2. Learning Objectives
After reading this chapter the reader should be able to:
1. Comprehend and utilize standard risk management security techniques.
2. Compare and contrast the ability to harden an airport terminal versus a rail or cruise ship terminal.
3. Analyze the difficulties related to installing metal detectors and scanning equipment in a mass
transit environment.
4. Explore the means to track hazardous cargo through the trucking industry.
5. Assess the federal government’s highway safety and security program.
6. Discuss the “best industry practices” in place in the trucking, mass transit, and oil pipeline
industries and debate the need for federal mandated rules.
7. Describe the unique aspects of protecting the pipeline industry.
8. Conduct a risk management assessment on a transportation facility.
3. Subtopics
Introduction
The U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
assumed responsibility for overall transportation security
after 9/11. They initially hired approximately 65,000
employees in a relatively short period of time and promised
to hire more competent screeners, use explosive detection
devices (EDS); and increase the percentages of screened
baggage. Long standing vulnerabilities had been recognized
but not sufficiently addressed prior to 9/ll including failure
by screeners to detect threats when screening passengers,
absence of a requirement to examine checked baggage on
domestic flights, inadequate controls in limiting access to
secure areas, and failure to control access to air traffic
control systems (ATC). These problems persist.
4. Update:
• An investigation by the General Accountability Office
shows a gaping vulnerability remains. Between
January 2006 and October 2006 teams of undercover
federal investigators walked through various airport
checkpoints carrying common household items in
their bags. By themselves the materials were not
bombs. But they were ingredients that could have
been mixed together in an airplane restroom to make
an improvised explosive device (IED) .
• The failure was across the board. 21 airports were
tested and in all 21, screeners were unable to find
component parts that could be used to make
homemade bombs.
6. Solutions
The process of risk assessment begins with three well accepted principles: predictability, probability,
and criticality. Security professionals agree that the process from risk analysis to risk management
involve several distinct steps. They generally include:
1. Define the existing problem
2. Spell out the objectives of the assessment
3. Evaluate the current measures in place
4. Identify and appraise the potential risk
5. Select the appropriate risk reduction measures appropriate to the circumstances
6. Develop and implement the selected measures
7. Test the measures
8. Update the program at least annually.
7. Protecting Public Air Transportation
Airports are public facilities offering a public service, and are
extremely difficult to harden, as targets due to the need for
accessibility. Consequently, public air transportation is an
alluring target in terms of difficulty in providing adequate
physical, personnel, and operational security. A report issued
by the GAO in June 2000 stated that screeners failed to detect
threat objects located on passengers and carry-on baggage;
failing to notice about 20% of the objects, which would have
posed a threat. The statistics actually showed a decline in the
detection rate between the years 1991and 1999, something not
lost on terrorist strategic planners. Access control also presents
unique problems for airport officials and special measures must
be taken because of the uniqueness of the airport venue.
8. Update:
A May 2005 GAO report says many of the nation's 45,000
screeners are not getting congressionally mandated
training because of staffing shortages and because many
work sites don't have access to high-speed Internet
training courses. "As of October 2004, nearly half of the
screener workforce did not have high-speed access to the
Online Learning Center at their training facility," according
to the report. The GAO said the TSA has taken steps to
improve screener performance, and to better measure
performance, but said more needs to be done, particularly
in the area of checked baggage. The TSA has made a
request for $174 million in the fiscal 2006 budget for high-
speed Internet connectivity.
9. TSA FAIL Missed Loaded Gun in Carry-
On Bag . . . Passenger Boards Plane!
10. Protecting Rail Service
Train robbery, a quintessentially 19th century crime, is alive and
well today. Railroad police use computers to pinpoint where
cargo disappeared and infrared scopes to scan rail yards. Theft
and pilferage have been estimated at $9 million to $14 million a
year. The Association of American Railroads has indicated the
actual loss during 2002 to be $11.4 million. This, of course,
represents only a fraction of the industry’s 2002 revenue of
$42.9 billion. The heart of the rail security system is the Railway
Alert Network (RAN), the major purpose of which is to monitor
the level of threat to the rail industry and to alert the industry
if it changes. In March 2004, the DHS announced a plan to the
begin testing a way to screen rail passengers and their luggage
to see if it can quickly and accurately detect security risks.
11. Protecting Rail Service continued
The stated purpose of the project would be to test
new technologies and screening concepts to see if
they could be applied to trains, which depend on
passengers being able to get on and off cars
quickly. So far it has been the position of the TSA
that putting a new security system in place at
railroad facilities is inappropriate. A TSA official
was quoted as saying, “We can implement a
system of security that is very, very
comprehensive….. but it would cost billions of
dollars. Is that the right strategy? Our judgment at
this point is that it is not.”
13. Protecting Maritime Facilities
Maritime security presents some of the most
unique challenges of the transportation industry.
The challenge is even greater due to a complex
network of ownership, domestic, and foreign
interests, and varying levels of security at different
ports and terminals. Cruise ships have similar
unique challenges but do inspect all carry-on
baggage and use metal detectors to examine
passengers. The industry must now comply with
U.S. Coast Guard rules and the corresponding
regulations of the International Maritime
Organization.
14. Protecting Maritime Facilities
Most U.S. ports are landlord ports. The port owns
the property, builds the facilities, and performs
most maintenance functions. The facilities are
leased to terminal operators. These people engage
in the actual business of moving cargo. Ports are
generally patrolled by local police officers but all
tenants must provide individual security. Access to
ports is generally provided along truck ways or
causeways where incoming cargo is searched upon
entering the facility. Unless proper equipment is
utilized to conduct these searches, the exercise
can become an exercise in futility.
15. Protecting Maritime Facilities
The U.S. Coast Guard has established port
security zones in all U.S. ports. They screen,
though not all physically, all arriving
commercial vessels. Port security measures are
imposed on an 'as needed' basis. The U.S. Coast
Guard has also established protection zones for
a distance of 500 yards around all U.S. naval
vessels in navigable waters of the United
States.
17. Protecting Mass Transit
The evolution of urban public transportation systems from
horse-drawn street cars to automobiles, buses, and complex
subway and elevated train systems has transformed the
industry and its associated security requirements. In an
attack against a mass transit system, local law enforcement
would take the lead in preparing for, preventing, and
responding. Most American cities give responsibility for
mass transit security to municipal law enforcement agencies,
although some larger municipalities support designated
forces. The Department of Homeland Security announced in
November 2003 that it allocated $750 million for the Urban
Area Security Initiative (UASI). The program provides monies
to urban areas to enhance overall security and preparedness
levels in order to prevent, respond, and recover from acts of
terrorism.
18. Protecting Mass Transit
As part of a commitment to directing funds to urban areas, which
have been designated as critical national infrastructures, DHS has
selected several urban areas to receive the largest portion of funds:
up to $675 million. The DHS based the decision on a formula that
took into account factors including critical infrastructure, population
density, and credible threat intelligence. In December 2002, the
Government Accounting Office issued a report outlining the
vulnerability of buses and commuter rail systems. The report
conducted in-depth reviews of ten transit agencies and concludes
that while commuter transit systems could be targets of terrorist
attacks, insufficient funding, coordination and sharing of critical
information are inhibiting efforts to make the systems more secure.
Approximately 14 million Americans use mass transit every workday.
The key to a better response against a mass transit attack is better
technology and better training.
19. TRANSPORTATION IN 2 learns about the newly
created transit counter terrorism team
20. Protecting Highways/Trucking
The purpose of the Highway Watch Program is to promote security
awareness among all segments of the motor carrier transportation
community. This program trains commercial drivers to observe and report
any suspicious activities or items that may threaten the highway
transportation system. Authority for the program was originally contained
in the fiscal year 2003 Appropriations Act under Public Law 108-7 and
included an amount of $19,700,000. On an average day, more than 7.5
million vehicles and approximately 10.5 million holders of commercial
driver’s licenses (CDL’s) are on U.S. roads. Almost 2.5 million of the drivers
have an endorsement, which permits them to haul hazardous cargo.
According to U.S. Customs, more than 11.2 million trucks entered the United
States in 2001. The job of protecting them and their cargo is incredible and
hard to grasp. Of particular significance in evaluating the safety and security
of the trucking industry, is of course, the huge numbers of people involved.
Those people who typically come into contact with vehicles include drivers,
mechanics, washers, loading and unloading personnel, and commercial
vehicle inspectors. In order for any semblance of security to prevail, these
positions must be filled with qualified employees who are provided with
appropriate supervision.
22. Protecting Pipelines
There are approximately 200,000 miles of oil pipeline alone in the
United States. The industry has taken steps to increase close
surveillance of pipelines, implement even more restrictions to
access vital points along routes, and to expand the physical
patrolling of the lines. Presidential Decision Directive 63 assigned
lead responsibility for pipeline infrastructure protection to the
Department of Transportation. Immediately after 9/11 the Office
of Pipeline Safety issued emergency bulletins to oil and gas
companies and also removed from its website detailed diagrams
representing the locations of the nation’s pipelines. The OPS also
conducted a detailed vulnerability assessment of exactly which
pipeline facilities were absolutely critical to the economic and
defense capabilities of the nation. The industry soon came to
focus on critical pipeline facilities, control centers, pump and
compressor stations, and storage facilities.
24. Conclusion
The world faces a two-branched challenge both to
maintain the security of transportation systems and
continue to ensure the free flow of commerce. The
Department of Homeland Security consolidated 22
different agencies in an attempt to orchestrate a
network of standardized security for each
transportation component. However, now several years
since the tragedy on 9/11, the bureaucracy has yet to
really accomplish all but the beginnings of a security
program based on time tested protocols of risk
management. The efforts are often under-funded,
overlapping, insufficient and redundant, and have only
recently expanded outside the air component.
25. Case Study:
If you were asked to be a contributing
consultant on the planning and
development of a new port in New
Orleans, what policies, processes, and
procedures would you recommend to
adequately protect the maritime industry
using this facility; i.e., rail access, truck
access, pipeline access and possibly mass
transit to a cruise ship terminal?
