1. 1
Antoine de Lamothe Cadillac became the commandant of Fort Pontchartrain at Detroit in
1701. A few years after its founding, in 1706, violence erupted at Fort Pontchartrain between the
different Native American groups surrounding the area. The Ottawa nation was on one side and
the Huron and Miami nations on the other. The Ottawa attacked a group of Miami, and the result
was the death of three Frenchmen, about thirty Ottawas, fifty Miamis, and an unknown number
or Hurons. The 1706 violence at Detroit between these groups occurred partly due to the constant
missteps from Detroit's founder and commander, Lamothe de Cadillac, among other factors.
Cadillac failed to fulfill his promise of creating one cohesive settlement, and he also failed to
maintain peace among the nations he invited to Detroit. Also, other French officials, such as
governor Frontenac, and the Minister of Marine, Pontchartrain, also made critical mistakes in
handling colonial affairs that enabled the violence between the nations. Another leading factor of
the 1706 attack, which was not entirely in the hands of the French, was a cultural separation in
1701 among the Ottawa and the Huron tribes living near Detroit. All of these factors led to the
1706 violence in Detroit.
The career of Lamothe de Cadillac has not been the focus of much scholarly work and
scholars have given even less attention to the violence involving Native American groups that
broke out around Detroit in the early 1700s. Older works by C.M. Burton and Jean Delanglez
written between the late 1800s and mid 1900s made Cadillac the focal point of research. The
research also focused more on Cadillac's proposals for the fort at Detroit. More recent studies,
such as those by Richard White, Andrew Sturtevant, Kenneth Banks, and Richard Weyhing shift
away from the individual politics of officials and elites to explore the larger historical context of
incidents at Detroit, especially involving Native Americans. These recent scholars consider the

2. 2
roles of Native American groups and the French, and acknowledge that there were larger cultural
and political frameworks for understanding events in New France.
Early political historians such as C.M. Burton treated Cadillac as more of a hero, and
barely touched upon his role in the animosity between the French and the Native Americans at
Detroit. Burton was a lawyer in Detroit and amateur historian with an interest in Cadillac and the
establishment of Detroit. He wrote several biographical sketches, as well as compiled and
translated archival records, such as letters between colonial officials in New France and royal
administration at Versailles. Burton argued that the Jesuits and colonial officials waged a spiteful
and unjust “personal and wordy warfare” with Cadillac.1
Burton argued that the Jesuits and other
colonial officials, such as governor Vaudreuil and the intendant, Louis-Hector de Caillieres
wanted to see Cadillac fail at Detroit. Burton argued that they schemed against Cadilac to draw
the Natives into combat with each other. He explained that the governor of New France at the
time, Vaudreuil, encouraged the Iroquois to instigate violence against the Ottawa nation and
French at Detroit by not solving initial violence that spiraled into a series of fighting between the
Ottawas and Hurons.2
Burton was sympathetic towards Cadillac and argued he was not
responsible for all the problems that happened at the post in Detroit. He falls into the category
writing “great man” history because he focused mainly on political elites, notably the
commander, the governor, and intendant to explain the clashes between Native Americans at
Detroit.
Jean Delanglez, a Jesuit, wrote a series of works on Cadillac that were published in the
mid 1900s. He attempted to destroy the myth of Cadillac as the heroic founder of Detroit. Like
1 Clarence Monroe Burton, A Sketch of the Life of Antoine De La Mothe Cadillac Founder of Detroit (Detroit, MI:
Wilton-Smith, 1895), 13, accessed January 30, 2014, http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?
id=mdp.39015004052570;view=1up;seq=3.
2 Burton, A Sketch of the Life of Antoine De La Mothe Cadillac,15, 19.

3. 3
Burton, Delanglez falls into the category of “great man history,” but challenged Burton's claims,
as he was critical of Cadillac's actions at Detroit. Delanglez argued Cadillac abused his power,
was constantly in pursuit of contraband trade, and manipulated the government officials.
Delanglez places the blame for Detroit's problems solely on Cadillac. His analysis still put
Cadillac and other officials at the center of events rather than exploring the cultural and political
contexts or the role in which Native Americans played in the violence in 1706.3
Richard White, a professor of American history at Stanford University and author of five
books, practiced an ethnohistorical view he called “new Indian history” to explain the violence in
Detroit between the different Native groups and the French. It is “new Indian history” because it
places the Native American groups who lived in the Great Lakes region, or also called the
nation des lacs “at the center of the scene to explain the reasons for their actions.”4
He argued
that, while the French had power in the Great Lakes region, also called the pays de'n haut, it was
limited. He explained that the problems in Detroit in the early 1700s were partly due to cultural
differences between the Native groups who moved to the Detroit area and depended on the
French for support. He also argued that the clashes between the different Native nations were
caused by Cadillac's inability to understand the cultural differences between the different nations,
and was therefore unable to mediate problems between them. This is what White believes led to
the 1706 violence. He argued that the French made an effort to create a common identity
between the French and the Native allies, which was attempted through accommodation and
compromise. This is what White named the “middle ground.” He argued that Cadillac attempted
to create and sustain this “middle ground” between the French and the the allied Native nations
3 Jean Delanglez, "The Genesis and Building of Detroit," Mid-America; an Historical Review 30 (1948): 75-104.
4 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xxvii.

4. 4
by trying to mediate and compromise with them. Although he attempted to mediate differences
between the Indian groups, the cultural differences overwhelmed his efforts to broker peace to
rivaling Indian nations.
While Andrew Sturtevant also identified inter-Native dynamics as the root cause of the
violence at Detroit in the 1700s, he challenged White's analysis of the events. He focused on the
Native relations to answer why violence occurred in the Detroit region, but he criticized White
for attempting to survey too large of a geographical region. This is why Sturtevant stated White's
interpretation of the events and social relations between the allied Nations and the French were
“blurry.”5
He rejected White's assertion that the Native Algonquin groups had a common identity
because his focus was too broad. He added that by looking into a specific area, such as Detroit,
rather than the whole pays de'n haut, it is clear the Algonquin groups did not share common
identities. Sturtevant used both an ethnohistorical view, like White, but also a “microhistorical
view” to explain the events that occurred at Detroit.6
He argued that the Hurons, Ottawas, and
Miamis acted with their own separate interests as a result of these distinct social group identities.
He explained that while the different Native groups undoubtedly changed from colonialism and
interactions with the Europeans, they still kept their “distinct ethnic, social, and political
identities.”7
Sturtevant expressed that the interconnected relationships among these groups
molded the affairs in the Great Lakes region just as much as the relationships between the
Natives and the Europeans. He stated, “Intercultural relations at Détroit, in other words, did not
constitute a two-way dialogue between the French and the natives, but a multi-sided conversation
5 Andrew Keith Sturtevant, Jealous Neighbors: Rivalry and Alliance among the Native Communities of Detroit,
1701-1766, diss., College of William and Mary, 2006 (Frankfurt: College of William and Mary, 2011), 10-12.
6 Sturtevant, Jealous Neighbors, 15.
7 Sturtevant, abstract page.

5. 5
among many groups including the French.”8
For example, he explained that the cultural split
between the Ottawas and the Hurons in 1701 during the Great Peace of Montreal sparked the
first set of attacks that occurred in 1704, which spiraled into the events in 1706 because of
cultural differences between the French, Ottawas, Hurons, and Miamis at Detroit.9
Contrary to Sturtevant, in Richard Weyhing's article published in 2013, the author argued
that by looking at Cadillac's proposals for Detroit, through a transatlantic perspective, one can
understand how certain flaws in his plan led to later violence between the Native Americans in
Detroit, particularly the Fox Wars (1710-1740). Weyhing further concentrated Kenneth Banks's
broader transatlantic thesis about the problem of French imperialism and the role of
communication. In Banks's book released in 2002, he argued that the constraints on state control
“arose from the challenge of trying to absorb, comprehend, evaluate, and coordinate a very
complex number of tasks” across the Atlantic ocean, which most state officials back in France
never experienced.10
He added that disagreements between the colonial elites resulted in “royal
weakness.” He argued that this problem was most evident in the rewards for supplying
information. In order to keep the information flowing, the Marine had to reward their colonial
officials. He argued that the state could only be as strong as its reports from these colonial
officials, whom he named “misinformation elites” because they competed with each other for
rewards such as upward mobility in military rank. The officials often purposely misinformed the
state about certain events in their colonies. Banks argued that the communication structure led to
the failure of France's colonies because of physical and cultural distance. European elites often
depended on people like Cadillac to inform other elites back in France, who rarely ever traveled
8 Sturtevant, 7.
9 Sturtevant, 17.
10 Kenneth J. Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-
1763 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002), 5.

6. 6
to the new world, for information regarding the colonies. Banks argued that these elites in France
had too much trust for their informants in New France, who purposely lied to their superiors for
political gain. This structure of relying on people like Cadillac, who could misinform the French
elites about aspects of what was happening on the ground, was the reason for problems in the
colonies.11
Weyhing narrowed Banks's broad thesis and focused on the French-Indian relations at
Detroit. He explained the role in which these relations played in the Fox Wars, which were two
wars between the Fox Indians and the French that lasted from 1710 to 1740. He explained the
conflicts at Detroit were a product of the French colonial presence as the “preexisting animosities
that occurred between the native groups.”12
Weyhing argued that the Indian villages and French
at Detroit were interconnected by the words and actions of men such as Cadillac, who were
constantly moving back and forth from the different worlds. He recruited French and Indian
allies without knowing the consequences. Weyhing partly agrees with the ethnohistorical view,
like White's, that Indian conflicts in the pays de'n haut play a role in the violence, but he thought
the blame mainly fell on “naive colonial policy that created an inter-tribal powder keg doomed to
explode.”13
Unlike White's view, Weyhing stated in his article that Cadillac did not have much
political control over the allied Indian nations. His argument also differs from Sturtevant in the
cause of the problems at Detroit. While he somewhat agrees that cultural differences are to
blame, he puts more weight on the fact that the initial proposal for Detroit was flawed. Weyhing
argued that Cadillac's proposal of Detroit brought the different Native groups together without
11 Banks, Chasing Empire, 194.
12 Richard Weyhing, “'Gascon Exaggeration' The Rise of Laumet Dit De Lamothe, Sieur De Cadillac, the
Foundation of Colonial Detroit and the Origins of the Fox Wars," ed. Robert Englebert and Guillaume Teasdale,
in French and Indians in the Heart of North America, 1630-1815 (East Lansing: Michigan State University
Press, 2013), 79.
13 Weyhing, ”Gascon Exaggerations,” 79.

7. 7
knowing how they would react towards each other, which resulted in an eruption of violence in
1706 with the Ottawas on one side and the Hurons and Miamis on the other.14
The recent schools of studying Detroit has changed immensely since the mid 1900s.
Older research primarily concentrated on the founding of Detroit, and focused on the main
political actors in New France to explain the problems that occurred in the early 1700s. Rather
than focusing on the French perspective within the narrative, recent historians have shifted and
studied the cultural and political backgrounds and especially involve Native American dynamics
to answer questions about the violence that erupted in the Great Lakes region. White and
Sturtevant focus on the Native American cultural differences in explaining the violence in
Detroit. Weyhing then concentrates the arguments of Banks and White, which illuminates both
Native and French perspectives.
This article builds on some material from Weyhing's approach by suggesting that the
violent acts between the Ottawas, Huron, and Miami nations at Detroit in 1706 occurred due to
the missteps of its founder, Lamothe de Cadillac. It also includes other main political actors such
as the governor and Minister of Marine, also naming them as contributing factors. It also argues,
however, that their was an aspect of the violence that the French were not involved in, but made
it difficult for them to maintain peace among the Indian nations. The cultural split between the
Ottawa and Hurons in 1701 also made a vital contribution to the violence in 1706.
Not much scholarly information is known about Cadillac's life before he came to New
France. His rise to power, however, is important in understanding the Ottawa attack at Detroit in
1706. According to Weyhing and historian Thomas Gallant, Cadillac was a “military
entrepreneur” who pledged to lead forces on the ground of New France in exchange for land,
14 Weyhing, 88.

8. 8
money, or other “spoils of war more difficult to attain in the 'Old World'.”15
Cadillac quickly asserted himself as a major contributor to the Marine as an official over
the navy's troops on the ground in New France. He claimed to come over as a soldier of the
Marine in 1683. His expertise of the waters around New England and Acadia were promptly
noticed by French elites, and he was promoted to pilot vessels for ongoing missions in the North
Atlantic. During one of these missions, in 1689, Cadillac's ship was forced to dock at the French
naval center in Rochefort because of autumn storms. While in France, Cadillac attempted to gain
more responsibility and a higher status in the Marine. He composed a letter to the Minister
advertising his qualifications about his knowledge and expertise of Acadia, New England, and
Carolina.16
Cadillac gained the support of his superiors and quickly rose through the ranks of the
Marine. In November of 1690, the new Minister of Marine, Louis Phelypeaux, Comte de
Pontchartrain, ordered the governor of New France, Louis de Baude, Comte de Frontenac, to
promote Cadillac. He returned to the colonies as a newly promoted lieutenant of the Marine.
With Frontenac’s support, Cadillac gained a very influential position as an informant to the
French officials. He informed his superiors about the movements of the French opposition, the
English, who were expanding west in North America The westward movement of the English
threatened French efforts of colonization. Soon after, disasters in the English Channel destroyed
two ships, which caused France's naval efforts to decrease. Realizing that Marine support would
soon decrease, Frontenac focused on the use of smaller raiding parties, using Indian allies and
militias to stop the English movement. Knowing that the main military strategy changed from a
15 Weyhing, 82.
16 Weyhing, 84-87.

9. 9
strong naval military to the need of an increase in French-Indian relations,“Cadillac's eye was
drawn west,” where he believed he could profit from the fur trade, while gaining support from
the Indian nations of the Great Lakes region.17
In 1692, Cadillac made a reconnaissance trip
along the New England coast with mapmaker Jean-Baptiste Franquelin. He submitted a detailed
geographical map of the area to the French government, which impressed Frontenac. In
recognition of this service he was promoted to the rank of captain in October of 1693.18
Instead of using Cadillac's knowledge of the seas based on his Marine experience,
Frontenac wanted to use Cadillac on land. In 1694, upon the governor's suggestion, Pontchartrain
promoted Cadillac to a higher rank as commandant of Fort de Baude at Michilimackinac, which
was the most important military and trading station in the pays d'en haut at the time.19
He was
sent there to replace the previous commandant named Sieur de Louvigny de Laporte, who sent in
a request to be relieved after his four years of service at the Michilimackinac post. The governor,
Frontntenac, wrote that Cadillac made a great impression on him since his promotion to
lieutenant. In a letter to the Minister in 1694, the governor explained that Cadillac was “a man of
rank; full of capability and valor.” Frontenac wrote that Cadillac examined the “adroitness,
firmness, and tact which is required in managing the dispositions of all these savages who are not
easy to govern.”20
Frotenac made a great mistake with Cadillac's promotion because Cadillac only had
knowledge of the seas, and had very little expertise in dealing with Native Americans. Weyhing
17 Weyhing, 87.
18 Yves F. Zoltvany, “Laumet, de Lamothe Cadillac, Antoine,” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, vol. 2,
University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed March 18, 2014,
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/laumet_antoine_2E.html.
19 Wehying, 86-88.
20 Governor Frontenac“Promotion of Cadillac.” August 24, 1694, in Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society
(MPHS), edited by C.M. Burton. (Lansing: Robert Smith Printing Company, 1904), 72.

10. 10
argued that Frontenac probably promoted him to such a position because he was going to share
the profits of the fur trade with Cadillac.21
Regardless of their motives, this exchange shows that
it was Cadillac's connections, not expertise, that acquired him his first commanding position in
the pays d'en haut.
This decision to promote Cadillac also shows that their was too much trust between the
elites who corresponded back and forth. The Minister approved Frontenac's suggestion of
appointing Cadillac to command Fort de Baude without questioning his credentials for
commanding such an important post. The upper elites in France believed that their men on the
ground were more malleable and versatile than they actually were. Cadillac had virtually no
experience dealing with the French-Indian relations in the Great Lakes region, yet Pontchartrain
still promoted him. The Minister trusted the governor's judgment of Cadillac, not knowing that
they were political allies, or possibly agreed to split profits from the fur trade. Historians also
agree that it was this position of commandant of Michilimackinac that qualified him to propose
the idea for the fort at Detroit, and led to the violence that occurred there in 1706.22
Historians concluded that Cadillac was a failure at Michilimackinac. Historian Yves
Zoltvany argued that Cadillac's failures were due to his mishandling of French-Indian relations
and his inability to mediate during struggles with the Native Americans. It appears that the
failures to mediate were due to his lack of knowledge and experience in French-Indian
negotiations. He was, therefore, unable to solve conflicts between the Native groups. The pays
d'en haut was not at all what Cadillac had expected and far from what he had previously
experienced, only being part of the navy. Weyhing stated that the Great Lakes region was a place
21 Wehying, 87.
22 Wehying, 88 ; Yves F. Zoltvany, ”Laumet, De Lamothe Cadillac, Antoine.”

11. 11
of “a heterogeneous and a shifting world of Indian villages.”23
His failure at Michilimackinac not
only displayed Cadillac's inability to handle delicate French-Indian dealings, but this also shows
another misstep from the French government, mainly the Minister of Marine. After his failure to
handle the delicate Native relations at Fort de Baude, in Michilimackinac, Cadillac was
permitted to create yet another fort in the pays d'en haut at Detroit by the Minister.
Beginning in the late 1690s, Cadillac presented a series of proposals to create a settlement
at Detroit, in letters addressed to Pontchartrain. Within them, Cadillac proposed that a post at
Detroit would serve military, economic, and cultural benefits because of its location. He
explained that this post was critical for France to keep its territory because a fort in Detroit
would stop the English movement into the Great Lakes region. He also stated that the post
would be vital for maintaining the newly established peace with the five nations of the Iroquois,
and that the allies coming from Michilimackinac would be able to keep the Iroquois in check. In
addition, Cadillac explained that this territory was of utmost importance for the French to keep
control of the fur trade. He argued that they could raise the value of beaver skins sold to the
Natives, lessening the overall amount sold to them.24
He argued that this was also the only
effective means of keeping the allies. It would also prevent other traders in the area, which he
believed were the worst cause of irregularities in the pays d'en haut. Since they would be unable
to trade, they could be useful in farming and fishing.25
In one of the reports from 1700, Cadillac
explained that, “It is an incontestable fact that the strength of the savage lies in the remoteness of
the French, and that ours increases against them with our proximity.” He added that the Native
groups would be forced to maintain peace “unless they wish to ruin themselves irretrievably.”26
23 Weyhing, 89.
24 Lamothe De Cadillac, "The Necessity for a Post in Detroit," in MPHS, 42-44.
25 Sturtevant,18 ; Weyhing, 85.
26 Lamothe de Cadillac, “Detroit is Founded,” in MPHS, 97.

12. 12
The French wanted to keep control of the west, but for economic reasons, as Eccles
stated, “the glut of the beaver,” the Minister wanted to keep the number of men in the west to a
minimum.27
Pontchartrain was aware that the more men in the west meant less profit from the
beaver trade. He also knew that it would be difficult to hold the enemies of the western nations
without substantially maintaining posts in the west. The Minister was also worried that their
Native allies would begin trading with the English. In fact, in the 1680s and 1690s, British and
Dutch traders operating out of the post of Albany in New York, sent large trading convoys into
Lakes Erie and Huron. This was an area that the French claimed as part of New France.
However, the British and Dutch began trading with people whom the French considered their
allies. The Minister was worried that the Natives would start trading more with the English if
they provided cheaper and better goods. He assumed that if they stopped buying from the
French, the state would eventually lose their Native military allies.28
So, when Cadillac's
proposal to settle at Detroit, with all the allied nations settling there as well, the Minister was
persuaded that such a settlement would be perfect to serve as a deterrent for the expansion to the
west by the enemy nations of the Iroquois and the English.29
The Minister did not properly assess the cultural differences and the frailty of the
relations between the different Native groups in the Great Lakes region. Pontchartrain's decision
to allow Cadillac to create a settlement at Detroit shows yet another mistake made by a member
of the French government. Pontchartrain was too concerned with stopping English expansion
into the western territory, losing the Native allies of the French and profit from the fur trade, that
he permitted Cadillac to create the post at Detroit. Cadillac had previously proved that he could
27 W. J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 135-136.
28 Sturtevant, 18-19.
29 Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 135-136.

13. 13
not handle French-Indian relations already by failing at that same task at Michilimackinac.
Cadillac's plan for Detroit was for it to be one multicultural, co-inhabited territory for the
French colonists and Native allies to live together. The lack of care from Cadillac regarding the
cultural differences between the separate nations, and inviting them to live together was another
misstep, which led to the attacks in 1706. In 1701, Cadillac invited the Huron to come live at
Detroit and form “the same body.” Settled alongside the other native groups he invited, like the
Ottawa, Cadillac guaranteed the Huron protection and cheaper trade. A year later, the chief of the
Hurons, Cheanonvouzon, also called Quarante Sols, extended the invitation to the Miami
nation.30
According to Weyhing, “Cadillac was fully aware, of course, that the difficulties of
suppressing intervillage violence among the nations des lacs that he had experienced at Fort de
Buade would be magnified at Detroit.” However the potential profit from the fur trade became
much more important.31
Cadillac's plan attempted to accomplish more than what was possible.
Wehying argued that Cadillac was aware that his plan to relocate the Native groups to Detroit
could most likely result in violent clashes between them. However, he hoped that he would have
enough time to take advantage of the trade in that particular area of the pays d'en haut.32
Cadillac's plan of assimilation failed due to the structure of the settlement. He failed to
lay the groundwork for building a community as “the same body,”33
and even exacerbated the
differences between the different Native nations living around Detroit. The separate groups of
Natives were not even physically interconnected. In a letter written by Cadillac in September
1702, he explained the locations of the separate nations. “On the right of the fort, at a good
distance, there is a village of Hurons, which I have granted lands in the name of His Majesty,
30 Sturtevant, 1.
31 Wehying, 93.
32 Wehying, 94.
33 Sturtevant, 1.

14. 14
according to my order.”34
He added that the Ottawa tribes lived above and away from the fort. He
also stated that eighteen Miamis had recently came to ask for land and to plead with the other
tribes for a space to settle, and, eventually, they settled near the Huron.
This structure hardly coincides with Cadillac's idea of a community of “one body.”
Detroit, then, consisted of a collection of different Indian nations who were miles apart from one
another. This physical distance between the groups living around Detroit did not allow them to
assimilate into one culture, and made it more difficult for Cadillac to mediate cultural differences
between the separate nations, contributing to the cause of the violence in 1706. Cadillac even
explained that each of these native communities built walls around their villages to defend these
nations from external enemies, particularly the Iroquois, with whom the French had recently
made peace in August of 1701.35
The peace negotiations at Montreal included the French, the
Native allies of the French, and the five Iroquois nations. The events at the Great Peace
negotiations of Montreal in 1701 rattled what was a long term peacefulness between the Ottawa
and the Huron.
During these negotiations in 1701, the leader of the Ottawa, Otontagon, also called by the
French as Jean le Blanc, assumed that his group and the Huron were allied and formed “one
body.” He addressed the governor of New France, Louis-Hector de Calliere, speaking for both
the Ottawa and Huron, asking him to ban traders from carrying brandy into the pays d'en haut.
According to Sturtevant, Quarante Sols was attempting to take brandy back to the pays de'n haut
and saw this affair as Jean Le Blanc asserting dominance over the Hurons. Quarante Sols feared
Ottawa supremacy in French-Indian affairs and planned to assert Huron authority.36
Knowing
34 Lamothe de Cadillac, “Description of Detroit: Advantages Found There,” 1702, in MPHS, 137.
35 Sturtevant, 4-5.
36 Sturtevant, 162.

15. 15
that the Huron could not take on the Ottawa by themselves in a time of war, Quarante Sols
reached out to the Miami to be their allies. Not only did both groups have previous problems
with the Ottawa, but they lived close together near the St. Joseph river in the 1690s. When the
French invited the Huron to move to Fort Pontchartrain in Detroit, Quarante Sols encouraged the
Miami to move with them, proclaiming that the two groups should merge villages and act as
one.37
Thus, when the first group of Miami came to Detroit, they settled near the Huron.
The split between the Huron and the Ottawa settlements near Detroit worsened the
already evident cultural differences between the two groups. As Sturtevant stated, this cultural
distance was “a necessary precondition for violence.”38
The Huron were mainly an agricultural-
based society, who relied on hunting, fishing, and gathering only to supplement their crops.
French colonial officials often praised the Huron for their agriculture at the expense of the
Ottawa. The Hurons, who relied on horticulture, spent more time in their villages. The Ottawas,
on the other hand, relied on fishing, hunting, and gathering and did not necessarily rely on
agriculture. The Ottawa originally lived north of where the Hurons lived in the pays d'en haut,
and their land was not suitable for farming. Even when they moved to Detroit, which had better
land for cultivation, the Ottawa chose to purchase their grain from the Huron rather than growing
it themselves.39
The Ottawa were more active and left their villages more often. Sturtevant stated
that French praise for the Hurons reflected the likeliness of Huron culture to that of early-modern
France. Instead of the Ottawa, the French, therefore, made a stronger relationship with the
Hurons, and the Hurons became “the darlings of the French.”40
Another distinct cultural difference between the two groups was their different reactions
37 Sturtevant, 62.
38 Sturtevant, 154.
39 Sturtevant, 148.
40 Sturtevant, 149.

16. 16
toward the Jesuits. The Hurons were more inclined to accept the Jesuit missions than the Ottawa.
From the beginning of the 1630s, Jesuit missions focused on the Huron because of their cultural
similarities to the French. The Hurons at Detroit were even called some of the best Christians in
the pays de'n haut by the Jesuits and other colonial officials.41
The Jesuits had a more difficult time relating to the Ottawa culture because they was
more mobile and less like the French. In the early 1700s, some Jesuits in Detroit said they had
relative success with converting members of the Ottawa nation, while others claimed that
relations with them were a complete failure. Cadillac reported that each Ottawa household
worshiped their own deity and offered sacrifices to them. An important issue was that the Jesuits
did not build a mission post in Ottawa territory. Sturtevant stated that this absence was the
product of a power struggle between Cadillac, “who resented the Jesuits’ temporal meddling and
preten(s)ions to power” and the Jesuits, “who saw the captain as a grasping tyrant.” For example,
a Jesuit named Father François Vaillant de Gueslis was deployed to Detroit in 1701, but left the
same year after Cadillac accused him of plotting the post’s destruction.42
Sturtevant argued that Quarante Sols used all of these differences to define the Hurons as
culturally distinct from the Ottawa. The Hurons also clearly saw the Ottawa as cultural inferiors.
In their eyes, the Ottawas were hunters and gatherers who could not survive by themselves
without the agriculture of the Hurons. The Ottawas were also considered non-Christian “heathens
whose presence inhibited the Hurons’ own conversion to Christianity.”43
When Jean Le Blanc,
therefore, spoke for the Hurons at the Great Peace of Montreal, Quarante Sols was threatened
because he believed that the leader of the Ottawa, which was an inferior nation in his eyes,
41 Sturtevant, 152.
42 Sturtevant, 152.
43 Sturtevant, 150.

17. 17
attemped to assert dominance over the Huron.
Cadillac's failure to create his initial plan of one cohesive settlement, therefore, failed and
separated the Native groups even further than before. As previously, stated, he was completely
under qualified his position as commander of Michilimackinac, but was still supported by
Frontenac and Pontchartrain regardless of his previous knowledge and expertise regarding
Native American relations. Cadillac was given command of the fort at Detroit after failing at his
previous assignment. His inability to mediate the cultural dynamics of the Natives in the area led
to an extreme amount of violence that began in 1706. The cultural split in 1701 between the
Ottawa and the Huron at the Great Peace of Montreal, however, can not be blamed on Cadillac or
his superiors. This incident created more tension between the groups at Detroit who were already
physically separated, and also culturally different, and created an alliance between the Huron and
the Miami. It was this separation that sparked an initial attack in 1704 on the Ottawa from the
Miami.
In 1704, the Miami killed several Ottawa at Detroit, which was a major contributing
factor to the 1706 violence because it was handled poorly by Cadillac and the other colonial
officials, who failed at mediating the dilemmas between the Native groups. A man named Sr.
Francois d' Airgremont was sent to Detroit by Minister Pontchartrain in 1708 to report
information about the settlement. His report is the only source that explains this initial attack.
Being that it was written years later, in 1708, the report is quite limited in content. In addition, he
relied on information from people, including Native Americans, who may have not been there
when the attack happened. In his report, he attempted to explain the attacks in 1706. He
explained that the Miami told him the attack on the Ottawa was an accident. The Ottawa

18. 18
complained about this incident to Cadillac. The commander assured them he would address the
killings, and demanded that the Miami men responsible for the killing come back to Detroit.
Soon after, however, Cadillac told the Natives that he was called to Montreal. He left Detroit and
his wife followed him to Montreal two months later. Cadillac left Alfonse Tonty, second in
command at Detroit, to mediate the dispute. The Miami told Tonty that the incident was an
accident. It has not been indicated that Tonty addressed this incident. In 1705, Cadillac sent a
member of the Marine by the name of Sr. Bourgmont to Detroit because he had to take care of
business in Quebec. Very soon after Bourgmont's arrival in Detroit, he met with important men
of the Ottawa who asked him if he brought any news from the French regarding the resolution of
the Ottawa deaths. Bourgmont said, “I know none except to tell you that La Mothe will be back
next Spring with a large number of people, and all the French are already under orders,” claiming
that the French were too busy and dismissed the fact that the Ottawa were upset about what the
Miami had done.44
The fact that nothing was said or done about the deaths of the Ottawa men
whom the Miami killed made the Ottawa distrust the French even more.45
Sometime in the spring of 1706, the Ottawas planned a raid against a neighboring Sioux
nation, and with Bourgmont’s encouragement, invited the Miamis to come along.46
Because of
the Huron leader's close ties to the Miamis, the Ottawas sent him to the Miamis to ask for
assistance in the raid. According to Sturtevant, Quarante Sols saw this as his way to get revenge
on the Ottawa. He was still plotting against the Ottawa for when Jean le Blanc spoke for the
Huron nation at the Montreal peace negotiations in 1701. Quarante Sols told the Miami that the
Ottawa would betray them. He suggested that the Miamis wait until the Ottawas left their fort
44 d' Airgremont, ”Letter from d' Airgremont Denouncing Cadillac's Methods,” 1708, in MPHS, 424.
45 d' Airgremont, ”Letter from d'Airgremont Denouncing Cadillac's Methods,” 424.
46 d' Airgremont, 434-435.

19. 19
and attack them since they would be vulnerable at that time.47
A member of the Patowatami
nation, however, warned the Ottawas that the Miami planned to attack them.48
The attack against the Sioux never occurred. According to d' Airgremont's report of the
1706 events, upon finding out that the Miami planned to attack them, an Ottawa leader named Le
Pesant decided to initiate combat first and convinced the Ottawas to attack the Miami. The
Ottawas saw six members of the Miami nation who were walking towards the Huron Fort.49
Sturtevant argued that Le Pesant saw this opportunity to avenge the uncovered deaths from
1704.50
Le Pesant, then, led the Ottawa warriors to kill five of the Miamis, and one escaped into
the French fort. The rest of the Miamis also fled into the French fort. Bourgmont, who was in
charge while Cadillac was still away in Quebec, ordered the French to fire on the approaching
Ottawa, initially killing two of them. The Ottawa captured a missionary, Father Constantin, and
took him to their camp. When Ottawa leader, Jean le Blanc saw this, he ordered that the priest be
released. As the priest was returning, a young Ottawa man shot him. The Ottawa also killed a
young French soldier who was returning to the French fort.51
Before the Ottawa retreated, three
Frenchmen, about thirty Ottawas, fifty Miamis, and an unknown number of Hurons were killed.52
Cadillac's actions regarding the structure of Detroit inevitably led to the Ottawa attack in
1706 because he allowed the Native tribes to live separately, which enhanced their cultural
differences. His mistake also made it more difficult for him to mediate clashes between the
47 Sturtevant, 67 ; This account of the attempt of Quarante Sols to trap the Ottawa is not in d' Airgremont's report.
In his report, he stated the French reported that the Ottawa had the intention of attacking the Miamis when they
left the fort that morning. Sturtevant used correspondence between the different groups of Natives and governor
Vaudreuil.
48 White, 82.
49 d' Airgremont, 435.
50 Sturtevant, 67.
51 d' Airgremont, 436.
52 White, 83 ; d' Airgremont's report only noted that thirty Ottawa were killed by the Hurons and Miamis.

20. 20
different groups. In 1701, Cadillac promised the Huron that if they moved to Detroit, they would
live alongside groups like the Ottawa and create a settlement that acted as “one body.” In 1702,
Cadillac's report to Minster Pontchartrain announced that the groups were living separately. This
was contrary to his plan of creating a settlement that acted as “one body.” Because the Indians
were not assimilated into French culture, they created separate settlements outside of Detroit and
acted distinctly different from each other, which contributed to the violence in 1706.
Cadillac also failed as a commander of fort Pontchartrain. Mediation was a key
component to keeping peace in Detroit among the Natives. White stated, “The French had to
make sure that killings between the tribes were settled and the dead covered.”53
Even more so,
the major duty of the commander, was to mediate conflicts, and maintain peace between the
different nations living near Detroit. Cadillac promised the Ottawa that he would do this after the
1704 killings and failed to deliver. For example, his inconvenient absences after the 1704 attack
from the Miami on the Ottawa created rising tension between the groups. It also created distrust
from the Ottawas towards the French. While he was absent, however, both Tonty and Bourgmont
ignored the developing rage of the Ottawa towards the Miami. The other leaders of the fort, who
were also expected to mediate the problems between the Ottawa and the Miami, dismissed the
fact that the Ottawa wanted justice for the 1704 attack. All of these mistakes from all of the
colonial officials who were in charge of Detroit led to the Ottawa attack in 1706.
The fact that there was a cultural separation between the Ottawa and the Huron nations in
1701, can not be completely blamed on the French. This split was a major contributing factor to
the 1706 attack by the Ottawa. When Jean le Blanc spoke for both the Ottawa and Huron nations,
Quarante Sols felt that an inferior Ottawa nation was trying to gain the upper hand over the
53 White, 83.

21. 21
Hurons in French-Indian relations. From then on, Quarante Sols saw the Ottawa as enemies. The
cultural split caused irreparable damage to the fragile Native dynamics of the nations
surrounding Detroit. It was impossible to mediate problems between the separate groups because
both nations constantly wanted revenge on each other. Quarante Sols wanted revenge for the
incident at the Montreal peace negotiations in 1701, and Le Pesant wanted revenge on the
Miami, who were allies of the Huron, from the 1704 killings. Either way, an attack from either
group would cause a breakout of violence. The attack in 1704, then, created a spark that erupted
into a battle in 1706, with the Ottawas on one side and the Hurons and Miamis on the other.
Lamothe de Cadillac's resolution to the Ottawa attack in 1706 was also poorly planned.
His poor negotiation attempt sent these groups spiraling down another vortex of violence that
lasted long after Cadillac was removed from his position at Detroit in 1710.54
The Hurons
confronted Cadillac shortly after this conflict and exclaimed that any peace with the Ottawa or
the French would be ignored if the Ottawa were not punished. The commander of Detroit stated
that he would personally lead a campaign against the Ottawas if this incident was not
reconciled.55
In a letter in 1706 to Philippe de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil, who became the
Governor of New France in 1703, Cadillac suggested that the French shoot Le Pesant because he
initiated the attack, in addition to a few others, to make the Indian chiefs “wiser and more
prudent, for they are the originators of the wrong that is done.”56
Cadillac had to prove that the
killing of the priest Constantin and the French soldier could not go unanswered for fear of future
attacks from the Natives. According to White, however, Cadillac knew killing the chief would
end badly for all parties involved, but he had to show the Hurons and Miamis that he intended to
54 Zoltvany, “Laumet, de Lamothe Cadillac, Antoine.”
55 Sturtevant, 70.
56 Lamothe de Cadillac, “Cadillac's Letter to Marquis de Vaudreuil”, August 27, 1706, in MPHS, 272-285.

22. 22
punish the Ottawa chief because the Hurons and Miamis recently developed close relations with
the Iroquois. He feared that if the two groups were not satisfied with the solution, they would
align themselves with the Iroquois. On the other hand, the Ottawas were the largest Native nation
in the region, and were also in alliance with many other Algonquin-speaking groups.57
There was
a threat of future violence from both of the groups involved.
White stated, “Le Pesant's surrender was useful; his continued presence was not.”58
With
that in mind, Cadillac and the Ottawas solved this problem by staging an escape. The same night
that Le Pesant was handed over to Cadillac by the Ottawa, he escaped from Fort Pontchartrain.
Cadillac explained to the Miami and Huron that Le Pesant would die in the woods. Even if the
Ottawa chief survived, his influence was now destroyed. With Le Pesant gone, Cadillac could
tell the Ottawas that he intended to pardon him anyways, regardless of how the governor told
him to handle the situation.59
Cadillac's resolution “only fanned the fire.”60
Cadillac kept peace with the Ottawa, but
alienated the other nations. The Miami and the Iroquois knew that he never intended on killing
Le Pesant. The Miami, Huron, and other Iroquois, whom the two other groups made alliances
with, were infuriated and demanded justice. They even proposed to assassinate Cadillac. Some
Miamis took matters into their own hands. They attacked Detroit in April of 1706, killing people
from the Ottawa nation and the French. Other members of the Miami attacked Ottawa members
who were living at Saginaw. Ultimately, the Indian nations had to make their own peace because
they could not rely on the French colonial officials to mediate cultural disputes. The hostilities,
57 Sturtevant, 71.
58 White, 89.
59 White, 90.
60 Sturtevant, 72.

23. 23
however, between the Ottawa and the Huron-Miami alliance lasted long after 1706.61
The 1706 violence at Detroit between these groups occurred partly due to the constant
missteps from Detroit's founder and commander, Lamothe de Cadillac, among other elements.
Cadillac failed to fulfill his promise of creating his plan and his promise of a settlement that
acted as “one body.” He also failed to maintain peace among the Indian nations he invited to
Detroit, which was one of his most important roles as commander. Also, other French officials,
such as governor Frontenac, and the Minister of Marine, Pontchartrain, also made critical
mistakes in handling colonial affairs that enabled the violence between the nations. With the
support of the Governor of New France and the Minister, Cadillac was able to create a settlement
at Detroit even after he failed previously at his occupation in Michilimackinac. What further
exacerbated tensions between the Ottawa and the Huron-Miami alliance was that Cadillac was
inconveniently away to other forts in New France, such as Montreal and Quebec, after the 1704
attack on the Ottawa. In addition, Tonty and Bourgmont, who were put charge of mediating the
incident, never addressed it, worsening the relations between the Ottawa and Huron-Miami
alliance. The last factor of the 1706 attack, which was not entirely in the hands of the French,
was the cultural separation between the Huron and Ottawa, which occurred during the Montreal
peace negotiations. This incident worsened the cultural distance that was already evident
between the two nations. It was, then, the combination of all of these components, that led to the
Ottawa attack on the Miami in 1706.
61 White, 90 ; Sturtevant, 72-73.