200w_paper

Curry 1
Gunmen armed with Kalashnikov rifles rolled through the streets of Managua, Nicaragua
on July 19, 1979. The following day the National Sandinista Liberation Front established a
provisional government. With the establishment of the provisional government the Sandinistas
ended forty three years of family rule by the Somoza clan. Historian, David Ryan, contends that
the Nicaraguan Revolution resulted from decades of socio-economic inequality.1
Accordingly,
the Sandinistas reforms must be seen in this context. Their goals were to provide vast economic
redistribution through land and social reform. Their methods in pursuing these goals were
consistent with those of communism, and thus the Sandinistas received support from regional
and international communist allies.
The extent of support by communist governments is actually irrelevant in this case. It is
the fact that United States government perceived Nicaragua as being supported by communist
governments that is significant. In fact, communism in the western hemisphere was not as
prominent as many people believed. This perception resulted from cultural animosity with the
Soviet Union that had become institutionalized in Washington D.C.2
Regardless, the U.S.
response to these perceptions was unswerving and intervention always followed. The
intervention varied depending on the Administration in charge at the executive level. At a
minimum, economic sanctions and diplomacy were guaranteed. At the extreme, covert military
operations and support for anti-communist guerilla forces were not uncommon intervention
techniques in Central America.
The Reagan Administration especially pursued the latter method. In fact, the U.S.
Republican Party platform which helped elect Reagan reflected an anti-communist sentiment that
1
Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd. Pg. 6
2

Curry 2
was ultimately shown in his foreign policy. That platform specified that the Marxist Sandinista
takeover of Nicaragua would not be supported by the United States nor would any other Marxist
government in the western hemisphere.3
The platform echoes the Monroe and Truman doctrines,
as the Monroe doctrine disallows outside influence to interfere with U.S. interests in the western
hemisphere, and the Truman doctrine contends that the U.S. will support people who want
democratic government. The party platform ends by emphasizing the fact that Republicans will
support a free and democratic government in Nicaragua.
Bipartisan politics influenced the course of events in Nicaragua during the late 1970’s
and early 1980’s. Initially, the Nicaraguan 79’ revolution coincided with the end of President
Jimmy Carters’ term in office. The Democrats stance towards Nicaragua, as reflected by Carter’s
foreign policy decisions, was contrary to later Reagan policies and much less aggressive.
Carter’s directives were threefold; support the private sector, continue political pluralism, and
create a democratic electoral system.4
His initiatives reflect the fact that he wanted the U.S. to
appear non-aggressive against the new regime. In other words, he wanted the Sandinista
government to operate with majority rule and minority rights. He did not intend to force
democracy upon the Nicaraguans to the degree of Reagan, but rather he tried to lead them
towards it. By taking a less aggressive stance Carter’s Director for Latin American and
Caribbean Affairs, Robert Pastor, believed it would “deny the Sandinistas an enemy, precluding
them from obtaining Soviet and Cuban military aid.5
” In fact, the United States contributed 75
million dollars of emergency economic aid to the private sector during Carter’s term. This act
3
4
5

Curry 3
contrasts to the later actions of Reagan and shows that Nicaragua received significant attention
from political actors in Washington. This attention was not lost on U.S. tax payers.
The public became concerned with the significant support Nicaragua received. After all,
it was only a decade prior that the U.S. quit its significant military and economic support of
Vietnam; a country most Americans couldn’t find on a map, let alone care about its politics. As a
result, the public was wary of any potential follow-ups to that war, regardless of institutionalized
policy such as Monroe and Truman’s doctrines which stressed intervention in this case. In fact, a
study of the early 80’s suggested that the public disagreed with Reagan’s policy on Nicaragua
despite efforts by the administration to convince them otherwise. Americans believed that the
Administration misjudged the degree to which U.S. interests were at stake in central America
and “were fearful that U.S. involvement would lead to another Vietnam.”6
It was the Public’s
hesitation to support Reagan’s foreign policy in Nicaragua which ultimately led Congress to
enact funding restraints on Reagan’s initiatives.
However, this did not initially restrict the Reagan Administration’s ability to operate in
Nicaragua. In fact, the Administration began conducting covert options in November of 1981.
The NSDD or National Security Decision directive 17 allowed the CIA to organize a 500 person
force in Nicaragua to irritate the Cuban presence in the area and undermine Sandinista authority.7
It did just that and more. Within the next six months CIA operatives blew up two vital
transportation bridges in North Nicaragua. Covert ops to undermine the Sandinistas were
underway. These operations reflect the willingness of the Reagan Administration to carry out
policy contrary to the public wishes.
6
7

Curry 4
On November 8th
1982 Newsweek broke a story relaying the covert extent of military
operations in Nicaragua. This prompted Congress to enact more aggressive legislation that
expressed the public will and attempted to limit executive authority. Specifically, the Boland
amendments provided this legislation. Curiously, the Boland Amendments were continuously
amended. This was because the Executive Branch always found a way to operate through a legal
loophole not covered by the amendments. Regardless, the intent of the amendments was clear,
that U.S. intervention in Nicaragua be kept at a minimum.
However, the Reagan Administration could not comply with Congressional or public
sentiment. It maintained that interference in Nicaragua was necessary to the national security
interests of the United States and it would not compromise on its goals. Primary documents
reveal the extent to which funding constraints plagued foreign policy directives. However,
operators within the Administration ultimately solved budget constraints. Lt. Colonel Oliver
North used profits from arms sales with Iran to fund the Contra rebels. The arms deals were
originally not undertaken for profit but rather to secure the lives of American hostages in
Lebanon. In any case, these deals violated the Arms Export Control Act and connected the two
affairs. To make matters worse, after the public learned of the administrations covert presence in
Nicaragua and violation of the Arms Export Control Act, a document shredding party or cover-
up quickly followed. North destroyed countless documents which would have provided a much
fuller picture of the operation and the knowledge of top level officials in the Administration of
maneuvers of lower level NSC staff. The extent of North’s actions demonstrate that undermining
the Sandinista regime was a top priority. Therefore, the foreign policy of the Administration
reflected the sentiments of the Monroe and Truman Doctrines.

Curry 5
“The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and
interests of the United States are involved, that the American continent, by the free and
independent condition which they assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as
subjects for future colonization by any European power.”-
President James Monroe to Congress December 2, 1823
“I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we
must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help
should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability
and orderly political processes.”
President Harry S. Truman to Congress March 12, 1947
The above passages are known, respectively, as the Monroe and Truman doctrines. The Monroe
doctrine directly shaped the foreign policy of the United States well into the twentieth century.
Likewise, the Truman doctrine was equally significant in matters of foreign policy. Each
doctrine stresses the interest of the United States, and its willingness to support the sovereignty
of democratic governments worldwide. Truman’s policy is directed specifically towards
communist governments, and institutionalized an ideology of containment as foreign policy
throughout the twentieth century. Institutional in the sense that deviation from such policy was
rare and unorthodox from the time of its enactment. The Iran/Contra affair involving the Reagan
Administration and countless clandestine individuals must be analyzed within these parameters.
The Reagan Administration’s unfaltering belief in the Monroe and Truman doctrines ultimately
resulted in the Iran/Contra scandal.
An explanation of the origin of containment policy is necessary to understand the broader
actions of the Reagan Administration in Nicaragua. In political historian John W. Coffey’s, The
Statesmanship of Harry S. Truman, he examines and explains the origins of containment. He
relays, “From the beginning the cardinal feature of Soviet policy has been the militant,
universalist doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, which posits a fundamental, unremitting, global

Curry 6
class war where truce is impossible until capitalism is destroyed and communism dominates the
world.” The spread of communism during Truman’s presidency likely caused him to believe
Marxist theory was coming to fruition. Therefore, to protect American interests, “NSC-68 [was
enacted and] crystallized containment policy, uniting power with principle in a strategy that
matched military means to political ends.”8
In other words, Truman established the precedent
that any and all means of combating communist world dominance was acceptable, and thus helps
explain the Reagan Administration’s actions.
The conspiracy aspect of the Iran Contra affair arises from the intentional violation of
statutory law and attempts to cover-up violations by the Administration. Specifically, the Boland
Amendments of the 1980’s, the Arms Export Control Act, and Congressional notification
requirements in covert action laws, were all allegedly violated.9
However, some question arises
to the validity of the violations on constitutional grounds. This uncertainty is due to the fact that
the executive branch of the United States was doing the violating. As such, a host of complex
precedents on constitutional law dictate the interplay of power between the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government which ultimately decided opinion on the Reagan
Administration’s acts. It is the interaction of these forces which yielded the term conspiracy.
Though the complexity of the entire situation is beyond the scope of this paper, a sufficient
examination will reflect the traditional policy and distinguishing aspects of the Reagan
Administration which resulted in the Iran/Contra Conspiracy.
8
Coffey, John W. The Review of Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 231-252. Pg. 231
9
Walsh, Lawrence. 1993. FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA
MATTERS

Curry 7
In declassified documents President Reagan stressed the importance of containment in
Central America. Reagan expressed his purpose and justification for interfering in Nicaragua. He
relays that,
“In cooperation with other governments, provide support, equipment and training
assistance to Nicaraguan paramilitary resistance groups as a means to induce the Sandinistas
and Cubans and their allies to cease support for insurgencies in the region; to hamper
Cuban/Nicaraguan arms trafficking; to divert Nicaragua’s resources and energies from support
to central American guerilla movements; and to bring the Sandinistas into meaningful
negotiations and constructive, verifiable agreement with neighbors on peace in the region.”10
-President Reagan
The Nicaraguan paramilitary resistance groups Reagan refers to are the Contras or anti-
Sandinistas. His statement contends that the U.S. will provide support to the Contras to
combat the Sandinista government. Reagan then explains why support for the Contras is
necessary, or that supporting the Contras will hamper Sandinista initiatives in the region. He
also makes reference to the Sandinistas “allies.” An understanding of the context of the
situation is crucial to the significance of the reference. The Sandinistas unnamed ally is the
Soviet Union. By hampering the Sandinistas, Reagan is also hampering the Soviet Union's
projects in Central America. Therefore, Reagan exhibits his belief in Truman’s concept of
containment and Monroe’s concept that the western hemisphere is no longer available for
European hegemony.
Further expressions of the Administration’s adherence to containment policy occur
in the minutes of NSC meetings. At approximately 2:30 on the afternoon of June 25, 1984
the National Security Council (NSC) convened the National Security Planning Group
Meeting. In attendance at this meeting were: the President, the Vice President, CIA director
William J. Casey, and future Attorney General Edwin Meese III. At the meeting the
10
Document 1: White House, Presidential Finding on Covert Operations in Nicaragua (with attached Scope
Note), SECRET, September 19, 1983. National Security Archives

Curry 8
gentleman discussed the current state of affairs in Washington and in Central America.
Congress was concerned that support for the Contras would lead to another Vietnam or
unpopular war in Central America. Therefore, Congress began limiting funds and aid to the
Contras. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger relayed his concerns on funding limits
to the group, “On the anti-Sandinista issue, I think we need to take the offensive against the
Democrats in Congress. We need to hold them accountable for not providing the resources
needed to defend democracy”.11
The Secretary relays that funding is becoming
problematic because of Congressional spending constraints and that this constraint is
impeding the administration’s policy of containing communism in Latin America. The
Secretary’s concern reflects the principles of both the Monroe and Truman doctrines.
It would be this lack of funding that led the Reagan Administration to seek less than
legal means to raise money.
The most explicit reference to the Administration’s policy transpires in a
memorandum from Deputy Director of CIA, Robert Gates. In the document Deputy Director
Gates informs Director of CIA William Casey that “the fact is that the western hemisphere is
the sphere of influence of the United States. If we have decided totally to abandon the
Monroe Doctrine, if in the 1980’s taking strong actions to protect our interests despite the
hail of criticism is too difficult, then we ought to save political capital in Washington,
acknowledge our helplessness and stop wasting everybody’s time”.12
Deputy Director
Gate’s statement makes explicit references to the Monroe doctrine. He makes clear
that the Administration’s policy is based on a 150 year precedent. He provides
11
Document 2 NSC, National Security Planning Group Minutes, "Subject: Central America," SECRET, June 25,
1984. National Security Archives
12
Document 3: CIA, Memorandum from DDI Robert M. Gates to DCI William J. Casey, "Nicaragua,"
SECRET, December 14, 1984. National Security Archives

Curry 9
unquestionable inferences that the acts currently underway in Central America are a
result of that policy. Gate’s dissatisfaction with the way the policy is being carried out is
also visible. He clearly believes that more needs to be done in Nicaragua, or otherwise “[we]
should acknowledge our helplessness and quit wasting everybody’s time.” The statement
reflects the inability of covert ops to operate adequately in Nicaragua due to congressional
budget restraints. In addition, the hail of criticism Gates refers to is the public and
congressional reaction to covert programs in Nicaragua. The statement reflects that top level
officials knew executive policy was unpopular and that if the full extent of that policy could
not be realized then it should be abandoned. Political resources are being wasted at their
current usage levels and should only be continued if more can be done. Therefore, the
inability to carry out this policy is again connected to public unpopularity for foreign policy
in Nicaragua and thus congressional budget constraints. However, the Administration would
not allow funding constraints to disallow a 150 year policy precedent.
Congress passed the Boland Amendments to demonstrate the public’s declining
support for the Contra operations. Provisions of the Boland Amendments depleted funding
for the Contra rebels and caused the Administration to seek alternative methods of finance.
Though these alternatives were ultimately illegal they do reflect the Administration’s
refusal to allow funding to interfere with foreign policy initiatives. However, the
Administration does make arguments justifying their actions in attempts to invalidate
allegations of illegality.
The Boland Amendments were fairly clear in intent but were not specific enough in
terminology. The Administration discovered a loop hole through which it operated legally in its

Curry 10
view. Andrew Hayes in The Colombia Law Review states that there was a “covert change in the
status of the NSC”. This change was not accounted for in the Boland amendments. Therefore, the
National Security Council began to carry out clandestine operations previously done by the CIA.
Despite the Administration’s discovery of an apparent loophole, Hayes argues that the intent of
the amendments and the apparent change in NSC status are relevant and that “a court should find
the redistribution of funds though the NSC was prohibited by the amendments”. The first
Boland Amendment “restricts funds from being used for the overthrow of the government
of Nicaragua. Boland II extended this policy to limit all aid regardless of purpose. And
Boland IV, as a response to CIA mining of Nicaraguan Harbors further tightened
prohibitions on executive actions”. 13
It is clear from the Boland amendments that funding
and aid for the Contra rebels was becoming more difficult to obtain. Furthermore,
Congress’ intent to limit presidential action in Nicaragua regardless of venue is
demonstrated by the number and breadth of the provisions. Accordingly, Congress
intended the executive branch to limit its activities in Nicaragua; not to become more
covert in carrying out those activities.
Regardless, funding the Contra’s became so problematic that it strongly affected the
concerns of leaders involved. For example, Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane
Kirkpatrick expressed her frustration by demanding funds, “If we can’t get the money for
the anti-Sandinista, then we should make the maximum effort to find the money
elsewhere”.14
It is clear from the Ambassador’s statement that a lack funding will not be
tolerated by the administration. In other words, insufficient funds will not prevent the Reagan
13
Hayes, Andrew W. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 7 (Nov., 1988), pp. 1534-1574. Pg. 1572, 1573
14

Curry 11
Administration from carrying out traditional foreign policy. Moreover, Ambassador
Kirkpatrick is credited with her own doctrine, the Kirkpatrick doctrine. This doctrine
mimics the Truman doctrine and attempts to justify the support of Authoritarian regimes
over Totalitarian regimes in order to undermine communism. In other words, the
Kirkpatrick doctrine allowed the U.S. to support dictatorial governments that were not
communist in order to help contain the potential for a communist outbreak. The influences
of the Truman doctrine are reflected in her views and further suggest the degree to which
members in the Administration were influenced by traditional policy.
The Monroe and Truman doctrines influence even remained strong in the face of
potential illegality. Secretary of State George P. Schultz pointed out the possibility of
repercussions if the administration pursued certain alternative methods of funding. He
states that “[a] lawyer, Jim Baker (Chief of Staff to Reagan), said that if we go out and try
to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense”. The Administration was
aware of the potential for repercussions.
As a result, the Administration concocted a complex web of funding schemes to
continue aiding the anti-Sandinistas in a way it believed was legal. The complex nature of
the funding web is a direct result of the Administration’s attempt to maintain legality in the
face of mounting congressional opposition. Several venues of funding were pursued. The
administration eventually determined that third party funding was possible. Attorney
General Edwin Meese III relayed this sentiment, “it's important we tell the Department of
Justice that we want them to find the proper and legal basis which will permit the United

Curry 12
States to assist in obtaining third party resources for the anti-Sandinistas.”15
Meese’s
suggestion implies that the Administration intended to perpetuate aid to the Contras and
thus its adherence to the Monroe and Truman doctrines in legal fashion. However, when
third party donations no longer sufficed, the Administration sought illegal alternatives of
finance.
Accordingly, Lt. Colonel Oliver North offered proposals to obtain funding which would
allow the continuace of operations in Nicargau. The National Security Archives provides
documentation of these proposals and also relays that they were altered for Congressinal
hearings. The alteration of the document suggests that North viewed the content as potentially
incriminating. Regardless, North tells National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane that “The
plan attached at tab 1 has been developed, pursuant to our discussion Friday regarding fallback
options. It is premised on the assumption of a major congressional budget battle and an
assessment that the congress will not rescind the restrictions in section 8066 of the FY-85”.16
North explicitly states that the premise of his funding schemes is based on a lack of
congressional monetary support. Therefore, his construction of such schemes and the
Administrations acceptance of his schemes is related to their fear that insufficient funds
will cripple institutionalized American foreign policy. It is difficult to make sense out of the
following diagram by North, but his funding diagram is useful to visualize the extent to
which a lack of funding caused the administration to develop different techniques in order
to support institutionalized policy.
15
16
NSC, Memorandum from Oliver L. North to Robert C. McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance,"
TOP SECRET, March 16, 1985 National Security Archives

Curry 13
Figure 1. North’s funding web courtesy, of National Security Archives.
Allegations regarding the support of drug lords also occur in the affair. Particularly Such
allegations arise because of North’s meetings and arrangements with Panamanian Dictator
Manuel Noriega. Noriega used his position as Dictator of Panama to export vast quantities of
cocaine to America. In return for ending U.S. pressure on Panama for Noriega's drug smuggling
operations and helping to "clean up" his image, Noriega proposed to engage in efforts to
assassinate the Sandinista leadership. North’s personal diaries partially reflect this agreement.
North recounts, “tell Abrams that Noriega asked for [help] in cleaning up image”.17
The
compliance of the Administration in helping a known drug exporter should not necessarily be
viewed as acceptance. Therefore, conclusions cannot be drawn which infer that the aid
given to Noriega reflects any pro-narcotic aspect of the Administration. Rather, it is the
fact that Noriega agreed to assist in the fulfillment of policy or doctrine of the
Administration which attracts attention. In other words, the administration was so stringently tied
17
Document 9: NSC, Diaries, North Notebook Entries on Manuel Noriega, August 24 & September 22, 1986).
National Security Archives

Curry 14
to the Monroe and Truman doctrines that it overlooked Noriega’s negative activities.
Unfortunately, these aspects contributed to the scandal.
To further complicate the situation world events compelled the President to direct policy
in the Middle East as well as Latin America. The Lebanonese taking of American hostages in the
1980’s also played into the Iran/Contra Affair. It is the Administration’s actions in this aspect of
the affair which led to an alleged violation of the Arms Export Control Act. In document 13 of
the National Security Archives, president Reagan begins “[Description], The provision of
assistance by the central intelligence agency to private parties in their attempts to obtain the
release of Americans held hostage in the middle east. As part of these efforts certain foreign
material and munitions may be provided to the government of Iran which is taking steps to
facilitate the release of the American hostages”.18
It is the phrase certain munitions and materials
which became problematic to the Administration. Reagan’s directives are clear. The
administration provided the Iranians “certain foreign materials and munitions,” in return for their
help in retrieving American hostages. At first glance it appears as if the president’s directive and
the thesis of this paper are unrelated. However, the alleged violation of the Arms Export Control
Act of 1976 is one of several charges against the administration which lead to the Iranian aspect
of the affair. In other words, the Monroe and Truman doctrines were not responsible for the
president’s decision to exchange guns for hostages. However, the two events became connected
when profits from the arms sales were used for aiding the contra rebels. In this sense a brief
analysis was relevant.
18
Document 13: CIA, Draft Presidential Finding, "Scope: Hostage Rescue - Middle East," November 26,

Curry 15
Further evidence supporting the idea that the two affairs were originally separate is
provided by President Reagan himself. In Caspar Weinberger’s diary, dated December 7th
1985, he relays Reagan’s comments, “President sd. He could answer charges of illegality
but that he couldn’t answer charge that ‘Big Strong President Reagan passed up chance to
free hostages.”19
The President’s statement as recorded by Weinberger reflects the degree
to which the president did not intend to use funding from the sales of arms to fund the
Contras. Rather it suggests that the president really believed his directive was integral to
securing American lives.
Despite the Presidents intentions, North connected the events in Iran and
Nicaragua. North prepared a memorandum stating that profits from the Iranian arms
sales would be used to aid the Contra rebels in Nicaragua. He stated,
“The residual funds from [the Iranian Arms] transaction are allocated as follows: 12
million dollars will be used to purchase critically needed supplies for the Nicaraguan
Democratic Resistance Forces. This material is essential to cover shortage in resistance
inventories resulting from their current offensives and Sandinista counter attacks and to
“bridge” the period between now and when Congressionally approved lethal assistance (beyond
the $25 million in defensive arms) can be delivered” (North doc16).
Colonel North explicitly states that the residual profits from the arms sales will be used to fund
the contra rebels. This is contrary to the Presidents intentions and suggests that Reagan’s staff
operated independently in many cases. Furthermore, the passage reflects the fact that
congress is not providing enough funding. Congresses intentions are an expression of the
public’s discontent with the Administration’s policy in Nicaragua. Or more importantly,
that the Administration refused to compromise its loyalty to Monroe and Truman’s
doctrine for the public, Congress, or budgets. North clearly expressed his support for the
19
Document 14: Diary, Caspar W. Weinberger, December 7, 1985. National Security Archives

Curry 16
doctrines by allocating money to the democratic forces to be used for containment against
the Sandinista or communist backed forces.
If Monroe did not advocate intervention in the western hemisphere to protect the
interests of the U.S. or if Truman had not encouraged support of democratic governments
and containment of communism, the Iran/Contra Affair would not have occurred. No
precedent would have existed to guide Reagan’s’ Administration in the direction that it
actually took. In other words, the Administration might have heeded the Public’s and
Congressional demands. It would not have overlooked the dismay of its government
counterparts or its employers by ignoring the intentions of the restrictions placed on
executive action through the Boland Amendments. However, this was not the case. Monroe
and Truman developed doctrines which last to this day and are still highly influential. The
influence of these doctrines on Reagan’s Administration was no exception. As a result of
these strong influences, the Administration refused to compromise its initiatives in
Nicaragua. The result was the Iran/Contra Affair.

Curry 17
Appendix
Section 901 of the National Security Act of 1947 states, “the President may stay the imposition
of an economic, cultural, diplomatic, or other sanction or related action by the United States Government concerning
a foreign country, organization, or person when the President determines and reports to Congress in accordance with
section 903 that to proceed without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an ongoing criminal investigation
directly related to the activities giving rise to the sanction or an intelligence source or method directly related to the
activities giving rise to the sanction” (TITLE IX—APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, STAY OF SANCTIONS).
EXTENSION OF STAY
SEC. 902. ø50 U.S.C. 441a Whenever the President determines and reports to Congress in accordance with section
903 that a stay of sanctions or related actions pursuant to section 901 has not afforded sufficient time to obviate the
risk to an ongoing criminal investigation or to an intelligence source or method that gave rise to the stay, he may
extend such stay for a period of time specified by the President, which period may not exceed 120 days. The
authority of this section may be used to extend the period of a stay pursuant to section 901 for successive periods of
not more than 120days each. (TITLE IX—APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, STAY OF SANCTIONS).

Curry 18
Bibliography
Coffey, John W. The Review of Politics, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Apr., 1985), pp. 231-252 Published by: Cambridge
University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of Politics The
Statesmanship of Harry S Truman
http:Avalon.law.yale.edu/20th
_century/trudoc.asp
Hayes, Andrew W. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 7 (Nov., 1988), pp. 1534-1574 Published by: Columbia
Law Review Association, Inc. The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference
Walsh, Lawrence E. Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Vol. 1. n.d. United States
Court of Appeals for the district of Colombia Circuit.
Wroe, Ann. Lives, Lies, and the Iran Contra Affair. London: I.B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 1992.
National Security Act of 1947
Arms Export Control Act of 1976
http://www.knowledgerush.com/kr/encyclopedia/Kirkpatrick_Doctrine/
Ryan, David. 1995. US Sandinista Diplomatic Relations. London: MacMillan Press Ltd
Document 1: White House, Presidential Finding on Covert Operations in Nicaragua (with attached Scope
Note), SECRET, September 19, 1983. National Security Archives
Document 3: CIA, Memorandum from DDI Robert M. Gates to DCI William J. Casey, "Nicaragua,"
SECRET, December 14, 1984. National Security Archives
NSC, Memorandum from Oliver L. North to Robert C. McFarlane, "Fallback Plan for the Nicaraguan Resistance,"
TOP SECRET, March 16, 1985 National Security Archives
Document 9: NSC, Diaries, North Notebook Entries on Manuel Noriega, August 24 & September 22, 1986).
Document 13: CIA, Draft Presidential Finding, "Scope: Hostage Rescue - Middle East," November 26, 1985.
Document 14: Diary, Caspar W. Weinberger, December 7, 1985. National Security Archives

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