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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Advanced Operations Course
H200 Argumentative Essay
The Importance of Technology in Military Innovations
PHILLIPS, E. SHANE
MAJ, LG
CLASS 14-01
STAFF GROUP 12 D
January 24, 2014
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Military technology can have devastating and demoralizing effects on an enemy.
Technological advancement, however, is far from the most important factor in military
innovation because sound doctrine and appropriately forward looking national policy can
overcome a superior technology. In World War II, even though France had superior armored
technology it was unable to stand against German blitzkrieg tactics. Germany nearly starved
Great Britain out of the war with the U-boat until British and American forces developed
doctrine to counter the submersible threat. Furthermore, advocates of air power believed air
superiority was the definitive technology making all other forms of warfare obsolete until
national policies and international convention prohibiting total war severely limited the
capabilities of air power. Technology can only contribute to success in military innovation when
leaders combine new technologies with adaptive doctrine that is balanced with appropriate
national policy and compliant with international conventions.
France, Germany, and Great Britain each regarded their World War I experience
differently. Each also had very different outlooks on the concept and future of warfare. The
British Army found itself surrounded by hostile political opponents1 and relegated to the role of
colonial police force2 with a steeply restricted budget. The British largely believed that no
circumstance could possibly warrant another war on such a grand scale.3 The French experience
was somewhat similar.4 However, despite being just as eager to avoid war as Great Britain,
France’s proximity to Germany made it unrealistic to ignore the possibility of future hostilities.5
Germany, on the other hand, seemed to view its defeat in World War I as nothing more than an
extended operational pause,6 a pause that the German Army took advantage of to adapt and
redefine its method of warfare.7 Because of sanctions resulting from its defeat in 1918 that
prevented amassing a large army, the Germans instead developed a doctrine that embraced
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maneuver warfare with the armored tank as the centerpiece.8 France, however, biased by its
experience in World War I, failed to adapt to the advancement in technology and its effect on
doctrine and tactics. Thus, during the interwar period that precipitated World War II, the French
Army pursued a defensive based doctrine that lead to the Maginot Line. Using a highly
centralized command structure, France assumed massed artillery fire would reign supreme on the
battlefield and render fortified positions highly resistant to any enemy attack.9 Because of this,
the French relegated their tanks to a support role in what they termed the “methodical battle.”10
France simply did not grasp the concept of combined arms warfare.11 Instead, French doctrine
called for artillery to delay and attrite enemy forces while amassing an overwhelming
combination of infantry and armor units that would assault only when the situation was optimal
for success.12 Unfortunately, the German Wehrmacht, employing the now infamous blitzkrieg,
simply bypassed the Maginot Line and punched through a more weakly held French front line.13
Consequently, even though France had armored tanks that were technologically superior to
German armor in several ways, the French Army could not withstand the onslaught of the
German Wehrmacht and its blitzkrieg tactics.
Technology has had an almost equal influence on naval operations as it has had on land
warfare. During World War I, Germany set out to choke the British economy so tightly that it
would have to abandon the war effort.14 Although ultimately unsuccessful, Germany’s
unrestricted U-boat attacks on merchant and supply vessels very nearly drove Great Britain out
of the war.15 The only thing that prevented British defeat was the use of convoy operations
doctrine to help protect its shipping lanes. Oddly enough, the doctrine used to combat German
U-boats in World War I was similar to that used during the Napoleonic wars against French
raiders.16 It is understandable how British leadership might have forgotten or failed to consider
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sea convoys as a viable defense given the amount of time that passed between the Napoleonic
wars and World War I. Less understandable is how the British very nearly suffered the same fate
again in World War II and under virtually the same circumstances.
Following World War I, the Treaty of Versailles prohibited Germany from producing
submarines, aircraft, and aircraft carriers in order to eviscerate its navy and help prevent another
war.17 This treaty, along with the Washington Treaties and the London Treaties, proved to have a
profound psychological effect on the British who believed these treaties were sufficient to hold
the German war machine in check and that submarine warfare was now obsolete and no longer a
threat.18 The advent of sonar technology further clouded British judgment since they assumed it
provided a “silver bullet” with which to defeat German U-boats.19 If faced with a submersible
threat, sonar equipped destroyers would simply hunt down the enemy vessels. Therefore, the
British considered the need for anti-submarine warfare outdated. They soon found, however, that
hunting down German U-boats with sonar technology was very nearly impossible.20
Consequently, the British and their allies once again had to resort to naval convoys to protect
shipping lanes. This time, however, the British doctrine integrated aviation into their naval
defense plans.21 As a result, antisubmarine warfare was far more effective and destroyed 63
percent of German U-boat sorties from 1939 to 1945 compared to only about 42 percent
destroyed from 1914 to 1918.22
The German Wehrmacht proved that superior doctrine and tactical ingenuity could
overcome a technological disadvantage when they invaded France. The British demonstrated that
simply having a new technology does not automatically invalidate an existing threat. Yet another
potential limitation on the effectiveness of technology is the scope and breadth of a nation’s
policies, its strategy, or possibly even international conventions. The vast appeal of air power lies
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in its ability to project destructive power deep into enemy territory with great speed and without
the horrors associated with ground wars.23 Following World War I, advocates of air power
believed it to be the zenith of warfare that could dominate not only on land but at sea as well.24
To this end, Italian General Giulio Douhet believed in practicing total war on an enemy nation’s
government, economy, and its people.25 He even advocated using the range and speed of
strategic bombers to deliver chemical weapons in addition to conventional munitions. This, he
claimed, would significantly shorten wars by attacking the will of the people.26 However, the
potential widespread panic from air bombing if employed against civilian targets resulted in an
international debate regarding what constituted legal targets.27 The League of Nations even
considered outlawing aerial bombing outright in 1925 at the insistence of the United Kingdom.28
Today, of course, the Geneva Convention prohibits the use weapons that cause undue pain and
suffering or indiscriminately target military and civilian assets29 but even at the outset of World
War II, the United States Congress would not approve funding for an air bomber whose sole
purpose was to target civilian populations.30 Alternatively, British General Hugh Trenchard
proposed that air power could serve instead as a substitute for conventional ground or naval
forces to perform tactical roles on the battlefield.31 This concept ultimately developed into
tactical close air support doctrine such as used in the Battle of Cambrai during World War I
when, as part of a combined arms warfare campaign, the British integrated infantry, armor, and
air assets.32 Unfortunately, the British came to view close air support as too costly when the
positive effects were so unpredictable.33 Thus, the restrictive budget imposed by the British
government limited the capability of its air power at the time.
There is one instance, of course, when a technological advantage was so vast that no tactical
or doctrinal innovation could overcome it. On August 6 and August 9, 1945, two United States
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Army Air Corps bombers dropped the first and second atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, Japan. However, since then the United States’ policy is that it will not employ
“nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that are party to the non-nuclear proliferation treaty
and remain in compliance with their non-nuclear proliferation obligations.”34 Thus, as British
policy limited the development and employment of close air support so too does current United
States policy restrict employment of nuclear technology.
Technology is certainly a combat multiplier but history also proves that a balance of
technological advancement coupled with adaptive doctrine and appropriate national policy is
critical to effective military innovation. The French experience versus the German Wehrmacht
demonstrated that having a superior technological advantage is not always enough to overcome a
doctrinally innovative enemy. The British depended on various treaties to prevent German
aggression. When that failed their reliance on sonar technology proved insufficient as well. Only
when they adopted specific antisubmarine warfare doctrine to counter the German U-boats were
they successful. Finally, advocates of air power believed its capabilities were sufficient to swiftly
defeat its enemies and even replace conventional forces. However, international convention
emplaces restrictions on much of what air power can do. Additionally, some national policies
and budget constraints limit how a country employs its technologies. Technology remains vitally
important if for no other reason than because of the degree of destruction and psychological
devastation it can bring to the fight. Ultimately, the atomic bomb ended the war in the Pacific.35
Despite this fact, the most important factor in military innovation is not technology. Technology
is only one part of a triad that includes both political and military leadership as well as sound
doctrine to be effective.3637
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End Notes
1 Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German experiences.” In Military Innovation in
the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 6-49, New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press,1996, 9.
2 Ibid, 10.
3 Ibid, 9.
4 Ibid, 12.
5 Ibid, 12-13.
6 MAJ Michael Kotich, paraphrased from his comment during H206 Blitzkrieg, 1939-41 class on 16 DEC 13
indicating that Germany viewed the Interwar Period of 1918-1939 as similar to halftime at a football game.
7 Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German experiences.” In Military Innovation in
the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 6-49, New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press,1996, 7.
8 Ibid, 7.
9 Ibid, 32.
10 Ibid, 32.
11 Dr. Jill Valentine, paraphrased from a statement made during H206 Blitzkrieg, 1939-41 class on 16 DEC 13
regarding France’s understanding ofcombined arms warfare.
12 Williamson Murray, “Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German experiences.” In Military Innovation in
the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 6-49, New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press,1996, 32.
13 Robert A. Doughty, “French Operational Art: 1888–1940.” In Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art,
edited by Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, 90–108. Washington,DC: US Army Center of Military History,
2005. Reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H200 Book of Readings,217-227. Fort
Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, September 2013, 220-221.
14 Holger H. Herwig, “The Submarine Problem.” In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 6-49, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 231.
15Ibid, 229.
16 Ibid, 229.
17 John Kuehn, “Perspectives from Great Britain, Japan, and Germany.” Excerpt from The Influence of Naval Arms
Limitation on U.S. Naval Innovation During the Interwar Period, 1921–1937,ch.8, 263–88. PhD diss., Kansas
State University, 2007. Reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H200 Book of Readings,95-
108. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, September 2013, 95-96.
18 Ibid, 97.
19 Ibid, 97.
20 Holger H. Herwig, “The Submarine Problem.” In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 6-49, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 229.
21 Mark Milner, “The Battle That Had to Be Won.” In Naval History Magazine 22, no. 3 (June 2008: Reprinted in
US Army Command and General Staff College, H200 Book of Readings,305-314. Fort Leavenworth, KS:
USACGSC, September 2013, 307.
22 Holger H. Herwig, “The Submarine Problem.” In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by
Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 6-49, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 231; derived
from the numbers of U-boat sorties destroyed specifically by antisubmarine warfare during both World War I (134
out of 178) and World War II (593 out of 784).
23 Williamson Murray, “Strategic Bombing: The British, American, and German experiences.” In Military
Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 96-143, New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1996, 96.
24 Alan Stephens,“The True Believers: Airpower between the Wars.” In The War in the Air: 1914–1994,edited by
Alan Stephens,29–43. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2001. Reprinted in US Army Command
and General Staff College, H200 Book of Readings,75-85. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, September 2013, 75,
derived from the quotations of General Hugh Trenchard, General Giulio Douhet, and General William Mitchell
25 Ibid, 78.
26 Ibid, 78.
27 Ibid, 81-82.
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28 Ibid, 82.
29 International Committee of the Red Cross. The Geneva Convention.Chapter 20. Rules 70 and 71.
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter20_rule70 (accessed 19 January 2014).
30 Williamson A. Murray, “The World in Conflict.” In The Cambridge History of Warfare, Edited by Geoffrey
Parker, 314-337. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 319.
31 Ibid, 77.
32 Richard R. Muller, “Close Air Support: The German, British, and American experiences, 1918-1941.” In Military
Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 144-190, New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1996, 151.
33 Ibid, 152.
34 US Department of Defense. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington,DC: April 2010, 1-72, viii.
35 MAJ Philip Staten, paraphrased from a comment made during H208 Naval Innovation in the Pacific and the
Atlantic class on 17 JAN 14.
36 MAJ Tim Smith, paraphrased from a comment made during H208 Naval Innovation in the Pacific and the Atlantic
class on 17 JAN 14.
37 Faith Phillips read this paper for clarity.
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Bibliography
Doughty, Robert A. “French Operational Art: 1888–1940.” In Historical Perspectives of the
Operational Art, edited by Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, 90–108. Washington,
DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2005. Reprinted in US Army Command and
General Staff College, H200 Book of Readings, 217-227. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC,
September 2013.
Herwig, Holger H. “The Submarine Problem.” In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.
Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, 6-49, New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
International Committee of the Red Cross. The Geneva Convention. Chapter 20. Rules 70 and
71. http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter20_rule70
(accessed 19 January 2014)
Kuehn, John T. “Perspectives from Great Britain, Japan, and Germany.” Excerpt from The
Influence of Naval Arms Limitation on U.S. Naval Innovation During the Interwar Period,
1921–1937, ch. 8, 263–88. PhD diss., Kansas State University, 2007. Reprinted in US Army
Command and General Staff College, H200 Book of Readings, 95-108. Fort Leavenworth,
KS: USACGSC, September 2013.
Milner, Marc. “The Battle That Had to Be Won.” In Naval History Magazine 22, no. 3 (June
2008: Reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H200 Book of Readings,
305-314. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, September 2013.
Muller, Richard R. “Close Air Support: The German, British, and American experiences, 1918-
1941.” In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan
R. Millett, 144-190, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996
Murray, Williamson. “Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German experiences.” In
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R.
Millett, 6-49, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Murray, Williamson. “Strategic Bombing: The British, American, and German experiences.” In
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R.
Millett, 96-143, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Murray, Williamson. “The World in Conflict.” In The Cambridge History of Warfare, Edited by
Geoffrey Parker, 314-337. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005
Stephens, Alan. “The True Believers: Airpower between the Wars.” In The War in the Air:
1914–1994, edited by Alan Stephens, 29–43. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University
Press, 2001. Reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, H200 Book of
Readings, 75-85. Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, September 2013.
