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Information privacy is rife with unanswered questions of distributive justice. Privacy at least contributes to achieving just distributions of social goods. Information flow models of privacy assume answers to questions about justice in acquisition and transfer that may be indefensible on their own or incompatible with each other. Rights approaches often assume rather than articulate a justification of privacy itself. And there are considerable implicit differences between the two in what is to be distributed. It should not be seen as practical to address questions of information privacy without considering these questions. But Young’s critique of the distributive paradigm reveals deeper problems with understanding the question of justice in information privacy. Information privacy is as much a matter of social structure as it is of distributing material or moral goods, and the focus on distribution obscures the ways in which information privacy violations challenge the ability to participate in determining one’s actions. These critiques suggest that a more productive line of inquiry would be to pursue information justice as a matter of primarily structural rather than distributive justice.