1. Issues Surrounding Neuroenhancement and the Rise of Nootropics
by
Ezekeal D. Grounds
AN ESSAY
Submitted to the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
Wayne State University,
Detroit, Michigan,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
M.A. IN PHILOSOPHY
May 2014
Major: Philosophy
Approved:
Adviser Date
2nd Reader Date

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Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………......................... 2
Section 1…………………………………………………………………………………….……. 5
Setting the Stage: Physiological Enhancement by Professional Athletes
Section 2………………………………………………………………………………………….15
Cognitive Enhancers: Steroids for the Mind
Section 3………………………………………………………………………………………….24
Nootropics: Removing disutility from cognitive enhancement
Section 4………………………………………………………………………………………….30
Distributive Justice: Avoiding further social stratification
Section 5………………………………………………………………………………………….36
Concluding Thoughts

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Neuroenhancement is a burgeoning medical field that presents possibilities which we
have never before seen in our society; individuals can now provide themselves with a significant
boost to their cognitive function by using pharmaceuticals. The ability to enhance ourselves
physically through the use of steroids has existed for quite some time and has generated an
extensive discussion regarding the ethics of steroid use, both in and out of competition. I believe
a similar, if not greater, depth of discussion is required of neuroenhancement. This essay
concerns a subtype of cognitive enhancers classified as Nootropics (pronounced “new-tropics”).
These substances possess the usual benefits of cognitive enhancers, such as improved memory,
concentration, decision-making skills, or pattern recognition. What distinguishes Nootropics
from cognitive enhancers at large is that they are pure utility; Nootropics have no significant
disutility; they possess all of the upsides of cognitive enhancers and none of the downsides. An
example of such a substance is Modafinil: individuals who regularly take Modafinil gain
increased wakefulness, increased attention-span, and concentration “for free”, essentially,
without forming dependence on the substance.
It is not difficult to argue against the enhancement of cognition when adverse health
effects are a clear and present danger. I feel that the same arguments will be insufficient when it
comes to handling Nootropics since they lack the problematic features (i.e. health concerns) of
other cognitive enhancers. Some believe that any discussion regarding neuroenhancement is
merely a “phantom debate”, unnecessary because such discussion regards “a technology that will
probably never materialize.”1 These aforementioned naysayers find it outlandish to think that
such a powerful enhancer could exist while lacking negative side-effects. Though I appreciate
the pragmatic approach of handling issues that are likely to be real issues in the near future
1 Quednow, B., “Ethics of neuroenhancement: a phantom debate”

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rather than the issues presented by hypothetical super-powered Nootropics, the potential issues
tied to the advent of such technology are serious enough to warrant a thorough analysis before
even the weakest brain drugs begin circulating throughout society2. Other commentators share
my belief that the future of our society will be heavily influenced by the proliferation of
cognitive enhancers:
“Humanity’s ability to alter its own brain function might well shape history as powerfully
as the development of metallurgy in the Iron Age, mechanization in the Industrial
Revolution or genetics in the second half of the twentieth century”3.
Given the opportunity to discuss the ethics of a highly desirable technology before it becomes
readily available, it seems apparent to me that we should start the conversation: why risk an
ethical emergency when the issue can be dealt with prior to it becoming a pressing matter?
In an effort to facilitate the conversation, this essay will highlight some potential issues that
will arise with the advent of neuroenhancement. Before discussing Nootropics explicitly, I will
first discuss the present day use of pharmaceutical enhancement; namely, I will consider how
anabolic steroid use is handled in professional athletics and discuss the reasoning behind steroids
illegality. I will then show how the conclusions can apply to cognitive enhancement just as it
does for physical enhancement, thus establishing why Nootropics do not possess the sufficient
conditions for illegality. Secondly, I will review the ongoing debate surrounding cognitive
enhancers to better understand the ethical issues that surround the modification of intellect and
how that will differ from the modification of physical prowess. Additionally, the section on
cognitive enhancers will handle objections that claim the debate surrounding neuroenhancement
2 By “circulatingthrough society”I mean society atlarge, not the small sects thatare currently accessingsuch
substances via prescription.
3 Farah et al.,“Neurocognitive Enhancement: What can we do and what should we do?”

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is “phantom” in nature and unnecessary to discuss. Having laid sufficient groundwork, I will
then move on to Nootropic substances since they evade some of the counter-arguments that are
applicable to the use of steroids and non-Nootropic cognitive enhancers. Our discussion of
Nootropics will also delve into the treatment vs. enhancement distinction that medical
professionals are required to make and explain why this distinction makes it likely that
Nootropics will be an over-the-counter supplement as opposed to a prescription medication,
which will facilitate widespread access and use. Finally, I will utilize Rawls’ notion of Primary
Goods4 to show the large impact that such widespread use will have on fundamental aspects of
society and will also address some hypothetical cases regarding their use and distribution. I
intend to establish that, even if use of the substances themselves is not morally reprehensible,
issues of distributive justice can lead to exclusive use and unfairness in distribution (and thus
further stratification) in our society.5 Hopefully, this discussion of Nootropics will show the
necessity of discussing the ethics of neuroenhancement in the present rather than waiting until it
is too late.
4 I work with the assumption thatwe acceptRawls’conception of Primary Goods and their importance in society.It
is not within the scope of this essay to validatehis view.
5 I should note that this essay is notan attempt to resolve moral issues of neuroenhancement or suggest effective
policy for regulation.I do not pretend to offer solutions;I merely desireto highlightthe problems and facilitate
discussion.Additionally,itshould bestated that this topic is relatively new and the evidence and information
surroundingneuroenhancement is often conflicting.Rather than tryingto claimthatthe evidence is rightor wrong,
I am willingto grant the differingconclusionsthatresultfrom the interpretation of the data.My intention is to
followthe lines of argumentation that result from those interpretations and explain the strengths or shortcomings
of those arguments.

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1. Setting the Stage: Physiological Enhancement by Professional Athletes
With multi-million dollar salaries on the line, it is completely understandable why athletes
would desire to acquire any available edge that they can to improve their performance both on
the field and in the weight-room. Their profession is defined by competition and athletes are
willing to go to extreme lengths to create a competitive advantage. Rigorous training regimes,
scientifically-formulated diets to maximize muscle growth and energy, and professional personal
trainers all contribute to maximizing the potential of the athlete in their particular sport/event.
There are limits to such maximization due to the inherent limits of the human body so it seems
natural that the next step in maximizing an athlete’s potential lies in increasing this natural cap
on human physical potential. Anabolic steroids provide the solution to this problem: an athlete
using steroids can train harder, for longer, and more often than his competitors, stretching the
limits of human strength and endurance to provide the extra strength or agility to outperform
their opponent. Such a powerful advantage comes at a cost: steroids wreak havoc upon the
physiology of those who take them causing increased aggression, high blood-pressure, damaged
immune system function, anxiety, mania, and even suicide6. These substances provide a huge
benefit… but at an equally high cost.
Steroids’ impact is not limited to the health of the athletes; Fairness is another highly
important facet of athletic competition that also suffers when steroids are used. If the purpose of
an athletic competition is to gauge the athletic accomplishments of each side in an effort to
determine which athlete or team is superior, the use of performance-enhancing substances hardly
deserves to be called an accomplishment and does not fit into the metric used to establish a
victor. Those who are critical of steroid use believe we should “think of each competitive sport
6 "Anabolic Steroids and Suicide - A Brief Review of the Evidence". Thinksteroids.com.2005-07-12.

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as designed to test certain forms of human excellence, such as strength, speed, strategic cunning,
endurance, courage, or grace.”7 The banning of steroids, in addition to protecting athletes from
the negative impact of steroid use on personal health, maintains the integrity of the competition;
everyone should be on relatively equal footing with the acquisition of positive character traits
(such as a strong work ethic) being the determining factor in the athlete’s success rather than a
measurement of how many steroids they can take without killing themselves8. For other athletes,
the cost-benefit analysis leans in favor of increased performance on the field, consequences be
damned. In gauging the important qualities of their sport, fair and equal competition appears to
be secondary to victory for steroid-users.
The issue of fairness in competition warrants further discussion, as it will be of central
importance to the later discussions of large-scale Nootropic use. Asking “what is it for a state of
affairs to be fair?” will not get us the answer we’re looking for; fairness in a competitive
environment is much different than fair treatment in general. It would be incorrect to say a
competition is fair if all athletes enter the competition on equal footing; the disparity between the
skills and conditioning of the athletes is what allows for a competition in the first place! Given
what has already been said about steroid use, I would put forth the following as a possibility: a
competition is fair if there are no advantages available to certain athletes that are inaccessible to
other athletes. It may be the case, on occasion, that some athletes will possess some cutting-edge
training program or the like that will provide them with an advantage over their fellow
competitors. Such cutting-edge technology (conceptual or actual) is not inaccessible to athletes;
some competitors will simply seek it out more readily than others and, thus, gain a competitive
advantage in a fair manner.
7 Whitehouse et al.“EnhancingCognition in the Intellectual Intact”

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This prior interpretation of fairness is relatively simple and is likely flawed. One immediately
noticeable flaw is that the prior notion of fairness in competition fails to consider the natural
talents of the athletes9. Some athletes are bound to possess more natural aptitude for certain
sports than others: it will be very difficult to compete in the NBA if someone is 5’6, for example.
It may be the case that we must simply accept this issue; not everyone is cut out to be a
professional athlete. I acknowledge that, due to natural talent, some athletes have an innate
advantage over others which appears to be highly unfair. Any proposed solution that would give
certain athletes the right to use steroids to compensate for lack of natural talent would be
questionable due to the difficulty in assigning a precise value to the advantage their natural talent
provides them. It may just be that some people are not born to be athletes; by the same token
(and more relevantly for later discussions), some people are not born to by physicists.
Placing importance on fairness in competition does not solve the problem of steroids. If
anything, it actually allows steroids as part of a fair competition, since they are in no way
inaccessible to athletes (outside of their illegality, but the ludicrous salaries of professional
players tend to make that a non-factor). It also would support the use of steroids to make the
competitions more “fair”, since steroids can counter-balance the disparity in natural aptitude
between athletes. It also does not account for the aforementioned naturally talented athletes.
Given equivalent skill and conditioning, a 6’6 athlete will possess an advantage over the 5’6
athlete in a game of basketball; this advantage could be lessened if the short athlete had access to
HGH (i.e. human growth hormone) earlier in his life, allowing him to increase his future height.
It may be that we have to address the nature of competition rather than the nature of fairness to
discover the root of the problem, since fairness runs into all sorts of issues that are not really at
the heart of my concerns. Despite the fact that considerations of fairness will fail to solve the
9 I’m indebted to Ryan Fanselowfor this observation.

9. 8
moral problems surrounding steroid use, it bears mentioning since considerations of fairness will
be relevant in later discussion cognitive enhancers and Nootropics.
As stated earlier, a competition is intended to measure certain forms of human excellence.
Unless we consider one’s willingness to permanently damage one’s mind and body for
enhancement as a form of human excellence, steroids seem to run counter to the intentions of
competition. The danger that steroids poise to the health of athletes and to the health of the
competitive environment in which they participate necessitates an official stance from the
powers that govern professional athletics: Are we willing to allow the use of dangerous
substances to increase performance? If some athletes are willing to go the extra mile, even by
endangering their health, should we prevent them for doing so? Is it fair to allow the use of
steroids knowing that not all athletes are willing to risk their health for performance? Answers to
these questions have an important bearing on our future discussion of cognitive enhancers, so we
should endeavor to examine them and provide acceptable answers. The American College for
Sports Medicine offers a pretty telling position on the use of steroids in athletics:
The “win at all cost” attitude that has pervaded society places the athlete in a precarious
situation. Testimonial evidence suggests that some athletes would risk serious harm and even
death if they could obtain a drug that would ensure their winning an Olympic gold medal.
However’ the use of anabolic-androgenic steroids by athletes is contrary to the ethical
principles of athletic competition and is deplored.10
Given that this is the stance taken by the American College of Sports Medicine (a reputable
source in the athletic world), we have a good baseline for addressing the prior questions
ourselves.
10 American College of Sports Medicine. “Position Stand on The Use of Anabolic-Androgen Steroids in Sports”

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Most substances have had their use deemed perfectly legitimate: a myriad of protein powders
and energy supplements exist which are perfectly acceptable for athletes to use in their quest to
excel. The widespread acceptance of such supplements is telling: provided that the things you
put in your body are not harmful, you can use them to your heart’s content (or discontent, in the
case of some energy supplements). The prior assertion is actually weaker than the stance held by
our society at large given the widespread prevalence of addictive substances such as caffeine,
nicotine, and alcohol. We accept that they may cause adverse health effects and continue to
allow their use in society despite their problematic nature. More realistically, we accept the
following: provided that the things you put into your body are not too dangerous, you can use
them to your heart’s content. Not everyone is dissuaded from using substances that are too
dangerous, however: year after year athletes are caught using steroids to give themselves an
edge. Without policies banning the use of anabolic steroids it is likely that other athletes would
also perform a poor cost-benefit analysis and sacrifice years of healthy living for a larger salary
or the potential esteem of winning a championship. Should we prevent athletes from going the
extra mile if it endangers their health? The pressure to succeed drives these athletes to destroy
their well-being if provided with the means; the correct solution thus far has been to outlaw the
means that lead to such disastrous results.
What about freedom of choice and personal liberty? Of course, some athletes are going to use
dangerous steroids that ruin the long-term health and shorten their life-spans, but is that not their
decision? Smokers destroy their body via cigarettes but we do not stop them from doing so; we
allow them to continue using a substance with adverse health effects despite knowing its effects.
Running an analogy between nicotine and anabolic steroids misses the point: smoking does not
have the same impact that steroid use does. Smoking does not change the landscape of fair an

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equal competition in society at large, since you do not need nicotine to compete with your peers.
In athletic competitions, you are at a severe disadvantage if you decide to be “clean” but compete
against “dirty” athletes. Concerns regarding freedom of choice and personal liberty are equally as
applicable to arguments for the banning of steroids as it is to allowing them. If we allow the use
of steroids, it becomes exceedingly difficult for athletes that are not doping (i.e. the term for
steroid use used by the ACSM11) to compete. In granting doping athletes the freedom to use
steroids, you remove the freedom of choice from “clean” athletes.
Arguments that “clean” athletes still maintain the freedom of choice are simply incorrect.
Refraining from steroid use hamstrings athletes who desire to be competitive, as they cannot
hope to compete with “dirty” athletes. Though they still have a choice, it is hardly a fair one: use
steroids to compete or fail to be competitive. Given the earlier comparison with nicotine, it
seems unlikely that we disallow the use of anabolic steroids because they negatively impact the
health of the user. Rather, it seems like the banning of anabolic steroids has less to do with the
negative health effects for individual athletes and more to do with the health of the competition
as a whole (i.e. considerations of fairness). If we remove considerations of adverse health effects
from our argument in favor of banning anabolic steroids, the situation becomes more difficult to
handle.
Though the adverse health effects of steroids are certainly a good reason for their illegality, I
do not believe that health concerns are at the heart of the issue. Imagine a world in which
“perfect” steroids have been synthesized. Assume that these compounds possess all of the
positive effects of anabolic steroids but do not ravage the physiology of the user. If anabolic
steroids lacked the negative health effects that they currently do, would they still be banned?
11 American College of Sports Medicine

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Maybe, there are other considerations we must address first. Assuming that those “perfect”
steroids are legal and not yet banned we must attend to issues of equal access: what if some
athletes have access to steroids while others do not? If access is limited, it is clearly wrong to
allow the use of these perfect steroids. Given the relatively small pool of players and ludicrous
incomes (by comparison to the wealth of professionals in other fields), it seems unlikely that
professional athletes will struggle to acquire steroids. If all athletes have an equal opportunity at
an enhancement option (as with any of the other means they possess in their profession to
enhance themselves), it becomes much more difficult to argue against steroid use. Given that
athletes make the choice to do a number of things to their bodies to improve their performance,
why should taking steroids (provided that they are not destructive to health) be any different?
It is difficult to extricate oneself from this sticky question. The use of steroids provides a
clear competitive advantage over other athletes and, if the use were the norm rather than the
exception, it would become difficult to compete if an athlete were not playing “dirty”. Does this
mean they have no choice in the matter? Of course not: an athlete has the freedom to decide
against taking steroids… at the risk of losing his starting position to another player who has
fewer qualms about “juicing up”. So does the athlete really have the freedom to choose in the
issue? It is not clear that they do. Loss of livelihood, which is synonymous with failing to be
competitive in their line of work, is the proverbial gun held to the head of an athlete as they
decide whether or not to use steroids. Yet it remains to be seen as to how steroids truly differ
from the current and conventional means for enhancing one’s physiology: if the players have
chosen to live a very rigorous lifestyle already, sacrificing many freedoms that they could have
otherwise had, it seems like using steroids would be just another one of those sacrifices.

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I believe that the difficulty inherent in this discussion comes from a few sources. Firstly,
there is the aforementioned treatment vs. enhancement distinction (which will be covered in
more detail later) that concerns medical professionals: pharmaceuticals are intended to heal ills
or prevent diseases, not enhance one’s capacity in a given realm12. Steroids, in this case, are not
healing any ills: these substances are strictly being used to increase physical aptitude. Intuitively,
it feels wrong to force athletes to take drugs to be competitive and this prior consideration may
partially explain why. Intuition, however, fails as a sufficient justification for banning a harmless
substance with all upside. One could easily ask the following: “Well where does it all end? If
bionic arms and legs become safe and affordable, would we expect athletes to replace their limbs
for the sake of being competitive?” Despite the slippery slope that this question leads us down, it
is relevant to mention to highlight the vagueness hovering about the issue. It is true that policy-
makers have drawn the line at anabolic steroids: steroids, and anything more drastic, are off-
limits. Such a conclusion is totally understandable given the dangerous nature of the substances.
Removing the issue of health, it becomes unclear where to draw the line. Any account of the
“unfair competitive advantage” that a particular means of enhancement will provide will be
likely to fail given the earlier statements regarding natural talent. Given the varying athletic
potential of athletes, it is difficult to show how much of an advantage any individual athlete will
gain over his peers through use of a particular means of enhancement. If everyone has access to
it, why is it unfair? What constitutes an “unfair competitive advantage”? These questions require
much more consideration before they can be answered, so we will return to them later while
discussing cognitive enhancers. Returning to the matter at hand, we must still try and pinpoint
the particular aspect of steroid use that makes it so morally reprehensible.
12 This treatment vs. enhancement debate will be further covered duringthe discussion of cognitiveenhancers,but
bears mentioning here as well.

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Even without the adverse effects on long-term health, steroid use may be morally
questionable due to the lack of effort it requires. While a non-steroid user may spend three hours
a day exercising, stretching, and eating healthily, I may be able to dope and hit the gym for an
hour a day (with weekends off, even) to put on just as much muscle and, if I possess at least
marginal knowledge about physical fitness, look just as good. Something about the prior
example reeks of unfairness, though exactly how it is unfair may be questionable. It may be that
the athlete that engages in doping misses out on acquisition of commendable features such as a
strong work ethic, perseverance, or dedication. Quantifying such positive qualities and attaching
them reliably to the physical self-improvement that athletes engage in seems a tenuous process at
best. Though it deserves mention, I have little more to say on that particular vein of
argumentation, since it only tangentially is related to the direction which I wish to take. For now,
it will suffice to mention that we should consider the virtuous qualities that may be missed out on
by individuals engaging in pharmaceutical enhancement.
The use of steroids and the policies that outlaw them provide us interesting insight into our
present-day treatment of self-enhancement in competitive environments. We are willing to
accept consumption of substances with negative health effects provided that their consumption is
incentivized by success. Even so, there is a vague limit on the negative health effects that we
accept. That being said, it appears that the more concerning feature of enhancement relates to the
integrity of the competition one is participating in than the health of that individual who is
engaged in enhancement. The integrity of the competition is not threatened provided that the
substance can be accessed by all competitors, yet restricting access to only a subset of
competitors provides an unfair advantage to that subset and is therefore questionable. These
considerations, despite regarding physical enhancement specifically, should be kept in mind

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when discussing cognitive enhancement, as these concepts will carry over nicely into the
discussion of neuroenhancement.

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2. Cognitive Enhancers: Steroids for the Mind
Though the previous discussion of steroid use provides a model for how we should create
policy regarding access to and use of enhancing substances, it fails to adequately represent the
scale of the problems created by neuroenhancement. While anabolic steroids provide a means to
enhance the physical aspects of one’s body, uses for such enhancement are limited. Cognitive
enhancement is much more ubiquitous; it is easy to see how enhancing the mind would be
hugely beneficial in everyday life. Though the increased size of the target population does not
necessarily make the regulation of cognitive enhancers more important and meaningful than the
regulation of steroids, it certainly does not make it any less important given the already high
demand for such substances in society. This demand can be easily seen from the current situation
on the east coast of the United States: producers of Modafinil have struggled to keep up with the
demand for the wakefulness promoting agent13. Given that the substance is only intended for
those with narcolepsy or shift-work sleep disorder it seems highly unlikely that all of the
Modafinil being prescribed is used legitimately, considering that only 1 in 3000 Americans
suffers from narcolepsy14 and that the definition of shift-work sleep disorder is very flexible and
easily abused.
Use of substances such as Adderall or methylphenidate (i.e. Ritalin) show our willingness
to use drugs to enhance ourselves rather than to treat illnesses: popular studies make wild claims
about the excessive use of Ritalin and Adderall claiming that anywhere from 5% to 35% of the
student population use these cognitive enhancers to academic performance15. Regardless of the
actual number of non-prescription Adderall and Ritalin users in our nation, it is clear that at least
13 Kolker, "The Real Limitless Drug Isn’t Just for Lifehackers Anymore."
14 http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/narcolepsy/detail_narcolepsy.htm
15 Ragan et al.“What should be do about student use of cognitive enhancers? A analysisof currentevidence”

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some students have tried using pharmaceuticals to increase their productivity and cognitive
functioning to gain an edge on their peers. Given our earlier discussion of enhancement in
professional athletics via steroids it should not be all that surprising that the highly competitive
field of higher education has a similar problem. Commentary on performance enhancing
substances is highly concerned with the advent of a “pharmaceutical arms race”: in environments
where performance enhancing substances are not monitored closely, their use will flourish and
provide an unfair advantage to unscrupulous competitors.
Given that the rates of stimulant prescription tend to be highest in affluent schools (and
in some documented cases well above the prevalence of DSM-IV ADHD), it is
reasonable to surmise that some parents have already entered their progeny in a
pharmacologic performance arms race.16
Evidence leans heavily in favor of the proliferation of neuroenhancement. Despite the already
significant advantage of affluence that some students possess, they still engage in enhancement
to compete with their peers (and, in all likelihood, are more able to do so due to their affluence).
Given the highly competitive nature of our society, this rise in use is far more likely to increase
and become more problematic as time goes on.
Though the evidence shows a potential rise in the use of both Modafinil and Adderall, it
would be fallacious to lump the two together in this discussion of cognitive enhancement.
Modafinil and substances such as Adderall are very distinct from one another in an important
way: the former counts as a Nootropic in addition to being a cognitive enhancer while the latter
is only seen as a cognitive enhancer. There will be more extensive discussion of Nootropics later
in this essay but, for now, we can highlight the comparison in this way: Modafinil is pure utility
and Adderall comes with negative side-effects (i.e. disutility). As an amphetamine, Adderall (i.e.
16 Whitehouse et al.“EnhancingCognition in the Intellectual Intact”

18. 17
mixed amphetamine salts) comes with the traditional list of side-effects associated with
stimulants: irregular heartbeat, low or high blood pressure, erectile dysfunction (or frequent
erections), and more dangerous, yet rarer, physiological effects and psychological effects ranging
from mood swings and irritability to anxiety and psychosis (for heavy users)17. Despite these
adverse health effects, non-prescription users are not dissuaded from acquiring Adderall as a
study-aid in the same way that professional athletes are not dissuaded from using steroids.
Though I have made a point thus far to state how the negative health effects of enhancers
are important considerations for our banning or restriction on such substances, I have also made
the point that our society is not entirely against the use of substances with negative health effects
in general. Let’s examine the earlier mentioned examples of nicotine and caffeine. Both are
commonly thought of as “bootleg” cognitive enhancers insofar as they help facilitate focus and
concentration to increase productivity. Or, at least, they are believed to do so. Even the potential
for enhancement creates habitual use: popular studies claim that 54% of Americans over the age
of 18 report drinking coffee regularly18.At risk of making a generalization, this places the
majority of the population in the position of accepting the addictive qualities of caffeine and the
potential withdrawal symptoms in the short-term, not to speak of the potential long-term health
effects19. The most interesting feature about this extensive use of coffee as a “bootleg” cognitive
enhancer is that caffeine is not a cognitive enhancer. Though it may indirectly effect arousal,
mood, or concentration, the effects tend to vary widely and have no direct effect on learning or
memory20. Examining caffeine use provides us with interesting insight into our discussion of
17 http://www.merckmanuals.com/professional/special_subjects/drug_use_and_dependence/amphetamines.html
18 http://www.statisticbrain.com/coffee-drinking-statistics/
19 Studies of longterm coffee consumption vary wildly in their conclusions fromhighly negativeto highly positive,
makingit nigh impossibleto claimwhether coffee is beneficial or harmful in thelong run. This confusion has not
dissuaded use,however.
20 Nehlig, Astrid. “Is Caffeine a cognitiveenhancer?”

19. 18
enhancement. It highlights the human desire for means of boosting our energy, productivity, or
cognitive faculties (not strictly in our society, either; coffee is a worldwide addiction), even with
limited benefits and awareness of the costs. A majority of the adult population still drinks coffee
(not to speak of energy drinks or caffeine pills) to gain the perceived benefits while knowing of
the negative effects of caffeine dependency.
I am not trying to say that drinking coffee is the same as taking Modafinil. A more apt
comparison would say that taking caffeine pills is the same as taking Modafinil. The main
difference is that caffeine pills are easily purchased over-the-counter while Modafinil requires a
prescription: while we can easily purchase over-the-counter drugs with negative health effects to
enhance ourselves, we require the “ok” of a medical professional to obtain a prescription for a
healthier, more beneficial alternative. Unless I am a narcoleptic or work ridiculous hours that
remove my ability to sleep well, a doctor is not (technically) supposed to supply me with a
pharmaceutical wakefulness-promoting agent. What I wish to highlight here is the very odd
difference in how these substances are handled. Both substances promote wakefulness and
productivity. There is uncertainty in the long-term effects of both substances. Modafinil is an
actual cognitive enhancer21 while caffeine is not. Modafinil forms no physical dependency or
withdrawal symptoms while caffeine most certainly does. In an objective comparison it seems
highly unusual that Modafinil is viewed with far more suspicion than caffeine and requires a
prescription. It seems like the pharmaceutical nature of Modafinil must be the problematic
feature. Our society accepts common practices such as drinking coffee, smoking cigarettes (in
this case, begrudgingly accepts), or taking vitamin supplements to “enhance” ourselves, but
21 Turner et al.“Cognitive enhancingeffects of Modafinil in healthy volunteers”

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synthetic pharmaceuticals are where we draw the line even though they are very clearly superior
to the “bootleg” cognitive enhancers that we resort to using instead.
The hard line drawn on this point likely stems from a sort of “pharmaceutical Calvinism”
mentioned by the Whitehouse et al discussion of neuroenhancement. For the “pharmaceutical
Calvinist”, traditional/natural means to enhancing our cognition should be respected and praised,
while synthetic means to enhancing should be viewed with suspicion22. The real difficulties I see
with perspective are the terms ‘natural’ and ‘synthetic’. What counts as natural and what counts
as synthetic? For the pharmaceutical Calvinist, coffee seems to be a natural means to (indirect)
enhancement. If I remove the caffeine from the beans used to make that cup of coffee and create
a pill that makes it synthetic. I still receive the same amount of the same drug but the medium of
consumption, apparently, vastly changes how it should be viewed. Under this logic, a b-vitamin
would be morally condemnable; if you want b-vitamins you had better do your research and eat
the correct fruits and vegetables because, even though b-vitamins are good for you, taking a
synthetic b-vitamin supplement is potentially condemnable. I’m not entirely convinced by the
pharmaceutical Calvinist. Any form of preventative synthetic medication (which is not treatment,
per se, since it isn’t treating a current illness) would require suspicion, which seems
questionable. Additionally, the view would require us look down on purely beneficial substances
solely because they are synthetic. I am not sure why the synthetic-natural distinction carries such
moral weight but this perspective deserves representation as we continue the discussion of
cognitive enhancers.
Running a parallel thought experiment to the previous “perfect steroids” example, I wish
to ask the following question: if powerful cognitive enhancers were to exist without adverse
22 Whitehouse et al.“EnhancingCognition in the intellectually intact”

21. 20
health effects would their use be morally questionable? It may be that the “pharmaceutical
Calvinist” maintains their position and claims that it is morally reprehensible (or, at the
minimum, questionable) to use synthetic means to enhance one’s self. Others may make claims
that mirror one of my earlier concerns: the use of cognitive enhancers in and of themselves is not
morally reprehensible, but the proliferation of their use in society may lead to undesirable ethical
issues. Much like in the earlier example of “perfect steroids”, the use of cognitive enhancers will
be less morally questionable if they lack the negative health effects. I believe this reasoning ends
in a similar fashion to the steroid case; the problems of enhancement have less to do with the
health of the individual as it does with the maintenance of fairness within the group in which
enhancement is occurring.
The last issue that I’d like to handle before moving on to the topic of Nootropics is that of
the “phantom debate” argument. Boris B. Quednow claims, having reviewed
“Neuroenhancement: Ethik vor neuen Herausforderungen,”, that he is unconvinced that the
results point to powerful cognitive enhancers in the near future. He has two major issues with the
results. Firstly, he states that the cognitive enhancers in question are really just second-order
cognitive enhancers (much like caffeine). Secondly, he doubts claims that there has been a
significant increase in the use of such substances since they run counter to the actual evidence
provided by recent studies. Even if both of these points were valid, I do not see why they are
sufficient to stymie conversations regarding the ethics of neuroenhancement. Powerful second-
order cognitive enhancers may end up equally problematic in the future if their effects are potent
enough. I also fail to see how a small dip in the use of cognitive enhancers by society at large
means that, in the long term, that trend will continue. It is especially concerning that such studies
vary so widely on their results, leading me to believe that it is difficult to accurately measure the

22. 21
pulse of neuroenhancement in our society. If we struggle to accurately measure the use of
cognitive enhancers as is, it seems plausible that the problems of widespread neuroenhancement
could easily creep up on us.
To handle Quednow’s dismissive stance, let’s review the discussion of caffeine. Despite
caffeine’s failure to count as a first-order cognitive enhancer, it is still the most popular
psychoactive drug in the world23.Given that the effects of coffee provide second-order cognitive
enhancement, it makes some of Quednow’s claims seem queer:
“There is no increasing or epidemic use of cognitive enhancers to date, and it is unlikely
that such a trend will develop given that seemingly only a minority of the population is
interested in regular use.”24
In actuality, given the discussion thus far, it appears that a majority of the population is interested
in the regular use of substances that are only second-order cognitive enhancers provided that they
are accepted in society. Though Quednow also believes that the negative health effects of such
substances will diminish individuals’ desires to utilize such substances, caffeine provides an
excellent counter-example to this notion as well. People are clearly willing to accept small
disutility in acquiring the benefits of caffeine. Provided that a real cognitive enhancer or more
powerful second-order cognitive enhancer were to offer greater utility with similar disutility, I
see reasons to believe that such a substance would become very popular.
Of course, as Quednow would be quick to point out, these hypothetical substances do not
exist. Additionally, he does not believe that such substances will exist… not in the near future, at
least. This conclusion confuses me greatly for the following reasons. First, let me make a brief
23 Julien et al.“A Primer of Drug Action”
24 Quednow, B., “Ethics of neuroenhancement: a phantom debate”

23. 22
appeal to Moore’s Law and, more specifically, a phenomenon known as the Carlson Curve.
Though Moore’s Law specifically deals with the exponential growth of computing capacity, the
Carlson Curve is, in essence, Moore’s Law for biotechnology (specifically focused on DNA
sequencing, but applicable for our purposes)25. If medical technology were to improve at a static
rate, I can see justification for believing that powerful cognitive enhancers would not develop in
the near future. Given the exponential growth of information and technology in this day and age,
however, the advent of such technology seems much more likely than Quednow thinks. In all
fairness, Moore’s Law and the Carlson Curve are not natural laws and are in no way necessarily
the way such technologies will develop. These laws have been highly accurate in the past so I see
no reason to believe that they will fail to be accurate in the near future. For these reasons, I am
unconvinced that a debate regarding neuroenhancement is “phantom” in any sense of the word: it
appears to be a very real and tangible debate with the serious possibility of becoming a
concerning reality.
The current discussion of cognitive enhancers focuses mainly on the negative health
effects that stem from their use. I grant that the disutility inherent in the use of cognitive
enhancers provides excellent reason to argue against regular use. If cognitive enhancers have
potentially dangerous side-effects there is little to debate: healthy individuals should not take
medication that enhances them in some ways yet can damage them in others. It is for the prior
reason specifically that I am interested in Nootropics because they dodge the “negative side-
effects” complaint inherent to cognitive enhancers. The only other argument against the
proliferation of debate on the subject (i.e. the “Phantom Debate” claim) has hopefully been
shown to be unconvincing; the issue is more likely to escalate than to become a nonfactor as our
25 http://www.economist.com/node/7854314

24. 23
society moves forward. We are left needing further discussion regarding regulation due to
negative health effects on users. With steroids, our only option for removing the issue of adverse
health effects came through thought experiments alone. When it comes to cognitive enhancers,
Nootropics serve as the real-world analog to the “perfect steroid” thought experiment.

25. 24
3. Nootropics: Removing disutility from cognitive enhancement
Thus far, Nootropics have only been vaguely mentioned throughout this essay as a sort of
wonder drug capable of providing cognitive enhancement without the dangers of traditional
cognitive enhancers. There has been serious debate as to what substances actually count as
Nootropics. Very detailed medical accounts go much further than is necessary for the purposes
of this paper, but the initial classification criterion presented by Corneliu E. Giurgea should
provide sufficient insight into the type of substance we shall be discussing hereafter:
“The main features of the Nootropic profile consist of: (a) enhancement of learning
acquisition; (b) resistance to impairing agents; (c) facilitation of interhemispheric transfer
of information; (d) enhanced resistance to brain “aggressions”; (e) increased tonic,
cortico-subcortical “control”; and (f) absence of usual pharmacological effects of neuron-
psychotropic drugs.”26
It seems unnecessary that a Nootropic contain all of criterion listed in (a) through (e). Putting
Giugea’s classification into simpler terms, we can create the following profile for Nootropics as
they relate to our discourse:
For a substance to be designated as a Nootropic, it must meet two criteria:
(1) A substance must do at least one of the following:
(a) enhance learning
(b) improve resistance to distractions
(c) enhance executive function
(d) improve concentration
26 Giurgea, C., “Nootropic drugs” 1977

26. 25
(2) The substance should show an absence of the normal negative side-effects of neuro-
psychotropic drugs
Though (b) and (d) appear to be very similar, it is a necessary disambiguation between external
and internal factors that impede concentration; there may be a fundamental difference between
giving our brain the capability to filter out external stimuli as compared to filtering out its own
internal turmoil27. Executive function is a relatively vague term if we provide no further
definition: executive function should be taken to refer to our brains capacity when it comes to
working memory, reasoning, task flexibility, and problem solving28. Finally, (2) is potentially
suspect: some physicians and psychiatrists (Quednow, in particular) believe that, when it comes
to drugs, there can be no effect without a side-effect29. Nonetheless, there is no reason that the
side-effect of a drug is necessarily bad or, even if it is, that it is sufficiently bad to count as a
concern; taking too many b-vitamins could cause me to urinate more frequently, for example, yet
we would hardly see this side-effect as overly troubling.
Though I have provided a means to classify Nootropic substances, it may be more useful
to provide some examples of the types of substances that constitute real life examples of
Nootropics. Let us begin with substances that I’ll refer to as “minor Nootropics”: this class of
substances includes things like vitamin-B and omega-3 fish oils, healthy dietary supplements that
have been shown to facilitate good neurological functioning3031. These are substances that, for
the most part, are widely accepted by the public; no one expresses concerns about the use of
27 Seeing as how I am not a neuroscientist,I’ll refrain fromstatingthis claimwith certainty. Whether or not the two
differ is irrelevantto my argument, however, so briefly mentioning the distinction should suffice.
28 Monsell S. "Task switching"
29 Quednow “Ethics of Neuroenhancement: a phantom debate” pg 3.
30 Bryan, J., Calvaresi,E., “B Vitamins,Cognition,and Aging”
31 Ruxton, C. H. S., Reed, S. C., Simpson, M. J. A. and Millington,K. J. (2004), The health benefits of omega-3
polyunsaturated fatty acids:a review of the evidence

27. 26
these substances and many individuals already take them to improve their health and well-being.
On the other end of the spectrum, we have “major Nootropics”: substances like the
aforementioned Modafinil; pharmaceuticals that are more morally questionable and much more
potent than dietary supplements. Substances that are accepted by society despite adverse health
effects such as nicotine and caffeine, despite not being Nootropics, will be integral to
conversation about the morally questionable nature of these major Nootropics. They are clear
indicators that society is willing to accept a certain level of disutility to obtain an increase in
mental function or productivity, even if the substances in question are not technically cognitive
enhancers (as early established regarding caffeine in particular).
Since minor Nootropics are already a part of society and hardly anyone is concerned
about their use, major Nootropics are the substances that require further discussion. Just how
“major” are major Nootropics though? Not very, at present, yet capable of showing statistically
significant cognitive enhancement. A study performed by Turner et al. found that Modafinil
improved attention and alertness, allowed for speedier decision-making, and reduced errors in
pattern recognition.32 There is certainly utility to be gained by taking Modafinil: long days at the
office become easier with increased alertness, improved concentration, and enhanced executive
function (e.g. decision-making and pattern-recognition). These effects are certainly a boon
regardless of the particular type of work being done. And what of negative side-effects that
would declassify Modafinil as a nootropic? The study found that Modafinil slightly increased
systolic blood pressure (i.e. blood pressure during heartbeat) and the effect appeared to continue
for those taking Modafinil over time. Despite this, the increase failed to reach statistical
significance and, hence, fails to be a sufficiently negative side-effect to declassify Modafinil as a
32 Turner et al.,“Cognitive enhancingeffects of Modafinil in healthy volunteers.”

28. 27
nootropic. Even if Modafinil were to show statistically significant increases in blood pressure, it
does not follow that we would condemn its use, especially given that the popular “bootleg”
cognitive enhancers such as nicotine and caffeine have a similar physiological effect.
While on the subject of side-effects, it should be mentioned that Nootropics present a bit
of a conundrum for the medical community that relates to the treatment vs. enhancement
distinction mentioned earlier. Fundamentally, modern medicine is focused on treatment rather
than enhancement of patients. The objective of medical professionals is to bring individuals who
are below the standard of health and bring them up to that standard. The cognitive enhancing
substances that have been mentioned thus far, such as Adderall or Modafinil, require a
prescription: a doctor must believe that you possess a condition that forces you to operate below
the normal level of human functioning before providing a prescription. A large variety of
medication exists, however, that is over-the-counter (i.e. does not require a prescription) and
removes a medical professional from the decision entirely. These substances can be both for
treatment (e.g. Nyquil, Ibuprofen, etc.) or enhancement (e.g. vitamin supplements) and although
a physician may recommend an enhancing supplement his recommendation is not necessary for
acquisition of that substance.
Since the treatment-enhancement distinction fails to illuminate the fundamental
difference between the substances that require a prescription as opposed to substances that you
can purchase without consulting a professional (e.g. the earlier comparison of caffeine pills to
Modafinil), what is the determining factor? Any analysis which aims to separate prescription
from non-prescription medication will be quite difficult. Given that many prescription
medications are highly addictive, their potential for abuse could be targeted as a reason; an
appeal to a drug’s potential for misuse, addiction or overdose will fail to classify Nootropics as a

29. 28
drug that should require a prescription since Nootropics, by definition, have negligible risk of
addiction. The conundrum presents itself as follows: why should pharmaceutical Nootropics,
which can be used for either treatment or enhancement, require a prescription especially
considering that many minor Nootropics (e.g. b-vitamin supplements, omega-3 fish oils) are
currently over-the-counter? This question is highly important, since Nootropics will be much
more accessible to the general populace if such substances require no prescription.
Though I intuitively think that Nootropics should not require a prescription, I realize that
not everyone shares my intuition. I believe dissenters will be hard pressed to argue with my
intuition, however, if questioned about the over-the-counter nature of caffeine pills. If an
addictive psychoactive substance with high risk of dependency and potential for overdose is
allowable due to its ability to promote wakefulness and alertness, an less dangerous substance
with the same benefits should also be sold over the counter. Of course, one could claim that
caffeine pills should not be sold over-the-counter, but my point would still hold. Whatever stance
you take on allowing or disallowing the over-the-counter sale of wakefulness promoting agents,
your account cannot allow a substance like caffeine yet disallow a major Nootropic such as
Modafinil and still remain coherent, not even through an appeal to a natural vs. synthetic
distinction33. As long as our society accepts that substances such as caffeine pills are acceptable
for sale over-the-counter, Modafinil should be treated similarly. This result is very important to
this project: increased ease of access makes it all the more likely that the issue of
neuroenhancement will become highly important rather than a “phantom debate”.
At this point in time, no Nootropic is of a high enough potency to be a severely pressing
issue. Despite the recent developments surrounding Modafinil use, it is not sufficiently potent to
33 Unless you intend to argue that caffeinepills arenatural.

30. 29
create a large-scale change in the structure of society. I still hold, however, that the potential for
exponentially more powerful Nootropic substances makes the issue far more than a “phantom
debate”. Our highly competitive society has already shown that there is a real demand for
cognitive enhancers. Even if the substances do not create super human brains, providing the
slightest competitive edge will make their regulation an issue of utmost importance.

31. 30
4. Distributive Justice: Avoiding further social stratification
Despite claiming that is a real and urgent need to discuss the ethics of neuroenhancement,
I must still provide a descriptive account of the societal issues that will arise from the advent of
neuroenhancement. John Rawls provides a conceptual model that can quantify the problematic
effects that will result from the proliferation of neuroenhancement. In this section, I will view
some potential scenarios through the lens of Rawls’ discussion to establish the sort of problems
that arise through widespread access to neuroenhancement. Ultimately, I believe that the
proliferation of neuroenhancement threatens to violate the Rawlsian “difference principle”. This
violation, in addition to observations of the current state of our society, lends weight to my
concern that discussions of neuroenhancement should proceed with a sense of urgency.
The main reason that Nootropics will end up having a sizable impact is due to the
ubiquity of their potential application; our intellectual capabilities are important in almost all
aspects of daily life. If less advantaged members of society have difficulty acquiring these highly
important substances, they are likely to find it more and more difficult to escape their less “less-
advantaged” status. Using ideas put forth by Rawls, I would like to claim that the rise of
Nootropic use will have a large effect on persons’ access to “primary goods” which he uses as
the basis for establishing who counts as the “least privileged” members of society. Briefly, let’s
review what Rawls means by primary goods. For Rawls, “these are the various social conditions
and all-purpose means that are generally necessary to enable citizens adequately to develop and
fully exercise their two moral powers, and to pursue their determinate conceptions of the
good.”34 Rawls goes on to state that primary goods are not just things that are rational to want or
desire but are integral to the lives of people to help them be free and equal citizens. I am not
34 “Justice as Fairness:ARestatement”, pg.57

32. 31
trying to claim that access to Nootropics is a primary good itself. Instead, I believe that
Nootropics are important because they impact our general access to the primary goods.
Though any list of primary goods that we assemble is partially based on convention (i.e.
what we believe is important to life in society), the list that Rawls generates should be useful
since it is based in the structure of our American society. He establishes the following kinds of
goods as primary35:
(i) Basic rights and liberties: Freedom of thought and liberty of conscience
(ii) Freedom of movement (i.e. movement through different socioeconomic statuses) and free
choice of occupation
(iii) Ability to obtain positions of authority and responsibility
(iv) Income and wealth as all-purpose means to ends
(v) The social bases of self-respect, which are essential to our sense of worth as persons and our
ability to achieve our ends with confidence
So how exactly do Nootropics affect access to these primary goods? Recall that, at the moment,
these substances do not create superhuman cognition; they merely provide small boosts to
concentration, executive function, or memory. All of these enhancements economically impact
members of society. Individuals who possess more powerful forms of these cognitive features
are more desirable employees, more likely to be entrusted with important tasks, and more likely
to receive raises and promotions. Of the kinds of primary goods in the above list I am most
concerned with the impact of Nootropics upon (ii), (iii), and (iv).
35 This listis paraphrased for brevity.See pg58-59 of “Justice as Fairness:ARestatement” for the fully fleshed-out
entries.

33. 32
Before diving into exactly how Nootropics will affect specific primary goods, we should
address the societal conditions that would create issues of access. Let’s assume the following
scenario: Nootropics come in varying strengths and the quality of such substances is in some
way proportional to their cost. A minor Nootropic is not much different than a B-vitamin
supplement and affordable by everyone while a major Nootropic (e.g. facilitates executive
function or memory extensively by, say, providing a user with eidetic memory) and has a highly
prohibitive cost (e.g. requires a 6-digit salary to afford regularly). In this hypothetical situation, it
is clear that we’re going to run into some serious societal problems. Wealthy individuals who
already possess significant advantages due to their financial strength and social capital will be
able to further enhance themselves to the point where it becomes exceedingly difficult for
motivated, hard-working, intelligent members of lower financial brackets to compete. If such
individuals balk at using major Nootropics it then becomes impossible for them to compete
against their neuroenhanced peers in the workplace. Even if less wealthy individuals were to
engage in neuroenhancement, their enhancement would be less expensive and, likely, of lesser
quality. Our society would become further stratified and further impede movement up the
socioeconomic ladder.
Some clarifications are necessary given the extreme nature of the prior conclusion.
Firstly, one should be reminded that the prior scenario is hypothetical. There is no guarantee
Nootropics of such extreme potency are possible; we may never invent drugs capable of
producing photographic memory, halving reaction time, infinitely extending the duration of
intense concentration that a person is capable of, etc. Hypothetical Nootropics of this caliber help
facilitate the discussion due to their extreme nature: if we ever want to make clear statements

34. 33
about neuroenhancement we need to imagine the most extreme cases so that we can readily see
the problematic consequences of access gated by wealth.
Now that we have a hypothetical societal scenario in mind, let’s begin our discussion of
particular primary goods: freedom of movement amongst socioeconomic classes and free choice
of occupation [i.e. (ii)]. In general, employers aim to hire the most qualified individuals because
they will provide the highest quality (or quantity) of output for their profession36. Nootropics
directly impact the mental capacities that bear upon such output when it comes to white-collar
professions. Whether it is memory, concentration, or executive function, the enhancement
provided by Nootropics improves the ability of employees. Given the prior story, one could
claim that it is clearly wrong for a motivated, hard-working, intellectual to progress any further
socioeconomically due to lacking major Nootropics. It may be the case, however, that the
barriers I’ve considered are facades. As that individual climbs the socio-economic ladder they
will, in turn, be able to acquire the requisite substances for whatever rung they wish to advance
to via their enhanced means. While true, this objection misses the point. For some individuals,
the use of brain drugs will be unnecessary if they desire to climb the socio-economic ladder: their
own personal merit will be sufficient. At some point, however, they will be forced into making a
decision: Do they want to be competitive at this level if it means they have to take major
Nootropics? It may seem like the individual still has a choice, but the choice is illusory. The
choice to take major Nootropics is still available but the choice to advance further in their
professional life is not: that choice is made when the individual decides whether to engage in
neuroenhancement. Without engaging in neuroenhancement, individuals will struggle to compete
with their peers and find it difficult to surpass them.
36 Quality of employee is not the only criterion thatemployers look for (take affirmativeaction or nepotism, for
example), but it seems that it is generally the criterion that matters most.

35. 34
One only needs to look at our nation’s system of higher education to see that the prior
concern is very real and present. Regardless of one’s personal merit or qualifications, there is
only so far one can get in the professional realm without an advanced degree of some sort.
Analogously, the quality of your degree is often tied to the cost of attendance for the respective
university. The question of whether the cost is more reflective of the quality of the university’s
reputation or the quality of the education provided is irrelevant: if an employer believes that a
prestigious university is better, those attending lesser institutions end up at a disadvantage. There
are exceptions to this, obviously, such as the self-made millionaires who never finished college
yet clearly possess all of the skills or knowledge that they could have acquired through higher
education. These exceptions are not the general rule, however, and good policy tends to be
written based on the general state of affairs rather than by the exceptions. If I want to teach
philosophy at a prestigious university, I have no choice except to acquire a doctoral degree since
my peers, vying for the position will certainly do the same. In the same way that the prestige of a
graduate degree from a university may impact an individual’s access to the positions of power
and authority [i.e. Rawls’ primary good (iii)], Nootropics will have a similar impact. If I want to
become a senior developer in a software company, I may have no choice except to invest in
major Nootropics since my peers, vying for that position, will certainly be doing so.37
The issue with the prior case is the same one that arises earlier in this essay regarding the
use of “perfect steroids”. It is relatively easy to see why athletes would be disinclined to take
performance enhancing drugs that damage their bodies and cause debilitating health effects in
the long term. Even without those side effects, I intuitively find the notion of being forced into
37 There are disanalogies to be shown here: whileI can clearly ask a potential hireabouttheir educational history I
cannot ask them what drugs they’re on. I don’t think this is damningfor my example: maybe “affirmative” drug
tests will existwhere employers can require drug tests to see if candidates aretakingenhancingdrugs, as opposed
to lookingfor illicitdrug use.

36. 35
taking such substances to compete unpalatable due to athletes’ liberty being removed. Given the
large number of sacrifices to life and liberty that athletes already willingly make, it is difficult to
establish why the use of steroids that provide no disutility should be any different from other
sacrifices. For the average person, removing their choice to consume major Nootropics
highlights the issue more clearly given that they have to make fewer sacrifices to engage in their
profession than athletes do in theirs.38
In the realm of athletics, the affluence of the professionals provides equal access to the
best performance enhancing substances; unlike the state of affairs hypothesized previously (i.e.
Nootropics vary in quality in price, setting a limit on the quality one can access based on their
financial means), members of society at large do not possess the same level of affluence as
athletes and may find it difficult to acquire substances of sufficient quality. Affluence and access
varies across socio-economic tiers and may make the transition from “have-not” to “have” in our
society too vast of a gulf for the less fortunate to traverse. The issue of “access via affluence”
nicely highlights the impact that Nootropics have on our access to wealth as an all-purpose
means [i.e. Rawls’ primary good (iv)]. Not only does one require Nootropics to move up the
socioeconomic ladder in the first place, they require wealth to access the Nootropics of the
relevant potency, exacerbating the existing problems regarding distribution of wealth. Though
societal issues stemming from the disparity in wealth between our different socio-economic
classes are nothing new, the proliferation of neuroenhancement increases the severity of the
problem. The prior societal scenario (i.e. various strengths of Nootropics with varying costs),
though it is not likely to escalate to a eugenics issue reminiscent of Huxley’s “A Brave New
38 This sacrificeof individual liberty runs very closeto limitingaccess to basic rights and liberties [i.e.Rawls primary
good (i)]. I am not entirely convinced that it is a truly egregious violation of liberty,so it merely bears mention here
rather than meriting a full argument.

37. 36
World”, nonetheless concerns me. Something intuitively seems off in a situation where a
person’s bank account could dictate their intelligence rather than it being the other way around.
Rawls’ discussion provides strong support to my intuitions. Wealth determines
accessibility to Nootropics which, in turn, provides greater access to wealth; it is a feedback loop
that restricts access to primary goods. Rawls would not immediately see a problem with the
feedback loop; it would be unfair to characterize Rawls’ view of primary goods as a concern
about access to those goods in general. It is not the case that members of a more highly stratified
have no access to wealth as an all-purpose means, they merely have restricted access to greater
quantities of wealth. Appealing to Rawls’ discussion of primary goods is not sufficient for my
purposes since issues surrounding neuroenhancement will not completely remove access to
primary goods. My concerns can be quantified via appeal to Rawls’ “difference principle”. As a
schema for a system of distributive justice, the difference principle holds that a system is more
effective than another if it provides a greater return to less advantaged members of society than
the more advantaged39. Additionally, the existing inequalities in society are only permissible if
they benefit the least advantaged40. A society where wealth determines intellect and, in turn, that
intellect turns into more wealth, violates the difference principle. The combination of
neuroenhancement and the pre-existing inequality of wealth in society will more greatly benefit
the more advantaged and provide them with greater returns.
Though it is my belief that the more advantaged win out, it is possible the less-
advantaged may ultimately be provided with greater returns. The neuroenhancement of the more-
advantaged may lead to new advances in technology or changes in political thought that benefit
39 Rawls,John. “Justice as Fairness:A Restatement” pg. 63
40 Rawls,John. “Justice as Fairness:A Restatement” pg. 64

38. 37
the less-advantaged members of society. The benefits of the higher-quality neuroenhancement of
the wealthy trickles down and provide greater returns for the less wealthy. Though this view of
the matter seems plausible, I am unconvinced. I can imagine at least two problematic conditions
that must be met for this view to be acceptable. Firstly, it would require an affirmative evaluation
that the benefits reaped by the less advantaged are actually more valuable than the benefits
provided to the wealthy. Providing such a value judgment seems difficult and prone to invalid
equivocations. Secondly, the view must explain the unbalanced allocation of responsibility. It
needs to justify why, when it comes to being cutting-edge inventors, scientists, or policy-makers
the more-advantaged are more deserving of these roles than the less-advantaged. I struggle to
conceive of sufficient justification for a view that allows the more-advantaged members of
society to have a monopoly on esteem.
All of the aforementioned problems of distributive justice seem to disappear, however, if
all members of society have equal access to identical levels of neuroenhancement. There is no
need to invoke the difference principle. Let’s generate an equal access scenario: Nootropics are
readily available to everyone (over the counter or through the internet, no different than buying a
B vitamin supplement) and the cost is negligible. Everyone can access and afford Nootropics. In
this case, the choice whether or not to use such substances is entirely determined by an
individual’s opinion on Nootropic use rather than their social status, financial situation, or
physical location. Though this remedies problems of distributive justice, an equal access state of
affairs greatly complicates the issue of fairness in competition that has been mentioned
throughout this paper. In our previous examples regarding steroids and cognitive enhancers, we
could simply state that use of such substances was not in line with the “forms of human
excellence” metric that competitions were supposed to measure due to their problematic health

39. 38
effects. We could also go further, if necessary, to state that measuring the quality of those
substances is not the point of competition either, since it still misses the point of measuring a
form of human excellence. In an equal access state of affairs we have access to none of these
arguments: Nootropics won’t differ in quality in competitive environments, won’t have negative
health effects, and will be accessible to all competitors. Concerns about unfair advantages fall
away and it becomes much more difficult to object to widespread neuroenhancement. Though
concerns of fairness will no longer be an issue, the equal access scenario does not completely
solve the problems presented by neuroenhancement.
With unrestricted access to Nootropics, the refusal to enhance results in restricted access to
all of the aforementioned primary goods. Those who do not take Nootropics will quickly become
the least advantaged members of our society: they will struggle to move up the socioeconomic
ladder, will struggle to acquire positions of authority, and will have severely diminished access
to wealth. An equal access scenario also leads to questions surrounding self-worth and the ability
to achieve our ends with confidence, as put forth by (v). If major Nootropics are pure utility,
those who dislike the idea of using them would need to appeal to moral considerations to justify
their refusal to enhance. They are placed into a dilemma: they must either violate their
conscience (impacting their feelings of self-worth) or struggle against enhanced peers and lack
confidence in achieving their ends. Either way, they completely lack access to (v) and most
certainly count as “least advantaged” according to Rawls. Earlier discussions show the difficulty
of establishing Nootropics as morally problematic, leaving us with a difficult question: What
justification could anyone have to not take major Nootropics?
The answer to the prior question is tricky and I have no answer for it yet. The fact of the
matter is that the question needs an answer. I doubt that everyone will accept neuroenhancement

40. 39
with open arms; some individuals in our society will not desire to take major Nootropics and will
become significantly disadvantaged as a result. The more ubiquitous nature of cognitive
enhancers by comparison to their steroid counterparts increases the scale of the problem from
athletics to the majority of professional life in our society. As previously stated, this increase in
scale does not conceptually change the significance of the problem. It does, however, mean the
ethics surrounding Nootropic use will impact a large part of the population and questions about
their use and distribution should not be ignored.

41. 40
5. Concluding Thoughts
Having reached the end of this discussion about Nootropics, it is time to assess what has been
said thus far. Much like anabolic steroids, Nootropics are performance enhancing substances that
change the landscape of competitive environments in which they are used. Though Nootropics
have not yet shown benefits on par with the potency of anabolic steroids, it is plausible that they
may share similar potency in the near future through advances in pharmaceutical technology.
Though we can argue against powerful anabolic steroids or cognitive enhancers on the basis of
their negative health effects, these arguments are insufficient. Our willingness to accept the use
of drugs with notable disutility in our society makes the health of competition more
philosophically interesting than addressing the health concerns for the individuals who use them.
In order to maintain fair and equal competition in the cognitive realm, Nootropics would need to
be easily accessible by all levels of society so as to avoid further stratification of society by
allowing the “haves” to access more/better cognitive enhancers than the “have-nots”. Given that
Nootropics are enhancement rather than treatment (and lack adverse health effects), they need
not be prescribed by medical professionals and can instead by provided over-the-counter,
facilitating ready access.. When, not if, major Nootropics exist in the near future, we can avoid
potential problems regarding their use and distribution provided that we attend to the prior
considerations to ensure that they are fairly and equally accessible to all members of society.
Even in a society where we are all “haves” with regard to Nootropics, those who decide against
using Nootropics will be severely disadvantaged which necessitates further discussions of the
morality of neuroenhancement. Finally, claims that this prior discussion is merely a “phantom
debate” have hopefully been shown to be near-sighted and neglectful of trends in technological
development.

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To conclude, I wish to present my own opinion on the subject. I believe that enhancing
cognition is a positive end to aspire to provided that the means are not morally reprehensible. If
Nootropics are truly pure utility, I do not see that avenue of cognitive enhancement as
problematic. I am all for neuroenhancement provided that it is (1) safe, (2) equally accessible to
all members of society, and (3) provides a benefit that the individual user finds advantageous in
their quest for success and fulfillment. Nootropics can easily fit the first two criteria yet can fail
to meet the last criterion given the myriad interpretations of ‘success’ that exist. I hope that those
discussing neuroenhancement discuss more than just the facts and data surrounding Nootropic
substances and how that information will dictate policy; rather, I would hope that they consider
the important moral struggle that some individuals engage in when it comes to
neuroenhancement. We should remember that enhancing cognition, though highly valued by the
academic community, is not universally seen as a necessity, and we should be careful not to
punish those whose intuitions regarding neuroenhancement do not match our own.

43. 42
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