military power

1. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Military Power
Explaining Victory and Defeat
in Modern Battle
U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
Stephen Biddle
November 10, 2004
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004

2. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Agenda
1. What is “military power”?
2. Standard explanations
3. A new explanation
4. Recent experience: Afghanistan and Iraq
5. Implications

3. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
What is “Military Power”?
• Ability to take and hold territory
• Ability to inflict (and avoid)
casualties
• Time required
Initial focus:
mid-high intensity
conventional
warfare

4. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Standard Explanations
1. Material Preponderance (Quantity)
2. Technology (Quality)
3. Force Employment
(Strategy, tactics, skill, motivation)

5. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
A New Explanation
Force employment-technology interaction as key
• Radical lethality as dominant technological fact of post-1900 battlefield
• Survival requires exposure reduction
• Since 1918, “modern system” force employment has been key to exposure
reduction – and thus, successful operations
• Problems with the modern system:
– Very hard to do
– Politically unpopular side effects
• Result is wide variation in degree of implementation
• Where fully implemented, limits impact of weapons’ growing lethality, range
• Where little-implemented, troops exposed to full weight of modern firepower
– Increasingly grave consequences as firepower has grown more lethal
– Growing gap in real military power of those who can, and cannot, implement
• Effects of technology depend on force employment:
– Technological change can have opposite effects depending on force employment
– Modern system force employment can compensate for wide range of technical,
numerical, shortcomings

6. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Lethality Trends
Armor Penetration
200 mm RHA penetration range
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
meters
Artillery Range
0
50
100
150
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
kilometers
Mean Penetration Range of U.S.
Heavy Antitank Systems
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
meters
• Ongoing, progressive increase in
lethality for last 100 years
• Central problem of modern tactics:
How to survive long enough to
perform meaningful missions?

7. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
The Modern System
• Cover, concealment
• Dispersion
• Small unit independent maneuver
• Suppression
• Combined arms

8. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Problems with the Modern System
• Very hard to do
– Individual, custom decision making by thousands of jr. leaders
– Tight coordination between dispersed, moving units, multiple
commanders
– Leaders must master employment, support requirements of
multiple, radically dissimilar weapon types
• Unpopular Political, Organizational Side Effects
– Requires devolution of authority; autonomy, initiative at jr. levels
– Harder for superiors to control subordinates’ behavior
– Yields territory early
– Requires high military proficiency

9. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
New Theory Summarized
0.1
1
10
100
1000
1900 1925 1950 1975 2000
Attacker
Territorial
Gain
(km)
Non-Modern-System Defense
Non-Modern-System Offense
Modern-System Offense and Defense

10. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Recent Experience: Afghanistan and Iraq
• Does 21st century technology undermine modern
system, overturn new theory?
– Many see ongoing military revolution requiring
transformed military; Afghanistan and Iraq as examples
– New theory sees no revolution: incremental extension of
trends dating to First World War
• Do Afghanistan or Iraq suggest radical departure?
No.
Recent warfare as further examples of force
employment’s role in surviving modern firepower

11. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Afghanistan, 2001-2
• Many see Afghanistan as campaign of standoff precision warfare
• At first it was: indigenous Afghan Taliban unskilled, unable to
reduce exposure, easily defeated by standoff precision
• As target base shifts to better-skilled al Qaeda, close combat
increasingly necessary
• Al Qaeda adopts important
elements of modern system;
reduces exposure
• Operation Anaconda (3/02):
– Under 50% of al Qaeda's actual
fighting positions identified
prior to ground contact, in spite
of intensive intelligence effort
– Most fire received by US units
came from initially unseen,
unanticipated al Qaeda fighting
positions

12. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Iraq, 2003
• Why were Coalition casualties so low?
• Many credit technology: warfare
transformed by speed, precision strike
• But Iraqi force employment very
permissive: non-modern system
• In 2003, 21st c. firepower punishes non-
modern-system exposure very severely
• 2003 does not suggest that new
technology can overwhelm modern
system exposure reduction
• Caution warranted in extrapolating
technology’s effects vs. other militaries

13. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Central Findings
• Force employment and technology interact in powerful,
nonlinear way
– Predictions of combat outcomes based on materiel alone
subject to gross error
• Future warfare debate exaggerates change,
underestimates continuity
– Technology’s role in war commonly overestimated
– Force employment’s role understudied, underemphasized
• Current developments are extensions of longstanding
trends; no revolutionary discontinuity in prospect

14. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Implications: Policy
• Force Structure
– Many advocate radical restructuring to shift away from orthodox close
combat, toward standoff precision and/or SASO, COIN
– Risky:
 Works well vs. non-modern-system opponent
 Ineffective otherwise
 Cannot guarantee that we will never again
face a modern-system opponent
• Joint Doctrine
– Many advocate radical change:
 Emphasize speed, nonlinear operations;
avoid close combat
 Neither take nor hold terrain per se
 Replace concentration-breakthrough-exploitation with simultaneous operations
throughout depth of enemy positions
– Neither necessary nor desirable
 Warfare not being revolutionized: radical change not necessary to keep up
 Radical doctrines require unskilled enemy to work; cannot guarantee this
Change is needed, but
orthodox incremental
adaptation is sufficient

15. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004

16. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Backup Slides

17. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
How to Explain Military Power?
• Formal modeling
• Small-n case method testing
– Operation Michael, March 1918
– Operation Goodwood, July 1944
– Operation Desert Storm, January-February 1991
• Large-n statistical testing
– COW
– CDB90 (“HERO”)
– Miltech
• Ex ante simulation experimentation

18. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Implications: IR Theory
• Standard material indicators are poor proxies for actual capability
– Empirical literature likely to underestimate effects of capability relative
to resolve, audience costs, signaling
– Potential effects across wide range of empirical studies in IR
• Offense-Defense Theory misspecifies technology’s role
• To do better, must account for force employment
• Central role of states’ internal characteristics
– Force employment variance driven by states’ varying internal politics,
social organization
• Avenues for research:
– Other conflict types
– Explanation of variance in force employment; ex ante prediction
– Data development for force employment variables

19. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Historical Test: Operation Michael, March 1918

20. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Historical Test: Operation Michael, March 1918
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
• Rough parity between attacker, defender
Numerical Balance:
• 1.17:1 theaterwide troops
• 1.5:1 initially engaged troops
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
Theater Numerical Balance
German
Allied
Allied
Allied
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
1915 1916 1917 1918
Attacker/Defender
Troops
Local Numerical Balances
0
1
2
3
4
5
1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
Attacker:Defender
Divisions
MICHAEL
Technology:

21. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Historical Test: Operation Michael, March 1918
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
• Rough parity between attacker, defender
Numerical Balance:
• 1.17:1 theaterwide troops
• 1.5:1 initially engaged troops
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
Technology:
• Modern-System German attack
• Non-Modern-System British defense
– Exposed
– Forward
Fraction of Defenders in Reserve
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
MICHAEL
Force Employment:
Depth of Prepared Defenses
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
1915 1916 1917 1918 1919
Yards
MICHAEL
– Shallow

22. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Historical Test: Operation Michael, March 1918
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
• Rough parity between attacker, defender
Numerical Balance:
• 1.17:1 theaterwide troops
• 1.5:1 initially engaged troops
• Typical of Western Front stalemate
Technology:
• Modern-System German attack
• Non-Modern-System British defense
– Exposed
– Shallow
– Forward
Force Employment:
Outcome:
• Breakthrough
– 47 battalions of
British infantry
annihilated
– 530 British guns
overrun
• Exploitation fails
– 40 mile advance
– Exhaustion, Allied
reserve arrivals
halt offensive
– 250K casualties ea
– War continues
Orthodox theories predict shattered offensive
New theory predicts offensive breakthrough, but limited consequences

23. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Experimental Test: Refighting the Battle of 73 Easting
• Many see Desert Storm result as
technologically predetermined
• New theory implies not: if Iraqis
had used modern system, no rout
• Test via Janus recreation of 1991
Battle of 73 Easting
• Counterfactuals:
– What if Iraqis had used modern
system in 1991?
– What if US technology had been
less advanced?
Experimental Results,
73 Easting Janus Simulation
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Historical Base Older US
Technology
Modern
System Iraqi
Tactics
Armored
Vehicle
Losses
Iraqi Losses
US Losses

Findings: Outcome not technologically predetermined
• Technology’s effects influenced powerfully by force employment
• Modern system defensive tactics negate Iraqi technological inferiority

24. U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
From Military Power, published by Princeton University Press, copyright Princeton University Press, 2004
Anaconda Battlefield