This document proposes a theoretical framework for force design to guide defense planning. It begins by defining force design as conceptualizing, developing, and evaluating alternative military capabilities to meet defense requirements. It then presents an analytical construct that abstracts military capabilities into component elements and explains their relationships. Finally, it offers a framework integrating these concepts into a hierarchy with processes for devising defense alternatives even with limited knowledge. The goal is to provide a useful tool for relating capability requirements to defense demands in an uncertain threat environment, and for specifying new capabilities that could lead to different choices under adaptation, modernization or transformation.

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TOWARDS A THEORY OF FORCE DESIGN:
The Foundation of Capability-based Defense Planning
Salvador Ghelfi Raza1
, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT
Force Design is a complex issue involving decisions with implications in policy
formulation, modernization of military hardware, organizational restructuring and changes in
associated decision-making processes. This presupposes effective decision processes that
recognize long-term goals, as well as procedures that can guide its execution. Its core theme
is the creation of a professional defense sector appropriately sized, based on an efficient use
of resources, with precise guidelines subjected to democratic control.
Behind these decisions, a set of foundations seen axiomatic and absolute only because
they remain unexamined, often appearing to respond to events as they unfold. When specific
problems arise, they become the natural focus of attention. In such situation, these decisions
are typically viewed as more urgent than such abstract activity as force design.
Building “more of the same” is always easier than doing a comprehensive review and,
perhaps, developing an entirely new approach. Moreover, it is imprudent hinging on
technology as a basis for future capabilities without considerations on strategy. Unless force
design is addressed explicitly, allowing to better understand the various tradeoffs taken into
account and to examine their interaction in a systematic way, defense decisions are likely to
be inappropriate, in the sense that they result in a set of capabilities that are incapable of
meeting defense objectives.
This paper is an attempt to structure a theory of force design, fastening the foundations
of capability-based defense planning into a set of coherent concepts and a framework that
make those concepts practical in their proper terms and significance. For this purpose an
analytical construct that abstracts military capabilities into its component elements is
proposed, explicating concepts and its relationships; and a framework integrating those
concepts into a hierarchy is offered articulating processes that allows devising ways of
developing and choosing defense alternatives even when limitations of knowledge and
information exclude the possibility of assessing the expected outcomes.
The final goal of these system of concepts and framework is to be a useful tool in
thinking 1) the general relationship between capabilities requirements and defense demands
– properly addressing the challenge of defense planning in an era of uncertainty of threats and
information technology and 2) the specification of capabilities to be added that might lead to
different choices under three concurring perspectives - adaptation, modernization and
adaptation.
1
Dr. Salvador Ghelfi. Raza is professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Studies
(CHDS) in the National Defense University. He received a Ph.D in Strategic Studies from the University of Rio
de Janeiro, and has a M.A from the University of London. He is a member of the Group for Strategic Studies
(Grupo de Estudos Estratégicos) of the University of Brazil (UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro). His current research and
teaching interests include force design, defense analysis, games and simulation, and crisis management. The
opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied do not reflect views of any agency,
organization or government. (razas@ndu.edu).
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INTRODUCTION
The demise of the Cold War, information technology trends, and other contemporary
factors are associated causes for the emergence of new uncertainties and threats to the State’s
security goals. However diffuse and asymmetric in their impact, these causes have imposed
defense reforms in order to face a broad and more complex nexus of old and new tasks,
associated with efforts to eliminate redundancy and inefficiency in the defense resource
allocation process. Such accounts often fail to predict correctly that defense reforms effort in
is determining required military capabilities, connecting present fiscal possibilities with
future demands of the use or threat of force towards politically oriented objectives.
The term defense reform sounds like an aggressive approach to get military superiority
and organizational strength. In fact, it is usually just the opposite – an attempt to break out of
a deteriorating situation, more likely to reflect a recognition that one has fallen behind than an
attempt to exploit new possibilities.
The most telling basis for judging the complexity of defense reforms is the degree of
uncertainty of political objectives, evolving technological possibilities and resource allocation
priorities, considering that defense can both inhibit and stimulate economic growth2
. A few
examples might give the sense of the manifestation of these reform trends and goals in the
Western Hemisphere3
:
♦ Argentina recently changed in its military conscript/professional personnel ratio and
is endeavoring to integrate planning, programming, and budgeting procedures in its
defense planning and resource management system, struggling to maintain its
operational military capability4
.
♦ Bolivia, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic are endeavoring to produce Defense
White Books within the context of new roles for their Armed Forces; whereas Chile
is in the stage of revising its White Book.
♦ Peru is reforming its defense organizational structure. And the Paraguay is
struggling in the political arena to approve its Defense Organization Law that would
redefine military roles and mission and reorganize the defense sector, eventually
changing the responsibilities of the Ministry of Defense.
2
There is a lack of consensus in the empirical literature on the positive and negative economic effects of
defense spending. On one hand, it is assumed that defense spending divert resources from private and public
non-defense investments (crowding out); on the other, it is assumed that defense spending increases the
utilization of capital (crowding in). The latter position is support by the Benoit Thesis, referring to a positive
association found between defense spending and growth for 44 less developed countries over the 1950-65
period.
See Benoit, Emile, Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Boston, USA: Heath, 1973.
Sandler, T. E Hartley, K. The Economics of Defense. Cambridge, Ma: Cambridge University Press, 1995. pp.
200-220. review the literature and tabulate models alternative to that of Benoit arrising at different conclusion.
3
The object of analysis for this paper was limited to the Western Hemisphere – The Americas. However, its
conclusions and the proposed theoretical model it offers have higher ambitions in their possible applications.
4
Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de La Nación, Ley 24.948 de 18 de febrero de 1998. Reestructuración
de las fuerzas armadas. For Directives of Military Planning, see http//www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/Archivo/
d000 cbd2 htm. (Oct/02/9). And for operational capabilities, see http://64.69. 09.103/mic/eabstract.cfm?
recno=8796 (Jun/ 25/2002).
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♦ Brazil faces complex civil-military relations in the wake of the creation of its
Ministry of Defense (1999) and its National Defense Policy (1996), with impacts on
its defense command and control structure. Brazil’s National Multi annual Plan
PPA, explicitly declares that5
:
“The modernization of the Defense National System will be the main objective of
the project for reequipping and adjusting the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian Navy
and the Brazilian Air Force, together with the project for managing the armed
forces policy. Both projects will contribute to reequip and adjust force structure to a
new technological pattern, assuring the country higher protection”.
♦ In the US case, particularly, 11th
catalyzed, albeit drastically, post-Cold War
demands for reform. As early as February 2001, the Project on Defense Alternatives
of the Commonwealth Institute at Cambridge already pointed out four causes of
inefficiencies of the US Armed Forces, demanding reforms in the context of the
Quadrennial Defense Review:
“One type of inefficiency is manifest in excess infrastructure – a Cold War residue.
Today, the US Armed Forces still maintain 20 percent of excess infrastructure.
Crude, costly and seemingly intractable, this problem has had little political
salience. The support of excess infrastructure drains money away from training,
maintenance, and quality-of-life accounts. A second type of inefficiency derives
from inter-service rivalry and redundancy. A third type of inefficiency involves
having military “tools” and procedures that do not correspond closely to today’s
operational challenges. Persistent shortages despite the expenditure of more than
$250 billion on procurement during the past five years indicates a failure to
configure our armed forces to meet current needs. A final type of inefficiency results
from the failure to fully exploit information-age technology and organizational
principles, which could reduce structural redundancies in our military and increase
its flexibility. By contemporary business standards, our military remains an
industrial age organization”6
.
What is extraordinary are not these changes in themselves, since defense has an
evolutionary nature, been future oriented; but the scale and scope of current defense reforms,
with countries endeavoring simultaneously to:
♦ Define organizational requirements in association with new decision-making,
control and oversight mechanisms aiming at a higher degree of political control
over defense issues and priorities.
5
Brazil, National Government. Plano Plurianual. http://www.abrasil.gov.br/anexos/links/links.htm . For an
oeverview of current status of Brazilian Defense Reforms, see http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/
especial/militar/militar/militar16.html; and http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/especial/militar/militar/
militar11.html. (Oct 2001).
6
The Commonwealth Institute. The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review. Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18. 5 February 2001.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. pp. 6 Captured at http:://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo18.html.
(8/28/2001).
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4. DRAFT
♦ Increase the efficiency, efficacy and economy7
of defense resource allocation, with a
focus on the processes and criteria used for the formulation, spending and
evaluation of the defense budget.
♦ Define affordable military forces, balanced against multiple axes, to hedge against
uncertainty in the current and future threat environment.
These overarching themes are linked into mutually determinant chains of cause and
causality, making few of the decisions in security requirements and defense planning either
simple or noncrontoversial. Previously unnoticed is the necessity of an articulated set of
concepts and its associated analytical framework for planning defense alternatives based on
military capabilities. That is why the following questions are always present: What criteria
oriented the identification of military capabilities? What strategies do those capabilities
support and how do those strategies support political objectives? How are budgets related to
those capabilities?
All these questions pertaining to the defense reform debate – in its different shapes and
perceived priorities – have a common goal and a common assumption. The common goal is
to determine credible military capabilities that connect current fiscal possibilities to future
alternatives of possible military action, with an acceptable degree of political risk. The
common assumption is that peace has yielded insofar as the strength and credibility of
military capabilities to deter threatening intentions by others.
While these central arguments of defense planning are rather common-sensical, it is
important to keep in perspective that defining requirements for affordable and credible
military capabilities is a complex issue demanding a set of valid conceptual propositions
articulated by a coherent internal logic.
Conceptual propositions breed from reasoning and a critical examination of past events
while setting requirements for future register that will bring empirical evidence which,
eventually, will make them invalid. No conceptual proposition that pretends to be scientific
may postulate eternal validity. The internal logic of the conceptual system provides the
articulating rules of its component propositions, establishing a causal relationship between
concepts, which provides the starting point and the interdependency of the parts for the
desired or intended final product8
. This logic is only valid insofar as it is useful for instructing
the collection, organization and interpretation of quantitative and qualitative information;
orienting the research of alternative solutions for the assorted problems; flanking its analysis
with consistent and explicit criteria; and allowing the precise communication of results.
The validity of a conceptual system and its internal logic assures that the devised
problem is the real problem, and not that it can be solved within its domain of existing
competencies; and that the solutions proposed consider the relevant aspects of the problem.
7
Efficacy is defined as a measure of task accomplishment: the degree to which the activity/process and resultant
output delivered met the desired expectation. Efficiency translates the best combination of resources to
maximize efficacy. It is measured as a relationship of outputs to imputs, usually expressed in terms of a ratio. A
higher efficiency ratio translates a situation where changes in defense capabilities for a small change in
resources are balanced across all resources used to produce those capabilities. Economy reflects the degree to
which efficiency is obtained with lesser fiscal spending
8
This is the requirement of making the axiology of the method explicit as condition of scientific research.
Without an axiological option explicated, the criteria used to define the problem, determine appropriate research
and integrate results are methodologically flawed. For a theoretical discussion of axiological options and its
relation with developing conceptual systems, see OLIVA, A. Conhecimento e Liberdade. 2 ed. Porto Alegre:
Edipurs, 1999. pp. 124.
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Without the support of a valid conceptual system, defense reform propositions are mere
opinions, without any ways of ascertaining which opinion is better.
The required mind set for approaching defense reforms must take into account the fact
that most conceptual propositions and their articulating logic used for defense planning have
their origin in the last 50 years, in the wake of the Cold War, and are already becoming either
obsolete or inadequate. This situation is potentially harmful for three intertwined reasons:
♦ It might harbor inefficiency, compromising the effectiveness of military capability.
♦ It might create misleading performance evaluation criteria, masking capability
inefficiencies through methodologies deprived of analytical rigor.
♦ It might cause the breakdown of policy, strategy and resource allocation into
isolated processes, breeding into stove piping capabilities.
The outcome of this condition entails risks that are not always recognized, with defense
planners often trying to “purchase a breakthrough model” through experiences taken from
other cases. Unfortunately, these models do not work properly because they do not “import”
the conceptual system and the people who understand it.
Given post-Cold War demands of security and defense, and the aftermath of September
Eleven, past conceptual system are to be taken with a grain of salt. It seems appropriate and
opportune to propose a new conceptual framework for designing defense alternatives. This
would focus on the reevaluation of the concepts of security and defense, taking into
consideration its evolving nature and diffused contours; the mechanisms for forecasting
contingencies, within a framework that integrate distinctive rising and falling patterns; and
requirements for efficiency and economy in defense resource management. Such endeavor
should more properly be called Force Design.
This paper offers a conceptual framework for force design with the identification and
relationship of variables required to understand and plan defense reforms, accommodating
three potentially concurring circumstances: adaptation, modernization and transformation. It
proposes an innovative approach for understanding defense reform trends and possibilities,
systematically articulating concepts and processes to assure armed forces efficacy, efficiency
and economy, providing unity of purpose, unity of effort and unity of action for effectively
wielding power in support of national will. Its overarching thesis is that force design must
serve as a guide to defense planning, contributing to armed forces accountability,
professionalism and civilian control. Thus, defense reforms can play an important role in both
preparing for the use of force and in maintaining peace. Its underlying assumption is that
defense reform demands emerge as the differential between current defense capabilities and
the outcome of defense planning offer of future conditions.
The paper is organized in four parts. Part one, “Force Design”, sets the stage. It defines
force design as the fabric of military capability and develops a theoretical construct (an
idealization of a situation appropriate for a problem) that abstracts capabilities components
and identify its relationships, discussing some tensions among these components and its
relationships. Part two, “Force Design Framework”, presents three logical blocks, articulated
in an approach that examines the concept of security and defense, presents mechanisms for
developing scenarios, and examining defense superintendence requirements. Part three uses
force design concepts to present some judgments about actual trends in defense reforms,
taking a hard look at current defense superintendence potential mismanagement in the
5

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Western Hemisphere. Part four, explores both the construct of capabilities and the force
design framework to present the concepts and interrelationship of Adaptation, Modernization
and Transformation. The paper progress from a rather conceptual approach in parts one and
two to a pragmatic proposal of a template in part five, to conclude presenting Force Design as
a new area of study with its own articulated set of concepts and hypotheses.
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PART 1
FORCE DESIGN
Force design is the fabric of military capabilities and, as such, it provides the
foundations for an integrated project of defense. Its purpose is the conceptualization,
development and evaluation of alternative military capabilities to attend defense requirements
in response to security demands, assuring that the proper set of effective and efficient military
is economically identified, developed, organized, fielded and supported.
Force design results – an integrated project of defense - is the source of guiding
principles that contributes to communicate goals and plans that are reinforced through rules
and norms at all levels of the defense organization. Such a project ties objectives together and
gives meaning and purpose to operational procedures, enabling all parts of the organization
consistently contribute to the overall effort even though they have to act independently in an
environment changing rapidly. Equally important, it include an indication of what capabilities
will not be develop, retaining an appropriate focus in building essential capabilities. The basic
purpose of an integrate project of defense is to provide guidance to those whose actions can
affect the focus and development of the required military capabilities.
Although subordinating all defense operational processes to a common purpose force
design allows the necessary latitude for leadership and initiatives serving as an umbrella over
the various functional activities developed within the defense establishment, establishing the
context within which day-to-day decisions are made and sets the bounds on strategic options.
Further, an integrated project of defense guides in making trade-offs among competing
requirements for short-term and long-term goals. Finally, it provides consistency among
programs providing the instance of reference for resource allocation.
These guiding principles are defined as the pattern of decisions that determine the
ultimate set of military capabilities; being the blueprint for force planning, programming and
budgeting9
, underpinning all defense related functions, to include procurement and
acquisition; intelligence gathering; operational training and evaluation; personnel (civil and
military); educational requirements; and technology research. Essentially it is because of the
ability of these guiding principles to coordinate operational activities with policy
requirements assuring consistency over time: that military capabilities development evolve in
a directed manner renewing, augmenting and contracting its components to reinforce and
expand defense possibilities.
Although force design mills operational requirements into defense alternatives, it is not
merely the application of military planning at ministerial level, warning those who enter its
domains about the inadequacy of military operational planning10
concepts and methodologies
9
The traditional methodological approach for determining defense requirements was through procedures
commonly named either as force planning, strategic planning or military planning. These are methodological
approaches inherited from the Cold War period, led by the US initiative under the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS). This System provided the benchmark for other similar national initiatives, like the
Brazilian Navy Systematic for High Level Planning with its associated “Director Plan.”
10
Military operational planning refers to current practiced methodologies used to determine the best alternative
form of assigning tasks and to direct actions to secure military objectives by the application or the threat of
force.
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8. DRAFT
for the processes and products that fall under its purposes. This requires attention to the
organizational structure of a ministry of defense, involving determining the number and
qualification of the individuals on the force design team.
Force design provides a set of concepts and its articulating logic required for swiveling
political options into military capability requirements and for cranking these requirements
into force alternatives, assuring jointness and interoperability. It provides a functional logic
for management of the defense system, disciplining the relationships of its component parts.
Once an integrated project of defense has been defined, it informs the development of
subparts related to individual services and defense agencies that will converge to produce the
required set of military capabilities. The same logic that provide focus on the required
decisions at ministerial level can help to divide responsibilities among multiple agents,
dedicating portions of effort to each subunit of the defense establishment.
To insure that the alternatives chosen by subunits is adhered to over time demands of an
integrated project of demand, force design provide a systemic perspective in support of
decisions regarding preemptive additions or contraction in the military inventory based of
forecasted demands of military capabilities required for the desired level of efficacy; the
exploitation of better integration and synergy among component parts of the military system
in order to maximize its efficiency; and exploit economies of scale and scope that compete on
the basis of price in order to assure economy within acceptable levels of risk.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
Common sense, capabilities are understood as the quality of being able to use of be
used in a specified way.11
However, for specific force design purposes, a military capability is
the potential ability of force components to perform a defense task under specific pre-
determined conditions, with an expected degree of success.
Military capabilities are designed to fulfill the demands of the use of force for political
purposes, having no intrinsic value – their value derives from the assessment of success in its
intended use and has, therefore, a political nature. The above statement is crucial for force
design, because it casts light on the fundamental question: how much is enough? Providing
the understanding that the only acceptable answer for this question results from the political
priorities for defense; which allows developing criteria to pair wise anticipated tasks with
requirements of quantitative and qualitative dimensioning of force components under
resource constraints and acceptable level of risk.
The nature of these capabilities – instrumental in the practice of violence under state
authority - define individualizing competencies defense components have to acquire and
circumscribes its use within the political realm. Therefore, military capabilities are not
absolute values that could be measured in terms of such things as the currently available
quantity of military assets, the number of military personnel, and the possession of weapons.
Their value results from the assessment of the potential ability of successfully perform
defense tasks in the pursuit of politically defined objectives.
11
Ganer B. The Oxford Dictionary of American Usage and Style. New York: Berkley Books, 2000. pp. 57
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Structure of relationships
Military capabilities emerge in the functional relationship of force components and
operational tasks. This functional outline of military capabilities determines its relationships
with force structure and concept of employment12
.
Figure 1 depicts a general overview of elements that converge to produce military
capability as currently found in the literature13
. Force structure defines the size, type,
dimension, and stationing of military assets. The performance of its components depends on
how they are organized, equipped, trained, upgraded, maintained and supported.
Figure 1: Structure of relationships
Force components are the functional aggregation of force structure elements in combat
and associated support structures accordingly to practiced doctrine.
The concept of Employment is a set of articulated decisions that express the
prioritization of missions and operations, relating them with a political logic. Objectives are
elements, either material or insubstantial, that must be worked over through operations, in
12
The literature of force planning uses the term strategy as a synonym for concept of employment. This paper
will use the latter to develop the capability construct, reserving the former to translate the use of combat for the
purpose of war, in association with tactics, the use of force components in the engagements.
13
For an in-depth discussion of defense planning, see, for example, DAVIS, P. K. e KLALILZAD, Z. M. A
Composite Approach to Air Force Planning. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1996. DEWAR, J. e
BUILDER, C. H. Assumption-based Planning. California, EUA: Rand Corporation, 1993. HAFFA, R. Jr.
Planning U.S. Forces. USA: NDU, 1988. KAUFFMANN, W.N. Assessing the Base Force: How Much is
Enough. Washington, DC. EUA: Brookings Institution, 1992.
Support
Maintenance
Trainining
Support
Maintenance
Trainining
Military AssetsMilitary Assets ObjectivesObjectives
Missions
Operations
Missions
Operations
Force
Components
Force Structure Concept of Employment
Operational Structures
Capabilities Operational
Tasks
Policy Guidelines
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10. DRAFT
order to provide an intended benefit that contributes to a specific mission. Tasks are required
actions to achieve objectives, towards which there is some sort of opposition or threat.14
Countries have their defense assets (number and size) stationed or deployed in military
bases. However, these assets are not in themselves military capabilities. It is meaningless to
say, for example, that Brazil’s aircraft carrier São Paulo is a military capability. It is only an
asset. Brazil’s military capability reflects the scale and scope of tasks that force components,
where this asset might be integrated, could perform with expected degree of success.
One alternative of military capability for Brazil could include the São Paulo in a force
component to contribute to defend Brazil’s sovereignty in the Amazon area (defense
objective), aiming to deter international greed for the Amazon forest. The resulting capability
is conditioned by the readiness15
degree of its component air wing, the degree of training of
its crew, and the ability to sustain continuous operation for an extended period of time.
The Aircraft Carrier São Paulo is based in Rio de Janeiro, taking approximately 4 days
to deploy (non-stop) to the Amazon area, requiring the support of other assets with the
technical ability for replenishment at sea – tanker ships, in this case, to refuel the escorts of
the São Paulo. Similarly, these tanker ships are not also in themselves a military capability.
Replenishment at sea is only a technical requirement; the derived military capability is the
ability of the Brazilian Navy to support continuous operation of its sea assets.
Brazil’s required military capability to defend its sovereignty in the Amazon Area,
exploring the combat possibilities of air wing of São Paulo aircraft carrier in a force capable
to escort a convoy transporting Army troops and material to the region, would only be
constrained by the availability of tanker ships, if its defense posture (relating the concepts of
employment with force structure), would demand short reaction time, whereas keeping the
São Paulo stationed in the Naval Base of Rio de Janeiro (imposing non-stop deploy and
therefore requiring replenishment at sea).
If Brazil decides to station/deploy the São Paulo to a northern naval base (changing
force structure), it would produce a higher operational response tempo for the Amazon Area
with fewer demands of replenishment at sea, with the compromise of reducing the
responsiveness of that force component (integrating the São Paulo) to anti-submarine
operations within a context of maritime warfare to protect the national flow of petrol in the
South Atlantic. This would change Brazil’s defense posture, signaling a higher commitment
to defend the Amazon Area and, at the same time, would impose the necessity of developing
expensive shipyard facilities in the northern region of the Country, in order to provide repair
facilities to this extremely complex ship.
The required technical, fiscal and political costs would have to be weighed against the
effectiveness of a reduced operational tempo associated with the lower demands of
replenishment at sea. In addition, since the Army troops and material that the São Paulo
would convoy to the Amazon Area would be held in Rio de Janeiro, the decision of re-
deploying this asset to the northern region should take into consideration the technical
characteristics and operational requirements of Brazilian Army’s assets, increasing
coordination and control demands.
Referring to cost-effectiveness analysis, Brazil could have decided, instead of
convoying Army troops and material using a force component integrated by the Aircraft
14
These concepts will be retaken further on in this paper. Here they are stated with the purpose of supporting
arguments to explain the nature of military capabilities.
15
At this point, it is proposed to understand readiness as the performance required to accomplish a mission with
expected degree of success.
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Carrier São Paulo, to use near-the-shore maritime routes under the umbrella of the Brazilian
Air Force aircraft (changing the concept of employment). In this case, the same task – to
protect the military flow of troops and material – would be accomplished with other force
components and associated operations, without significant changes in the defense posture.
The extensive list of possible alternatives derived from Brazil’s case reflects the
complexity of force design. The mission potential of military capabilities results from the
assessment of task-force functional aggregations to achieve assigned objectives with force
structure components. Similarly, Mexico faces force design problems with its two oceans;
Argentina with Chile and Falklands/Malvinas; Venezuela with Suriname borders; Colombia
with its internal conflict; to mention just a few other cases.
Having outlined the purpose and several trends in force design, it remains to present its
operational definition. Force design is a system of decisions aiming that the proper set of
effective and efficient military capability is economically identified, developed, organized,
fielded, and supported. Whitin this operation definition, design is related to a proposed
solution to a perceived problem, presented with necessary and sufficient details to guide a
course of action and evaluate its outcomes, and the force as composite of military capabilities
explored to attend defense requirements in response to security demands.
FORCE PLANNING
The specific and limited purpose of force planning within force design is to determine
the quantitative dimension, organization, and spatial distribution of military assets in
association with a specific concept of employment for a determined theatre of operation.
Force planning has different approaches that might include more or fewer components
and processes, depending on the aggregation criteria ruled by specifics doctrinal
understanding. Force design does not dispute these aggregation criteria or doctrine16
; on the
contrary, it recognizes these efforts as a valid procedure to rationalize the planning process,
having as a reference the guidelines it provides.
An example might help to clarify the distinction between force design and force
planning. Force design might determine US capability requirements for protecting America’s
interests in Central and South America, assuring combat efficacy against any specific country
or regional coalition, and providing sea control and airspace interdiction against drug
trafficking and illegal immigration. The purpose of force planning for the Caribbean Basin
Theatre of Operation specifically, would determine how many X surveillance aircraft and Y
patrolling surface vessels based in Norfolk (VA) are required to deter and prevent illegal air
and maritime traffic under strict rules of engagement limiting the use of force. Force planning
would also determine the command and control requirements associated with an operational
structure for these air and maritime assets to assure the required operational tempo. In
addition, force planning would consider the redeployment of old surface patrol vessels from
Norfolk to Guantanamo (Cuba) to reduce transit time, allowing fewer ships to perform the
same tasks. It would also consider that the redeployment of these old patrol ships near the
theatre of operation would contribute to lesser its aging rate until faster and less fuel
consuming combat ships could be developed and stationed back in Norfolk. Force planning
also considers what changes in the concept of employment these new assets might demand
and determine how many new ships would be necessary and how enhanced air surveillance
detection aids (radar, for example) could reduce the number of required surveillance aircraft.
16
For an example, see Kent G. A Framework for Defense Planning. California: RAND Corporation, 1989.
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During these processes, Force Design would shape new rules of engagement and
instruct Force Planning about the changing defense roles and missions in the Caribbean
Basin, which would determine new tasks and evolving readiness and doctrine requirements,
conditioning the specification, development and deployment of these new assets. Force
design is, therefore, the instance of reference for force planning. It provides planning
guidance while incorporating operational alternatives as a condition of possibility for its
designing purposes. Although with complementary purpose, they do not fuse into one all
encompassing process. Force Design is the master of force planning; recognizing that its
servant would makes its designing requirement feasible. When these roles are inverted, or
force design simply does not exist, force planning starts imposing limits to political
alternatives. Politics will do what the military says it can do and it can do what it thinks
should be done: the military becomes the master of policy.
FORCE DESIGN ENVIRONMENT
The complex interrelationship between the problems force design faces must be viewed
and understood against the background of the political structure of the society in which they
occur, although this may not always give us a clear understanding of every detail. Current
mechanism to enforce defense reform range from reorganization acts, assuming the
structuring principle that legal boundaries can create conditions for effective defense reform,
to political guidelines provided by defense policy or “white papers”. The question, therefore,
of what kind and what amount of information is need head into the devilish question of
functional relevance. Applying these considerations, the most import feature in analyzing the
force design environment is to ascertain the place at the hierarchy of defense decision-making
from which its actions are guided.
Force design processes are related to defense ministry functions, being deeply
permeated with settled and routinized situations and decisions in situations that have not yet
been subjected to regulation.
Karl Mannheim, quoting the Austrian sociologist and statesman Albert Schäffle,
pointed out that: “at any moment of social-political life two aspects are discernible – first, a
series of social events which have acquired a set pattern and recur regularly; and, second,
those events which are still in the process of becoming, in which in individual cases,
decisions have to be made that give rise to new and unique situations”17
. This distinction
developed to qualify the difference between the routine affairs of state and politics, also apply
to qualify ministerial functions in the realm of administration and the realm of politics.
Notwithstanding the boundary between these two classes is rather difficulty, a set of enduring
characteristics is present in the ministerial functions18
:
♦ To be the prime instrument for assuring civilian control over defense alternatives.
♦ To represent the nation’s defense requirements and advise on the implications of
proposed alternatives.
♦ To balance military expertise and administrative-fiscal viewpoints on formulating
defense alternatives
17
Mannheim, K. Ideology & Utopy: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. London, UK: Hancourt,
1936. pp.112.
18
Some of these functions are reflected in Huntington’s perspective of the “Departamental Structure of Civil-
Military Relations. Huntington, S. P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press: 2000. pp.428-455.
12

13. DRAFT
Force design contribute to this ministerial functions because it demands the explanation
of the assumptions that support the formulation of military capability requirements, and
determine making explicit the articulating links between military capability requirements and
defense objective demands, integrating and assessing those assumptions, requirements and
objectives with a political logic.
This is not without problems. For example, the analysis of the definition of capability
presented by the Joint Pub 1-02 can explain a chain of unexpected consequences of force
design concepts in the environment and vice-versa. This publication defines military
capability as: “The ability to execute a specified course of action (a capability may or may
not be accompanied by an intention)19
”. This view transforms military capability in a self-
sufficient ability to perform operations. When military instrumentality becomes dissociated
from political goals, it allows military control of policy alternatives, jeopardizing the
prerogatives of popularly elected governments to decide upon defense alternatives.
Richard H. Kohn suggests evidence for this trend in the US:
“The U.S. Military is now more alienate from its civilian leadership than at any time in
American history, and more vocal about it. The warning signs are very clear, most
noticeable in the frequency with which officers have expressed disgust for the President
over the last year… Divorced now from broad parts of American society, the military,
increasing Washington-wise, was determined never again to be committed to combat
without the resources, public support, and freedom on the battlefield to win… The
military had accepted “downsizing” and reorganization, but not changes that invaded
too dramatically the traditional function of each of the individual armed services, or that
changed too radically the social composition of the forces, or cut too deeply into combat
readiness, or otherwise undermined the quality and ability of the military to fullfill its
functions”.20
One of the undisputed givens is that armed forces are still a major player in national
politics both in the US and in the region, with influence through expenditures, investments,
and savings in the economy and social environment to which they belong. Thus, designing
defense capabilities is an influencing factor in the national and international arena.
Zackkrison’s21
study of the roles and missions of the armed forces of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, and Peru, brings a unique perspective to force design environment:
♦ Argentina has the most distance between the arguments, with civilians generally
debating the need for armed forces and the military successfully lobbying the
government for money to maintain international multilateral operations.
♦ Brazil has the largest armed forces, adequately funded, but has no real sense of
missions and not enough public support to push a specific agenda.
♦ Chile has perhaps the best funded military in the region, and the best defined set of
roles and missions, but faces just enough public hostility that the future after
General Augusto Pinochet’s departure is a big question.
19
USA, Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001 (As
Amended Through 9 April 2002). pp.62.
20
Kohn, R.H. Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations. In The National Interests. Spring 1994,
pp.3-17.
21
Zackrison, J.L. Drawdown to Instability: Defense Budgets and Mission Glide.
13

14. DRAFT
♦ Colombia has the most urgency in defining an adequate role for its armed forces
because of the threat to national survival at the hand of the Marxist insurgents and
drug traffickers.
♦ Peru faces the popular perception of having lost a recent border skirmish against a
much smaller military, an increasing threat of insurgency, and pressure from the
armed forces for more funding and better military equipment.
These facts should be understood in the constantly changing configuration of
experience in which they actually lived. Notwithstanding, they give an example of the ever-
flowing stream of trends that shape force design environment.
The measure of the relevance of this trends have need of an analytical model that can
assure that the result to be achieved with force design do not become detached from the
environment it belongs. It is needed to model the components and relationships of military
capabilities understanding that the constituting characteristics of the whole will emerge
through the relationships of the individual characteristics of its component parts.
The goal is to understand not just the function of individual military assets, doctrine,
tasks, objectives, but to learn how all of these components interact within capabilities
possibilities hoping then to use this information to generate more accurate defense planning
methodologies that will help to unravel the complexities of defense reforms and the
underlying mechanisms that provoke inefficiency.
MODELING MILITARY CAPABILITIES
In order to design capabilities, first it is required to understand that capabilities are a
measure of the resulting ability of force component arrangements to perform a range of tasks.
The performances of these arrangements being depend on the performance of its component
parts and the stability of its relationships. Secondly, it its required to comprehend that
abstraction is the first step toward a model because it allows pointing out and organizing
aspects of the reality as the object of analysis. As Bunge22
presents, “ abstraction is
indispensable not only to apply causal ideas, but also to permit either empirical or
theoretical investigation.”
Both provisions were included in the formulation of the construct of capabilities
depicted in figure 2. This construct identifies military capability components, stating its
precise meaning with the description of its basic qualities, delineating the outer edge of its
component against the context they pertain. That means giving significance to the abstracted
object of analysis, defining its variety23
as pertaining to a system24
.
22
Bunge, M. La Causalidade: El Principio de Causalidade en la Ciencia Moderna. trad. Aernan Rodrigues.
Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamericana, 1959. pp 189.
23
Variety is a concept developed by Ross Ashby within the Theory of Cybernetics. It is used to explain the
distinguishable conjuncts, regardless of the order in which they appear, necessary and sufficient to describe the
essential characteristics of the systems at the required level of abstraction. ASHBY, W Ross. Introduction to
Cybernetics. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1970. Chap. 7.
24
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who introduced the General Theory of Systems in 1925/6, provides the concept of
system: a conjunct of interacting elements. The defense components are a system because they possess a mutual
dependency and complementary relationship: the performance of the whole depends on the performance of its
component parts. Bertalanffy, von L. Teoria General de los Sistemas: fundamentos, desarrollo, aplicaciones.
Trad. Juan Almela. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1968, pag. 38.
There are authors, such Bertalanffy himself, who recognizes that the founder of Theory of System would be W.
Kohler, with his work Die Phsischen Gestalten in Ruhe and in Staionaaren Zustand. Erlangen, 1924.
Notwithstanding, the literature credits Bertalanffy for developing the Theory of System because Kohler’s work
14

15. DRAFT
The capability construct is an ideal25
model with two purposes. The first purpose is to
abstract the complexity of the empirical reality in necessary and sufficiently analytical
variables; and explaining how these variables interact, contract and maintain relationships
that enable a required capability to be obtained. The second purpose is to explain the
sensibility of military capability to changes in the security and defense environment,
providing assessment criteria of its efficiency, efficacy and economy in adapting,
modernizing and transforming the defense sector in response to changes in the security
environment. The sensitivity analysis of military capability to changes in the security and
defense environment requires making explicit possible forms of its relationships and logical
consequences. That means supporting hypothesis formulation and explaining its elements of
refutation.
The capability construct, as an ideal model – in the sense o logical -, is not a hypothesis
and, therefore, can be neither true nor false but valid or not valid depending on its utility for
understanding reality26
. That means that it has its own conditions of possibility; it contains its
own principle of constitution, encapsulating a conjunct of defined predicative, arbitrarily
created accordingly to the necessity of the investigation, that can be used – or not – as an
instance of reference to compare empirical data drawn from the reality .
The construct models capabilities as an open system. It assumes a flow of materials,
information, etc. from and to the surrounding environment, implying that its variety assumes
different values in time, as well as the relationship between its component are dynamically
reconfigure, whereas keeping the system in a uniform state27
. This explains the characteristic
is restricted to applying the concept of system to biological phenomena, restricting its amplitude. For
applications of the Theory, see Bertoglio, J. Introduction a la Teoria General de los Sistemas. México: Limusa,
1982. This theory provides an investigative methodology that could be synthetically described as: take the
reality as it is presented, examine its component systems and enunciate valid regularities presented.” This
methodology was named empirical-inductive. For a critique of the theory and investigation methodology, see
Ashby, W.R. General Systems Theory as a New Discipline. EUA, General System, 3, 1958, pp. 1-6. Ashby
proposes an opposite approach, named deductive: instead of studying the system in a progressive form, from
inferior to superior levels of abstraction, he recommends taking the conjunct of all conceivable systems and
reduce them to a unique system of acceptable dimension. Luhmann, N. Power. Toronto: John Willey & Sons,
1979, proposes interpreting a macro system – society as the most complex macro system - using the deductive
methodology. He aims to eliminate the main restriction of Bertalanffy’s approach that in macro system the
distinction between the surrounding environment and the objected system under analysis becomes blurred.
Luhmann’s theory wasn’t completely accepted because it cannot be applicable to others fields that have more
restricted objects of analysis.
25
Ideal models, according to Weber, are theoretical models resulting from a selective process that blocks some
elements from the reality and explains its content unequivocally. Ideal models do not exist as part of the reality;
they are only a proposition of a hypothetical relationship of elements abstract from that reality. Weber, M.
Ensaios Sobre a Teoria da Ciência. Paris: Plon, 1965. pp.76. Ideal models are not a description of the reality,
because they retain only some of its aspects, representing relevant aspects of the totality that are regularly
presented in the object of investigation. They are not also an average term of the reality because ideal models do
not emerge from quantitative notion. Popper converges to Weber’s understanding of ideal models and explains
its utility in preventing contradictions and impreciseness when theorizing upon selected aspects of reality. Lévis-
Strauss has a different interpretation of ideal model. According to him, an ideal model is a simulacra, a relational
conjunct that simplifies reality in order to explains the totality of the phenomenon. See Bruyne, P. Herman, J.
and Schoutheete, M. Dinâmica da Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais: Os Polos da Prática Metodológica. 5 ed. trad.
Ruth Joffily Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. pp. 48.
26
Bruyne, P. Herman, J. and Schoutheete, M. Dinâmica da Pesquisa em Ciências Sociais: Os Polos da Prática
Metodológica. 5 ed. trad. Ruth Joffily Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. pp. 48, 182.
27
The concepts of “closed and open system” are part of Bertalanffy’s General Theory of Systems. A system is
defined as closed when it can be considered in an equilibrium state independent of the surrounding environment.
Chemistry, for example, deals with physical-chemical reactions in isolated recipients; and thermodynamics
affirms that its laws are only applicable to closed systems. Opens systems have in their animus the governing
15

16. DRAFT
of military capabilities to retain its efficacy while its components are reconfigured. It will also
explain the limits and possibilities of adaptation, modernization and transformation trends.
Pragmatically, the construct will help in problem definition in force design: what will
(and will not) be considered as inputs and outputs. This entails defining the scope of the
expected alternatives, what procedures will be followed in generating and evaluating
alternatives, and in selecting the alternatives to recommend to political decision.
Readiness
Rules of
Engagement
Enabling Elements
Military Hardware
Personel
Operational Protocols
Military Assets
Combat
Support
Operational Structures
C4
Tasks
Objectives
Interoperability
Force Components Regulating Factors Concepts of
Employment
Doctrine
Derivative
Elements
Operations
ISR
Figure 2: Capabilities construct
Military capabilities alternatives are a particular manifestation of a (intended) stable
relationship of three conjuncts28
of elements: the conjunct of force components, the conjunct
of regulating factors, and the conjunct of concepts of employment, all interacting with each
other in unique ways.
The concept of employment, force components and regulating factors are mutually
determined elements of capabilities. The first assures the proper relationship of tactical
factor towards higher states of order and organization. This paper uses the same characterization for capabilities,
having adaptation, modernization and transformation as trends to higher states of order and organization. The
biologist Driesch uses this description to characterize a system of living organisms. A uniform state is achieved
when an open system is in equilibrium. Closed systems equilibrium is dependent of the initial conditions. The
final concentration of a chemical product depends on the initial concentration of its components. However, in
open systems, uniform state is achieved based on the systems own parameters, and therefore is independent of
its initial conditions. Drischel, H. Formale Theorien der Organization. Halle: Nova Acta Leopoldina, 1968, pp.
136, in Bertalanffy, von L. Teoria General de los Sistemas: Fundamentos, Desarrollo, Aplicaciones. Trad. Juan
Almela. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1968. pp. 40.
28
M.D. Mesarovic explains the concept of conjunct as the individualizing properties that provide to some type
of cluster of elements within the environment its quality as system components. Each conjunct is, in itself, a
system, defined by particular analytical criteria used to isolate them from the rest. Mesarovic, M.D.
Foundations for a General System Theory. New York, USA: John Willey & Sons, 1964. pp. 1-24.
16

17. DRAFT
possibilities, strategic alternatives and political goals. The second determines the proper
quantitative and qualitative dimensioning of military assets and organizations, being enabled
by interoperability, jointness, command, control, communications and computing (C4)
possibilities. The regulating factors link both force components and concepts of employment,
assuring the external coherence of military capabilities with the political will and internal
coherence between its component parts. By examining these complex interactions, it is
possible to shed more light on how they alter defense reforms possibilities.
THE CONJUNCT OF FORCE
The conjunct of force emerges in the articulation of A) military assets possibilities, B)
operational structures, and C) its enabling elements, which will make tactics and strategy
possible.
A)Military Assets
Military assets are the means effectively used to accomplish assigned tasks and the means
necessary to provide efficiency and sustain the tactical effort for a certain period. For
analytical purposes, each military asset has three component elements: 1) military
hardware; 2) personnel; and 3) protocol of operations29
.
1) Military hardware
Military hardware is the machinery and equipment of war, such as tanks, aircraft,
ships, rifles, etc. The identifying criterion for including an element in the conjunct of
military asset is its sufficiency for a specific purpose. Such is the case with a war ship,
with its sensors, weapon systems, engines, damage control systems, communication
and command centers integrated into a single platform with the purpose of providing
task efficiency.
A Boeing 747 initially conceived for civilian airlines might become a military asset as
a troop transport; a merchant freighter may become a tank carrier or an ordinary SUV
may be converted into an armed scooter. On the other hand, if it is considered aircraft,
warships or tanks originally conceived as war-machines, the question would be what
are the distinguished features that typify a corvette, a frigate and a cruiser other than
their size and weaponry? A corvette with sophisticated and powerful weaponry might
overcome a frigate in an artillery duel, but the overweigh of this weaponry could
restrain its speed and performance, allowing the frigate maneuver fast to overcome its
weakness. Similar propositions could be posed to the entire war arsenal with its
composing typology of fighters, bombers, aircraft carriers, tanks, guns, etc. Clearly,
not only their aptitude to fly, navigate or off-road traffic empowers these material
components as military assets. What defines these material means as military assets is
their ability to provide tactical efficacy. However, because resources are always
constrained, efficacy should be associated with efficiency. An efficient combat asset,
for example, will perform tasks with less fuel, which is transformed into a wider
deployment range or longer periods on station without replenishment.
In other words, the criteria to define a military mean is whether it is able to provide an
identifiable contribution to the required task, being a lever of influence in the outcome.
Military assets are defined using four combining criteria:
29
For a typology of military assets, see Brzoska, M. et. al. Typology of Military Assets. Bonn, Ge: Bonn
International Center for Conversion. Paper 16. April 2000.
17

18. DRAFT
• Mobility and staying power: the ability of military means to deploy and maintain
continuous operations. Mobility and staying power can be enhanced by new
transportation and communications technologies.
• Offensive and defensive firepower: offensive firepower regards the ability to
damage (neutralize or destroy) adversaries’ fighting ability by attacking targets
such as missile launch sites, airfields, naval vessels, command and control nodes,
munitions stockpiles, and supporting infrastructure. Offensive firepower includes
but is not limited to physical attack and/or destruction, military deception,
psychological operations, electronic warfare, and special operations, and could also
include computer network attack. Defensive firepower seeks to affect the
adversary’s ability to achieve or to promote specific damage against our assets. It
includes all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while
simultaneously employing frequent movement, using deception and concealment
or camouflage.
• Sustainability: the ability to perform tactical actions until successful
accomplishment or revision of the tasks.
• Tactical Flexibility and Versatility: the ability to adjust assets configuration to
confront changes in the environment, laying out a wide range of interrelated
response paths.
2) Military personnel
Military personnel are considered in force design in its qualitative and quantitative
dimensions. The qualitative dimension of military personnel translates both its total
combat efficiency and the individual ability to assess complex situations making and
implementing decisions within the domain of their professional expertise, with
reasonable expectation of success. The quantitative dimension of military personnel
deals with the required mix of active, reserve, professional and conscripts to
effectively operate, deploy, and maintain material means required to attend a set of
concepts of employments.
The common trend in personnel reforms, supported by most scholars as a by-product
of the end of the Cold War, has been downsizing the military and a complement of
civilians. This is a monumental decision that has to be carefully throughout in its
impacts. David McCormick30
summarizes its complexity:
“Judging the appropriateness of an army’s downsizing objectives is more complicated
than it might appear. The logic behind each of the four primary objectives –
protecting quality, shaping the force, sustaining personnel readiness, and
demonstrating care and compassion – is persuasive. An officer corps of exceptional
quality is obviously crucial to a dynamic and effective military organization, even
more so given the uncertain challenges of the post-Cold War era. Maintaining
promotion opportunities and enhancing professional development opportunities as a
means of retaining to performers seems reasonable, too, especially since downsizing
organizations often lose their most valued performers. Similarly, there is an obvious
and compelling need for shaping the officers corps by precisely identifying the
individuals with the specific skill and expertise needed in a downsized organization
and for distributing officer cuts across the entire officer corps…Sustaining personnel
30
McCormick, David. The Downsized Warrior: America’s Army in Transition. New York: New York University
Press, 1998. pp 75-76.
18

19. DRAFT
readiness is also a reasonable objective. Personnel readiness in the aggregate is a
telling indicator of the alignment between cuts in force structure and cuts in
personnel, two activities that should ideally go hand in hand. Thus, personnel
readiness allows the army to gauge how effectively it is managing this aspect of
downsizing. In addition, at the unit level, reasonably high levels of personnel
readiness are necessary for effective unit training and operations. And, personnel
readiness obviously has significant implications for the army’s wartime capabilities.
Finally, a caring compassionate approach to downsizing is justified on moral as well
as practical grounds. From a moral perspective, it has traditionally to those who
loyally serve. And, as noted earlier, fair and compassionate treatment of downsizing
victims affects the attitudes and performance of those who remain and influences an
organization’s ability to recruit new members.”
In the US case, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld believes that the military's
personnel management system might be a Cold War relic that encourages too many
service members to stay for 20 years, too few to stay thereafter, and most members to
scurry between assignments at a pace harmful to unit cohesion and to families. 31
3) Operational protocols
Operational protocols are the instructions of how to operate efficiently those
material means, exploring their technical characteristics to maximize task
effectiveness. An operational protocol for five similar surface ships to deploy in calm
sea aiming sonar detection of low speed submarines would recommend a pattern of
simultaneous turning to have a detection probability of 80%. Another protocol of
operation for the same class of ships operating in rough sea would recommend another
pattern for a 60% detection probability32
.
More efficient protocols of operations can be developed by applying
computational routines to a generic “model”, modifying its parameters to make
military assets to satisfy performance requirements appropriated to a wide variety of
conditions, or to make them to perform existing tasks better, or to implement tasks
never before performed.
However, one of the most difficult and expensive activities of modern armed
forces is exactly making efficient protocols of operations. It demands sophisticated
centers of operational analysis and complex processing. For this reason, not all
countries can afford such centers. The problem, therefore, is that they might employ
newly acquired military assets with obsolete operational protocols, virtually
neutralizing their efficiency. However, since they do not have such centers, they do not
realize their necessity, or simply deny this problem. The error, therefore, is circular,
with increasing costs of acquiring and maintaining technologically sophisticated assets
with diminishing returns in terms of effectiveness.
When defining the military assets conjunct, the relevant variable is the tooth-to-tail
ratio of fighting assets to its supporting components. Fighting assets are designed to
maximize combat ability relatively to foreseen opponents. Supporting components are
designed to assure the maintenance of the cutting edge of fighting assets. The fighting tooth
needs refueling and ammunition supplies to maintain combat ability. Without supplying
31
Tom Philpott. Military Update: Longer Careers, Fewer Moves: Two Of Rumsfeld's Tougher Goals.
http://www.militarylifestyle.com/home/1,1210,S:1100:1:1187,00.html. (June 19, 2002).
32
For methodological processes of developing operational protocols, see NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. Naval
Operations Analysis. (2. ed.). Annapolis, EUA: NWC Press, 1989.
19

20. DRAFT
vessels, tank aircraft, depots and bases, the fighting ability would be severed to the point of
impairing task possibilities. In US, for example, the fighting tooth has required deployment of
only 4% of active-duty personnel33
.
The conjunct of military assets, therefore, includes both its cutting edge and its
supporting device categories. Training and motivation of military personnel, the internal
military organization, communications systems, logistical and other systems all may enhance
or prejudice military capability because they possible impact on the possible tooth-to-tail
ratio.
B) Operational Structures
The conjunct of operational structures creates the ability of military assets to perform
operations in support of required tasks. They are designed, therefore, to attend command
and control requirements, articulating military assets in order to get task efficacy through
the efficient performance of the parts. Its role is to make the conjunct of military assets
present in a military capability become more than the sum of the parts. For analytical
purposes, operational structures have two distintive components: 1) Combat structures,
and 2) Support Strutures.
1) Combat structures
Combat structures allow parts of the conjunct of military assets to be detached and
deployed to specific tasks, allowing expansion of the number of possible tasks that the
conjunct might perform. Therefore, the synchronization of detachment and
reincorporation of those parts maximizes the potential ability of military assets to
accomplish the envisaged concept of employment.34
2) Support structures
Support Structures are designed to fulfill two simultaneous demands. The first refers
to the maintenance of military effort in time. In this case, the purpose of support
structures is to provide the adequate logistical flow to maintain both military means in
their optimum technical performance, and personnel adequate supplied in order to
assure the continuous validity of operational protocols, providing for the expected
performance of military assets. The second demand imposed on support structures is
to prepare the conjunct of military assets to attend operational requirements. In the
first demand, support structures are articulated with combat structures, timely linking,
for example, depot resources with theatre demands. In the second demand, support
structures group military assets by types and classes, seeking a gain in scale in
maintenance, repair and training.
Decisions regarding military assets and the organizational design are highly
dependent on the degree of require jointness, as well as on decisions regarding how force
components are deployed, interconnected and specialized.
33
The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18 5 February 2001. http:://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo
18.html. . pp. 5. (8/28/2001)
34
See Department of the Army, United States of America. 1986 US Army Field Manual 100-5, blueprint for the
AirLand Battle. Washington DC: Brassey’s (US), Inc, 1991. To identify the impact of combat structure in force
structure and warfare see Deichman, P.F. der. Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwffe Operations in Support of The
Army: 1939-1945. New York, USA: IVY Books, 1996. Diechman’s book is also relevant to see the functional
role of doctrine in the relationship of combat structure and the conjunct of military assets.
20

21. DRAFT
C)Enabling Elements
The range of possibilities provided by military assets in response to tasks depends on the
1) interoperability of their component parts, and 2) the possibilities created by command,
control, communication, and computing. Together, they contribute to achieve and
jointness synergy.
1) Interoperability
Interoperability defines the degree of compatibility between force components that
permits them to work together to produce expected tactical results. It explores
technical features incorporated in military assets to perform operations.
Interoperability is a technology function. It depends on a systemically integrated
conjunct of knowledge and instructions that fulfill or create specific demands of
force designing, and guide the production possibilities of defense products and
processes though proper techniques35
.
Technology differs from techniques in continuously reconstructing and transforming
itself, having as reference all previous knowledge, whereas techniques are specific
knowledge circumscribed in time and space oriented to use or produce required
products and processes. Technology supports the presumption of certainty that force
components will produce expected results to tasks demands, and determines the
transforming rules of knowledge into force components possibilities36
.
2) Command, Control, Communications and Computing (C4)
Command and Control, Communications and Computing assure the processes
transaction of operational and support structures in a logical fashion, being an
35
Literature offers a variety of definitions of techniques within an unresolved discussion about the difference
with technology. Longo defines technology as the organized assemblage of all scientific, empiric and intuitive
knowledge used in the production and commercialization of goods and services; and techniques as the purely
empirical and intuitive knowledge. Longo, W.L. O Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico do Brasil e suas
Perspectivas Frente aos Desafios do Mundo Moderno. Belém: UNAMA, 2000. pp. 11,12. For Morais,
technology is derived from the evolution of techniques. For him, techniques refers to Paleolithic, Neolithic,
medieval or even modern humankind creative behavior used to provide human necessities though the
transformation of the environment; and technology refers to more recent practice of objective human creativity.
Morais, R. J.F. Ciência e Tecnologia. 2.ed. São Paulo: Cortez & Morais, 1978. pp.102. Munford has the same
understanding of Morais regarding techniques: “through technical improvements we create a new environment
and highly organized new behavioral standards that have attended human necessity of living in a orderly and
predicable world”. Munford, L. Arte e Ciência. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1986. pp.14. Jacques Ellul has an
inverted perspective of the concepts when he says that technology regards naïve activities oriented toward
perfection; and techniques as the contemporaneous mentality oriented to efficiency as a supreme goal. Ellul, J.
A Técnica e o Desafio do Século. trad. Roland Corbisier. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1968. pp. 445. Buzan sees
in the technology the most important factor in determining the nature of military alternatives and means of
force, isolated from political influence. Buzan, B. Strategic Studies: Military Technology & International
Relations. London, UK:MacMillan Press, 1987. pp.7. Häbermas, on the other hand, thinks that technical
reasoning does not abandon its political content. Habermas, J. Técnica e ciência como Ideologia. (trad. Arthur
Morão). Lisboa, Portugal: Edições 70, 1968. pp. 46.
36
For a historical perspective of the composition and influence of technology upon force design, see: Macksey,
K. Technology in War: the Impact of Science on Weapons Development and Modern Battle. London, UK:
Armour Press, 1986. Creveld, M. van. Technology and War: From 2000 B.C to the Present. New York, USA:
Free Press, 1991. Dupuy, T.N. The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Fairfax, USA: Hero Books, 1984. Jones,
A. The Art of War in the Western World. New York, USA:Oxford University Press, 1987. O’Connel, R.L. Of
Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggressions. London, UK: Oxford U.P., 1989. MacNeill, W. The
Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society Since A.D. 1000. Chicago, USA: The University of
Chicago Press, 1982.
21

22. DRAFT
integral part of force structure manifested in military capabilities. They can lead to
fewer changeovers in force components and tasks to produce required military
capabilities, reducing cycle time without changing military effectiveness or
increasing military effectiveness using lesser-sophisticated conjunct of military
assets. As the size of force components increases, it can exploit more and more tasks,
but it also becomes increasingly complex to select the C4 system that makes it
possible to provide effectiveness at a low total cost/risk ratio and at the same time
assure interoperability37
.
Properly identified, C4 requirements lead demand growth of military capabilities
with preemptive actions to exploit current deployment of military assets considering
its different degrees of readiness tailored to expanding or contracting tasks demands
within a specific concept of employment.
THE CONJUNCT OF CONCEPTS OF EMPLOYMENT
The conjunct of concepts of employment define a set of articulated decisions that
express the prioritization of objectives and its translation into tasks requirements having
operations as its linking factors, whereas relating all of them with a political logic.
In the US case, for example, the Navy has put emphasis on network-centric operations,
the Air Force moves towards becoming an expeditionary force, the Marines’s continuing
experiments with concepts such as Desert Warrior and Urban Warrior, and the Army’s
recently announced effort to develop medium-sized brigades with increaded responsiveness38
.
A) Objectives
Objectives are functionally sufficient descriptors of foreseeable demands of the use of
force for political purposes. Each one encapsulates a comprehensive content that justifies
its individuality and permanence, supporting the assumption that during the processes
force design guides those demands of force will not change.
There are five implicit premises in this formulation. First, that the objectives, once
selected, are necessary and sufficient to achieve the predetermined purpose. Second, that
the processes are logically articulated. Third, that if those objectives were achieved, the
envisaged initial purpose would be accomplished. Forth, that its formulation and
execution are bounded by some degree of sufficient rationality. Fifth, that during the
processes, the objectives and the rules of transformation will not change.
These premises support the proper linkages between national interests and defense
capabilities towards higher states of effectiveness, efficiency, provided four conditions:
• Intelligibility: the denotative content of objectives are clearly defined and
understood.
• Feasibility: objectives are achievable within the realm of practical possibilities and
logical reasoning.
• Assessment possibility: the results are measurable either quantitatively or
qualitatively.
37
For a in-depth discussion of Command and Control, see Weisman, R.M.L. A Conceptual Model for Military
Command and Control. Ontario, Canada: University of Ontario,UMI Dissertations Services. 1992.
38
Davis, P. Tranforming Military Force. California: Rand Corporation, 2002. pp. 231. http://www.rand.org/
contact/personal/pdavis/MR1306.1.sec6.pdf . (Mar/20/2002).
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23. DRAFT
• Compatibility: the effects are part of a chain of causality addressing defense
requirements
Intelligibility is the requirement for the proper developing of plausible hypothesis
related to a set of accepted values and principles; and for clearly communicated results.
Assessment Possibility is the requirement for determining the consistency of the
proposed objectives and its sensibility to changes in the threat environment.
Attending intelligibility and assessment possibility requirements are relevant to prevent
three common risks in defining defense objectives. The first risk is making static a
dynamic process. The second, is that objectives, as Lodi39
put, convey solutions in
terms of re-scaling existing capabilities, increasing or downsizing, thus restricting the
emergence of new capabilities based on different internal logic for rearranging force
components. Finally, objectives tend to focus on the short term.
Compatibility is the enable of strategic possibilities. It assures that the resulting effect
of operations – manifested in tactical use of military assets in the engagements – might
be articulated toward the political goals though a cascade of linked results.
B) Tasks
Tasks are a set of intended actions or desired effects of the application of force towards
specific defense objectives. They are the building blocks of the concept of employment,
defining the intention for using force components in a chain of linked tactical actions,
expecting that the aggregated outcome of this chain will contribute to achieve a cascade
of intermediate objectives having at its top the defense objective.
The political logic that links objectives and tasks can be understood with the
comprehension of its relation with 1) Defense Missions and 2) Defense Roles.
1) Defense missions
Defense missions are the assemblage of tasks within the scope of an intended
purpose. Each mission is related to a specific outcome, in the form a hypothetical
combination of assumptions and chains of future developments that serve as a
reference for the diagnosis of current and required tasks. Defense missions are,
therefore, a proposition of reality aiming to anticipate possible, probable and
plausible contingencies where the uses of military capabilities are considered.
Determining and prioritizing missions are a prime political decision found in a set of
compromises seeking to reconcile, and where possible, to balance conflicting
questions of value. Once defined, they orient the bulk of national effort towards the
political use of military capabilities in defense related tasks. At least three important
characteristics are common to the use of the term mission:
a) Time horizon: it defines a time horizon for the anticipated impact of the tasks
required to carry out its mandate.
b) Focus: it required concentration of effort on a narrow range of pursuits reducing
the resources available for other activities.
c) Chain of causality: in requires a series of decisions supportive to one another
following a consistent pattern.
39
Lodi conclusions are taken for business strategic planning methodologies. However, his analyis and
conclusions can be transposed to force design because both fields explore similar articulating logic and general
concepts. See Lodi, J.B. Admininstração por Objetivos: Uma Crítica. São Paulo: Pioneira, 1972. pp.25.
23

24. DRAFT
2) Defense roles
Defense roles are generic descriptors of the nature of the effect, cause or consequence
of applied military capabilities in defense tasks. Defense roles are usually categorized
as nation building, diplomatic, combat, constabulary, and police; reflecting the
different political rules and legal framework that bounds defense tasks.
Nation building roles shape defense tasks towards the social and economic
development of the state under democratic governance, civil law and economic rules
of market regulation. International law and treaties bind diplomatic and combat roles
in peace, crisis and war, asseverating Clausewitz’s conclusion that war is the
continuation of policy with the introduction of means of force. The importance of
diplomatic roles lies in the fact that nations judge potential adversaries in terms of its
military responsiveness, reliability, consistency, and, most of all, unity: unity of
purpose, unity of effort, and unity of action40
. Constabulary and policy roles are
oriented to the maintenance of order and enforcement of regulations, under national
or coalition legal mandate.
The priorities of defense roles reflect the mandate of politics in defense issues. The
importance of clearly defined defense roles is the assignment of functions for
defense, making it accountable for its results. Military capabilities acquire fighting,
diplomatic, police, or constabulary roles depending on doctrine, the way they are
organized, deployed, trained, sustained, commanded and controlled. The required
status of each of these requirements are assessed taking into considerations
topological characteristics of possible areas of operation, national and alliances fiscal
and production possibilities to sustain existing capabilities or incorporate others
during the course of operations. This, in turn, will require a sustained degree of
readiness41
articulated with expected tempo of the military operations.
The relationship of objectives, roles and missions, having tasks as its linking elements,
define a matrix of cross impacts.
Objectives
A B C D
Missions
1 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks A
Roles
2 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks b
3 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks c
4 Tasks Tasks Tasks Tasks d
Figure 3: Cross-Impact matrix of objectives, tasks, missions, and roles
40
Foster, GD. The Postmodern Military: The Irony of "Strengthening" Defense. Harvard International Review;
Cambridge, Summer 2001. pp. 24-29.
41
The concept of readiness will be retaken further on. Here, it is proposed to understand it as the degree of
preparedness for a specific purpose.
24

25. DRAFT
Strategy links tactical intended results with the purpose of defense through a political
logic; and use tasks, missions and roles to both instruct its formulation and assess its
results.
Canada offers an example of the relationship of mission, objectives, and tasks42
:
Defense Mission:
Defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international
peace and security
Defense Objective:
To conduct surveillance and control of Canada’s territory, aerospace and maritime
areas of jurisdiction. This Defense Objective will be met by
Defense Tasks:
1. Protecting Canadian sovereignty through surveillance and control of Canada’s
territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction; and
2. Mounting an immediate, effective and appropriate response for the resolution of
terrorist incidents that affect, or have the potential to affect, national interests.
Tasks determine the chain of operations and actions [tactical] expected to be
accomplished to achieve an objective. Defense mission instructs strategy formulation
establishing the validity of linked task results for defense objectives and security goals.
Defense Roles provide parameters to assess the degree of efficacy of these valid results
to the envisage success defense and security policy determine. That means that strategy
completes itself in the tactical possibilities and in the political determinants; having no
significance isolated from any one. Finally, it should be kept in mind that objectives,
roles and missions are enormously sensitive issues, for they means fiscal resources.
C) Derivative elements
Derivative elements mediate the process of desegregating tasks attending both the
criteria formulated based on 1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and
2) the practiced categories of operations. Together, they offer the criteria for developing
guidelines for making decisions about the employment of the force components,
reflecting how decision-makers define the hierarchy of tasks and describe through
missions their understanding of the country’s requirements of security and defense.
1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
ISR ensures that threats will be detected well in advance. Asymmetric threats, for
example, such as information and terrorist attacks, are more difficult to predict than
large-scale conventional attacks, and therefore have significantly less strategic
warning associated with them. The response to asymmetric attack, however, is
unlikely to trigger the requirement for national mobilization of conventional forces.
As a conclusion, readiness requirements that anticipates a longer period of increasing
tension marked by hostile activities, warning indicators and instances of crises prior
to the outbreak of a conflict, may be undertaken with the expectation of warning time
prior to the emergence of a threat necessitating mobilization.
2) Operations
42
Canada. Defense Planning Guidance 2001 – Chapter 2 – Strategic Directions. http://www.vcds.ca/dgsp/dgp/
dgp2001/chap2e.asp. (Jun/01/2002).
25

26. DRAFT
Operations are doctrinarly defined actions taken in the pursuit of defense tasks, such
as convoying, combat air patrol, interdiction, reconnaissance, and replenishment at
sea. These actions inevitably involve a degree of coordination; nonetheless, they need
not necessarily result in either desired or desiralbe results.
The assemblage of practiced operations are doctrinally defined and categorized,
varying from country to country and time to time accordingly to the practiced
conceptual system used to determine those categories and the criteria used to allocate
operations within each category. Currently, the general trend is to define two broad
categories for operations: one reflecting the bulk of the required warfare effort
against a specific type of assets (submarine warfare, mine warfare, etc.); the other
reflecting required supporting actions to provide efficiency of the operation in the
first category (replenishment, surveillance, intelligence, patrol, etc.).
Across the spectrum of operations, small-scale contingencies are the dominant trend
in the current defense environment, expanding its limits toward war-like operations
and diplomatic actions. The US uses nine categories for smaller-scale contingencies,
which are defined as the range of military operations: 1) beyond peacetime
engagement but short of major theater warfare; 2) opposed interventions; 3) coercive
campaigns; 4) humanitarian intervention; 5) peace accord implementation; 6) follow-
on peace operations; 7) interposicional peacekeeping operations; 8) foreign
humanitarian assistance; 9) domestic disaster relief and consequent management; 10)
no-fly zone enforcement; 11) maritime intercept operations; 12) counterdrug
operations and operations in support of other agencies; 13) noncombatant evacuation
operations: 14) shows of force; 15) and strikes. These categories and the criteria to
allocate contingencies in each one of them have been a focus of debate, making it a
major issue in the post-Cold War era to offer a public rationale for capabilities
needed to handle the full range of contingencies without putting undue strains on
budget and political possibilities.
Combined as derivative elements of the capability construct, ISR and operations attend
four basic purposes:
1) To collect authoritative information about the security and defense context;
2) To provide criteria to identify required tasks to be performed (application domain
decomposition);
3) To orient representational abstractions for those tasks; and
4) To define interactions and relations among objectives and tasks to ensure that a)
constraints and boundary conditions imposed by context are accommodate, b)
identify data to be collected and appropriately addressed, and c) control the flow of
information that allow the derivation of tasks be stopped or restarted, assuring that
the scope and scale of tasks are represented with discernible details.
THE CONJUNCT OF REGULATING FACTORS
Regulating factors are the arsenal of normative instructions linking the requirements of
the concepts of employment with the possibilities of force components. This arsenal
comprises A) Doctrine, B) Readiness Guidelines, and C) Rules of Engagement (ROE).
26

27. DRAFT
A) Doctrine
Doctrine is the acerb of experiences and practices that guides the selection of operational
protocols, instructing the individual and collective use of military assets towards higher
levels of efficacy and efficiency, and exploring operational and support structures to
perform military operations43
.
Doctrine is associated with tactical success, while operational protocols are associated
with the technical performance of military assets. Military commanders are expected to
have the moral courage to discard a doctrinal recommendation based on its professional
experience and even intuition, when they perceive that current doctrine will not produce
the expected tactical success in the novel situation he/she confronts. Operational
protocols provide guidance, but it is the ability to interpret its adequacy and translate it
into tactical success that makes a general a master of war.
B) Readiness
Readiness is defined as the level of preparedness for personnel and materiel to respond to
considered tasks. The time assigned to a force component to reach the readiness level is
the time required to be fully manned and equipped at organizational strength, including
training and logistics stocks necessary for the operations or actions assigned.
Readiness requirements are specified at three levels: 1) tactical, 2) structural and 3)
mobilizational.44
1) Tactical Readiness
Tactical readiness determines the level of training and maintenance necessary
for timely deployment of military assets. It explores operational and support structure
possibilities to accomplish a predetermined range of tasks with expected degree of
success and acceptable level of risk.
Higher degree of tactical readiness, either to prepare to immediate deployment
or simple to communicate political intentions, demands military assets be kept in
higher state of alert with its systems energized and manned, causing personnel
fatigue and increased rate of material damage. In turn, personnel fatigue and higher
maintenance demands burdens the support structures, stressing the logistics
possibilities to the point that the degree of expected tactical success can not anymore
be maintained.
2) Structural Readiness
Structural Readiness determines military organizational architecture and
logistic requirements to avail, when demanded, large scale and higher periods of
tactical readiness, either increasing the range of possible tasks or diminishing risk
probability. However, structural readiness has its costs. Higher degree of structural
readiness immobilizes capital and resources for future actions, inherently creating
inefficiency. Maintaining large repair facility mostly inactive and enormous logistics
structure are expensive; similarly, structural readiness demands a top heavy military
personnel structure based upon the assumption that it is more difficult and time
43
For a discussion on military doctrine, see Drew, D.M and Snow. D.M. Making Strategy: An introduction to
National Processes and Problems. Maxwell, Alabama: Air University Pres, 1988. pp.163-174.
44
See Betts, Richard. Military Readness: Concepts, Choises, Consequences. Washington, DC. EUA: Brookings,
1995.
27

28. DRAFT
consuming to prepare officers than soldiers. In addition, structural readiness bets on
time for bolstering military capabilities.
3) Mobilizational Readiness
Mobilizational readiness determines priorities for the conversion of the peace time
social, technologic, industrial and economic national possibilities into military assets
and support requirements to avail and maintain tactical efforts through the
organizational and logistic possibilities created by the structural readiness.
Mobilizational readiness also has its costs, mainly in terms of preparing and
maintaining an inventory of conversion possibilities.
The proper balance of tactical, structural and mobilizational readiness requirements
reflect concept of employment possibilities and the assumption of time available for
deploying military capabilities and the efforts to sustain that effort. Location decision also
impacts in readiness alternatives. This balance, therefore, changes as the concept of
employment changes. US readiness spending per person in uniform, for example, averaged
22 percent more (in inflation-adjusted terms) during the Clinton years than on the eve of the
1990-1991 Gulf War45
.
C) Rules of Engagement
Rules of engagement are directives delineating the circumstances and limitation under
which the use of force would be initiated, continued and ceased. These rules have a
political nature with two mutually complementary dimensions. The first one, judicial,
refers to the limitations imposed by domestic and international law, in peace and war, to
the use of force. The second one, functional, refers to the limitations imposed by the
defense roles.
The choices regarding the degree of readiness required depends of the size, location,
and specification of force components possibilities, the spectrum of anticipated tasks made
possible by practiced doctrine and authorized by the ROE, complemented by an
understanding of the interaction among these decisions. All issues related to force designed
are centered in these elements. The optimal size of a given military is only possible to be
assessed affixed to its political determinants and costs possibilities, the construct of
capabilities make explicit the tradeoff among the required elements to produce this optimum.
The functional merit of the construct is in reducing all military capabilities to the same
components abstracted into an ideal model; recognizing that the difference among actual
resulting capabilities is directed by the scope of its components and the relationship they
establish. The assumption here is that if the total parts constituent of a construct and its
relationships are known, the nature of the whole is derivable from the nature of the parts. The
result determines a common nature for all possible emergences of capabilities belonging to
the same system of knowledge.
The number and qualitative dimension of personnel, the number of levels of
organizations, the characteristics of the technology employed, and the articulation of tasks
into mission within the concepts of employment are all import determinants of this an ever
45
The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18 5 Feburary 2001. http:://www.comw.
org/pda/0102bmemo18.html. Downloaded in8/28/2001. pp. 5
28

29. DRAFT
changing optimum. They are a function of the political determinants for defense, making
military capabilities a living with changing composite of relationships, whose linkages are
enacted by two inner factors: Jointness and C4I-SR (Command, Control, Communication,
Inteligence, Surveillance, and Reconaissance). These factors provide the “animus” of a
military, allowing the mechanisms at work within the capabilities to attempt to improve
continually its relationship to produce the optimum levels of force and procedures over time
to enforce required tasks.
Jointness
The most succinct definition of jointness is that offered by Gen Colin Powell, former
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: “We train as a team, fight as a team, and win as a
team46
”. Jointness is a major factor that contributes to capability potential. It is the idea of
unity of effort and acting accordingly. In the end, how integrated force components are poses
the essential question to jointness, to encompass organizational expediency requirements and
statutory jurisdiction alike.
The current emphasis on jointness is on the establishment of rules and conventions that
allow efficient control of military operations through established mechanisms. Incremental
demands for jointness have created demand for flexible military capabilities in their
composition, generating raids for new appropriations (operations and maintenance). Force
design sees this demand as a reactive-corrective measure to improperly devised capabilities.
From the perspective of force design, jointness determine the degree of integration of force
structure requirements and tasks possibilities since its conception. Relatively homogeneous
service operational doctrine does not provide an indication as to the degree of jointness if
dissociated from jointly designed capabilities.
Interoperability stems from good functioning and close coordination of all force
components in the effort of providing adequate operational efficiency. Decisions regarding
technology in interoperability are incorporated in specific pieces of assets equipment, the
degree of automation and the connection between different equipment. Whereas jointness
depends on assuring cohesive operations for extended periods with a focus in how best to
support task accomplishment.
Jointness, as a requirement of force design, derives from the stability of those patterns
of relationship required to produce a capability, which implies in the ability of its components
to store its own program of integration, devised for operations that could last the range of
combining tasks, without reprogramming.
C4I-SR
Command and control, communications and computers, are enabling elements of the
force components, which are linked through doctrine to intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance, constituting the enacting mechanisms C4I-SR, designed to provide support
for the employment of a capability according to its specific operational requirements. C4ISR
is seen as an adaptative control system seeking to influence selected aspects of an operating
environment, supported by a variety of information systems47
. Its functionally progresses
across the full range of possible tasks, directing and monitoring operations at the joint and
combined level and supporting effective end-to-end management. This includes space and
46
Joint Forces Quarterly. Summer 1993, pp 5. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq0301.pdf.
(Jun/18/2002).
47
Alberts, D. et al. Understanding Information Age Warfare. Washington, D.C.: CCRP Publication Series, 2001.
pp. 136.
29