InnovationEssays

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Table of Contents
In trodu ction 2
Adaptive Workforce
“Leadersh ip in th e 21st Cen tu ry En viron m en t; A Proposed Fram ework”
by Dale L. Moore, Ph .D. 3
“Creatin g a Cu ltu re of Creativity” by LT Kristen Wh eeler 7
“Creatin g th e Tim e for Process Im provem en t” by Scott Hargate 9
“Creatin g Cogn itive Warriors” by Robert Kozloski 11
“Is En der’s Gam e ou r En d Gam e?” by Robert Kozloski 14
“Can Saberm etrics Replace th e Officer FITREP?”
by Robert Kozloski an d Major Arm an do Martin ez, USMC 17
“Bu ildin g th e Naval In n ovation Network” by J an e Roberts 20
“How Can th e Departm en t of th e Navy Cu ltivate More Wom en In n ovators?”
by Mau ra Su llivan , Ph .D. 23
Operational Challenges
“Hybrid Warfare an d its Im plication s” by CAPT Robert Newson 25
“In n ovation in Action - Adaptive Force Packages”
by Nich olas Malay, NSWC Carderock Division Pu blic Affairs 27
“Figh tin g In th e Open : Th e Im pact of Ubiqu itou s Sen sors on th e Fu tu re Maritim e
Battlespace” by CAPT J oh n Lith erlan d, USN (ret) 29
“Utility of Non -Leth al Force” by Robert Kozloski 31
Em erging Fleet Capabilities
“Cou n terin g an d Exploitin g Swarm s” by J oh n Arqu illa, Ph .D. 34
“Self-Su stain in g Sh ip: Naval Logistics for th e Fu tu re” by VADM Ph il Cu llom 36
“Wargam in g: Now m ore th an ever” by Saran dis Papadopou los, Ph .D. 37
Future Environm ent
“War in 2030” by LT(j.g.) Kat Dran sfield 39
“Fu tu re Operatin g Con text: Au gm en ted Hu m an Perform an ce”
by Scott Ch en ey-Peters 40
“A Fram ework for Un derstan din g two Macro Tech n o-Revolu tion s an d ou r Naval Fu tu re”
by Mark Hagerott, Ph .D. 42
“In n ovatin g for an Un certain Fu tu re” by Mau ra Su lliva n , Ph .D. 45
“Wh at Ifs” by Scott Ch en ey-Peters 47
“Th e In direct Approach ” by Saran dis Papadopou los, Ph .D. 48
“Extricatin g DON In form ation ” by LT(j.g.) Kat Dran sfield & Mau ra Su llivan , Ph .D. 50
** = Th e opin ion s expressed h ere are solely th ose of th e au th ors, an d do n ot n ecessarily reflect
th ose of th e Departm en t of th e Navy, Departm en t of Defen se or th e Un ited States govern m en t.

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Introduction
By Sarandis Papadopoulos, Ph.D.
In April 2015, Secretary of th e Navy Ray Mabu s recogn ized all n aval in n ovators wh o u se ideas
to overcom e barriers to ch an ge, as well as th ose wh o n ou rish in n ovation across th e
Departm en t. Th e com plexity of th e world’s secu rity ch allen ges, en abled by acceleratin g ch an ges
in tech n ology, com pels th e U.S. Navy an d Marin e Corps to adju st, qu ickly, th eir th in kin g. Th e
essays com piled h ere represen t a sm all sam ple of su ch bold th in kin g in side th e Departm en t of
th e Navy workforce, an d are circu lated both to stim u late fu rth er th ou gh t an d to en cou rage
oth ers to sh are ideas th rou gh ou t th e organ ization .
Th ese 23 sh ort essays h igh ligh t th e u rgen t n eed for th e U.S. Marin e Corps an d Navy to u se
in n ovative approach es to alter h ow th ey con fron t a wide array of ch allen ges. Th ey are grou ped
alon g fou r broad th em es: an Adaptive Workforce; Operation al Ch allen ges; Em ergin g Fleet
Capabilities, in clu din g u n m an n ed system s; an d th e Fu tu re En viron m en t. In essen ce th e
papers are sou rces for fu rth er in n ovative wor k. Th e h ope is th ey will prom pt Navy Departm en t
service m em bers an d civilian s to th in k abou t th e m eth ods n eeded for in n ovation to su cceed,
n ow an d in th e foreseeable fu tu re, as well offer th em ideas to m ake th eir own in n ovative
th ou gh ts becom e reality.
Ultim ately, th e lon g-term su ccess Task Force In n ovation will be m easu red in h ow far th e
service m em bers of U.S. Navy an d Marin e Corps, an d th eir civilian cou n terparts, u n derstan d
th e th reats ou tlin ed h ere an d develop respon ses to th em . Th e stakes are h igh , for h ostile actors
can tu rn th ese n ew in stru m en ts in to tru ly h arm fu l th reats to Am erica an d its allies. At th e risk
of pu ttin g words in th ese au th ors’ m ou th s, all of u s wan t th e sea services to su cceed, ideally by
preven tin g wars or, if n eeded, by win n in g t h em . If over tim e th e essays h ere su pport th e goal of
m akin g in n ovation in th e Departm en t of th e Navy a reality, th ey will h ave su cceeded .
▲ Table of Con ten ts

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By Dr. Dale L. Moore, Dept. of the Navy **
Th e strategic en viron m en t of th e 21st Cen tu ry h as been ch aracterized as volatile, u n certain ,
com plex an d am bigu ou s (V.U.C.A) as n ew tech n ologies, developm en ts, disru ption s, ch an ge an d
tran sform ation con tin u e to accelerate. Th ese tren ds profou n dly im pact th e ability of an y
organ ization to rem ain relevan t an d com petitive. We are n ow en terin g a period wh ere ou r
existin g views of leadersh ip n eed to be recon sidered to pace th ese ch an ges an d ou r en su re
su periority an d com petitive advan tage.
Often leadersh ip gets con fu sed with m an agem en t, wh ich are qu ite differen t bu t also closely
related. Man agem en t focu ses on th e plan n in g, stru ctu rin g an d efficien t execu tion of an activity,
task or project to ach ieve a set of ou tcom es – it is h igh ly organ ized, m on itored an d con trolled to
get th e fin al produ ct or resu lt. Leadersh ip is th e oth er side of th e coin an d is abou t in spirin g
an d m otivatin g people in organ ization s to go well beyon d wh ere th ey th ou gh t possible, m akin g
th eir greatest accom plish m en ts; th ese can ch an ge th e gam e or sh ift paradigm s to a h igh er level
of perform an ce, efficien cy an d effectiven ess – essen tially tran sform in g in stitu tion s to ach ieve
th eir u tm ost in m eetin g th eir m ost ch allen gin g goa ls an d objectives.
Leadersh ip depen ds on differen t an d com plex factors rooted in psych ology an d sociology, bu t
u ltim ately focu ses on wh at leaders kn ow, h ow th ey th in k, an d h ow th ey both com m u n icate an d
sen d appropriate sign als to bu ild tru st an d m u tu al res pect. Leadersh ip is abou t creatin g an
en viron m en t in th eir organ ization s wh ich u n leash es fu ll h u m an poten tial, on e gu idin g an d
in spirin g coalition s of participan ts to ach ieve great th in gs. Stru gglin g to provide leadersh ip in
an in creasin gly V.U.C.A. en viron m en t, leaders requ ire n ew ways of lookin g at th e world i.e.
sh iftin g th eir m odels to better adapt to an d an ticipate an u n certain an d acceleratin g fu tu re,
on e by its very n atu re approach in g ch aos.
Leadership in the 21st Century Environment;
A Proposed Framework

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A fram ework is proposed as sh own in Figu re 1 in tegratin g 7 key con cepts n ecessary for leaders
to su cceed in th is 21st Cen tu ry V.U.C.A. en viron m en t. Th e elem en ts of th is fram ework form a
system of th ou gh t, captu red as a: Strategic, Com plex, Adaptive, In n ovative, Learn in g, an d
Em ergen t System (SCAILES). Th is fram ework leverages, exten ds an d broaden s con cepts
grou n ded in com plex adaptive system s’ (CAS) th eory. SCAILES takes CAS to a n ew level an d
m akes it m ore accessible, by addressin g n eeded an ticipatory an d in n ovative capabilities,
focu sed on learn in g, as th e pre-requ isite for fu tu re su ccess. Th e SCAILES fram ework is
described below:
Strategic: To su cceed an d ach ieve a desired cu ltu re of strategic th in kin g, leaders an d th eir
organ ization s n eed to be able to see th e big pictu re an d th in k h olistically abou t h ow dyn am ic
in pu ts affect on e an oth er. Strategic th in kin g is abou t an ticipatin g th e fu tu re based on wh at is
kn own , an d con siderin g th e possibilities an d probabilities of each lon g term ou tcom e. Strategic
th in kin g lin ks th e past to th e presen t, as well as to th e fu t u re, as a sin gle con tin u u m of
dyn am ic in teraction s. It lin ks th e big pictu re view to th e tactical level. Strategic th in kin g h elps
leaders to step back an d th in k-th rou gh plan s an d decision s, con n ectin g fu tu re ou tcom es to
today’s tactical action s, an d develop a credible path to ach ieve a desired state.
Com plex: Com plexity refers to th e n u m bers of elem en ts on e con siders wh en th in kin g th rou gh
problem s, issu es or situ ation s, to h elp create well-in form ed strategies, plan s an d decision s.
Organ ization s an d tech n ologically advan ced system s are in creasin gly com plex, an d th eir
dyn am ic, tu rbu len t n atu re creates sign ifican t leadersh ip ch allen ges. Leaders m u st try to
n avigate wh at is kn own , wh ile accou n tin g for wh at m igh t n ot be kn own i.e. u n kn own
u n kn own s. Th ese are an im portan t con sideration , especially in a VUCA en viron m en t, requ irin g
discern in g ju dgm en t an d wisdom . Leaders m u st realize th e n etworked n atu re of com plexity,
an d h ow its variou s elem en ts are in terdepen den t an d all strivin g to ach ieve a proper
equ ilibriu m .
Adaptive: As th e VUCA en viron m en t con tin u es to ch an ge, leaders an d th eir organ ization s
m u st adeptly sen se en viron m en ts an d be aware of ch an ges wh ich m ay in flu en ce th eir action s,
beh aviors, plan s, strategies an d in vestm en ts. With awaren ess in grain ed in leade rs’ m in ds an d
in th eir organ ization s, th ere m u st be an ability to react effectively an d efficien tly to stay ah ead
of en viron m en tal ch an ges. Th is requ ires leaders an d th eir organ ization s to be agile, flexible an d
adaptive. In bu reau cratic organ ization s, wit h rigid processes, gu idelin es, workflows etc., th is is
very difficu lt an d can be a “system con strain t” in th e fast paced com petitive en viron m en t.
Innovative: In n ovative leaders an d th eir organ ization s place a prem iu m on learn in g,
kn owledge an d th e ability to th in k creatively to catalyze n ew th ou gh ts an d con n ection s wh ich
resu lt in n ovel ideas an d con cepts. In n ovation s occu r in an en viron m en t wh ere th ere is an
explicit n eed, an d wh ere it is safe to experim en t an d fail, su m m ed u p by “fail safe, fail fast, fail
often .” Leaders focu s on fosterin g organ ization s wh ich accelerate learn in g an d th e developm en t
of break-th rou gh ideas an d con cepts wh ich m ake real an d su bstan tial differen ces.
Organ ization s wh ich can rou tin ely develop n ovel solu tion s th rou gh collective in telligen ce,
rooted in kn owledge an d effective an d efficien t social n etworks bu ilt on m u tu al tru st an d
respect, will ach ieve a cu ltu ral n irvan a. In th e 21st Cen tu ry VUCA en viron m en t, gen eratin g
gam e-ch an gers or disru ptive in n ovation s th at establish com plet ely n ew paradigm s, or “off-sets”
for distin ctive com petitive advan tage, represen t th e Holy Grail to stakeh olders an d cu stom ers,
specifically th e Departm en t of th e Navy.
Learning: Learn in g is th e fou n dation al skill of th e 21st Cen tu ry – it n ot on ly affects wh at on e
kn ows bu t also h ow th in kin g takes place. In th e fu tu re, kn owledge dom in an ce will determ in e
ou tcom es. Learn in g to th in k strategically, creatively, critically, an alytically an d in term s of
system s an d n etworks is fou n dation al to effective organ ization s. Acceleratin g learn in g both
in dividu ally an d collectively cou ld n ot be m ore im portan t, especially in a VUCA en viron m en t. It
takes place by associatin g som eth in g n ew with wh at is already kn own , exten din g existin g
kn owledge. New kn owledge dem an ds askin g in sigh tfu l qu estion s, cou pled to foresigh t, to create
a better u n derstan din g. Spen din g tim e to m ake sen se of com plexity, an d to th in k th rou gh
m ean in gs an d im plication s, can bu ild n ew n eu ral con n ection s. Th ese n ew con n ection s foster

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even m ore possibilities for catalyzin g n ew association s, i.e. acceleratin g learn in g. Alon g th ese
lin es, prototypin g an d experim en tin g are very powerfu l ways to learn som eth in g n ew.
Con tin u ou s learn in g en h an ces on e’s ability to th in k an d con tribu te m ean in gfu lly; it is also
in spirin g, self-fu lfillin g an d u ltim ately self-actu alizin g. Experien tial learn in g, wh ere kn owledge
is applied in con text, i.e. h an ds -on , bu ilds person al an d organ ization al growth an d
developm en t, an d wider resu lts. Newly em ergin g seriou s gam es, virtu al, collabora tive
experien ces in clu din g Massive Open On lin e Cou rseware (MOOCs) an d, especially, Massive
Mu ltiplayer On -lin e War Gam e Leveragin g th e In tern et (MMOWGLI) pion eered by th e Navy,
provide platform s offerin g great poten tial to accelerate learn in g. Th ey do so t h rou gh deep
en gagem en t an d im m ersion in a collaborative settin g to ach ieve deeper u n derstan din g, con text
an d perspective.
Em ergence: To u n leash h u m an poten tial, leaders in th e 21st Cen tu ry m u st create an
en viron m en t th at en ables th e u n bridled em ergen ce of n ew ideas, con cepts an d perspectives.
Leaders m u st set th e ton e, so th at em ployees feel en cou raged an d possess safety of voice,
perceivin g a sen se of open n ess an d tru st for m ean in gfu l dialogu e an d exch an ge as th e n orm .
J u st as in th e rich an d lu sh con dition s of an ecosystem or rain forest, wh ere n atu re can th rive
in n ear-perfect balan ce, leaders create th e righ t expectation s an d open -m in ded con dition s
allowin g n ew ideas to em erge. Leaders set th e stage for th eir en viron m en t an d th e cu ltu re th at
com es with it – em ergen ce occu rs wh en a gen u in e in terest in gen eratin g produ ctive ideas an d
solu tion s arises, an d with an expressed appreciation based on th e m erit of ideas regardless of
th eir sou rce i.e. a m eritocracy in stead of a m ore tradition al h ierarch y. Diversity of th ou gh t an d
perspective, applyin g differen t len ses an d backgrou n ds to a problem , often plays a key role in
en ablin g th e em ergen ce of th e m ost n ovel an d m ean in gfu l ideas. Th e role of leaders is to set th e
stage, create th e righ t environ m en t, ask th e righ t qu estion s, an d th en ‘let go’ to catalyze
produ ctive an d m ean in gfu l exch an ge to ach ieve great ou tcom es.
System : Su ccessfu l leaders th in k in term s of open an d collaborative system s, wh ich foster
in tern al an d extern al in teraction s, exch an ges an d, u ltim ately, syn ergy to create dyn am ic
learn in g an d in n ovative social en viron m en ts. Leaders m u st th in k in term s of in tercon n ected
an d in terdepen den t system s, loosely cou pled an d able to easily adapt. Leaders m u st also
realize th at th in kin g itself is a com plex system th at evolves n ew th ou gh ts an d ideas in respon se
to in flu en tial factors. Un derstan din g th ese in flu en tial factors is critical to u n derstan din g th e
basis of th ou gh ts an d ideas i.e. th e biases an d em otion s of ou r th in kin g. Ultim ately, th e ability
of leaders to con sider th e wide ran ge of possibilities an d th eir in h eren t probabilities, th in k
th em th rou gh , an d con sider th eir poten tial im plication s provides th e basis for th e in sigh ts,
foresigh ts an d capabilities n ecessary to take action an d su cceed.
Th e SCAILES fram ework is a n ew way to th in k abou t leadersh ip am idst th e growin g ch allen ges
of th e 21st Cen tu ry VUCA en viron m en t. Leaders an d organ ization s th at can stay acu tely
aware, an ticipate, ideate, an d lean forward in th eir con n ectedn ess, th in kin g an d learn in g will
set th e exam ple for oth ers to follow. Th ese organ ization s exem plars of th ou gh t leadersh ip an d
leadersh ip-in -action , an d will h ave a distin ct com petitive advan tage as th e u n certain ties,
disru ption s an d n on lin earities of th e 21st Cen tu ry u n fold.
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By LT Kristen Wheeler, USS IWO JIMA (LHD 7 ). **
In stillin g a cu ltu re of in n ovation an d creativity is n o easy task. It m ean s steppin g away from
th e com fort of th e fam iliar an d rou tin e an d in to th e realm of u n kn own possibilities. Here
on board USS IWO J IMA, we are doin g ju st th at, by bu ildin g a cu ltu re th a t will allow deckplate
in gen u ity to bu bble u p to th e su rface. Ou r goal is sim ple; create a cu ltu re sh ift towards
creativity, in gen u ity, an d in n ovative th ou gh t with in ou r Wardroom an d th en m an ifest th is
paradigm th rou gh ou t th e sh ip. Ou r sh ift began in th e Wardroom , th rou gh th e im plem en tation
of a n ew train in g program .
Deckplate in n ovation starts with leaders wh o ch am pion th e cau se. Ou r Com m an din g Officer,
CAPT Dan a Gordon an d Execu tive Officer, CAPT J am es Midkiff are stau n ch su pporters of th is
tran sition an d believe we h ave th e ideal Wardroom to en able th is ch an ge. After an earn est
discu ssion with th e Skipper regardin g Navy train in g, leadersh ip ch allen ges, an d th e fu tu re of
th e Navy, ou r goal was clear; we n eeded to reexam in e n ot on ly wh at we train , bu t h ow w e train .
Seekin g to redesign th e m u n dan e train in g experien ce, we decided th at death by Power Poin t
an d rote m em orization were off th e table. In stead, ou r approach to train in g focu ses on
in corporatin g “system s th in kin g” an d “experien tial learn in g” tech n iqu es. Ou r train in g is
effective, in teractive, m em orable, an d m ean in gfu l. We also capitalize on ou r diverse pool of
talen t. Th e IWO J IMA Wardroom is th e defin ition of diverse. We h ave over 80 Officers in 28
differen t design ators, ran gin g from fresh -ou t-of-college En sign s to season ed 25+ year Lim ited
Du ty Officers (LDO) an d Ch ief Warran t Officers (CWO) . With th at, we cu rren tly h ave two
differen t, yet com plem en tary, train in g program s. On e is design ed for Division Officers (DIVO
SWO Train in g) wh ile th e oth er is targeted for th e en tire Wardroom (Officer Leadersh ip
Con tin u u m ).
Kickin g off DIVO SWO Train in g on March 12, 2015, we explored “system s th in kin g” as a way to
u n derstan d h ow th e Navy is com prised, sin ce we are a com plex organ ization of system s with in
system s. In order to u n derstan d com plex system s, we con du cted an exercise in volvin g every
person in th e room sim u ltan eou sly.
Th e ru les were sim ple. Each person selected a sin gle card with a system or n ode (i.e. PQS,
Walkin g Blood Ban k, COMTUEX, Main ten an ce on SPS -48G Radar, ORM, ASA Ch ecklists,
Detection of a Th reat Missile, Evacu ation of Em bassy, etc). After each participan t ch ose a card,
th ey th en h eld it u p for th e oth ers to see. Next, with ou t com m u n icatin g, each person ch ose two
oth er cards th at related to th eir card. For exam ple, th e person h oldin g th e Detection of a
Th reat Missile Card silen tly ch ose th e person h oldin g th e PQS Card an d th e Main ten an ce on
th e SPS-48G Radar Card. Sim u ltan eou sly, th e person h oldin g th e Main ten an ce of th e SPS -48G
Radar Card silen tly ch ose th e person h oldin g Detection of a Th reat Missile an d Evacu ation of
Em bassy. Next, everyon e was in stru cted to m ove equ al distan ce from th e two oth er cards th ey
ch ose, with ou t com m u n icatin g. In th e en d, th ere was a room fu ll of people wh o were
con tin u ally readju stin g, illu stratin g an ever ch an gin g "com plex system s". After five m in u tes, we
cam e to a stoppin g poin t. Each person in th e room th en briefly explain ed th eir system card an d
th en revealed th e two cards th ey ch ose, wh ile explain in g th e relation . Even th ou gh th e exercise
was in itially received with h esitation , in th e en d, people were en ergized an d ch atty with th is
n ew visu alization of wh y we n eed to u n derstan d n ot on ly each system , bu t h ow th ese system s
affect on e an oth er.
Toward th e en d of J u n e, DIVO train in g will tran sition as we begin to explore “design th in kin g”.
Th e DIVOs will be divided u p in to th e fou r watch team s an d tasked to redesign SWO an d
Creating a Culture of Creativity

8
Wardroom train in g du rin g th e u pcom in g yard period. Th ere are th ree train in g topics to
facilitate th is project: “In trodu ction to Radical Collaboration ”, “In trodu ction to Design Th in kin g
an d Plan n in g”, an d fin ally “In trodu ction to Effective Briefin g/ Pitch in g”. Th e en d goal is th at
each of th e fou r team s will com e u p with fou r differen t ideas for train in g an d th en pitch th em
to th e Skipper an d th e Wardroom . We expect to see sh ipboard SWO Train in g com pletely
tran sform ed an d revitalized.
Con cu rren tly, we h old Wardroom Train in g for all Officers. Th ese topics address ch allen ges we
face as a diverse Wardroom of variou s ages, backgrou n ds, com m u n ities, an d ran ks. As of May
16th , ou r Wardroom leaders h ave sh owcased th eir talen t in five train in g topics. Ou r Skipper
(Aviator) an d XO (SWO) kicked u s off with “Com m u n ity Briefs”, expan din g kn owledge on
Fitn ess Reports, prom otion boards, career advice, an d gu idan ce. Th is n ext lesson was
facilitated by CDR Raym on d Marsh (Air Boss) regardin g “Th e Good, Th e Bad, an d th e Basics of
Naval Leadersh ip”. Th is lesson was followed by CAPT Sean Su llivan (Sen ior Medical Officer)
an d CDR Stu art Day with “Leadersh ip u n der Pressu re”. Recen tly, on e of ou r salty Lim ited Du ty
Officers (LDO), LCDR Sh awn Collin s (AIMD Main ten an ce Officer) an d ou r brackish Bu ll En sign ,
ENS Mike Cu om o (SWO DIVO) team ed u p to deliver “Bridgin g th e Gen eration Ga p”. Topics still
on th e h orizon are “Sm all Th in gs th at Makes a Big Differen ce”, “Effective Com m u n ication ”, an d
“Creative Leadersh ip”.
Overall, ou r goal is to foster th e “flip”, wh ich is defin ed by th e th ou gh t leader David Kelley as
th e poin t wh en people “s ee th em selves as creative in dividu als”. We are en cou ragin g people to
ask qu estion s, u n derstan d th eir system s, seek ways to im prove th ese system s an d th en
becom e ch am pion s for oth ers. Th ere is n o in stru ction or doctrin e developed by th e Navy on
h ow to do th is, wh ich m akes th e leap in to th e u n kn own rath er dau n tin g. However, with
ch am pion s to back u p th e cu ltu re sh ift an d an open -m in ded crew, IWO J IMA Sailors will
certain ly be Fleet gam e-ch an gers.

9
By Scott Hargate **
I am am azed at th e n u m ber of tim es th at I’ve been told th at som ebody is “too bu sy” for process
im provem en t. Man y of ou r Sailors, Marin es an d civilian s kn ow ways by wh ich th ey can
im prove th eir jobs, if on ly th ey h ad th e tim e to develop th eir own ideas. Th ese in dividu als
believe th ey can n ot afford to spen d th e tim e to design an d im plem en t th eir ch an ges, becau se
th eir cu rren t tasks are barely com pleted in th e tim e th at th ey h ave available. B elow are two
real-world exam ples of process im provem en ts wh ich were im plem en ted as a resu lt of
su pportive leadersh ip an d takin g person al in itiative to m ake th e tim e for process im provem en t.
Maintenance Organization
A Marin e Corps Lan ce Corporal tran sferred from a com bat arm s battalion to an Electron ics
Main ten an ce Com pan y (ELMACO) in a Marin e Logistics Grou p. As a Grou n d Electron ics
Tran sm ission System s Main tain er, h e h ad ju st spen t th e previou s 18 m on th s workin g in th e
Sh ippin g an d Receivin g Section , an d was n ow expected to fix radios th at h e h adn ’t seen sin ce
MOS sch ool. Th e Lan ce Corporal n oticed th at the oth er m ain tain ers were very proficien t at
determ in in g th e cau se of th e issu es, bu t spen t m ost (between 80 an d 90%) of th eir tim e fillin g
ou t th e paperwork (Equ ipm en t Repair Orders (EROs), ERO Sh oppin g Lists, etc…). Th e Lan ce
Corporal, h owever, h ad th e opposite role. He wou ld spen d alm ost all of th e tim e testin g th e
equ ipm en t, in order to determ in e th e cau se of th e errors, takin g alm ost n o tim e to fin ish t h e
associated paperwork.
Th e ELMACO section was swam ped with m ore th an 1300 EROs, with on ly a dozen
m ain tain ers. A few weeks later, th e section ch ief an n ou n ced th at th e team was goin g to start
port an d starboard sh ifts, with a day crew an d a n igh t crew, in order to try to redu ce th e
backlog of equ ipm en t waitin g in th e m ain ten an ce cycle (an d n ot available for th e Operatin g
Force Marin es to u se). Th e Lan ce Corporal asked th e section ch ief if th ey cou ld talk for a
m in u te an d explain ed h is observation s. Th e section ch ief n oted th at th e section didn ’t h ave
en ou gh tim e to stop fixin g broken equ ipm en t an d to train th e oth er m ain tain ers on th e
paperwork. Th e Lan ce Corporal th en briefed h is plan . He recom m en ded th at th e oth er
m ain tain ers con cen trate on fixin g th e equ ipm en t, an d th at h e wou ld deal with th e paperwork.
On ce th ey got “cau gh t u p” with th e EROs, th e Lan ce Corporal cou ld teach th e oth er
m ain tain ers h ow to com plete all of th e requ ired docu m en tation . Th e section ch ief accepted th e
risk of takin g on e of th e m ain tain ers off of th e floor, an d tryin g ou t a n ew process offered by h is
team m em ber.
After six weeks, th e section h ad redu ced th e n u m ber of ou tstan din g EROs to less th an 100 —a
cu t of over 90%. Th e rem ain in g u n repaired equ ipm en t wou ld be fixed as soon as th e repair
parts arrived. Th e section th en h ad th e tim e available to teach classes on com pletin g th e
paperwork, with ou t th e n eed to work day an d n igh t.
Spreadsheet Macros
A Departm en t of th e Navy Civilian workin g at th e Pen tagon received th e task of processin g
procu rem en t requ ests. Th e du e diligen ce requ ired for th is role h ad m an y steps, in clu din g
com parin g five separate spreadsh eets. Th e tim e requ ired to process each requ est was abou t 2
h ou rs, m ostly taken u p com parin g th e differen t spreadsh eets. With an aver age of 10-15
requ ests every week, th is job was takin g m ost of h is tim e an d, worse, th e qu an tity of requ ests
was in creasin g. Th e civilian realized th at com parin g spreadsh eets was a process th at cou ld be
au tom ated, savin g tim e an d in creasin g accu racy. To au t om ate th e process, th e civilian wou ld
Creating the Time for Process Improvement

10
n eed a program (a m acro) to sort, com pile, an d com pare th e differen t spreadsh eets an d
determ in e if all du e diligen ce requ irem en ts h ad been m et.
Th e civilian wen t to h is su pervisor to explain th e situ ation an d th e estim ated tim e savin gs from
th e m acro at approxim ately 16 -25 h ou rs a week. Th e su pervisor agreed th e au tom ation n eeded
to be don e, an d was su pportive of h is su ggestion . Th e two agreed to stop processin g requ ests
for on e week in order to create th e au tom ation toolset. As th e procu rem en t requ ests h ad a
ten den cy to ebb an d flow, th is tem porary sh u tdown was im plem en ted du rin g th e n ext slow
period. A week was dedicated to its developm en t an d testin g.
At th e en d of th e week, th e toolset h ad been created, tested, an d im plem en ted. Th e backlog of
requ ests was “cleared” in ju st 2 days, an d th e tim e requ ired to perform du e diligen ce was
redu ced to on ly 20-30 m in u tes per requ est.
Way Ahead
With in th e Departm en t of th e Navy, we m u st assu m e appropriate risk, with in laws an d
regu lation s, to m ake th e tim e to im prove ou r processes. Alon g with th e rest of DoD, th e
Departm en t’s bu dget is an ticipated to fall across th e n ext five years, if n ot lon ger, with ou t a
correspon din g redu ction in m ission requ irem en ts. As a resu lt, Departm en t of th e Navy m u st
u rge its leaders to su pport in n ovation , an d leave in dividu al service m em bers an d civilian s
en ou gh person al in itiative to con tin u e to provide an d im prove th e defen se of th e Am erican
people.

11
By Robert Kozloski **
In th e m id-1990s, Com m an dan t of th e Marin e Corps Gen eral Ch arles Kru lak, recogn ized th e
ch an gin g n atu re of m odern con flict an d in trodu ced th e con cepts of th e “Th ree Block War” an d
th e “Strategic Corporal.” Both ideas stressed th e dyn am ic ch allen ges of th e n ew battlefield,
wh ere leaders across th e m ilitary ran k stru ctu re wou ld h ave to m ake diam etrically differen t
decision s often with in m om en ts of on e an oth er du rin g a sin gle operation .
Kru lak’s view of th e fu tu re operatin g en viron m en t dem an ded m en tal agility. Cen trally, h e
recogn ized th at poor tactical decision s wou ld qu ickly tu rn in to an adversary’s advan tage,
particu larly in a globally con n ected en viron m en t. Th e Com m an dan t’s prescien t vision becam e
reality on ly a few years later in Iraq an d Afgh an istan .
To prepare th e Marin es of th at era for th is ch allen gin g n ew en viron m en t, Kru lak provided th e
followin g gu idan ce:
“Th ere is a critical n eed for all Marin es to prepare th em selves m en tally an d ph ysically for th e
rigors of com bat. Ph ysical preparation h as lon g been in grain ed in ou r cu ltu re an d Marin es are
well kn own for th eir ph ysical con dition in g. Men tal preparation n eeds to receive th e sam e
em ph asis.”
He stressed th e n eed for Marin es to tak e tim e to im prove tactical decision -m akin g an d ordered
a two-pron ged approach – m ake wider u se of tactical decision gam es an d h ave regu lar
discu ssion s on warfigh tin g. Kru lak also ch allen ged tradition al views of train in g by en cou ragin g
th e u se of com m ercial video gam es to im prove tactical decision -m akin g wh en live train in g
opportu n ities were lim ited.
Today, Marin es still em ph asize th e n eed to h on e decision -m akin g skills in officer developm en t
program s. Su ccessfu lly com pletin g th e leadersh ip reaction cou rse is part of Officer Can didate
Sch ool wh ile lan d n avigation , wh ere in dividu al decision -m akin g is as im portan t as m ilitary
orien teerin g, is still a sign ifican t part of Th e Basic Sch ool cu rricu lu m at Qu an tico.
Th e Marin es are n ot th e on ly service m em bers to recogn ize th e n eed to con tin u ally sh arpen
m en tal acu ity to prepare for th e com plex battlefield. Navy SEALs are widely recogn ized as
world-class ath letes bu t th ey are also som e of th e m ost in telligen t m em bers of th e US m ilitary.
For years th e SEALs h ave u sed Keep In Min d exercises to im prove an operator’s powers of
observation an d recall. A decade ago, th e SEALs faced th e ch allen ge of growin g th eir n u m bers
wh ile n ot com prom isin g th eir h igh stan dards. Rath er th an h avin g can didates do m ore pu sh -
u ps or flu tter kicks, th ey en listed th e h elp of top n eu roscien tists to h elp im prove th e cogn itive
con dition in g of fu tu re warriors. Th ese scien tists fou n d fou r cogn itive pillars wh ich h elp en su re
su ccess: settin g goals, m en tal visu alization , positive self-talk an d stress con trol.
Th e Secretary of th e Navy h as also recogn ized th e n eed to im prove th e cogn itive skills of n aval
officers. Specifically, h e tasked th e services to im prove problem -solvin g skills of n aval officers,
to m ake wider u se of wargam es an d to in crease th e u se of virtu al train in g an d sim u lation
system s. All of th ese action s are to h elp prepare Navy an d Marin e Corps leadersh ip for a
com plex an d u n certain fu tu re, savin g tim e an d lives on a fu tu re battlefield.
Despite top leadersh ip’s gu idan ce n ot all n aval officers believe cogn it ive skills are valu ed in th e
fleet. Du rin g Task Force In n ovation we fou n d th at m an y ju n ior officers, figh ter pilots bein g an
exception , were discou raged from developin g critical th in kin g an d problem solvin g skills in th e
operation al en viron m en t. In stead, th e em ph asis was placed on en forcin g establish ed practices
Creating Cognitive Warriors

12
an d followin g ch eck-lists. In th e private sector, workers perform in g su ch repetitive fu n ction s
h ave been replaced by robots.
Su ch devalu ation dem oralizes ou r ju n ior leaders, an d risks worsen in g th eir respon se tim e in
com bat. In a fu tu re foresh adowed by swarm s of m icro UAVs, cyber attacks, an d even th e
proliferation of in telligen t robots on th e battlefield, decen tralization of decision -m akin g will be
critical for su ccess.
As an in stitu tion we m u st recogn ize th is problem - th e n avy attracts som e of th e best you n g
m in ds ou r n ation h as to offer. Th is is a su ccess, yet th eir cogn itive skills are n ot valu ed or
developed in th e operatin g forces. Sim ply sen din g officers periodically to gradu ate sch ools is an
in su fficien t rem edy eith er to en cou rage th e best to stay or to develop n eeded problem -solvin g,
an d life-savin g, skills.
As a Marin e Officer, I design ed several squ adron , grou p/ regim en t an d win g-level exercises. Th e
gu idan ce I received was u su ally th e sam e – m ake th e exercise ch allen gin g an d force leaders to
m ake decision s in a stressfu l, realistic en viron m en t. Gen eral Al Gray, Kru lak’s Cold War
predecessor, was an advocate for “free play” an d risk -takin g in field train in g, in flu en cin g th e
Marin es of th at gen eration .
“Hot wash es” after th e exercises were an essen tial part of th e learn in g en viron m en t. Exercise
participan ts were u su ally advised of th e “Rh in o-Ru les”, th at is, h ave a thick skin an d let th e
spears th rown by oth ers bou n ce off, in oth er words, h ave can did discu ssion s abou t wh at
worked an d m ore im portan tly wh at didn ’t work du rin g th e exercise; th at’s wh at great
organ ization s do.
In con trast, m y first fleet-wide An ti-Terrorism / Force Protection exercise as a n avy civilian was
ju st th e opposite of m y Marin e Corps experien ce: we were advised to follow a script an d m ake
su re th ere were n o su rprises! My observation was th at large n aval exercises were m ore of a
dem on stration to prove train in g h ad fin ish ed. Alth ou gh h istory h as sh own th ese m ay reassu re
allies an d captu re an adversary’s atten tion , th ey are n ot tru e learn in g exercises.
Som e m ay argu e th at th e m ission s of th e n avy, focu sed on com m an din g sh ips, su bm arin es an d
aircraft, are sign ifican tly differen t th an th ose of th e Marin es or SEALs, wh ich are focu se d on
leadin g people an d operatin g in a h u m an -cen tric battle space. Th erefore, train in g th e form er
sh ou ld also be differen t. Bu t th e fu tu re battle space for all n aval officers will ch an ge
sign ifican tly over th e n ext few decades an d officer developm en t m u st adapt as well. J u st as
Com m an dan t Kru lak was able to look in to th e fu tu re an d u rge h is Marin es to adapt, we sh ou ld
be scan n in g th e h orizon today for sim ilar ch an ges an d a recen t US Arm y stu dy sh ou ld provide
u s with som e in terestin g food for th ou gh t.
Accordin g to th e report, m ajor ch an ges are com in g with respect to ou r ability to see,
com m u n icate, th in k, an d decide on th e tactical battlefield of 2050. Th ese ch an ges draw u pon a
sh ared view th at th is battlefield will be ch aracterized by th e vastly in creased presen ce an d
relian ce on au tom ated processes an d decision m akin g; h u m an s with au gm en ted sen sin g; an d
in form ation -related an d cogn itive capabilities.
Th e stu dy’s au th ors iden tified th e followin g 7 in terrelated fu tu re capabilities th at th ey believe
differen tiate th e battlefield of th e fu tu re from cu rren t capabilities an d en gagem en ts:
• Au gm en ted h u m an s
• Au tom ated decision -m akin g an d au ton om ou s processes
• Misin form ation as a weapon
• Micro-targetin g
• Large-scale self-organ ization an d collective decision -m akin g
• Cogn itive m odelin g of th e oppon en t
• Ability to u n derstan d an d cope in a con tes ted, im perfect, in form ation en viron m en t
For th e n aval services to con ten d with th ese n ew realties, we m u st prepare ou r fu tu re leaders
to th rive in th is n ew in form ation - cogn itive-cen tric en viron m en t. Th e first step is to follow th e
advice of Gen eral Kru lak an d place cogn itive fitn ess on a par with ph ysical fitn ess.

13
To im prove cogn itive fitn ess we sh ou ld follow th e sam e stru ctu re as ph ysical con dition in g
program s. We m u st create local experts to offer cogn itive in stru ction an d provide am ple
opportu n ities to allow ju n ior officers to exercise decision -m akin g ability; th e latter can occu r in
a virtu al en viron m en t if n eeded. Fitn ess equ ipm en t is widely available to con dition ph ysical
system s; so, too, sh ou ld sim u lation or n etworked gam in g to develop cogn itive skills. Fin ally,
th e n aval services in clu de th e resu lts of ph ysical fitn ess tests on officer perform an ce
evalu ation s. We m u st develop an accu rate stan dard of cogn itive developm en t an d in clu de th ose
scores on perform an ce evalu ation s as well.
Th e in form ation age battle space will be m u ch differen t from th at of th e indu strial age. We
m u st recogn ize th e n eed to develop th e n ext gen eration of warriors with the cogn itive skills to
dom in ate th e data rich en viron m en t of th e fu tu re. Th e cogn itive warriors of th e n aval services
m u st be able to apply m en tal an d ph ysical skills with equ al acu m en . Sim ply developin g an d
prom otin g leaders wh o can follow a ch ecklist will leave u s ill-prepared for fu tu re ch allen ges.

14
By Robert Kozloski **
Secon d Lieu ten an ts at Th e Basic Sch ool in th e late 1990s were requ ired to read Orson Scott
Card’s n ovel Ender’s Gam e. At th e tim e, I cou ld n ot u n derstan d wh y, with th e Marin e Corps’
rich operation al h istory, we were requ ired to read com m ercial scien ce fiction . Had learn in g
from ou r own legacy becom e som eh ow in su fficien t?
Years later I cam e to appreciate th e scien ce fiction classic m ore – n ot on ly for th e m an y
leadersh ip lesson s iden tified by En der Wiggin ’s experien ce at th e story’s Battle Sch ool, or for its
con version in to a popu lar film bu t for th e fu ll poten tial wh ich m odelin g an d sim u lation in a
n etworked en viron m en t h olds for preparin g for, or even con du ctin g, fu tu re m ilitary operation s.
As Secretary of th e Navy Ray Mabu s iden tified in h is speech at Sea-Air Space , “New m odelin g
an d sim u lation capabilities allow u s to try n ew con cepts with ou t ben din g steel. Th ey allow u s
to look at th in gs like asym m etrical con cepts with ou t goin g th rou gh th e tortu ou s, som etim es
years-lon g acqu isition process.” Wh ile m odelin g an d sim u lation (M&S) offers trem en dou s
advan tages in m ilitary train in g an d experim en tation today, it is difficu lt to predict th eir fu ll
poten tial. Cou ld En der Wiggin ’s com bat experien ce be a h arbin ger for m ilitary operation s in th e
fu tu re?
On e grou p from th e Arm y Research Laboratory recen tly took a closer look at Ender’s Gam e in
th is con text an d iden tified several lesson s learn ed:
Lesson One – The Training Spectrum Ranges from Individual to Collective
All m ilitary services train th eir in dividu als before th ey train th e u n it. En der’s tim e in Battle
Sch ool was n o differen t. All n ewcom ers (“lau n ch ies”) to th e sch ool were su bjected to classroom
in stru ction an d virtu al sim u lation s before th ey were assign ed to an arm y. On ce assign ed to an
arm y, th eir platoon leaders worked with th em in sm all u n its prior to allowin g th em in th e
battleroom . En der, by n ecessity, pu t th is spectru m aside wh en train in g h is so-called Dragon
Arm y. He was forced by h is in stru ctors to train h is arm y to perform as on e team im m ediately.
In th is scen ario, in dividu al train in g asked m ore experien ced soldiers to take on th e less
experien ced, in stru ctin g th em on e-on -on e u n der En der’s gu idan ce.
Lesson Two – All But War is Sim ulation
Arm y Doctrine Reference Publication 7 -1, Training Units and Developing Leaders (U.S. Arm y,
2012) lists several prin ciples of Arm y u n it train in g. On e is “Train as you will figh t” (p. 2-1). A
sim ilar con cept is codified in th e form er logo of th e U.S. Arm y’s Program Execu tive Office for
Sim u lation , Train in g, an d In stru m en tation (PEO STRI): “All Bu t War is Sim u lation .”
As Dragon Arm y’s leader, En der em braced th ese con cepts. His train in g session s en forced
prim ary con cepts, su ch as m an eu ver an d m arksm an sh ip, wh ich h e kn ew were cru cial in th e
battleroom ’s gam es. En der was train ed to view th ese gam es as war, h on in g skills n eeded for
com plex com m an d roles. In th e en d, even “r eal” war becam e sim u lation , as En der an d h is
com m an ders did n ot realize th eir fin al battle m ade th em com m an ders of a real force -on -force
action , an d n ot a sim u lation .
Lesson Three – Perception of Lim itations
Th e train in g program at th e Battle Sch ool was very ch allen gin g. Yet, critically, it was design ed
so th at th e ch ildren cou ld ch allen ge th e train in g program itself. In deed, th ey h ad to do so in
order to su cceed – su ccess was defin ed as “win n in g at all costs,” with bestin g th e sim u lation or
Is Ender’s Game our End Game?

15
oth er “players” in th e sim u lated en viron m en t as th e sole prize. En der did th is on m u ltiple
occasion s th rou gh ou t th e n ovel.
For exam ple, in th e m in d gam e in volvin g th e gian t, th e player appears to be faced with failu re:
by design , n eith er of th e option s led to a su ccessfu l con clu sion . As part of th e train in g
program , Colon el Graff an d Major An derson sou gh t to discover h ow En der wou ld deal with th e
prospect of im m in en t failu re. By killin g th e gian t in stead of acceptin g on e of th e ch oices it
offered, En der refu sed to be lim ited to failu re. Th is was fu rth er con firm ation to Graff an d
An derson th at th eir search for a brillian t leader was over.
Lesson Four – OPFOR Must Adapt
Early in h is tim e at Battle Sch ool, En der n oticed older stu den ts playin g 3 -D gam es. Sin ce h e
was still a “lau n ch ie” h e cou ld n ot play th e gam e, so h e learn ed by watch in g oth ers do so. He
discovered th e older stu den ts often learn ed by playin g again st Artificial In telligen ce (AI)
oppon en ts. Th e AI was n ot adaptive, wh ich resu lted in h u m an players becom in g predic table as
oppon en ts – accu stom ed to playin g a static OPposin g FORce (OPFOR). Th ey solely em ployed
th e tactics an d strategies requ ired to defeat th e AI OPFOR regardless of wh eth er th ey played
again st AI or h u m an oppon en ts. En der u sed th is kn owledge again st h is oppon en ts: h e kn ew
h ow th ey wou ld react becau se h e kn ew h ow th e AI wou ld force th em to react.
Resolvin g th e issu e of n on -adaptive, static, AI is n ot ju st scien ce fiction , h owever. “A m ajor
disadvan tage of n on -adaptive gam e AI is th at on ce a weakn ess is discovered, n oth in g stops th e
h u m an player from exploitin g th e discovery” (Bakkes, Spron ck, & van den Herik, 2009, p. 28).
Bakkes, Spron ck, an d van den Herik proposed a con cept kn own as opponent m odelling as a
fram ework for m ach in e learn in g algorith m s to d evelop “case-based adaptive gam e AI” (p. 28).
Had th e virtu al gam e been blessed with su ch a dyn am ic, adaptive AI OPFOR, En der m ay well
h ave faced m u ch tou gh er h u m an oppon en ts, as th ey wou ld h ave been forced to adapt th eir
own gam e to beat th e com pu ter.
Lesson Five – There is no “One Size Fits All” Training
An derson ’s an d Graff’s con versation s, wh ich begin each ch apter, offer in sigh t in to h ow En der is
progressin g th rou gh th e Battle Sch ool. However, th eir con versation precedin g ch apter 4 is
especially poign an t. At th e close of ch apter 3, En der h as agreed to leave h is fam ily an d atten d
Battle Sch ool. An derson an d Graff discu ss h is train in g regim en , an d it is clear th at Graff h as a
plan for h ow it is to be stru ctu red based on data collected from En der’s observed beh aviors an d
m en tal pattern s. Wh ile we are n ot at th e poin t of em beddin g tech n ology to read th ou gh ts
directly in to stu den ts’ brain s, we do h ave th e capability of gau gin g th e level of kn owledge of
in com in g stu den ts via on lin e pre-testin g. Kn owledge of an in com in g class’s stren gth s an d
weakn esses can th en be u sed to tailor th e cou rses (Pike & Hosn i, 2004). As an exam ple,
assu m e En der an d h is fellow “lau n ch ies” perform ed poorly on a pre-test on first aid
fu n dam en tals, bu t all pre-tested well in weapon fam iliarization . Th eir weapon fam iliarization
class cou ld be sh orted, an d th e extra tim e allotted to first aid.
Lesson Six – Fully Blended Learning
In An derson an d Graff’s train in g regim e, all of the separate learn in g elem en ts in form on e
an oth er. From th e classroom en viron m en t, to th e in dividu al an d collective sim u lation s, an d
even th e social in teraction s of th e soldiers du rin g th eir free tim e, in each in stan ce, En der’s
beh aviors are evalu ated, an d h is perform an ce in flu en ces h is su bsequ en t learn in g experien ces.
Alth ou gh th e Battle Sch ool’s assessm en t system borders on Orwellian , it h igh ligh ts two
prin ciples wh ich can reason ably apply to real warfigh ters today.
First, perform an ce in on e settin g, su ch as a sim u lated train in g experien ce, sh ou ld h elp in form
fu tu re learn in g. Alth ou gh straigh tforward, m ost con tem porary train in g program s still treat
each even t as a stovepipe. At best, participan ts m u st com plete pass/ fail “gates” to progress,
bu t rarely do th e specifics of th eir past perform an ce directly in form th e n atu re of later learn in g
experien ces.

16
Secon d, person n el sh ou ld be assessed h olistically du rin g all learn in g experien ces; classroom s
are n ot th e sole testbeds for declarative kn owledge n or are live train in g evolu tion s th e on ly
place to evalu ate applied tactics. In stead, th e wh ole person is con tin u ou sly tested in and by
each con text. Perform an ce evalu ation also exten ds to in form al learn in g con texts, i.e., th ose
even ts th at take place ou tside of form ally stru ctu red edu cation or train in g settin gs. In Ender’s
Gam e, com preh en sive perform an ce data from th ese diverse en viron m en ts feeds in to a u n ified
learn er profile. In th e real world, n ew tech n ologies, su ch as th e Advan ced Distribu ted Learn in g
(ADL) Next Gen eration Learn in g En viron m en t, are begin n in g to en able th e captu re an d
in tegration of disparate, form al an d in form al learn in g ou tcom es.
Lesson Seven – Em phasize Cognitive Readiness
Mu ch of En der’s train in g in Battle Sch ool is design ed to provoke h is critical th in kin g,
adaptability, decision -m akin g, an d team perform an ce s kills. Alth ou gh h e an d th e oth er you n g
soldiers also stu dy tactics an d procedu res, th ey spen d sign ifican t tim e practicin g th e m en tal,
em otion al, an d in terperson al skills n eeded for com plex, u n certain fu tu re problem s. In Card’s
world, m an kin d faces an alien oppon en t wh ich th ey can n ot fu lly u n derstan d or predict; h en ce,
th ey n eed to develop in depen den t reason in g, good ju dgm en t, an d m en tal flexibility. Alth ou gh
less extrem e, in ou r own world warfigh ters face greater volatility, u n certain ty, com plexity, an d
am bigu ity; sim ilarly, ou r person n el m u st develop th e in depen den t th in kin g, em otion al
regu lation , an d in teraction skills n ecessary to cope with su ch con texts. Th is clu ster of skills is
often referred to as “Cogn itive Readin ess,” an d program s like th e Marin e Corps’ Sm all Un it
Decision Makin g (SUDM, 2011) in itiative or th e Arm y’s efforts to advan ce th e Hu m an
Dim en sion (U.S. Arm y Com bin ed Arm s Cen ter, 2014) exem plify th e focu s on it.
Wh ile th is an alysis focu ses on M&S from a train in g perspective, m an y qu estion s rem ain on
h ow it m ay even tu ally affect actu al m ilitary operation s. It is widely recogn ized th at both cyber
operation s an d u n m an n ed system s will play an in creasin gly im portan t role in fu tu re con flict. In
both of th ese em ergin g fields it grows m ore difficu lt to distin gu ish th e live en viron m en t from
th e sim u lated en viron m en t. A decade ago, we witn essed th e ease in wh ich an ad h oc global
com m an d an d con trol n etwork cou ld be establish ed, with accou n ts of sen ior leaders
m on itorin g real-tim e operation s from th e CENTCOM, th e Pen tagon an d even th e Wh ite Hou se.
Will th e n ext con flict requ ire sen ior com m an ders to actu ally deploy with th eir forces?
Th e m ilitary workforce of th e fu tu re will be com posed of people wh o grew u p on video gam es
an d h an d h eld tech n ology. Th ey will be com pletely com fortable m akin g ch oices, even
poten tially life or death decision s, in a virtu al en viron m en t. Th ey n eed to practice an d bu ild
th ese skills in a safe way. Will th is con vergen ce of tech n ological an d h u m an tren ds resh ape
h ow fu tu re wars are fou gh t? Will M&S system s better prepare th e leaders of th e fu tu re for
decision -m akin g in com bat? Will today’s n etworked video gam e platform s evolve in to an
en viron m en t for state level com petition ? Ender’s Gam e su ggests M&S belon gs in m ilitary
train in g. It fu lly ju stifies wh y th e n ovel h as been on th e Com m an dan t of th e Marin e Corps’
Profession al Readin g List for decades an d it m ay provide great in sigh t in to th e fu tu re of m ilitary
operation s.

17
By Robert Kozloski and Major Arm ando Martinez **
Major Leagu e Baseball is a data -rich en viron m en t providin g a great exam ple of h ow an alytics
can effectively assess an d m an age talen t. As ou tlin ed in th e book (later m ovie) Mon eyball, th e
tradition al role of th e h u m an talen t scou t, a so-called su bject m atter expert u sin g h igh ly
person al ju dgm en t, is bein g replaced by a statistician wh o u n derstan ds baseball. Fu rth erm ore,
th e in creasin g popu larity of fan tasy sports provides clear eviden ce of h ow an alytics are
perm eatin g Am erican society, a tren d arisin g in m an y fields except m ilitary person n el system s.
Talen t decision s in profession al baseball were h istorically viewed th rou gh th e eyes of an
experien ced observer, su pported by stan dard scales of perform an ce: Ru n s, Hits, an d Ru n s -
Batted-In (for h itters) or Win s, Strikeou ts, an d Earn ed Ru n Average (for pitch ers). Becau se of
th e ease of data collection an d an alysis, m ore in sigh tfu l m easu res of perform an ce were created
to m ake m ore in form ed person n el decision s.
Saberm etrics, n am ed in h on or of th e Society for Am erican Baseball Research , u ses statistical
an alyses to evalu ate, com pare an d forecast baseball talen t. Early u se of th ese n on -tradition al
m etrics started in th e 1970s, bu t on ly becam e popu lar th is past decade, largely du e to
advan ces in in form ation sh arin g u sin g better qu an titative tech n iqu es. With m ore team
own ers—both real an d fan tasy—relyin g on an alytics, th e valu e of data -driven in sigh t is readily
apparen t.
On e exam ple of h ow baseball statistics h ave evolved can be fou n d in th e n ew “Win s Above
Replacem en t” (WAR) m easu rem en t. Th is m eth od com pares an in dividu al player to a
“replacem en t player,” wh o cou ld be h ired easily an d (likely) at th e leagu e -m in im u m salary.
WAR takes existin g m etrics an d u ses th em in a com plex algorith m to calcu late th e n u m ber of
win s an in dividu al player will brin g a team , beyon d th e replacem en t’s valu e, by con siderin g
con tribu tion s on both offen se an d defen se.
Saberm etrics brin gs objectivity to baseball m an agem en t th rou gh a m ore robu st statistical
an alysis. Man agers can n ow m ake person n el d ecision s n ot on ly u sin g th e qu ality of a player,
bu t by assessin g h ow well on e fits with in th e existin g talen t stru ctu re of a team . A team wh ich
plays in a h itter-frien dly ballpark will target players differen tly th an a team at h om e in a
pitch er-frien dly ballpark. A m an ager is n ow also m ore likely to con sider th e talen t su rrou n din g
a player—th eir con text with in th e team —th an base a decision solely on th e in dividu al player’s
skills in depen den tly.
Like Major Leagu e Baseball, th e su ccess of th e US m ilitary dep en ds u pon best u sin g th e talen t
of ou r ou tstan din g m en an d wom en in u n iform . No baseball team wou ld stan d a ch an ce on th e
field today if it didn ’t in corporate advan ced an alytics in to th e clu bh ou se; th e US m ilitary m u st
recogn ize its sh ortfall in th ese tools an d pu t data an alytics in to its gam e.
Can “Sabermetrics” Replace the Officer FITREP?

18
How th e US m ilitary m easu res an d u ses officer talen t is fu n dam en tally broken , particu larly in
th e Navy, wh ere th e m ajority of officers h ave lost faith in th e cu rren t evalu ation system . On e of
th e m ain flaws with ou r an tiqu ated approach is th e over -em ph asis on su bjective assessm en ts
an d a lack of clear m easu res. Su ch sh ortfalls cou ld cripple th e services, wh ose “talen t scou ts”
(com m an din g officers) prom ote ju n ior officer m u ch like th em selves. If th e com bat en viron m en t
sh ifts too qu ickly, th is approach will yield disaster. Th e n aval services, th erefore, can learn a
great deal from Major Leagu e Baseball to resolve th is problem .
Th e first step to creatin g a data-driven perform an ce system is to defin e th e ch aracteristics
desired from n aval officers an d th en develop ways to m easu re perform an ce. To illu strate th e
poin t, th e followin g an alysis will u se ph ysical fitn ess, cogn itive skills, tactical proficien cy an d
leadersh ip as th e variables to calcu late th e Officer Qu an titative Ratin g Score (OQRS).
Physical Fitness: Th ere are several ways to m easu re ph ysical fitn ess. It can easily be
appraised with a com bin ation of body com position assessm en ts an d fitn ess tests res u lts. Th ere
are oth er factors wh ich cou ld be u sed in th is algorith m , su ch as age, sex an d deploym en t tim e,
wh ich can h elp create a better fitn ess valu e. Com m ercial h ealth m on itorin g tech n ology, su ch as
th e u biqu itou s Fitbit type m on itor, will even tu ally be in clu ded in th is m easu re.
Cognitive Skills: Wh ile cogn itive skills m ay be difficu lt to qu an tify, th ere are a n u m ber of
com pon en t factors wh ich cou ld be m easu red: stan dardized tests resu lts, academ ic
perform an ce, profession al pu blication s, or practical problem solvin g tests. On ce th e data
sou rces are defin ed, th ese m easu res cou ld develop a base “cogn itive ratin g” an d officers wou ld
work towards im provin g th eir ratin gs over th e cou rse of a career.
Tactical Proficiency: Th is com pon en t m u st be cu stom ized for each design ator, so th at tactical
proficien cy in a warfigh tin g com m u n ity cou ld be m easu red clearly at each skill level from
n ovice to m aster practition er. Specific train in g experien ce, deploym en t tim e an d warfare
qu alification s can all be u sed to calcu late th is valu e.
Th is variable wou ld also be u sed to ch oose between specialist or gen eralist career path s. Som e
officers h ave sign ifican t operation al experien ce with in th eir warfare com m u n ity wh ile oth ers
gain operation al experien ce from join t du ty assign m en ts. Distin gu ish in g between th e two cou ld
in form selection decision s for a join t com m an d or sen ior n aval warfare com m u n ity assign m en t.
Leadership: Measu rin g th is com pon en t is likely th e m ost difficu lt an d con ten tiou s. In th e past
m ost leadersh ip m easu res focu sed on person al accom plish m en ts rath er th an actu ally leadin g
team s or organ ization s. On e way to gau ge leadersh ip is to establish clearly defin ed goals,
m easu rin g team perform an ce. Begin n in g each reportin g year, officers sh ou ld be given a set of
ch allen gin g bu t ach ievable goals com m en su rate with ran k, billet an d m ission . Th e an n u al
assessm en t wou ld m easu re th e exten t to wh ich goals were accom plish ed. Addition ally, th e
resu lts of 360 degree perform an ce assessm en ts, to assess leadersh ip beh avior, as well a s
com m an d clim ate su rveys, cou ld feed in to th is calcu lation .
Fu rth er, types of billets or du ty assign m en ts cou ld be categorized an d factored in to th is valu e.
In baseball, a pitch er for th e Colorado Rockies is likely to h ave a h igh er earn ed ru n average
th an on e from a pitch er-frien dly h om e ballpark. Th is differen ce can be attribu ted to th e h igh er
altitu de of th e Rockies’ stadiu m in Den ver, allowin g m ore h om e ru n s. Each com m u n ity
m an ager kn ows som e billets are m ore dem an din g th an oth ers, so an officer m eetin g h er
person al goals at a deployed or h igh tem po u n it wou ld stan d ou t m ore th an on e in a less
dem an din g role. Un it assessm en t reports su ch as th e Defen se Readin ess Reportin g System or
Statu s of Resou rces an d Train in g System cou ld factor in to th is valu e as well.
On ce th e OQRS score is calcu lated, it m u st be placed in to m ean in gfu l con text. Th e officer
receivin g th e assessm en t m u st be provided th e ch an ce to n ote an n u al ach ievem en ts or provide
explan ation wh y goals were n ot m et. Sim ilarly, the reportin g sen ior sh ou ld com m en t on
prom otion poten tial, preferably on a grade-in flation proof scale, an d provide in sigh t on th e
OQRS score for th at particu lar year. Lim ited resou rces, for exam ple, m ay h ave preven ted an

19
officer from ach ievin g a specific goal. Ideally, th e OQRS wou ld be u sed con sisten tly over an
en tire career, sim ilar to a lifetim e battin g average in baseball.
Rath er th an u sin g th is score sim ply for prom otion s, as is ou r cu rren t practice, th e OQRS cou ld
h elp both th e service m em ber to ach ieve career goals wh ile aidin g th e in stitu tion in m an agin g
th e actu al talen t of th e workforce, rath er th an sim ply pu ttin g “bu tts in seats”.
OQRS scores sh ou ld be viewable by all officers, to take person n el evalu ation ratin gs ou t of “th e
sh adows” an d m ake th e en tire process tra n sparen t. Th e secrecy an d back -room deals
su rrou n din g th e reportin g of fitn ess are h oldovers from a bygon e era. Officers will kn ow h ow
th ey stack u p again st peers an d in wh at areas th ey n eed im provem en t. Top perform in g officers
wou ld welcom e su ch tran sparen cy an d weaker officers will get th e m essage to im prove or get
ou t.
With su ch data, Detailers, Mon itors an d com m an d selection boards can m ake in form ed
decision s abou t wh ere people “best fit” for a particu lar position . Sen ior com m an ders, sim ilar to
a GM in baseball, cou ld requ est a specific type of officer to fill th e im m ediate organ ization al
n eeds. For exam ple, if they kn ow a billet dem an ds stron g cogn itive skills bu t less leadersh ip,
m ore weigh t cou ld be assign ed to th e first variable to iden tify officers m eetin g th is criterion .
Like profession al baseball, th e m ilitary person n el system is a data rich en viron m en t, yet we
h ave failed to take advan tage of ou r existin g in form ation an d create a tru ly effective talen t
m an agem en t system . Man y m ay argu e th at expert ju dgm en t is th e best way to m an age ou r
n aval officers, sim ply ou t of tradition . However, we do n ot kn ow h ow to m easu re th e
u n deru tilization of officer talen t, n or th e n u m ber of capable people wh o exit m ilitary service
each year becau se th e fu ll poten tial of officers often stays on th e ben ch .
As an in stitu tion , we m u st adm it th e cu rren t system is n ot workin g; it can ’t be u sed to bu ild a
World Series ch am pion in th is n ew en viron m en t. Worse, given th e cu rren t th reat en viron m en t
we can n ot afford to h ave a “rebu ildin g year” to resolve th is issu e. Ch an gin g ou r person n el
pattern s n ow m ay allow u s to win ou r n ext war. We m u st explore n ew data -driven option s to
m easu re effectively an d u se th e talen t of ou r n aval officers. Th e saberm etrics approach to
talen t m an agem en t in baseball provides an excellen t startin g poin t.

20
By Ms. Jane Roberts **
INTRODUCTION
Th e Naval In n ovation Network is a Departm en t of th e Navy-wide foru m to con n ect in n ovators,
th ou gh t leaders, su bject m atter experts, m id -level m an agers an d sen ior leaders to ch am pion ,
accelerate an d prom ote in n ovation . Collectively, th e grou p represen ts a wide ran ge of
disciplin es, organ ization s an d fu n ction al com m u n ities arou n d th e globe. Th rou gh greater
collaboration , creativity, experim en tation , “in tra” pren eu rsh ip, an d diversity of th ou gh t, th e
Naval In n ovation Network seeks to actively en gage th e trem en dou s u n tapped in tellectu al
capacity an d m otivation of ou r talen ted workforce to tacklin g ou r m ost com plex prob lem s an d
im provin g ou r m ission .
VISION
Tactically an d practically, th e Naval In n ovation Network fosters greater social con n ection s
between organ ization s, people, an d th e in n ovation com m u n ity of practice. It will do so by
bu ildin g virtu al platform s as well as ph ysical foru m s, wh ere in dividu als an d team s can sh are
ideas an d problem s an d let th e n etwork h elp. As th e Network expan ds, people will be able to
collaborate with oth ers on ideas, brain storm viable solu tion s to im portan t problem s, try ou t
n ew tech n ologies an d experim en t in creative spaces on a m u ch larger scope an d scale th an
ever before. To create an agile an d resilien t 21st cen tu ry workforce r eady for an in creasin gly
ch allen gin g an d u n certain fu tu re, th e Network seeks to com plete fou r m ajor tasks over th e n ext
2 years: crowdsou rce th e DON, in cen tivize in n ovation , su pport in n ovators locally, an d create
an en viron m en t th a t in stitu tion alizes in n ovation .
CROWDSOURCE THE DON
With a workforce of 900,000 Marin es, Sailors an d civilian s in th e Departm en t, we h ave a
trem en dou s opportu n ity to u n leash an d u n lock th e creative talen t an d en ergy of a diverse,
m u lti-gen eration al workforce to solve ou r m ost difficu lt ch allen ges. In order to tap in to th is
poten tial m ore fu lly, a DON-level virtu al platform called “th e Hatch ” recen tly stood u p, allowin g
m ilitary an d civilian s an ywh ere arou n d th e world, on sh ip an d ash ore, to leverage th eir
kn owledge an d skills to bu ild on ideas an d solve problem s. Th e Hatch h as th e ability for
in dividu als, organ ization s an d com m u n ities to develop th eir own “cam paign s” to solve vexin g
problem s or get n ew ideas on u n tapped areas. Som e exam ples of past an d cu rren t pu blic
cam paign s are: Artificial In telligen ce/ Robotics, Virtu al an d Sim u lated En viron m en ts, Open
Ideas Foru m , In cen tives, New Issu es 2015 for Redu cin g Adm in istrative Distraction s, an d Navy
Reserve Policy. Th ere h ave also been several private cam paign s to focu s on specific topic s for a
particu lar sh ip or com m u n ity. Gettin g feedback from large crowds th rou gh crowdsou rcin g is a
relatively fast an d easy way to get to th e best or m ost in terestin g ideas on a wide ran ge of
topics. By dram atically in creasin g th e visibility an d scalability of con cept discu ssion s an d
proposals, m an y m ore people (100x, 1000x, 100,000x) can vote an d provide com m en ts to
im prove an idea. Th ere is trem en dou s poten tial in crowdsou rcin g th e DON wh eth er th rou gh
“th e Hatch ” spon sored at th e Departm en t level, th rou gh “Navy Brigh twork” to su pport
deckplate in n ovation spon sored by Naval Warfare Developm en t Com m an d, or th rou gh oth er
creative ideation ven u es available to th e Departm en t.
Building the Naval Innovation Network

21
INCENTIVIZE INNOVATION
In n ovation is n ot on ly abou t creative ideas; it’s also doin g n ew th in gs an d realizin g th e ben efits
from th eir im plem en tation . Th e Departm en t is cu rren tly developin g ways to in cen tivize even
m ore in n ovation th rou gh an n u al awards, revam pin g th e cu rren t MILCAP/ BENESUGS
program , an d in corporatin g n on -tradition al ways to reward an d recogn ize in n ovators. First, an
ALNAV h as ju st been released to an n ou n ce th e SECNAV’s an n u al In n ovation Awards program
for 2015. Nom in ation form s are cu rren tly bein g accepted from n ow th rou gh 31 October for
sign ifican t in n ovative ach ievem en ts in eigh t distin ct categories. Secon d, work h as started on
revam pin g th e cu rren t MILCAP/ BENESUGS program , in clu din g ways to elim in ate extran eou s
adm in istrative layers an d accelerate th e m on etary award process for m atu re ideas. Th ird, a
grou p of folks are lookin g at n on -tradition al ways to reward an d recogn ize in n ovators especially
design ed to appeal to Gen eration Y an d Millen n ials. Som e of th e n on -m on etary awards bein g
con sidered in clu de: pu blic recogn ition , train in g opportu n ities an d edu cation on in n ovation ,
addition al tim e an d space to develop ideas fu rth er, u n iqu e access to leaders an d su bject m atter
experts to discu ss an d refin e th eir ideas, an d special-access even ts for in n ovators. Th ese are
ju st a few of m an y ideas bein g discu ssed.
SUPPORT INNOVATORS LOCALLY
In n ovation is robu st at th e grass -roots level an d grows as in dividu als fin d oth er open an d
creative m in ds to stim u late a dyn am ic force for ch an ge. Th e Navy’s Ath en a Project is a prim e
exam ple of m otivated, locally driven in n ovation wh ich h as proven s o su ccessfu l th at it h as
n atu rally cau gh t on in oth er places. Th e idea of “Sh ark Tan k”-like 5-m in u te pitch es to “an gel
in vestors” allows participan ts to gen erate ou t -of-th e-box possibilities in a fu n , frien dly, yet
com petitive atm osph ere. Th e con cept of design th in kin g an d accelerator classes to teach a
variety of m eth ods for tappin g in to differen t ways of problem solvin g is catch in g h old in m an y
com m u n ities in clu din g th e In tel com m u n ity, th e CNO’s Rapid In n ovation Cell (CRIC), an d
J oh n s Hopkin s Applied Ph ysics Lab (APL). A m ore form al an d deliberate approach to
su pportin g local in n ovation is th e growin g tren d of iden tifyin g an d assign in g specific poin ts of
con tact, su ch as scien ce advisors or lead en gin eers, to be “In n ovation Officers” at local
com m an ds. Recen tly, on e Ech elon 2 organ ization stood u p a n ew in n ovation cell with poin ts of
con tact at its Ech elon 3 com m an ds to brin g n ew ideas forward from th at com m u n ity. A m ore
21st cen tu ry tech n ological tool to su pportin g in n ovators locally is th e con cept of th e Fab Lab.
Th e Fab Lab is m u ch like a h obby sh op for 3 -D prin tin g wh ich allows people to design an d
produ ce th eir own 3-D m odels of objects. Experim en tation an d prototypin g is an im portan t
tactic for in n ovation becau se it effectively tests a design an d in corporates faster, iterative
ch an ges to deliver a com pleted produ ct. If th e produ ct n eeds to be m an u factu red u sin g
differen t m aterials, 3-D m odelin g resu lts in h igh er qu ality requ irem en ts specification s for a
design . As m ore Fab Labs becom e available arou n d th e cou n try, wh eth er th rou gh partn erin g
with local com m u n ity colleges, m ilitary com m u n ity services, or on sh ips an d in fleet
con cen tration areas, th is will be yet an oth er way to su pport in n ovators locally. Office of Naval
Research also h osts a web-based tool to brin g tech n ology n eeds to th e Naval Research
En terprise for rapid respon se an d delivery th rou gh a scien ce an d tech n ology program called
Tech Solu tion s.
CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT THAT INSTITUTIONALIZES INNOVATION
Last, an d m ost im portan tly, proactive an d r espon sive leadersh ip action s at all levels is
absolu tely essen tial to su pportin g an d rein forcin g a cu ltu re of in n ovation with in you r span of
in flu en ce. Wh eth er you person ally con sider you rself an in n ovator or n ot, you play a vital role in
in flu en cin g in n ovation an d h elpin g it to develop an d grow. Wh ile th ere is defin itely a tim e an d
place for bein g effective an d efficien t, th ere are also tim es an d places wh ere ch am pion in g a
good idea, givin g people tim e to th in k, experim en t, an d test ou t a n ew approach , an d edu catin g
oth ers on h ow to n avigate th rou gh a process can yield far greater learn in g an d overall
im provem en t to th e larger Naval m ission an d lon g-term vision . As th e world becom es m ore
com plicated an d in tercon n ected, su ccess will n ot always easily be dete rm in ed by ju st on e
person ’s idea or action , bu t by th e adjacen t an d collective learn in g of on e person ’s idea bu ildin g

22
off of an oth er’s, an d so on . We will always h ave brillian t in ven tors tin kerin g in a room by
th em selves, bu t we also n eed leaders an d organ ization s to: en cou rage diversity of th ou gh t,
cu ltivate in trin sic m otivation , em ph asize in form ation sh arin g, com fort with risk an d
u n certain ty, agile decision -m akin g, an d m easu rin g wh at m atters. Th e Naval In n ovation
Network wan ts to exten d th at reach by h elpin g leaders at all poin ts to in crease th e prevalen ce
of th ese six organ ization al featu res of in n ovative organ ization s to h elp th e DON overcom e
u n n ecessary bu reau cratic barriers an d in trodu ce n ew con cepts an d m ore effective ways of
th in kin g an d actin g wh ich can tru ly ch an ge th e gam e for ou r fu tu re.
CONCLUSION
As we en ter in to th e au tu m n , m em bers of th e Naval In n ovation Network will be h ostin g local
even ts an d virtu al foru m s an d visitin g m ajor fleet con cen tration areas to get th e word ou t an d
offer addition al opportu n ities for gettin g in volved. We in vite you to be a part of ou r in n ovation
fu tu re.
For m ore in form ation abou t th e Naval In n ovation Network, participate in th e Hatch , or to fin d
people in you r com m u n ity of in terest or local geograph ical are a, con tact:
DON_In n ovation @n avy.m il

23
By Maura Sullivan, Ph.D. **
Com in g from th e private sector I was stru ck by th e con spicu ou s lack of fem ale voices
participatin g in SECNAV’s Taskforce In n ovation (TFI). Wom en cu rren tly con stitu te less th an
10% of Th e Hatch in n ovation crowdsou rcin g com m u n ity an d in n ovation organ ization s like th e
CNO’s Rapid In n ovation Cell (CRIC) h ave b een overwh elm in gly m ale. Th e wom en in volved in
TFI h ave provided a disproportion ately large con tribu tion in term s of con ten t, com m itm en t, an d
ability to catalyze larger n etworks, h igh ligh tin g th e n eed to cu ltivate m ore wom en in n ovators.
Th e valu e of wom en in n ovators h as been dem on strated in th e private sector, wh ere accordin g
to a Kau ffm an Fou n dation report wom en tech n ology en trepren eu rs ach ieve a 35 percen t better
retu rn on in vestm en t th an m ale cou n terparts.
Both in th e private sector an d th e m ilitary wom en h ave worked to be recogn ized for th eir
skillsets alon e, often by attem ptin g to rem ove gen der from th e equ ation . Th e Departm en t of th e
Navy (DON) diversity agen da h as largely focu sed on elim in atin g differen ces in perception an d
opportu n ity between th e gen ders, su ch as open in g all operation billets an d gen der -n eu tral
u n iform s. Th e DON m ay h ave m oved beyon d th e active in ten t to exclu de or discrim in ate, bu t
cu ltu ral n orm s still preven t wom en from fu lly con tribu tin g to activities th at take th em off th e
prescribed path .
Scarce n u m bers in crease visibility an d scru tin y, an d h u m an s are less likely to try th in gs wh en
th ere is a poten tial of bein g th reaten ed. As Sh eryl San dberg an d Adam Gran t poin ted ou t in a
J an 2015 New York Tim es op -ed, wh en m ale execu tives speak u p, th ey receive 10% h igh er
com peten ce ratin gs; wh en fem ale execu tives do th e sam e, th eir ratin gs from th eir peers are
14% lower. In m ale dom in ated fields m en an d wom en are h eld to a differen t stan dard wh en it
com es to provin g in itial com peten ce. Men are a ssu m ed com peten t at th e core fu n ction s u n til
proven oth erwise, wh ereas wom en are forced to spen d tim e provin g core com peten ce prior to
bein g allowed to pu sh bou n daries. On e private sector m an ifestation of th is is th e fact th at
wom en are often exclu ded from position s on tech n ology boards becau se th ey lack STEM
backgrou n ds, h owever a sign ifican t proportion of th e m ale board m em bers of tech n ology
com pan ies also lack STEM backgrou n ds, bu t are assu m ed to be com peten t.
In n ovation requ ires th e ability to qu estion n orm s, syn th esize differen t views, an d collaborate to
develop u n iqu e an d powerfu l solu tion s. Diversity is th e DNA of in n ovation , bu t th e cu rren t
DON focu s on diversity is sim ply abou t brin gin g wom en to th e table, n ot providin g th e
en viron m en t to en su re th ey are in clu ded in th e con versation . In clu sion is abou t en su rin g
diverse voices are h eard, recogn ized, an d rewarded. Below are th ree su ggestion s for m ore fu lly
in corporatin g wom en in n ovators th rou gh ou t th e DON.
Create space:
An often cited Hewlett-Packard in tern al report fou n d m en apply for jobs wh en th ey m eet on ly
60% of th e qu alification s, bu t wom en will n ot apply u n til th ey m eet 100% of th em . Th e fact
th at wom en m ake u p less th an 1% of writers at th e Naval In stitu te Blog is likely an artifact of
th is fact. Wom en are less likely to presen t ideas in progress in a m ale dom in ated en viron m en t.
En cou ragin g wom en to in n ovate requ ires creatin g safe space to develop ideas an d experim en t.
Addition ally, creatin g a sen se of com m u n ity wh ere wom en can talk open ly an d ta ke risks
with ou t bein g ju dged prem atu rely is critical. Wom en specific in itiatives, su ch as discu ssion
grou ps an d wom en in writin g week, can create th e sen se of com m u n ity an d th e critical m ass
n ecessary to pu sh wom en in n ovators in to takin g risk.
How Can the Department of the Navy Cultivate
More Women Innovators?

24
Research also sh ows th at wh en wom en com e to th e table th e ideas are m ore likely to be m ore
developed com preh en sive solu tion s. In n ovation program s n eed to en su re th ey are n ot prim ed
to give m ore con sideration to ideas th at are brou gh t to th e table first.
Support the First Followers:
Derek Sh ivers gave a TED talk on h ow th e first followers are critical to startin g a m ovem en t
an d tran sform in g a lon e n u t in to a leader. In a h ierarch ical organ ization followers are gen erally
th ose th at h ave less au th ority an d in flu en ce th an th eir su periors. Th ey m ay try an d get alon g
to preserve career or sim ply becau se it is th e path of least resistan ce. Leadersh ip in th e
in n ovation space is bein g th e lon e n u t, a place wom en are often u n com fortable in th at role du e
to th e reason s discu ssed in th is blog post. Good followers are th e key to drivin g in n ovation .
Th ey em power people, rem ove obstacles, an d catalyze im plem en tation . Th ey su pport good
leaders an d are willin g to actively oppose bad leadersh ip. Valu in g, actively en cou ragin g, an d
rewardin g first followers are critical to th e su ccess of an y in n ovation agen da an d give th ose
ou tside of th e cu ltu ral m ajority a place to en gage, refin e ideas, an d if desired step in to
leadersh ip position s.
Maxim ize Strengths:
As an organ ization th e DON spen ds a sign ifican t am ou n t of th e m an power effort gettin g th e
workforce to a m in im u m acceptable stan dard. Th is was critical in an in du strial era m ilitary
wh en force stru ctu res were optim ized for h om ogen eity an d in terch an geability. However,
research su ggests th at th e m ost su ccessfu l in dividu als capitalize on th eir in n ate dom in an t
talen ts an d develop th ose stren gth s by addin g skills an d kn owledge. Reth in kin g wh o an d h ow
people com e togeth er to collaborate an d solve problem s is critical to avoidin g grou p -th in k, a
con dition wh ich h as created past n ation al secu rity failu res. In n ovation requ ires in ten tion ally
cu ltivatin g views th at are ou tside th e cu ltu ral n orm s.
In order to be an in n ovative organ ization , th e DON n eeds to em brace th e fact th at in dividu als
h ave differen t stren gth s an d weakn esses an d th at a m odel based on in terch an geability is n ot
ten able in today’s world. Th ere are biological distin ction s between th e gen ders, it is a fact, an d
n ot som eth in g organ ization al con versation sh ou ld sh y away from . Scien tific brea kth rou gh s
occu r in team s with m ore wom en becau se of in creased creativity an d fresh approach es an d
accordin g to research pu blish ed in Scien ce in creasin g th e collective social sen sitivity by addin g
wom en in creased th e collective in telligen ce of team s. Creatin g a cu ltu re th at valu es in dividu als
an d em ph asizes organ ization al con stru cts th at m axim ize cogn itive diversity will allow th e DON
to m axim ize th e in n ovative poten tial of its workforce irrespective of gen der.

25
By Robert A. Newson, CAPT USN,
Council on Foreign Relations Military Fellow **
Clau sewitz said, “Every age h as its own kin d of war, its own lim itin g con dition s, an d its own
pecu liar precon ception s.” Today we face con flict th at is h ybrid in n atu re, in crem en tal in
execu tion an d savagely violen t. Th e leth ality an d soph istication of n on -state actors, added to
th eir ability to persist with in an d ch allen ge th e m odern state is n ovel to ou r tim e. Th e rise of
n on -state actors, in form ation tech n ology, an d proliferation of advan ced weapon s gives rise to
m odern h ybrid war, wh ich in th e fu tu re m ay ch allen ge u s at h om e. Th e Un ited States requ ires,
bu t does n ot h ave, a credible strategic-level ability to (1) address in crem en tal, persisten t
belligeren ce an d (2) in terdict an d roll back extern al spon sors of in su rgen t an d separatist
m ovem en ts.
The Growing Threat of Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare h as been defin ed as com bin in g con ven tion al, irregu lar, an d asym m etric m ean s,
in clu din g persisten t m an ipu lation of political an d ideological con flict, an d can com bin e special
operation s an d con ven tion al m ilitary forces; in telligen ce agen ts; political provocateu rs; m edia
m an ipu lation an d in form ation warfare; econ om ic in tim idation ; cyber -attacks; u se of proxies
an d su rrogates, para -m ilitaries, terrorist, an d crim in al elem en ts. Wars tradition ally h ave
regu lar an d irregu lar com pon en ts – th is is n ot n ew. However, th ese com pon en ts previou sly
applied in differen t areas of operation , as distin ct efforts. Modern h ybrid warfare com bin es
th em sim u ltan eou sly with in a sin gle dom ain . Th is vastly in creases th e com plexity an d disord er
of th e con flict an d requ ires an adaptable an d versatile wh ole of society approach – m ilitary,
wh ole of govern m en t, an d n on -govern m en tal.
Hybrid warfare places a prem iu m on u n con ven tion al warfare (UW)—defin ed as activities
con du cted to en able a resistan ce m ovem en t to coerce, disru pt, or overth row a govern m en t.
Extern al spon sorsh ip often provides m otivation , resou rces, an d su pport to destabilize
in tern ation al an d region al secu rity. Som e exam ples of th is strategy in clu de th e Ru sso-Georgian
war of Au gu st 2008, Ru ssia’s cu rren t activities in Ukrain e an d poten tial fu tu re m oves in th e
Baltics, as well as Iran ’s u se of su rrogates like Hezbollah in Syria an d Sh iite m ilitias in Iraq.
Accordin gly, developin g a Un ited States capacity for cou n ter -UW is absolu tely n ecessary.
What’s Different About Counter-Unconventional Warfare?
Cou n ter-UW is distin ct from cou n ter terrorism (CT) an d cou n ter in su rgen cy (COIN). CT
operation s are sh ort-term , tim e-sen sitive an d in telligen ce-driven , with im m ediately visible
resu lts; i.e., h as th e kill or captu re been ach ieved or n ot? Cou n ter -UW, by con trast, is
protracted an d proactive. Th e resu lts are expressed in n egative term s: wh at areas do
in su rgen ts n ot con trol? Wh at opportu n ities h ave been den ied to th em , an d wh at objective h as
th e en em y failed to ach ieve? Mean wh ile, COIN operation s con tain an d defeat an in su rgen cy
wh ile sim u ltan eou sly addressin g its root cau se. As a resu lt, COIN ten ds to n eed a large
footprin t an d h igh U.S. sign atu re. Fu tu re cou n ter -UW, on th e oth er h an d, is execu ted by a
sm aller force, m ore n arrowly scoped. It h as a sm all footprin t, a low sign atu re, an d specifically
den ies an adversary th e ability to u se su rrogates for strategic su ccess. Bu ildin g u pon th e
lesson s from m ore th an a decade of CT an d COIN, U.S. special operation s forces (SOF) can u se
th is capability to den y adversaries th e capacity to em ploy u n con ven tion al warfare for th eir
goals. A com bin ation of Special Operation s capabilities is n eeded: m ilitary in form ation su pport
operation s (form erly psych ological op eration s); civil affairs; Special Forces (Green Berets),
Hybrid Warfare and its Implications

26
Marin e Special Operators an d SEALs; robu st an d scalable com m an d an d con trol capacity; an d
a growin g “reach -back” capability in all areas to su pport operation s from th e U.S.
More Than Special Operations Forces
Wh ile SOF will h ave th e prim ary cou n ter -UW role with in a wh ole of govern m en t effort, h ybrid
warfare an d cou n ter-UW h ave im plication s beyon d th em . Ch in a’s pu rsu it of u n restricted
warfare h as n ot yet in clu ded su rrogates or para -m ilitary forces—u n less you cou n t th e
in tim idatin g u se of th e Ch in ese Coast Gu ard —bu t th eir UW capabilities sh ou ld n ot be
discou n ted. Th e U.S. sh ou ld expect m ore th an a con ven tion al figh t in an y fu tu re con flict with
Ru ssia, Ch in a, Korea, Iran , or Syria. Hybrid warfare, seen n ow in region al con flicts, will be
tu rn ed again st th e U.S. an d ou r m ilitary forces. Cou n ter -UW sh ou ld be in join t an d service
exercises, as well as operation al an d con tin gen cy plan s. Addition ally, th e m ilitary services
sh ou ld explore h ow to in tegrate a SOF cou n ter-UW cam paign with in th eir broader operation s.
Im plications
Responding to Gradualism . Global actors h ave fou n d som e su ccess by in crem en tally—over
tim e—in creasin g in flu en ce over sovereign territory, in tern ation al waters, or creatin g proh ibited
capabilities. Su ch a strategy ach ieves strategic goals bit -by-bit wh ile stoppin g ju st sh ort of
drawin g a m ilitary respon se. Respon din g to gradu alism requ ires presen ce an d com m itm en t as
a deterren t tripwire; n on -leth al weapon s to avoid escalation an d m iscalcu lation in h eren t in
leth al action ; an aggressive an d realistic cou n ter -n arrative an d in form ation operation s
cam paign , an d an ability an d m eth ods to de-escalate at every step. In fu tu re, th is m u st be
in tegrated h olistically.
An Uncertain Path Ahead
Cou n ter-UW requ ires a wh ole-of-govern m en t approach an d a com preh en sive, in tegrated
pu rsu it of political warfare, in clu din g econ om ic san ction s, diplom acy, u se of su rrogates,
m ilitary an d law en forcem en t su pport for partn er n ation s, an d strategic com m u n ication an d
in form ation operation s. Th e U.S. h as n ot displayed a strategic wh ole -of-govern m en t capacity
beyon d CT, cou n ter- an d cou n ter-proliferation tactical operation s ru n by join t in teragen cy task
forces. A con siderable effort an d stron g leadersh ip will be requ ired to create th is capacity for
th e fu tu re. Th is task is so great it m ay take con gression al action t o create a n ation al cou n ter-
UW capability. Mu ch depen ds u pon n ation al leaders com m ittin g to protracted cou n ter -UW
operation s in sen sitive, h ostile, an d den ied en viron m en ts. Cou n ter -UW requ ires early an d lon g-
term in vestm en t. Tim ely decision s, before a cris is, are n eeded, a real problem . Sin ce th e en d of
th e Cold War th e U.S. h as rarely in vested in developin g su ch lon g-lead option s. To secu re th e
fu tu re, it sh ou ld start n ow, preparin g cou n ter -UW capabilities in Eastern Eu rope an d th e
Baltics to cou n ter an y Ru ssian u se of h ybrid warfare. It is all too easy for in stitu tion al forces to
argu e cou n ter-UW activities an d th eir preparation s will be destabilizin g, escalatory, or
u n con trollable du e to th e cen tral role of su rrogates. Regardless of th e down sides of cou n t er-
UW, th e altern ative—givin g adversaries strategic advan tage th rou gh u n opposed u se of
su rrogates an d proxies —will always be worse.

27
By Nicholas Malay, NSWC Carderock Division Public Affairs
Th e Stiletto Maritim e Dem on stration Program con du cted a Capability Dem on stration April 13 -
24, in su pport of th e Ch ief of Naval Operation s (CNO) to assess n ew con cepts for com m an d an d
con trol an d m u lti-sen sor fu sion tech n ologies for sm all vessels. Th e dem on stration was
execu ted th rou gh a partn ersh ip with th e CNO’s Rapid In n ovation Cell (CRIC) off th e Virgin ia
coast n ear J oin t Expedition ary Base Little Creek -Fort Story, in Virgin ia Beach , Virgin ia.
Du rin g th e two-week dem on stration , system developers from private in du stry assem bled th eir
com pon en ts in to rapidly recon figu rable m ission packages to perform m aritim e com m an d,
con trol, com m u n ication s, com pu ters, in telligen ce, su rveillan ce an d recon n aissan ce (C4ISR)
m ission s aboard th e Stiletto in a realistic m aritim e en viron m en t. Th e Stiletto program is a
m aritim e dem on stration platform th at serves as a prototype dem on stration tool for in du stry,
govern m en t laboratories an d academ ic in stitu tion s.
Th e Stiletto Maritim e Dem on stration Program is spon sored by th e Rapid Reaction Tech n ology
Office in th e Depu ty Assistan t Secretary of Defen se for Em ergin g Capability & Prototypin g to
rapidly evalu ate an d m atu re em ergin g tech n ologies in a realistic m aritim e en viron m en t .
En gin eers an d tech n ician s with specialized expertise in m aritim e tech n ology from Naval
Su rface Warfare Cen ter, Carderock Division 's (NSWCCD) Norfolk detach m en t m ain tain th e
craft an d operate th e program .
Stiletto person n el partn ered with th e CRIC an d coordin ated with Navy Expedition ary Com bat
Com m an d (NECC) to create th e Adaptive Force Package Littoral Operation s Cen ter (AFP LOC),
a con figu ration of m aritim e rapidly recon figu rable C4ISR m ission packages to perform join t
an d coalition m aritim e operation s.
AFP LOC provides com m an d an d con trol an d m u lti-sou rce sen sor fu sion for sm all vessels an d
au xiliary m aritim e platform s th at typically do n ot h ave th ese organ ic capabilities on board.
Adaptive force packages are essen tially th e person n el an d th eir associate d an alytical
equ ipm en t, wh ich can be tailored to m eet th e specific n eeds of a given m ission .
AFP LOC h as th ree prim ary com pon en ts: in frastru ctu re (e.g., an ten n a cablin g, patch pan els
an d power); backbon e (e.g., com pu ter system s, n avigation , radar an d weapon system s); an d
sen sor packages – wh ich are m ission specific an d m ay be h ardware or software based. All
system s are m odu lar an d able to be carried on an d set u p on th e AFP LOC in frastru ctu re in
less th an 24 h ou rs.
However, vessels typically do n ot h ave AFP LOC organ ic capabilities on board. Accordin g to Rob
Tu tton , NSWCCD en gin eer an d m an ager of th e Stiletto Maritim e Dem on stration Program , “Th e
electrical an d secu rity in frastru ctu re m u st be bu ilt in to th e vessel in advan ce, wh ich requ ires
tim e an d fu n din g, bu t on ce th e in frastru ctu re is in stalled an d approved, th en th e AFP LOC
allows for easy in stallation an d rem oval with m in im al im pact to th e vessel’s n orm al
operation s,” said Tu tton . “I believe th is is th e tru e gen iu s beh in d th e AFP LOC th at will provide
savin gs an d in creased capability for th e Navy th at align s with th e CNO’s ‘Payloads Over
Platform s’ con cept.”
Th e CRIC’s AFP LOC Capability Dem on stration coin cides with th e Secretary of th e Navy’s
establish m en t of Task Force In n ovation (TFI) priorities to en s u re em ergin g operation al
capabilities, su ch as adaptive force packages, h ave a clear an d expedien t path to th e fleet. Th e
task force in clu des su bject m atter experts wh o h ave been ch arged with developin g a
com preh en sive in n ovation agen da for th e Navy an d Ma rin e Corps.
Innovation in Action - Adaptive Force Packages

28
Th e objectives were to dem on strate th e ability to set u p a rapidly recon figu rable operation s
cen ter on a large su rface craft capable of relayin g in form ation from oth er su rface an d air
platform s an d dem on strate th e ability to com m u n icate an d tra n sfer data with a lan d-based
tactical operation s cen ter via lin e of sigh t radio an d satellite n etworks.
“Th e C4ISR system s th e Navy cu rren tly fields on board sh ips are expen sive, slow to u pgrade
an d in stall, an d n early im possible to recon figu re for a ch an ge in m ission ,” CRIC Project Lead
Lt. J ason Kn u dson said. “As a resu lt, we on ly field fu ll C4ISR system s on ou r carriers,
destroyers, am ph ibiou s sh ips an d cru isers. We asked th e qu estion , ‘How m igh t we m ake C4ISR
m ission packages rapidly recon figu rable?’ We are determ in ed to break ou t of th e old m odel an d
take advan tage of n ew tech n ologies an d platform s of opportu n ity.”
Th e program also provided th e 25 participatin g in du stry partn ers an opportu n ity to receive
im m ediate en d-u ser feedback toward in creasin g tech n ology readin ess levels an d access to
direct operator in pu t.
Th e Capability Dem on stration was u n iqu e in th at each ven dor sign ed a Cooperative Research
an d Developm en t Agreem en t (CRADA) with Carderock Division specifically developed for th e
Stiletto Maritim e Dem on stration Program . Th e Capability Dem on stration 's requ irem en ts led Dr.
J oseph Teter, NSWCCD director of tech n ology tran sfer an d Depu ty Director Alyssa Littleston e,
to develop an d execu te a n ew type of lim ited -pu rpose CRADA allowin g private in du stry t o brin g
th eir tech n ology an d expertise on to th e at -sea dem on stration platform . Each agreem en t
facilitates th e exch an ge of th e data collected between th e Navy an d th e com pan y. Sin ce th is is
n ot a tradition al acqu isition process, th ese official agreem en ts we re n ecessary to allow th e
govern m en t an d private com pan ies to work togeth er on research an d design .
“Th e ven dors were en cou raged to work with oth er ven dors to rapidly in tegrate th eir in dividu al
tech n ologies in to a system of system s to overcom e capability gaps,” said Tu tton .
“At th is tim e, we are forced to take ou r assets with capability an d pu sh th em to wh ere we n eed
access. Often , th is in volves takin g a m u lti-billion dollar in vestm en t off station wh en oth er
platform s are available, bu t m ay n ot h ave th e capability,” Kn u dson said. “We are sayin g pu sh
ou t th e capability, n ot the platform . Make it m an -portable. Make you r platform s plu g-an d-play
ready. By doin g th is, we can m ake th e CNO’s con cept of ‘Payloads Over Platform s’ a reality.”
With Navy Expedition ary Com batan t Com m an d an d Navy Expedition ary In telligen ce
Com m an d’s expertise in expedition ary operation s , Kn u dson said h e h opes to see NECC an d
NEIC, am on g oth ers, operatin g AFP LOC m ission s in th eater by th e en d of th e year.
Two scen arios were con du cted daily to dem on strate h ow th e AFP LOC will h elp optim ize
com m an d an d con trol capabilities: a h igh -valu e target in terdiction scen ario an d a
h u m an itarian assistan ce disaster relief scen ario. To test rapid recon figu rability, th e AFP LOC
sh ifted between th ese drastically differen t m ission sets with in an h ou r.
In addition to th e Stiletto vessel, th ere was an 11 -m eter rigid-h u lled in flatable boat an d oth er
Carderock-own ed assets, su ch as jet skis, th at were u sed as n eeded depen din g on th e
requ irem en ts of th e dem on stration .
“For th is dem on stration , th e CRIC was assessin g adaptive force packages wh ile ou r sm aller
craft sim u lated sm all boat th reats, CRIC an d Stiletto person n el alon g with system s developers
tracked item s of in terest from th e Stiletto’s Com m an d In form ation Cen ter,” Tu tton said.
Th e n ext Stiletto Maritim e Dem on stration will be in fall 2015.

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