Port Security_Anderson_Richard

AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY SYSTEM
MARITIME PORT SECURITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACKS
A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO
PROFESSOR GEORGE FARON
AMERICAN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
BY
RICHARD ANDERSON
JUNE 6, 2014

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Pentagon, World Trade Center, and
associated buildings, leaders of the free world recognized the need to enhance security in a
number of areas and at several levels. The use of aircraft to bring down huge skyscrapers
demonstrated to America and other developed nations to not only consider possible attacks from
ICBM missiles and conventional weapons systems, but take into account other delivery
mechanisms such as trucks, railways, automobiles, and ocean bound vessels housing large metal
cargo containers shipped by the millions annually. The maritime world-product supply line and
all of its individual components such as ports, terminals, and a variety of facilities would
undergo a major transition into becoming a "supply chain," with focus and inclusion of extended
surrounding land areas.
The United States, via the newly designated Department of Homeland Security, would
lead the charge in directing where the main point of attention should be considered for enhancing
the security of the maritime industry. Legislation such as the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, the Maritime Transportation Antiterrorism Act of
2002, and the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and others were
promptly designed and passed to incorporate new changes to beef up maritime security.1
Container security was of particular importance because although the U.S. generates
about 30% of all global trade, it only commands about 1% of the international commercial
shipping fleet.2
The bulk of international shipping is carried out by foreign cargo carriers, and
the large containers used for shipping mass quantities of goods number in the millions. The
Central Intelligence Agency reported that a weapon of mass destruction would more likely be
delivered by one of these containers rather than by ICBM3
because of their easy access and
1
1. Stasinopoulos, Dinos. "Maritime Security - the Need for a Global Agreement." Maritime
Economics & Logistics 5, no. 3 (09, 2003): 311.
http://search.proquest.com/docview/194506960?accountid=8289.
2
2. Ibid., 313.
3
3. Helmick, Jon S. and Dennis Compton. "Maritime and Intermodal Transportation
Security: The Training Factor." Review of Business 25, no. 3 (Fall, 2004): 23.
1

2
difficulty in tracking. Measures had to be taken to ensure safe, reliable, and secure container
travel beginning from point of origin, through a variety of transitions from marine ports, through
international waters, to their final destinations.
In an article written by Brian Fortner for Civil Engineering magazine in 2002, he points
out that about 17,000 cargo containers enter U.S. seaports each day, but only a few are able to be
physically inspected; about two to four percent of millions of containers prior to 2001.4
To
improve this scenario, an electronic device known as a "smart seal," designed by Savi
Technology is attached to the container. This smart seal contains reprogrammable electronics
which carry data regarding contents, destination, point of origin, and other information deemed
appropriate. Receivers are mounted at sea ports which monitor arriving and departing
containers. The smart seals put out a radio frequency which can be detected for hundreds of feet
from the port towers, providing enough distance to sound alarms or alert security personnel
should the container have been tampered with.5
Originally, these sensors were retailed at $25.00
each, but efforts have been made to reduce that cost. As of October of 2013, Savi is still
engineering and producing smart sensors for the container industry, and business is booming.6
To support the new security mindset and needs in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, new
initiatives were created to help facilitate better international maritime security. The idea of port
security was expanded to be thought of as "port supply chain security";7
the entire route of
4
4. Thibault, Marc, Mary R. Brooks, and Kenneth J. Button. "The Response of the U.S.
Maritime Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives." Transportation Journal 45, no. 1
(Winter, 2006): 5. http://search.proquest.com/docview/204591309?accountid=8289.
5
5. Fortner, Brian. "Electronic Seals Track Containers to Improve Port Security." Civil
Engineering 72, no. 10 (10, 2002): 37.
6
6. Savi Analytics. http://sensorbasedanalytics.com/2013/10/03/reusable-containers-the-under-appreciated-
champions-of-the-supply-chain/
7
7. Bichou, Khalid. "The ISPS Code and the Cost of Port Compliance: An Initial Logistics
and Supply Chain Framework for Port Security Assessment and Management." Maritime
Economics & Logistics 6, no. 4 (12, 2004): 322.

3
produced goods from manufacturer to distributor, then finally to retailer, in between which is
often shipping through international waters, finally ending up in deep water marine ports. Two
pieces of legislation created were the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code
and non-ISPS initiatives. The ISPS, officially implemented on July 1, 2004 through the passage
of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002, requires that "governments, ports,
ships, and shipping companies"8
follow guidelines for risk assessment, three separate security
levels of threat (complete with plans for each level), and provide funding for personnel,
information resources, equipment, and training. Furthermore, the ISPS has specified mandatory
positions of professional authority. These posts are Ship Security Officers, Company Security
Officers, Port Facility Security Officers, and other security positions assigned to deal with
vessels and port functions relegated to international trade.9
To date, funding these requirements has caused great concern, especially for the larger
marine port organizations. The non-ISPS security initiatives have mandatory as well as
voluntary requirements. Mandatory requirements include security cards for personnel and port
security assessments.10
Voluntary programs include involvement with the CSI, previously
mentioned, and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The C-TPAT
initiative looks at port security along six basic lines: procedural, physical security, personnel,
education, training, and conveyance security.11
Though the C-TPAT initiative is voluntary and
only available to U.S. companies and a few Mexican firms, many companies have signed on
because faster as well as fewer inspections are required, and an account manager is provided by
the federal government. Also, companies involved with C-TPAT know which other firms are
8
8. Bichou, 324.
9
9. Helmick, 25.
10
10. Bichou, 325.
11
11. Thai, Vinh V. and Devinder Grewal. "The Maritime Security Management System:
Perceptions of the International Shipping Community." Maritime Economics & Logistics 9, no.
2 (06, 2007): 129. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.mel.9100175.

4
participants as well, and will be given priority of recovery should there be an incident.12
Further
legislative enhancements include the Twenty-Four-Hour and Ninety-Six-Hour Rules.
The Ninety-Six-Hour Rule requires that prior to arriving at a U.S. port, ships will give
four days notice that they are coming. The idea is that should a terrorist group command a ship
they will be limited in driving it into a port. The Twenty-Four-Hour Rule requires that a liner
company give twenty-four hour notice that they are loading a container onto a vessel which is
bound for U.S. ports, thus allowing the U.S. government time to decide whether or not to pay
closer attention to that particular cargo, and ensures appropriate security for all containers
destined for U.S. ports.
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) has also implemented guidelines through its
Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars (NVICs). The NVIC 10-02, composed in October of
2002, has established guidelines assessing security of vessels, interacting with ports and their
facilities, and possible risk to others within the marine environment.13
Another USCG document,
NVIC 11-02, provides guidance for creating security "plans, procedures, and measures for
facilities."14
However, new guidelines imposed by the Coast Guard initiatives have not gone
without some rebuke. Many marine facility owners believe these new regulations are very
expensive mandates, and would prefer that a fee be attached to cover their costs, but that does
not appear to be on the forefront anytime soon. The Coast Guard estimates there are somewhere
around 5,000 marine facilities and 10,000 vessels effected by the new regulations, and the cost
will be tremendous for incorporating the many changes. Physical features such as new fences in
port facilities, electronic equipment performing surveillance actions requiring cameras and
receiver stations have been deemed appropriate, and other such requirements. According to
Helmick, expenditures for aviation security receive far more funding than does the marine port
environment, and so far over $500 million has been allocated, with a further $49 million
12
12. Thibault, 8.
13
13. Helmick, 26.
14
14. Ibid., 27.

5
expected, but many in the industries feel this is still far too inadequate to perform the tasks
required. And besides the costs for doing what is necessary as far as equipment, personnel, and
training, there are penalties for non-compliance after the 2004 deadline; ranging from $10,000 to
over $30,000 in fees, or a worst case scenario of operations shut down for extreme negligence to
conform to the new ship and facility regulations.
As mentioned earlier, risk assessment is part of the requirements of the ISPS Code. Risk
analysis was started during the Eisenhower era with the concerns over nuclear power plant, fuel,
and waste.15
Maritime security was now targeted for risk analysis in the face of a possible
terrorist attack. The principles lie in speculating what can go wrong, the chances of an incident
occurring, and what would be the resultant consequences. Marine ports are significant centers of
economic activity, and the negative financial implications of a chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapon attack would be dramatic. Hurricane Katrina has been estimated on the order of $100
billion in recovery costs, and a mass destruction weapon attack at a marine port has been
calculated potentially to exceed that of Katrina.16
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has actively pursued risk analysis for marine ports, and has distributed over $1.1 billion dollars
to about 130 ports in the U.S. to cover the years 2002 to 2007. Eight of the largest ports received
60% of the funding due to their size, and the balance was distributed according to decided tier
levels. These eight ports were the San Francisco Bay Area, Delaware Bay, Houston-Galveston,
Los Angeles-Long Beach, New Orleans, New York-New Jersey, Puget Sound, Washington,
Sabine-Neches River, Texas.17
With regards to the financial and physical efficiency of the new maritime security
measures, particularly where container involvement is concerned, Khalid Bichou performed an
15
15. Greenberg, Michael R. "Risk Analysis and Port Security: Some Contextual Observations
and Considerations." Annals of Operations Research 187, no. 1 (07, 2011): 121.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-009-0631-3.
16
16. Greenberg, 127.
17
17. Ibid., 134.

6
empirical evidence study whereby the Damas organization estimated the new security measures
would cost the U.S. economy over $150 billion annually, and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) estimated costs to businesses roughly $1.6 billion per year.18
The good news is that the
study conducted from the years 2002 to 2008, involving pre-ISPS data and post ISPS
implementation, determined that container terminals benefited from the enhanced security
enacted after July 1, 2004. In addition, the twenty-four hour rule, the fast-lane process, new
technologies allowing for quicker and more efficient data entry for cargo and manifest also
assisted in terminal efficiency.19
With regards to international compliance, Australia accepted the regulations and
requirements of the ISPS, but tried to enhance their security additionally by proposing a Joint
Offshore Protection Command composed of Australian Customs Service and Defense Force.20
They established the Australian Maritime Identification System (AMIS) whereby they would
manage the identification of vessels, their cargo and crews, and destination in an area equivalent
to a distance of 1,000 miles from their coastline. This zone was to be referred to as Australia's
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Interdiction of vessels would also be within their right.
Concerns were immediately raised by the international maritime community over the distance of
control; quite a leap from the 12 nautical mile distance designated by international marine law.
After several complaints, the Australian wording in the AMIS organization was changed in effect
to read voluntary submission to information requests by Australian security forces.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, marine port security has received special attention,
particularly where the container industry and the global supply chain are concerned. Legislation
18
18. Bichou, Khalid. "Assessing the Impact of Procedural Security on Container Port
Efficiency." Maritime Economics & Logistics 13, no. 1 (03, 2011): 4.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/mel.2010.16.
19
19. Bichou, "Assessing the Impact," 24.
20
20. Klein, Natalie. "Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australias Maritime Security." Melbourne
Journal of International Law 7, no. 2 (10, 2006): 308.

7
such as the ISPS and other regulatory standards have provided a building block for ports around
the world to institute guidelines, trained personnel, equipment, and funding to some extent. But
even with these far-reaching advancements in processes and physical amenities, the personnel
involved and how they conduct themselves in accordance to the law remains elusive in some
areas. Indonesia is a good example of the difficulties with people involved is concerned.
Southeast Asia was one of the most pirate riddled areas in world during the mid-2000s.21
And though some illegal activity with regards to fishing and smuggling still occur, international
cooperation has reduced the threat of piracy in and around the many islands of the Indonesian
archipelago. One of the reasons for better security besides the traditional long-standing military
control over such matters has been the introduction of Private Military Security Companies
(PMSCs).
A study performed by Alban Sciascia in 2013 in Belawan, Medan, Indonesia, points out
the difficulties occurring where competing factions such as military, state, and private security
factions compete for control of intermodal and marine port security operations. Complications
are further incurred when areas of jurisdiction overlap, leading to confusion as to who is
responsible for what area. Finally, accepted tradition of illegal activity within one's own sphere
and competition with encroaching organizations further disqualifies security measures as being
optimal.
Belawan has been an important port for the export of plantation goods for several decades
at least. Products such as palm oil, tea, coffee and rubber have been exported by the ton.22
Belawan became an active participant in the container industry during the 1980s. And although
the Belawan port does tremendous business, the Indonesian government does not consider it one
of the more crucial ports to secure, thus it tends to fall a bit by the wayside as far as security in
21
21. Sciascia, Alban. "Monitoring the Border: Indonesian Port Security and the Role of Private Actors."
Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 2 (08, 2013): 164.. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1437254443?
accountid=8289.
22
22. Ibid., 166.

8
general is concerned. Thus, competing factions, local governments and private security
companies control the roost, as it were.
In 1992, the Shipping Law (UU21/1992) turned administration of Indonesian shipping
over to the PT Pelabuhan Indonesia (Pelindo) organization which is further divided into four
groups: Pelindo I-IV, each one covering a different area. Belawan is controlled under Pelindo I.
Even though jurisdictions have been established, and laws laid down, there remains confusion as
to who controls which areas with regards to private companies and the government.
ISPS regulations were implemented in Indonesia on or just after the 2004 deadline.
Responsibility lies with Indonesia's Ministry of Transportation. To help with the transition to
accomplishing the new requirements for ship and port security, the ISPS Code Implementation
Assistance Program (ICIAP) was brought into the area. Japan is the controller for ICIAP in the
Indonesian archipelago. Additional players involved with local security for the Belawan area are
the Police Kepolisian Resort (POLRES), Polairud who are water and airspace police, TNI-AL
which is the Indonesia navy, and coast guard group known as Kesatuan Penjaga Laut dan Pantai
(KPLP). Add to this group the private security companies, customs officials, and immigration
agencies, this results in a stew of many actors vying for resources and legal and illegal income
earning capabilities in a relatively small area.
Of particular concern to port security are the three main for-profit private security
providers for the Belawan area: The Pelindo I security guards, members of Pemuda Pancasila,
and private military security companies (PMSCs).23
The Pelindo I group has control over foot
operations and camera monitoring, and some are trained to handle hazardous waste incidents.
These folks are charged with ensuring ISPS compliance. The Pemuda Pancasila (PP) are hired
by Pelindo I and enforce ideological philosophy of Indonesia but many see them as hoods
involved with criminal activity "specializing in extortion, illicit trafficking and smuggling . . .
observed by several private investors,"24
This group's basic philosophy is that a little theft is
23
23. Ibid., 176.
24
24. Ibid., 176-177.

9
okay, stealing things such as tobacco products and small high-technology mechanisms. To sum
it up, a chief of the Belawan PP who controls illegal activity uses Pelindo to control the PP who
in turn hires people to secure and safeguard their interests against other potential illegal
encroachers. And if that is not confusing enough, yet another private security group, which is
Singapore-based, is the Glenn Defense Marine. They protect "foreign military and merchant
ships in port,"25
Furthermore, many if not all of these groups have at least some access to the
container traffic, and simply driving a very expensive automobile can get one admittance into a
secure area without being checked out whatsoever.26
It should be noted as well that the Belawan
port has received some new equipment for security purposes, but few actually know how to
operate it effectively.
Though the marine port security in the Indonesian arena seems congested with private
interests, both government, military, and civilian, and overlapping jurisdictions with personnel
confused as to exactly what their areas of responsibility are, terrorist activity is low on the
priority of international concern. The variety of groups running the Belawan port do not like
attention drawn to them, therefore they discourage any thoughts along the lines of Islamic
extremism.
Maritime port security is of vital importance to the global economy and the safety of
people and industrialized infrastructures everywhere. Since the 9/11 incident, international
concern over the enormous container industry supply chain has received much attention.
Legislation has been passed to see that properly trained personnel are involved with vessel
security, marine port terminal and facility security, equipment, and appropriate monitoring and
upkeep of said processes continues. Problems such as the confusion over individual
responsibilities among competing groups, as in the Indonesian example, still exist, but they are
known about and work will continue to refine these processes. The concern over container
control is being addressed with information systems to monitor contents, intramodal transfers,
25
25. Ibid., 178.
26
26. Ibid., 179.

10
and points of origin and destination, as well as physical technology such as the container sensors
designed by Savi Analytics to alarm appropriate facilities of breaches in security. The functions
for a secure supply chain are in place and will continue to contribute to a reduction in fears over
a weapon of mass destruction being distributed through the use of said supply chain.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bichou, Khalid. "Assessing the Impact of Procedural Security on Container Port Efficiency."
Maritime Economics & Logistics 13, no. 1 (03, 2011): 1-28.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/mel.2010.16.
Bichou, Khalid. "The ISPS Code and the Cost of Port Compliance: An Initial Logistics and
Supply Chain Framework for Port Security Assessment and Management." Maritime
Economics & Logistics 6, no. 4 (12, 2004): 322-348.
Fortner, Brian. "Electronic Seals Track Containers to Improve Port Security." Civil Engineering
72, no. 10 (10, 2002): 37. http://search.proquest.com/docview/228528977?
accountid=8289.
Greenberg, Michael R. "Risk Analysis and Port Security: Some Contextual Observations and
Considerations." Annals of Operations Research 187, no. 1 (07, 2011): 121-136.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-009-0631-3.
Helmick, Jon S. and Dennis Compton. "Maritime and Intermodal Transportation Security: The
Training Factor." Review of Business 25, no. 3 (Fall, 2004): 23-29.
Klein, Natalie. "Legal Limitations on Ensuring Australias Maritime Security." Melbourne
Journal of International Law 7, no. 2 (10, 2006): 306-338.
Sciascia, Alban. "Monitoring the Border: Indonesian Port Security and the Role of Private
Actors." Contemporary Southeast Asia 35, no. 2 (08, 2013): 163-187.
Stasinopoulos, Dinos. "Maritime Security - the Need for a Global Agreement." Maritime
Economics & Logistics 5, no. 3 (09, 2003): 311-320.
Thai, Vinh V. and Devinder Grewal. "The Maritime Security Management System: Perceptions
of the International Shipping Community." Maritime Economics & Logistics 9, no. 2 (06,
2007): 119-137. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.mel.9100175.
11

12
Thibault, Marc, Mary R. Brooks, and Kenneth J. Button. "The Response of the U.S. Maritime
Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives." Transportation Journal 45, no. 1
(Winter, 2006): 5-15. http://search.proquest.com/docview/204591309?accountid=8289.

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