the aviation,
mass transit, and maritime transportation
sectors. Finally, USCG deploys canine explosive detection
teams to strategic U.S. ports to enhance
security throughout the maritime transportation sector. The
Recovery Act provided $150 million for
the Transportation Security Grant Program, of which $78
million is being used by transit agencies to
hire new law enforcement officers and by police departments
with dedicated transit bureaus to hire
anti-terrorism personnel, purchase anti-terrorism equipment,
and obtain and train explosive detection
canines.
Nuclear Detection
DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) works to
improve the Nation’s capability to
detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, develop, or
transport nuclear or radiological
material for use against the U.S. DNDO has worked with intra-
and inter-agency partners to develop
strategies for improving the probability of detecting and
interdicting radiological and nuclear
threats. Since its inception, DNDO has launched more than 250
research and development projects
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with National Laboratory, academic, and industrial partners,
aimed at advancing detection
technologies. DNDO has also made radiological and nuclear
detection training available to over
15,000 state and local officers and first responders. In order to
meet the challenge of the global
helium 3 shortage, DNDO is aggressively bringing alternative
technologies for helium 3 from
concept to product through a rapid acquisition process,
expediting new and innovative detection
technology.
DNDO works across DHS to develop nuclear detection
capabilities throughout the transportation
sectors. TSA’s VIPR Program is currently working in
conjunction with DNDO and DOE and has the
capability to deploy preventative radiological and nuclear
detection equipment to the field. CBP has
deployed hundreds of Radiation Portal Monitors to ports of
entry, airports and seaports to screen cars,
trucks, and other conveyances for the presence of radioactive
and nuclear materials. Finally, all
USCG teams are now equipped with radiation detection
capabilities, including USCG personnel
specifically trained to board and search vessels.
In March 2010, DHS renewed a Project Arrangement
“Concerning the Detection of Illicit Movement
of Radiological and Nuclear Materials” with the U.K. to address
information and data sharing
between the countries in the development of radiation and
nuclear detection equipment and
technology.

RECOMMENDATION: Vigorously track and disrupt terrorist
financing
Disrupting terrorist financing is one of a number of tools that
the U.S. Government employs to
counter terrorism. The Secret Service has expanded its
Electronic Crimes Task Force (ECTF)
program across the country and internationally, with its first
international ECTF in Rome, Italy. These
task forces are designed to prevent, detect, and investigate
various forms of electronic crimes,
including potential terrorist attacks against critical
infrastructure and financial payment systems.
Additionally, the Secret Service has Special Agents assigned to
all Joint Terrorism Task Forces
around the country. These locally-based facilities partner
federal, state and local law enforcement and
intelligence agencies to target and prevent terrorist activities.
Furthermore, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has
a lead role in combating bulk cash
smuggling, a common strategy used by criminals seeking to
move illicit proceeds across transnational
borders. ICE’s Operation Firewall, a bulk-cash smuggling
initiative that intercepts currency
smuggling en route to the border, has led to more than hundreds
of arrests and the seizure of more
than $316 million, including $116 million seized overseas. ICE
has provided outreach and training on
the interdiction and investigation of bulk currency violations to
more than 2,500 law enforcement,
financial, and government officials in more than 85 countries .
ICE also developed the Cornerstone Initiative to detect and
close gaps within U.S. financial, trade,

and transportation sectors that can be exploited by criminal
networks, and ICE’s Trade Transparency
Units target money laundering and illegal trade transactions.
These Trade Transparency Units have
launched over 600 trade-based money laundering investigations,
seizing more than $180 million
since 2004.
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SECURING OUR BORDERS
RECOMMENDATION: Standardize secure identification
DHS strongly supports national standards for identification
documents to strengthen security while
enhancing privacy safeguards. Over the past several years, DHS
has taken numerous steps to
implement this recommendation to help prevent terrorism,
reduce fraud, and improve the reliability
and accuracy of personal identification documents.
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI)
In June 2009, DHS successfully implemented the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) for
land and sea travel to the U.S., increasing border security while
facilitating legitimate travel and trade
by requiring that U.S. and Canadian citizens present a passport
or other secure travel document that
denotes identity and citizenship when crossing the border.
In response to WHTI, CBP is working with tribes across the
country on the development of Enhanced
Tribal Cards (ETC)—WHTI compliant documents that formally

recognize tribal membership and
U.S./Canadian citizenship for the purpose of border crossing.
To date, CBP has signed Memorandum
of Agreements for the development of ETCs with the Kootenai
Tribe of Idaho, the Pascua Yaqui of
Arizona, the Tohono O’Odham of Arizona, the Seneca Nation of
New York, and the Coquille of
Idaho, and is working with additional tribes on the ETC
initiative.
Drivers License Security
Under DHS’s Driver’s License Grant Security Grant Program,
states have made substantial progress
in improving the security and integrity of their driver’s licenses
and issuance processes. Over the past
3 years, this program has provided $176.4 million to states to
assist with implementing these security
procedures.
DHS continues to work with states and territories, congressional
allies, and the National Governors
Association to enhance the security of driver’s licenses while
reforming and resolving many of the
concerns in the REAL ID Act through legislation.
Transportation Worker Identity Credential (TWIC) Program
DHS has enrolled over 1.6 million port workers and merchant
mariners in the Transportati on Worker
Identity Credential (TWIC) program, a tamper-resistant
biometric credential issued to those who
require unescorted access to secure areas of ports and vessels.
Citizenship and Immigration Documents
In May 2010, U.S. Citizenship and Immigrati on Services
(USCIS) launched a new card
personalization system with state-of-the-art technology that

enhances the verification and sharing of
electronic records. USCIS redesigned all of its secure identity
documents to comport with the latest
DHS and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
standards, as well as best practices in
industry and government.
The new Permanent Resident Card (“green card”) includes a
radio frequency identification tag that
allows CBP to quickly access the electronic records of travelers
seeking to enter the United States and
includes new security features that reduce the risks of
counterfeiting, tampering, and fraud.
Additionally, USCIS updated the Employment Authorization
Document by adding a machine-
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readable zone that for the first time allows USCIS to share data
through these work authorization
cards with CBP and U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology (US-VISIT).
RECOMMENDATION: Integrate border security into larger
network of screening points that
includes the transportation system and access to vital facilities
Biometric Entry-Exit Screening System
The US-VISIT biometric identity and verification process
collects digital fingerprints and a
photograph from international travelers at U.S. visa-issuing post
and ports of entry to help
immigration officers determine whether a person is eligible to
receive a visa or enter the United

States. US-VISIT also supports the Department’s ability to
identify international travelers who have
remained in the United States beyond their period of admission.
To date, DHS has achieved ten-
fingerprint collection at entry for 98 percent of inbound
travelers.
Visa Waiver Program and Lost and Stolen Passport Screening
The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) enables nationals of 36
participating countries to travel to the
United States for tourism or business for stays of 90 days or
less without obtaining a visa. DHS
implemented the Electronic System for Travel Authorization
(ESTA) to screen VWP applicants prior
to travel to the United States and, as a result, has virtually
eliminated the paper arrival/departure form
(Form I-94W) for authorized travelers from nations
participating in the VWP.
DHS—in cooperation with the Departments of State and
Justice—has made substantial progress in
bringing VWP countries into compliance with the information
sharing requirements of the 9/11 Act.
The 9/11 Act requires VWP countries to enter into an agreement
with the United States to report lost
and stolen passport data to the United States so that it can be
screened against INTERPOL’s Stolen
and Lost Travel Document database, which contains the lost and
stolen passport records of more than
120 countries. To date, 32 of the 36 VWP countries have
reached such agreements.
In addition, DHS, in collaboration with the Departments of
Justice and State, has signed Preventing
and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) Agreements with 14
VWP countries to share information to

better identify known terrorists and criminals during
investigations and other law enforcement
activities.
Visa Security Program (VSP)
DHS is expanding the Visa Security Program (VSP) to U.S.
Embassies and Consulates identified by
the Departments of State and Homeland Security as having the
highest risk from a terrorism
perspective, subject to appropriations and Departmental
approval. DHS provides expert advice and
training to consular officers regarding specific security threats
relating to the adjudication of
individual visa applications; reviews applications; and conducts
investigations with respect to
consular matters under the jurisdiction of DHS.
Southwest Border
Southwest Border Initiative
In March 2009, the Obama Administration announced the
Southwest Border Initiative—a series of
unprecedented steps to crack down on Mexican drug cartels by
deploying additional personnel and
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technology, increasing information sharing, working closely
with the Mexican government, and
improving federal coordination with state, local and tribal law
enforcement authorities.
Over the past sixteen months, DHS has dedicated unprecedented
personnel, technology, and

resources to the Southwest border. Today, the Border Patrol is
better staffed than at any time in its
85-year history, having nearly doubled the number of agents
from approximately 10,000 in 2004 to
more than 20,000 today. Since March 2009, DHS has doubled
the number of personnel assigned to
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces; tripled the number of
ICE intelligence analysts working
along the U.S.-Mexico border; quadrupled deployments of
Border Liaison Officers; and begun
screening 100 percent of southbound rail shipments for illegal
weapons, drugs, and cash – for the first
time ever. DHS has also deployed additional canine teams
trained to detect drugs and weapons and
non-intrusive inspection technology that help identify anomalies
in passenger vehicles at the
Southwest Border.
CBP has also worked closely with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to obtain Certificates
of Authorization (COA) to operate Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS), extending surveillance
capability to personnel on the ground. The latest COA approvals
have increased the miles of airspace
available for UAS operations above Texas, enabling CBP to
deploy its unmanned aircraft from the
eastern tip of California, across the land borders of Arizona,
New Mexico, and Texas, and into the
maritime border just short of the Texas and Louisiana border.
These initiatives and investments have yielded impressive
results. Seizures of contraband along the
Southwest border have increased across the board and illegal
crossings continue to decline. In 2009,
DHS seized over $39.2 million in southbound illegal currency—
an increase of more than $29.4

million compared to 2008. In total, DHS seized more than $103
million, 1.7 million kilograms of
drugs, and 1,400 firearms in 2009—an increase of more than
$47 million, 450,000 kilograms of
drugs, and 300 firearms, respectively, compared to 2008.
Additionally, overall apprehensions of
illegal aliens decreased from 723,825 in FY2008 to 556,041 in
FY2009, a 23 percent reduction,
indicating that fewer people are attempting to illegally cross the
border.
To continue to bolster these efforts, President Obama recently
requested $600 million in supplemental
funds for enhanced border protection and law enforcement
activities, and announced the deployment
of up to 1,200 National Guard Troops to the Southwest border
to contribute additional capabilities
and capacity to assist law enforcement agencies.
Interagency Efforts
In June 2009, the Obama Administration released its Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy,
which provides the Administration’s overarching framework to
address the threats posed by the illicit
narcotics trade along the Southwest border. DHS has also
forged historic agreements with DOJ,
increasing coordination between ICE and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) on
important Southwest border issues such
as combating arms trafficking, bolstering information sharing
and providing ICE agents the authority
to work on important drug trafficking cases.
DHS and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
are also partnering to develop and

implement Project Roadrunner, an integrated license plate
reader recognition system which will target
both north- and southbound drug trafficking and associated
illegal activity along the Southwest
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border. Under this partnership, ONDCP will provide DHS with
previously-purchased fixed and
mobile cameras—expanding DHS’ existing capabilities at
minimal cost.
Collaboration with State and Local Law Enforcement
The federal government has worked closely with state and local
law enforcement along the border—
leveraging the resources and capabilities of over 50 law
enforcement agencies to crack down on
transnational criminal organizations.
DHS has increased the funding state and local law enforcement
can use to combat border-related
crime through Operation Stonegarden—a DHS grant program
designed to support state, local, and
tribal law enforcement efforts along the border. Based on risk,
cross-border traffic and border-related
threat intelligence, nearly 83 percent of 2009 and 2010
Operation Stonegarden funding went to
Southwest border states.
DHS is also forging a new partnership with major law
enforcement associations to create the
“Southwest Border Law Enforcement Compact”—designed to
boost law enforcement at the border
by enabling non-border state and local law enforcement

agencies to detail officers to Southwest
border state and local law enforcement agencies to focus on
criminal networks operating along the
border.
Further, ICE is expanding the Joint Criminal Alien Removal
Task Forces, comprised of ICE officers
and local law enforcement agents who work together to identify
and arrest convicted criminal aliens
and deploying additional officers to work with state and local
jails that are within 100 miles of the
Southwest border to ensure the identification of all removable
convicted criminal aliens who pose a
danger to public safety.
Additionally, DHS is strengthening the analytic capability of
fusion centers across the Southwest
border to receive and share threat information, and is working
with DOJ to create a new system that
will link the information systems of all state, local and tribal
law enforcement entities operating along
the Southwest border, as appropriate, with federal law
enforcement.
Finally, DHS is establishing a suspicious activities reporting
program for the Southwest border. This
will help local law enforcement officers on the front lines
recognize and track incidents related to
criminal activity by drug traffickers, integrate disparate
information from across the border to identify
trends and utilize this information for targeted law enforcement
operations on both sides of the
border.
Increased Cooperation with Mexico
Reflecting their unprecedented collaboration, Secretary

Napolitano and her Mexican counterparts
have signed numerous bilateral agreements and declarations to
bolster cooperation in the areas of
enforcement, planning, information and intelligence sharing,
joint operations and trade facilitation
along the Southwest border.
For the first time in history, U.S. Border Patrol agents are
coordinating joint operations along the
Southwest border with Mexican Federal Police, and working
together to prosecute human trafficking
cases. In addition, the Department is increasing joint training
programs with Mexican law
enforcement agencies—focusing on money laundering and
human trafficking investigations. ICE will
11
begin training Mexican customs investigators in August 2010,
enabling Mexican Customs to support
ICE investigations.
To increase information sharing, the United States and Mexico
are establishing a new cross-border
communications network, which will improve incident response
and coordination among
participating federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement
and public safety personnel along the
border. Additionally, ICE and the Government of Mexico have
entered into a Criminal History
Information Sharing Agreement in which ICE provides serious
felony conviction information on
Mexican nationals being repatriated to Mexico.

In October 2009, ICE launched the Illegal Drug Program in
Nogales, Arizona to refer narcotics
smuggling cases declined for prosecution in the United States to
the Mexican Office of the Attorney
General for prosecution. In April 2010, ICE expanded this
program to El Paso, Texas. DHS is
expanding the program to four additional Southwest border
ports of entry—for a total of six
locations.
In order to help define and ultimately disrupt the movement of
criminal proceeds from the United
States to Mexico, the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement,
ICE, and the Government of Mexico
for the first time ever collaborated in April 2009 on the Bi -
National Criminal Proceeds Study, which
describes the criminal proceeds supply chain and quantifies
important indicators of this illegal
financial network.
Northern Border and Increased Cooperation with Canada
DHS has made critical security improvements along the
Northern border, investing in additional
Border Patrol agents, technology, and infrastructure. By the end
of 2010, DHS will have more than
2,200 agents on the Northern border, a 700 percent increase
since 9/11. DHS is also deploying
technology, including thermal camera systems, Mobile
Surveillance Systems, and a Remote Video
Surveillance System, to the Northern border, and is using
Recovery Act funds to modernize 29 CBP-
owned land ports of entry along the Northern border to meet the
security and operational standards of
our post-9/11 world.
In May 2009, Secretary Napolitano signed the Shiprider

Agreement with Canada to make joint law
enforcement teams permanent along the international maritime
border. In November 2009, Secretary
Napolitano and Public Safety Canada Minister Peter Van Loan
agreed on a series of initiatives to
combat common threats, including measures to streamline
border shipping, assist one another during
emergencies, and recognize NEXUS and FAST trusted traveler
program cards at all land and sea
border ports of entry. Additionally, investigators and
intelligence analysts from DHS, the Canada
Border Services Agency, and the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police share information and analysis
through Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and Border
Enforcement Security Teams along the
border.
In July 2010, Secretary Napolitano and Canadian Minister of
Public Safety Vic Toews announced the
first-ever U.S.-Canada Joint Critical Infrastructure Action Plan,
enabling both countries to more
effectively address a range of cross border critical infrastructure
issues and work together to share
information, identify interdependencies and conduct exercises.
They also announced the ICE, CBP,
and Canada Border Services Agency currency seizure
Memorandum of Understanding, which will
help law enforcement officials and border services officers
better identify potential threats and assist
in money-laundering and terrorist-financing investigations and
prosecutions. They also announced a
12

joint border threat and risk assessment to ensure a common
understanding of the threats and
challenges, which will enable a coordinated approach to
addressing them.
STRENGTHENING PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS
RECOMMENDATION: Allocate homeland security funds based
on risk
DHS uses risk-based methodology to identify areas eligible for
homeland security grants, accounting
for threats, population, economic output, and prevalence of
critical infrastructure. In FY2010, DHS
awarded the following security grants to assist state, local, and
tribal governments and the private
sector in strengthening preparedness for acts of terrorism, major
disasters, and other emergencies
based on risk:
o $842 million for the State Homeland Security Program to
build and strengthen
preparedness capabilities at all levels through planning,
equipment, and readiness.
o $832 million for the Urban Areas Security Initiative to
enhance urban preparedness
capabilities in 64 high-threat, high-density areas, with the seven
highest risk areas (Tier 1)
receiving 61 percent of available funds.
o $541 million and an additional $300 million in Recovery Act
funds for Port and Transit
Security Grant Programs to create a sustainable, risk-based
effort to protect critical
infrastructure from terrorism.

o $48 million for the Interoperable Emergency Communications
Grant Program for
planning, training, exercises and equipment to states, territories,
and local and tribal
governments to carry out initiatives identified in Statewide
Communication
Interoperability Plans.
o $60 million for the Operation Stonegarden Grant Program to
enhance law enforcement
preparedness and operational readiness along the border. Based
on risk, cross-border
traffic and border-related threat intelligence, nearly 80 percent
of the funding went to the
Southwest border states.
In addition to these grant programs, the Science and Technology
Directorate published the 2010
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (classified) in January of 2010 to
inform all federal decision-making
about resource allocation and risk manage ment regarding
homeland security, infrastructure
protection, detectors (such as BioWatch sensors)
countermeasures, response plans, and overall
consequence management capabilities.
RECOMMENDATION: Improve interoperable communications
at all levels of government
DHS has implemented multiple programs to improve
interoperable communications across the
Department. As noted above, DHS awarded $48 million through
the Interoperable Emergency
Communication Grant Program in FY 2010 to fund state and
local activities that assist in the

implementation of the National Emergency Communications
Plan and the Statewide Communication
Interoperability Plans.
The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is in the final
stages of testing the Multi-Band Radio,
a portable radio that enables emergency responders to
communicate with partner agencies regardless
of radio band.
13
USCG is in the process of establishing Interagency Operations
Centers throughout the nation’s ports
by deploying the Rescue 21 coastal command, control, and
communications system and the
Watchkeeper information sharing and operational planning and
coordination system. The USCG has
also developed Mobile Command Center capability, which
consists of two Enhanced Mobile Incident
Command Posts positioned on each coast, providing robust,
interoperable communications anywhere
in the world.
As mentioned above, as part of the effort to improve
international interoperable communications, the
United States and Mexico are establishing a new cross-border
communications network, which will
improve incident response and coordination among participating
federal, state, local, and tribal law
enforcement and public safety personnel along the border.
Additionally, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is currently developing the
nation’s next-generation infrastructure of

alert and warning capabilities, the Integrated Public Alert and
Warning System, which will expand to
new mediums of communication.
RECOMMENDATION: Establish a unified incident command
system
DHS has incorporated the Incident Command System and
National Response Framework into the
National Incident Management System, which provides
nationwide guidelines to clarify the roles of
federal, state and local governments, nongovernmental
organizations, and the private sector in
protecting against, responding to and recovering from disasters.
The response to the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill—which spans all levels of government and
includes the private sector— is an
example of the implementation of this program, as it has been
organized according to the Incident
Command System to allow a unified, coordinated response
under the leadership of the Department
with the Coast Guard as the lead agency. DHS also developed
the Unified Incident Command and
Decision Project to share information and enhance multi-agency
incident command systems and
coordination.
RECOMMENDATION: Prioritize private sector preparedness
As part of our commitment to increase private sector
preparedness, in June 2010, DHS announced the
adoption of the final standards for the Voluntary Private Sector
Preparedness Accreditation and
Certification Program (PS-Prep)—a major milestone in DHS's
implementation the 9/11
Commission’s recommendation to create a program to improve

private sector preparedness for
disasters and emergencies.
RECOMMENDATION: Assess critical infrastructure and
readiness
In 2009, DHS revised the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (NIPP), to integrate the concepts of
resiliency and protection, and broaden the focus of NIPP-related
programs and activities to an all-
hazards environment. In FY2010, DHS has provided the
following Infrastructure Protection Program
grants:
14
o $541 million and an additional $300 million in Recovery Act
funds for Port and Transit
Security Grant Programs to create a sustainable, risk-based
effort to protect critical
infrastructure from terrorism.
o $48 million for the Buffer Zone Protection Program to
increase prevention and protection
capabilities of law enforcement agencies responsible for
safeguarding critical
infrastructure such as chemical facilities and nuclear power
plants.
o $11 million for the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program to
support security plans, facility
security upgrades, and vehicle and driver protection.
DHS is also implementing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism

Standards to regulate national
security at high-risk chemical facilities. To date, over 38,000
facilities have submitted data on their
chemical holdings, and approximately 7,000 have been assessed
for risk. The Department has also
deployed Protective Security Advisors to all 50 states and
Puerto Rico to support state, local, tribal
and territorial officials and the private sector with critical
infrastructure security efforts and to
maintain effective information sharing and situational
awareness. Additionally, USCG’s Maritime
Security Risk Analysis Model has assessed over 22,000
potential terrorist targets spanning 13 critical
infrastructure sectors.
DHS also develops an annual National Risk Profile that
provides an all-hazards assessment of risks
facing critical infrastructure, including terrorist threats, cyber
risks, and natural disasters.
In November 2009, DHS launched a new Web site—
dhs.gov/criticalinfrastructure—to inform the
public about the Department’s critical infrastructure protection,
readiness and resiliency efforts, part
of an increased effort to heighten awareness about the
importance of protecting America’s vital
assets, systems and networks.
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
RECOMMENDATION: Safeguard Individual Privacy When
Sharing Information
DHS involves its Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and
the Privacy Office from the outset of
the policymaking process, building in rights and liberties

protections to new security measures from
the beginning. The DHS Privacy Office works to ensure privacy
is protected when personally
identifiable information is collected, used, shared, or
maintained by the Department, and supports
U.S. Government-wide policy initiatives governing information
sharing by conducting Privacy
Impact Assessments of information sharing systems.
The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Privacy
Office provide training on civil rights
and civil liberties and privacy to intelligence analysts and state
and local fusion center personnel. The
DHS Privacy Office also supports the Fusion Center Program by
reviewing fusion center privacy
policies to ensure they adhere to the Information Sharing
Environment Privacy Guidelines,
participating in the creation of the DHS Joint Fusion Center
Program Management Office, and
providing training to the Interagency Threat Assessment and
Coordination Group.
15
RECOMMENDATION: Maintain Civil Liberties While
Protecting Security
As noted above, DHS involves the Office for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties from the outset of the
policymaking process, building in protections to new security
measures through collaboration with
communities and stakeholders across the country. The DHS
Office for Civil Rights and Liberties
created a Civil Liberties Impact Assessment process to review

Departmental programs, and conduct
regular outreach with American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South
Asian, and Somali community leaders,
elected officials, and NGOs across the country. Recently, DHS
has consulted with privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties advocates about how to build privacy
and civil liberties protections into
Advanced Imaging Technology, and its operating policies.
DHS is working with communities across the country on
preventing violent crime motivated by
ideology and on leveraging successful models like community
policing. In Summer 2010, DHS and
DOJ will launch the “Building Communities of Trust” initiative
to enhance local efforts to understand
and mitigate the threats facing communities.
These efforts include a public education element through the
expansion of the “See Something Say
Something” campaign—a simple and effective program to raise
public awareness of indicators of
terrorism, crime and other threats and emphasize the importance
of reporting suspicious activity to
the proper transportation and law enforcement authorities. This
program was originally implemented
by New York City's Metropolitan Transit Authority and was
funded, in part, by $13 million from
DHS' Transit Security Grant Program.
IMPROVING COLLABORATION AND INFORMATION
SHARING
RECOMMENDATION: Provide Incentives for Information
Sharing

Cybersecurity
In October 2009, DHS opened the new National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration
Center—a 24-hour, DHS-led coordinated watch and warning
center to improve national efforts to
address threats and incidents affecting the nation's critical
information technology and cyber
infrastructure.
Tailoring Information Sharing to State, Local, Tribal and
Territorial Customers
DHS, working closely with the FBI, has re-focused its
information sharing and production efforts to
better address the needs of state, local, tribal, and territorial
governments. DHS continually works
with senior law enforcement officials from the largest
metropolitan areas, the directors of fusion
centers, and State Homeland Security Advisors to tailor the
Department’s efforts, particularly
information sharing initiatives, to better support the efforts of
state, local, tribal, and territorial law
enforcement to protect local communities.
State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers
DHS supports state and major urban area fusion centers across
the country, which share information
and intelligence within their jurisdictions as well as with the
federal government. To date, 72 state
and major urban area analytic centers have been designated as
fusion centers by state and local
authorities throughout the country. DHS has deployed
Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN)
systems to the state and major urban area fusion centers,
enabling the federal government to share
16

information and intelligence – including classified terrorism-
related threat information – with state,
local, tribal, and territorial partners. DHS has also placed
federal Intelligence Officers at state and
major urban area fusion centers, who act as the primary liai son
between the federal governments and
state, local, tribal, and territorial partners.
Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative
DHS, in conjunction with DOJ, is also working to implement
the Nationwide Suspicious Activities
Reporting Initiative (NSI) across the nation. The NSI provides
the foundation for state and local
efforts to identify and mitigate emerging terrorism related
threats through training, reporting and
analysis while ensuring privacy and civil liberties are protected.
Currently, NSI capability exists in
three states (New York, Florida, and Virginia), and nine major
cities (Boston, District of Columbia,
Chicago, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Houston, Phoenix, Seattle,
and Miami-Dade). Twelve additional
states are expected to implement NSI by Fall 2010.
These efforts include a public education element through the
expansion of the “See Something Say
Something” campaign—a simple and effective program to raise
public awareness of indicators of
terrorism, crime and other threats, and emphasize the
importance of reporting suspicious activity to
the proper transportation and law enforcement authorities. The
program was originally implemented
by New York City's Metropolitan Transit Authority and was
funded, in part, by $13 million from

DHS' Transit Security Grant Program.
Improved Analysis of Travel-Related Data
DHS, in partnership with the National Counterterrorism Center
and other federal entities, has
expanded efforts to analyze travel related data in order to better
understand the travel patterns of
known and suspected terrorists. Leveraging threat-related
intelligence, travel-related data has been
essential in identifying, targeting, and interdicting known and
suspected terrorists prior to entering the
United States or boarding a flight bound for the United States.
First Responders Community of Practice
In April 2010, DHS launched the First Responders Community
of Practice, which allows law
enforcement, emergency medical services, and emergency
management personnel to share best
practices and solutions with other professionals, enabling them
to more efficiently and effectively
prepare for disasters.
QHSR AND THE BOTTOM UP REVIEW
In February 2010, the Department of Homeland Security
published our Nation’s first ever
comprehensive review of America’s strategy for homeland
security—the Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review (QHSR). The QHSR was the first step in
setting the strategic path forward to guide
the activities of the homeland security enterprise toward a
common end: a homeland that is safe,
secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards. The
QHSR identified five core mission
areas of homeland security—preventing terrorism and enhancing
security, securing and managing our

borders, enforcing and administering our immigration laws,
safeguarding and securing cyberspace,
and ensuring resilience to disasters.
A bottom-up review (BUR) of the Department of Homeland
Security was initiated in November 2009
as an immediate follow-on and complement to the QHSR. The
BUR resulted in a comprehensive
17
catalogue of DHS activities across the homeland security
missions. The BUR Report distills the
results of this analysis, describing the alignment of the
Department and setting forth the Department’s
priority initiatives and enhancements to increase mission
performance, improve Departmental
management, and increase accountability over the next four
years.
The Department’s FY 2012 budget request will begin the
process of implementing the BUR
initiatives and enhancements, and the corresponding FY 2012-
2016 Future Years Homeland Security
Program will set forth the budget plan required to provide
sufficient resources to successfully execute
the Department’s responsibilities across the full range of
homeland security missions as described in
the QHSR, with a priority placed on the initiatives and
enhancements set forth in the BUR Report.
###
18

THE 9/11
COMMISSION
REPORT
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page i
List of Illustrations and Tables ix
Member List xi
Staff List xiii–xiv
Preface xv
1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1
1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1
1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14
1.3 National Crisis Management 35
2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47
2.1 A Declaration of War 47
2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48
2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55
2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring
War on the United States (1992–1996) 59
2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63
3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71

3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New:
The First World Trade Center Bombing 71
3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation—
. . . in the Law Enforcement Community 73
3.3 . . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82
3.4 . . . and in the Intelligence Community 86
CONTENTS
v
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page v
3.5 . . . and in the State Department and the Defense
Department 93
3.6 . . . and in the White House 98
3.7 . . . and in the Congress 102
4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108
4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108
4.2 Crisis: August 1998 115
4.3 Diplomacy 121
4.4 Covert Action 126
4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134
5. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 145
5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs 145
5.2 The “Planes Operation” 153
5.3 The Hamburg Contingent 160
5.4 A Money Trail? 169
6. FROM THREAT TO THREAT 174

6.1 The Millennium Crisis 174
6.2 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 182
6.3 The Attack on the USS Cole 190
6.4 Change and Continuity 198
6.5 The New Administration’s Approach 203
7. THE ATTACK LOOMS 215
7.1 First Arrivals in California 215
7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States 223
7.3 Assembling the Teams 231
7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics 241
8. “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” 254
8.1 The Summer of Threat 254
8.2 Late Leads—Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM 266
9. HEROISM AND HORROR 278
9.1 Preparedness as of September 11 278
9.2 September 11, 2001 285
9.3 Emergency Response at the Pentagon 311
9.4 Analysis 315
vi
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vi
10. WARTIME 325
10.1 Immediate Responses at Home 326
10.2 Planning for War 330
10.3 “Phase Two” and the Question of Iraq 334
11. FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT 339
11.1 Imagination 339
11.2 Policy 348

11.3 Capabilities 350
11.4 Management 353
12. WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY 361
12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge 361
12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizatio ns 365
12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism 374
12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks 383
13. HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF
ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT 399
13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide 400
13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community 407
13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information 416
13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress 419
13.5 Organizing America’s Defenses in the United States 423
Appendix A: Common Abbreviations 429
Appendix B:Table of Names 431
Appendix C: Commission Hearings 439
Notes 449
vii
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page vii
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page viii

p. 15 FAA Air Traffic Control Centers
p. 15 Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector
p. 32–33 Flight paths and timelines
p. 49 Usama Bin Ladin
p. 64 Map of Afghanistan
p. 148 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
p. 238–239 The 9/11 hijackers
p. 279 The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11
p. 284 The World Trade Center radio repeater system
p. 288 The World Trade Center North Tower stairwell with
deviations
p. 312 The Twin Towers following the impact of American
Airlines
Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175
p. 313 The Pentagon after being struck by American Airlines
Flight 77
p. 313 American Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville,
Pennsylvania
p. 413 Unity of effort in managing intelligence
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
AND TABLES
ix
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page ix
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page x
Thomas H. Kean
chair

Richard Ben-Veniste
Fred F. Fielding
Jamie S. Gorelick
Slade Gorton
Lee H. Hamilton
vice chair
Bob Kerrey
John F. Lehman
Timothy J. Roemer
James R.Thompson
COMMISSION
MEMBERS
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page xi
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page xii
Joanne M. Accolla
Staff Assistant
Alexis Albion
Professional Staff Member
Scott H. Allan, Jr.

Counsel
John A. Azzarello
Counsel
Caroline Barnes
Warren Bass
Ann M. Bennett
Information Control Officer
Mark S. Bittinger
Madeleine Blot
Counsel
Antwion M. Blount
Systems Engineer
Sam Brinkley
Geoffrey Scott Brown
Research Assistant
Daniel Byman
Dianna Campagna
Manager of Operations
Samuel M.W. Caspersen
Counsel
Melissa A. Coffey
Staff Assistant
Lance Cole
Consultant
Marquittia L. Coleman
Staff Assistant
Marco A. Cordero
Rajesh De
Counsel

George W. Delgrosso
Investigator
Gerald L. Dillingham
Thomas E. Dowling
Steven M. Dunne
Deputy General Counsel
Thomas R. Eldridge
Counsel
Alice Falk
Editor
John J. Farmer, Jr.
Senior Counsel & Team Leader
Alvin S. Felzenberg
Deputy for Communications
COMMISSION
STAFF
xiii
Philip Zelikow, Executive Director
Christopher A. Kojm, Deputy Executive Director
Daniel Marcus, General Counsel
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:25 PM Page xiii
Lorry M. Fenner
Susan Ginsburg
T. Graham Giusti

Security Officer
Nicole Marie Grandrimo
Douglas N. Greenburg
Counsel
Barbara A. Grewe
Senior Counsel, Special Projects
Elinore Flynn Hartz
Family Liaison
Leonard R. Hawley
L. Christine Healey
Karen Heitkotter
Executive Secretary
Walter T. Hempel II
C. Michael Hurley
Dana J. Hyde
Counsel
John W. Ivicic
Security Officer
Michael N. Jacobson
Counsel
Hunter W. Jamerson
Intern
Bonnie D. Jenkins
Counsel
Reginald F. Johnson
Staff Assistant
R.William Johnstone
Stephanie L. Kaplan
Special Assistant & Managing Editor
Miles L. Kara, Sr.

Janice L. Kephart
Counsel
Hyon Kim
Counsel
Katarzyna Kozaczuk
Financial Assistant
Gordon Nathaniel Lederman
Counsel
Daniel J. Leopold
Staff Assistant
Sarah Webb Linden
Douglas J. MacEachin
Professional Staff Member & Team Leader
Ernest R. May
Senior Adviser
Joseph McBride
Intern
James Miller
Kelly Moore
Charles M. Pereira
John Raidt
John Roth
Peter Rundlet
Counsel
Lloyd D. Salvetti
Kevin J. Scheid
Professional Staff Member & Team Leader

Kevin Shaeffer
Tracy J. Shycoff
Deputy for Administration & Finance
Dietrich L. Snell
Jonathan DeWees Stull
Communications Assistant
Lisa Marie Sullivan
Staff Assistant
Quinn John Tamm, Jr.
Catharine S.Taylor
Staff Assistant
Yoel Tobin
Counsel
Emily Landis Walker
Professional Staff Member & Family Liaison
Garth Wermter
Senior IT Consultant
Serena B.Wille
Counsel
Peter Yerkes
Public Affairs Assistant
xiv COMMISSION STAFF
xiv
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xiv
We p re se nt th e narrat ive of this report and the
recommendations
that flow from it to the President of the United States, the

United States
Congress, and the American people for their consideration. Ten
Commissioners—five Republicans and five Democrats chosen
by elected
leaders from our nation’s capital at a time of great partisan
division—have
come together to present this report without dissent.
We have come together with a unity of purpose because our
nation
demands it. September 11, 2001, was a day of unprecedented
shock and suf-
fering in the history of the United States.The nation was
unprepared. How
did this happen, and how can we avoid such tragedy again?
To answer these questions, the Congress and the President
created the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (Public
Law 107-306, November 27, 2002).
Our mandate was sweeping.The law directed us to investigate
“facts and
circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001,” includ-
ing those relating to intelligence agencies, law enforcement
agencies, diplo-
macy, immigration issues and border control, the flow of assets
to terrorist
organizations, commercial aviation, the role of congressional
oversight and
resource allocation, and other areas determined relevant by the
Commission.
In pursuing our mandate, we have reviewed more than 2.5

million pages
of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in
ten countries.
This included nearly every senior official from the current and
previous
administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in our
mandate.
We have sought to be independent, impartial, thorough, and
nonpartisan.
From the outset, we have been committed to share as much of
our investi-
gation as we can with the American people.To that end, we held
19 days of
hearings and took public testimony from 160 witnesses.
PREFACE
xv
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xv
Our aim has not been to assign individual blame. Our aim has
been to
provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding
9/11 and to
identify lessons learned.
We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient,
disciplined,
and lethal.The enemy rallies broad support in the Arab and
Muslim world
by demanding redress of political grievances, but its hostility
toward us and

our values is limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world of
religious and polit-
ical pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It
makes no dis-
tinction between military and civilian targets. Collateral damage
is not in its
lexicon.
We learned that the institutions charged with protecting our
borders,
civil aviation, and national security did not understand how
grave this threat
could be, and did not adjust their policies, plans, and practices
to deter or
defeat it.We learned of fault lines within our government —
between foreign
and domestic intelligence, and between and within agenci es.We
learned of
the pervasive problems of managing and sharing information
across a large
and unwieldy government that had been built in a different era
to confront
different dangers.
At the outset of our work, we said we were looking backward in
order
to look forward. We hope that the terrible losses chronicled in
this report
can create something positive—an America that is safer,
stronger, and wiser.
That September day, we came together as a nation. The test
before us is to
sustain that unity of purpose and meet the challenges now
confronting us.
We need to design a balanced strategy for the long haul, to

attack terror-
ists and prevent their ranks from swelling while at the same
time protecting
our country against future attacks. We have been forced to think
about the
way our government is organized. The massive departments and
agencies
that prevailed in the great struggles of the twentieth century
must work
together in new ways, so that all the instruments of national
power can be
combined. Congress needs dramatic change as well to
strengthen oversight
and focus accountability.
As we complete our final report, we want to begin by thanking
our fel-
low Commissioners, whose dedication to this task has been
profound. We
have reasoned together over every page, and the report has
benefited from
this remarkable dialogue. We want to express our considerable
respect for
the intellect and judgment of our colleagues, as well as our
great affection
for them.
We want to thank the Commission staff.The dedicated
professional staff,
headed by Philip Zelikow, has contributed innumerable hours to
the com-
pletion of this report, setting aside other important endeavors to
take on this
xvi PREFACE

Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xvi
all-consuming assignment. They have conducted the exacting
investigative
work upon which the Commission has built.They have given
good advice,
and faithfully carried out our guidance.They have been superb.
We thank the Congress and the President. Executive branch
agencies
have searched records and produced a multitude of documents
for us. We
thank officials, past and present, who were generous with their
time and
provided us with insight. The PENTTBOM team at the FBI, the
Director’s Review Group at the CIA, and Inspectors General at
the
Department of Justice and the CIA provided great assistance.
We owe a
huge debt to their investigative labors, painstaking attention to
detail, and
readiness to share what they have learned. We have built on the
work of
several previous Commissions, and we thank the Congressional
Joint
Inquiry, whose fine work helped us get started.We thank the
City of New
York for assistance with documents and witnesses, and the
Government
Printing Office and W.W. Norton & Company for helping to get
this
report to the broad public.
We conclude this list of thanks by coming full circle:We thank

the fam-
ilies of 9/11, whose persistence and dedication helped create the
Commission. They have been with us each step of the way, as
partners and
witnesses.They know better than any of us the importance of the
work we
have undertaken.
We want to note what we have done, and not done.We have
endeavored
to provide the most complete account we can of the events of
September
11, what happened and why.This final report is only a summary
of what we
have done, citing only a fraction of the sources we have
consulted. But in
an event of this scale, touching so many issues and
organizations, we are
conscious of our limits.We have not interviewed every
knowledgeable per-
son or found every relevant piece of paper. New information
inevitably will
come to light. We present this report as a foundation for a better
under-
standing of a landmark in the history of our nation.
We have listened to scores of overwhelming personal tragedies
and
astounding acts of heroism and bravery. We have examined the
staggering
impact of the events of 9/11 on the American people and their
amazing
resilience and courage as they fought back.We have admired
their determi-
nation to do their best to prevent another tragedy while
preparing to

respond if it becomes necessary. We emerge from this
investigation with
enormous sympathy for the victims and their loved ones, and
with
enhanced respect for the American people. We recognize the
formidable
challenges that lie ahead.
We also approach the task of recommendations with humility.
We have
PREFACE xvii
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xvii
made a limited number of them. We decided consciously to
focus on rec-
ommendations we believe to be most important, whose
implementation
can make the greatest difference. We came into this process
with strong
opinions about what would work. All of us have had to pause,
reflect, and
sometimes change our minds as we studied these problems and
considered
the views of others.We hope our report will encourage our
fellow citizens
to study, reflect—and act.
xviii PREFACE
Thomas H. Kean
chair

Lee H. Hamilton
vice chair
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xviii
THE 9/11
COMMISSION
REPORT
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xix
Final FM.1pp 7/17/04 5:26 PM Page xx
1
“WE HAVE
SOME PLANES”
1
Tue sday, S e p te m b e r 11, 2 0 01, dawned temperate and
nearly cloudless in
the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied
themselves for
work. Some made their way to the Twin Towers, the signature
structures of the
World Trade Center complex in New York City. Others went to
Arlington,Vir-
ginia, to the Pentagon. Across the Potomac River, the United

States Congress
was back in session. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue,
people began to
line up for a White House tour. In Sarasota, Florida, President
George W. Bush
went for an early morning run.
For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not
have been
better for a safe and pleasant journey.Among the travelers were
Mohamed Atta
and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland,
Maine.
1.1 INSIDE THE FOUR FLIGHTS
Boarding the Flights
Boston:American 11 and United 175. Atta and Omari boarded a
6:00 A.M.
flight from Portland to Boston’s Logan International Airport.1
When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected
by a com-
puterized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer
Assisted Passen-
ger Prescreening System), created to identify passengers who
should be
subject to special security measures. Under security rules in
place at the time,
the only consequence of Atta’s selection by CAPPS was that his
checked bags
were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had
boarded the air-
craft. This did not hinder Atta’s plans.2
Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later,

Atta appar-
ently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague
who was at
another terminal at Logan Airport.They spoke for three
minutes.3 It would be
their final conversation.
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 1
Between 6:45 and 7:40, Atta and Omari, along with Satam al
Suqami,Wail
al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri, checked in and boarded
American Airlines
Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles.The flight was scheduled to
depart at 7:45.4
In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez
Banihammad, Mohand
al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi, checked in
for United
Airlines Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles.A couple of
Shehhi’s colleagues
were obviously unused to travel; according to the United ticket
agent, they had
trouble understanding the standard security questions, and she
had to go over
them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring answers.5
Their flight was
scheduled to depart at 8:00.
The security checkpoints through which passengers, including
Atta and his
colleagues, gained access to the American 11 gate were
operated by Globe

Security under a contract with American Airlines. In a different
terminal, the
single checkpoint through which passengers for United 175
passed was con-
trolled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh
USA to per-
form the screening.6
In passing through these checkpoints, each of the hijackers
would have been
screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect
items with at
least the metal content of a .22-caliber handgun. Anyone who
might have set
off that detector would have been screened with a hand wand—a
procedure
requiring the screener to identify the metal item or items that
caused the alarm.
In addition, an X-ray machine would have screened the
hijackers’ carry-on
belongings.The screening was in place to identify and
confiscate weapons and
other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial
flight.7 None of
the checkpoint supervisors recalled the hijackers or reported
anything suspi-
cious regarding their screening.8
While Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three
members of his
hijacking team—Suqami,Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri—
were selected
in Boston.Their selection affected only the handling of their
checked bags, not
their screening at the checkpoint. All five men cleared the
checkpoint and

made their way to the gate for American 11. Atta, Omari, and
Suqami took
their seats in business class (seats 8D, 8G, and 10B,
respectively). The Shehri
brothers had adjacent seats in row 2 (Wail in 2A, Waleed in
2B), in the first-
class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40.
The aircraft
pushed back from the gate at 7:40.9
Shehhi and his team, none of whom had been selected by
CAPPS, boarded
United 175 between 7:23 and 7:28 (Banihammad in 2A, Shehri
in 2B, Shehhi
in 6C, Hamza al Ghamdi in 9C, and Ahmed al Ghamdi in
9D).Their aircraft
pushed back from the gate just before 8:00.10
Washington Dulles:American 77. Hundreds of miles southwest
of Boston,
at Dulles International Airport in the Virginia suburbs of
Washington, D.C.,
five more men were preparing to take their early morning
flight.At 7:15, a pair
2 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 2
of them, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the
American
Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los
Angeles.Within the next
20 minutes, they would be followed by Hani Hanjour and two

brothers, Nawaf
al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi.11
Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were
flagged by
CAPPS.The Hazmi brothers were also selected for extra
scrutiny by the air-
line’s customer service representative at the check-in counter.
He did so
because one of the brothers did not have photo identification
nor could he
understand English, and because the agent found both of the
passengers to
be suspicious.The only consequence of their selection was that
their checked
bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they
had boarded
the aircraft.12
All five hijackers passed through the Main Terminal’s west
security screen-
ing checkpoint; United Airlines, which was the responsible air
carrier, had
contracted out the work to Argenbright Security.13 The
checkpoint featured
closed-circuit television that recorded all passengers, including
the hijackers,
as they were screened. At 7:18, Mihdhar and Moqed entered the
security
checkpoint.
Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the belt of
the X-ray
machine and proceeded through the first metal detector. Both
set off the alarm,
and they were directed to a second metal detector. Mihdhar did

not trigger the
alarm and was permitted through the checkpoint. After Moqed
set it off, a
screener wanded him. He passed this inspection.14
About 20 minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77,
Hani Han-
jour, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt in the Main
Terminal’s west
checkpoint, and proceeded, without alarm, through the metal
detector. A short
time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same
checkpoint. Salem al
Hazmi cleared the metal detector and was permitted through;
Nawaf al Hazmi
set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors
and was then
hand-wanded before being passed. In addition, his over-the-
shoulder carry-on
bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed.
The video
footage indicates that he was carrying an unidentified item in
his back pocket,
clipped to its rim.15
When the local civil aviation security office of the Federal
Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) later investigated these security screening
operations, the
screeners recalled nothing out of the ordinary.They could not
recall that any
of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees. We
asked a screening
expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he
found the qual-
ity of the screener’s work to have been “marginal at best.” The

screener should
have “resolved” what set off the alarm; and in the case of both
Moqed and
Hazmi, it was clear that he did not.16
At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight
and were
seated in 12A and 12B in coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat
1B (first class),
“WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 3
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 3
soon followed.The Hazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined
Hanjour in the
first-class cabin.17
Newark: United 93. Between 7:03 and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi,
Ahmed al
Nami, Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked in at the
United Airlines
ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles.Two checked
bags; two did
not. Haznawi was selected by CAPPS. His checked bag was
screened for explo-
sives and then loaded on the plane.18
The four men passed through the security checkpoint, owned by
United
Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security.
Like the check-
points in Boston, it lacked closed-circuit television surveillance
so there is no

documentary evidence to indicate when the hijackers passed
through the
checkpoint, what alarms may have been triggered, or what
security procedures
were administered.The FAA interviewed the screeners later;
none recalled any-
thing unusual or suspicious.19
The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four
had seats
in the first-class cabin; their plane had no business-class
section. Jarrah was in
seat 1B, closest to the cockpit; Nami was in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D,
and Haznawi
in 6B.20
The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights.21 They
were plan-
ning to hijack these planes and turn them into large guided
missiles, loaded
with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:00 A.M. on the
morning of Tuesday,
September 11, 2001, they had defeated all the security layers
that America’s civil
aviation security system then had in place to prevent a
hijacking.
The Hijacking of American 11
American Airlines Flight 11 provided nonstop service from
Boston to Los
Angeles. On September 11, Captain John Ogonowski and First
Officer
Thomas McGuinness piloted the Boeing 767. It carried its full
capacity of nine
flight attendants. Eighty-one passengers boarded the flight with
them (includ-

ing the five terrorists).22
The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to
26,000 feet,
not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet.All
communications
and flight profile data were normal. About this time the “Fasten
Seatbelt” sign
would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants
would have begun
preparing for cabin service.23
At that same time, American 11 had its last routine
communication with
the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from
the FAA’s
air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen seconds after
that transmis-
sion,ATC instructed the aircraft’s pilots to climb to 35,000
feet.That message
and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not
acknowledged.
From this and other evidence, we believe the hijacking began at
8:14 or
shortly thereafter.24
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 4
Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty
Ong and
Madeline “Amy” Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about
how the

hijacking happened. As it began, some of the hijackers—most
likely Wail al
Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, who were seated in row 2 in first
class—stabbed
the two unarmed flight attendants who would have been
preparing for cabin
service.25
We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the
cockpit;
FAA rules required that the doors remain closed and locked
during flight. Ong
speculated that they had “jammed their way” in. Perhaps the
terrorists stabbed
the flight attendants to get a cockpit key, to force one of them
to open the cock-
pit door, or to lure the captain or first officer out of the cockpit.
Or the flight
attendants may just have been in their way.26
At the same time or shortly thereafter, Atta—the only terrorist
on board
trained to fly a jet—would have moved to the cockpit from his
business-class
seat, possibly accompanied by Omari.As this was happening,
passenger Daniel
Lewin, who was seated in the row just behind Atta and Omari,
was stabbed by
one of the hijackers—probably Satam al Suqami, who was
seated directly
behind Lewin. Lewin had served four years as an officer in the
Israeli military.
He may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of
him, not real-
izing that another was sitting behind him.27

The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace, pepper
spray, or
some other irritant in the first-class cabin, in order to force the
passengers and
flight attendants toward the rear of the plane.They claimed they
had a bomb.28
About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong
contacted the
American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary,
North Carolina,
via an AT&T airphone to report an emergency aboard the
flight.This was the
first of several occasions on 9/11 when flight attendants took
action outside
the scope of their training, which emphasized that in a
hijacking, they were to
communicate with the cockpit crew.The emergency call lasted
approximately
25 minutes, as Ong calmly and professionally relayed
information about events
taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground.29
At 8:19, Ong reported:“The cockpit is not answering,
somebody’s stabbed
in business class—and I think there’s Mace—that we can’t
breathe—I don’t
know, I think we’re getting hijacked.” She then told of the
stabbings of the two
flight attendants.30
At 8:21, one of the American employees receiving Ong’s call in
North Car-
olina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American Airlines operations
center in Fort
Worth,Texas, reaching Craig Marquis, the manager on duty.

Marquis soon real-
ized this was an emergency and instructed the airline’s
dispatcher responsible
for the flight to contact the cockpit. At 8:23, the dispatcher
tried unsuccessfully
to contact the aircraft. Six minutes later, the air traffic control
specialist in Amer-
ican’s operations center contacted the FAA’s Boston Air Traffic
Control Center
about the flight. The center was already aware of the
problem.31
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 5
Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because
just before
8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate with the
passengers. The
microphone was keyed, and immediately one of the hijackers
said, “Nobody
move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves,
you’ll endanger
yourself and the airplane. Just stay quiet.”Air traffic controllers
heard the trans-
mission; Ong did not.The hijackers probably did not know how
to operate the
cockpit radio communication system correctly, and thus
inadvertently broad-
cast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of
the cabin
public-address channel. Also at 8:25, and again at 8:29, Amy
Sweeney got

through to the American Flight Services Office in Boston but
was cut off after
she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight.Three minutes
later, Sweeney
was reconnected to the office and began relaying updates to the
manager,
Michael Woodward.32
At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was “flying erratically.”A
minute later,
Flight 11 turned south. American also began getting
identifications of the
hijackers, as Ong and then Sweeney passed on some of the seat
numbers of
those who had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit.33
Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been
hijacked; a
man in first class had his throat slashed; two flight attendants
had been
stabbed—one was seriously hurt and was on oxygen while the
other’s wounds
seemed minor; a doctor had been requested; the flight attendants
were unable
to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit.
Sweeney told
Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much
information as they
could to people on the ground.34
At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically
again.
Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers
were Middle East-
erners, naming three of their seat numbers. One spoke very little
English and

one spoke excellent English.The hijackers had gained entry to
the cockpit, and
she did not know how.The aircraft was in a rapid descent.35
At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were
under the
impression that there was a routine medical emergency in first
class. Other
flight attendants were busy at duties such as getting medical
supplies while Ong
and Sweeney were reporting the events.36
At 8:41, in American’s operations center, a colleague told
Marquis that the
air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking and “think
he’s [American
11] headed toward Kennedy [airport in New York City].They’re
moving every-
body out of the way.They seem to have him on a primary
radar.They seem to
think that he is descending.”37
At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong.
About this
same time Sweeney reported to Woodward,“Something is
wrong.We are in a
rapid descent . . . we are all over the place.”Woodward asked
Sweeney to look
out the window to see if she could determine where they were.
Sweeney
responded:“We are flying low. We are flying very, very low.
We are flying way
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 6

too low.” Seconds later she said,“Oh my God we are way too
low.” The phone
call ended.38
At 8:46:40, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the
World Trade
Center in New York City.39 All on board, along with an
unknown number of
people in the tower, were killed instantly.
The Hijacking of United 175
United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart for Los
Angeles at 8:00. Cap-
tain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks piloted
the Boeing 767,
which had seven flight attendants. Fifty-six passengers boarded
the flight.40
United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed
Logan Airport
at 8:14. By 8:33, it had reached its assigned cruising altitude of
31,000 feet.The
flight attendants would have begun their cabin service.41
The flight had taken off just as American 11 was being
hijacked, and at 8:42
the United 175 flight crew completed their report on a
“suspicious transmis-
sion” overheard from another plane (which turned out to have
been Flight 11)
just after takeoff. This was United 175’s last communication
with the ground.42

The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46.They
used knives
(as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant), Mace
(reported by one
passenger), and the threat of a bomb (reported by the same
passenger). They
stabbed members of the flight crew (reported by a flight
attendant and one pas-
senger). Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight
attendant).The eye-
witness accounts came from calls made from the rear of the
plane, from
passengers originally seated further forward in the cabin, a sign
that passengers
and perhaps crew had been moved to the back of the aircraft.
Given similari-
ties to American 11 in hijacker seating and in eyewitness
reports of tactics and
weapons, as well as the contact between the presumed team
leaders, Atta and
Shehhi, we believe the tactics were similar on both flights.43
The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on
United
175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice
within a
minute. At 8:51, the flight deviated from its assigned altitude,
and a minute
later New York air traffic controllers began repeatedly and
unsuccessfully try-
ing to contact it.44
At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson
received a
phone call from his son Peter, a passenger on United 175. His
son told him:

“I think they’ve taken over the cockpit—An attendant has been
stabbed—
and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is
making
strange moves. Call United Airlines—Tell them it’s Flight 175,
Boston to LA.”
Lee Hanson then called the Easton Police Department and
relayed what he
had heard.45
Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office in
San Francisco,
reaching Marc Policastro.The flight attendant reported that the
flight had been
hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been
stabbed, and
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 7
the hijackers were probably flying the plane.The call lasted
about two minutes,
after which Policastro and a colleague tried unsuccessfully to
contact the
flight.46
At 8:58, the flight took a heading toward New York City.47
At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney tried to call
his wife,
Julie. He left a message on their home answering machine that
the plane had
been hijacked. He then called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told

her the flight
had been hijacked, and added that the passengers were thinking
about storm-
ing the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the
hijackers.48
At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son Peter:
It’s getting bad, Dad—A stewardess was stabbed—They seem to
have
knives and Mace—They said they have a bomb—It’s getting
very bad
on the plane—Passengers are throwing up and getting sick—The
plane is making jerky movements —I don’t think the pilot is
flying the
plane—I think we are going down—I think they intend to go to
Chicago or someplace and fly into a building—Don’t worry,
Dad—
If it happens, it’ll be very fast—My God, my God.49
The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream
just before
it cut off. He turned on a television, and in her home so did
Louise Sweeney.
Both then saw the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center.50
At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower
of the World
Trade Center.51 All on board, along with an unknown number
of people in
the tower, were killed instantly.
The Hijacking of American 77
American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from
Washington Dulles
for Los Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a Boeing 757 piloted

by Captain
Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois.
There were four
flight attendants. On September 11, the flight carried 58
passengers.52
American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at
8:20. At 8:46,
the flight reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet.
Cabin service
would have begun. At 8:51, American 77 transmitted its last
routine radio com-
munication.The hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on
American 11
and United 175, the hijackers used knives (reported by one
passenger) and
moved all the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the
aircraft (reported
by one flight attendant and one passenger). Unlike the earlier
flights, the Flight
77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have box cutters.
Finally, a pas-
senger reported that an announcement had been made by the
“pilot” that the
plane had been hijacked. Neither of the firsthand accounts
mentioned any stab-
bings or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace,though both
witnesses began
the flight in the first-class cabin.53
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 8

At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning
south. Two
minutes later the transponder was turned off and even primary
radar contact
with the aircraft was lost.The Indianapolis Air Traffic Control
Center repeat-
edly tried and failed to contact the aircraft. American Airlines
dispatchers also
tried, without success.54
At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard
Arpey learned
that communications had been lost with American 77.This was
now the sec-
ond American aircraft in trouble. He ordered all American
Airlines flights in
the Northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground.
Shortly before
9:10, suspecting that American 77 had been hijacked, American
headquarters
concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center
might have
been Flight 77. After learning that United Airlines was missing
a plane,Amer-
ican Airlines headquarters extended the ground stop
nationwide.55
At 9:12, Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las
Vegas. She said
her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved
them to the
rear of the plane. She asked her mother to alert American
Airlines. Nancy May
and her husband promptly did so.56
At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her

husband,
Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. She
reported that the
flight had been hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and box
cutters. She fur-
ther indicated that the hijackers were not aware of her phone
call, and that they
had put all the passengers in the back of the plane. About a
minute into the
conversation, the call was cut off. Solicitor General Olson tried
unsuccessfully
to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft.57
Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband
again. She
reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been
hijacked, and
she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to
do.Ted Olson asked
for her location and she replied that the aircraft was then flying
over houses.
Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast.The
Solicitor Gen-
eral then informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and
crashes. She did
not display signs of panic and did not indicate any awareness of
an impending
crash. At that point, the second call was cut off.58
At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the
aircraft was at
7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon.59
At 9:32, con-
trollers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control
“observed a primary
radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed.” This

was later deter-
mined to have been Flight 77.
At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised
the Secret Ser-
vice of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the
White House.Amer-
ican 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and
began a
330-degree turn. At the end of the turn, it was descending
through 2,200 feet,
pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington.The
hijacker pilot then
advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the
Pentagon.60
Final1-4.4pp 7/17/04 9:12 AM Page 9
At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the
Pentagon, travel-
ing at approximately 530 miles per hour.61 All on board, as
well as many civil-
ian and military personnel in the building, were killed.
The Battle for United 93
At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New
Jersey) Liberty
International Airport bound for San Francisco.The aircraft was
piloted by Cap-
tain Jason Dahl and First Officer Leroy Homer, and there were
five flight atten-
dants. Thirty-seven passengers, including the hijackers, boarded

the plane.
Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00, the Boeing 757’s takeoff
was delayed
because of the airport’s typically heavy morning traffic.62
The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart at
7:45 (Amer-
ican 11), 8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and 8:10 (American
77). Three of
the flights had actually taken off within 10 to 15 minutes of
their planned
departure times. United 93 would ordinarily have taken off
about 15 minutes
after pulling away from the gate.When it left the ground at 8:42,
the flight was
running more than 25 minutes late.63
As United 93 left Newark, the flight’s crew members were
unaware of the
hijacking of American 11. Around 9:00, the FAA, American,
and United were
facing the staggering realization of apparent multiple
hijackings. At 9:03, they
would see another aircraft strike the World Trade Center. Crisis
managers at
the FAA and the airlines did not yet act to warn other
aircraft.64 At the same
time, Boston Center realized that a message transmitted just
before 8:25 by the
hijacker pilot of American 11 included the phrase,“We have
some planes.”65
No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt w ith
multiple
hijackings. Such a plot had not been carried out anywhere in the
world in more

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