1. Defence Reform – Understanding Change Using a Business-Management Approach
Achievingreformof the military inthe FormerSovietUnion(FSU) andYugoslavianstatesisproving
harderthan firstimagined.Whilethere hasbeensome progress, muchof the oldsystemcontinues
to labouron virtuallyunchanged,suggestingthatreformingthe deeplyflawedstructures of legacy
defence establishmentsrequiresfreshthinking. Modernapproachesto businessmanagementshow
that change shouldoccur inseveral stages.Thisbusiness-focusedperspective highlightswhy the
militariesof somanycountriesare strugglingateachstep.It alsohighlights the changes they must
make inorder to implementlastingreforms.
JohnP Kotter,of the Harvard Business School,suggeststhatthe firsttask of any change leader– in
the contextof seniormilitarystaff orMinistry of Defence (MoD) departmentheads –is tocreate a
sense of urgency. Thismeans thata leadermust engage people;explainwhysomethingisimportant
to boththemand the organisation;appeal totheirmoral valuesandsense of need;and,ultimately,
encourage them toraise theirgame. To achieve this,aleadermusthave the skill tomotivate others,
while the teammusthave the basicunderstandingandskillstoact inthe appropriate manner.
Most systemsfall atthisfirsthurdle. The military establishmentsall sufferfromaverylarge ‘power
distance’,touse the termcoinedbycultural expertGeertHofstede,referringtohow subordinates,
throughtheiracquiescence,canmake theirleadersmore powerful.Withinthesemilitaries, chiefs
are bothgiven,andtake, extremely highlevelsof power.They holdtothemselves eventhe smallest
of decisions andtreatthe soldieryasserfs. Insome waystheycanbe excused.These leadershave
neverbeentaughttolead,onlytofollow.Transformational leadership,wherethe leaderclosely
workswithemployeestoidentify the change required,orservantleadership,where the leaderputs
othersfirstand supportsthem intheirdevelopmentorperformance, isanathematothem.They
have no experience of the humaninteraction natural inWesternprofessional environments.The
systemis simply baseduponpower–and poweralone,usednottomake the systemworkas it
should,butto secure gainsforthe leaderandhis friends.
Any orderto implementchange isgivenonpaperandsignedbymanypeople soasto remove any
hintof individual responsibility. Theseorders are rarely subjectedtoanalysis before given andlittle
considerationisgiventopotential consequences orresource andpersonnel implications.The
militaryculture discouragessuperiorsfromseekingadvicefromthose furtherdownthe hierarchy
evenwhensubordinatesknow better.Thisis inordertoshow no weakness.There isnohistoryof
engagingjuniorstaff ascolleagues.These factorsmake itvirtuallyimpossible forleaders toengender
enthusiasticurgency forchange amongstsubordinates.Juniorstaffs live infearof makingamistake
or breakingthe powerbasedrulesandthiscreatesparalysis.
Furthermore,there are significantquestionsoverwhether the recipientsof ordersforchange have
the skills toimplementthem,letalonefeel trulyempoweredtotake the initiative. Throughouttheir
workinglife,they have beenencouragedto follow orders.Theirideasfornew initiativesor
improvementshave been activelydiscouraged,possiblyevenresultinginpunishment orbeing
postedaway.
The formationof a team of change-mindedindividuals isthe nextstep towards fosteringchange
withinanorganisation,accordingtoKotter.Thisisalsolikelytobe problematicforany defence
establishment.The headsof formerFSUMoD directorates are rarely appointed onmerit,butfor
political purposes orreasonsof loyalty. Assuch, manyhave neitherthe drive norcapacityto direct
change. Those retiredmilitary whohave been givenMODpostsafterservice have the same Soviet-
style characteristics andare reluctantto considernew ideasorimplementthemquickly.Both
militaryandcivilianjuniorstaffs have noauthority orcourage to make novel contributionsand step

2. up a level.Those with real capability have the starkchoicesof toconformto the reality,leave early
or be sidelined bythe seniorleadership aspotential ‘troublemakers’.Thisisparticularly true of those
Western-trainedofficerswhomayhave grasped how toimplementthe typesof concepts which
Kotterputsforward.Theyare all too oftenplacedinjobsoutside the mainstreamwheretheycannot
challenge the system.Theyare broughtout onshow for everywesternvisitandseminarbuttheir
viewsare rarelyheardor heeded.
Accordingto thisbusiness-managementapproach, amilitary leadershipmustthenalsocreate a
powerful visionof the future andsetof strategies toachieve it.Althoughmany defence
establishmentshave claimedtodoso, innearlyeverycase,the visionhas simply advocated amuch
largerversionof the verysystem whichhasalreadyfailed,demandingmore soldiersandmore
headquarterseventhoughonlyafractionof these are neededorused. The strategiesare re-runsof
the oldSovietfive-yearplans,withcomments bydefence officials suggestingthatoldplansjustneed
tweakingatthe marginsand givensubstantially more money.Thisisacommonbelief among
plannersin defence ministriesandgeneral staffs. The currentstrategies forreform, logisticsand
evenfightingare simplytooslowandheavyfor modernwarfare.
Once the change processisunderway,leadersmustcontinue to communicate the vision being
pursued.Inan organisationthatpridesitself onsecrecyandpower,the veryideaof articulatinga
vision–or reasonforan order – is simply notcontemplated.Defenceestablishmentsfounders at
thisstage for the same broad cultural reasonsthat they alwaysdo:the vertical powerstructure,
where decisionsare onlymade atthe topand are passeddownasorders through everylevel,
ensuresthatthe rationale islost as more juniorofficersandmanagers ateachstage withhold
informationinaneffort toreinforce theirownpowerbase. Thisisakeytechnique thatisusedto
accumulate powerinthis style of culture anditis not likelytochange inthe foreseeable future.Asa
result, ordersandendgoals remainmisunderstood.
As one of the final stepsincreatingchange, Kotteremphasisesthe vital role of empowerment –but
ina power-basedsociety like the military,achievingthisisimpossible. ManyChiefsof Defencestill
signcontracts for the purchase of minorneedslike socks. Anothertellingexample isthatthe heads
of services have nobudgetaryauthority,theirplansare written centrally bythe MODor General
Staff,andtheyhave limitedpowertomove andselectpeople.Inshort, theyare delegatedthe bare
minimumof commandauthority tokeepthe positioncredible.The onlyrecourse of these ‘non-
commanders’istherefore toexercise the powerthat theydohave to extremesinordertomaintain
the facade of commandamongsttheirsubordinatesandthe public.Thissimply reinforcesthe
failingsof the systemidentifiedabove.
The allocationof powerswithingovernmentsmakesitevenmore difficulttochange the culture of a
militaryestablishment. Undermostlegacyconstitutions,the Headof State isthe commander-in-
chief of the armedforces. In fulfillingthisrole,however, many Presidentstake thispowerbeyond
the pointthat makessense ina modern,complex democracy. They deal directlywiththe chiefof
defence onthe detailed tactical conductof the military andselectionof officers,sideliningboththe
MoD andthe defence ministerinthe process.These measures reduce political credibility of the
minister,stopciviliancontrol of the military, anddestroy the capacity forsystemicreform.
Moreover,bytakingthisaction,the presidenthasassumedresponsibilityforinitiating reformsand
has ineffecthimself undermined civiliancontrol andoversightof the defence system. However, no
Presidenthaseitherthe time orthe energytodrive the change he hastaken responsibilityforas
commander-in-chief;asa result,he acts as a brake on reformratherthan a driver.
So generallythe defenceandsecuritysectorlagsbehind modernisation.The public-governance
systemisnotonly outdated,butwasdesignedtowork fora completelydifferentmodelof society.

3. To make a breakwiththispast defence establishmentsneedtoadoptthe fundamental principlesof
goodgovernance.Onthe surface,a facade continuallyconvinces the publicthatthese principlesare
beingimplemented andreformistakingplace.Commentsmade onsocial mediaby soldiersand
civilianstaffs increasingly exposethe realityof the situation inmanycountries.If thisoverall
structural malaise isnotcorrected thensimplyreplacingkeyindividuals,evenwiththe bestand
brightestavailable,will notbringresults because there isastructural andcultural biasagainstlasting
progress.MODs needto radicallyredesign theirsystemsandunderstandandchange cultures first,
not justchange the people init.
Indeed,while the literature onbusiness management,andinparticularthe workof Kotterand
Hofstede,providesvaluableinsights forunravellingthe culture andsystemiccomplexityof adefence
systems,the hardtask will be persuadingdefence officialstouse these models.Currently,theyshow
no signsof interestand wouldrather“muddle through” leavingreformto the nextgeneration,if at
all.
Most Eastern Europeancountries share similarcommunistlegacies.Overcomingthishistoryhas
proveddifficult. Manystates have seemingly implementedthe reformsneededforNATOandEU
membership,buthave really failedtoaddress legacy weaknesses underpinningtheirmilitary
cultures.Followingaccession,those resisting reformhave retrenchedevenfurtherinthe belief that
additional measures are unnecessary.Westernofficialsand evenbusinesspeople have utterly failed
to grasp the depthof the 70 yearSovietlegacyandhow stronglyitstill pervadesandundermines the
militaryestablishmentsof mostpost-communistcountries.
Those Westerncountriesand international organisations seekingtohelpformerWarsaw Pact states
mustgrasp the realitythatreformis primarilyapolitical activitywhichcannotbe substitutedforby
tactical-level training. Cultural andinherentsystemicflawssimply cannotbe changedwithout
willingness onthe partof the host countryto throw out the oldconceptsand culture,selectnew
Western-trainedleaders,andcompletelyredesignstructures,militarytrainingandeducationfrom
firstprinciples. Assistance inthismustbe providedatthe ambassadorial leveland by skilledmilitary
managementconsultants,notjustcaptainsandcorporals. Change will come inthese – but itwill be
slow,with manylarge dragonsto slayfirst. Letus hope itis nottoo slow.
GlenGrant
StrategyLecturer,RigaBusinessSchool.
Twitter:@GlenGrant
This article was written with the supportof Dr Thomas-DurellYoung,CenterforCivil-Military
Relations,Monterey,CA and Colonel(Rtd) VladimirMilenski,Bulgarian armed forces.