This document summarizes a paper on conceptualizing collective trust within organizations. The paper introduces the concept of collective trust, which refers to a generalized trust placed in an organization and its collective membership as a whole, rather than interpersonal trust between individuals. It discusses how collective trust differs from interpersonal trust in that it is based on more impersonal and indirect foundations. The paper also reviews different methodological approaches for studying collective trust, from laboratory experiments to field studies, noting the benefits of a multi-method approach.

1. Corporate Reputation Review Volume 13 Number 2
Collective Trust within Organizations:
Conceptual Foundations and Empirical
Insights
Roderick M. Kramer
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, USA
ABSTRACT actions, calculated for common benefit,
This paper introduces a conception of collective and agree to be true to their words; nor
trust applied to organizational settings. In con- is there anything requisite to form this
trast with widely studied interpersonal forms concert or connection, but that eve-
of trust, collective trust is conceptualized as a ryone have a sense of interest in the
kind of generalized trust conferred on other faithful fulfilling of engagements, and
organizational members. The paper elaborates express that sense to other members of
on the psychological, relational, and structural the society. (Hume, 1969)
underpinnings of collective trust. It then expli-
Hume’s observations regarding the founda-
cates individual and organizational consequences.
tions of mutual trust and collective action
The paper also discusses methodological approach-
has a surprisingly contemporary relevance
es to studying collective trust, ranging from
and resonance, as many organizations and
laboratory simulations to field-based, qualita-
institutions struggle with problems of this
tive studies. Representative findings from such
very nature. His analysis also directs our at-
studies are summarized.
tention to the role positive social expecta-
Corporate Reputation Review (2010) 13, 82–97.
tions play in the emergence of collective
doi:10.1057/crr.2010.9
behavior: Because trusting others creates
KEYWORDS: collective trust; cooperation; vulnerability, anything that provides grounds
organizational trust; social capital; social identity; for mutual assurance might help reduce that
trust perceived vulnerability.
In the present paper, I pursue these ideas
of vulnerability and assurance from the
INTRODUCTION
standpoint of social psychological and
More than 200 years ago, the British Em-
organizational research on the relational
piricist David Hume offered this insightful
underpinnings of trust. In particular, I
analysis regarding the psychological founda-
present some theoretical ideas regarding a
tions of our trust in others and the beneficial
form of generalized trust found in organiza-
consequences that flow from such trust:
tional settings. I characterize this generalized
When each individual perceives the trust as collective trust. In contrast with inter-
same sense of interest in all his fellows, personal trust – the target of which is an-
he immediately performs his part of any other specific individual – the distinctive
Corporate Reputation Review,
contract, as being assur’d that they will characteristic of collective trust is that its
Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 82–97 not be wanting in theirs. All of them, target is the organization and its collective
© 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.,
1363-3589 by concert, enter into a scheme of membership taken as a whole. In other
www.palgrave-journals.com/crr/

2. Kramer
words, the cognitive unit is a larger social such collective trust? Second, what can we
aggregate, defined and bounded by common say about the foundations or bases upon
membership in the organization. Second, I which such trust might be based? Third,
suggest how we might conceptualize such what are the special methodological issues,
collective trust. Third, I review evidence if any, to consider when we attempt to study
regarding the foundations on which such such trust?
generalized trust in other organizational
members might be predicated. CONCEPTUALIZING COLLECTIVE
To foreshadow one of the primary con- TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXTS
clusions I wish to reach, I argue that collective The benefits of trust within organizational
trust arises when a variety of institutional, settings have been elaborated at some length
social and psychological elements are in elsewhere (Bachmann and Zaheer, 2006;
place. Loosely construed, collective trust Bromiley and Cummings, 1995; Fukuyama,
constitutes a kind of psychological tipping- 1995; Gambetta, 1988; Kramer and Cook,
point phenomenon: when sufficient reassur- 2006; Lane and Bachmann, 1998). Thus, it
ing factors are perceived to be in place, is not necessary to repeat them here, other
collective trust tends to be present. When than to note that a well-documented rela-
they are insufficient or absent, it does not. tionship exists between individuals’ trust in
There are, I assume, multiple configurations other people and their willingness to engage
of such factors, but some threshold of such in trust-related behavior when interacting
confluent factors is assumed to be necessary with them. In elaborating on the circular
in order to tip the prototypic organization- and inherently self-reinforcing nature of this
al member toward trusting others. A basic vital relationship, Putnam (1993) observed,
research question this paper addresses is, ‘The greater the level of trust within a com-
‘What are the conditions under which such munity, the greater the likelihood of coop-
trust thrives?’ eration. And cooperation itself breeds trust’
Throughout this paper, I emphasize the (p. 171). Thus, stated in slightly different terms,
presumptive nature of collective trust be- positive expectations about others facilitate
cause it is based, I will propose, on the kinds positive behaviors when interacting with
of social understandings – both explicit and them; those behaviors, in turn, strengthen
tacit – that move decision-makers toward a positive expectations; hence, a virtuous cycle
willingness to engage in trusting behavior in which expectation and action collude to
when dealing with others, especially in the create and reinforce desired outcomes.
absence of the sort of individualized, per-
sonal knowledge about others that usually Preliminary Considerations
constitutes a foundation for such risky In the context of simple, dyadic relation-
behavior. In the place of individuating ships, the underpinnings of such virtuous
knowledge about specific others, collective cycles have been elaborated at some length
trust is predicated on schematic knowledge (eg, Lindskold, 1978). To a large extent,
and stereotypic beliefs regarding the organ- much of this previous research has construed
ization and what membership in it presumably the development of individuals’ positive ex-
tells us about other members’ trust-related pectations regarding others’ trustworthiness
motives, intentions, and likely actions. In as history-dependent processes (Boon and
this respect, collective trust is treated here as a Holmes, 1991; Deutsch, 1958; Pilisuk and
cognitive construct. Skolnick, 1968; Gabarro, 1978; Solomon,
To explore these issues, this papers sev- 1960; Weber et al., 2005; Whitener et al.,
eral issues. First, how might we conceptualize 2006). According to such models, trust
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3. Collective Trust within Organizations
between two interdependent actors thickens infrequent contact, and only superficial
or thins as a function of their cumulative familiarity.
interactions. Interactional histories give de- Recognizing this conceptual chasm be-
cision-makers information that is useful in tween interpersonal and collective forms of
assessing others’ dispositions, intentions, and trust, Putnam (1993) commented, ‘Trust
motives. This information, in turn, provides entails a prediction about the behavior of
a basis for drawing inferences regarding an independent actor. In small, close-knit
their trustworthiness and for making predic- communities, this prediction is based on
tions about their future behavior. Evidence what Bernard Williams calls ‘thick trust’,
of the importance of such interactional that is, a belief that rests on intimate
histories comes from a substantial body of familiarity with this individual. In larger,
experimental research linking specific pat- more complex settings, however, a more
terns of behavioral interaction with changes impersonal or indirect form of trust is required’
in trust (Deutsch, 1958; Lindskold, 1978; (p. 171, emphases added).
Pilisuk et al., 1971; Pilisuk and Skolnick, It is precisely this less personal, less indi-
1968). viduated, and less direct form of trust that
Such models posit that interactional his- has engaged me as a conceptual problem. In
tories become a basis for initially calibrating particular, there are several specific questions
and then updating trust-related expectations. that have preoccupied me as a social psy-
Boyle and Bonacich’s (1970) analysis of chologist interested in trust. First, what
trust development is representative of such might be the psychological contours of such
arguments. Individuals’ expectations about impersonal trust? Second, and relatedly, how
trustworthy behavior, they posit, tend to does impersonal trust differ from the more
change ‘in the direction of experience and widely studied ‘thick’ forms of trust? Also,
to a degree proportional to the difference what can we say about the foundations of
between this experience and the initial ex- such ‘thin’ trust?
pectations applied to it’ (p. 130). In this regard,
history-based trust can be construed as an Collective Trust as a Positive Social
important form of knowledge-based or per- Expectation
sonalized trust in organizations (Lewicki and As Hardin (2002) aptly noted in a recent
Bunker, 1995; Shapiro et al., 1992). assessment of the trust literature, scholars
As we move from the simple dyadic case often talk about trust in elliptical terms, as
to more complex multi-actor or collective if it were simply a belief, attitude, or dispo-
contexts, however, it isn’t entirely clear that sition of a social perceiver. However, this
this sort of deep, historical, or ‘thick’ inter- way of talking about trust is really merely
personal trust will necessarily generalize convenient shorthand for describing what is
readily or fully to a larger aggregate or col- inherently a complex three-part relationship
lection of interdependent social actors. In between a social perceiver and the object or
such collective contexts, individuals may target of his or her target. Specifically, trust
be just as deeply interdependent with, and involves a truster (the subject rendering a
dependent on, other people, but they are trust judgment), a trustee or set of trustees
unlikely to have the requisite detailed, (the object or targets of that judgment), and
personal knowledge of each other that a specific domain or context within which
provides the usual foundation for interper- trust judgments arise or apply. Thus, medi-
sonal trust. Instead, they must interact with cal patients might fully trust their surgeons
myriad others, often on the basis of scant with respect to any surgical recommenda-
individuating information, transient goals, tions they might have, but not trust them
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4. Kramer
at all with respect to their financial advice, generalized expectation conferred on the
simply and only because the domain of aggregate or collective. In short, it consti-
expertise of the physician is not viewed as tutes a sort of diffuse cognitive expectation
encompassing that domain. (insofar as its object or target is a social
In the case of the simplest trust relation aggregate that encompasses all the members
– dyadic trust – we obviously have one spe- of the collective). It is also a bounded expec-
cific truster and one designated trustee in- tation, insofar as it applies only to those in-
volved in some sort of interdependent dividuals who are considered ‘in-group’
relationship. In the case of a patient’s trust members (included in the relevant social
in her physician, for example, the founda- boundary or category). I characterize this
tions of that trust might be predicated on bounded organizational trust, then, as a
such things as (1) the specific training form of generalized expectation or belief
and institutional affiliation of the physician; that is predicated upon, and co-extensive
(2) the history of interpersonal interaction with, shared membership in an organization.
(favorable or not) between them; (3) the I view it as a presumptive psychological state
reputation of the medical institution em- or orientation because it represents a sort
ploying the physician and within which the of background expectation that individuals
patient’s care is provided; and (4) the nature have about other organizational members.
of the medical complaint or malady. Thus, In this sense, it can acquire over time a
a patient with cervical cancer might trust a taken-for-granted quality (of exactly the sort
physician who was trained at Harvard Med- Hume that posits).
ical School, is affiliated with the Mayo
Comprehensive Cancer Center, and has spe- STUDYING COLLECTIVE TRUST:
cific expertise in gynecologic oncology. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In the case of generalized trust perceptions There are a variety of different approaches
and judgments within larger social aggregates a researcher might take when exploring the
– such as a group or organization – the judg- antecedents and consequences of collective
mental foundations or underpinnings of trust trust. Experimental analogs can be created
become more complicated. Obviously, there to study collective cognition and choice
are multiple trusters, multiple trustees, and behavior within laboratory settings, and a
multiple domains onto which their trust variety of such analogs have been used in
concerns may be mapped. There may also past research (eg, Kollock, 1994; Kramer,
be important power-status differences and 1998; Messick et al., 1983). Surveys can be
resource dependencies between interde- use to assess attitudinal and behavioral cor-
pendent actors, which further complicate relates of generalized trust (Pew Research
trust-related information processing, and Center, 1996). Ethnographic observation
judgment. As a consequence, the particular constitutes another rich source of evidence
evidentiary grounds on which trust is pred- (Fine and Holyfield, 1996).
icated in collective contexts are less obvious The trade-offs with respect to the internal
and clear-cut. Nonetheless, actors still typi- versus external validity of these methods are
cally possess some general set of beliefs and well known (Crano and Brewer, 2002).
expectations regarding the trustworthiness of Thus, I won’t discuss them explicitly here,
the ‘average’ or prototypic other within the other than to emphasize the advantages of
group or organization. a multi-method approach. If convergent
One way of conceptualizing this general validity is the researcher’s ultimate goal, then
level of trust in these other prototypic or- the use of multiple methods is highly recom-
ganizational members, then, is as a form of mended. In my own work, summarized
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5. Collective Trust within Organizations
throughout this paper, I’ve tried to adopt that enjoyed a great reputation on this
precisely such a multi-method approach dimension). On balance, though, the effort
(a review of these studies is provided in is worth it: I believe we learn a great deal
Kramer, 2009c). Thus, my colleagues and by intensive field observation and open-
I started with laboratory experiments to test ended conversations with real people talking
the causal significance of theorized variables about the real trust dilemmas they confront
such as common fate and shared social iden- in their very real work places.
tities using experiments, using undergradu-
ate students as study participants (summarized Relational and Structural Underpinnings
in Kramer and Brewer (1986) and also of Collective Trust: A Review of the
Kramer et al. (1996)). We then turned to Empirical Evidence
the use of computer-based tournaments, Social scientists have afforded considerable
using expert decision-makers (Bendor et al., attention to identifying the foundations
1991). More recently, we’ve found it useful or bases of trust within organizations (eg,
to investigate more directly how people Arrow, 1974; Cook, 2001; Cook et al.,
actually think about trust dilemmas in 2005; Creed and Miles, 1996; Granovetter,
the organizational settings in which they 1985; McEvily et al, 2006; Zucker, 1986).
actually work (eg, Cook et al., 2004). These The quotation by David Hume, introduced
settings include, for example, studying at the beginning of this paper, clearly sug-
the grounds for collective trust in a variety gests the importance of individuals’ a priori
of public institutions and private organiza- beliefs or expectations regarding other group
tions. These include the Oval Office, members’ trustworthiness in shaping their
Hollywood film studios, talent agencies, own willingness to engage in trusting
sales organizations, hi-tech companies and behaviors themselves. When the requisite
special effects firms, grocery stores, and assurances are in place, Humes argues, the
medical care settings. path to mutual trust and resultant coopera-
Although these field sites presented them- tion is paved. But what are the grounds for
selves opportunistically, I wouldn’t charac- such assurances? On what basis do individu-
terize them as necessarily ‘convenience als entertain such positive expectations
samples’. More often than not, I found, regarding other organizational members?
assessing sensitive issues of trust and distrust My research on this question has adopted
in real-world settings turns out to be any- a social information processing perspective.
thing but convenient. Many organizations According to Salancik and Pfeffer’s (1978)
are loath to admit problems with trust. Thus, original formulation of this perspective, in
they tend (and not inappropriately so) to be order to understand people’s behavior in
extremely wary of outside interventions or organizations, it is essential to consider the
intrusions – even purely observational ones. social context within which that behavior
And even those organizations which do not is embedded. ‘One can learn most about
perceive themselves as having problems with individual behavior’, they posit, ‘by studying
trust, I found, are often quite reluctant the informational and social environment
to allow outsiders in – they intuit the pos- within which that behavior occurs and to
sibility that outsiders might, in their probes, which it adapts’ (p. 226). One reason context
disturb a valued but potentially fragile equi- is so crucial, Salancik and Pfeffer go on to
librium. ‘Why risk rocking a boat that is argue, is that it directs our attention toward
sailing smoothly?’ one executive suggested certain information ‘making that informa-
to me when turning down my request to tion more salient and providing expectations
study trust relations in his organization (one concerning individual behavior and the
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6. Kramer
logical consequences of such behavior’ As a consequence, when reciprocal con-
(p. 227). According to this perspective, then, fidence in members’ socialization into, and
we can understand people’s decisions to continued adherence to, a normative rule
engage in trusting behavior (or any other system is high, mutual trust acquires a taken-
form of social behavior for that matter) by for-granted quality. Along these lines, and
paying attention to what information they as one example, the supermarket Whole
attend to and also, of course, how they Foods has created an elaborate system of rules
interpret or construe that information. among its employees that help shape their
This guiding assumption has led me to positive expectations regarding the organiza-
think about trust behavior from the perspec- tion and the behavior of its members (eg,
tive of what I term the vigilant social auditor members are organized into teams and teams
(Kramer, 1998). The vigilant social auditor are empowered to hire new members them-
is presumed, all else equal, to be a moti- selves, rather than having this function
vated social perceiver, interested in render- managed by a traditional human resource
ing sensible and productive judgments department). Thus, they can interview
about others’ trustworthiness. Thus, the in- individuals extensively before hiring them,
dividual engages in trust acts when sufficient and getting a sense for how the person might
grounds are perceived to be present, and fit into the value system of the organization.
avoids such acts when they are perceived to When asked about trust and trustworthy
be missing. behavior at one store, an employee put it
to me this way, ‘It [trustworthy behavior] is
Rule systems constitute a primary and impor- just expected of others – and it is expected
tant mechanism for providing the kinds of of you as well. You don’t have to worry
shared assurances that facilitate trusting about it because you can count on it’.
behavior in collective contexts. By a rule Fine and Holyfield (1996) provide
system, we mean simply a set of formal and another nice illustration of how a set of
informal understandings that govern how explicit rules, and the tacit understandings
individuals within the organization interact. they produce, can function to create and
As March (1994) argued, organizational sustain high levels of collective trust within
rules contribute in many ways to members’ an organization. Their study examined the
positive expectations about others’ behavior. bases of trust in the Minnesota Mycological
In this sense, rules constitute a set of norma- Society, an organization that consists of
tive or institutionalized expectations regarding amateur mushroom aficionados. This or-
one’s own and other’s range of acceptable ganization provided a rich setting in
or anticipated actions. Rule-based trust, I which to study the bases of trust for several
should note, is not predicated on members’ reasons. First, the costs of misplaced trust
attempts to predict others’ specific trust- in this organization can be quite severe:
related behaviors or outcomes, but rather on eating a mushroom that someone else in
their understandings – presumed to be prev- the organization has mistakenly declared
alent or shared – regarding the binding safe for consumption can lead to serious
structure of rules guiding – and constraining illness and even, in rare instances, death.
– others’ behavior. As March and Olsen Given such risks, Fine and Holyfield noted,
(1989) posited along these lines, rule-based credibility is lost only once unless a mistake
trust is sustained within an organization ‘not is reasonable. Consequently, members are
[by] an explicit contract … [but rather] by likely to be highly vigilant when it comes
[members’] socialization into the structure to assessing and maintaining mutual trust and
of rules’ (p. 27). trustworthiness. Second, because membership
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7. Collective Trust within Organizations
in the organization is voluntary, exit is com- constitutes an interesting sort of trans-
paratively costless. If doubts about others’ generational positive social expectation.
trustworthiness become too great, therefore, Over time, Fine and Holyfield argued, as
members will take their trust elsewhere and members acquire knowledge about the
the organization will simply die. Thus, the organization, the nature of trust itself is
organization’s survival depends upon its transformed. Early on, the organization is
ability to successfully instill and sustain per- simply [in their terminology] a ‘validator’ of
ceptions of mutual trustworthiness among trust for new members. Over time, how-
its members. ever, it becomes an ‘arena in which trusting
Fine and Holyfield identified three im- relations are enacted and organizational
portant bases of trust within this organiza- interaction serves as its own reward’ (p. 29).
tion, which they termed awarding trust, As with trust in engineers, this form of trust
managing risk, and transforming trust. One way is not simply trust in the expertise of
trust is created, they observed, is to award specific individuals, but more importantly,
trust to others even when confidence in trust in a system of expertise. And that sys-
them may be lacking. For example, consid- tem, in turn, is embodied in a well-thought
erable social pressure is exerted on novices out system of rules which members believe
to consume dishes at banquets prepared by to be efficacious.
other members. As Fine and Holyfield put Another way in which rules foster trust
it, there is an insistence on trust. Thus, even is through their influence not only on
if members remain privately anxious, their individuals’ expectations regarding other
public behaviors (even if somewhat coerced) members’ behaviors, but also their expecta-
connote high levels of trust. Collectively, tions regarding their own behavior (ie, their
these behavioral displays of trust in other self-perceptions). As March (1994) observed
members constitute a potent form of social in this regard, organizations function much
proof to members that their individual acts like ‘stage managers’ by providing ‘prompts
of trust are sensible. that evoke particular identities in particular
This insistence on trust is adaptive, of situations’ (p. 72). Miller (1992) offered an
course, only if collective trustworthiness excellent example of this kind of socially
is, in fact, actually in place or warranted. constructed, and ultimately self-reinforcing,
Accordingly, a second crucial element in the dynamic. In discussing the underpinnings
management of trust within this organiza- of mutual trust and cooperation at Hewlett-
tion occurs through practices and arrange- Packard (HP), he noted that, ‘The reality of
ments that ensure competence and due cooperation is suggested by the open lab
diligence. This result is achieved partially stock policy, which not only allows engi-
through the meticulous socialization proc- neers access to all equipment, but encour-
esses that newcomers to the organization ages them to take it home for personal use’
are subjected to. Novices participate in these (p. 197).
socialization processes with appropriate From a strictly economic perspective of
levels of commitment because it helps them course, HP’s policy simply reduces monitor-
manage the risks of mushroom eating and ing and transaction costs. However, from
also to secure a place in the social order of the standpoint of a rule-based unde standing
the group. In turn, more seasoned organi- of trust-related transactions, its consequences
zational members teach novices out of a are more subtle and pervasive. As Miller
sense of obligation, having benefitted from (1992) observed, ‘The open door symbol-
the instruction from those who came before izes and demonstrates management s trust
them. This repayment or reciprocation in the cooperativeness of the employees’
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8. Kramer
(p. 197). Because such acts are so manifestly performance are typically aligned with roles
predicated on trust in others, moreover, they in organizations in ways that work reason-
tend to breed trust in turn. As with many ably well: role occupants are expected to
forms of social behavior, trust is governed fulfill the fiduciary responsibilities and
by general expectations of reciprocity: all else obligations associated with the roles they
equal, if you trust me, I ought to trust you. occupy and frequently do. Thus, to the ex-
In interviews that I did with HP employees tent that people within an organization have
in 1984–1985, I observed many examples of confidence in the fact that role occupancy
this sort of trust. signals both (1) an intent and motivation to
Rule-based practices of this sort can exert fulfill such obligations; and (2) the compe-
subtle but powerfully self-reinforcing influ- tence required for carrying them out, indi-
ences on expectations, shaping not only indi- viduals can adopt a sort of presumptive trust
viduals’ perceptions of their own honesty and based upon knowledge of role occupancy
trustworthiness, but also their expectations and and the system of role relations, even in the
beliefs regarding other organizational mem- absence of personalized knowledge about
bers’ general honesty and trustworthiness as the individual in the role or history of prior
well. As Miller noted in this regard, by elim- interaction.
inating time clocks and locks on equipment Unpacking this logic a bit, numerous
room doors at HP, the organization built ‘a scholars (Barber, 1983; Dawes, 1994; Meyerson
shared expectation among all the players that et al., 1996) have noted, it is not the person
cooperation will most likely be reciprocated’ in the role that is trusted so much as the
(emphases added). The result, he went on to system of expertise that produces and main-
argue, is ‘a shared common knowledge in the tains the role-appropriate behavior of role
ability of the players to reach cooperative occupants. As Dawes (1994) aptly observed
outcomes’ (p. 197). Thus, by institutionalizing in this regard, ‘We trust engineers because
trust (and trustworthiness) through rule-based we trust engineering and believe that engi-
practices at the macro-organizational level, neers are trained to apply valid principles of
trust becomes internalized at the micro- engineering’ (p. 24). Moreover, Dawes notes,
organizational (individual) level. In this fash- ‘We have evidence every day that these
ion, rule-based trust becomes a potent form principles are valid when we observe air-
of ‘expectational asset’ (Knez and Camerer, planes flying’ (p. 24). The strength of such
1994) that facilitates more spontaneous coop- trust arises from, and is sustained by, people’s
eration among organizational members. common knowledge or beliefs regarding
such things as (1) the severity of barriers to
Role-based trust represents a closely related entry into the organizational role (ie, the
and additional basis for presumptive trust in selectivity of the organization); (2) their
others. Role-based trust constitutes a form presumptions regarding the adequacy and
of impersonalized trust, insofar as it is pred- effectiveness of the training and socialization
icated on knowledge that a person occupies processes that role occupants undergo; and
a particular role in the organization rather (3) their perceptions of various accountabil-
than on specific knowledge regarding his or ity mechanisms intended to ensure ongoing
her capabilities, dispositions, motives, or role compliance.
intentions. Roles can serve as proxies for As with the other foundations for gener-
personalized knowledge about other alized trust, role-based trust functions to
organizational members in several ways. reduce uncertainty regarding role occupant’s
First, as Barber (1983) noted, strong expec- trust-related intentions and capabilities.
tations regarding technically competent role They thus lessen the perceived need to
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9. Collective Trust within Organizations
negotiate trust when interacting with role or knowledge. Transitive trust is a solution
occupants: if you’re in the role, you’re predicated by reducing or mitigating our un-
obviously up to the task. certainty about one target’s trustworthiness by
Interestingly, unlike other forms of trust, drawing on, or benefitting from, our knowl-
role-based trust may actually benefit from edge of another’s demonstrated trustworthi-
the absence of personalized knowledge about ness. I characterize this form of trust as
others (Meyerson et al., 1996). Personalized transitive because it facilitates transferring pos-
knowledge can interfere with, and in some itive expectations from one (known) target to
cases even undermine, trust (eg, in a recent another (lesser known) one. Appreciating
plane crash, the cockpit recordings revealed both the importance of information regarding
the pilot and co-pilot sharing thoughts others’ trustworthiness and the problem of
about their lack of experience, as well as uncertainty about such information, Burt
their doubts concerning their ability to deal and Knez (1995) argued that third parties in
with the circumstances – icing – they were organizations are important conduits of trust
confronting). because of their ability to diffuse trust-relevant
information via gossip. As they demonstrated
Category-based trust constitutes another substi- in a study of trust among managers in a high
tute or proxy for individualized knowledge tech firm, gossip constitutes a valuable source
about others (Orbell et al., 1994). Category- of ‘second-hand’ knowledge about others.
based trust refers to trust predicated on infor- However, the effects of gossip on trust judg-
mation regarding a trustee’s membership in a ments are complex and not always in the
social or organizational category – information service of rational assessment of others’ trust-
which, when salient, often unknowingly worthiness. Part of the problem, Burt and
influences others’ judgments about their trust- Knez theorized, is that third parties tend to
worthiness. As Brewer (1981) noted, there are make only partial disclosures about others. In
a number of reasons why membership in a particular, third parties often communicate
salient category can provide a basis for pre- incomplete and skewed accounts regarding
sumptive trust. First, shared membership in a the trustworthiness of a prospective trustee
given category can serve as a ‘rule for defining because people prefer to communicate infor-
the boundaries of low-risk interpersonal trust mation consistent with what they believe
that bypasses the need for personal knowledge the other party wants to hear. Consequently,
and the costs of negotiating reciprocity’ when when a person has a strong relation to a pro-
interacting with other members of that cate- spective trustee, third parties tend to convey
gory (p. 356). Further, because of the cognitive stories and information that corroborate
consequences of categorization and in-group and strengthen the tie, therefore increasing
bias, individuals tend to attribute positive certainty about the person’s trustworthiness.
characteristics such as honesty, cooperative- Thus, third parties tend to amplify such
ness, and trustworthiness to other in-group trust.
members (Brewer, 1996). As a consequence, The most important or informationally
individuals may confer a sort of what she relevant kinds of third parties are those who
terms depersonalized trust on other in-group are members of our networks or otherwise
members that is predicated simply on the trusted networks. Uzzi’s (1997) study of
basis of awareness of their shared category exchange relations among networked firms
membership. in the New York apparel industry, described
earlier, provides further evidence of the
Transitive trust constitutes another alternative crucial role third parties play in the develop-
to a history of direct, personal interaction ment and diffusion of trust. He found that
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10. Kramer
third parties acted as important ‘go- In a similar vein, Davis et al. (2000) found
betweens’ in new relationships enabling in- that trust in management was associated with
dividuals to ‘roll over’ their expectations improved sales and profits, along with
from well-established relationships to others reduced turnover. In yet another study,
in which adequate knowledge or history Dirks (2000) reported a relationship between
was not yet available. In explaining how this players’ trust in their head coach and win-
worked, Uzzi argued that go-betweens ning in the National Basketball Association.
transfer expectations and opportunities of Finally, and more recently, Grant and
existing embedded relationships to newly Sumanth (forthcoming) found that trust in
formed ones thereby ‘furnishing a basis for leaders was associated with enhanced proso-
trust and subsequent commitments to be cial motivations and behaviors among em-
offered and discharged’ (p. 48). ployees, at least within the context of
If collective trust is grounded, in part, service organizations.
on a confluence of signals indicating the There are several mechanisms by means
reasonableness of trust, then the signals that of which leaders create collective trust. From
organizational leaders send constitute an an attributional perspective, leaders garner a
especially potent source of trust. Leaders large share of the causal credit for things
tend to be focal points for organizational that happen – and don’t happen – inside
sense making and subordinates, not unrea- organizations. This association is so power-
sonably, often pay a great deal of attention ful that Hackman (2002) characterized the
to what those at the top do – and don’t do tendency as the leader attribution error. While
(Kramer, 1998; Weick, 1995). Filmmaker the leadership attribution error can get us
George Lucas, who at one point in his into trouble (eg, by misattributing the rea-
career was CEO of eight corporations at the sons for organizational failures), in the case
same time, once quipped that, ‘Trust starts of trust-building initiatives, it’s a bias that
at the top and trickles down’ (Kramer, can be exploited positively. A leader can use
2009b). the error to heighten the sense that trust is
Recognizing the central role leaders play reasonable because he or she will make sure
in the trust-building process, organizational the requisite grounds for trustworthiness
scholars have attempted to explore the na- are created and maintained. When I talked
ture and impact of this relationship (Dirks, to someone who had worked on a film crew
2006; Dirks and Skarlicki, 2004). In an with Clint Eastwood, he stated, ‘There is
attempt to assess the state of our knowledge, a sense of everyone knowing just what
Dirks and Ferrin (2002) performed a useful they are supposed to be doing and doing
meta-analysis of nearly four decades of it well. And everyone knows everyone else
research on the positive effects of trust on is really good at his or her job. So, it’s very
leadership effectiveness and organizational efficient; you don’t have to talk a lot about
performance. They found that trust in lead- what needs to be done. There’s a sense of
ers had a significant relationship with respect every one trusting everyone else. It’s a very
to a variety of important outcomes, includ- professional and very pleasant atmosphere
ing constituents’ commitment to a leader’s in which to work’. Eastwood himself
decisions, their commitment to the has stated, ‘You’re always confident when
organization itself, reductions in reported you have people [around you] who are
intentions to turnover jobs, enhanced good and who know your shorthand.
job performance and satisfaction, and in- Because there’s understanding there, a
creased levels of organizational citizenship shared history. These people understand
behaviors. completely – sometimes without any words
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11. Collective Trust within Organizations
at all – what you want’ (cited in Kramer, This argument is based on evidence that
2009a). members’ trust within organizations is
A second way in which leaders help affected by members’ confidence in the pro-
create trust is through the management of cedural and distributive fairness of outcomes
meaning (Weick, 1993). When I inter- (eg, Brockner and Sigel, 1996; Brockner
viewed employees at Whole Foods, they said et al., 1997; Tyler and Degoey, 1996).
the emphasis on the importance of trust Effective monitoring and sanctioning sys-
and being trusted was palpable – and largely tems constitute possible mechanisms for
the results of founder John Mackay’s efforts providing such reassurance. To the extent
to inculcate and support it. People felt such mechanisms are perceived as credible
empowered to act on the basis of that pre- or effective deterrents to breaches of the
sumptive trust and, equally important, were collective trust (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995),
committed to reinforcing and supporting it. then they will provide the requisite assur-
(In contrast, I should note, employees I in- ance that one’s own trusting behaviors
terviewed at HP under the leadership of are neither risky nor foolish. If people be-
CEO Carly Fiorina felt that words like trust, lieve that others are doing their fair share
cooperation and teamwork had become in terms of the social contract, it makes it
hollow, mindless mantras.) The disconnec- easier for them to do so as well (Messick
tion between rhetoric and reality, in fact, et al., 1983). Thus, for example, the presence
was palpable to students. When Fiorina of sanctioning systems that are perceived to
visited the Stanford Business School, she be efficacious and fair provides a useful deter-
gave a rousing talk regarding the importance rent mechanism (Yamagishi and Yamagishi,
of trusting people and getting them to trust 1994) that, in turn, provides assurance.
you in return. Yet, when I interviewed In addition to explicit deterrents, hedges
executives and managers at HP under her constitute another interesting mechanism
(some who had listened to the very same for mitigating the perceived risks associated
talk I had), they said it was as if there were, with initial acts of trust (Meyerson et al.,
as one put it, ‘two different Carly’s … one 1996). A hedge operates to reduce the per-
the stage performer who knows all the right ceived risks and vulnerabilities of trust by
lines. And the second the real Carly you see reducing perceived dependence on a given
during your day-to-day interactions at HP. actor or outcome. In other words, hedges
And then it’s not about trust and rapport protect individuals against the risks of mis-
with the people at all. It’s about the results placed trust, especially in situations where
you produce – and that’s it. Produce or get the perceived stakes are high. The existence
out of the way’. of a hedge allows one to enter into a risky
In concluding my consideration of the venture because there is a back up against
various intra-organizational influences on disappointment or breach. In this respect,
collective trust, I would be remiss if I failed hedges function much like Best Alternatives
to mention some of the more macro-level, to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAs) in
structural determinants. If collective trust is negotiations. As with BATNAs, hedges cre-
largely about individuals’ diffuse expecta- ate a psychological ‘fail safe’ mechanism,
tions and generalized beliefs regarding other thereby reducing perceived vulnerability
organizational members’ trustworthiness, to an acceptable level. As psychological
then any formal structures or procedures that devices, hedges are interesting because
provide a basis for inferring or presuming they imply an attitude that is somewhat
that others are likely to behave in a trust- equivocal: one trusts the other, but not com-
worthy fashion should enhance such trust. pletely. Hedges thus help jumpstart a trust
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12. Kramer
development process and, if reinforced or trustworthiness. In this respect, the argu-
reciprocated by others’ subsequent trustwor- ments presented here resonate with recent
thy actions, become self-reinforcing. efforts by Gambetta and his colleagues to
develop a sign theory of trust (Bacharach
CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS and Gambetta, 2001; Gambetta and Hamill,
In this paper, I have tried to indicate how 2005). As Gambetta and Hamill (2005) note
we might conceptualize individuals’ general- in a recent articulation (and empirical inves-
ized trust in other organizational members tigation) of this perspective, it is assumed
as a form of positive social expectation, an that ‘trusters acquire, in various ways, an
expectation predicated upon their percep- idea of which trust-warranting properties a
tions of, and beliefs about, the attributes of trustee needs to be trustworthy in a given
the collective as a whole and/or its average game (as well as the obverse properties that
or ‘prototypic’ member. In trying to locate make a trustee untrustworthy’ (p. 6). These
this particular conceptualization of trust trust warranting properties include such things
within the large and diverse network of as the trustee’s honesty and benevolence.
extant constructs in the literature, I would The problem with such trust-warranting
like to emphasize a few points of concep- properties, Gambetta and Hamill go on to
tual linkage and affinity with other theo- point out, is that they can never be assessed
retical perspectives. directly through observation. They must,
First, and perhaps foremost, collective therefore, be inferred from the available
trust should be viewed as a particular type evidence at hand. As a consequence, social
of social representation held by the indi- perceivers are forced to assess a trustee’s
viduals within a social system. As Brewer trustworthiness ‘by evaluating observable
and Gardner (1996) argued in their influen- signs of him that the truster believes to be
tial analysis of individuals’ cognitive self- correlated with the unobservable trust-
representations, the self-concept appears to warranting properties’ (p. 7). With respect to
consist of at least three basic levels, which dyadic-level trust dilemmas, Gambetta and
they characterized as the individual self, the Hamill note, such signs include any observ-
interpersonal or relational self, and the collec- able feature of the individual trustee, includ-
tive self. As numerous experiments have ing verbal and non-verbal indicators,
demonstrated, the sense of self that is salient physical signs such as clothing and other
or activated in a given social situation is props, as well as a host of other indicators
likely to be influenced by a variety of social that might be construed as diagnostic of an
and situational cues. When these cues are underlying trust-warranting property.
primed, individuals’ behavior changes ac- In the case of collective contexts, I would
cordingly (see Kramer and Brewer (1986) argue, we also rely on a rich and complex
and Kramer et al. (1996) for reviews of this set of ambient environmental signs when
experimental literature). trying to calibrate the general level of trust-
One implication of the social information worthiness of a group or collective to which
processing model presented here – which we belong. These ambient signs include the
construes individuals as vigilant social audi- kinds of structural, procedural, and social
tors – is that individuals will pay consider- indicators described above, and that are
able attention to cues indicative of others’ construed as probative evidence of other
trustworthiness or lack of trustworthiness. people’s willingness to behave in a trustwor-
Some cues will reassure people that trust in thy fashion. Such signs represent, in a sense,
their situation makes sense, whereas other proxies for individuating knowledge about
cues will activate concerns regarding others’ specific trustees. In that sense, they resemble
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13. Collective Trust within Organizations
stereotypes – but positive stereotypes rooted in institutionalized deception that fooled a vast
a considerable body of converging, support- collective of associates and investors. As one
ive evidence of underlying general trustwor- broker who had been lulled into investing
thiness. with Madoff, ‘There was something about
I would be remiss if I failed to mention this person, pedigree, and reputation that
that there is a potential dark side to this inspired trust’. Madoff created an illusion of
argument as well. Every sign of trustworthi- personal and institutional trustworthiness on
ness can be faked – and those that are con- an audacious scale: he successfully cultivated
sidered most reliable and most diagnostic the right social networks, acquired the right
may be the easiest to fake (Kramer, 1998, credentialing friends and associates, created
2009d). As Gambetta and Hamill (2005) and managed what seemed to be flourishing
point out, skillful impersonators can always business offices, and located himself and
mimic the outward signs or appearance of his institutions in reassuring, high prestige
trustworthiness, thus lulling potential victims locations. Government figures sought his
into a false sense of security. Are there advice and he was a frequent commentator
equivalents of such mimicry or deception and expert on financial affairs. In short, all
at the collective level? Enron might be tak- the signs of professional and personal trust-
en as one candidate (Kramer, 2002). In a worthiness were there – they were just all
Wall Street Journal article entitled ‘En-ruse?’, faked. Thus, a little prudent paranoia and
that appeared shortly after the collapse of due diligence are also warranted, especially
Enron, it was reported that in 1998 more in situations where the costs of misplaced or
than 70 Enron employees were asked by mistaken trust are high.
top management to go to an empty trading Another point of conceptual connection
floor and pose as busy sales representatives of the present arguments is with Robert
to impress a group of Wall Street analysts Putnam’s (1993) analysis of the relationship
who were visiting the company’s headquar- between the levels of trust in a social system
ters. According to one employee who had and the social capital available to its mem-
participated in the lie, ‘We actually brought bers. As I hope it is already clear, collective
in computers and phones, and they told us trust has a number of benefits from the
to act like we were typing or talking on standpoint of organizational effectiveness
the phone when the analysts were walking and functioning. First and foremost, it great-
through. They told it us it was very impor- ly reduces transaction costs. Individuals do
tant for us to make a good impression, and not have to negotiate trust, but instead
if the analysts saw that the operation was can simply assume trustworthiness (to the
disorganized, they wouldn’t give the com- extent sufficient indicators are in place). In
pany a good rating. ‘To enhance this illu- addition, individuals should be able to
sion, the employees even brought in cooperate and coordinate more easily and
personal pictures of loved ones to adorn effectively. In this case, collective trust con-
the tops of their desks. Although the whole stitutes a vital organizational resource.
charade lasted only 10 min, it was enough Loosely speaking, it constitutes a useful
time to create the impression of a dynamic, psychological form of organizationally
flourishing trade floor. bounded social capital (Putnam, 1993).
A more recent – and perhaps even more As a potential form of social capital, the
compelling example because of the sheer question can be raised as to how resilient or
scale and longevity of the deception – is the reliable might be such trust. The issue of
fraud perpetuated by Bernard Madoff the resilience of any given form of trust is
(Kramer, 2009d). He created an enormous important. A number of scholars have noted
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14. Kramer
the seeming fragility of trust in many Acknowledgments
situations, noting that trust is often ‘hard An earlier version of this paper was pre-
won, but easily lost’. In the case of the sented at the 2009 Ruffin Summit on Pub-
various bases of collective trust identified lic Trust in Business, held at the University
here, the jury is still out. However, it is of Virginia’s Darden School of Business in
important to note that it is not necessary to Charlottesville, Virginia. I am extremely
assume that a particularly strong or cohesive grateful to the organizers of that conference
bond or positive expectation needs to exist and the conference participants for their
among all the members of the collective in helpful feedback and suggestions. I am par-
order for trust to work. As Deutsch (1958) ticularly grateful to the Brian Moriarty,
suggested in this regard, ‘Mutual trust can Andy Wicks, and Jared Harris for their com-
occur even under circumstances where the ments and efforts in improving these ideas.
people involved are not overly concerned The development of these ideas was sup-
with each other’s welfare, provided that ported by funds from the Kennedy School
the characteristics of the situation are such of Government and the Stanford Business
as to lead one to expect one’s trust to be School.
fulfilled’ (p. 279).
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