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Social engineering fraud is widespread, increasing at an alarming rate, and the
fraudsters are persistent and relentless in the pursuit of their crimes. For those
unprepared organisations that fall victim to an attack, the financial consequences
can be devastating.
WHAT IS SOCIAL ENGINEERING?
“Social engineering fraud” refers to a variety of techniques
used by fraudsters to deceive and manipulate victims into
voluntarily performing actions which result in them giving out
confidential information or transferring funds.
Techniques vary and can include: emails which purport to be
sent from employees, vendors, clients, customers, or other
organisations; phone calls, text messages, or even leaving a
malware-infected USB stick lying around an office.
Fraudsters aim to piece together information from various
sources such as social media and intercepted correspondence
in order to appear convincing and trustworthy while
perpetrating the fraud. The often complex nature of these
schemes makes it extremely difficult to identify the fraud
before it is too late. Victims range from small businesses to
large organisations, across many industries and geographies.
The fraudsters are not selective, and will often adopt a scatter-
gun approach to see what response they can get from a
fraudulent communication.
HOW ARE BUSINESSES BEING
TARGETED?
A diverse range of companies around the globe lost more than
US$3.1 billion2
in the period between October 2013 and
May 2016 as a result of social engineering fraud.
SOCIAL ENGINEERING FRAUD –
RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
TOP-3 CYBER THREATS IN 20161
Social engineering52%
40%
39%
Insider threats
Advanced persistent threat
1
Source: Varonis
2
Source: FBI
Social Engineering Fraud – Recommendations and Solutions
EXAMPLES OF ATTACKS3
June 2014 April 2015 June 2015
Fraudsters used well-targeted emails to
convince Scoular Co’s controller to
send a series of wire transfers totalling
US$17.2 million to a bank in China.
Scrap processor Mega Metals Inc. wired
US$100,000 to a German vendor to pay
for titanium shavings, but the vendor did
not receive payment.
An outside entity used fraudulent
requests targeting Ubiquiti Networks’
finance department.
Emails claiming to be from the CEO said
that Scoular was buying a company in
China and instructed a controller to get
wire instructions from an employee of its
accounting firm.
The hacker falsified wire-transfer
instructions to collect money.
An attacker used a “CEO scam”, causing
an employee to transfer
US$46.7 million held by a company
subsidiary incorporated in Hong Kong.
Scoular lost US$17 million due to this
“spearphishing” attack.
Mega Metals Inc. was tricked into
losing US$100,000.
Ubiquiti Networks was the victim
of a US$17 million social engineering
attack.
DO TRADITIONAL CRIME POLICIES
ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE
EXPOSURES?
Whether or not traditional crime insurance policies (for a
commercial institution or a financial institution) provide cover for
this type of loss is not always clear. The policy wording may not
be broad enough to encompass all of the ways a fraudster could
persuade a company to transfer funds.
In order to address social engineering exposures, some insurers
offer coverage by way of a specific extension. These are often
not fit for purpose, as they may not address all of the ways that
a fraud can be perpetrated. They may include a requirement
for a specific verification process to be completed in relation to
communications the company may receive, which may not be in
line with the company’s processes and procedures.
Social engineering coverage is more frequently being offered on
a sub-limited basis, particularly within the US, and for financial
institutions. Many insurers also require the completion of
supplemental applications or questionnaires regarding internal
business systems and controls, which can be both arduous and
time-consuming for insurance buyers.
Coverage available for social engineering can vary from company
to company. Coverage for commercial institutions is often
broader, as is cover for those businesses that can demonstrate
that they have robust systems and controls in place to prevent
attacks by fraudsters.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND
SOLUTIONS
1.	Review systems and controls
Having robust IT security, policies and procedures plays an
important part in preventing and managing social engineering
frauds, and can include:
–– A multi-level authentication and verification process.
–– Appropriate access controls.
–– Employee fraud awareness training.
When a fraud loss does occur, responding effectively is critical.
This ensures that the situation is appropriately managed and
that the impact to the business is mitigated.
Marsh Risk Consulting (MRC) Financial Advisory and Claims
Services (FACS) provide pre- and post-loss services to assist
clients, ranging from fraud risk management through to post-
discovery fraud investigation services.
3 Sources: WSJ, CSO Online, Advisen Ltd.
Marsh • 3
2.	Crime Insurance
Even if your business has the most robust systems and controls
in place aimed at preventing social engineering fraud, it is still
extremely difficult to prevent attacks. This is because fraudsters
are often extremely successful in circumventing internal
procedures by demonstrating a sophisticated knowledge of
them. They specifically use social engineering techniques to
target employees within a business and use them obtain the
information they require. The consequences of which can be
financially devastating.
Appropriate crime insurance can protect you from the financial
consequences of social engineering fraud. It should reflect
the different techniques used by fraudsters to perpetrate their
fraud, and, in the event of a loss, provide cover for the costs of
verifying and preparing appropriate documentation to prove it.
Key coverage/terms should include:
–– An “all-risks” definition of fraud/crime to encompass social
engineering loss.
–– No requirement for prior verification of sender of
correspondence.
–– Cover for the cost of assessing and quantifying a loss.
–– No “voluntary transfer” exclusion.
–– No continuing condition precedents or systems of checks for
coverage to apply.
SUMMARY
Irrespective of how “honest” employees are, or how sophisticated
the systems and controls of a company may be, fraudsters who
use social engineering as a means to defraud companies are
extremely persistent. Prevention plays a key part in avoiding
social engineering attacks on your business.
Commercial institutions are just as at risk as financial institutions
when it comes to attacks by fraudsters. Insurance can be an
important line of defence in protecting the assets of your business
in the event a fraud. The cover you select should be fit for purpose
and respond to a wide range of techniques that fraudsters use
when carrying out social engineering attacks.
Businesses that demonstrate robust controls and procedures
are more likely to obtain favourable terms from insurers. Marsh
continues to develop tailored insurance products and select the
best coverage available in the market to meet our clients’ needs
and exposures.
The information contained herein is based on sources we believe reliable and should be understood to be general risk management and insurance
information only. The information is not intended to be taken as advice with respect to any individual situation and cannot be relied upon as such.
In the United Kingdom, Marsh Ltd is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.
Copyright © 2016 Marsh Ltd All rights reserved
GRAPHICS NO. 16-1196
For further details on the impact of social engineering fraud and our crime insurance capabilities, please contact:
ELENI PETROS
FINPRO UK
+44 (0)20 7357 1507
eleni.petros@marsh.com
HOLLIE MORTLOCK
FINPRO UK
+44 (0)20 7357 3097
hollie.mortlock@marsh.com

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Social Engineering Flyer.pdf- chatter

  • 1. Social engineering fraud is widespread, increasing at an alarming rate, and the fraudsters are persistent and relentless in the pursuit of their crimes. For those unprepared organisations that fall victim to an attack, the financial consequences can be devastating. WHAT IS SOCIAL ENGINEERING? “Social engineering fraud” refers to a variety of techniques used by fraudsters to deceive and manipulate victims into voluntarily performing actions which result in them giving out confidential information or transferring funds. Techniques vary and can include: emails which purport to be sent from employees, vendors, clients, customers, or other organisations; phone calls, text messages, or even leaving a malware-infected USB stick lying around an office. Fraudsters aim to piece together information from various sources such as social media and intercepted correspondence in order to appear convincing and trustworthy while perpetrating the fraud. The often complex nature of these schemes makes it extremely difficult to identify the fraud before it is too late. Victims range from small businesses to large organisations, across many industries and geographies. The fraudsters are not selective, and will often adopt a scatter- gun approach to see what response they can get from a fraudulent communication. HOW ARE BUSINESSES BEING TARGETED? A diverse range of companies around the globe lost more than US$3.1 billion2 in the period between October 2013 and May 2016 as a result of social engineering fraud. SOCIAL ENGINEERING FRAUD – RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTIONS TOP-3 CYBER THREATS IN 20161 Social engineering52% 40% 39% Insider threats Advanced persistent threat 1 Source: Varonis 2 Source: FBI
  • 2. Social Engineering Fraud – Recommendations and Solutions EXAMPLES OF ATTACKS3 June 2014 April 2015 June 2015 Fraudsters used well-targeted emails to convince Scoular Co’s controller to send a series of wire transfers totalling US$17.2 million to a bank in China. Scrap processor Mega Metals Inc. wired US$100,000 to a German vendor to pay for titanium shavings, but the vendor did not receive payment. An outside entity used fraudulent requests targeting Ubiquiti Networks’ finance department. Emails claiming to be from the CEO said that Scoular was buying a company in China and instructed a controller to get wire instructions from an employee of its accounting firm. The hacker falsified wire-transfer instructions to collect money. An attacker used a “CEO scam”, causing an employee to transfer US$46.7 million held by a company subsidiary incorporated in Hong Kong. Scoular lost US$17 million due to this “spearphishing” attack. Mega Metals Inc. was tricked into losing US$100,000. Ubiquiti Networks was the victim of a US$17 million social engineering attack. DO TRADITIONAL CRIME POLICIES ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE EXPOSURES? Whether or not traditional crime insurance policies (for a commercial institution or a financial institution) provide cover for this type of loss is not always clear. The policy wording may not be broad enough to encompass all of the ways a fraudster could persuade a company to transfer funds. In order to address social engineering exposures, some insurers offer coverage by way of a specific extension. These are often not fit for purpose, as they may not address all of the ways that a fraud can be perpetrated. They may include a requirement for a specific verification process to be completed in relation to communications the company may receive, which may not be in line with the company’s processes and procedures. Social engineering coverage is more frequently being offered on a sub-limited basis, particularly within the US, and for financial institutions. Many insurers also require the completion of supplemental applications or questionnaires regarding internal business systems and controls, which can be both arduous and time-consuming for insurance buyers. Coverage available for social engineering can vary from company to company. Coverage for commercial institutions is often broader, as is cover for those businesses that can demonstrate that they have robust systems and controls in place to prevent attacks by fraudsters. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTIONS 1. Review systems and controls Having robust IT security, policies and procedures plays an important part in preventing and managing social engineering frauds, and can include: –– A multi-level authentication and verification process. –– Appropriate access controls. –– Employee fraud awareness training. When a fraud loss does occur, responding effectively is critical. This ensures that the situation is appropriately managed and that the impact to the business is mitigated. Marsh Risk Consulting (MRC) Financial Advisory and Claims Services (FACS) provide pre- and post-loss services to assist clients, ranging from fraud risk management through to post- discovery fraud investigation services. 3 Sources: WSJ, CSO Online, Advisen Ltd.
  • 3. Marsh • 3 2. Crime Insurance Even if your business has the most robust systems and controls in place aimed at preventing social engineering fraud, it is still extremely difficult to prevent attacks. This is because fraudsters are often extremely successful in circumventing internal procedures by demonstrating a sophisticated knowledge of them. They specifically use social engineering techniques to target employees within a business and use them obtain the information they require. The consequences of which can be financially devastating. Appropriate crime insurance can protect you from the financial consequences of social engineering fraud. It should reflect the different techniques used by fraudsters to perpetrate their fraud, and, in the event of a loss, provide cover for the costs of verifying and preparing appropriate documentation to prove it. Key coverage/terms should include: –– An “all-risks” definition of fraud/crime to encompass social engineering loss. –– No requirement for prior verification of sender of correspondence. –– Cover for the cost of assessing and quantifying a loss. –– No “voluntary transfer” exclusion. –– No continuing condition precedents or systems of checks for coverage to apply. SUMMARY Irrespective of how “honest” employees are, or how sophisticated the systems and controls of a company may be, fraudsters who use social engineering as a means to defraud companies are extremely persistent. Prevention plays a key part in avoiding social engineering attacks on your business. Commercial institutions are just as at risk as financial institutions when it comes to attacks by fraudsters. Insurance can be an important line of defence in protecting the assets of your business in the event a fraud. The cover you select should be fit for purpose and respond to a wide range of techniques that fraudsters use when carrying out social engineering attacks. Businesses that demonstrate robust controls and procedures are more likely to obtain favourable terms from insurers. Marsh continues to develop tailored insurance products and select the best coverage available in the market to meet our clients’ needs and exposures.
  • 4. The information contained herein is based on sources we believe reliable and should be understood to be general risk management and insurance information only. The information is not intended to be taken as advice with respect to any individual situation and cannot be relied upon as such. In the United Kingdom, Marsh Ltd is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Copyright © 2016 Marsh Ltd All rights reserved GRAPHICS NO. 16-1196 For further details on the impact of social engineering fraud and our crime insurance capabilities, please contact: ELENI PETROS FINPRO UK +44 (0)20 7357 1507 eleni.petros@marsh.com HOLLIE MORTLOCK FINPRO UK +44 (0)20 7357 3097 hollie.mortlock@marsh.com