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MSc Development and Security 2014-2015
Unit Title: Dissertation
Unit Number: POLIM1001
Supervisor: Vernon Hewitt
Candidate Number: 11567
Dissertation Title
'Post-war System in Lebanon: How communities created everyday peace'.
Statement:
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of
the degree of MSc in Development and Security. This dissertation contains no
plagiarism, has not been submitted in whole or in part for the award of another
degree, and is solely the work of Cyril Mehanna.
Signature: Cyril Mehanna
Date: September 11th
2015.
Word Count: 13988

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CONTENTS
Introduction
1. Lebanon 5
2. The Lebanese Civil War 6
3. Undesrtanding the Civil War 8
4. Statement 9
5. Definitions 11
6. Research Method 11
7. Structure 12
Part I- Post-war system
I.1 Taif Agreements 14
I.2 Consociational Democracy 15
I.3 The role of the state 17
I.4 Communities and their role(s) 18
Part II- Mac Ginty's Theory
II.1 Hybridity and Hybridisation 20
II.2 Local participation 22
II.3 Everyday peace 24
II.4 Lebanon, through the eyes of Mac Ginty 25
Part III- Social contribution
III.1 Social situation after the war 27
III.2 Social issues in Lebanon 28
III.3 Role of communtities 30
III.4 Culture of peace 31
Part IV- Reconstruction
IV.1 Post-war reconstruction 31
IV.2 Reconstruction in Lebanon 37
IV.3 Infrastructure reconstruction in Lebanon 39
IV.4 Rafiq El Hariri 40
IV.5 Communities and reconstruction 41

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Part V- Obstacles and solutions
V.1 The system in Lebanon 43
V.2 The Theory 45
V.3 Local participation 46
V.4 The idea of Peace 48
Conclusion
Conclusion 49
References 54
Appendixes 57

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ABSTRACT
Lebanon has always been considered a failure. The civil war in Lebanon from 1975 to
1990 proved the fragility of Lebanon and the dangers of consociational systems. The
multiple communities that are part of Lebanon did not succeed in showing that,
despite the war, Lebanon is a successful consociational democracy. Lebanon is not
considered a country at peace, even 25 years after the end of the war. The instability
of the Middle East, the questions related to religion and the history of the war have all
played a significant roles in threatening Lebanon’s ‘stability’ and ‘peace’. It is argued
that Lebanon is on the verge of another internal conflict because of the critical
situation of the region. However, since 1990, the idea of an oncoming war is present
but war itself seems inexistent.
Peacebuilding is a notion of strong importance, especially today, as it seems that
peacebuilding is what can help a country recover from a conflict while eliminating the
threats and the possibilities or reigniting the conflict. Roger Mac Ginty defends the
idea of peacebuilding with an approach to local participation and local development.
Lebanon seems to be the perfect example in which peacebuilding and local
participation meet. Indeed, peacebuilding was not part of Lebanon’s post-war
organisation, meanwhile the communities (local) tried to lead the country towards
peace and build their own kind of peace; what Mac Ginty calls ‘everyday peace’.
Many will argue that Lebanon is not in a state of peace, not even everyday peace. I
contradict this idea by showing that Lebanon is in fact at peace.
My line of arguments starts with the post-war system, where communities, through
consociational democracy and their own development, contributed to building peace,
and succeeded in creating everyday peace. I go further by saying that Lebanon should
be an example for peacebuilding.

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Introduction

1. Lebanon
‘There is not a single resident in Lebanon who cannot, in one sense or another,
truthfully claim to belong to a minority’ (McDowall, 1986:7). Hence resides the
weakness of Lebanon, which is also its strength. Since its existence, Lebanon was a
country shared by many, divided by many (Ottoman Empire, France, Syrian) and
envied by many. The political traditions in Lebanon are based on power-sharing.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Druze and Maronite had to share this
land and coexist in order to simply exist. The Ottoman Empire used a ‘Divide and
Rule’ strategy. Under the French mandate in the aftermath of World War I, power-
sharing was not anymore a condition, and Christians were at the head of the state,
with the protection of the French. The independence in 1943 based on a consensus
(The National Pact), reinstated the political tradition of power-sharing, and
coexistence was again part of the Lebanese organisation. One of the major principles
of the National Pact imposed to Lebanon was the religious organisation of the state:
The President should be Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni and the President of the
Chamber of deputies Shi’a. This organisation was intended to ease the tensions and to
create a certain balance of power. Meanwhile, tensions increased with the years. From
1943 till 1975, coexistence was more synonymous of survival, and the 18 different
communities trying to live together were on the verge of explosion. The situation in
the Middle East always influenced Lebanon’s politics, and in 1975, the tight line on
which Lebanon was standing finally broke.

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2. The Lebanese Civil War
The Lebanese civil war is very complicated to understand.
To make it simple, two camps were born between 1943 and 1975, especially in 1958,
when the Nasserite movement divided Lebanon on the question of Pan-Arabism, and,
in 1975, these two camps took different stands, an action that led Lebanon to 15 years
of civil war. On one side was the right-wing Christian political organisation
(Lebanese Front), which was opposed to the presence of Palestinian in Lebanon
(because it was seen as a threat), and on the other side was the leftist Muslim group.
This division symbolises more than an opposition about political ideology. This
division confirms the weakness and the fragility of coexistence. This same weakness
quickly became the main factor of the civil war. In April 1975, a simple exchange of
fire between the Maronite party (Phalange) and the Palestinians in Lebanon was
enough to divide the country into two camps and lead the country into 15 years of
civil war, where the violence demonstrated the frustration of many years of
coexistence and tension because of the political tradition of power-sharing, that could
not stand anymore.
The first three years of the war (1975-1978) were punctuated by many massacres on
both sides, and by two external interventions. In 1976 the Arab League created The
Arab Deterrent Force (mainly Syrian). In 1979, only Syrian troops were still in
Lebanon under the flag of the ADF. Another international force was sent in
1978under the UN flag. The UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon) was
created to protect Lebanon from an Israeli intervention. However, in 1982, the Israeli
troops start the offensive ‘Peace for Galilee’ against the PLO, intervene in Lebanon
and occupy Beirut, the capital. Backed up by Israel, the Maronite militia initiates an
attack on two camps, Sabra and Chatila, leading to the biggest massacre of the war.

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(3500 Palestinians will be killed). 1983, Israel, the Maronite party and the US sign an
agreement for Israel’s withdrawal. The withdrawal will not ease the tension of the
conflict in which the US, Israel Syria and the Lebanese different militias were
fighting. After 1982 and the creation of many armed groups such as the Hezbollah
(which was created as a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation), the
conflict only got more complicated and more intense. However, solutions to the civil
war started to be found. Even with the implication of Iran (to support Hezbollah and
Amal) and Iraq (to support the Christians), in 1988, the Ta’if agreements were signed
in 1989, and the fighting officially ended in October 1990, when a new government
imposed by Syria, and accepted (because of no other choice) by each and every
political group was formed. After the war all the international actors present during
the war left from Lebanon, except for the UNIFIL that stayed in the south, and the
Syrian troops that stayed till 2005. After the war, the Syrian troops in Lebanon
controlled a part of the country, and had a very strong influence on the Lebanese
political organisation.
Right Wing
(Christian
dominated)
Left Wing
(Muslim
dominated
International
actors
Neutral Parties
- Lebanese Forces
(Christian,
composed of
many Christian
militias)
- Lebanese
National
Movement (until
1982)
-Independent
- Lebanese Armed
Forces
- UNIFIL (from
1978)
- Armenian
Revolutionary
federation
- Kurds

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- South Lebanon
Army (from 1976)
- Israel (from
1978)
Nasserite
Movement (Al-
Mourabitoun)
- PLO
- Amal (Shi’a)
- Hezbollah (Shi’a)
(from 1982)
- Iran (from 1980)
- US
- France
- Arab Deterrent
Force
- Syria
This table represents the actors of the civil war. The first colon from the left is the right wing
led by the Lebanese Forces (Christian). The second colon is the left wing, led by Muslim
movements to support the PLO. The third colon shows the international actors who tried to
ease the conflict without officially taking sides. The last colon shows the Neutral parties.
3. Understanding the Civil War
The civil war in Lebanon was more than just fighting. It was a strategic way of
reorganising the political system, which was for long enough dominated by the
Christians. The context of the Arab world was in favour of the Muslims, and it was
time to shift this domination, or at least to equalize it. The political game hidden
behind the curtains of a conflict led, in 1989, to the Document of National Accord: the
Ta’if agreements. The Ta’if agreements heralded the Second Republic and instated
the basis of the post-war political organisation. Ta’if reorganised the political
representation, and the political system, based on power-sharing between the different

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communities. Some constitutional amendments were also adopted (theoretically at
least). However, Ta’if did not mention any peacebuilding policy, any reconciliation
committee, it did not plan any transitional justice, and resolved 15 years of internal
conflict by just readjusting the political organisation, without even resolving the issue
that led to war: coexistence.
Today, coexistence seems to be the solution and not the problem. In fact, the conflict
did not reignite since 1990, and communitarianism is not only part of Lebanon’s
history, but also part of Lebanon’s daily life.
4. Statement
It is astonishing to see that after the civil war, ‘there was never an international
peacebuilding strategy for Lebanon and the country was left to fend for itself’
(Knudsen, 2005:18). This explains why communities in Lebanon developed their own
post-conflict process and created their own form of peace. My dissertation is based on
the post-war system in Lebanon, the construction of everyday peace by the
communities. Through my project, I will analyze How communities contributed to
building everyday peace in Lebanon’s post-war system?
The Lebanese case is unique in a sense that communities were the cause of the war,
and communities were reinforced after the war. Opposed to Bosnia, Lebanon was left
at its own mercy and had to find an internal solution to the complex problems of
communitarianism and coexistence, which were not to be abolished.
There are many reasons why Lebanon is an interesting case to study. First, the post-
war system proved to be opposed to the international theory on peacebuilding and to
the general beliefs on post-conflict development. Roger Mac Ginty (2007) believes
that the dominant western model of ‘liberal peace or liberal internationalism is

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championed by leading international organisations, leading states and international
financial institutions’. The Lebanese post-war system did not succumb to liberal
intervention in the name of peace, and succeeded in building its own post-conflict
theory, while ignoring the general beliefs of western post-conflict theories.
Second, it is interesting to approach the communities in Lebanon. The political
system in Lebanon never organised the multiple groups. Instead, communities were
the heart of the political organisation. Belonging to a community has its importance in
Lebanon, as it is part of the identity. This importance is social, economic, cultural,
and especially political. In a context of coexistence and power-sharing, communities
are very important. The most essential part in Lebanon was the power of these
communities during the war, and their power after the war. Indeed, if they were the
main actors during the war, communities were as well the main actors of the post-war
system; they were the main part of the problem as well as the main part of the
solution. It is interesting to understand how communities dealt with the post-war
system, and how they developed ‘their own methods of dealing with the effects of
violence’ (Harris, 1999:217).
The Lebanese system has always been seen as a failure. And this is what pushes me to
maintain my argument that Lebanon succeeded in building peace. It is believed that
the political organisation in Lebanon does not function, and that power-sharing is an
illusion, so is the idea of peace. It is important to be critical and to try to understand
that, 25 years ago, the conflict in Lebanon ended. And since, the 18 communities
coexist, and the political system, even weak, is still standing. This makes the
particularity of Lebanon. Lebanon is not a failure, and the communities are
responsible for the Lebanon of today; yet, surviving, but at least not dead.

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5. Definitions
Before going further into details, it is important to mention that Kofi Annan ( in Paris,
2004:56) defines peacebuilding as ‘actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to
consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation’. The divided
society of Lebanon contributed to peacebuilding, even if it was not planed by the
Ta’if agreements. The ‘divided society is taken to be a society in which there is a
significant cleavage that goes beyond the political institutions and party politics’ (Mac
Ginty, 2014). Having many differences such as history, religion, traditions, social
behaviour, economic organisation, the 18 communities of Lebanon make of the
Lebanese society a divided society. However, this divided society – even if opposed
during the war – proved to be more than united, considering the coexistence and the
strong recovery from the civil war. This united society created its own peacebuilding
process to impose its own form of peace.
6. Research Method
My dissertation will be based on the Lebanese case, which will be my case study. The
analysis of the post-war system will focus on peacebuilding, with a closer look at the
social contribution to peace and the reconstruction process. However, my dissertation
will combine as well some articles and researches, based on general concepts such as
post-conflict development, based on the Lebanese case but also based on other cases
such as Bosnia. My research was conducted on 5 different levels:
1- A study of general concepts that will help study Lebanon as a unique case, and
compare Lebanon post-conflict organisation to the general beliefs.

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2- A study of literature on Lebanon and post-war Lebanon, to have a better
understanding of the case.
3- A field study to better understand what happened in the inside, and to get
evidence.
4- A study based on the work of Roger Mac Ginty, who has been studying and
writing about post-conflict development, with an approach on Lebanon.
5- A comparison of the Lebanese case and other cases, especially Bosnia after
the conflict of 1995. This comparison will help to understand the difference between a
local development (Lebanon) and an international development (Bosnia), as well as
nation building with help of others (Bosnia was supported by the EU).
7. Structure
The first part of the dissertation will introduce the post-war system, with a closer look
at the main pillars of the post-war organisation. Mainly political, this part will focus
on the importance of the communities in the post-war system. The first part serves as
an introduction of the Lebanese political organisation in order to better understand the
post-war system as well as the issues that communities had to face in the aftermath of
the war. Understanding the importance of the communities is the key to understand
the complexity of the system. The second part of the dissertation will introduce the
theory of Roger Mac Ginty, on which this dissertation was built. Focusing on
peacebuilding, the theory of Mac Ginty is applicable to the Lebanese case, while
defying the westernised theory on peacebuilding. The third and fourth part are
dedicated to the practical side of the dissertation. Focusing on the social aspect and on
the reconstruction process, these two parts will show the inability of the state in the
aftermath of the war, as well as the strength and power of the communities. These two

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parts will introduce the actions taken by the communities in order to build the post-
war system and more importantly to build peace after the war. The fifth and final part
of the dissertation will expose the dangers and obstacles of the post-war system and of
peacebuilding in Lebanon. These obstacles faced by the communities did add up to
the many problems of the country. However, solutions can be found and will be
presented in order to counter these problems.
The dissertation aims to show how communities and consociationalism in Lebanon
contributed to peacebuilding and created a form of peace: everyday peace. However,
to go even further, this dissertation aims at proving that the Lebanese case is unique
and should be a lesson to post-conflict theory and peacebuilding.
I - The Post-war system in Lebanon
One of the difficulties of the post-war system in Lebanon is to define the so-called
period of post-war. Junne and Verkoren (2005:1) define postconflict as ‘shorthand for
conflict situations, in which open warfare has come to an end’. Considering this
accurate definition, the post-war system in Lebanon came following the Ta’if
agreements signed in October 1989. However, between the accord and its application,
Lebanon witnessed some minor fighting. The numerous characteristics of the post-
war system in Lebanon reflected a complex system in a unique context. This part will
study the four most important characteristics or pillars of the post-war system, that
were the Ta’if agreements; the consociational system; the role of the state; and finally
the communities. The post-conflict situation is the main pillar on which the
dissertation will evolve. This part aims to show first the complexity of the post-war

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system in Lebanon, and second the reasons why communities had an important
position in the aftermath of the war.
The concrete actions of the communities and their real contribution to the post-war
system will come further in the dissertation. This part will only analyze
communitarianism within the post-war system.
1. The Ta’if Agreements
The Ta’if agreements known also as the document of national accord were the basis
of the ending of the Lebanese civil war. After 15 years of conflict, the complex
political situation could only make place for a more complex solution. Indeed, the
Ta’if agreements try to reorganise the Lebanese political system without considering
‘one of the root causes of the conflict: sectarianism’ (ICTJ, 2014). Mainly influenced
by Saudi Arabia and Syria, the accord had to consider the numerous communities and
their influence, and therefore created what is called the ‘principle of mutual
existence’, which was the base for the consociational system after the war. The need
for the political reorganisation was satisfied in a way by the agreements. The Accord
‘redistributed domestic political power among major confessions – Maronite, Sunni,
Shi’a’ (Zahar in Roeder and Rotchild, 2005:232). Ta’if also increased the number of
deputies, shared the political power equally between Christians and Muslims,
restructured the prerogatives of the three major figures (The Prime Minister has more
prerogatives than the President, which was not the case before the war). Besides the
political changes, ‘Ta’if sought to introduce a number of reforms’, (Zahar in Roeder
and Rotchild, 2005:233), on an administrative scale with the decentralization, on a
military scale with the disarmament of all the militias, on a socio-economic scale and
so on. What is important to retain from the Ta’if Accord is that it did not alter

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communitarianism. Moreover, it is essential to note that Ta’if did not mention the idea
of peacebuilding, and the post-war system was not based on building peace but rather
on reforming the political system.
The problem of the communities and the confessions was also part of the solution.
Norton (1991) believes that ‘The accord leaves no doubt that […] confessionalism is
here to stay for some time to come’. Knowing that communitarianism and
confessionalism were both root causes of the war, it is astonishing to see that the
agreements did not alter communitarianism, did not target the question of
sectarianism and did not even ‘set a timetable for its abolition’ (Knudsen, 2005:2).
The fact that communities were also part of the solution demonstrates the complexity
and the difficulty of understanding the political system in Lebanon, especially after
the war. As if the situation was not already complicated, after the agreements,
‘Lebanese leaders used customary practices to challenge the provisions of the new
constitution’ (Zahar in Roeder and Rotchild, 2005:233). This is an idea of the
importance of communities in Lebanon, especially in the post-war system. Indeed, the
communities not only took part in the complex post-war system, but they also had to
step up as the most important actors of the post-war system, because of the weakness
of the state in this consociational ‘democracy’.
2. Consociational Democracy
In the 1960’s, Arend Lijphart tried to analyze the phenomenon of consociational
democracies. To resume the definition of Lijphart, a consociational democracy is a
government by elite in a politically fragmented society. Four features must be found
in all consociational systems: ‘ a grand coalition government; a segmental autonomy;
proportionality; and minority vote’ (Wolff, 2011). Hudson goes further by saying that

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a consociational democracy can only work if 6 conditions are present: distinct lines of
cleavage, a multiple balance of power, popular attitudes favourable to a grand
coalition, an external threat, moderate rationalism and relatively low total load on the
system. (Hudson in Shehade and Mills, 1988:226). Michael Hudson believes that
‘consociationalism seems like a good prescription for the Lebanese body politic’
(Hudson in Shehade and Mills, 1988:226). However, he is reluctant towards its
application. In fact, the political system in Lebanon after the war challenged
consociationalism with its complexity. The political changes brought by the Ta’if
Agreements encouraged a restructure of the consociational democracy. Even if ‘Post-
war Lebanon […] remains more-or-less a consociational democracy’, (Hudson, 1999)
it has its unique features, because of the sectarian proportionality, because of the
‘non-territorial self-governance’, (Wolff, 2011) and because of the difficulty of the
political system. One of the challenges Lebanon had to face after the civil war was to
reorganise the political system, without threatening the consociational democracy.
Hudson introduces one of the ideas of Dekmejian, which says ‘that Lebanon fits the
consociational model in important ways’ however the are some ‘ways in which
Lebanon deviates from it’. This is part of the complexity of the Lebanese system,
especially the Lebanese post-war system. One of the differences between Lebanon
and other consociational democracies is the power of the communities in Lebanon.
Communities are not represented in the political system; communities DO the
political system. The political order in Lebanon after the civil war was based on
power sharing and on the reconstitution of a unified state, two opposite ideas that
were the basis of the post-war system. This is consociationalism. However, in the case
of Lebanon, we can go further and talk about ‘consociationalism-plus’ (Hudson,
1999). The expression of Hudson targets the Lebanese problem of governance within

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a deeply confessional political system. It is then obvious that the complexity of the
post-war political system makes of Lebanon a unique case, where communities are
the pillar of the political organisation, instead of the opposite.
3. The role of the State
‘What happens when neither the power-sharing (consociational) nor hegemonic etatist
(authoritarian) models work?’ (Hudson in Shehade and Mills, 1988:236). This is
precisely the problem of Lebanon in the post-war era. However, in the post-war
system it was difficult to differentiate consociational democracy and authoritarian
democracy, because the political actors were the same in both. Defining the political
system in Lebanon as an authoritarian power-sharing model would not be wrong. In
the aftermath of the war, the political leaders were so busy figuring out the new
political organisation that they did not complete a major part of their tasks. For
example, the ‘formulation of a well integrated program of reconstruction and
development’ (Makdisi, 1977) stayed on the agenda for many years after the war,
without any concrete project. With this obsession of organising the post-war political
system, the question of peacebuilding and reconciliation were not even mentioned on
the political agenda. The war ended without any concrete policy on peacebuilding,
without transitional justice, and without even a state opting for a peaceful transition.
The lack of concrete actions and peacebuilding actions from the state encouraged the
communities to become more independent, and to lead the way towards peace. Again,
it shows that the Lebanese system is more complex than it looks. Hudson (1999)
believes that ‘Lebanese politics is not simply a matter of sectarian power-sharing. One
must also consider socioeconomic cleavages, patronage and clientelism, ideological
movements, and extraordinary external involvements’. The post-war system is

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difficult to understand. Imagine what it is like to be part of it. And the communities
were part of it, but the different communities knew how to deal with it and how to
face the challenges, especially how to face the state, which did not even have a
political role, but rather the role of organising the political system. One of the
solutions to the Lebanese post-war system was proposed by David Ignatius (1983),
who believes that ‘the solution […] is the development of a genuinely “national”
politics, in which officials of the central government – rather than feudal leaders – are
able to provide security and services for the people’. However, what Ignatius did not
bear in mind is that the official of the central government are the feudal leaders. This
is the principle of communitarianism. The leaders of the communities are also the
political leaders. So this solution can only be a theoretical one.
This is the reason why the communities had to be independent and to contribute to
their own development and create their own peacebuilding. The idea of power-sharing
is acceptable, but the idea of a unified state with national policies was far beyond
reach, especially after 15 years of civil war.
4. Communities and their role(s)
In the aftermath of the war communities were still the predominant actor. Even if
sectarianism was one of the root causes of war, it was also one of the solutions. It is
understandable if we consider the post-war context. Verkoren (2013) says that ‘Local
actors in fragile contexts often play mixed roles, playing peacebuilding roles on the
one hand, but simultaneously being associated with armed actors, or being highly
partisan and political’. It is the case in Lebanon where communities tried to build
peace, but not in a political context. The political sphere was only reserved to power-
sharing, but the real change came from the communities. Tschirgi (2004) tried to

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define ownership as one of the principles of post-conflict peacebuilding. She says that
‘the people from the war-torn society must own the reconstruction process. They must
actively be involved in setting the agenda and leading the process, which is a highly
political process complicated by the deep wounds of the conflict’. The principle of
ownership applies in Lebanon, were communities had to be independent regarding
peacebuilding and reconstruction, because of the complexity of the political
reorganisation. So as it was said earlier, communitarianism was reinforced by Ta’if,
and after the war, ‘each group [was] likely to favour the current confessional system
as they [felt] some protection for their rights as a community’ (Ghosn and Khoury,
2011). Isolation was part of the post-war system. Nevertheless, on a bigger picture,
communitarianism contributed to the development of a whole nation, despite ‘what
Waltz calls the ‘self-help’ system, in which autonomous actors pursue their security
and other interests in an environment of anarchy, uncertainty and danger.’ (Hudson in
Shehade and Mills, 1988:236).
Communities had an important role to play in the post-war system. The complexity of
the situation and of Lebanon in the aftermath of the war contributed in a way to the
obstruction of any political action from the state. The Ta’if agreements reinforced
communitarianism, and the post-war context was favourable to the development of
sectarianism. This is why communities were the strongest pillar of the post-war
system. They were in charge of the reconstruction of the country, and more
specifically, they were in charge of building and creating peace in the post-war
system.

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Understanding the post-war system is not enough to understand the role of
communities in the post-war system, and certainly not the contribution of the
communities to peacebuilding. In fact, the theory of Mac Ginty on peacebuilding and
local participation is essential in order to fully understand the issues of the post-war
system in Lebanon and the crucial contribution of communities to peacebuilding.
Part II - Mac Ginty’s theory
Roger Mac Ginty defends since a long time the concept of local resistance, and local
participation. His experience led him to believe in bottom-up development and
peacebuilding, to introduce the concept of hybridity into social sciences, and to create
a new term for a state of peace, which is called everyday peace. The three terms used
and pioneered by Mac Ginty are the base of my theory, and the base of my argument.
I shall first introduce the concept of hybridity, before talking about local participation
and introducing the idea of everyday peace; all of this linked to the Lebanese case,
through the eyes of Mac Ginty.
This part intends to show that Lebanon is beyond the western-led theory on
peacebuilding, and that everyday peace is a viable solution, brought by local actors.
1. Hybridity and Hybridisation
To put it in simple words, hybridity is the ‘erasure and blurring of boundaries’ (Mac
Ginty, 2011:71) between a condition and another. ‘I understand hybridity as both a
process and a condition of interaction between actors and practices’ (Mac Ginty,
2011). What is important to retain from the theory of Mac Ginty, is how hybridity is
opposed to the western theory on liberal peace and liberal peace intervention. For

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example, ‘in the liberal mind, the universal must be prioritised over the particular. Yet
our interest in hybrids demands that we scrutinise the minutiae of identity affiliations
and aspirations’ (Mac Ginty, 2011:76). In the case of Lebanon after the civil war, it
was essential to consider identity affiliations and aspirations, because of the
preponderant role of communities.

Mac Ginty believes that hybridity is necessary today, and this for five reasons:

-‐ It allows us to have a critical view of liberal peace and liberal peacebuilding.

-‐ It allows us to see the interaction and the cooperation between different actors,
because of the erasure of boundaries.
-‐ It allows us to get a closer look at the inside of categories, and not use
generalised terms such as international community.
-‐ It allows us to better understand the complexity of international peacebuilding.
-‐ It allows us to consider all the actors involved in peacebuilding.
Related to the post-war system in Lebanon, the concept of hybridity is of better use
than the concept of liberal peace, especially because of the internal aspect of Lebanon.
Moreover, Mac Ginty introduces a four-part model to explain the process of
hybridisation. The four parts of the model are:
-‐ The ability of liberal peace actors, structures and networks to impose their
version of peacemaking.
-‐ The ability of liberal peace actors, structures and networks to incentivise local
actors to cooperate with the liberal peace.
-‐ The ability of local actors, structures and networks to negotiate with, subvert,
exploit, and resist the liberal peace.

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-‐ The ability of local actors, structures and networks to create and maintain
alternatives to the liberal peace.
From this four-part model, the two last models are to be retained when considering
the post-war system in Lebanon. Indeed, local actors not only resisted liberal peace
and liberal intervention in the name of peace, but local actors (communities) found an
alternative to the liberal peace, and created what will be later introduced as everyday
peace.
However, the most important part of the theory of hybridization is its aim. ‘The
intention is to illustrate how in all cases the will of external intervening powers was
subject to severe distortion as a result of the power of local actors’ (Mac Ginty,
2011:69). In the case of Lebanon, communities had to face the presence of Syrian
troops in the country, and not only resist the Syrian domination, but also create and
conduct their own peace process: everyday peace.
2. Local participation
‘Local ‘ownership’ and ‘participation’ [are] regarded as ways of enhancing the
success and sustainability of peace and development initiatives’ (Mac Ginty, 2011:3).
The importance of the participation of local actors is one of the pillars of Mac Ginty’s
theory. Taking Lebanon as the main example, it is possible to understand the role of
local actors such as communities, in peacebuilding initiatives. There are many reasons
why local participation is important. Legitimacy is not questioned when the change or
the participation comes from the local; the initiatives are easily accepted and
implemented because it comes from the local, for the best interest of the local. ‘One
key piece of best practice promotes the notion that local participation in

23

reconstruction, development and peace-support projects will enhance the
effectiveness of projects’ (Mac Ginty and Hamieh, 2010). After the civil war in
Lebanon, it was easier for communities to implement their own development and
peace projects, for two reasons: the first one is the weakness of the state, and the
second is the policy of isolation exerted by communities because of the fear and
hatred towards other communities.
However, one of the weaknesses of the post-war system is the lack of reparation. But
Mac Ginty assures that ‘if reparations can be seen as part of a locally negotiated
package […] they may be more accepted’ (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2013).
Additionally, the importance of local actors is their opposition to western-based
actors, and even to the ‘international community’. Principally in the case of post-war
Lebanon, where communities defied liberal peace and independently contributed to
their own development, creating their own vision of peace. Mac Ginty and Richmond
(2013) write that ‘the local turn contradicts the universalism that lies at the heart of
liberal optimism and notions of universal rights’. And this was the strength of the
Lebanese local actors in the aftermath of the war. For example, ‘Hezbollah in
Lebanon […] developed a series of security and governance alternatives to the liberal
peace provided by the western-backed Lebanese state’ (Mac Ginty, 2011:87). Hence,
the important thing to know is that local actors in Lebanon were important enough to
resist the westernised liberal peace intervention and to find an alternative.
The idea of everyday peace is part of the theory of Mac Ginty. However, before
introducing the concept of everyday peace, it is essential to present the link between
local actors and peace. In Lebanon, communities were the only actors contributing to
building peace. As mentioned earlier, the political leaders were too busy organising
the power-shared state; the Syrian government only focused on controlling and

24

manipulating the state; and international peacebuilding was absent. Therefore, local
actors had to create their own peace process, and they developed, unintentionally
what we call ‘ ”emancipatory peacebuilding,” which encompasses a more inclusive
and local participation that moves away from traditional top-down, elite-led
processes’ (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2013). The top-down, elite-led process was
replaced in Lebanon by a bottom-up, community based process. Nevertheless it was
difficult in Lebanon to differentiate between an elite-led process and a community
based process, because the head of the communities formed the elite. This brings us
back to the complexity of the post-war system in Lebanon, in which communities try
to find a solution from the inside.
3. Everyday peace
Everyday peace is a term used by Mac Ginty to characterise the everyday interaction
of different groups in a divided society, within a tensed atmosphere. To explain
everyday peace in the terms of Mac Ginty, it ‘refers to the practices and norms
deployed by individuals and groups in deeply divided societies to avoid and minimize
conflict and awkward situations at both inter- and intra-group levels’ (Mac Ginty,
2014). To develop more this definition, everyday peace is the everyday life of
different groups living in a deeply divided society. This everyday life is characterised
by coping mechanisms in order to avoid conflict and violent interaction between
groups. It can be seen as a ‘localised peace […] where individuals and communities
get on with everyday economic, cultural or survival tasks’ (Mac Ginty and Richmond,
2013). For Mac Ginty however, the process of everyday peace is more of a social
process, as it provides ‘enough social glue to prevent a society from tipping from
sustained tension to all-out war’ (Mac Ginty, 2014). He goes further by defining

25

everyday peace as ‘fluid’, dominated by ‘negotiation, change, adaptation, co-optation,
resistance and agency’ (Mac Ginty, 2014). If we take a closer look at Lebanon after
the civil war, we can see that there was an effort from the different communities to
become more fluid and to lead the way of everyday peace. Meanwhile, the process
can only be seen on a long-term scale, and the aim of everyday peace is ‘to contribute
to wider goals such as peace formation’ (Richmond, 2013).
Everyday peace was maybe part of the solution in Lebanon, but everyday peace is,
even for Mac Ginty, ‘a very limited form of peace’ (Mac Ginty, 2014). Nonetheless, it
is still a form of peace, and the only viable one if we consider the post-war system in
Lebanon.
In fact, the Lebanese communities after the war did not have any choice other than
isolation, and, despite this isolation, the different groups had to learn the ‘principle of
mutual existence’ (see Part I). Everyday peace seemed like the first step towards
mutual existence. And this is how the Lebanese communities defied the western
theories, defied liberal peace, created a solution from the local, to the local. This is
how the Lebanese communities instated everyday peace, by defying the post-war
system. The most important part that communities played was to confront the
memories of the war, without any reconciliation, without any reparations, and to build
peace, especially with a social contribution (Part III) and with the reconstruction of
the country (Part IV).
4. Lebanon, through the eyes of Mac Ginty
This part is essential in that it expresses the point of view of Roger Mac Ginty
towards Lebanon, and especially the application of his theories on hybridity, local
participation and everyday peace in Lebanon.

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In his book International peacebuilding and local resistance, Mac Ginty (2011:167)
tries to present the three most important factors of the post-war system in Lebanon.
The factors are: ‘the persistence and deeply ingrained nature of confessional politics,
the penetration of the state and society by external actors, and a vibrant civil society
in the context of a constrained state’. This definition is accurate, because it presents
the most important aspects of the organisation of the system in the aftermath of the
war; however, this definition is not complete to show the complexity of the system
and the predominant position of the communities. It is therefore essential to mention
the role of the local actors in building everyday peace, while facing the powerless
state. Roger (2011:170) mentions later in his book that ‘many inhabitants have been
forced to rely on civil associations because of the inability or unwillingness of the
state to provide social services’. And this leads us to study and analyse the social
contribution of the communities and their role in the reconstruction process in order to
create peace, or at least to create everyday peace.
The theory of Roger Mac Ginty introduces, theoretically, the role of the communities
and the importance of local participation in peacebuilding. Besides the idea of
hybridity that describes the governance system in Lebanon, the idea of everyday
peace is essential in this case. Indeed, the communities contributed to the creation of
everyday peace, on many levels, one of them being the social level.

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PART III - Social contribution to peace
Civil society (CS) is considered to be playing a big part in the social development of a
country, especially after a conflict, when the state is too weak to engage any social
activity. ‘The term ‘CS’ refers to the sphere of organized society that exists outside
the government and the private sector’ (Verkoren and Leeuwen, 2013). In Lebanon,
Civil Society, with the help of communities, shape all of the social actions of the
country. In the aftermath of the war, the social situation of the country characterised
by the state’s weakness and the absence of civil society forced the communities to
continue their social role and even to reinforce it, facing many issues that the state
could not target. Finally, despite the post-war tensed situation, the communities tried
to develop, maybe unconsciously, a culture of peace. The aim of this part is to see
how communities contributed to peace on a social level, despite the state failure in
targeting the numerous social issues of the post-war system.
1. Social situation after a war
It is difficult after a civil war to imagine that communities will have a strong social
role. Communities are usually weak in the aftermath of an internal conflict, and are
often put aside of the social and political affairs of the post-war system. However, in
Lebanon, communities stayed omnipresent in both political and social spheres,
despite the idea that they were weak. In fact, Nordstrom (1994:13) believes that,
during a war, ‘Beyond the bloodshed is a violence that destabilises social stability,
community sustainability, and cultural viability’. Nordstrom is not wrong when she
says that social stability is destabilised, as well as community sustainability. Indeed,
in Lebanon after the war, it was normal to see communities struggling internally.

28

Nevertheless, I would not go as far as Bonnerjea (quoted by Lewis in Harris, 1999:99)
by saying that ‘Local decision-making systems, along with networks of mutual help
and systems of right and responsibilities, may be damaged as family heads and
community leaders are lost in the conflict’. I believe that communities come out
stronger after a war, especially after a civil war. Not only the experience of the war
will reinforce the communities, but also the communities will develop a policy of
survival, which will lead to isolation and sectarianism: two essential factors for the
development of a community. In the aftermath of a civil war, communities will
develop a policy of ‘self-help’, even on a social scale. And this was the case in
Lebanon, where communities contributed to their own social development, not only
because of the state weakness, but also because of a need to trust leaders and reinforce
the groups. Talking about state weakness, it is important to mention that, after a civil
war, it is expected of the state to take over the social organisation of the country and
create new reforms in order to target the needs and the issues that the war left behind.
However, it has been seen in the past years and especially in the 1990s that Civil
Society and NGOs are the ones filling-in the social gap in post-war context, because
of the state weakness. In Lebanon, NGOs were not the principal actor, neither was the
civil society. It was the communities – who later formed the civil society – who were
in charge of the social development; of their own social development.
2. Social issues in Lebanon
After the civil war in Lebanon, the country had to face many social difficulties. Still,
the biggest difficulty was the lack of social actions from the state. In his paper on
post-war Lebanon, Are Knudsen (2005:19) points out the fact that ‘In post-war
Lebanon, there were neither social reforms nor attempts to reverse regional and social

29

disparities’. Again, because the state was too busy figuring out the political
organisation, it completely ignored the need for social policies. Worst, the state did
not even plan peace implementation or reconciliation between communities, which
was more than needed after the civil war. Reconciliation was needed because of the
strong opposition between different communities; an opposition that emerged during
the war and characterised the post-war environment. Two problems emerged of this
unresolved opposition. The first problem was the isolationist policy applied by the
communities, a policy that reinforced sectarianism, which was positive for the
development of communities, but it ignored any national need for social development
and rather focused on the individual needs of each community. The second problem
was not a social one but more of a societal one, and was that ‘during prolonged wars
societies typically become ingrained with the message that the way to reclaim dignity
and power is through violence ‘ (Lewis in Harris, 1999:106). The hatred between the
different communities that were opposed during the war was still felt in the post-war
system, and this obviously affected the social development of the country. On another
hand, it is important to target the direct social issues of the country. After the war, all
of the social pillars were weak. The health department had been strongly affected by
the violence of the war; education was, because the war, a difficult issue since there
was a difference of culture and a strong opposition between communities; poverty
was more present; displaced people and refugees was a predominant question to
resolve, so were other social issues. In an article in the French journal Le Monde
Diplomatique in 1997, Georges Corm talks about the social situation in 1996, 6 years
after the end of the war:
‘Socially, too, discontent is rising. In 1996, one third of Lebanese families were living
on a subsistence budget of $600 a month. Unemployment is put at close on 20%.

30

While well-paid jobs have been created for qualified people in banking, real estate and
public works, there is a shortage of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs and rates of pay
are depressed by the low wages paid to foreign workers, from Syria in particular.’
So the main social components (health, education, unemployment, poverty) were
affected not only by the war but also and mainly by the post-war system that could not
face these difficulties, because of its complexity. Nonetheless, the communities played
once again an important role in the social field, and contributed, by resolving some
social issues, to building everyday peace.
3. Role of communities
‘Civil society has important roles to play in development, democratization and
peacebuilding’ (Verkoren and Leeuwen, 2013). In Lebanon, the CS did not exist after
the war. The role of CS was filled by the communities, and because the communities
were taking care of issues such as development and peacebuilding, the civil society
was unnecessary. In the post-war system it was the different groups who had important
roles to play, especially on social matters. Communities were essentially regional and
confessional. After the war, religion was the main pillar of the communities. This
confirms the idea expressed by Neryl Lewis (in Harris, 2011:105) that ‘religion can
play an important role in the process of re-establishing individuals and their
communities’. The post-war system reinforced communitarianism, reinforced
confessionalism, and individuals after the war turned towards their community, not
only by defaults because the state was absent, but also because the trust in their
community was stronger. The policy of isolation that communities exerted after the
war encouraged people to turn towards their community, even for social matters. And
this was the case in Lebanon. In fact, practically, the different religious groups took

31

care of their own social development. For example, ‘the poor [had] to turn to their
network of family or friends or sectarian charities’ (Knudsen, 2005:3). Education was
a big part of the social development after the war, for two reasons: the first reason was
that each community developed its own mode of education, in its own schools, and
had its own educational system. Hezbollah (Shi’a) developed its own school
(Makassed), Hariri (Sunni) had its university and so on. The second reason of the
importance of education is the teaching material. How will the war be taught? Whose
side will be taken? How will all the different communities find an objective way of
teaching the history of the war? Many questions where to be asked, and no answers
were to be found. Until today, the history of the war is interpreted differently from
each side. Other than education and poverty, confessional groups targeted a number of
social issues, but on a much smaller scale. The reintegration of ex-soldiers,
unemployment, the issue of the displaced and many other social subjects were
approached, and each individual preferred to turn towards its community for help. This
is the policy of ‘self-help’.
4. A culture of peace
Despite the isolation and the social development inside the communities, the different
groups developed on a national scale a culture of peace, maybe involuntarily. The
communities tried to transcend the hatred and to put aside the idea that violence is a
solution. On the other hand, Lebanon witnessed ‘attempts to break the culture of
violence produced by war [that occurred] both on an individual level and as a social
movement’ (Lewis in Harris, 2011:108). The social actions engaged by the different
communities were separated by each other, this is why, indirectly, the ‘principle of
mutual existence’ was respected. The policy of isolation exerted for the social

32

development contributed to building everyday peace. Despite the hatred and the
violence, a peaceful cooperation existed between the different social development
policies of the communities. Rebuilding a socially strong environment forced the
communities to get close to each other, and to form a bond not based on violence but
rather based on sharing the same social issues. This special bond is one of the pillars
of everyday peace. Let’s consider the question of education. Instead of teaching the
history of the civil war subjectively and differently according to each school and each
community, the different groups decided to not teach the history of the war. It is
probably difficult to see how this is a social development part of the culture of peace,
however, the different communities agreed not to agree, which is a big step in the
complex post-war system in Lebanon. It is a big step for the social development; it is a
big step towards everyday peace. Finally, considering the relation between the state
and the communities, every community received the same treatment from the state on
a social level. Rather, every community did not receive any treatment from the state on
a social level, which encouraged them to share the same problem and to find solutions
to the problems all the communities shared. Even if the solution was isolation, each
community, by contributing to its own social development, contributed to the social
development of the country. The respect of isolation and mutual existence is a proof
that the will to create everyday peace was present in the post-war system. In fact, the
war did not continue after the Ta’if agreements.
The different communities succeeded in surpassing the state weakness in social
development. More importantly, communities succeeded in creating everyday peace
through social development. However, if the state, and more particularly the Prime

33

Minister was in charge of the reconstruction process, the communities contributed to
reconstruction, not only by their indirect role, but also by their crucial role of
reconstructing the society.
Part IV - Reconstruction
Reconstruction is part of all post-conflict situations. Every conflict is different,
therefore every reconstruction plan is different, not only because of the targets of
reconstruction, but also because of the way reconstruction is managed. As Richard
Brown (in Junne and Verkoren, 2005:102) said, ‘after wars there will be the
additional task of repairing social, political, and cultural divisions’. After the civil
war, Lebanon had to face the heavy burden of reconstruction. And this is one of the
very few tasks that the government assumed and completed, with the help of
communities. The Lebanese government was aware of the importance of
reconstruction, especially in the Lebanese complex post-war system. This is the
reason why the reconstruction plan was divided in two parts: the first part concerning
the reconstruction of the infrastructure, and the second part concerning the
reconstruction of a fractured society. These two parts were inevitably linked: ‘The
primary objective of sustainable infrastructure is to support communities […] in the
long term’ (Brown in Junne and Verkoren, 2005:111). The Hariri Government took
the responsibility of rebuilding the infrastructure, while communities tried to repair
the fractured society with the benefits of the infrastructure reconstruction. The
importance of reconstruction in peacebuilding, especially in Lebanon, remains that all
the communities benefit from reconstruction, and all the communities get closer to
each other in assuming the same task of reconstruction. The aim of this part is to show

34

that communities strongly contributed to reconstruction, and, because reconstruction
is part of peacebuilding, it was an important part in building everyday peace in
Lebanon. This part will tackle the question of reconstruction in Lebanon,
(infrastructure and fractured society), with an overview on Hariri’s contribution to
reconstructing the infrastructure.
1. Post-war reconstruction
According to Jos Van Gennip (2005), there are four pillars of post-conflict
reconstruction: security; justice and reconciliation; social and economic wellbeing;
governance and participation. In Lebanon, security had to be found within the
communities, which were the principal factor of insecurity during the war. Justice and
reconciliation was inexistent, instead it was replaced by ‘mutual existence’, which
also contributed to security. It would be more appropriate to replace social and
economic wellbeing by societal wellbeing, because the communities were the essence
of the reconstruction process. The difference between social and societal can be found
in a fragmented society, where different groups constitute society, and not different
individuals. And finally, governance and participation covered the role of
communities. However, the participation of communities can be visible in all 3 other
pillars. Therefore, it is not necessary to talk about local participation in Lebanon after
the civil war, because local participation was evident. It is somehow interesting to talk
about infrastructure reconstruction, as it played an important role not only on a
political level (with the implication of Hariri,) but also on a societal level, where it
contributed to peacebuilding, and helped reconstructing the fractured society.
To summarize, based on the four pillars of Jos Van Gennip, reconstruction in the
post-war system in Lebanon had to be based on 3 pillars: ‘mutual existence’;

35

infrastructure; and societal wellbeing. ‘Mutual existence’ covered principally the
political reconstruction, reintegration, disarmament, consociation and so on.
Infrastructure covered the reconstruction of the country on a material level, in which
all the communities were implicated (directly and indirectly). And societal wellbeing
targeted reconstruction of the fractured society, with an important role from
communities. It is astonishing to see that the reconstruction of the fractured society
came from the society itself. This part will focus on infrastructure and societal
wellbeing, and will not consider ‘mutual existence’ as part of the reconstruction for
two reasons: the first reason is that mutual existence did not lead to successful results
till now, and the second reason is that mutual existence was a political principle that
did not include communities (practically) in the way that it was more political than
societal.
In his book, Geoff Harris (1999) proposes a breakdown of reconstruction in four
phases. It is interesting to see the evolution of reconstruction in Lebanon according to
these phases.
-‐ Phase 1, Ending the conflict: the main tasks according to Harris are a peace
agreement, cease the fighting, and start building a durable peace. In Lebanon,
the three tasks were completed, however many would argue that the last task
was not completed. Durable peace should be replaced by everyday peace for
the Lebanese case, meanwhile, the last part of this dissertation will argue that
25 years of everyday peace is durable peace.
-‐ Phase 2, Immediate rehabilitation and restoration: disarmament, restoration of
basic services, return of refugees… All of these tasks should be completed in
order to have a full rehabilitation and restoration. Lebanon did not plan any of
these tasks, except for the disarmament of militias, which was not fully

36

completed. Hezbollah was armed and still is, because it was seen as a
resistance movement. It is important to know that, in Lebanon, disarmament
was part of ‘ending the conflict’, and not part of rehabilitation, because it was
a necessary condition to stop the fighting.
-‐ Phase 3, Reconstruction: Infrastructure, return social and economic life to pre-
war levels, structural changes to society, re-establish old institutions… In
Lebanon, infrastructure was the only part covered by the government, and it
was more the action of a men (Rafiq Hariri, prime minister at the time) then
the action of the government. When talking about the social issues, it was
already mentioned that the communities were in charge. Nonetheless, Harris
talks about pre-war levels and old institutions, which is wrong, because it
suggests a policy of restructuration and not reconstruction. Reconstruction in
Lebanon focused on creating new institutions in the post-war context, without
going back to the pre-war context.
-‐ Phase 4, Development: new vision, culture of peace, reconciliation… All this
phase was ignored in Lebanon, and was not part of reconstruction. It was
tacitly part of the reconstruction of a fragmented society, but was not part of
the plan.
The importance of comparing Geoff Harris’s phases to the Lebanese post-war
reconstruction is to show that Lebanon did not respect the ordinary path of post-
conflict reconstruction, and had a different vision of reconstruction.
It is important to expose the phases of Lebanon’s reconstruction:
-‐ Phase 1, ending the conflict: sign a peace agreement, cease the fighting,
disarm the militias, and instate the principle of mutual existence.

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-‐ Phase 2, reconstruction: rebuild the infrastructure, rebuild the fragmented
society, and build everyday peace, involuntarily.
-‐ Phase 3, development: restructuration, rehabilitation, social development,
refugees. The phase 3 already began, but is not yet completed.
This part focuses on phase 2.
2. Reconstruction in Lebanon
The economic situation in Lebanon after the war was not as bad as the social and
societal situation. During the war, Lebanese people continued to stimulate the
economy, and it was impressive to see this country survive. ‘A great deal of credit
goes to the resilient Lebanese people’ (Kubursi, 1999).
In the post-war system, it was important to focus the reconstruction plan on the social
level as well as on the infrastructure.
Infrastructure is important for many reasons. In Lebanon, geography was part of the
conflict. Beirut-east (mainly Christian) and Beirut-west (mainly Muslim) were
separated by what was called by the Lebanese ‘the green line’. This line passed
through the central business district, and one of the main projects of reconstruction
was in fact to rebuild the business district; A way of erasing the image of separation
and creating instead an image of reconciliation and coexistence. The reconstruction of
the airport was also a big project, which was important not for the communities, but
rather for the country. And the importance of rebuilding the country remains in the
fact that, even after a civil war, Lebanon was One country. After 15 years of civil war,
the reconstruction project targeted the reconstruction of Lebanon, the same country in
which all these communities fought each other; the same country that all these

38

communities are now rebuilding, for the sake of everyone. And this had a strong
impact on the societal level. Communities were not only the main target when talking
about fragmented society, they were also the main actor. The communities
contributed to rebuilding the fragmented society that they composed. In the end, it is
right to say that the reconstruction of infrastructure was part of the reconstruction of
fragmented society, because the infrastructure brought the Lebanese communities
closer not only on a moral level, but also on a geographic level. These communities
continued to share to same country that they rebuilt. While describing a picture of
Lebanon in his book Conflict and Development, Roger Mac Ginty (2009:126) writes ‘
post-war reconstruction includes not only infrastructure, but also rebuilding fractured
relationships in society’.
Lebanon encountered many obstacles in reconstruction. However, two main obstacles
remain. The first obstacle was the cost of reconstruction, and the second obstacle was
the money that Lebanon did not have. Kubursi (1999) is concerned that ‘the
reconstruction program has become too costly’, and his concern is supported by
Ignatius (1983) who says that ‘the cost of economic reconstruction will be
substantial’. The problem is not the cost of reconstruction, it is rather that ‘In
Lebanon, there are no such sources or income or wealth to rely upon to help pay for
the debt’ (Kubursi, 1999). Two solutions were applied in Lebanon after the war. The
first solution was to borrow money from the banks inside Lebanon, and therefore
increase the internal debt. And the second solution came from the Gulf countries,
especially from Saudi Arabia, with Rafiq Hariri as an intermediate.

39

3. Infrastructure reconstruction in Lebanon
In this part, Infrastructure will be seen as the main components of a country’s
organisations: seaports, airports, highway, central business district, and important
facilities (educational, medical, administrative).
‘The development of infrastructure has the potential to bring communities together,
[…] and thus aid the consolidation of peace’. (Brown, in Junne and Verkoren,
2005:112). The reconstruction of the infrastructure in Lebanon helped create everyday
peace by bringing the communities together. However, the difficult part to understand
is that infrastructure was part of the communitarianism policy that was established
after the war. Indeed, each community tried to contribute selfishly to the
reconstruction of infrastructure. So how were the communities brought together, if
each community was self-centred? The problem that communities had to face with
infrastructure is that everyone benefits from it. And the problem for the communities
was actually the solution for the country, and for peace. In fact, the infrastructure was
rebuild mostly by the Sunnis, but under the name of the Lebanese government and the
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq El Hariri. So even if the Sunni were the most
profitable in this situation, it was for the whole country’s benefit. Finally, the
important part of the infrastructure reconstruction is that it was a long-term project.
Brown argues that ‘the pivotal factor that will transform infrastructure from being a
short-term to long-term utility is securing ownership by the community’ (in Junne and
Verkoren, 2005:106). As it was said earlier, the communities in Lebanon are the
centre of the country’s organisation. Therefore, it is not a question of ownership. It is
more a question of coexistence and cohabitation. Everyone benefits from
infrastructure, but one man was behind the reconstruction in Lebanon: Prime Minister
Rafiq El Hariri.

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4. Rafiq El Hariri
‘Since 1992, Lebanon’s billionaire Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, has been the
individual most responsible for outlining an economic program for the post-war era’
(Young, 1998). Rafiq Hariri made his fortune in Saudi Arabia, and forged a strong
relationship with Saudi Arabia. In October 1992, Hariri became prime minister and
directly restructured the post-war economy, attracting investments, especially from
Saudi Arabia. In 1993, he started a 10 billion dollar plan ‘Horizon 2000’. Hariri had a
very strong position in Lebanon, especially in the reconstruction process. First, he was
Prime Minister, which is the most influential position in Lebanon. Second he
controlled the Council for Reconstruction and Development (CRD), and third, he was
the head of the Sunni community, one of the three most influential community in
Lebanon (the two others being Shi’a and Christian). This raised a lot of questions, for
example whether Hariri was acting as Prime Minister or as Sunni leader. Despite his
strong commitment to rebuilding infrastructure, Hariri was very criticised, but some
would still see him as ‘the personification of Lebanon’s post-war economic miracle’
(Knudsen, 2005:1).
The plan ‘Horizon 2000’ was divided into two parts, between 1993 and 2002. The
first part of the plan targeted the damaged infrastructure, and the second part focused
on education, health and industries. Hariri’s second government in 2000 ‘introduced a
number of austerity measures’ (Knudsen, 2005:5), because of the heavy expanses that
forced Lebanon to search for donors. Hariri was dedicated to rebuild Lebanon and
especially the central business district. He wanted to focus on Lebanon’s private
sector in order to develop the country, and wanted Lebanon to benefit from
reconstruction rather than Gulf countries. Meanwhile, he was heavily criticised.
‘Hariri was accused of focusing on infrastructure at the expense of under-funded

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social sectors of Lebanon’s crippled economy’ (Young, 1998). Others would say that
he forgot the ‘problem of disparities between rich and poor’ and was ‘running
Lebanon as if it were one of his many businesses’ (Hudson, 1999). Surely, critics
cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, Hariri not only contributed to the reconstruction of
infrastructure, he also contributed to building peace. Indeed, Hariri built the
infrastructure as Prime Minister, not as Sunni leader, which erased, at least on the
reconstruction scale, the idea of communities. On the other hand, Hariri succeeded in
creating a central business district shared by all communities, without the idea of
separation, but rather with the idea of mutual existence in the same country. Finally,
Hariri brought to Lebanon the idea of hope after the civil war. He was the only leader
to forget all about the political problems and focus on the economic problems, and he
was the only leader to take concrete actions that led to the reconstruction of the
infrastructure, and to the resurface of hope, after 15 years of war. Hariri contributed to
peace on the psychological level more than on the practical level.
5. Communities and reconstruction
It is important to highlight the actions of communities in reconstruction, and see how
communities contributed to peace with reconstruction. Here, it is essential to talk
about reconstructing a fragmented society. In the post-war system, the society was
fragmented into different communities searching for isolation. In order to build peace
and rebuild the society, it was essential to bring the question of reconciliation within
the reconstruction process. However, the Ta’if agreements and the post-war system
did not introduce any reconciliation plan. Reconciliation came tacitly, without prior
organisation. The post-war political system based on ‘mutual existence’ and
consociation forced the idea of reconciliation. In fact, in order to function, the

42

political system had to face reconciliation, or at least had to put aside the war quarrels.
Reconciliation was not part of the post-war system, but communities’ coexistence
forced it, in order to create everyday peace.
Reconstruction was an essential factor of the post-war system, not only in terms of
peacebuilding but also in terms of practicality. However, the reconstruction of the
infrastructure and of the fractured society proved to be very efficient for
peacebuilding and for reconciliation. The role of the communities was not only to
contribute to reconstruction in order to find peace, but also to face the many obstacles
of the post-war atmosphere.
Part V: Obstacles and solutions
The Lebanese case was and still is very fragile. The complexity of Lebanon makes it
difficult to comprehend and difficult to predict. Lebanon is easily criticised, but not
easily understandable. The post-war system is criticised, the non-application of the
general theories is criticised, the lack of sustainable solution is criticised, the state’s
weakness is criticised and even the everyday peace is criticised. Therefore, there is a
need to find solutions and to contradict these critics. This part will give an overview
of the different obstacles and weaknesses that could point out a certain failure in the
Lebanese case, however, solutions will also be proposed, and the success of the
Lebanese case will be clarified. The problems of the Lebanese post-war system are
many, but they could be grouped into 4 major obstacles: the system itself, the general
theory and its application, the local versus state development, and the notion of

43

(everyday) peace. This part will essentially point out the Bosnian case, not only to
compare both cases, but also to oppose them. The aim of this part is to show how,
despite many problems, the numerous communities in Lebanon succeeded in facing
the obstacles and in developing, independently, their own perspective of peace and
peacebuilding.
It is important to mention that most of the problems emerged because of the way the
war ended. In Fact, ‘Ta’if […] did not offer any basis for long-term resolution of the
conflict’ (Ghosn and Khoury, 2011).
1. The system in Lebanon
The post-war system in Lebanon is one of the most important obstacles that
communities had to face in order to build peace. The organisation of the system in
itself was one of the strengths of Lebanon, (coexistence, mutual existence,
consociationalism, sectarianism…) however, the system was very criticised, was not
synonym of hope, and brought many problems to the different communities trying to
build peace in the aftermath of the civil war. One of the major problems of the post-
war system was the lack of post-conflict resolution tools, such as reconciliation or
transitional justice. ‘[Brown] depart from the argument that symbolic reparations are
an important element in peacebuilding initiatives in deeply divided societies because
of their transformative potential’ (Mac Ginty and Firchow, 2013). In Lebanon,
reparation was not part of the post-war system, neither were reconciliation and
transitional justice. Rather, the same political figures at the centre of the civil war
were left unpunished and continued to serve as political leader after the war. Instead
of building the path through reconciliation, the different communities developed a
policy of isolation (as mentioned above). This policy that appears as a problem was

44

actually one of the solutions found by communities to replace the lack of
reconciliation. On one hand, isolation reinforced the communities in their role after
the war, and on the other hand, isolation was a way of heeling the wounds of the war.
Isolation was an alternative to a dangerous coexistence after 15 years of civil war.
Sectarianism and consociationalism was another characteristic of the post-war system
as an obstacle. Consociationalism was criticised on three different levels: theoretical
level: ‘it is built on an uncertain and changing conceptual basis’ (Wolff, 2011); a
normative level: ‘it is undemocratic’ (Wolff, 2011); and a pragmatic level: ‘it does not
lead to stable conflict settlements’ (Wolff, 2011). On a theoretical level,
consociationalism was based on the principle of ‘mutual existence’, which is still an
unchanged conceptual basis. On a normative level, the consociational system is based
on power-sharing, and on the representation of every community. Doesn’t it defend
the democratic principle of representation? Then how can Wolff consider
consociationalism as undemocratic? It is true that power-sharing is seen as ‘a
transitional mechanism’ (Wolff, 2011), but in Lebanon, power sharing is a pillar of
the system. And finally, on a pragmatic level, 25 years after the end of the civil war,
the conflict may not be settled, but it is not anymore a conflict, and the fighting did
not continue. Therefore, even on a pragmatic level, Wolff is wrong about
consociationalism. About sectarianism, Mac Ginty (2011:181) affirms that ‘Lebanon
remains a sectarian society’. By taking a closer look at the Bosnian case, sectarianism
was to be abolished after the conflict (1992-1995), and one of the post-war scenarios
was partition, where ‘peace is equated with the legitimacy of authoritarian nationalists
regimes’ (Kaldor, 1999:67). It is better to have a power-sharing system based on
sectarianism than an authoritarian system, where the communities are not equally

45

represented. The Lebanese and the Bosnian case were similar in the presence of many
different communities, but differed in the organisation of the post-war situation.
Last but not least is the obstacle of the relationship between the communities and the
state (as an institution). In the aftermath of the war, the community leaders were also
the political leader. The difficulty of distinction between a political figure and a
community leader makes it complicated to act on a political level for a national cause.
While acting on a political level, leaders were seen to act on behalf of their
community’s interests. The positive aspect of this impossible distinction is that
communities are directly represented on the political scale, and are equally
represented, without any authority, but rather power-sharing.
2. The theory
It is difficult to talk about one theory. There are many theories about post-conflict
situations and peacebuilding. However, this part will consider the general theory and
the general principles shared by many theories.
One of the most important post-conflict theories is based on international
intervention. And Bosnia is one of the numerous examples of international
intervention is post-war settings. The international community feels the need to
intervene in post-war settings, most of the time in the name of development.
However, ‘the development theory itself is increasingly focused on the need for
community driven development strategies, and this is all the more important in post-
conflict settings’ (Van Gennip, 2005). Community driven development is more
efficient in post-war situation than international intervention. Even Mac Ginty is in
favour of local initiatives rather than international interventions. The most important
theory to consider as an obstacle for the Lebanese case is peacebuilding. There are

46

many reasons why the theory on peacebuilding is an obstacle for Lebanon.
Nonetheless, the main reason remains that, if we follow the theory, there was no
peacebuilding in Lebanon.
-‐ Peacebuilding is usually brought from the outside with the intervention of the
International community. And in Lebanon, the international community did
not intervene and did not plan a peacebuilding process.
-‐ The first condition of peacebuilding is securitization. That said, securitization
was not part of the post-war reconstruction process.
-‐ The actors that are part of peacebuilding were not present in Lebanon.
Peacebuilding, according to Mac Ginty, requires the state, IGOs, NGOs and
the press. In Lebanon, the state was weak and did not contribute to building
everyday peace. The IGOS and NGOS were not present, and the different
communities owned the press.
Does this mean that peacebuilding was not part of the post-war system in Lebanon? I
would rather say that Lebanon developed its own theory of peacebuilding, based on
the post-war context and on the different possibilities that Lebanon had to build
peace. Not only did Lebanon develop its own theory, it also developed its own peace
principle: everyday peace. 25 years after the civil war, the conflict in Lebanon did not
reignite, and peace seems to rule. It may not be the kind of peace that peacebuilding
precursors defend, but it is still peace.
3. Local participation
When talking about the local participation, two obstacles can be found. The first one
concerns the dangers of local participation; the second concerns the weakness of the
communities.

47

The first obstacle is the idea of Mac Ginty (2011:51) that ‘there is a danger in
romanticising all things local’. It is true. In some context, the local participation can
be very dangerous, especially if the local participation is favoured compared to the
role of the state. If the communities are preferred to the state, than the state becomes
weak and loses of its credibility. The local participation is not always the best option.
Sometimes, it would be wiser to take decisions without the participation of the
communities. In the post-war Lebanon, the communities contributed to their own
development, while practising a policy of isolation. The local participation in
Lebanon was for the local, and the communities contributed to their own development
while contributing, indirectly, to the reconstruction of the country. So, in Lebanon, the
local participation was not a danger. However, favouring the local participation means
weakening the state. In Lebanon, the state is already weak, because of the importance
of local participation. The importance of local participation is another danger of local
participation. In fact, giving too much importance to the communities is dangerous,
especially if these communities are armed. The Hezbollah in Lebanon is still armed
despite the post-war process of disarmament. This give Hezbollah a very strong asset,
and the Shi’a militia have a very strong control not only over the state, but also over
other communities. Hence resides the bigger danger of empowering the communities,
and the issue of armed communities is still unresolved in Lebanon.
The second major obstacle in the local participation is the weakness of communities.
After the civil war, the communities were weak. It was then difficult to expect much
from the participation of the local in the reconstruction process, especially in the
process of peacebuilding. ‘Many scholars have pointed out that local and hybrid
institutions are weak or dysfunctional, corrupt and neopatrimonial’ (Mac Ginty and
Richmond, 2013). This was the case in Lebanon, but the exception was that all the

48

communities were equal in front of the institutions. And one thing to mention is that,
despite their weakness, communities were stronger than the state. So even if the
‘local’ is seen as weak, it is not always an obstacle, and it was not an obstacle in
Lebanon.
4. The idea of peace
Peace is a real issue in post-war Lebanon. The situation in Lebanon has been
criticised, and peace is seen as unsustainable. Peace is even absent for some scholars.
Ghosn and Khoury (2011) think that ‘Peace is more likely to be sustained if all parties
are represented’. As mentioned above, all the communities were represented in the
Lebanese post-war system. It is essential to note that the conflict stopped 25 years
ago, and did not reignite since. So not only is Lebanon in a state of peace, but
Lebanon is also in a state of sustainable peace. Some would say that there is no peace
in Lebanon. However, there is no conflict either. The best description for this
situation is the term employed by Ghosn and Khoury (2011): ‘negative peace’.
Finally, everyone does not accept the notion of everyday peace. Even Mac Ginty
(2014) found some limitation to everyday peace. ‘It is a very limited form of peace. In
this view, it is a form of conflict management rather than the more expansive conflict
transformation’. It is true. Everyday peace is a limited form of peace. Long-term
peace is not guaranteed, and everyday peace can easily shift to everyday tension and
conflict. Nevertheless, in Lebanon, everyday peace was the only possible outcome. As
Mac Ginty (2014) said, ‘It may be that limited forms of everyday peace are all that are
possible given the conflict context’.

49

The obstacle of not perceiving peace in Lebanon can be faced, with a bit of optimism,
by not perceiving conflict, and by defending the idea of everyday peace as the only
viable solution.
Conclusion
How the communities contributed to building everyday peace in the post-war
Lebanon is a very delicate subject that must be treated carefully. Not only because of
the complexity of the subject, but also because of the risk of getting it all wrong. As
Knudsen (2005:1) said: ‘Lebanon’s weakness is its strength’. This is one of the
reasons why it is very difficult to treat a subject such as the post-war system in
Lebanon. Lebanon and its communities have always been a centre of interest,
however not studied enough. The fact that Lebanon has unique features makes it
complicated to study it in comparison with other cases. One of the most daring and
dangerous factor that is encountered while studying the Lebanese case is that Lebanon
can be analysed in many different ways, and there is no One theory that applies to
Lebanon. As seen trough the development of this dissertation, Lebanon is at the
intersection of many theories, and is as well the inventor of its own theory. Despite all
the theories on peacebuilding, on communitarianism, on post-conflict reconstruction
and post-conflict development, the post-war system in Lebanon was based on
communitarianism and led to everyday peace, without peace being a pillar of the post-
war system. It can lead us to believe that communities in Lebanon are not the
problem, but rather the solution to the post-war system. In fact, in the absence of a
strong state, the different communities were forced to conduct the social development
after the war, and to encourage the reconstruction of the country. The policy of

50

isolation that the communities were applying after the war proved to be more than
successful. Not only did it contribute to the reconstruction of the country and the
social development, but it also contributed to building a form of peace proper to
Lebanon: everyday peace. The organisation of Lebanon, the post-war situation, the
history of the country and the special features of the country (communities,
location,…) all contributed to create a unique way to deal with post-war issues; a
unique way to build a new form of peace.
The first part of the dissertation introduced the four pillars of the post-war system
(Ta’if, Consociationalism, the state, the communities) based on the principle of
‘mutual existence’. It is important to understand the post-war system, its mechanism
and its implications, in order to understand why the Lebanese case is much more
complex than it seems. What is to be retained from this part is that communities were
reinforced after the war; mutual existence was the basis of the political organisation,
based on power-sharing; the reorganisation of the political system paralysed all of the
political actions, because the new system had to be installed; and peacebuilding was
not part of the post-war policies. At first, it seems that the post-war system was not in
favour of creating peace in this war-torn context. However, it is important to see that
it is this post-war environment that enabled the creating of everyday peace. Without a
post-war system so focused on communities and their wellbeing, everyday peace
would have never been created.
The second part focuses on Mac Ginty’s theories on hybridity, local participation and
everyday peace. The three concepts shape the basis of my theory, which shows how
the local contributed to everyday peace. The three concepts of Mac Ginty defy the
western-based theory of liberal peace and peacebuilding interventions. This part not
only contradicts the western-based theory, it also introduces the theory applied in

51

Lebanon. However, this theory is dangerous because based on the state’s weakness,
based on the theory of isolation, and criticised by many. The dangers of this theory
can be avoided by proving that the Lebanese pos-war system, because of hybridity
and local participation, led to everyday peace.
The social contribution to peace is the third part of the dissertation. The communities
took care of the social issues that the state could not face and resolve. Trough
isolation, the different communities contributed to their own social development
while contributing to the country’s development. Besides the social issues, the
different groups created tacitly and involuntarily a culture of peace, that slowly
evolved into everyday peace. The role of communities on a social level shows the
importance of the local participation not only in development but also in
peacebuilding. Even if isolation is seen as a break to development, it was in the post-
war system a push to Lebanon’s peace. Building a culture of peace was not part of the
post-war organisation and was not even part of the communities’ development,
meanwhile it demonstrates the will of the Lebanese people.
The part on reconstruction is strongly linked to the social contribution, with however
some differences. One of the main differences is that reconstruction was one of the
state’s policies. Even if the communities contributed to reconstruction, infrastructure
was reserved to the state and to Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. The communities’
contribution was regarding the reconstruction of a fractured society, which was a
success if we consider the principle of mutual existence. Nevertheless, till today, the
Lebanese society still suffers from the war quarrels, but still fights to preserve peace.
The most important part of reconstruction is that Lebanon created its own
reconstruction process. Without respecting the theories on post-war reconstruction,
Lebanon led its own process that helped create peace. Having its own process was a

52

way of resisting to the international pressure and to avoid international intervention,
while understanding the unique features of the post-war period, instead of installing a
one-size-fits all policy.
The last part of the dissertation concerns the many obstacles and problems that
Lebanon had to face in order to avoid conflict and to create peace after the 15 years
civil war. The system was an obstacle but also a strength. The communities succeeded
in defying the international theory by understanding the need of the country for
developing its own theory. The local participation was strong enough, even if it put
the country at risk, and finally the idea of everyday peace, even if criticised by many,
was created in Lebanon, and is still a pillar of the post-war system. This last part
shows that there is and there will always be negative aspects and even dangers in
Lebanon, which could lead us to believe that peace is an illusion. However, this part
shows as well that despite the many problems, conflict is not part of Lebanon’s post-
war system, and communities succeeded in building everyday peace, the only possible
form a peace.
As Hudson (1999) said, ‘it is hard to avoid concluding that post-war Lebanon’s
political recovery has been only partly successful. The most important achievement
has been peace and quiet’. Communities contributed to building peace in Lebanon’s
post-war system. The main lessons to take out from the Lebanese case are the
complexity of the post-war situation; the power of communities who were the main
actor of the post-war recovery; the courage that communities had in defying general
beliefs and general theories; the power of communities in creating their own process
of post-war reconstruction and development by understanding the needs of Lebanon,
and adapting to the situation; and finally the success of communities in creating and

53

maintaining everyday peace. The post-war system in Lebanon should be an example
to the post-conflict theory.
In fact, opposed to the Bosnian case, the Lebanese case proved that
communitarianism and consociational system can create a friendly environment to
peacebuilding, and that local participation can contribute to building peace. Moreover,
I totally agree with Knudsen (2005:1) who said that ‘The Lebanese peace treaty and
post-war period have a number of unique features that make them important lessons
for post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding’.
To resume, Lebanon should be an example to post-conflict theory, because
communities in Lebanon understood its unique features and succeeded in creating its
own form of peace.
Finally, my conclusion is in harmony with the conclusion of Richmond’s article
(2013), which ‘concludes by considering the extent to which everyday peace may
contribute to wider goals such as peace formation’. Everyday peace in Lebanon is the
beginning of a long process that leads to a more sustainable form of peace.
25 years after the end of the civil war, it is a hope to see that everyday peace replaced
the idea of conflict.
‘You have your Lebanon and I have mine. Yours is political Lebanon and her problems; mine is natural
Lebanon in all her beauty. Your have your Lebanon with programmes and conflicts, I have mine with
her dreams and hopes. Be satisfied with your Lebanon as I am content with the free Lebanon of my
vision’. (Gibran Khalil Gibran).

54

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