1. Judith Jarvis Thomson
A Defense of Abortion—part ii

2. The plan
• Review
• The fourth repair option: the ‘dependency’
view
• Getting clearer about rights
• The standard case
• Responsibility
• Abortion and samaritanism
• Wrap-up

3. Review
Remember, JJT is trying to convince us that the best anti-abortion
argument she can think of is unsound.
The opposing argument she has in mind is an argument from rights:
1. The fetus is a person.
2. Every person has a right to life.
So, 3. The fetus has a right to life.
4. It’s impermissible to violate a right, unless that right is
outweighed by another right.
5. The fetus’ right to life is not outweighed by any of the
mother’s rights.
6. Killing the fetus violates its right to life.
So, 7. It’s impermissible to kill the fetus.

4. Review
The violinist case gave us reason to think the
argument is unsound—has at least one false
premise—and we were considering four ways to
repair it:
(1) The ‘extreme’ view (abortion never permissible)
(2) The weakened extreme view.
(abortion by non-mothers never permissible)
(3) The moderate view.
(abortion impermissible when mother’s life not in jeopardy)
(4) The ‘dependency’ view.
(fetuses standardly acquire rights to use mother’s body)

5. Review
Last time, we saw problems with the first three options:
• vs. ‘extreme’ view:
• no way to choose between rights to life;
• and the killing/letting die distinction doesn’t help
(why? the rapidly growing child case)
• vs. ‘weakened extreme’ view:
• modified rapidly growing child case—woman owns house.
• the self-ownership thesis.
• vs. ‘moderate’ view:
• question of what exactly the ‘right to life’ consists in.
• not ‘bare minimum’, or ‘right not to killed by anyone’
• Thomson’s proposal: right not to be killed unjustly.
Upshot: Thomson’s opponent has a problem.

6. Review
We finished by considering Thomson’s argument that
abortion is not unjust killing:
1. The fetus is killed unjustly only if the fetus has a
right to the use of the mother’s body.
2. The fetus has a right to the use of the mother’s
body only if it acquired that right from someone.
3. It cannot have acquired that right from the mother.
4. It cannot have acquired that right from anyone else.
So, 5. The fetus does not have a right to the use of the
mother’s body.
So, 6. The fetus is not killed unjustly.

7. Review
New idea for Thomson’s opponent: criticize premise 3. Say that the
fetus does sometimes acquire a right from the mother.
1. The fetus is killed unjustly only if the fetus has a right to the use
of the mother’s body.
2. The fetus has a right to the use of the mother’s body only if it
acquired that right from someone.
3. It cannot have acquired that right from the mother.
4. It cannot have acquired that right from anyone else.
So, 5. The fetus does not have a right to the use of the
mother’s body.
So, 6. The fetus is not killed unjustly.
Next question: OK—how?!

8. The plan
• Review
• The fourth repair option: the ‘dependency’
view
• Getting clearer about rights
• The standard case
• Responsibility
• Abortion and samaritanism
• Wrap-up

9. The ‘dependency’ view
• Why call it a ‘dependency’ view?
• The basic idea: the reason the fetus acquires
the relevant right has something to do with its
dependency on the mother.
• Next question: OK, how exactly does the fetus
acquire the right?

10. The plan
• Review
• The fourth repair option: the ‘dependency’
view
• Getting clearer about rights
• The standard case
• Responsibility
• Abortion and samaritanism
• Wrap-up

11. Getting clearer about rights
• The picture so far:
• Remember, we don’t have a fully worked-out account of what a
right is—we just have reason to suspect there are such things…
(…and JJT’s opponent thinks so, anyway.)
• But JJT takes some things to be ‘data points’ in any such account of
rights:
• “The primary control we must place on the acceptability of of
an account of rights is that it should turn out in that account …
that all persons have a right to life” (56).
• “… there are drastic limits to the right of self-defense” (54).
• “… to deprive someone of what he has a right to is to treat him
unjustly” (56).
• “… if a human being has any just, prior claim to anything at all,
he has a just, prior claim to his own body” (54).
• “… other ways of acquir[ing+ a right than by *invitation+” (57).

12. Getting clearer about rights
• So, maybe we have a picture like this:
• Some rights (e.g., self-ownership, life) are basic, and
• all other rights are acquired from other persons.
• And, if I acquire a right from B, then we’ll say that I have a
right against B that he shall do (or not do) something.
• The question for us: When and how does A
acquire a right from B?

13. Getting clearer about rights
• So, two questions:
• from whom can you acquire a right to the use of another person’s
body?
• with JJT’s self-ownership thesis: only from that person.
• w/out the self-ownership thesis?
• how can you acquire such a right?
• invitation?
• contract?
• tacitly?
Question: It’s worth asking whether it’s true that anytime I ‘invite’
you to do something—like have some use of my body—that you
acquire a right? Can you think of any counterexamples? (In
philosophers’ jargon: is A’s invitation a sufficient condition for B’s
acquiring a right?)

14. Digression: necessary and sufficient
conditions
• You’ll often see philosophers ask whether x is a necessary
condition for y and whether it’s a sufficient condition for y.
• x is necessary for y if not having x means not having y. Put
another way, without x, you definitely don’t have y. Put yet
another way, x is required for y.
• e.g., being unmarried is necessary for being a bachelor.
• x is sufficient for y if having x is enough to have y. Put
another way, once you have x, you automatically have y.
• e.g., being a bachelor is sufficient for being a man.
• If x is both necessary and sufficient for y, philosophers get
very excited! Finding out that x is both necessary and
sufficient for y is a way of analyzing what it is to be y.
• e.g., being an unmarried man is both necessary and sufficient for
being a bachelor.

15. The plan
• Review
• The fourth repair option: the ‘dependency’
view
• Getting clearer about rights
• The ‘standard’ case
• Consent, rights, and responsibility
• Abortion and samaritanism
• Wrap-up

16. The ‘standard’ case
Let’s remind ourselves why we care about these general
questions about rights. We were interested in premise (3) of
this argument:
1. The fetus is killed unjustly only if the fetus has a right to
the use of the mother’s body.
2. The fetus has a right to the use of the mother’s body
only if it acquired that right from someone.
3. It cannot have acquired that right from the mother.
4. It cannot have acquired that right from anyone else.
So, 5. The fetus does not have a right to the use of the
mother’s body.
So, 6. The fetus is not killed unjustly.

17. The ‘standard’ case
3. The fetus cannot have acquired that right from the mother.
Now let’s ask if any of the ways to acquire a right (from the
mother—we’re assuming self-ownership) get purchase in the
‘standard’ case:
• Invitation/contract? No.
• Tacitly? Maybe?

18. The ‘standard’ case
• What we assume about the standard case:
two people have consensual sex, they use
contraception, and the contraception fails.
• We’ll also assume that:
• Both people know that it is possible that the
contraception will fail, and
• They are confident that the contraception will not fail.

19. Aside: how standard is the ‘standard’
case?
Does this matter? Who knows.

20. The plan
• Review
• The fourth repair option: the ‘dependency’
view
• Getting clearer about rights
• The ‘standard’ case
• Consent, rights, and responsibility
• Abortion and samaritanism
• Wrap-up

21. Consent, responsibility, and rights
• What’s relevant to finding out whether B has
acquired a right from A?
(i) what A consents to? or would consent to?
(ii) what A does, given what she knows?
JJT helps us out: the Burglar and People-Seeds
cases.

22. The Burglar and Burglar+ cases
• The relevant details:
•
•
•
•
W performs a voluntary act (opening a window)
That act is necessary for B to do something
W knows that there are people like B who want to do something
W knows that her act is necessary for B to do what he wants to.
Question: does B acquire a right from W to the use of the house?
If you think yes, then why does he?
If you think no, then how could he? (Could he, ever?)
Now change to Burglar+: W performs a second voluntary act
(installing ‘burglar-proof’ bars, before she opens the window)

23. The People-Seeds case
• The relevant details:
• W performs two voluntary acts (installing mesh screens and
opening a window)
• The second act is necessary for B to do something
• W knows that the second act is necessary for B to do something.
• W knows that there are such people as B.
The question: does B acquire from W a right to the use of the house?
If you think yes, is it for the same reason as the Burglar case?
If you think no, what do you have to change about the case
before your answer changes to ‘yes’? Suppose W installs less
fine screens that stop fewer seeds on average. Does that change
things? Why?

24. Thomson’s diagnosis
• It’s “absurd” to say that someone who opens a window
“because it is stuffy” thereby gives a burglar (or a
person-seed) any rights.
• (Partial) responsibility is not enough to transfer rights.
Why not? “Someone could argue that you are
responsible … because you could have lived out your
life … with sealed windows … But this won’t do—for by
the same token anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to
rape by having a hysterectomy” (59).
• What exactly is the argument here?

25. Consent, responsibility, and rights
• The upshot: if JJT is right, then the final way of
fixing the argument doesn’t work—the argument
is unsound.
• Also worth saying: remember, her target is an
opponent who says, “Look, once I show you that
the fetus is a person with a right to life, we’re
done—all abortions are impermissible.” That
guy’s argument, if you agree with JJT’s diagnosis,
is now in serious trouble.

26. The plan
• Review
• The fourth repair option: the ‘dependency’
view
• Getting clearer about rights
• The ‘standard’ case
• Consent, rights, and responsibility
• Abortion and samaritanism
• Wrap-up

27. Varieties of samaritanism
• In most discussion sections, a variant on the
violinist case came up: the violinist needs just
60 seconds of your life.
• JJT: “It would be morally indecent to refuse”
(59-60).
• (Wait, what’s this new category: moral
decency? Don’t do this in your papers, until
you’re as eminent as JJT!)

28. Varieties of samaritanism
So, her opponent has one more way to argue:
1. In the variant violinist case, you ought not
to detach yourself.
2. If you ought not to detach yourself from B,
then B has a right (against you) that you
not detach yourself from him.
So, 3. It’s impermissible to detach yourself in the
variant violinist case.

29. Thomson’s diagnosis
(2) If you ought not to detach yourself from B,
then B has a right (against you) that you
not detach yourself from him.
JJT thinks this is false. Why? If it were true, then
rights would disappear if it became more
difficult to do something (why? because we said
in the original violinist case that you may detach
yourself).

30. Thomson’s diagnosis, ctd.
• A puzzling remark:
“Supposing a case in which a woman pregnant due to
rape ought to allow the unborn person to use her body
for the hour he needs … we should conclude that she is
self-centered, callous, indecent, but not unjust, if she
refuses. The complaints are no less grave; they are just
different” (61).
Is it really true that someone who is self-centered (but
always acts justly is subject to a complaint “no less grave”
than someone who acts unjustly?

31. Back to samaritanism
• One more sting in the tail for her opponent:
• Suppose that it’s morally required to be a Minimally Decent
Samaritan or even to be a Good Samaritan. Then it’s always
required; we can’t pick and choose towards whom to be good
samaritans.
• So JJT can make something like this argument:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
If abortion is impermissible, then being an MDS or a GS is required.
But currently, the law only requires some people to be GS (and only
towards some others).
A law that applies, without good reason, only to some people is
arbitrary.
If a law is arbitrary, then it is unjust.
So, current laws are unjust.

32. Samaritanism, ctd.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
If abortion is impermissible, then being an MDS or a GS is required.
But currently, the law only requires some people to be GS (and only
towards some others).
A law that applies, without good reason, only to some people is
arbitrary.
If a law is arbitrary, then it is unjust.
So, current laws are unjust.
• Someone might challenge (3). There is a good reason to have only
an abortion law, not a general Good Samaritan law: there’s a special
connection between mother and fetus.
• JJT’s reply: no special responsibility if the mother doesn’t explicitly
or implicitly assume it, i.e. take it on.

33. A parting shot?
• At the very end of the article, JJT says:
“… however, it should be remembered that we have only been
pretending throughout that the fetus is a [person] from the
moment of conception. A very early abortion is surely not the
killing of a person….” (66).
• She’s been taking it that the best anti-abortion
argument must include the premise that the fetus
is a person—a good assumption, of course (think
about cable news).
• Keep this in mind when you read Marquis. What
does he think?

34. Wrap-up and review
• Thomson’s position:
(1) If fetuses are persons, then it is rare that killing a
fetus violates its rights (not in rape cases, not in
contraception cases).
(2) At most there is a requirement, when one can easily
aid a fetus, not to abort it.
(And even then, any law compels people in such
cases to do that good must be a general goodsamaritan law, or else it is unjust.)
(3) And some fetuses are not persons, and the best
argument against abortion doesn’t even get going in
those cases.